M/S Bharti Airtel Limited v. A.S. Raghavendra
- Citation
- 2024 INSC 265; [2024] 4 S.C.R. 100
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Hima Kohli, Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah
- Decided
- 2 Apr 2024
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 5187/2023
- Sections
- 2, 5, 3, 10(1), 16, 25
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:23 am. Original source ↗
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* Author [2024] 4 S.C.R. 100 : 2024 INSC 265 M/S Bharti Airtel Limited v.
A.S. Raghavendra (Civil Appeal No.5187 of 2023)
02 April 2024 [Hima Kohli and Ahsanuddin Amanullah,* JJ.] Issue for Consideration Whether the respondent would or would not come within the definitional stipulation of a “workman” as laid out under Section 2(s), Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
Headnotes Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 – s.2(s) – “workman” – When not – Respondent appointed in the appellant-Company as Regional Business Head (South) in the grade of Senior Manager (B2)-Sales performed managerial and supervisory work, if a “workman”:
Held: No – Respondent himself described his position as a Member of the senior management cadre, in-charge of supervising the Account Managers in the four Southern States – He performed a supervisory role over the managers and was the Assessing Manager of his team, which consisted of Managers in the B-1 & B-2 Levels – Respondent had perks such as Special Allowance, Car Hiring Charges, Petrol and Maintenance, Driver’s Salary etc. – Labour Court vide a detailed order and discussion held the respondent not to be covered under “workman” as per s.2(s) – However, the Single Judge did not appreciate the discussion by the Labour Court and the available evidence in their true perspective, relying mainly upon the judgment in Ved Prakash Gupta v. Delton Cable India (P.) Ltd. [1984] 3 SCR 169 – Absence of power to appoint, dismiss or conduct disciplinary enquiries against other employees was not the only reason for the Court to conclude in Ved Prakash Gupta that the appellant therein was a “workman” – Mere absence of power to appoint, dismiss or hold disciplinary inquiries against other employees, would not and could not be the sole criterion to determine such an issue – Nature of duties performed by the respondent do not place him under the cover of s.2(s) – Impugned judgment passed by Division Bench of the High Court as well [2024] 4 S.C.R. 101M/S B h a r t i A i r t e l L i m i t e d v . A .S. Raghavendra as the judgment of the Single Judge holding respondent to be a “workman”, set aside – Judgment of the Labour Court holding that respondent was performing the role of a Manager and thus was not a “workman” within the meaning of s.2(s), restored – Respondent not a “workman” and thus, reference to the Labour Court under the ID Act against the appellant would not be maintainable. [Paras 5, 21, 22-25 and 29] Constitution of India – Articles 226, 227 – Re-appraisal of facts – Respondent working as Regional Business Head (South)- Government Enterprise Services in the grade of Senior Manager (B2)-Sales resigned from the appellant- Company however, later filed petition before the Deputy Labour Commissioner alleging that his resignation was forceful – Dispute referred to the Labour Court by appropriate Government – Labour Court rejected the reference holding that respondent was performing the role of a Manager and thus was not a “workman” within the meaning of s.2(s), ID Act – Writ Petition filed by respondent challenging the said award – Award set aside by Single Judge – Appellant filed appeal, dismissed by Division Bench – Appellant contended that the approach of the Single Judge of re-appreciating the entire evidence and coming to a fresh conclusion was not proper while exercising jurisdiction u/Articles 226 and 227: Held: As regards the power of the High Court to re-appraise the facts, it cannot be said that the same is completely impermissible u/Articles 226 and 227 – However, there must be a level of infirmity greater than ordinary in a Tribunal’s order, which is facing judicial scrutiny before the High Court, to justify interference – Such a situation did not prevail in the present facts. [Para 26] Case Law Cited Devinder Singh v. Municipal Council, Sanaur [2011] 4 SCR 867 : (2011) 6 SCC 584; Suo-Motu Contempt Petition (Civil) No.3 of 2021 (2022) SCC OnLine SC 858; Shankarbhai Nathalal Prajapati v. Maize Products (2002) SCC OnLine Guj 143; Suzuki Parasrampuria Suitings Private Limited v. Official Liquidator of Mahendra Petrochemicals Limited (in Liquidation)
[2018] 12 SCR 906 : (2018) 10 SCC 707; Muthu Karuppan, Commissioner of Police, Chennai v. Parithi Ilamvazhuthi [2011] 5 SCR 329 : (2011) 5 SCC 496;
102 [2024] 4 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports K D Sharma v. Steel Authority of India Limited [2008] 10 SCR 454 : (2008) 12 SCC 481; Tularam Manikrao Hadge v. Sudarshan Paper Converting Works, Nagpur 2020 SCC OnLine Bom 965; Bombay Mothers and Children’s Society v. General Labour Union (Red Flag)
