Shoma Kanti Sen v. The State of Maharashtra & Anr.
- Citation
- 2024 INSC 269; [2024] 4 S.C.R. 270
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Aniruddha Bose, Justice Augustine George Masih
- Decided
- 5 Apr 2024
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 2595/2023
- Sections
- 34, 21(2), 15, 162, 184, 18, 120, 207, 43, 439, 164, 482
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:23 am. Original source ↗
Preview: first 50% of the document.
* Author [2024] 4 S.C.R. 270 : 2024 INSC 269 Shoma Kanti Sen v.
The State of Maharashtra & Anr.
(Criminal Appeal No. 2595 of 2023)
05 April 2024 [Aniruddha Bose* and Augustine George Masih, JJ.] Issue for Consideration The appellant was detained on 06.06.2018. The appellant assails the order of a Division Bench of the High Court passed on 17.01.2023, disposing her application for bail with liberty to approach the Trial Court for filing a fresh application for bail. The issue arises for consideration that whether the offences under Part IV & VI of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, alleged to have been committed by the appellant, are prima facie true or not. Headnotes Penal Code, 1860 – ss. 153A, 505 (1b), 117 r/w. s.34 – Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 – ss.13, 16, 17, 18, 18B, 20, 4 38, 39, 40 & 43-D– National Investigation Agency Act, 2008 – The prosecution’s case is that in a programme, provocative speeches were delivered and there were cultural performances which resulted in disruption of communal harmony, violence, and loss of life – Police conducted raids – The State Police, allegedly, found incriminatory materials – According to prosecution, the State Police had discovered a larger conspiracy of which the appellant was a part – They found that CPI (Maoist) to be behind such conspiracy – The latter being a banned terrorist organisation, led to invoking offences under the 1967 Act – Appellant was arrested – After that the initial chargesheet and supplementary charge-sheet was submitted by the State Police invoking allegations of commission of offences under sections of the 1860 Code r/w. Sections of the 1967 Act – Bail application of appellant was rejected by trial Court – Appellant filed regular bail application before the High Court – Meanwhile, investigation was transferred to NIA – Single judge directed to file bail application before the Division Bench of the High Court considering the provisions of s.21(2) of the 2008 Act – The Division Bench disposed of [2024] 4 S.C.R. 271Shoma Kanti Sen v. The State of Maharashtra & Anr. the appellant’s prayer for bail, giving liberty to the appellant to approach the Trial Court for filing a fresh application for bail – Permissibility:
Held: The course adopted by the High Court was a permissible course – However, the appellant has been in detention for almost six years, her age is over 66 years suffering from various ailments and charges have not yet been framed – Having taken these factors into account, it would not be in the interest of justice to remand the matter to the Special Court constituted under the 2008 Act at this stage – Bail of the appellant required to be considered on merits – NIA responded to the necessity of detention of the appellant at this stage in negative – There is no allegation at this stage that apart from being present, she had any further active participation on that date in the programme – She was also not named in the initial FIR – On examining the acts attributed to the appellant by the various witnesses or as inferred from the evidence relied on by the prosecution, there is no prima facie commission or attempt to commit any terrorist act by the appellant applying the test for invoking s.15 r/w. s.162 of the 1967 Act – On the allegations of raising funds for a terrorist act, there are mere third-party allegations that money has been directed to be sent to her – None of the materials reveal receipt of any funds by her or her direct role in raising or collecting funds – As regards the allegation against the appellant for committing an offence u/s. 184 of the 1967 Act are concerned, the materials collected so far, only reveal her participation in some meetings and her attempt to encourage women to join the struggle for new democratic revolution – These allegations, prima facie, do not reveal the commission of an offence u/s. 18 of the 1967 Act – There are no specific materials or statements produced by the prosecution which attribute acts of recruitment in banned organization by the appellant – Evidence of her involvement in any fund-raising activities for the CPI (Maoist) or her support to the said organisation has not transpired through any reliable evidence at this stage – Mere meeting of accused individuals or being connected with them through any medium cannot implicate one in Chapter VI offences under of the 1967 Act, in the absence of any further evidence of being associated with a terrorist organisation – On perusal of the evidences collected against her as also the allegations made by prosecution witnesses, there is no reasonable ground for believing that the accusations against the appellants for commission of the offences incorporated 272 [2024] 4 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports in Chapter IV and VI of the 1967 Act are prima facie true – Thus, the impugned judgment set aside and the appellant directed to be released on bail with conditions. [Paras 14, 15, 23, 24, 30, 31, 32, 35, 36, 42] Case Law Cited Vernon v. The State of Maharashtra & Anr. [2023] 10 SCR 867 : (2023) INSC 655 – relied on.
