Shri Gurudatta Sugars Marketing Pvt. Ltd. v. Prithviraj Sayajirao Deshmukh & Ors.
- Citation
- 2024 INSC 551; [2024] 7 S.C.R. 1211
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Vikram Nath, Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra
- Decided
- 24 Jul 2024
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 3070/2024
- Sections
- 143, 7, 138, 141, 258, 14, 421, 143A
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:22 am. Original source ↗
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[2024] 7 S.C.R. 1211 : 2024 INSC 551 Shri Gurudatta Sugars Marketing Pvt. Ltd.
v.
Prithviraj Sayajirao Deshmukh & Ors.
(Criminal Appeal Nos. 3070-3071 of 2024)
24 July 2024 [Vikram Nath* and Prashant Kumar Mishra, JJ.] Issue for Consideration Whether the signatory of the cheque, authorized by the “Company”, is the “drawer” and whether such signatory could be directed to pay interim compensation in terms of section 143-A of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 leaving aside the company. The High Court answered the question in the negative.
Headnotes† Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – ss.138, 141, 143-A – Appellant company entered into several agreements with C Ltd. and made advance payments for supply of sugar – C failed to supply – In order to discharge the liability, two cheques were issued by respondent nos.1 to 3 (directors of C) in favour of the appellant and the same were dishonoured due to insufficiency of funds – Appellant issued notice – Again payments were not made – Appellant preferred a complaint before the Judicial Magistrate – In the meantime, C was admitted into CIRP – Appellant filed an application u/s. 143-A, NI Act against respondent Nos. 1 to 3 seeking interim compensation – Judicial Magistrate directed each of the respondents to pay 4% of the total cheque amount as interim compensation – The said order was challenged by the respondent nos.1 to 3 before the High Court – The High Court allowed the application preferred by the respondent Nos. 1 to 3 herein and set aside the order of interim compensation passed by the Judicial Magistrate – Correctness:
Held: The High Court’s interpretation of Section 7 of the NI Act accurately identified the “drawer” as the individual who issues the cheque – This interpretation is fundamental to understanding the obligations and liabilities u/s. 138 of the NI Act, which makes it * Author 1212 [2024] 7 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports clear that the drawer must ensure sufficient funds in their account at the time the cheque is presented – The appellants’ argument that directors or other individuals should also be liable u/s. 143-A misinterprets the statutory language and intent – The general rule against vicarious liability in criminal law underscores that individuals are not typically held criminally liable for acts committed by others unless specific statutory provisions extend such liability – Section 141 of the NI Act is one such provision, extending liability to the company’s officers for the dishonour of a cheque – The appellants’ attempt to extend this principle to Section 143-A, to hold directors or other individuals personally liable for interim compensation, is unfounded – The High Court rightly emphasized that liability u/s. 141 arises from the conduct or omission of the individual involved, not merely their position within the company – The distinction between legal entities and individuals acting as authorized signatories is crucial – Authorized signatories act on behalf of the company but do not assume the company’s legal identity – This principle, fundamental to corporate law, ensures that while authorized signatories can bind the company through their actions, they do not merge their legal status with that of the company – This distinction supports the High Court’s interpretation that the drawer u/s. 143-A refers specifically to the issuer of the cheque, not the authorized signatories – The High Court’s decision to interpret ‘drawer’ strictly as the issuer of the cheque, excluding authorized signatories, is well-founded – This interpretation aligns with the legislative intent, established legal precedents, and principles of statutory interpretation – The primary liability for an offence u/s. 138 lies with the company, and the company’s management is vicariously liable only under specific conditions provided in Section 141 – The appellants’ submissions are thus rejected, and the High Court’s judgment is upheld – Thus, the question of law put before this Court is answered in negative. [Paras 28, 29, 30, 35] Case Law Cited Aneeta Hada v. Godfather Travels and Tours Pvt. Ltd. [2012] 5 SCR 503 : (2012) 5 SCC 661 – held inapplicable.
Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor, AIR 1936 Privy Council 253; Central Bank of India v. Ravindra [2001] Supp. 4 SCR 323 : (2002) 1 SCC 367; Noor Mohammed v. Khurram Pasha [2022] 6 SCR 860 : (2022) 9 SCC 23; N. Harihara Krishnan v. J. Thomas [2024] 7 S.C.R. 1213Shri Gurudatta Sugars Marketing Pvt. Ltd. v. Prithviraj Sayajirao Deshmukh & Ors.
