Government of NCT of Delhi & Anr. v. M/S Bsk Realtors Llp & Anr.
- Citation
- 2024 INSC 455; [2024] 5 S.C.R. 1159
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 3 Judges: Justice Surya Kant, Justice Dipankar Datta, Justice Ujjal Bhuyan
- Decided
- 17 May 2024
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 6604/2024
- Sections
- 4(1), 24(2), 24, 11, 24(1), 4, 31, 34, 31(1), 16, 3, 6
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[2024] 5 S.C.R. 1159 : 2024 INSC 455 Government of NCT of Delhi & Anr.
v.
M/s BSK Realtors LLP & Anr.
(Civil Appeal No. 6604 of 2024)
17 May 2024 [Surya Kant, Dipankar Datta and Ujjal Bhuyan, JJ.] Issue for Consideration a) Whether the dismissal of a civil appeal preferred by one appellant in the first round operates as res judicata against the other appellant in the second round before this Court; b) Whether suppression of the first round of litigation by the appellants constitutes a material fact, thereby inviting an outright dismissal of the appeals at the threshold; c) Does the doctrine of merger operate as a bar to entertain the civil appeals in the present case; d) Whether the previous determination of the rights of subsequent purchasers in an inter se dispute precludes the same issue from being reconsidered between the same parties.
Headnotes † Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 – Whether the dismissal of a civil appeal preferred by one appellant in the first round operates as res judicata against the other appellant in the second round before this Court:
Held: In the lead matter before this Court or for that matter the other appeals, the co-respondents before the High Court, namely, GNCTD and DDA did not have conflicting interests – Inter se them, neither was there any disputed issue, nor could have the High Court possibly adjudicated on any such issue – Before this Court too, in the first round, there was no issue on which GNCTD and DDA were at loggerheads – In the light of this, in accordance with the legal principle, the applicability of res judicata is negated – Res judicata, as a technical legal principle, operates to prevent the same parties from relitigating the same issues that have already been conclusively determined by a court – However, it is crucial to note that the previous decision of this Court in the first round would not operate as res judicata to bar a decision on the lead matter and the 1160 [2024] 5 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports other appeals; more so, because this rule may not apply hard and fast in situations where larger public interest is at stake – In such cases, a more flexible approach ought to be adopted by courts, recognizing that certain matters transcend individual disputes and have far-reaching public interest implications. [Paras 23 and 25] Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 – Whether suppression of the first round of litigation by the appellants constitutes a material fact, thereby inviting an outright dismissal of the appeals at the threshold:
Held: Law is well settled that the fact suppressed must be material in the sense that it would have an effect on the merits of the case – The concept of suppression or non-disclosure of facts transcends mere concealment; it necessitates the deliberate withholding of material facts—those of such critical import that their absence would render any decision unjust – Material facts, in this context, refer to those facts that possess the potential to significantly influence the decision-making process or alter its trajectory – This principle is not intended to arm one party with a weapon of technicality over its adversary but rather serves as a crucial safeguard against the abuse of the judicial process – Nevertheless, this Court has carefully considered the orders issued during the first round of litigation, which are alleged to have been suppressed – Despite reviewing these orders, there are no compelling reason to dismiss the appeals based solely on the prior dismissal of appeals filed by some other appellant/ authority. [Paras 30 and 31] Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 – Does the doctrine of merger operate as a bar to entertain the civil appeals in the instant case: Held: The concept of public interest need not be viewed narrowly only on the yardstick of loss to public exchequer and that these are the cases where public at large has acquired interest in the public infrastructures already complete or in process of completion, this Court is satisfied that if the doctrine of merger is applied mechanically in respect of Groups A (deals with M.A.s filed by the appellants-authorities primarily pleading change in law and [2024] 5 S.C.R. 1161Government of NCT of Delhi & Anr. v. M/s BSK Realtors LLP & Anr. seeking recall of the judgments and orders of this Court dismissing the Civil Appeals and/or Review Petitions in the first round) and B.1 (includes cases where Civil Appeals were dismissed in the first round, and now an SLP (now Civil Appeal) is pending before this Court in the second round) cases, it will lead to irreversible consequences – This Court is satisfied that the element of disparity between Groups A and B.1 cases visà-vis cases falling in Group C is liable to be eliminated and this can only be done by invoking extraordinary power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India so that complete justice is done between the expropriated landowners, the State and its developing agencies and most importantly the public in general who has acquired a vested right in the public infrastructure projects. [Para 41] Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 – Delhi Lands (Restrictions on Transfers) Act, 1972 – Whether the previous determination of the rights of subsequent purchasers in an inter se dispute precludes the same issue from being reconsidered between the same parties:
Held: Group E cases deal with allegations regarding fraud by landowners by suppressing subsequent sale transactions, ownership title disputes, etc – It is settled that transfer of land in respect of which acquisition proceedings had been initiated, after issuance of Notification under section 4(1) of the 1894 Act, is void and a subsequent purchaser cannot challenge the validity of the notification or the irregularity in taking possession of the land – Also, the structure of the Delhi Lands (Restrictions on Transfers) Act, 1972 clearly indicates that any subsequent sale of the specified land without prior permission from the competent authority is not allowed, and if such sale is done through concealment, it amounts to fraud – The law with respect to “who” can invoke section 24(2) of the 2013 Act has been well settled after the decision of this Court in Shiv Kumar wherein it was held that subsequent purchasers do not have the locus to contest the acquisition and/ or claim lapse of the acquisition proceedings – Coming to the specifics of each case qua subsequent purchasers or disputes regarding the title of the subject lands, this Court has clarified the scope of inquiry in Delhi Development Authority v. Tejpal and others – As far as the concealment of material facts regarding 1162 [2024] 5 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports subsequent sale transactions, earlier round of litigations etc. are concerned, it is noted that the landowners and affected parties are under no obligation to either confirm or deny the allegations levelled against them – Nor this Court has directed the appellants to furnish original records or documents to substantiate their claim of concealment and suppression of material facts – Engaging in a factual inquiry at such an advanced stage of the legal process, especially without providing adequate opportunities to all parties, may not be fair – The cases listed in Group E involve complex questions of fact and this Court being the Court of the last resort, ought not to be involved in such elaborate factfinding exercise – Therefore, deem it appropriate to remit these cases to the High Court for proper adjudication on points of law as well as facts. [Paras 42, 44, 45, 46, 48] Doctrine/Principles – Res judicata – discussed.