1991 SCC OnLine Bom 88; Deepali Gundu Surwase v.
Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.ED.) [2013] 9 SCR 1 : (2013) 10 SCC 324; Ishwarlal Mali Rathod v Gopal (2021) SCC OnLine SC 921; Anvar P V v. P K Basheer [2014] 11 SCR 399 : (2014) 10 SCC 473; Sri Shivadarshan Balse v. The State of Karnataka, rep. by its Secretary, Revenue Department (2017) SCC OnLine Kar 2317; Atlas Cycle (Haryana) Limited v. Kitab Singh [2013] 1 SCR 611 : (2013) 12 SCC 573; National Kamgar Union v. Kran Rader Private Limited [2018] 1 SCR 74 :
(2018) 1 SCC 784; Ananda Bazar Patrika (P) Ltd. v.
The Workmen (1970) 3 SCC 248; Arkal Govind Raj Rao v. Ciba Geigy of India Ltd. Bombay [1985] Suppl.
1 SCR 282 : (1985) 3 SCC 371 – held inapplicable.
Ved Prakash Gupta v. Delton Cable India (P.) Ltd. (1984)
2 SCC 569 : [1984] 3 SCR 169; Indian Overseas Bank v. IOB Staff Canteen Workers Union [2000] 2 SCR 1212 : (2000) 4 SCC 245; Anoop Sharma v. Public Health Division, Haryana (2010) 5 SCC 497; Pepsico India Holding (P) Ltd. v. Krishna Kant Pandey [2015] 1 SCR 288 : (2015) 4 SCC 270; Heavy Engineering Corporation v.
Presiding Officer, Labour Court [1996] Suppl. 8 SCR 92 :
(1996) 11 SCC 236; Muir Mills Unit of NTC Ltd. v. Swayam Prakash Srivastava [2006] Suppl. 9 SCR 1028 : (2007)
1 SCC 491; C Gupta v. Glaxo Smithkline Ltd. [2007] 7 SCR 800 : (2007) 7 SCC 171; E.S.I. Corporation’s Medical Officers’ Association v. ESI Corporation [2013] 12 SCR 907 : (2014) 16 SCC 182; Sonepat Cooperative Sugar Mills v. Ajit Singh [2005] 2 SCR 105 : (2005) 3 SCC 232; H R Adyanthaya v. Sandoz (India) Ltd. [1994] 3 SCALE 816 : (1994) 5 SCC 737; Management of M/s May and Baker (India) Ltd. v. Workmen AIR (1967) SC 678; Chauharya Tripathi v. Life Insurance Corporation of India [2015] 4 SCR 186 : (2015) 7 SCC 263; S K Maini v. M/s Carona Sahu Company Limited [1994] 2 SCR 333 : (1994) 3 SCC 510 – referred to.
[2024] 4 S.C.R. 103M/S Bharti Airtel Limited v. A.S. Raghavendra List of Acts Industrial Disputes Act, 1947; Constitution of India.
List of Keywords Workman; Reference to Labour Court; Managerial and supervisory work; Supervisory role; Managerial capacity; Nature of duties; Re-appraisal of facts.