State of Haryana v. Basti Ram [2013] 4 SCR 850 : (2013) 4 SCC 200; State of Andhra Pradesh, through Inspector General, National Investigation Agency v. Mohd. Hussain alias Salim [2013] 11 SCR 140 : (2014) 1 SCC 258;
National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali [2019] 5 SCR 1060 : (2019) 5 SCC 1; Gurwinder Singh v. State of Punjab [2024] 2 SCR 134 : (2024)
INSC 92; K.A. Najeeb v. Union of India [2021] 1 SCR 443 : (2021) 3 SCC 713; Mazhar Khan v. N.I.A. New Delhi; Shaheen Welfare Association v. Union of India and Others [1996] 2 SCR 1123 : (1996) 2 SCC 616;
Angela Harish Sontakke v. State of Maharashtra (2021)
3 SCC 723 – referred to.
List of Acts Penal Code, 1860; Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967; National Investigation Agency Act, 2008; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
List of Keywords Provocative speeches; Disruption of communal harmony, violence, and loss of life; Detention; Incarceration for a long period; Nonframing of charges; Bail; Commission or attempt to commit any terrorist act; Third-party allegations; Direct role in raising or collecting funds; Punishment for terrorist activities; Terrorist Organizations.
Case Arising From CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 2595 of 2023 From the Judgment and Order dated 17.01.2023 of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in CRMBA No. 118 of 2020 [2024] 4 S.C.R. 273Shoma Kanti Sen v. The State of Maharashtra & Anr. Appearances for Parties K M Nataraj, A.S.G., Anand Grover, Mihir Desai, Sr. Advs., Paras Nath Singh, Rohin Bhatt, Ms. Nupur Kumar, Ms. Aparna Bhat, Ms. Karishma Maria, Ms. Rishika Agarwal, Kanu Agarwal, Mrs. Swati Ghirdiyal, Siddharth Dharmadhikari, Shailesh Madiyal, Anam Venkatesh, Annirudh Sharma Ii, Siddhant Kohli, Ishaan Sharma, Annirudh Bhatt, Amit Sharma B, Arvind Kumar Sharma, Omkar Deshpande, Aaditya Aniruddha Pande, Bharat Bagla, Sourav Singh, Aditya Krishna, Ms. Preet S. Phanse, Adarsh Dubey, Raj Kamal, Aseem Atwal, Shaheen Pradhan, Siddhant Sharma, Maheen Pradhan, Advs. for the appearing parties.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment Aniruddha Bose, J.
The appellant before us assails the order of a Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay passed on 17.01.2023, disposing her application for bail with liberty to approach the Trial Court for filing a fresh application for bail.
2. The appellant was detained on 06.06.2018 in connection with First Investigation Report (“FIR”) no. 04/2018 dated 08.01.2018 registered with Vishrambaug Police Station, Pune alleging commission of offences under Sections 153A, 505 (1b), 117 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (“1860 Code”). The complaints therein related to violence that broke out at a function organised by Elgar Parishad. Certain acts of violence had taken place at Shanivarwada, Pune on 31.12.2017 thereafter. The prosecution’s case is that in the said programme, provocative speeches were delivered and there were cultural performances which had the effect of creating enmity between caste groups, resulting in disruption of communal harmony, violence, and loss of life. The said FIR was initially lodged against the organisers of the Elgar Parishad event, which included activists of a cultural body, known as Kabir Kala Manch. The appellant before us was not named in that FIR as an accused at that point of time.
3. Subsequently, the scope of investigation was expanded and Section 120-B of the 1860 Code was added to the list of offences on 06.03.2018. The State Police, who were investigating the case at that point of 274 [2024] 4 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports time raided houses of eight accused persons on 17.04.2018, namely
(1) Rona Wilson of Delhi, (2) Surendra Gading of Nagpur, (3) Sudhir Dhawale of Mumbai, (4) Harshali Potdar of Mumbai, (5) Sagar Gorkhe of Pune, (6) Deepak Dhaeagale of Pune, (7) Jyoti Jagtap of Pune and (8) Ramesh Gaychore of Pune. The State Police, allegedly, found incriminatory materials from the residences of the raided persons. The State Police seemed to have had discovered a larger conspiracy of which the appellant was a part, according to the prosecution. They found that Communist Party of India (Maoist) [“CPI (Maoist)”] to be behind such conspiracy. The latter is a banned terrorist organisation, and has been included in the First Schedule of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (“1967 Act”) by an order of the Union Home Ministry dated 22.06.2009. This led to invoking offences under Sections 13, 16, 17, 18, 18B, 20, 38, 39 and 40 of the 1967 Act. On 06.06.2018, appellant’s residence was raided and certain literatures, electronic devices and mobile phones were seized from her. On that date itself, the appellant came to be arrested by the State Police.
