Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India v. Satyanarayan Bankatlal Malu & Ors.
- Citation
- 2024 INSC 319; [2024] 5 S.C.R. 1
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Bhushan Ramkrishna Gavai, Justice Sandeep Mehta
- Decided
- 19 Apr 2024
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 3851/2023
- Sections
- 435, 236(1), 236, 73, 235A, 10, 14, 12A, 55, 100, 452, 435(3)
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:23 am. Original source ↗
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* Author [2024] 5 S.C.R. 1 : 2024 INSC 319 Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India v.
Satyanarayan Bankatlal Malu & Ors.
(Criminal Appeal No. 3851 of 2023)
19 April 2024 [B.R. Gavai* and Sandeep Mehta, JJ.] Issue for Consideration Special Court under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 would be as provided u/s. 435 of the Companies Act as it existed at the time when the Code came into effect, or it would be as provided u/s.435 after the 2018 Amendment; and the reference to ‘Special Court established under Chapter XXVIII of the Companies Act, 2013’ in s. 236(1) is ‘legislation by incorporation’ or ‘legislation by reference’.
Headnotes Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – ss.236, 73(a) and 235A – Trial of offences by Special Court – Petition by the Corporate Debtor for initiation of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process – Petition admitted and interim Resolution Professional appointed – Meanwhile, the respondent/Ex- Director of the Corporate Debtor filed an application for the withdrawal in light of One Time Settlement and the same was allowed by the NCLT – On account of non-compliance of the terms of the OTS by the respondents, the NCLT found it to be a fit case to prosecute the respondents – Appellant-Board then filed a complaint against the respondents before the Sessions Judge u/ss. 73(a) and 235A – Sessions Judge directed issuance of process against the respondents – Respondents filed writ petition before the High Court for the quashing the order passed by the Sessions Judge for the want of jurisdiction – High Court allowed the petition – Correctness:
Held: Special Court presided by a Sessions Judge or an Additional Sessions Judge would have jurisdiction to try the complaint under the Code – Under s. 236(1) the reference is only to the fact that the offences under the Code shall be tried by the Special Court established under Chapter XXVIII of the Companies Act, 2013 – Reference is not general but specific – Instant case is a case of ‘legislation by incorporation’ and not a case of ‘legislation by 2 [2024] 5 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports reference’ – Provision with regard to Special Court has been bodily lifted from s. 435 of the Companies Act, 2013 and incorporated in s. 236(1) – Provision of s. 435 of the Companies Act, 2013 with regard to Special Court would become a part of s. 236(1) as on the date of its enactment – Any amendment to s. 435 of the Companies Act, 2013, after the date on which the Code came into effect would not have any effect on the provisions of s. 236(1) – Special Court at that point of time only consists of a person who was qualified to be a Sessions Judge or an Additional Sessions Judge – Thus, the reasoning of the High Court that in view of the 2018 Amendment only the offences under the Companies Act would be tried by a Special Court of Sessions Judge or Additional Sessions Judge and all other offences including under the Code shall be tried by a Metropolitan Magistrate or Judicial Magistrate of the First Class, is untenable – High Court erred in quashing the complaint only on the ground that it was filed before a Special Court presided by a Sessions Judges – High Court could have directed the complaint to be withdrawn and presented before the appropriate court having jurisdiction – Impugned judgment passed by the High Court is quashed and set aside. [Paras 41-46,48] Legislation – ‘Legislation by incorporation’ or a ‘legislation by reference’ – Distinction between:
Held: Effect of incorporation means the bodily lifting of the provisions of one enactment and making it part of another so much so that the repeal of the former leaves the latter wholly untouched – However, in the case of a reference or a citation of the provisions of one enactment into another without incorporation, the amendment or repeal of the provisions of the said Act referred to in a subsequent Act will also bear the effect of the amendment or repeal of the said provisions. [Para 27] Case Law Cited Bolani Ores Ltd. v. State of Orissa [1975] 2 SCR 138 : (1974) 2 SCC 777; Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. v. Union of India and another [1979] 2 SCR 1038 : (1979) 2 SCC 529; Ebix Singapore Private Limited v. Committee of Creditors of Educomp Solutions Limited and another [2021] 14 SCR 321 : (2022) 2 SCC 401; Embassy Property Developments Private Limited v. State of Karnataka and others [2019] 17 SCR 559 : (2020) 13 SCC 308; Bharti Airtel Ltd. and another v. Vijaykumar V. Iyer [2024] 5 S.C.R. 3Insolvency a n d B a n k r u p t c y B o a r d o f India v . Satyanarayan B a n k a t l a l M a l u & O r s .