Case Arising From CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 5187 of 2023 From the Judgment and Order dated 31.03.2022 of the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru in WA No. 4067 of 2019 Appearances for Parties C U Singh, Sr. Adv., Vatsalya Vigya, Advs. for the Appellant. Respondent-in-person.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment Ahsanuddin Amanullah, J.
1. Heard learned counsel for the appellant and the respondent-in-person.
2. The present appeal arises out of the final judgment and order dated 31.03.2022 (hereinafter referred to as the “impugned judgment”), passed by a learned Division Bench of the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru (hereinafter referred to as the “High Court”) in Writ Appeal No.4067 of 2019 (L-TER) arising from Writ Petition No.13842 of 2018 (L-TER) by which the High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant (hereinafter also referred to as the “Company”), which was occasioned on account of the learned Single Judge partly allowing the respondent’s writ petition.
THE FACTUAL COMPASS:
3. The respondent, upon being interviewed by the appellant’s concerned officials was appointed as the Regional Business Head (South) – Government Enterprise Services on 22.06.2009, in the grade of Senior Manager (B2)-Sales. The same carried an annual benefits package of Rs.22,00,000/- (Rupees Twenty-Two lakhs) with fixed pay 104 [2024] 4 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports of Rs.13,20,000/- (Rupees Thirteen Lakhs Twenty Thousand) and variable pay under the Sales Incentive Plan (hereinafter referred to as “SIP”) of Rs.8,80,000/- (Rupees Eight Lakhs and Eighty Thousand). The respondent worked as Team Leader and Regional Business Head (South) - Government Enterprise Services, heading a team comprising four Account Managers (Sales), one each for the States of Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh and Kerala, respectively. The said Managers were working under the supervision and control of the respondent and were in the B1 and B2 salary levels. On 24.03.2011, the respondent made an initial resignation request on the internal system, which was accepted by the appellant on 09.05.2011. In terms thereof, the respondent was paid Rs.5,92,538/- (Rupees Five Lakhs Ninety-Two Thousand Five Hundred and Thirty-Eight) by the appellant in full and final settlement of all his claims.
4. After about 19 months, the respondent filed a petition before the Deputy Labour Commissioner, Region-2, Bengaluru, alleging his resignation to be a forceful resignation, which resulted in initiation of conciliation proceedings but ended in failure. However, on 27.06.2013, brushing aside the appellant’s objections that the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the “ID Act”) was not applicable in the case of the respondent as he performed managerial and supervisory work at an annual package totalling Rs.22,00,000/- (Rupees Twenty-Two Lakhs) and thus, was not a “workman”, within the meaning of Section 2(s)1, ID Act, the “appropriate Government”2 1 Extracted hereinafter.
2 ‘(a) “appropriate Government” means,—
(i) in relation to any Industrial Disputes concerning any industry carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government or by a railway company or concerning any such controlled industry as may be specified in this behalf by the Central Government or in relation to an Industrial Dispute concerning a Dock Labour Board established under Section 5-A of the Dock Workers (Regulation of Employment) Act, 1948 (9 of 1948), or the Industrial Finance Corporation of India Limited formed and registered under the Companies Act, 1956], or the Employees’ State Insurance Corporation established under Section 3 of the Employees’ State Insurance Act, 1948 (34 of 1948), or the Board of Trustees constituted under Section 3-A of the Coal Mines Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1948 (46 of 1948), or the Central Board of Trustees and the State Boards of Trustees constituted under Section 5-A and Section 5-B, respectively, of the Employees’ Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (19 of 1952), or the Life Insurance Corporation of India established under Section 3 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956 (31 of 1956), or the Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited registered under the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956) or the Deposit Insurance and Credit Guarantee Corporation established under Section 3 of the Deposit Insurance and Credit Guarantee Corporation Act, 1961 (47 of 1961), or the Central Warehousing Corporation established under Section 3 of the Warehousing Corporations Act, 1962 (58 of 1962), or the Unit Trust of India established under Section 3 of [2024] 4 S.C.R. 105M/S B h a r t i A i r t e l L i m i t e d v . A .S. Raghavendra [herein, the Government of Karnataka] referred the dispute to the Labour Court under Section 10(1)(c)3 , ID Act on 27.06.2013. Pleadings were completed and witnesses were examined by both sides.