Doctrine/Principles – Doctrine of merger – Exception: Held: This Court takes notice of the exception carved out by this Court in Kunhayammed, to the effect that the doctrine of merger is not of universal or unlimited application and that the nature of jurisdiction exercised by the superior forum and the content or subject matter of challenge laid or which could have been laid shall have to be kept in view – The exception that has been carved out in Kunhayammed, will only be permissible in the rarest of rare cases and such a deviation can be invoked sparingly only – However, among such exceptions, the extraordinary constitutional powers vested in this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, which is to be exercised with a view to do complete justice between the parties, remains unaffected and being an unfettered power, shall always be deemed to be preserved as an exception to the doctrine of merger and the rule of stare decisis. [Para 33] Public Interest – Land Acquisition – Elements of Public interest: Held: a) While balancing the interest of the public exchequer against that of individuals, there are many other interests at stake, and it might not be possible to undo the acquisitions without causing significant cascading harms and losses to such other interests; b) Since development projects have either begun or most of the acquired lands have already been deployed for essential public projects such as hospitals, schools, expansion of metro, etc., the [2024] 5 S.C.R. 1163Government of NCT of Delhi & Anr. v. M/s BSK Realtors LLP & Anr. effect of non-condonation of delay would go beyond mere financial loss to the exchequer and would extend to the public at large; c) It would be like unscrambling the egg if compensation paid would have to be clawed back or possession taken would have to be reversed; d) In many cases, the development projects might also have to be undone – The reversal of possession of even a small plot lying on projects such as an under-construction metro corridor would be practically impossible; e) These are the cases where rights are vested to the public at large given the public infrastructure that has come up on a large number of acquired lands; f) The fresh acquisition, if so is required to be done by the State, would be at the expense of delaying the construction of critical public infrastructure in our national capital – When balancing public with private interest, the comparative interest on the landowners would be nominal as compared to the public at large; and g) The multiplicity of contradictory judicial opinions on section 24 (2) of the 2013 Act has made the present set of circumstances sui generis – The constant flux in the legal position of law has posed significant challenges for the State and its authorities. [Para 40] Case Law Cited Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal [2020] 3 SCR 1 : (2020) 8 SCC 129 – followed.
State of Gujarat and Others v. M.P. Shah Charitable Trust and Others [1994] 3 SCR 163 : (1994) 3 SCC 552; Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal and Others v. Dossibai N.B. Jeejeebhoy [1970] 3 SCR 830 : (1970) 1 SCC 613; S.J.S. Business Enterprises (P) Ltd v. State of Bihar and Others [2004] 3 SCR 56 : (2004) 7 SCC 166; Arunima Baruah v. Union of India and Others [2007] 5 SCR 904 : (2007) 6 SCC 120 – relied on.
Delhi Development Authority v. Tejpal and Others Civil Appeal No. 6798 of 2024 arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 26697/2019; Pune Municipal Corporation v. Harakchand Mistrimal Solanki [2014] 1 SCR 783 : (2014) 3 SCC 183; Govt (NCT) of Delhi v. Manav Dharam Trust and Another [2017] 4 SCR 232 : (2017) 6 SCC 751; Shiv Kumar and Another v. Union of India and Others [2019] 13 SCR 695 : (2019) 10 SCC 229; Kunhayammed and Others. v. State of Kerala and Another [2000] Supp. 1 SCR 538 : (2000) 6 SCC 359; Pune Municipal Corporation v. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki (2020) SCC OnLine SC 1471 – referred to.
1164 [2024] 5 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports Ranjana Bhatia v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi and another (2014) SCC OnLine Del 2151; Sparsh Properties Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India and Others (2014) SCC OnLine Del 6659 – referred to.
Munni Bibi (since deceased) and Another v. Tirloki Nath and Others AIR (1931) PC 114 – referred to.
List of Acts Land Acquisition Act, 1894; Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013; Delhi Lands (Restrictions on Transfers) Act, 1972; Constitution of India; Supreme Court Rules, 2013.
List of Keywords Land Acquisition; Res judicata; Interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium; Salus populi suprema lex esto; Public interest; Doctrine of merger; Article 142 of the Constitution of India; Elements of Public interest; Balancing the interest of the public exchequer; Public infrastructure; Balancing public with private interest; Fraud by Landowners; Concealment and suppression of material facts; Subsequent sale transactions; Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013; Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Case Arising From CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 6604 of 2024 From the Judgment and Order dated 11.01.2016 of the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in WPC No.7442 of 2015 With C.A. Nos. 6605, 6606, 6607, 6608, 6610, 6611, 6612, 6613 and 6649 of 2024, M.A. No. 277 of 2023 In C.A. No. 8492 of 2016, M.A. …. D.No. 39901 of 2022, M.A. No. 278 of 2023, M.A. ... D.No. 674 of 2023, M.A. ... D.No. 3577 of 2023, M.A. No. 346 of 2023, M.A. ... D.No. 5711 of 2023, C.A. No. 542 of 2016, C.A. Nos. 6614, 6615 and 6650 of 2024, Conmt. Pet.(C) No. 189 of 2019 In C.A. No. 2690 of 2017, C.A. Nos. 6651, 6616, 6618, 6652, 6619, 6653, 6620, 6621, 6622, 6623, 6624, 6625, 6626, 6627, 6628, 6654 and 6655 of 2024, Slp(C) D.No. 21746 of 2022, C.A. Nos. 6629 and 6656 of 2024, M.A. ... D.No. 39898 of 2022, M.A. ... D.No. 40951 of 2022, M.A. ... D.No. [2024] 5 S.C.R. 1165Government of NCT of Delhi & Anr. v. M/s BSK Realtors LLP & Anr. 42177 of 2022, M.A. ... D.No. 1215 of 2023, M.A. ... D.No. 1713 of 2023, M.A. No. 1888 of 2023 In C.A. No. 352 of 2023, C.A. Nos. 6630, 6631, 6632 and 6633-6634 of 2024, M.A. No. 806 of 2020 in C.A. No. 2690 of 2017, C.A. Nos. 6981, 6635, 6636, 6637, 6638, 6639, 6640, 6641, 6642 and 6643 of 2024, SLP(C) D.No. 18142 of 2022, C.A. Nos. 6658 and 6644 of 2024, SLP(C) D. No.19142 of 2022, C.A. No. 6659 of 2024, SLP(C) D. No.19687 of 2022, C.A. Nos. 6660, 6648, 6661, 6662, 6647 and 6663 of 2024, SLP(C) D. Nos. 20104 and 20203 of 2022, C.A. Nos. 6645, 6664 and 6646 of 2024 and M.A. ... D.No. 32991 of 2023.