and others [2024] 1 SCR 140 : (2024) SCC OnLine SC 4; Girnar Traders (3) v. State of Maharashtra and others [2007] 9 SCR 383 : (2011) 3 SCC 1; Collector of Customs, Madras v. Nathella Sampathu Chetty and Anr. [1962] 3 SCR 786 : AIR 1962 SC 316; New Central Jute Mills Co.
Ltd. v. Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Allahabad & Ors. [1971] 2 SCR 92 : (1970) 2 SCC 820; Ujagar Prints and others v. Union of India and others [1989] 1 SCR 344 : (1989) 3 SCC 488; Innoventive Industries Limited v. ICICI Bank and another [2017] 8 SCR 33 :
(2018) 1 SCC 407; Principal Commissioner of Income Tax v. Monnet Ispat and Energy Limited (2018) 18 SCC 786; E.S. Krishnamurthy and others v. Bharath Hi-Tech Builders Private Limited [2021] 12 SCR 28 : (2022) 3 SCC 161; Pratap Technocrats Private Limited and others v. Monitoring Committee of Reliance Infratel Limited and another [2021] 8 SCR 938 : (2021) 10 SCC 623; V.
Nagarajan v. SKS Ispat and Power Limited and others [2021] 14 SCR 736 : (2022) 2 SCC 244 – referred to.
List of Acts Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; Companies Act, 2013. List of Keywords Special Court; Legislation by incorporation; Legislation by reference; Want of jurisdiction.
Case Arising From CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 3851 of 2023 From the Judgment and Order dated 14.02.2022 of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in WP No. 2592 of 2021 Appearances for Parties S.V. Raju, A.S.G., Ms. Rashi Rampal, Apoorv Khatore, Vikas Mehta, Advs. for the Appellant.
Amir Arsiwala, Dhaval Deshpande, Anand Dilip Landge, Siddharth Dharmadhikari, Aaditya Aniruddha Pande, Bharat Bagla, Sourav Singh, Aditya Krishna, Ms. Preet S. Phanse, Adarsh Dubey, Advs. for the Respondents.
4 [2024] 5 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
INDEX
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND Paras 1 to 2 II. SUBMISSIONS Paras 3 to 17 III. CONSIDERATION OF STATUTORY PROVISIONS Paras 18 to 25 IV. CONSIDERATION OF PRECEDENTS Paras 26 to 40 V. CONCLUSION Paras 41 to 49 Judgment B.R. Gavai, J.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
1. This appeal challenges the judgement and order dated 14 th February 2022, passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Writ Petition No.2592 of 2021, thereby allowing the petition filed by Satyanarayan Bankatlal Malu and Ramesh Satyanarayan Malu, the Ex-Directors of M/s. SBM Paper Mills Pvt. Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Respondents’) challenging the order dated 17 th March 2021 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, 58th Court in Special Case No.853 of 2020 (‘learned Sessions Judge’ for short). The learned Sessions Judge had directed issuance of process against the Respondents on account of a Complaint filed by the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Appellant-Board’) under Section 236 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (hereinafter referred to as “the Code”) read with Sections 190, 193 and 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“Cr.P.C.) for the offences punishable under Section 73(a) and Section 235A of the Code.
