K.P. Khemka & Anr. v. Haryana State Industrial and Infrastructure Development Corporation Limited & Ors.
- Citation
- 2024 INSC 396; [2024] 6 S.C.R. 234
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Surya Kant, Justice K.V. Viswanathan
- Decided
- 8 May 2024
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 6144/2024
- Sections
- 32, 2, 3, 29, 3(1), 32G, 71, 69(2), 186, 70, 70(3), 7
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:22 am. Original source ↗
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* Author [2024] 6 S.C.R. 234 : 2024 INSC 396 K.P. Khemka & Anr.
v.
Haryana State Industrial and Infrastructure Development Corporation Limited & Ors.
(Civil Appeal No. 6144 of 2024)
08 May 2024 [Surya Kant and K.V. Viswanathan,* JJ.] Issue for Consideration By the impugned judgment, the High Court dismissed the writ petitions and rejected the contention of the appellants herein that if a debt is time-barred under the Limitation Act, 1963, the same cannot be recovered by resorting to the Haryana Public Moneys (Recovery of Dues) Act, 1979 read with the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951.
Headnotes Haryana Public Moneys (Recovery of Dues) Act, 1979 – State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 – Limitation Act, 1963 – The appellants herein had relied upon the judgment of a three- Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in State of Kerala and Others vs. V.R. Kalliyanikutty & Anr. to contend that a timebarred debt under the Limitation Act cannot be recovered under the Recovery of Dues Act – Respondent contended that the impugned order of the High Court was perfectly justified in holding that the decision of this Court in V.R. Kalliyanikutty has not considered the holding in Bombay Dyeing and Tilokchand Motichand:
Held: The Division Bench in the impugned order do not directly address the holding in V.R. Kalliyanikutty that the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act did not create any additional right to recover and enforce the outstanding amounts due – The real question that arises is do the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951 and the Recovery of Dues Act create a distinct right and provided an alternative mechanism of enforcement to recover the amount due, even if the amounts due were time barred – While the process of filing a civil suit may be barred because of the statute of limitation, the power to recover vested through Section 32-G [2024] 6 S.C.R. 235K.P. Khemka & Anr. v. Haryana State Industrial and Infrastructure Development Corporation Limited & Ors.
of the State Financial Corporations Act read with Section 2(c) and Section 3 of the Recovery of Dues Act is a distinct power which continues notwithstanding that another mode of recovery through a civil suit is barred – Understood in that sense, it does appear that there is an additional right to enforce the claims of the financial corporations notwithstanding the bar of limitation – Also, in a three-judge Bench decision of the Supreme Court in K.C. Ninan v. Kerala State Electricity Board, 2023 INSC 560, the Court noticed the decision in V.R. Kalliyanikutty and concluded that statute of limitation only barred a remedy, while the right to recover the loan through ‘any other suitable manner provided’ remains untouched – For a comprehensive consideration and an authoritative pronouncement after taking into account all aspects, the matter needs to be placed before the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India to constitute an appropriate three-judge Bench. [Paras 13, 14, 18, 31, 32] Case Law Cited State of Kerala and Others v. V.R. Kalliyanikutty & Anr. [1999] 2 SCR 372 : (1999) 3 SCC 657; Bombay Dyeing and Manufacturing Company Limited v. The State of Bombay and Ors. [1958] 1 SCR 1122; Tilokchand and Motichand and Others v. H.B. Munshi and Another [1969] 2 SCR 824 : (1969) 1 SCC 110; Khadi Gram Udyog Trust v. Ram Chandraji Virajman Mandir, Sarasiya Ghat, Kanpur [1978] 2 SCR 249 : (1978) 1 SCC 44; Director of Industries, U.P. v. Deep Chand Agarwal [1980] 2 SCR 1015 : (1980) 2 SCC 332; New Delhi Municipal Committee v. Kalu Ram [1976] Supp.
1 SCR 87 : (1976) 3 SCC 407; K.C. Ninan v. Kerala State Electricity Board [2023] 9 SCR 637 : 2023 INSC 560 – referred to.
Hansraj Gupta v. Dehra Dun-Mussorie Electric Tramway Co. Ltd., AIR 1933 PC 63 – referred to.
Sri Narain v. Liquidator, Union Bank of India, ILR 4 Lah. 109 – referred to.