4. On 02.11.2018, statement of one Kumarasai was recorded. He had also recorded two other subsequent statements on 23.12.2018 (Annexure P-6 to the appeal-petition) and 24.08.2020. All these statements form a part of the three chargesheets which have been submitted in connection with the subject case and we shall refer to the contents thereof later in this judgment. We would also point out here that on behalf of prosecution, four sets of statements have been produced before us as statements of protected witnesses. But status of two of those witnesses as ‘protected’ was removed by the Special Court constituted under the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008 (“2008 Act”) by an order passed on 27.04.2022. The investigation was transferred to the National Investigation Agency (“NIA”) on 24.01.2020 and the same case was renumbered as RC-01/2020/ NIA/MUM, with NIA police station, Mumbai. The Special Court held that prior directions to maintain secrecy in respect of identity of KW2 and KW4 ought to be set aside. The names of KW2 and KW4 thus stood removed from the list of protected witnesses. This was done mainly on the ground that copies of statements of those two witnesses had been supplied to the defence under Section 207 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“1973 Code”), which transmitted their names and identities. KW4 is Kumarasai, whose statement we have referred to earlier in this paragraph.
[2024] 4 S.C.R. 275Shoma Kanti Sen v. The State of Maharashtra & Anr.
5. On 15.11.2018, the initial chargesheet was submitted by the State Police invoking allegations of commission of offences under Sections 153A, 501(1)(b), 117, 120B, 121, 121A, 124A & 34 of the 1860 Code read with Sections 13, 16, 17, 18, 18B, 20, 38, 39 & 40 of the 1967 Act. The appellant was implicated in the said chargesheet as accused no. 4 for having committed offences under the aforesaid provisions. In column 10 of this chargesheet, under the heading “Details of accused charge-sheeted (with absconding accused)” names of Sudhir Prahlad Dhavle, Rona Jacob Wilson, Surendra Pundlikrao Gadling, Shoma Sen (the appellant) and Mahesh Sitaram Raut appear as arrested accused whereas names of five other accused persons have been shown as “at present underground”. A supplementary chargesheet was also filed by the State Police on 21.02.2019, broadly under the same provisions, implicating certain other individuals, Varavara Rao, Vernon Gonzalves, Arun Ferreira and Sudha Bhardwaj as accused persons in the same case.
6. After filing of the initial chargesheet, the appellant had preferred a bail application before the Sessions Court at Pune on 13.12.2018. The Additional Sessions Judge, upon going through the two chargesheets dated 15.11.2018 and 21.11.2019, rejected her bail plea by an order dated 06.11.2019. The Sessions Court applied the bail restricting provision contained in Section 43-D (5) of the 1967 Act to deny bail to the appellant. Thereafter, on 09.01.2020, the appellant had filed a regular bail application before the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, invoking the provisions of Section 439 of the 1973 Code.
7. As the investigation had been transferred to the NIA during subsistence of the bail application before the High Court, the learned Single Judge, before whom the appellant’s petition was pending, directed that the bail application ought to be placed before a Division Bench and the NIA was also impleaded as respondent to the said petition. Under normal circumstances, the bail petition would have been heard by a learned Single Judge only. This direction, however, was made considering the provisions of Section 21(2) of the 2008 Act. The order dated 17.07.2021 passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court, placing the bail application before the Division Bench, reads: - "1. Learned counsel for the applicant states that, the case is now being investigated by N.I.A. under the 276 [2024] 4 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports N.I.A. Act. He seeks leave to add N.I.A. as a party respondent. Learned counsel for the applicant seeks two weeks time to carry out amendment. Time is granted.
2. Since the N.I.A. has taken over the investigation, the matter will have to be placed before the Division bench. I have taken this view in Criminal Bail Application No.2024 of 2021 vide order dated 11/06/2021 based on the Hon’ble Supreme Court’s Judgment in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh, through Inspector General, National Investigation Agency, Vs. Mohd. Hussain @ Salim, as reported in (2014) 1 Supreme Court Cases 258.
3. Hence, the following order is passed:
ORDER
(i) Leave to amend is granted to add N.I.A. as a party respondent.
(ii) Amendment shall be carried out within a period of two weeks from today.
(iii) Office to take steps to place this matter before the appropriate Division Bench.
(iv) The applicant shall supply second set of this application.”