2. The facts in brief, giving rise to the present appeal are as under: 2.1 M/s. SBM Paper Mills Private Limited (hereinafter referred to as “the Corporate Debtor”) filed a petition on 4 th September 2017 under Section 10 of the Code for initiation of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (hereinafter referred to as “CIRP”) of itself vide CP/1362/I&BC/NCLT/MB/MAH/2017. The National Company Law Tribunal, Mumbai Bench (hereinafter [2024] 5 S.C.R. 5Insolvency a n d B a n k r u p t c y B o a r d o f India v . Satyanarayan B a n k a t l a l M a l u & O r s .
referred to as “the NCLT”) vide order dated 17 th October 2017, admitted the Petition and directed the moratorium to commence as prescribed under Section 14 of the Code and directed certain statutory steps to be taken as a consequence thereof. Vide the said order, the NCLT also appointed Mr. Amit Poddar as the Interim Resolution Professional (hereinafter referred to as “RP”) to carry out the functions as prescribed under the provisions of the Code.
2.2 In the meanwhile, Mr. Satyanarayan Malu, i.e., the Respondent/ Ex-Director of the Corporate Debtor filed an application being M.A. No. 1396/2018 before the NCLT under Section 12A of the Code for the withdrawal of the aforesaid petition under Section 10 in light of a One Time Settlement (“OTS” for short) entered into with the sole Financial Creditor, i.e., Allahabad Bank. On the other hand, the RP had also filed an application being M.A. No. 827/2018 for the approval of the Resolution Plan. The NCLT vide order dated 20 th December 2018 allowed the M.A. No. 1396/2018 filed by the Respondent while observing the consent for withdrawal of the petition by the sole Financial Creditor vide letter dated 27th November 2018.
2.3 However, on account of non-compliance of the terms of the OTS by the Respondents, the NCLT issued a Show-Cause Notice against them vide order dated 11 th March 2019. The NCLT further found it to be a fit case to propose the prosecution of the Respondents vide order dated 20 th August 2019 while hearing an application filed by the sole Financial Creditor being M.A. 494 and 495 of 2019 thereby seeking prosecution of the Respondents.
2.4 Thereafter, on 22 nd September 2020, the Appellant-Board filed a Complaint against the Respondents before the Sessions Judge in Special Case No. 853/2020 under the aforementioned provisions and for offences punishable under Section 73(a) and 235A of the Code for the non-compliance of the terms of the OTS and for not having filed the M.A. 1396/2018 under Section 12A of the Code through the RP. The Sessions Judge vide Order dated 17 th March 2021 directed issuance of process against the Respondents and further directed them to be summoned on the next date of hearing.
6 [2024] 5 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports 2.5 Being aggrieved thereby, the Respondents filed a Writ Petition No. 2592 of 2021 before the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, praying for the quashing and setting aside of the order dated 17 th March 2021 passed by the Sessions Judge for the want of jurisdiction. The High Court vide impugned judgement and order dated 14 th February 2022 allowed the Writ Petition No. 2592 of 2021 filed by the Respondents.
2.6 Hence, this Appeal.
II. SUBMISSIONS
3. We have heard Shri S.V. Raju, learned Additional Solicitor General of India (“ASG” for short) appearing for the Appellant-Board and Shri Amir Arsiwala, Advocate on Record, appearing for the Respondents/ Ex-Directors of the Corporate Debtor.
4. Shri S.V. Raju, learned ASG submitted that the learned Single Judge of the High Court has grossly erred in quashing the proceedings. Shri Raju submitted that the learned Single Judge of the High Court has grossly erred in holding that, in view of the Companies (Amendment) Act, 2017 (which came into effect from 7 th May 2018), only the offences committed under the Companies Act can be tried by Special Court consisting of Sessions Judge or Additional Sessions Judge. He submitted that the reasoning given by the learned Single Judge that the offences other than the Companies Act cannot be tried by the Special Court consisting of Sessions Judge or Additional Sessions Judge is totally in ignorance of the provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 236 of the Code.