Books and Periodicals Cited Salmond on Jurisprudence, 12th Edition, on concepts of “Right” and “Power” [Page 224, 229 & 230] 236 [2024] 6 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports List of Acts Haryana Public Moneys (Recovery of Dues) Act, 1979; State Financial Corporation Act, 1951; Limitation Act, 1963. List of Keywords Debt; Time-barred debt; Remedy; Time-barred debt under Limitation Act, 1963; Recovery of dues under Haryana Public Moneys (Recovery of Dues) Act, 1979; Limitation Act bars remedy; Limitation Act does not extinguish debt; Recovery of loan; Right to recover; Recovery proceedings; Alternative mechanism of enforcement to recover the amount due; Additional rights to enforce claims. Case Arising From CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 6144 of 2024 From the Judgment and Order dated 24.04.2015 of the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in CWP No. 15983 of 2013 With Civil Appeal No. 6145 of 2024 Appearances for Parties Rakesh Kumar, Saurabh Mishra, Ms. Preeti Kashyap, Varun Pandit, Shrimay Mishra, Abhimanyu Tewari, Ms. Eliza Bar, Siddhant Saroha, Sidhant Awasthy, Manav Bhalla, Praveer Singh, Advs. for the Appellants.
Lokesh Sinhal, Sr. A.A.G. Akshay Amritanshu, Nikunj Gupta, Ms. Himanshi Shakya, Samyak Jain, Karunakar Mahalik, Manish K. Bishnoi, Rajat Navet, Kushagra Pandit, D. S. Mahra, Advs. for the Respondents.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Order K.V. Viswanathan, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The present appeals arise from the judgment of a Division Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh dated 24.04.2015 in CWP No. 15983 of 2013 and CWP No. 26452 of 2014. By the said [2024] 6 S.C.R. 237K.P. Khemka & Anr. v. Haryana State Industrial and Infrastructure Development Corporation Limited & Ors.
judgment, the High Court dismissed the writ petitions and rejected the contention of the appellants herein that if a debt is time-barred under the Limitation Act, 1963, the same cannot be recovered by resorting to the Haryana Public Moneys (Recovery of Dues) Act, 1979 (for short “the Recovery of Dues Act”) read with the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951. In so holding, the Division Bench applied the well established principle that the Limitation Act, which applies to Courts, merely bars the remedy and does not extinguish the debt.
3. The appellants herein had relied upon the judgment of a three- Judge Bench of this Court in State of Kerala and Others vs. V.R. Kalliyanikutty & Anr. (1999) 3 SCC 657 to contend that a timebarred debt under the Limitation Act cannot be recovered under the Recovery of Dues Act. While dealing with this contention, the High Court relied upon the judgment of a Constitution Bench of this Court in Bombay Dyeing and Manufacturing Company Limited vs. The State of Bombay and Ors., 1958 SCR 1122 to reiterate the principle that the Limitation Act merely bars the remedy and does not extinguish the debt. The High Court also distinguished the judgment in V.R. Kalliyanikutty (supra) by holding that the judgments of this Court in Bombay Dyeing and Manufacturing Company Limited (supra) and Tilokchand and Motichand and Others vs. H.B. Munshi and Another, (1969) 1 SCC 110 were not brought to the notice of the Bench deciding V.R. Kalliyanikutty (supra).
4. Facts in Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 14213 of 2015 are as follows:
i. Respondent No.3 - M/s Khemka Ispat Limited was a Company engaged in the business of manufacture, production, import, export, sale and distribution of all types of Cold Rolled Strips, steel sockets, pipe and tube products, and other allied goods. ii. On 07.03.2003, Respondent No.3 had taken a Term Loan under an Equipment Finance Scheme from Respondent No.1 - Haryana State Industrial and Infrastructure Development Corporation Limited (hereinafter referred to as “the HSIDC Ltd.”) for a sum of Rs.105.90 lakhs. In view of the said Term Loan, Respondent No.3 had entered into a Loan Agreement with HSIDC Ltd. along with the personal guarantees of the appellants herein.