8. The Division Bench heard the bail application and by an order passed on 17.01.2023, which is assailed before us, disposed of the appellant’s prayer for bail, giving liberty to the appellant to approach the Trial Court for filing a fresh application for bail. Prior to the passing of the order which is impugned before us, the NIA had submitted a second supplementary chargesheet dated 09.10.2020, implicating seven more persons as accused in the case. They are Anand Teltumbde, Gautam Navlakha, Hany Babu, Sagar Gorkhe, Ramesh Gaychore, Jyoti Jagtap and Stan Swamy. It is the case of the prosecution that the second supplementary chargesheet filed by the NIA contains certain incriminating materials against the appellant as well. It is primarily on account of the second supplementary chargesheet being filed, the Division Bench of the High Court refused to consider [2024] 4 S.C.R. 277Shoma K a n t i Sen v . T h e State o f M a h a r a s h t r a & A n r . the appellant’s petition for bail on merit. The reasoning for such a course being directed by the Division Bench would appear from the following passage of the impugned order: - "2. As noted in Order dated 2nd December, 2022, the investigation of present Crime was subsequently transferred to the National Investigation Agency (for short “the NIA”) in the month of January, 2020 i.e. after passing of the impugned Order. After completion of further investigation, the NIA has filed supplementary charge-sheet in the Special Court (under NIA Act) at Mumbai. The said case arising out of present crime is now pending for final adjudication in the Special Court (under NIA Act) at Mumbai.
3. It is to be noted here that, after the NIA filed supplementary charge-sheet, in view of the substantive change in circumstance, the Applicant did not approach the trial Court, at the first instance for appreciation of evidence by it. This Court therefore does not have the benefit of assessment of entire evidence on record by the trial Court. It is therefore necessary for the Petitioner to approach the trial Court afresh for seeking bail under Section 439 of Criminal Procedure Code, so that the trial Court will get an opportunity to assess entire material available on record against the Applicant. Even otherwise, in view of substantive change in circumstance it is necessary for the Applicant to approach the trial Court by filing a fresh Application for bail.”
9. Appearing on behalf of NIA, learned Additional Solicitor General, Mr. Nataraj, took preliminary objection on maintainability of the present appeal. His counter-affidavit is also founded on that factor. He stressed on the fact that since the first Court of bail had no opportunity to examine the fresh set of accusations emanating from the second supplementary chargesheet, no error was committed by the Division Bench in remanding the matter to the Court of first instance.
10. His argument is that the High Court is an appellate forum on the question of bail, where the 2008 Act is applicable and thus ought not to examine, for the first time, a fresh set of accusations made 278 [2024] 4 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports by the investigating agency. He relied on a judgment of this Court in the case of State of Haryana -vs- Basti Ram [(2013) 4 SCC 200]. A Coordinate Bench of this Court observed in this case:- “27. Normally, we would have gone through the entire evidence on record and decided whether the acquittal of Basti Ram should be sustained or not. However, in the absence of any discussion or analysis of the evidence by the High Court in the first appeal, we are of the opinion that a right of appeal available to Basti Ram would be taken away if we were to consider the case on its merits without the opinion of the High Court. Additionally, for a proper appreciation of the case, it is necessary for us to have the views of the High Court on record. This is important since the High Court has reversed a finding of conviction given by the trial Judge.”
11. This was a case where the respondent-accused was implicated in offences of sexual assault and kidnapping of a minor girl along with other related offences and the accused was convicted by the Trial Court. Conviction of the respondent along with the co-accused was set aside by a Single Judge of the High Court. It was contended by the State before this Court that the judgment of acquittal was passed by the High Court ignoring the statement of prosecutrix, made under Section 164 of the 1973 Code, as also her testimony before the trial court. It was in the context of this argument that the aforesaid judgment was delivered and observations were made in the passage quoted above. The same course, in our opinion, would not be mandatory on the question of considering pre-trial bail plea.