[2017] 9 SCR 324 : (2018) 13 SCC 663; K.K. Ahuja v. V.K. Vohra [2009] 9 SCR 1144 : (2009) 10 SCC 48 – referred to.
List of Acts Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.
List of Keywords Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Section 141 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Section 143-A of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Signatory of cheque; Dishonour of cheque due to insufficiency of funds; Interim compensation; Vicarious liability in criminal law; Distinction between legal entities and individuals acting as authorized signatories; Authorized signatories of company; Interpretation of ‘drawer’; Primary liability u/s.138 lies with company. Case Arising From CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal Nos. 3070- 3071 of 2024 From the Judgment and Order dated 08.03.2023 and 29.03.2023 of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in CRLA No. 967 of 2022 Appearances for Parties D.P. Singh, Manu Mishra, Ms. Shreya Dutt, Iman Khera, Ms. Sonam Gupta, Advs. for the Appellant.
Siddharth Dave, Sr. Adv., Ramchandra Madan, Ms. Tanisha Kaushal, Aaditya Aniruddha Pande, Siddharth Dharmadhikari, Bharat Bagla, Sourav Singh, Aditya Krishna, Ms. Preet S. Phanse, Adarsh Dubey, Advs. for the Respondents.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment Vikram Nath, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The present Appeals are filed challenging the judgments and orders passed by the Bombay High Court, dated 08.03.2023 and 29.03.2023 in CRLA 967/2022, whereby the High Court allowed the Criminal Application filed by the present respondents thereby setting aside 1214 [2024] 7 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports the order of the Judicial Magistrate directing the interim payment under Section 143-A, Negotiable Instruments Act, 18811 to be paid by the respondents – directors of the company on whose account the dishonoured cheque was drawn.
3. Appellant company entered into several Agreements and Sale Orders with one Cane Agro Energy (India) Ltd. (Cane hereinafter) between September 2016 and June 2017. Under these Agreements and Sale Orders, the appellant made advance payments amounting to Rs.63,46,00,000/- (Rupees sixty three crores forty six lakhs) for supply of sugar by Cane. It is alleged by the appellant that Cane failed to supply the ordered quantities of sugar and also failed to discharge its other obligations as agreed upon. Cane agreed to refund the advance amount due and payable to the Appellant. In part discharge of liability, a sum of Rs.1,00,00,000/- (Rupees one crore) was refunded by Cane on 30.01.2018.
4. Subsequently, respondent Nos. 1 to 3 issued two cheques dated 30.03.2020 in favour of the appellant, one for Rs.45,00,00,000/- (Rupees forty five crores) and one for Rs.6,64,41,300/- (Rupees six crores sixty four lakhs forty one thousand and three hundred), amounting to a total amount of Rs.51,64,41,300/- (Rupees fifty one crores sixty four lakhs forty one thousand and three hundred). These two cheques were signed by respondent No.1, who is the Chairman of Cane.
5. The said cheques were presented to the Bank but were dishonoured due to insufficiency of funds, vide return memos dated 02.06.2020. Appellant issued notice date 18.06.2020 to respondent Nos. 1 to 3 against the dishonour of cheques demanding payment of dues. A notice was duly served on 30.06.2020. When the payments due were not made, the appellant preferred a complaint before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Kolhapur, which was registered as Summary Criminal Case No.2967 of 2020. On 11.08.2020, the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Kolhapur issued process against respondent Nos. 1 to 3. In the meantime, Cane was admitted into Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process by order of National Company Law Tribunal, Mumbai.
1 In short, “NI Act”
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 1215Shri Gurudatta Sugars Marketing Pvt. Ltd. v. Prithviraj Sayajirao Deshmukh & Ors.
6. Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 entered appearance before the Judicial Magistrate and subsequently preferred an application under Section 258, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1860,2 seeking stoppage of proceedings in terms of the moratorium running against Cane. On 20.05.2021 an order imposing moratorium against Cane was passed under Section 14, Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. 3 Respondent Nos. 1 to 3, along with Cane, preferred another application under Section 258, CrPC seeking stoppage of proceedings before the Judicial Magistrate.
7. The Judicial Magistrate partly allowed the above application and held that the complaint shall not proceed against Cane in view of Section 14, IBC till the order of moratorium is operative; but the complaint was ordered to proceed ordinarily against respondent Nos.1 to 3 herein. The Judicial Magistrate observed that as per the scheme of Section 14, IBC the proceedings for offences punishable under Section 138, NI Act is withheld by order of moratorium only for corporate debtors and not against other natural persons arrayed as respondents in representative capacity for the accused company.