5. Learned ASG submitted that sub-section (1) of Section 236 of the Code provides that the offences under the Code shall be tried by the Special Court established under Chapter XXVIII of the Companies Act, 2013. He submits that the legislative intent is clear. There is no general reference to the provisions of the Companies Act. He submits that what has been done by sub-section (1) of Section 236 of the Code is that the offences punishable under the Code are required to be tried by the Special Court established under Chapter XXVIII of the Companies Act, 2013
6. Shri Raju further submitted that the legislative intent is clear. A specific provision of the Companies Act, 2013 has been incorporated in subsection (1) of Section 236 of the Code. It is submitted that, if the [2024] 5 S.C.R. 7Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India v. Satyanarayan Bankatlal Malu & Ors.
legislative intent was that of legislation by reference, then a general reference could have been made in sub-section (1) of Section 236 of the Code to Chapter XXVIII of the Companies Act. Learned ASG therefore submitted that, if the reference made to the Special Court established under Chapter XXVIII of the Companies Act, 2013 is held to be legislation by incorporation, then the subsequent amendments to the Companies Act, 2013 would not be applicable to the Code. He submitted that since the Code has come into effect on 28 th May, 2016, the provisions of Section 435, as it existed in Chapter XXVIII of the Companies Act, 2013 then, would only be applicable. Learned ASG in this respect refers to the judgments of this Court in the cases of Bolani Ores Ltd. vs State of Orissa1 and Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. vs Union of India and another2.
7. Learned ASG further submits that the Code has been held to be a complete Code in itself in a catena of judgments of this Court. In this respect, he relied on the judgments of this Court in the cases of Ebix Singapore Private Limited vs Committee of Creditors of Educomp Solutions Limited and another 3, Embassy Property Developments Private Limited vs State of Karnataka and others4, and Bharti Airtel Ltd. and another vs Vijaykumar V. Iyer and others 5.
8. Learned ASG submits that, if a statute is a complete Code in itself, then normally a reference to the provisions of the prior statute referred to in a subsequent statute would only have a restrictive operation. In such a case, it would be a ‘legislation by incorporation’ and not a ‘legislation by reference’. In this respect, he relied on the judgments of this Court in the case of Girnar Traders (3) vs. State of Maharashtra and others 6.
9. Learned ASG further submits that the Statement of Objects and Reasons (SOR) to the Companies (Amendment) Act, 2017, amending the Companies Act, 2013 clearly shows that the amendment is for the purposes of restricting only to the Companies 1 [1975] 2 SCR 138 : (1974) 2 SCC 777 2 [1979] 2 SCR 1038 : (1979) 2 SCC 529 3 [2021] 14 SCR 321: (2022) 2 SCC 401 4 [2019] 17 SCR 559 : (2020) 13 SCC 308 5 [2024] 1 SCR 140 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 4 6 [2007] 9 SCR 383 : (2011) 3 SCC 1 8 [2024] 5 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports Act and not for any other purpose. He therefore submits that the finding of the learned Single Judge of the High Court that in view of the Companies (Amendment) Act, 2017, the Special Court consisting of Sessions Judge or Additional Sessions Judge will not have the jurisdiction to entertain the complaint in question is totally erroneous.
10. Learned ASG submits that, in any event, the learned Single Judge of the High Court has erred in quashing the complaint. It is submitted that, in the event the learned Single Judge found that the Special Court consisting of Sessions Judge or Additional Sessions Judge did not have jurisdiction and it is the Special Court of Metropolitan Magistrate or Judicial Magistrate First Class which has jurisdiction, then it should have returned the complaint for presentation of the same before the competent court having jurisdiction.
11. Shri Amir Arsiwala, learned Advocate on Record appearing for the Respondents raises a preliminary objection. He submits that the point with regard to ‘legislation by incorporation’ was not argued before the learned Single Judge of the High Court and therefore the said contention cannot be permitted to be raised for the first time in this Court.