12. So far as the initial and the first supplementary chargesheets filed by the State Police are concerned, the Court of first instance had the occasion to go through the same. But the High Court opined that after transfer of investigation to NIA and filing of the second supplementary chargesheet, which was also placed before the High Court, it should be the Special Court itself which should examine, at the first instance, the content of all the chargesheets, before considering the prayer of an accused for bail. In the present case, when the bail application was filed before the Single Judge of the High Court under Section 439 of the 1973 Code, the second supplementary chargesheet had not been submitted. Under the provisions of the 1973 Code, [2024] 4 S.C.R. 279Shoma K a n t i Sen v . T h e State o f M a h a r a s h t r a & A n r . the jurisdiction of the High Court to consider the question of bail is coordinate with that of the Sessions Court and it has evolved as a matter of practice that an accused seeking bail ought to approach the Sessions Court before approaching the High Court. Thus, at the point of time when the bail petition was filed by the appellant before the High Court, there was no apparent jurisdictional shortcoming in the High Court examining the appellant’s plea for bail. It was also, in our opinion, the proper course which was adopted by the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 439 of the 1973 Code to refer the matter to a Division Bench to decide the bail plea in accordance with Section 21(2) of the 2008 Act. This course has been prescribed in the judgement of this court in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh, through Inspector General, National Investigation Agency -vs- Mohd. Hussain alias Salim [(2014) 1 SCC 258], which was relied upon by the learned Single Judge while placing the bail application before a Division Bench. The relevant portion of this judgement passed by a Coordinate Bench of this Court stipulates: - “27. The order passed by this Court on 2-8-2013 in State of A.P. v. Mohd. Hussain [State of A.P. v. Mohd. Hussain, (2014) 1 SCC 706] is therefore clarified as follows:
27.1. Firstly, an appeal from an order of the Special Court under the NIA Act, refusing or granting bail shall lie only to a Bench of two Judges of the High Court.
27.2. And, secondly as far as Prayer (b) of the petition for clarification is concerned, it is made clear that inasmuch as the applicant is being prosecuted for the offences under the MCOC Act, 1999, as well as the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, such offences are triable only by the Special Court, and therefore application for bail in such matters will have to be made before the Special Court under the NIA Act, 2008, and shall not lie before the High Court either under Section 439 or under Section 482 of the Code. The application for bail filed by the applicant in the present case is not maintainable before the High Court.
27.3. Thus, where the NIA Act applies, the original application for bail shall lie only before the Special Court, and appeal against the orders therein shall lie only to a Bench of two Judges of the High Court.”
280 [2024] 4 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports
13. The factual position which forms the background of the present appellant’s plea for bail is, however, different from that in which the aforesaid judgments were delivered. The appellant before us, at each stage, had applied for bail before the Court which, at that point of time, had regular jurisdiction to consider her application. It was because of supervening circumstances the NIA entered into the picture and then issued the second supplementary chargesheet. The Division Bench, being an appellate forum, has the jurisdiction to look into the facts which may arise subsequent to the order of bail passed by the Court of regular jurisdiction. The order by which the Single Judge, hearing the bail application under Section 439 of the 1973 Code, placed the matter before the Division Bench (in essence, giving the said application the form or character of an appeal under Section 21(2) of the 2008 Act), had not been assailed by any of the parties. We also do not find any error in such a direction having been issued by the Single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 439 of the 1973 Code. It was the same investigation which was continued by the NIA, based on the same FIR. Only the investigating agency had changed. Just because the second supplementary chargesheet had been issued by the NIA after disposal of the bail application by the Sessions Court, it was not the only legal course available to the High Court to remand the matter to the Special Court for examining the second supplementary chargesheet at the first instance. As an Appellate Forum, in the facts of the given case, it was well within the jurisdiction of the High Court exercising its power under Section 21(2) of the 2008 Act, to examine the second supplementary chargesheet as well, while sitting in appeal over the order of rejection of bail by the regular Sessions Court upon considering the first two chargesheets.
14. Now, the question arises as to whether the course adopted by the High Court ought to be invalidated by us simply because another course, which is suggested by the appellant, could also be adopted by the High Court. In our view, under ordinary circumstances, we might not have had interfered with the High Court’s judgment and order which is under appeal before us. The course adopted by the High Court was a permissible course. We, however, must take into account that the High Court had passed the aforesaid order when the appellant, a lady, was in detention for over four and a half years. At present, the appellant has been in detention for almost six years, [2024] 4 S.C.R. 281Shoma Kanti Sen v. The State of Maharashtra & Anr. her age is over 66 years and charges have not yet been framed. The appellant has also moved an application before us, registered as CRL MP No. 166531 of 2023, in which various ailments from which she suffers have been cited and prayer is made for bail on medical grounds as well.
15. Having taken these factors into account, we do not think it would be in the interest of justice to remand the matter to the Special Court constituted under the 2008 Act at this stage. We are taking this view as in our opinion, it would not have been beyond jurisdiction of the High Court Division Bench, even in exercise of appellate power under Section 21(2) of the 2008 Act, to examine the second supplementary chargesheet as well. For these reasons, we decline to accept the preliminary objection raised by Mr. Nataraj and shall proceed to consider here, the appellant’s plea for bail on merit. Now that we have given leave to the appellant in her petition for special leave to appeal, the same appellate jurisdiction which vested in the High Court will vest in us as well and in exercise of such appellate jurisdiction, we shall consider the appellant’s prayer for bail, which was not considered by the High Court on merit.