Appearances for Parties R. Venkataramani, Attorney General, Ms. Aishwariya Bhati, K M Nataraj, A.S.Gs., Ms. Rachna Shrivastva, Sanjay Poddar, V. Chitambaresh, Gopal Sankaranarayanan, C.A. Sundaram, Dhruv Mehta, Ashish Dholakia, Jayant Mehta, Vinay Garg, Ravinder Sethi, Kailash Vasdev, A.K Panda, Sr. Advs., Atul Kumar, Ms. Sweety Singh, Ms. Archana Kumari, Rahul Pandey, AVS Kadyan, Chintan Singhal, Ms. Sonali Jain, Abhishek Pandey, Raman Yadav, Kartikay Aggarwal, Ms. Sujeeta Srivastava, Ms. Monika, Ms. Poornima Singh, Ms. Manisha Chava, Ms. BLN Shivani, Rustam Singh Chauhan, Ms. Niharika Ahluwalia, Ms. Sonakshi Chaturvedi, M/s. Saharya & Co., Varun Punia, Ms. Manika Tripathy, Ashutosh Kaushik, Rony John, Ms. Astha Tyagi, Nishit Agrawal, Ms. Prachi Bajpai, Chandra Prakash, Ms. Shalini Chandra, Ashwani Kumar, Kedar Nath Tripathy, Ram Naresh Yadav, Ms. Malvika Kapila, Ms. Tanwangi Shukla, Nitin Mishra, Ms. Sunieta Ojha, Ms. Vasudha Priyansha, Vineet Malhotra, Mohit Paul, Vishal Gohri, Ms. Rangoli Seth, Ms. Sanjleena Lal, N. Balraj, Soumik Ghosal, Pankaj Bhagat, Ms. Trisha Chandran, Vishal Sinha, Ms. Prerna Raman, Zafar Inayat, Ms. Rohini Musa, A. Gupta, M. C. Dhingra, Sumit Bansal, Udai Bir Singh Kochar, Utsav Garg, Mrs. Madhavi Yadav, Ms. Prashi Tyagi, Vikrant Yadav, Yashraj Singh Deora, Priyesh Mohan Srivastava, Abhishek Singh, Ms. Sonal K Chopra, Bharat Arora, Manikya Khanna, Raghav Bhatia, Sharath Sampath, Aprit Kumar Singh, Tarun Mehta, Aditya Krishna, M/s. Vedya Partners, Siddharth Batra, S.K. Raout, Chinmay Dubey, Ms. Shivani Chawla, Ms. Archna Yadav, Rhythm Katyal, Ashutosh Chugh, Pratyush Arora, Kunal Yograj Verma, Jasbir Singh Malik, Ms. Chandni Sharma, Ms. Divya Mishra, Manish Paliwal, Udaibir 1166 [2024] 5 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports Singh Kochar, Parv Garg, Pawas Kulshreshtha, Karandeep Singh Rekhi, Puneet Sharma, Mahesh Prasad, Ms. Aashi Gupta, Shambu Prasad, Sher Singh, Alok K. Prasad, B.L. Shivhare, Rajesh Singh Chauhan, Mukesh Kumar Maroria, Ms. Sushma Suri, Ranjit Kumar Sharma, Rajeev Ghawana, Neelaksh Sharma, Vikalp Chandela, T.V.S. Raghavendra Sreyas, Siddharth Vasudev, Ms. Kiran Ahlawat, Prithvi Pal, S K Rout, Dr. N. Pradeep Sharma, Ganesh Singh, Priyonkoo Anjan Gogoi, Amit Acharya, Mayank Gupta, Ms. Sristhi Jain, Onkar Prasad, Ms. Shruti Vaibhav, Aman Mehrotra, Pramod B. Agarwala, Chandra Bhushan Prasad, Gagan Gupta, Udaibir Kochar, R.B. Singh, Mohit Kumar Gupta, Arvind Kumar Gupta, Vikas Kumar, Mukesh Kumar Verma, Vikas Gupta, Vivek Gupta, Lav Kumar Agrawal, Nikhil Tyagi, Ajay Marwah, Vinay K. Shailendra, Jagjit Singh Chhabra, Saksham Maheshwari, Abhimanyu Bhandari, N.S. Vasisht, M.P. Bhargava, Ms. Rooh-e-hina Dua, Sahib Kochhar, T. Mahipal, Ms. Charu Ambwani, N S Vasisht, Ms. Jyoti Kataria, M P Bhargava, Aashu Tyagi, Varun Kapur, Mehmood Umar Faruqui, Bankey Bihari, Rajender Pd. Saxena, N.P. Sahni, Vineet Sinha, V.S. Tomar, Rabin Majumder, Rajiv Ranjan Dwivedi, Ms. Rashmi Malhotra, Ravi Bharuka, Aman Mohit Hingorani, Arvind Kumar Sharma, Ms. Smita Maan, Vishal Maan, Aditya Singh, Aakash Sehrawat, Ms. Sunita Sharma, Hariom Singh R., Shalinder Saini, Ms. Mitali Gupta, Ishaan Sharma, Ms. Sambhaavi Sharma, Govind Kumar, Ms. Shagun Sabharwal, Mrs. Sunita Sharma, Balendu Shekhar, Anukalp Jain, A.K Kaul, Rohit Pandey, Amrish Kumar, Gurmeet Singh Makker, Nachiketa Joshi, Pratyush Shrivastava, Prashant Rawat, Rajan Kumar Chourasia, Annirudh Sharma-ii, Ms. Rukhmini Bobde, Ms. Sakshi Kakkar, Ms. Jyoti Mendiratta, Rakesh Kumar-I, Ms. Arti Singh, Mukul Kumar, Ms. Prachi Bajpai, Krishan Kumar, Dharamraj Ohlan, Ms. Charu Nagpal, Krishan Kaushik, Chirag Singhal, Mukesh Kumar, Vishwa Pal Singh, Dr. Rajeev Sharma, Prashant Sharma, Dharmendra Sharma, Vipin Kumar Sharma, Raghuvir Sharma, Ms. Devjani Deka Bharali, Ms. Meena Hasan, Anil Kaushik, Aishwary Jaiswal, Tarun Johri, Anil Kumar Panwar, Rajinder Juneja, Gaurav Singh, Advs. for the appearing parties.