238 [2024] 6 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports iii. On 31.03.2003, the sanctioned loan amount to the tune of Rs.105 lakhs was disbursed to Respondent No.3. On 15.07.2003, further amount of Rs. 2 lakhs was disbursed. The Loan was to be repaid in five years with a moratorium period of six months w.e.f. 01.10.2003.
iv. On 19.08.2004, the First Default Notice was issued to Respondent No.3 by HSIDC Ltd. along with intimation of a right under Section 29 of the State Financial Corporations Act. v. In the meantime, Respondent No.3 became a Sick Company and reference was made to the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (for short “the BIFR”). On 31.07.2006, the outstanding as on date to HSIDC Ltd. was Rs.99.32 lakhs. vi. On 17.08.2006, BIFR declined Respondent No.3’s Reference and the One-Time Settlement request. ING Vysya Bank also informed the BIFR that it had taken over possession of the unit, in accordance with which the BIFR ordered the reference to have abated. Respondent No. 3 informed the said ING Vysya Bank that the latter will not be responsible for the dues of the HSIDC Ltd, and that the machinery is in possesison of the Company. On 01.06.2007, HSIDC Ltd. took possession of the movables. vii. While proceedings were carrying on against the principal borrower, on 08.08.2007, Respondent No.1 HSIDC Ltd. issued a show cause notice under Section 3(1)(b) of the Recovery of Dues Act to Respondent No.3, which notice was returned back with the remarks “closed/left”.
viii. On 25.09.2007, a winding up petition was filed by one of the creditors of Respondent No.3 in C.P. NO. 171 of 2007 before the High Court of Delhi, wherein a provisional order to windup was passed and a provisional liquidator appointed. Further, Final Order of winding up of Respondent No.3 appears to have been passed on 24.03.2009.
ix. When the matter stood thus, on 29.10.2009, Respondent No.1 issued a show cause notice under Section 3(1)(b) of the Recovery of Dues Act to the Appellants and the same was returned with the remarks “left/closed”.
x. Thereafter, on 10.01.2012, recovery notice sent to the appellants by Respondent No.2, the Additional General Manager of HSIDC [2024] 6 S.C.R. 239K.P. K h e m k a & A n r . v. H a r y a n a State Industrial a n d Infrastructure D e velopment Corporation L imited & O r s .
Ltd., under Section 3(1)(b) of the Recovery of Dues Act was returned with the remarks “left/closed”. The order determining the amount due as Rs. 213.19 lakhs w.e.f 10.01.2012 was passed by the HSIDC Ltd.
xi. On 02.02.2012, the HSIDC Ltd. sent a notice under the provisions of the Recovery of Dues Act to the Appellants and the Respondent No. 3 indicating the sum determined to be due from them, which was to the tune of Rs.213.19 lakhs. On 01.03.2012, the appellants filed their reply. This was rejected by the Respondent No. 2, Additional General Manager of HSIDC Ltd., on 15.11.2012. Thereafter, the Respondent No. 2, Additional General Manager of HSIDC Ltd., issued a Final Notice under the provisions of the Recovery of Dues Act dated 15.11.2012 calling upon the appellants to pay Rs. 213.19 lakhs which was determined to be due from the Appellants and Respondent No. 3. xii. On 11.01.2013, recovery certificate under Section 3(1) of the Recovery of Dues Act for a sum of Rs. 243.11 lakhs, was issued. xiii. On 12.07.2013, appellants filed CWP No. 15983 of 2013 challenging the recovery notice. The relevant ground was raised in the following terms:
“G. BECAUSE the Impugned Orders deserve to be quashed as the recovery which has been initiated by first sending the notice on 10.01.2012 under the provisions of Haryana Public Moneys (Recovery of Dues) Act, 1979 is much beyond the limitation to recover any dues by the Corporation. The period of limitation if any was 3 years from 31.07.2004, when the amount stood and payable by Respondent No. 3 Company (in Liqn.). The period to recovery from either the Company or the Guarantors who stood surety for the said amount expired in the year 2007. The recovery as per the notices sent by the Respondent Corporation admittedly have been sent on 10.01.2012 and subsequent thereto and therefore any adjudication or determination of a sum due in view of the above said Act is unsustainable and is in any case time barred”
xiv. The Writ Petition was dismissed vide the impunged order. 240 [2024] 6 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports
5. The facts in Civil Appeal arising out of Special Leave Petition (C) No. 23041 of 2015 are as under:
i. The Haryana Financial Corporation sanctioned a term loan of Rs.88,74,000/- to Respondent No.5 - Cosmo Flex Private Limited on 31.01.1996. The loan was to be repaid within a period of eight weeks by way of quarterly instalments and the agreed rate of interest was 19.5% with half yearly rests. On 17.03.1997, the loan agreement was executed.