16. It was also urged by Mr. Nataraj that in the appeal-petition, the appellant has only asked for setting aside the impugned judgment and order. No specific prayer for bail has been made. But in our opinion, the plea for bail in the context of the present appeal is implicit. The petition which was transferred to the Division Bench carried prayer of the appellant for being released on bail and argument advanced by Mr. Grover, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant is that the High Court itself ought to have granted bail to the appellant on the basis of available materials. Moreover, the appellant in the appeal-petition has also asked for bail as interim relief. Since the appeal, in substance, is against the judgment by which prayer for bail was refused, merely based on the manner of framing of reliefs or prayers in the subject-petition, the actual relief sought by the appellant would not stand eclipsed.
17. Mr. Nataraj had also contended that the NIA must be permitted to contest the bail plea of the appellant before the first Court of bail on the basis of materials disclosed in the second supplementary charge-sheet, because the prosecution would also be entitled to a right of appeal. His submission is that such right of appeal 282 [2024] 4 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports would stand lost if the High Court itself had examined the second supplementary charge-sheet and decided the question of bail in favour of the appellant-accused. These are cogent arguments, but we must not lose sight of the fact that we are concerned here with the question of liberty of a pre-trial detenue, who is a senior citizen, in custody for almost six years, against whom charges are yet to be framed. The question of losing right of an appellate forum would have greater significance in substantive proceedings but on the question of bail, in a proceeding where the detenue herself has volunteered to forego an appellate forum by arguing before us her case for bail, the approach of this Court would be to address the question on merit, rather than to send it back to the Court of first instance for examining the materials available against the appellant.
18. This argument of the prosecution would have had stronger impact if the last charge-sheet, which the first bail Court could not examine, had disclosed any new or egregious set of accusations against the appellant, far removed from those contained in the earlier chargesheets. We have gone through the second supplementary chargesheet but do not find disclosure of any such material. This question shall be examined by us in the subsequent paragraphs of this judgment.
19. Another point urged by Mr. Nataraj was that the entirety of incriminating material in the chargesheets, which forms the basis for implicating the appellant did not form part of petition for special leave to appeal and to that extent the investigating agency did not have full opportunity to meet the appellant’s case. But as would be evident from various paragraphs of this judgment, these materials were brought on record and both parties had the opportunity to consider these materials and advance submissions on that basis. This is not a case where equitable relief is snatched ex-parte, for instance in case of an ad-interim injunction, by not bringing to the notice of the Court the entire factual basis of a given case. In this appeal, both the parties have had sufficient opportunity to deal with the relevant materials and the appellant cannot be non-suited on the sole ground of non-disclosure of such materials.
20. We shall now test the appellant’s claim for bail on merit. Having regard to the proviso to Section 43D (5) 1 of 1967 Act, the Court hearing the 1 43-D. Modified application of certain provisions of the Code. 1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code or any other law, every offence punishable under [2024] 4 S.C.R. 283Shoma Kanti Sen v. The State of Maharashtra & Anr. question of bail is under duty to scan through the case diary or report made under Section 173 of the Code for the purpose of forming an opinion to the effect that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against the appellant is prima facie true. This test would apply in only relation to offences stipulated under Chapters IV and VI of the 1967 Act. So far as the prosecution’s accusation against the appellant is concerned, allegations of commission of offences under Sections 16, 17, 18, 18B, 20, 38, 39 and 40 of the 1967 Act come within the purview of the bail restricting clause as specified in the aforesaid provision. The manner in which the Court shall come to such a finding at the stage of considering petition for bail has this Act shall be deemed to be a cognizable offence within the meaning of clause (c) of section 2 of the Code, and “cognizable case” as defined in that clause shall be construed accordingly. 2) Section 167 of the Code shall apply in relation to a case involving an offence punishable under this Act subject to the modification that in sub-section (2),--
(a) the references to “fifteen days”, “ninety days” and “sixty days”, wherever they occur, shall be construed as references to “thirty days”, “ninety days” and “ninety days” respectively; and
(b) after the proviso, the following provisos shall be inserted, namely:-- “Provided further that if it is not possible to complete the investigation within the said period of ninety days, the Court may if it is satisfied with the report of the Public Prosecutor indicating the progress of the investigation and the specific reasons for the detention of the accused beyond the said period of ninety days, extend the said period up to one hundred and eighty days:
Provided also that if the police officer making the investigation under this Act, requests, for the purposes of investigation, for police custody from judicial custody of any person in judicial custody, he shall file an affidavit stating the reasons for doing so and shall also explain the delay, if any, for requesting such police custody.