12. Shri Arsiwala submits that the judgment of this Court in the case of Bolani Ores Ltd. (supra) would not be applicable in the facts of the present case inasmuch as, in the said case what was incorporated in the subsequent statute was a definition of ‘motor vehicles’ as found in the earlier statute i.e. Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. It is therefore submitted that, the definition cannot be in a state of flux subject to the mercy of amendments to the Central Act.
13. Similarly, he submits that the judgment of this Court in the case of Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. (supra) would not be applicable to the facts of the present case inasmuch as, in the said case what was referred in Section 55 of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969 was a right to file an appeal on any of the grounds mentioned in Section 100 of the Code of Civil procedure, 1908 (“CPC” for short). He submitted that in the said case, this Court was considering a provision which provided a substantive right to file an appeal. As such, a reference to Section 100 of the CPC was held amounting to be an ‘incorporation’ as the substantive right of appeal could not be left at the mercy of subsequent amendments to the CPC. [2024] 5 S.C.R. 9Insolvency a n d B a n k r u p t c y B o a r d o f India v . Satyanarayan B a n k a t l a l M a l u & O r s .
14. Insofar as the judgment of this Court in the case of Girnar Traders (supra) is concerned, learned counsel submits that rather than the said judgment supporting the case of the Appellant-Board, if the test laid down in the said case is applied to the facts of the present case, it will lead to a conclusion that the present case is that of ‘legislation by reference’.
15. Relying on the judgments of this Court in the cases of Collector of Customs, Madras vs Nathella Sampathu Chetty and Anr. 7 , New Central Jute Mills Co. Ltd. vs. Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Allahabad & Ors. 8 , and Ujagar Prints and others vs Union of India and others9 , he submits that what has to be taken into consideration is the plain language used by the legislation in the statute to which a reference is made by the subsequent statute. Learned counsel submits that in the present case, a general reference is made to Chapter XXVIII of the Companies Act. It is therefore submitted that, since a general reference is made, the present case would not be a case of ‘legislation by incorporation’ but would be a case of ‘legislation by reference’.
16. Learned counsel submits that in any case, the Respondents Nos.1 and 2 have a good case on merits. He submits that the learned Single Judge of the High Court has not considered the merits of the matter and in the event this Court holds that the learned Single Judge was not justified in quashing the proceedings, the matter be remitted to the learned Single Judge of the High Court for deciding it afresh on merits.
17. Shri Vikas Mehta, learned Advocate on Record for the Appellant- Board, in rejoinder, reiterated the submissions made by Shri S.V. Raju, learned ASG. He submits that the legislative intent is clear. If the legislature wanted to take out the offences punishable under the Code from the ambit of Chapter XXVIII of the Companies Act, 2013, nothing prevented it from making an amendment to the Code itself.
III. CONSIDERATION OF STATUTORY PROVISIONS
18. For considering the rival submissions, it will be necessary to refer to Section 236(1) of the Code, which reads thus:
7 [1962] 3 SCR 786 8 [1971] 2 SCR 92 : (1970) 2 SCC 820 9 [1989] 1 SCR 344 : (1989) 3 SCC 488 10 [2024] 5 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports
236. Trial of offences by Special Court.—(1)
Notwithstanding anything in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), offences under of this Code shall be tried by the Special Court established under Chapter XXVIII of the Companies Act, 2013 (18 of 2013).
19. It can thus be seen that Section 236(1) of the Code begins with a non-obstante clause. It provides that the offences under the Code shall be tried by the Special Court established under Chapter XXVIII of the Companies Act, 2013. Chapter XXVIII of the Companies Act, 2013 deals with ‘Special Courts’.
20. For appreciating the rival submissions, it will also be necessary to refer to Section 435 of the Companies Act, 2013, as it was originally enacted; Section 435 after the amendment in 2015 by the Companies (Amendment) Act, 2015, which came into effect from 29th May 2015 (hereinafter referred to as “the 2015 Amendment”); and Section 435 as it existed after the amendment by the Companies (Amendment) Act, 2017 with effect from 7th May 2018 (hereinafter referred to as “the 2018 Amendment”), which reads thus:
Section 435 (originally enacted)
“435. Establishment of Special Courts.—(1) The Central Government may, for the purpose of providing speedy trial of offences punishable under this Act, by notification, establish or designate as many Special Courts as may be necessary.