ii. The appellant, who was a Director of the R-5 Company, claims that he resigned from the Directorship of the Respondent No. 5 Company on 06.04.1998.
iii. On 29.07.1998, the loan was recalled by the Haryana Financial Corporation.
iv. In the meantime, the appellant claims that on account of his resignation from Directorship of the Respondent No. 5 company, he was paid a full and final settlement from the Company on 23.10.1998. Thereafter, he claims that the Registrar of Companies was also intimated about the fact of his resignation, on 12.10.1998.
v. The Haryana Financial Corporation, on 19.08.1999, sent a notice for taking over possession of the Company’s assets and thereafter took possession on 31.08.1999.
vi. The Haryana Financial Corporation has set-out the time-line of events where multiple recovery notices under the Recovery of Dues Act were issued, leading up to the determination of the sum due from the Appellants herein, in the following terms: “4. ...On continous non-repayment of dues, the possession of the mortgaged properties was taken over under section 29 of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951. The primary security was disposed of by the Corporation for Rs. 61.00 lakh on 16.12.1999. The Recovery Certificate was issued on 22.09.2000 to the Collectors Gurgaon, Delhi & Srinagar and were returned in the year 2001 on the ground that no immovable/movable properties were available in the names of directors/guarantors and [2024] 6 S.C.R. 241K.P. Khemka & Anr. v. Haryana State Industrial and Infrastructure Development Corporation Limited & Ors.
they were not residing at the given addresses. The fresh Recovery Certificate was issued on 10.08.2005 u/s 3 of Haryana Public Moneys (Recovery of Dues)
Act, 1979 in the name of Collectors, Sri Nagar, Delhi & Gurgaon through Collector, Gurgaon. The Recovery Certificate pertaining to Collectors, Sri Nagar & Delhi were returned by Collector, Gurgaon to send the same directly to the concerned Collectors as there was no provisions to send the same by one Collector to another Collector. After obtaining legal opinion as per which, it was advised that as per Section 3 of the Revenue Recovery Act, the Collector may send a certificate to other Collector, Recovery Certificates were returned to Collector, Gurgaon. However, Recovery Certificate in the name of Collector Gurgaon was being pursued. As Recovery Certificate with Collector Delhi was not traceable in his office, photocopy of the Recovery Certificate was re-lodged with Collector Delhi on 16.04.2008. It was informed by Collector Delhi that the Recovery Certificate lodged with them was not in their jurisdiction and as such recovery cannot be effected. Further, the directors residing at Gurgaon & Delhi had shifted to some unknown places. However, as the new addresses of one of the Directors Sh. Charanjeet Gaba were found out, fresh RCs were issued to Collectors Delhi (Central, East, South & West), Gurgaon & Sri Nagar (Kashmir) on 19.04.2010 u/s 32G of the State Financial Corporations Act. However, the Recovery Certificate dated 19.04.2010 was quashed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana vide order dated 02.12.2011 passed in CWP No. 12226 of 2010 on the ground that the same was issued without affording the Petitioners an opportunity of personal hearing.
The Corporation was given liberty to proceed after hearing the petitioner and giving him opportunity to file his objections.
xxx xxx xxx 242 [2024] 6 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports
7. Accordingly, personal hearings were given to defaulting borrowers/guarantors for sum determination under Section 32-G of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951 on 11.12.2013, 19.03.2014 and 06.08.2014, objection raised by Sh. Charanjeet Gaba, borrower/ guarantor verbally during the personal hearing as well as through various representations were dealt in detail in the proceeding of personal hearing held on 06.08.2014. However, as no constructive proposal for repayment/settlement under the new Settlement Policies of HFC-2011 was recived from Sh. Charanjeet Gaba or other borrowers/guarantors, Recovery Certificate was issued to Collectors, Srinagar, Solan (HP), Gurgaon & Delhi on 08.10.2014 for the recovery of Rs. 14,55,11,275/- with further interest @24% from 01.03.2014, the same stand challenged by the petitioner before the Hon’ble High Court as stated above.”