(3) Section 268 of the Code shall apply in relation to a case involving an offence punishable under this Act subject to the modification that--
(a) the reference in sub-section (1) thereof
(i) to “the State Government” shall be construed as a reference to “the Central Government or the State Government.”;
(ii) to “order of the State Government” shall be construed as a reference to “order of the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be”; and
(b) the reference in sub-section (2) thereof, to ‘the State Government” shall be construed as a reference to “the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be”.
(4) Nothing in section 438 of the Code shall apply in relation to any case involving the arrest of any person accused of having committed an offence punishable under this Act.
(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, no person accused of an offence punishable under Chapters IV and VI of this Act shall, if in custody, be released on bail or on his own bond unless the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity of being heard on the application for such release:
Provided that such accused person shall not be released on bail or on his own bond if the Court, on a perusal of the case diary or the report made under section 173 of the Code is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against such person is prima facie true.
(6) The restrictions on granting of bail specified in sub-section (5) is in addition to the restrictions under the Code or any other law for the time being in force on granting of bail.
(7) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sections (5) and (6), no bail shall be granted to a person accused of an offence punishable under this Act, if he is not an Indian citizen and has entered the country unauthorisedly or illegally except in very exceptional circumstances and for reasons to be recorded in writing.”
284 [2024] 4 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports been dealt with and explained in two judgments of two Coordinate Benches of this Court in the cases of National Investigation Agency -vs-Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali [(2019) 5 SCC 1] and Vernon -vs- The State of Maharashtra & Anr. [2023 INSC 655]. (One of us, Aniruddha Bose J., was a party to the latter judgement).
21. In the case of Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali (supra), it has been, inter-alia, held:- “23. By virtue of the proviso to sub-section (5), it is the duty of the Court to be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against the accused is prima facie true or otherwise. Our attention was invited to the decisions of this Court, which has had an occasion to deal with similar special provisions in TADA and Mcoca. The principle underlying those decisions may have some bearing while considering the prayer for bail in relation to the offences under the 1967 Act as well. Notably, under the special enactments such as TADA, M coca and the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, the Court is required to record its opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is “not guilty” of the alleged offence. There is a degree of difference between the satisfaction to be recorded by the Court that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is “not guilty” of such offence and the satisfaction to be recorded for the purposes of the 1967 Act that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against such person is “prima facie” true. By its very nature, the expression “prima facie true” would mean that the materials/evidence collated by the investigating agency in reference to the accusation against the accused concerned in the first information report, must prevail until contradicted and overcome or disproved by other evidence, and on the face of it, shows the complicity of such accused in the commission of the stated offence. It must be good and sufficient on its face to establish a given fact or the chain of facts constituting the stated offence, unless rebutted or contradicted. In one sense, the degree of satisfaction is lighter when the Court has to opine that the accusation is “prima facie true”, as compared to the [2024] 4 S.C.R. 285Shoma Kanti Sen v. The State of Maharashtra & Anr. opinion of the accused “not guilty” of such offence as required under the other special enactments. In any case, the degree of satisfaction to be recorded by the Court for opining that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against the accused is prima facie true, is lighter than the degree of satisfaction to be recorded for considering a discharge application or framing of charges in relation to offences under the 1967 Act. Nevertheless, we may take guidance from the exposition in Ranjitsing Brahmajeetsing Sharma v. State of Maharashtra, [(2005) 5 SCC 294 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1057], wherein a three-Judge Bench of this Court was called upon to consider the scope of power of the Court to grant bail. In paras 36 to 38, the Court observed thus : (SCC pp. 316-17)
“36. Does this statute require that before a person is released on bail, the court, albeit prima facie, must come to the conclusion that he is not guilty of such offence? Is it necessary for the court to record such a finding? Would there be any machinery available to the court to ascertain that once the accused is enlarged on bail, he would not commit any offence whatsoever?
37. Such findings are required to be recorded only for the purpose of arriving at an objective finding on the basis of materials on record only for grant of bail and for no other purpose.
38. We are furthermore of the opinion that the restrictions on the power of the court to grant bail should not be pushed too far. If the court, having regard to the materials brought on record, is satisfied that in all probability he may not be ultimately convicted, an order granting bail may be passed. The satisfaction of the court as regards his likelihood of not committing an offence while on bail must be construed to mean an offence under the Act and not any offence whatsoever be it a minor or major offence. … What would further be necessary on the part of 286 [2024] 4 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports the court is to see the culpability of the accused and his involvement in the commission of an organised crime either directly or indirectly. The court at the time of considering the application for grant of bail shall consider the question from the angle as to whether he was possessed of the requisite mens rea.”