8. Appellant filed an application under Section 143-A, NI Act against respondent Nos. 1 to 3 seeking interim compensation from the respondents during the pendency of the criminal proceedings before the Judicial Magistrate. Vide order dated 27.04.2022, the Judicial Magistrate directed each of the respondents to pay 4% of the total cheque amount as interim compensation to the appellant within 60 days. The respondents were granted an extension till 26.07.2022 to pay the interim compensation upon an application made by them.
9. Appellant preferred an application under Section 421, CrPC read with Section 143-A(5), NI Act seeking execution of order dated 27.04.2022 and thus recovery of interim compensation as if it were a fine. The respondents filed their response to the application, the same is pending before the Judicial Magistrate.
10. Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 preferred Criminal Application No. 967 of 2022 before the High Court challenging the order of interim compensation dated 27.04.2022 passed by the Judicial Magistrate. The High Court, 2 CrPC
3 IBC
1216 [2024] 7 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports vide interim order dated 23.09.2022, stayed the operation of the order impugned therein.
11. During the pendency of the above application, the High Court, in a batch of Writ Petitions and Criminal Application dealing with the same issue and the question of law that whether the signatory of the cheque, authorized by the “Company”, is the “drawer” and whether such signatory could be directed to pay interim compensation in terms of section 143A, NI Act leaving aside the company, vide its final judgment and order dated 08.03.2023 held that the signatory of the cheque is not a ‘drawer’ in terms of Section 143-A, NI Act and cannot be directed to pay interim compensation under Section 143A.
12. In light of the above judgment and order of the co-ordinate bench in Criminal Application No. 886 of 2022, the High Court vide order dated 29.03.2023, allowed the application preferred by the respondent Nos. 1 to 3 herein and set aside the order of interim compensation passed by the Judicial Magistrate on 27.04.2022.
13. The appellant has challenged the judgment and order of the High Court dated 29.03.2023 as well as the relied upon judgment and order dated 08.03.2023. The present Appeal is filed assailing the correctness of these orders vis-à-vis the larger question of law, as framed by the High Court:
“Whether the signatory of the cheque, authorized by the “Company”, is the “drawer” and whether such signatory could be directed to pay interim compensation in terms of section 143A of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 leaving aside the company?”
14. The High Court, in its judgment dated 08.03.2023 in Criminal Application No.886 of 2022, answered the above question in the negative and upheld the same in its order dated 29.03.2023 in the case of the appellant before us. To answer the question of law and determine the correctness of its view it is imperative to look into the considerations before the High Court and its analysis.
OBSERVATIONS MADE BY THE HIGH COURT
15. The High Court, while answering the above question in the negative, made several observations based on the interpretation of the relevant statutes under the NI Act as well as on the judgments relied upon by the counsels in their arguments before the High Court. [2024] 7 S.C.R. 1217Shri Gurudatta Sugars Marketing Pvt. Ltd. v. Prithviraj Sayajirao Deshmukh & Ors.
15.1. Obligation of the Drawer of the Cheque The High Court observed that under Section 7 of the NI Act, the maker of a bill of exchange or cheque is termed the “drawer,” and the person directed to pay is called the “drawee.” The drawer is the individual who issues the cheque. Sections 138, 143A, and 148 of the NI Act fall under Chapter XVII, which pertains to penalties for the dishonour of certain cheques due to insufficient funds. A plain reading of Section 138 highlights that the drawer must have an account with sufficient funds to cover the cheque. The primary liability under Section 138 is on the drawer, who must ensure that there are adequate funds in the account at the time the cheque is presented. Additionally, the offence under Section 138 is not complete until a demand notice is served on the drawer, emphasizing the drawer’s responsibility. The drawer is considered the principal offender if the cheque is returned unpaid, subject to the fulfilment of the necessary conditions before and after the cheque is dishonoured.
15.2. General Rule of Criminal Liability The High Court noted the general rule against vicarious liability in criminal cases, where individuals are typically not held criminally liable for acts committed by others. However, this principle is subject to exceptions created by specific statutory provisions extending liability to additional parties. Section 141, NI Act is one such provision that extends criminal liability for dishonour of a cheque committed by a company to its officers. The Court emphasized that liability under Section 141 arises from the conduct, act, or omission of the person involved, not merely their position in the company. The provision establishes vicarious liability for officers of the company, such as signatories of the cheque, managing directors, or those in charge of its affairs, by legal fiction. Thus, while the drawer of the cheque remains primarily liable, Section 141 broadens liability to include others associated with the company’s management, ensuring accountability beyond the drawer alone.
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