5. On 05.09.2017, the Labour Court made its Award recording findings of fact and held that the respondent had failed to plead or prove that he was a “workman” and that on an assessment of the evidence on record, he was performing the role of a Manager and thus was not a “workman” within the meaning of Section 2(s), ID Act, and accordingly rejected the reference. Aggrieved, the respondent filed Writ Petition No.13842 of 2018 (L-TER) before the High Court challenging the Labour Court’s Award and the learned Single Judge by judgment and order dated 29.11.2019, partly allowed the writ petition, relying upon the judgment of this Court in Ved Prakash Gupta v Delton Cable India (P.) Ltd., (1984) 2 SCC 569. The learned Single Judge held that since there was an absence of power in the respondent, whilst the Unit Trust of India Act, 1963 (52 of 1963), or the Food Corporation of India established under Section 3, or a Board of Management established for two or more contiguous States under Section 16 of the Food Corporations Act, 1964 (37 of 1964), or the Airports Authority of India constituted under Section 3 of the Airports Authority of India Act, 1994 (55 of 1994), or a Regional Rural Bank established under Section 3 of the Regional Rural Banks Act, 1976 (21 of 1976), or the Export Credit and Guarantee Corporation Limited or the Industrial Reconstruction Corporation of India Limited, or the Banking Service Commission established, under Section 3 of the Banking Service Commission Act, 1975, or an air transport service, or a banking or an insurance company, a mine, an oilfield, a Cantonment Board, or a major port, any company in which not less than fifty-one per cent of the paid-up share capital is held by the Central Government, or any corporation, not being a corporation referred to in this clause, established by or under any law made by Parliament, or the Central public sector undertaking, subsidiary companies set up by the principal undertaking and autonomous bodies owned or controlled by the Central Government, the Central Government, and
(ii) in relation to any other industrial dispute, including the State public sector undertaking, subsidiary companies set up by the principal undertaking and autonomous bodies owned or controlled by the State Government, the State Government:
Provided that in case of a dispute between a contractor and the contract labour employed through the contractor in any industrial establishment where such dispute first arose, the appropriate Government shall be the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be, which has control over such industrial establishment.’ 3 ‘10. Reference of disputes to Boards, Courts or Tribunals.—(1) Where the appropriate Government is of opinion that any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, it may at any time, by order in writing,—
(a) xxx; or
(b) xxx; or
(c) refer the dispute or any matter appearing to be connected with, or relevant to, the dispute, if it relates to any matter specified in the Second Schedule, to a Labour Court for adjudication; or
(d) xxx:
Provided that where the dispute relates to any matter specified in the Third Schedule and is not likely to affect more than one hundred workmen, the appropriate Government may, if it so thinks fit, make the reference to a Labour Court under clause (c) :’ 106 [2024] 4 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports in service of the appellant, to appoint, dismiss or hold disciplinary enquiries against other employees, the same indicated that the respondent did not belong to the managerial category and held him to be a “workman”. The learned Single Judge, thus, set aside the award and remanded the matter to the Labour Court for adjudication on merits within 3 months therefrom. Aggrieved by the learned Single Judge’s judgment, the appellant filed Writ Appeal No.4067 of 2019 (L-TER) before the learned Division Bench, which was dismissed vide the impugned judgment.
SUBMISSIONS BY THE APPELLANT:
6. Mr C U Singh, learned senior counsel for the appellant submitted that the Labour Court’s order covered in detail all the factual and legal aspects based on the evidence produced before it by both sides and needed no interference. It was urged that the learned Single Judge as also the learned Division Bench of the High Court erroneously interfered in the matter. It was submitted that the respondent was a Regional Business Head, whose nature of duties clearly established that he was a senior manager in the managerial cadre, earning an annual package of Rs.22,00,000/- (Rupees Twenty-Two Lakhs)
and thus, was not covered by the definition of “workman” as per Section 2(s), ID Act. He contended that even the approach adopted by the learned Single Judge of re-appreciating the entire evidence and coming to a fresh conclusion was not proper while exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the “Constitution”) as it was not a Court of first instance.