Petitioner-in-person Respondent-in-person Applicant-in-person [2024] 5 S.C.R. 1167Government of NCT of Delhi & Anr. v. M/s BSK Realtors LLP & Anr. Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment TABLE OF CONTENTS* A. PREFACE........................................................................... 5
B. BRIEF RESUME OF FACTS .......................................... 7
C. JUDICIAL TRAJECTORY ............................................... 11
D. CATEGORIZATION OF CASES ...................................... 13
E. SUBMISSIONS ................................................................ 18 F. ANALYSIS ....................................................................... 24 F.1 Res judicata................................................................ 24 F.2 Suppression of material facts by appellants.............. 28 F.3 Merger......................................................................... 31 F.4 Allegations of fraud committed by landowners........... 38 G. CONCLUSION.................................................................. 41 ANNEXURE 1.......................................................................... 53
1. In view of the reasons assigned in the judgment pronounced by Hon’ble Surya Kant, J., speaking for the three of us minutes before in Delhi Development Authority v. Tejpal and others,1 delay in presentation of all the Special Leave Petitions (“SLPs”, hereafter) under consideration stands condoned except those mentioned in Group B.2, which have been rendered infructuous as discussed later in this judgment, and Group D which we have directed to be de-tagged for separate listing.
2. Special leave is granted in all the SLPs except those in Group B.2 and Group D.
A. PREFACE
3. We are confronted with a peculiar situation where the Latin maxim “interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium” (it is in the interest of the State * Ed. Note: Pagination as per the original Judgment.
1 Civil Appeal No…………of 2024 arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 26697/2019 1168 [2024] 5 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports that there be an end to litigation) notwithstanding, it is the State itself that has initiated a second round of litigation before this Court after culmination of the first round and sown the seeds for days’ of hearing engaging our attention to erudite arguments from learned counsel on both sides. We are now tasked to decide on which side the Court should lean.
4. The quest for primacy between private interest and public interest has been a matter of debate for years together; the scales, however, seem to have tilted, ever so slightly, in favour of the latter. Yet, between the devil and the deep sea, we endeavour to construct a bridge—a ‘setu’—to strike a harmonious balance for the greater good; all, while adhering to the enduring Latin dictum “salus populi suprema lex esto”, a principle that reinforces the paramountcy of the people’s welfare as the supreme law.
5. There is one other aspect which needs emphasis. Justice, alone of all virtues, implies a notion of duty. As Judges of this Court, we are duty-bound to not only uphold the law but also ensure its consistent application. In navigating through the crisis, chaos, and confusion presented by the several sets of appeals before us, we are committed to ensure consistency, clarity, and coherence and strike a delicate, yet, necessary balance to arrive at a harmonious resolution. In the course of rectifying the aftermath of rulings and overrulings, and grappling with complexities surrounding questions of limitations, maintainability, merger doctrine, etc., our commitment to justice remains resolute.
6. With these prefatory words, we now proceed to decide the various sets of appeals before us.
B. BRIEF RESUME OF FACTS
7. While there are multiple civil appeals, which we are tasked to decide, a particular SLP 2 was referred to a Bench of three Judges by a Bench of two Judges vide order dated 21 st July, 2022. In view of grant of leave by us, this would be treated as the lead matter.
8. We place on record that it is pursuant to the said order dated 21 st July, 2022 that all these appeals have been listed before us, in deference to orders made by the Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India. 2 Diary No. 17623/2021 [2024] 5 S.C.R. 1169Government of NCT of Delhi & Anr. v. M/s BSK Realtors LLP & Anr.