(2) A Special Court shall consist of a Single Judge who shall be appointed by the Central Government with the concurrence of the Chief Justice of the High Court within whose jurisdiction the judge to be appointed is working.
(3) A person shall not be qualified for appointment as a Judge of a Special Court unless he is, immediately before such appointment, holding office of a Sessions Judge or an Additional Sessions Judge.”
Section 435 (after the 2015 Amendment)
“435. Establishment of Special Courts.—(1) The Central Government may, for the purpose of providing speedy trial of offences punishable under this Act with imprisonment of [2024] 5 S.C.R. 11Insolvency a n d B a n k r u p t c y B o a r d o f India v . Satyanarayan B a n k a t l a l M a l u & O r s .
two years or more, by notification, establish or designate as many Special Courts as may be necessary.
Provided that all other offences shall be tried, as the case may be, by a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the First Class having jurisdiction to try any offence under this Act or under any previous company law.
(2) A Special Court shall consist of a Single Judge who shall be appointed by the Central Government with the concurrence of the Chief Justice of the High Court within whose jurisdiction the judge to be appointed is working.
(3) A person shall not be qualified for appointment as a Judge of a Special Court unless he is, immediately before such appointment, holding office of a Sessions Judge or an Additional Sessions Judge.”
Section 435 (after the 2018 Amendment)
“435. Establishment of Special Courts.—(1) The Central Government may, for the purpose of providing speedy trial of offences under this Act, except under section 452, by notification, establish or designate as many Special Courts as may be necessary.
(2) A Special Court shall consist of—
(a) a single judge holding office as Session Judge or Additional Session Judge, in case of offences punishable under this Act with imprisonment of two years or more; and
(b) a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the First Class, in the case of other offences, who shall be appointed by the Central Government with the concurrence of the Chief Justice of the High Court within whose jurisdiction the judge to be appointed is working.”
21. It could thus be seen that as per Section 435(3) of the Companies Act, 2013, as it existed on the date on which the Code came into effect (i.e. after the 2015 Amendment), a person to be qualified for appointment as a Judge of a Special Court was required to hold office 12 [2024] 5 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports of a Sessions Judge or an Additional Sessions Judge immediately before his appointment as a Judge of a Special Court.
22. After Section 435 of the Companies Act, 2013 suffered an amendment in the year 2015 by the 2015 Amendment (Act No. 21 of 2015), with effect from 29 th May, 2015, sub-section (1) thereof provided that the Central Government may, for the purpose of providing speedy trial of offences punishable under the said Act with imprisonment of two years or more, by notification, establish or designate as many Special Courts as may be necessary. It further provided that all other offences shall be tried either by a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the First Class having jurisdiction to try any offence under the said Act or under any previous company law; meaning thereby, the offences under the Companies Act punishable with imprisonment of two years or more were to be tried by Special Courts comprising of Sessions Judge or Additional Sessions Judge, whereas all other offences punishable with imprisonment of less than two years, were to be tried by the Courts of Metropolitan Magistrate or Judicial Magistrate First Class having jurisdiction to try such offences. Insofar as sub-sections (2) and (3) are concerned, there was no change and as such, for being a person to be eligible for appointment as a Judge of a Special Court it was necessary that he occupied the office of a Sessions Judge or an Additional Sessions Judge prior to his appointment.
23. Another amendment to Section 435 of the Companies Act, 2013 was effected by the Companies (Amendment) Act, 2017 (i.e. Act No. 1 of 2018), with effect from 7 th May, 2018. Vide the said amendment, two classes of Special Courts were constituted. Firstly, a Special Court presided by a single judge holding office as Session Judge or Additional Session Judge, in case of offences punishable with imprisonment of two years or more under the Companies Act, 2013; and the second being presided by a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the First Class in the case of other offences, i.e., offences punishable with imprisonment of less than two years.