And again in paras 44 to 48, the Court observed : (SCC pp. 318-20)
“44. The wording of Section 21(4), in our opinion, does not lead to the conclusion that the court must arrive at a positive finding that the applicant for bail has not committed an offence under the Act. If such a construction is placed, the court intending to grant bail must arrive at a finding that the applicant has not committed such an offence. In such an event, it will be impossible for the prosecution to obtain a judgment of conviction of the applicant. Such cannot be the intention of the legislature. Section 21(4) of Mcoca, therefore, must be construed reasonably.
It must be so construed that the court is able to maintain a delicate balance between a judgment of acquittal and conviction and an order granting bail much before commencement of trial.
Similarly, the court will be required to record a finding as to the possibility of his committing a crime after grant of bail. However, such an offence in futuro must be an offence under the Act and not any other offence. Since it is difficult to predict the future conduct of an accused, the court must necessarily consider this aspect of the matter having regard to the antecedents of the accused, his propensities and the nature and manner in which he is alleged to have committed the offence.
45. It is, furthermore, trite that for the purpose of considering an application for grant of bail, [2024] 4 S.C.R. 287Shoma Kanti Sen v. The State of Maharashtra & Anr. although detailed reasons are not necessary to be assigned, the order granting bail must demonstrate application of mind at least in serious cases as to why the applicant has been granted or denied the privilege of bail.
46. The duty of the court at this stage is not to weigh the evidence meticulously but to arrive at a finding on the basis of broad probabilities.
However, while dealing with a special statute like Mcoca having regard to the provisions contained in sub-section (4) of Section 21 of the Act, the court may have to probe into the matter deeper so as to enable it to arrive at a finding that the materials collected against the accused during the investigation may not justify a judgment of conviction. The findings recorded by the court while granting or refusing bail undoubtedly would be tentative in nature, which may not have any bearing on the merit of the case and the trial court would, thus, be free to decide the case on the basis of evidence adduced at the trial, without in any manner being prejudiced thereby.
47. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan [(2004) 7 SCC 528 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977] this Court observed : (SCC pp. 537-38, para 18)
‘18. We agree that a conclusive finding in regard to the points urged by both the sides is not expected of the court considering a bail application. Still one should not forget, as observed by this Court in Puran v. Rambilas [(2001) 6 SCC 338: 2001 SCC (Cri) 1124] :
(SCC p. 344, para 8)
“8. …Giving reasons is different from discussing merits or demerits.
At the stage of granting bail a detailed examination of evidence and elaborate documentation of the merits of the case has not to be 288 [2024] 4 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports undertaken. … That did not mean that whilst granting bail some reasons for prima facie concluding why bail was being granted did not have to be indicated.”
We respectfully agree with the above dictum of this Court. We also feel that such expression of prima facie reasons for granting bail is a requirement of law in cases where such orders on bail application are appealable, more so because of the fact that the appellate court has every right to know the basis for granting the bail. Therefore, we are not in agreement with the argument addressed by the learned counsel for the accused that the High Court was not expected even to indicate a prima facie finding on all points urged before it while granting bail, more so in the background of the facts of this case where on facts it is established that a large number of witnesses who were examined after the respondent was enlarged on bail had turned hostile and there are complaints made to the court as to the threats administered by the respondent or his supporters to witnesses in the case. In such circumstances, the court was duty-bound to apply its mind to the allegations put forth by the investigating agency and ought to have given at least a prima facie finding in regard to these allegations because they go to the very root of the right of the accused to seek bail. The non-consideration of these vital facts as to the allegations of threat or inducement made to the witnesses by the respondent during the period he was on bail has vitiated the conclusions arrived at by the High Court while granting bail to the respondent. The other ground apart from the ground of incarceration which appealed to the High Court to grant bail was the fact that a large number of witnesses are [2024] 4 S.C.R. 289Shoma Kanti Sen v. The State of Maharashtra & Anr. yet to be examined and there is no likelihood of the trial coming to an end in the near future. As stated hereinabove, this ground on the facts of this case is also not sufficient either individually or coupled with the period of incarceration to release the respondent on bail because of the serious allegations of tampering with the witnesses made against the respondent.’
Continue reading
Sign in and become a member to continue reading this judgment and every other document in the library.
Members read the full text, download where permitted, and keep notes and bookmarks.