9. Before delving deep into the intricacies presented by these civil appeals, it would be apposite to trace the factual trajectory of the lead matter culminating in the present stage:
a) The facts are noticed from the Civil Appeal 3 arising out of the Writ Petition 4 instituted before the High Court of Delhi (“High Court”, hereafter) by the first respondent, M/s BSK Realtors LLP. Land acquisition proceedings had been initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (“1894 Act,” hereafter) to acquire several parcels of lands. Land belonging to M/s BSK Realtors LLP comprised in Khasra No.623(5-10) measuring 5 bighas 10 biswas in Chattarpur village also formed part of the proceedings. The High Court vide its judgment and order dated 11 th January, 2016 allowed the writ petition. In so allowing, it relied on the decision of this Court in Pune Municipal Corporation and another v. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki and others 5 and similar line of decisions. It was held in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) that if any one of the two ingredients of section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (“2013 Act”, hereafter) was attracted, i.e., either the physical possession of the land was not taken or the compensation was not paid, as the case may be, the acquisition proceedings under challenge would be deemed to have lapsed. As a matter of fact, the High Court found all the ingredients of section 24(2) of the 2013 Act as interpreted by the Supreme Court to be satisfied despite Award No.15/87- 88 dated 5 th June 1987 and hence, declared the acquisition proceedings to have lapsed.
b) Aggrieved thereby, the beneficiary of the acquisition proceedings- Delhi Development Authority (second respondent herein) (“DDA”, hereafter), carried such judgment and order in appeal praying for it to be set aside. After granting leave, a Bench of two Hon’ble Judges of this Court vide judgment and order dated 3 GNCTD & Anr. v. M/S BSK Realtors LLP & Anr., Diary No. 17623/2021 4 W.P. (C) No. 7442/2015
5 (2014) 3 SCC 183
1170 [2024] 5 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports 31st August, 2016 dismissed the Civil Appeal.6 It was observed that the issue, in principle, had already been adjudicated against DDA in a previous judgment and order of a co-ordinate Bench of this Court in a related matter.7 DDA was granted extension by a period of one year to avail the liberty of initiating acquisition proceedings afresh under section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. This marked the culmination of the first round of litigation. c) However, on 06 th March, 2020, the decision in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) was overturned by a Constitution Bench of five Hon’ble Judges in Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal and others [5-Judge, lapse] 8 holding that land acquisition proceedings lapse only when the twin conditions are met, i.e., non-payment of compensation to the landowners together with failure of the State to take physical possession of the acquired lands. Leveraging this, Government of NCT of Delhi (first appellant herein) (“GNCTD”, hereafter) approached this Court through a SLP 9 (the lead matter) wherein M/s BSK Realtors LLP and DDA were impleaded as the first and second respondents, respectively. It was contended on behalf of GNCTD that the judgment and order dated 11 th January, 2016 rendered by the High Court ought to be reconsidered in view of Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra).
d) A preliminary objection qua the maintainability of the SLP was raised by M/s BSK Realtors LLP. The first contention in line with the doctrine of merger was that the order of the High Court dated 11 th January, 2016 had merged with the order dated 31 st August, 2016 of this Court whereby the civil appeal at the instance of DDA was dismissed. Such dismissal, M/s BSK Realtors LLP further contended, was after grant of leave and by a speaking order upon hearing all the parties involved. M/s BSK Realtors LLP also contended that the order dated 11 th January, 2016, upon its merger with the order dated 31 st August, 2016, ceased to exist and GNCTD being a party to the 6 Civil Appeal No. 8670/2016 7 Civil Appeal No. 8477/2016 arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 8467/2015 8 [2020] 3 SCR 1 : (2020) 8 SCC 129 9 Diary No. 17623/2021 [2024] 5 S.C.R. 1171Government of NCT of Delhi & Anr. v. M/s BSK Realtors LLP & Anr. civil appeal filed by DDA, the same would disentitle GNCTD from initiating a new round of litigation to have the order dated 11 th January, 2016 reversed on the specious ground that the decision in Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra) has been rendered after dismissal of the civil appeal of DDA, overruling the decision in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra). Accordingly, it was submitted that the SLP not being maintainable deserved outright dismissal.
e) Observing that the issue requires deeper examination, a Bench of two Hon’ble Judges, vide the said order dated 21 st July, 2022, directed that the matter be placed before a three-Judge Bench. The relevant portion of the said order is extracted hereunder:
“According to the land-losers, rejection of challenge to the declaration of lapsing at the instance of Authority or State, would dis-entitle the other (i.e., Authority or State) to maintain successive petition against the same judgment; and especially where in the earlier round leave to appeal was granted by this Court and the appeal had been disposed of after hearing all concerned. In other words, the doctrine of merger is being invoked to buttress this preliminary objection. On the other hand, Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, learned Additional Solicitor General is relying on the observations/dictum of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Indore Development Authority vs.
Manoharlal & Ors. reported in (2020) 8 SCC 129 to contend that the effect of the declaration or conclusion recorded therein is to efface all the orders passed in the concerned special leave petition or civil appeal following the decision in Pune Municipal Corporation & Anr. Harakchand Misirmal Solanki & Ors. reported in 2014 (3) SCC 183 — which has been expressly overruled and as noted in paragraph 365 of the reported decision. (Indore Development Authority).
It is urged that the effect of such overruling is to efface all the orders, including passed by this Court relying on Pune Municipal Corporation (Supra).
1172 [2024] 5 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports […] Suffice it to observe that these matters require deeper examination, for which the same need to be placed before the three Judge Bench for hearing on 17.08.2022.”
(underlining ours, for emphasis)
10. As observed above, it is by virtue of this order that we now have the occasion to decide the issue raised by parties on both the sides.