(emphasis supplied)
vii. The appellant challenged the proceedings dated 06.08.2014 by filing CWP No. 26452 of 2014. By the Impugned Order, the Writ Petition was dismissed.
viii. In the Special Leave Petition filed before this Court, the case of the Appellant as regards the debt being time-barred is as follows: “A. Because the order/proceedings dated 06.08.2014 passed by Respondent No. 3 under Section 32 (G)
of the State Financial Corporation Act for recovery of Rs. 14,55,11,275/- along with pendente lite and future interest could not have been issued as the recovery had already become time barred against the petitioner. Since the recovery on the basis of mortgaged property had already been effected by way of sale dated 16.12.1999 the remaining amount could not be recovered beyond the limited time of three years”
Contentions of the Parties
6. Before us, learned counsel for the appellants contend that the judgment in V.R. Kalliyanikutty (supra) directly covers the issue [2024] 6 S.C.R. 243K.P. K h e m k a & A n r . v. H a r y a n a State Industrial a n d Infrastructure D e velopment Corporation L imited & O r s .
as according to them, in substance, there is no difference between the provisions of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, with which V.R. Kalliyanikutty (supra) was concerned, and the Recovery of Dues Act of the State of Haryana. According to the learned counsel, V.R. Kalliyanikutty (supra) has clearly held that Acts, like the Recovery of Dues Act, are intended for speedy recovery of loans and do not create a new right in the creditor. It is their contention that on that reasoning the word “due” in the Recovery of Dues Act cannot be interpreted to include time-barred debts.
7. Learned counsel for the respondent-Corporations strongly refuted these contentions and contended that the impugned order was perfectly justified in holding that the decision of this Court in V.R. Kalliyanikutty (supra) has not considered the holding in Bombay Dyeing (supra) and Tilokchand Motichand (supra).
Questions that arise for this Court’s consideration
8. The questions that fall for consideration are, firstly, are the appellants right in contending that the recovery proceedings initiated against them under the Recovery of Dues Act are barred in view of the principle laid down in V.R.Kalliyanikutty (supra). Secondly, if they are right, then is the decision in V.R. Kalliyainkutty (supra) contrary to the holding in Bombay Dyeing and Manufacturing Company Limited (supra) and if so what is the course open for this two-Judge Bench. Reasoning in V.R. Kalliyanikutty (supra)
9. To appreciate these contentions, we need to first understand the law laid down in V.R. Kalliyanikutty (supra). The primary question of law involved in V.R. Kalliyanikutty (supra) was, whether a debt which is barred by the law of limitation can be recovered by resorting to recovery proceedings under the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. This apart, the Bench, after setting out the scheme of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, examined the further question as to whether the object of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act was only for speedy recovery or if the said Act also enlarged the right to recover. Additionaly, the Bench addressed the question as to whether the words “amount due” would refer to the amounts repayable under the terms of the Loan Agreement executed between the debtor and the creditor irrespective of whether the claim was time-barred or whether the words refer to only those claims which are legally recoverable. 244 [2024] 6 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports
10. Relying upon Hansraj Gupta vs. Dehra Dun-Mussorie Electric Tramway Co. Ltd., AIR 1933 PC 63, the Bench in Kalliyanikutty (supra) held that the Kerala Recovery Act did not create any new right and that it merely provided a process for speedy recovery. In view of the same, it held that since the Act did not create any right, the person claiming recovery cannot claim recovery of amounts which are not legally recoverable. The Bench thereafter distinguished the judgment in Khadi Gram Udyog Trust v. Ram Chandraji Virajman Mandir, Sarasiya Ghat, Kanpur, (1978) 1 SCC 44 as having no applicability to the interpretation of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act. It further relied on the judgment of this Court in Director of Industries, U.P. vs. Deep Chand Agarwal (1980) 2 SCC 332 to reinforce its holding on the interpretation of the word ‘due’ under the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act. The plea that the statute of limitation merely bars the remedy and does not touch upon the right was not accepted by the Court by holding that the rights of the parties are not enlarged by the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act and that unless the Act expressly provided for enlargement of claims extending to the recovery of barred debts, that principle will not apply. Ultimately, the Court held that under the provisions of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act a debt which is barred by the law of limitation cannot be recovered.