7. Mr Singh submitted that even without examining the Award and findings of the Labour Court, the learned Single Judge concluded that the same were perverse. It was advanced that the learned Division Bench, on the assumption that the learned Single Judge had examined the materials on record, concurred with the judgment of the learned Single Judge, ignoring the admitted fact that the respondent had worked in progressively more senior managerial positions before joining the appellant as Senior Manager (Sales) in Band-2 which was equivalent to Deputy General Manager as also that his previous employment was as Regional Manager (South) in Kodak India Private Limited and he had joined the appellant as Head of Sales Operations for four Southern States (Karnataka, Tamil [2024] 4 S.C.R. 107M/S Bharti Airtel Limited v. A.S. Raghavendra Nadu, Andhra Pradesh and Kerala) and was also the Team Leader of a managerial team which comprised an Account Manager (Sales) each for the four States. It was canvassed that the respondent was also writing the half-yearly and annual performance assessments and appraisals of the Account Managers referred supra as also liaising, negotiating and representing the appellant/Company with senior government officials of the Indian Administrative Service and the General Managers of various Public Sector Undertakings.
8. Further, learned Senior Advocate submitted that the burden of proving that the respondent was a “workman” under the ID Act, was not discharged and he had neither pleaded nor proved the nature of duties and functions performed by him. It was his stand that once the respondent tendered his resignation on 24.03.2011, which was accepted and he was relieved from service on 09.05.2011, pursuant whereto he accepted the full and final settlement on 23.06.2011 along with receipt of SIP on 26.08.2011, he had clearly accepted what had transpired. It was advanced that, therefore, after a period of over 1½ years raising an industrial dispute before the Deputy Labour Commissioner and Conciliation Officer, Bengaluru, on the ground that his resignation was obtained under coercion and duress, was not tenable and was rightly rejected by the Labour Court. It was submitted that ironically the documents relied upon by the respondent himself clearly demonstrated that he was a member of the senior management cadre, being in-charge of and supervising the Accounts Managers in the four Southern States as noted hereinbefore, which, by no stretch of imagination can lead to the conclusion that he was a “workman”. Learned Senior counsel submitted that in the written statement filed by the Company in reply to the Statement of Claim of the respondent, it was specifically pleaded that the respondent was not a “workman” and the nature of his duties were described in detail. However, the learned Single Judge grossly erred and misread the documentary and oral evidence while reaching the incorrect conclusion that the respondent was a “workman” within the meaning of Section 2(s), ID Act.
9. On the legal aspect, it was contended that the High Court had exceeded its jurisdiction in such matters, as the law was that a writ of certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution can be issued only to correct errors of jurisdiction where a Court or Tribunal acts with material irregularity or in violation of natural justice but not for the 108 [2024] 4 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports purpose of re-appreciation of evidence or acting as a Court of appeal. For such proposition, reliance was placed on the judgment in Syed Yakub v K S Radha Krishnan, AIR 1964 SC 477, the relevant being Paragraph 74. Similarly, it was contended that in matters pertaining to industrial law, it has been held that unless the High Court first concludes that the Award or Order of a Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal is based on no evidence or is perverse, the High Court cannot proceed to reappreciate the evidence under Articles 226 or 227 of the Constitution. In this regard, following judgments were relied on - Indian Overseas Bank v IOB Staff Canteen Workers Union, (2000) 4 SCC 245; Anoop Sharma v Public Health Division, Haryana, (2010) 5 SCC 497, relevant being Paragraphs 12-145, and; 4 ‘7. The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Article 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals : these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts illegally or properly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity, be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised (vide Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmad Ishaque [(1955) 1 SCR 1104] Nagandra Nath Bora v. Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals Assam [(1958) SCR 1240] and Kaushalya Devi v. Bachittar Singh [AIR 1960 SC 1168].’ 5 ‘12. A reading of the impugned order shows that the Division Bench of the High Court set aside the award of the Labour Court without even adverting to the fact that challenge to similar award passed in the cases of other employees was negatived by the High Court and this Court. We have no doubt that if the Division Bench had taken the trouble of ascertaining the status of the disputes raised by other employees, then it would have discovered that the award of reinstatement of similarly situated employees has been upheld by the High Court and this Court and in that event, it may not have passed the impugned order. That apart, we find that even though the Division Bench did not come to the conclusion that the finding recorded by the Labour Court on the issue of non-compliance with Section 25-F of the Act is vitiated by an error of law apparent on the face of the record, it allowed the writ petition by assuming that the appellant’s initial engagement/employment was not legal and the respondent had complied with the conditions of a valid retrenchment.