C. JUDICIAL TRAJECTORY
11. Having noticed the facts in the lead matter, we must at this stage acknowledge the predicament of being faced with a peculiar dusty situation where we are tasked not only to clear our path to adjudicate a similar issue on separate fronts but also to ensure that the law on this matter settles the dust so raised. This exercise would necessitate harmonising the different routes that we are bound to traverse to reach the same destination. Hence, notwithstanding the expense of reiterating the foregoing, it is imperative to navigate the broader judicial trajectory that has brought us to the current stage. a) Relying upon the decision of this Court in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) and similar line of decisions, the High Court vide various judgments and orders, allowed writ petitions filed by the several affected landowners (“landowners”, hereafter). b) Discontented, the aggrieved authorities [being the respondents in the writ petitions including DDA, GNCTD, Land Acquisition Collector (“LAC”, hereafter), and Land & Building Department (“L&B”, hereafter)] carried such judgments and orders independently by way of their respective SLPs impleading the other, however, as a co-respondent. This triggered the first round of litigation (“first round”, hereafter) yielding diverse outcomes which are categorized as follows: first, in some cases, leave was granted but the civil appeals were subsequently dismissed (or allowed, in handful of cases); second, in some cases, leave was not granted and the SLPs were dismissed in limine; and third, where SLPs/civil appeals are still pending adjudication. c) Dismissal of the civil appeals/SLPs brought about a quietus. However, in the light of change in law consequent to the decision [2024] 5 S.C.R. 1173Government of NCT of Delhi & Anr. v. M/s BSK Realtors LLP & Anr. in Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra), such of the authorities (DDA, GNCTD, LAC, and L&B) who had not earlier challenged the judgments and orders of the High Court declaring land acquisition proceedings as lapsed, approached this Court by way of SLPs/Miscellaneous Applications (“M.A.s”, hereafter)/ Review Petitions. This triggered the second round of litigation (“second round”, hereafter), however, with the status of the aggrieved authorities being transposed. For instance, filing of SLP by GNCTD impleading DDA as the second respondent in the lead matter, as noticed above, whereas GNCTD was the second respondent in the first round initiated by DDA. d) Upon the appeals being placed before us, we are entrusted with resolving the issue, or for that matter issues, outlined later in the judgment.
12. Since the authorities (DDA, GNCTD, LAC, and L&B) jointly harbour a shared grievance and individually act as appellants in the ongoing proceedings, they will be collectively denoted as “appellants” hereafter, notwithstanding the transposition of the authorities as parties or their status as respondents in the second round. Insofar as the affected landowners are concerned, they shall be referred to as “landowners” or “aggrieved parties”, as the context would require.
D. CATEGORIZATION OF CASES
13. Each of the Civil Appeals/M.A.s before us may necessitate separate directions. We have, therefore, categorised them in six groups based on varied outcomes in the first round of litigation and their respective status in the second round of litigation for ease of reference.
14. A brief overview of the groups we have carved out for the facility of reference is as under:
a) Group A deals with M.A.s filed by the appellants-authorities primarily pleading change in law and seeking recall of the judgments and orders of this Court dismissing the Civil Appeals and/or Review Petitions in the first round.
b) Group B.1 includes cases where Civil Appeals were dismissed in the first round, and now an SLP (now Civil Appeal, leave having been granted by us) is pending before us in the second round.
1174 [2024] 5 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports c) Cases categorized under Group B.2 encompass the following scenarios:
i. Four cases where the Civil Appeals of the appellantsauthorities were allowed in the first round and the SLPs, filed during the pendency of the appeals in the first round, are pending before us in the second round (present batch). ii. One case where the appeal, filed by the appellant-authority subsequent to the SLP pending before us in the present round, was allowed after granting leave.
d) Group C.1 covers a case where an SLP was dismissed in limine in the first round, and now an SLP (now Civil Appeal, leave having been granted by us) is pending before us in the second round. In this particular case, the land acquisition proceedings would lapse following the test laid down in Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra) as the twin conditions under section 24(2) of the 2013 Act are met [non-payment of compensation to the landowners together with failure of the State to take physical possession of the acquired lands]. e) Group C.2 covers a case where an SLP was dismissed in limine in the first round, and now an SLP (now Civil Appeal, leave having been granted by us) is pending before us in the second round. In this particular case, land acquisition proceedings would not lapse following the test laid down in Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra) as the twin conditions under section 24(2) of the 2013 Act are not met.
f) Group C.3 involves cases where during pendency of the SLP in the first round, the appellants approached this Court with a fresh SLP owing to a change in law. While in some cases both the SLPs (now Civil Appeals) are pending before us in the present batch, in some cases, the other SLP is pending separately and is not part of the present batch. There are also a few cases where there is only one SLP filed and the same is now pending as a Civil Appeal in the present batch after grant of leave.
g) Group D are miscellaneous matters which have been tagged incorrectly with the present batch and they follow separate [2024] 5 S.C.R. 1175Government of NCT of Delhi & Anr. v. M/s BSK Realtors LLP & Anr. directions. Group D also involves cases where no notice has been issued by this Court till date.
h) Cases falling under Group E generally involve allegations related to subsequent sale transactions by landowners. There are certain cases where this position is admitted. Some cases also include allegations regarding the ownership title of the land in question. Additionally, in a few instances, the appellants claim that the land in question is vested in Gaon Sabha, a fact which the landowners and affected parties have suppressed. These cases require thorough fact-finding, as determined later, and are therefore addressed separately. Cases categorized under Group E may overlap with Groups A to C (excluding Group B.2, which we propose to dismiss as infructuous infra). As a result, any directions issued under Group E are intended exclusively for that category alone, and such cases shall be automatically excluded from the purview of Groups A to C. For added clarity, it is stated that all cases falling under Group E are proposed to be remitted to the High Court, regardless of their classification within the aforementioned categories. i) We set out hereinbelow in tabular form the cases covered by the aforesaid groups:
GROUP SUB-
GROUPS DESCRIPTION
TOTAL
NUMBER
OF
CASES
GROUP A
(M.A.s)
Not Applicable M.A.s filed by the appellantsauthorities primarily pleading change in law and seeking recall of the judgments and orders of this Court dismissing the Civil Appeals and/or Review Petitions in the first round.
GROUP B
(Civil Appeal in first round)
Group B.1 Civil Appeal dismissed in the first round; SLP pending in the second round (present batch)
Group B.2 Civil Appeal allowed in the first round; SLP pending in the second round (present batch)
1176 [2024] 5 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports
GROUP C
(SLP in first round)
Group C.1 SLP dismissed in limine in the first round; SLP pending in the second round (present batch)
• Land acquisition proceedings would lapse following the test laid down in Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra) as the twin conditions under section 24(2)
of the 2013 Act are met [nonpayment of compensation to the landowners together with failure of the State to take physical possession of the acquired lands].
Group C.2 SLP dismissed in limine in the first round; SLP pending in the second round (present batch)
• Land acquisition proceedings would not lapse following the test laid down in Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra) as the twin conditions under section 24(2) of the 2013 Act are not met.