11. The Division Bench, in the impugned order, has relied on Bombay Dyeing (supra) to reinforce the point that the statute of limitation only bars the remedy and does not extinguish the debt. The decision in Bombay Dyeing (supra) was a case where the Constitution Bench of this Court reiterarted the principle that statutes of limitation only bar the remedy and do not extinguish the right and so holding, it found that the definition of “unpaid accumulations” in that case did apply to wages of employees that were time-barred. The Court went on to hold that while time-barred wages did vest in the State, since the Act did not, in that case, provide for disbursement of the wages to the workers whose claims could be established and since there was no provision for the workers making the claim, the Act was held to be contrary to Article 31(2) of the Constitution, which then existed.
12. It is well settled that the laws of limitation only bar the remedy and do not extinguish the right, except in cases where title is acquired by prescription. We may note here that V.R. Kalliyanikutty (supra) did not dispute the principle that the statute of limitation only bars [2024] 6 S.C.R. 245K.P. Khemka & Anr. v. Haryana State Industrial and Infrastructure Development Corporation Limited & Ors.
the remedy and does not extinguish the debt. After considering this principle it went onto hold that there was no enlargement of right in the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act. The impugned order, in the present case, further holds that Bombay Dyeing (supra) and Tilokchand and Motichand (supra) were not brought to the notice in V.R. Kalliyanikutty (supra). The decision in Tilokchand and Motichand (supra) was a case which inter alia dealt with extension of the principles of laches and res judicata to writ proceedings and have no direct relevance to the present controversy. The impugned order, in the present case, thereafter goes on to hold that the machinery for recovery under the Recovery of Dues Act or the State Financial Corporations Act do not have the trappings of a Court to hold that the provisions of the Limitation Act have no application for the same. Discussion and Reasoning:-
13. In our view, the findings of the Division Bench in the impugned order do not directly address the holding in V.R. Kalliyanikutty (supra) that the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act did not create any additional right to recover and enforce the outstanding amounts due.
14. The real question that arises is do the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951 and the Recovery of Dues Act create a distinct right and provided an alternative mechanism of enforcement to reover the amount due, even if the amounts due were time barred? To answer this question, we need to examine the relevant statutory provisions.
15. The objects and reasons of the State Financial Corporations Act are relevant for the purposes of the present case. They read as under: “The intention is that the State Corporations will confine their activities to financing medium and small scale industrial and will, as far as possible, consider only such cases as are outside the scope of the Industrial Finance Corporation. The State Governments also consider that the State Corporations should be established under a special Statute in order to make it possible to incorporate in the Constitution necessary provisions in regard to majority control by Government, guaranteed by the State Government in regard to the repayment of principal, and payment of a minimum rate of dividend on the shares, restriction on distribution of profits and special powers for the enforcement of its claims and recovery of dues.
246 [2024] 6 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports The main features of the Bill are as follows:-
(vii) The Corporation will be authorised to make longterm loans to industrial concerns and to guarantee loans raised by industrial concerns which are repayable within a period of not exceeding 25 years. The Corporation will be further authorised to underwrite the issue of stocks, shares, bonds or debentures by industrial concerns, subject to the provision that the Corporation will be required to dispose of any shares, etc., acquired by it in fulfilment of its underwriting liability within a period of 7 years.
(ix) The Corporation will have special privileges in the matter of enforcement of its claims against borrowers” (emphasis supplied)
Section 32-G of the State Financial Corporations Act reads as under:- “32G. Recovery of amounts due to the Financial Corporation as an arrear of land revenue.—Where any amount is due to the Financial Corporation in respect of any accommodation granted by it to any industrial concern, the Financial Corporation or any person authorised by it in writing in this behalf, may, without prejudice to any other mode of recovery, make an application to the State Government for the recovery of the amount due to it, and if the State Government or such authority, as that Government may specify in this behalf, is satisfied, after following such procedure as may be prescribed , that any amount is so due, it may issue a certificate for that amount to the Collector, and the Collector shall proceed to recover that amount in the same manner as an arrear of land revenue.”
(emphasis supplied)
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