13. In our view, the approach adopted by the Division Bench is contrary to the judicially recognised limitations of the High Court’s power to issue writ of certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution—Syed [2024] 4 S.C.R. 109M/S Bharti Airtel Limited v. A.S. Raghavendra Pepsico India Holding (P) Ltd. v Krishna Kant Pandey, (2015)
4 SCC 270.
10. Further, it was submitted that unless a person proves that he is employed to perform any manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical, or supervisory work, such person does not fall within the definition of “workman” under Section 2(s), ID Act and that it has been held that a teacher, an advertising manager, a chemist employed in a sugar mill, gate sergeant in a tannery, and a welfare officer in an educational institution are not “workman”, and that a legal assistant, whose job is not stereotyped and involves creativity can never be a “workman”. It was submitted that the High Court has, thus, clearly fallen in error in not appreciating the ratios of judgments of this Court in Heavy Engineering Corporation v Presiding Officer, Labour Court, (1996) 11 SCC 236; Muir Mills Yakoobv. K.S. Radhakrishnan [AIR 1964 SC 477 : (1964) 5 SCR 64] , Municipal Board, Saharanpur v. Imperial Tobacco of India Ltd. [(1999) 1 SCC 566] , Lakshmi Precision Screws Ltd. v. Ram Bahagat [(2002) 6 SCC 552 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 926] , Mohd. Shahnawaz Akhtar v. ADJ, Varanasi [(2010) 5 SCC 510 : JT (2002) 8 SC 69] , Mukand Ltd. v. Staff and Officers’ Assn. [(2004) 10 SCC 460 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 798] , Dharamraj v. Chhitan [(2006) 12 SCC 349 : (2006) 11 Scale 292] and CIT v. Saurashtra Kutch Stock Exchange Ltd. [(2008) 14 SCC 171 : (2008) 12 Scale 582]
14. In Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan [AIR 1964 SC 477: (1964) 5 SCR 64] the Constitution Bench of this Court considered the scope of the High Court’s jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari in cases involving challenge to the orders passed by the authorities entrusted with quasi-judicial functions under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. Speaking for the majority of the Constitution Bench, Gajendragadkar, J. observed as under: (AIR pp. 479-80, para 7)
“7. … A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals; these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the court or tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior court or tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised.”’ 110 [2024] 4 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports Unit of NTC Ltd. v Swayam Prakash Srivastava, (2007) 1 SCC 491; C Gupta v Glaxo Smithkline Ltd., (2007) 7 SCC 171; E.S.I. Corporation’s Medical Officers’ Association v ESI Corporation, (2014) 16 SCC 182; Sonepat Cooperative Sugar Mills v Ajit Singh, (2005) 3 SCC 232; H R Adyanthaya v Sandoz (India) Ltd., (1994) 5 SCC 737; Management of M/s May and Baker (India) Ltd. v Workmen, AIR 1967 SC 678, and; Pepsico India Holding (supra).
11. Even with regard to Chauharya Tripathi v Life Insurance Corporation of India, (2015) 7 SCC 263, the relevant being Paragraphs 9-166, 6 ‘9. We have quoted in extenso as the Constitution Bench has declared the pronouncement in S.K. Verma case [(1983) 4 SCC 214 : 1983 SCC (L&S) 510] as per incuriam.
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