Group C.3 SLP from either the first round or both rounds is pending in the present batch • Land acquisition proceedings would not lapse following the test laid down in Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra) as the twin conditions under section 24(2) of the 2013 Act are not met.
GROUP D
(Miscellaneous matters)
Group D.1 • Cases filed by landowners;
• Cases seeking a different relief;
• Cases where no notice has been issued either on delay or on merits Group D.2 Cases where no notice has been issued either on delay or on merits
TOTAL 81
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 1177Government of NCT of Delhi & Anr. v. M/s BSK Realtors LLP & Anr.
GROUP E
(Suppression of facts qua subsequent purchaser/title etc.)
Not Applicable Cases where the landowners are alleged to have committed fraud by suppressing facts regarding them being subsequent purchasers and/or the land being vested in Gaon Sabha Note: Cases categorized under Group E, owing to their distinct facts and circumstances, may overlap with Groups A to C (excluding Group B.2, which we propose to dismiss as infructuous). As a result, any directions issued under Group E are intended exclusively for that category alone, and such cases shall be automatically excluded from the purview of Groups A to C. For added clarity, it is stated that all cases falling under Group E shall be remanded back to the High Court, regardless of their classification within the aforementioned categories. A detailed table listing each case along with its respective group has been appended to this order for easy reference.
E. SUBMISSIONS
15. Given the significance of the present exercise, an array of distinguished counsel from both sides — including the learned Attorney General, learned Additional Solicitor General, and other senior counsel — appeared before us. While it may not be necessary for the purpose of disposal of these appeals to record in detail the extensive submissions made at the Bar by them, for the sake of completeness, we propose to provide a concise overview of the arguments presented.
16. Counsel for the appellants prayed for allowing the civil appeals, while advancing the following arguments:
On merger, res judicata, and prospective overruling:
a) The doctrine of merger is neither a doctrine of constitutional law nor a doctrine having statutory recognition. It is merely a common law doctrine founded on principles of propriety and does not have universal applicability. Even a speaking order dismissing the SLP would not attract the doctrine.
b) Law declared by the Constitution Bench in Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra) applies retrospectively from 01 st January, 2014. Earlier decision of the previous court shall not operate as res judicata, if the law has been altered. 1178 [2024] 5 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports c) In the first round, the appellants/authorities were arrayed as respondents merely as a formality, without being adequately heard. As a result, the doctrines of merger or res judicata do not apply and the judgment and order issued by this Court in the first round is not binding on these authorities. Such a situation could allow anyone to come forward, get the appeal dismissed, and conclude the lis forever, which is an undesirable outcome. d) By virtue of principles flowing from Rule 4 read with Rule 33 of Order XLI, Code of Civil Procedure (“CPC” hereafter), this Court possesses ample authority to do complete justice, aligned with principles of justice, equity, and good conscience. The mere fact that a petitioner who filed the SLP in the second round was a party to the first round as a respondent would not warrant the application of the doctrine of res judicata.
e) Decisions rendered in the preceding round of litigation, solely relying on judgments that have since been invalidated and effaced, within a brief timeframe, should not be permitted to result in a miscarriage of justice under the pretext of the doctrine of merger. Each case possesses unique and distinct facts, even if they pertain to a common subject.
f) Any factual claim involved in the present appeals may be remanded to the High Court to ensure proper adjudication and prevent miscarriage of justice.
On subsequent purchasers contesting acquisition proceedings: g) A judgment or decree obtained through fraudulent means is void and non-existent in the eyes of the law and can be contested even in a collateral proceeding.
h) Purchasers subsequent to the issuance of a Notification under section 4(1) of the 1894 Act lack the entitlement to assert the lapse of acquisition proceedings on any grounds. In cases where landowners engaged in fraudulent activities by entering into subsequent sale transactions with prior knowledge of the Notification under section 4(1) of the 1894 Act, such subsequent purchasers lack entitlement to initiate a case for declaration. They do not acquire any legal rights in the land, as the sale is fundamentally void ab initio, thereby disqualifying them from asserting the lapse of acquisition proceedings or claiming the land under the policy.
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 1179Government of NCT of Delhi & Anr. v. M/s BSK Realtors LLP & Anr. i) Although the Bench of two Hon’ble Judges in Govt (NCT) of Delhi v. Manav Dharam Trust and another10 had recognised the right of the subsequent purchasers, such decision is no longer good law in view of the same being overruled by a Bench of three Hon’ble Judges in Shiv Kumar and another v. Union of India and others11 and such decision having found approval in Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra).
On principles of consistency and public interest j) The constitutional tenets of consistency, the rule of law, and the principle of “actus curiae neminem gravabit” embody the fundamental and foundational principles of justice.
k) The Government and Public Sector Undertakings, acting in the public interest and with good faith, aim to avoid burdening the court dockets unnecessarily.
l) However, the appeals at hand present a unique situation not hitherto dealt with by any judicial pronouncement of this Court and bearing in mind the gravamen of the appellants’ complaint and the extent of public interest at stake, the Court may not take a view which would throw asunder the developmental works undertaken by the appellants on the acquired lands.
17. Counsel for the landowners and the affected parties urged this Court to dismiss the appeals at the outset, being devoid of merits. The following submissions were advanced by them:
On merger:
a) In cases where this Court had previously granted leave and dismissed the appeal, the doctrine of merger would apply and the judgment and order of the High Court would stand merged into the judgment and order of this Court. The judgment and order of the High Court cannot thereafter be challenged by any party, as it has ceased to exist. The doctrine applies regardless of whether the appeal has been dismissed through a speaking or a non-speaking order.
10 [2017] 4 SCR 232 : (2017) 6 SCC 751 11 [2019] 13 SCR 695 : (2019) 10 SCC 229 1180 [2024] 5 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports b) Additionally, whether there has been a discussion of facts in the judgment(s) of this Court will be immaterial as it has resulted in a merger with the judgment and order of the High Court where the facts were discussed.