24. It is thus clear that Section 435 of the Companies Act, 2013 as it originally existed, provided for only one class of Special Courts i.e. a person holding office of a Sessions Judge or an Additional Sessions Judge and all offences under the Companies Act, 2013 were required to be tried by such Special Courts. The 2015 Amendment to Section 435 also provided for only one class of Special Courts i.e. a person [2024] 5 S.C.R. 13Insolvency a n d B a n k r u p t c y B o a r d o f India v . Satyanarayan B a n k a t l a l M a l u & O r s .
holding the rank of a Sessions Judge or an Additional Sessions Judge. The change that was brought out was that, only offences punishable under the Companies Act, 2013 with imprisonment of two years or more were to be tried by the Special Courts, whereas all other offences i.e. offences punishable with imprisonment of less than two years were to be tried by the jurisdictional Metropolitan Magistrate or the Judicial Magistrate of the First Class. By the 2018 Amendment, two classes of Special Courts were established. The first class of Special Courts comprised of an officer holding the office as Sessions Judge or Additional Sessions Judge, whereas the second class of Special Courts comprised of Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the First Class. The offences punishable under the Companies Act with imprisonment of two years or more were required to be tried by a Special Court comprising of Sessions Judge or Additional Sessions Judge, whereas all other offences i.e. the offences punishable with imprisonment of less than two years were to be tried by a Special Court comprising of Metropolitan Magistrate or the Judicial Magistrate of the First Class.
25. The question that requires to be considered is, as to whether the Special Court under the Code would be as provided under Section 435 of the Companies Act as it existed at the time when the Code came into effect, or it would be as provided under Section 435 of the Companies Act after the 2018 Amendment. The answer to that question would depend upon as to whether the reference to ‘Special Court established under Chapter XXVIII of the Companies Act, 2013’ in Section 236(1) of the Code is a ‘legislation by incorporation’ or a ‘legislation by reference’. If it is held that it is a ‘legislation by incorporation’, then the subsequent amendments would not have any effect on the Code and the Special Court would continue to be as provided under Section 435 of the Companies Act, as it existed when the Code came into effect. Per contra, if it is held that it is a ‘legislation by reference’ then the subsequent amendments would also be applicable to the Code and the Special Courts would be as provided under Section 435 of the Companies Act after its amendment by the 2018 Amendment.
IV. CONSIDERATION OF PRECEDENTS
26. A Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of Collector of Customs, Madras vs Nathella Sampathu Chetty and Anr. (supra) 14 [2024] 5 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports has considered the distinction between ‘legislation by reference’ and ‘legislation by incorporation’. It will be apposite to refer to the following observations of this Court in the said case: “………To consider that the decision of the Privy Council has any relevance to the construction of the legal effect of the terms of Section 23-A of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act is to ignore the distinction between a mere reference to or a citation of one statute in another and an incorporation which in effect means the bodily lifting of the provisions of one enactment and making it part of another so much so that the repeal of the former leaves the latter wholly untouched. In the case, however, of a reference or a citation of one enactment by another without incorporation, the effect of a repeal of the one “referred to” is that set out in Section 8(1) of the General clauses Act:
“8. (1) Where this Act, or any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals and re-enacts, with or without modification, any provision of a former enactment, then references in any other enactment or in any instrument to the provision so repealed shall, unless a different intention appears:
be construed as references to the provision so reenacted.”
On the other hand, the effect of incorporation is as stated by Brett, L.J. in Clarke v. Bradlaugh [1881 8 QBD 63] : “Where a statute is incorporated, by reference, into a second statute the repeal of the first statute by a third does not affect the second.”