On res judicata c) The principles of res judicata and analogous principles embodied in section 11, CPC and its Explanations clearly apply to the present appeals. Even an erroneous decision, whether on facts or law, would bind the parties. The acquiring authorities (GNCTD, LAP, L&B Department), and the beneficiary (DDA) share a common interest in the acquisition of land for public purpose. When either of the parties litigates, one is deemed to litigate on behalf of all interested parties. Thus, the dismissal of a civil appeal preferred by one of the authorities, would act as res judicata against the other authority.
d) The appellants were granted one-year period to commence fresh acquisition proceedings. With the expiry of this timeframe, the State’s right has been closed for all intents and purposes. It cannot now contest this Court’s order and assert a reversal of the lapse of acquisition proceedings.
On subsequent purchasers contesting acquisition proceedings: e) None of the appeals has alleged any form of fraud practised by the affected parties. Legal principles dictate that when fraud is asserted, it must be expressly pleaded in accordance with the provisions of Order VI Rules 2 & 4, CPC. The law does not permit unsubstantiated assertions to be made solely through oral arguments. The appellants have not succeeded in establishing that a subsequent sale transaction occurred with prior knowledge after the Notification under section 4(1) of the 1894 Act. Without evidence of such foresight and dishonest intention, the claim of fraud cannot be substantiated. f) The decisions of the High Court in Ranjana Bhatia v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi and another12 and Sparsh Properties Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India and others 13 sanctioned subsequent 12 (2014) SCC OnLine Del 2151 13 (2014) SCC OnLine Del 6659 [2024] 5 S.C.R. 1181Government of NCT of Delhi & Anr. v. M/s BSK Realtors LLP & Anr. purchasers to pursue a declaration of a right that had already vested in the landowners under the deeming provision of section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. These decisions were given a further seal of approval by the decision of a Bench of two Hon’ble Judges of this Court in Manav Dharam Trust (supra). Therefore, the change in law occasioned by its overruling in Shiv Kumar (supra) cannot be utilised as a crutch to claim that subsequent purchasers cannot seek a declaration of lapsing.
g) In any event, the decision in Shiv Kumar (supra) is not good law and requires reconsideration by a larger Bench of this Court.
F. ANALYSIS
18. Having heard the arguments presented by both sides at length on different issues, we propose segmenting our analysis accordingly. The following issues emerge for our consideration:
a) Whether the dismissal of a civil appeal preferred by one appellant in the first round operates as res judicata against the other appellant in the second round before us?
b) Whether suppression of the first round of litigation by the appellants constitutes a material fact, thereby inviting an outright dismissal of the appeals at the threshold?
c) Does the doctrine of merger operate as a bar to entertain the civil appeals in the present case?
d) Whether the previous determination of the rights of subsequent purchasers in an inter se dispute precludes the same issue from being reconsidered between the same parties?
F.1 Res judicata
19. The first issue we noticed at the start of our analysis stems from the submission pertaining to res judicata. Counsel for the landowners, pressing the applicability of the principle of res judicata to the present appeals, submitted that the dismissal of a Civil Appeal preferred by one of the appellants in the first round, would act as res judicata against the other in subsequent round/s of litigation. The appellants contested the same and submitted that res judicata would not apply to the current proceedings.
1182 [2024] 5 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports
20. Would the rule of res judicata operate against the co-respondents before the High Court, namely GNCTD and DDA, and preclude us from looking into the merits of the present set of appeals, is the question that we propose to examine and answer now.
21. Nearly a century ago, a Bench of three Hon’ble Judges of the Privy Council in Munni Bibi (since deceased) and another v. Tirloki Nath and others14 laid down the following three conditions for the application of res judicata between co-defendants:
“(1.) There, must be a conflict of interest between the defendants concerned; (2.) it must be necessary to decide this conflict in order to give the plaintiff the relief he claims; and (3.) the question between the defendants must have been finally decided.”
22. In State of Gujarat and others v. M.P. Shah Charitable Trust and others,15 a Bench comprising two Hon’ble Judges ruled that the principle of res judicata applies only when there has been a directly and substantially disputed issue between the parties, which the court has heard and conclusively resolved. The relevant extract of the decision is extracted hereunder:
“17. […] For attracting the rule of res judicata between co-defendants — according to the terms in Section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code which provision of course is not, in terms, applicable to proceedings in a writ petition — it is necessary that there should have been some issue directly and substantially in controversy between them which has been heard and finally decided by the court. Same would be the position, where a plea of res judicata is sought to be raised between co-respondents in a writ petition, on the general principles of res judicata. Since the said basic requirement is not satisfied, the said judgment cannot be treated as res judicata between the trust and the Government.
(underlining ours, for emphasis)
14 AIR 1931 PC 114
15 [1994] 3 SCR 163 : (1994) 3 SCC 552 [2024] 5 S.C.R. 1183Government of NCT of Delhi & Anr. v. M/s BSK Realtors LLP & Anr.
23. In the lead matter before us or for that matter the other appeals, the co-respondents before the High Court, namely, GNCTD and DDA did not have conflicting interests. Inter se them, neither was there any disputed issue, nor could have the High Court possibly adjudicated on any such issue. Before this Court too, in the first round, there was no issue on which GNCTD and DDA were at loggerheads. In the light of this, in accordance with the aforementioned legal principle, the applicability of res judicata is negated.
24. A brief review of the ruling in Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal and others v. Dossibai N.B. Jeejeebhoy 16 will also guide us to the resolution of the second issue on the applicability of res judicata. In the said decision, the first-instance court and the High Court rejected an application seeking fixation of standard rent, holding that the provisions of the Rent Act did not extend to open land, relying upon an earlier decision. However, this Court later overturned the said decision, affirming the applicability of the Rent Act to open land as well. When A filed a fresh application, B opposed it, claiming it was barred by res judicata. Dismissing this argument and affirming the application’s viability, a Bench of three Hon’ble Judges of this Court observed thus:
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