This is analogous to, though not identical with the principle embodied in Section 6-A of the General Clauses Act enacted to define the effect of repeals effected by repealing and amending Acts which runs in these terms:
“6-A. Where any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act repeals any enactment by which the text of any Central Act or Regulation was amended by the express omission, [2024] 5 S.C.R. 15Insolvency a n d B a n k r u p t c y B o a r d o f India v . Satyanarayan B a n k a t l a l M a l u & O r s .
insertion or substitution of any matter, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not affect the continuance of any such amendment made by the enactment so repealed and in operation at the time of such repeal.”
We say “not identical” because in the class of cases contemplated by Section 6-A of the General clauses Act, the function of the incorporating legislation is almost wholly to effect the incorporation and when that is accomplished, they die as it were a natural death which is formally effected by their repeal. In cases, however, dealt with by Brett, L.J. the legislation from which provisions are absorbed continue to retain their efficacy and usefulness and their independent operation even after the incorporation is effected.”
27. It could thus be seen that the effect of incorporation means the bodily lifting of the provisions of one enactment and making it part of another so much so that the repeal of the former leaves the latter wholly untouched. However, in the case of a reference or a citation of the provisions of one enactment into another without incorporation, the amendment or repeal of the provisions of the said Act referred to in a subsequent Act will also bear the effect of the amendment or repeal of the said provisions.
28. In the case of Bolani Ores Ltd. (supra), this Court was considering the question as to what would be the effect of amendment of the definition of ‘motor vehicles’ for the purposes of Bihar and Orissa Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1930 (for short “the Orissa Taxation Act”). The Orissa Taxation Act had adopted the definition of ‘motor vehicles’ as provided in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 for the purposes of taxation. The definition at the time of adoption brought the motor vehicle under the ambit of the said definition. It excluded the ‘motor vehicles’ used solely upon the premises of the owner. However, the said enactment suffered an amendment in the year 1956 and specifically excluded vehicles of special type adapted for use only in a factory or in any other enclosed premises. It was sought to be urged on behalf of the State of Orissa that the definition of ‘motor vehicles’ as adopted in Section 2(c) of the Orissa Taxation Act was not the definition by ‘incorporation’ but a definition by ‘reference’ and therefore amendment to the said definition would also be applicable 16 [2024] 5 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports for the purposes of taxation under the Orissa Taxation Act.
29. Rejecting the said contention and referring to various earlier judgments, this Court observed thus:
“29. The question then remains as to whether these vehicles though registrable under the Act are motor vehicles for the purpose of the Taxation Act. It has already been pointed out that before the amendment vehicles used solely upon the premises of the owner, though they may be mechanically propelled vehicles adapted for use upon roads were excluded from the definition of ‘motor vehicle’. If this definition which excludes them is the one which is incorporated by reference under Section 2(c) of the Taxation Act, then no tax is leviable on these vehicles under the Taxation Act. Shri Tarkunde for the State of Orissa contends that the definition of ‘motor vehicle’ in Section 2(c ) of the Taxation Act is not a definition by incorporation but only a definition by reference, and as such the meaning of ‘motor vehicle’ for the purpose of Section 2(c) of the Taxation Act would be the same as defined from time to time under Section 2(18) of the Act. In ascertaining the intention of the legislature in adopting the method of merely referring to the definition of ‘motor vehicle’ under the Act for the purpose of the Taxation Act, we have to keep in mind its purpose and intendment as also that of the Motor Vehicles Act. We have already stated what these purposes are and having regard to them the registration of a motor vehicle does not automatically make it liable for taxation under the Taxation Act. The Taxation Act is a regulatory measure imposing compensatory taxes for the purpose of raising revenue to meet the expenditure for making roads, maintaining them and for facilitating the movement and regulation of traffic. The validity of the taxing power under Entry 57 List II of the Seventh Schedule read with Article 301 of the Constitution depends upon the regulatory and compensatory nature of the taxes. It is not the purpose of the Taxation Act to levy taxes on vehicles which do not use the roads or in any way form [2024] 5 S.C.R. 17Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India v. Satyanarayan Bankatlal Malu & Ors.
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