Mohd Abaad Ali & Anr. v. Directorate of Revenue Prosecution Intelligence
- Citation
- 2024 INSC 125; [2024] 2 S.C.R. 638
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia, Justice Prasanna Bhalachandra Varale
- Decided
- 20 Feb 2024
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 1056/2024
- Sections
- 5, 378, 135(1), 482, 378(5), 493, 496, 417, 3, 4, 4171, 29(2)
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* Author [2024] 2 S.C.R. 638 : 2024 INSC 125 Mohd Abaad Ali & Anr.
v.
Directorate of Revenue Prosecution Intelligence (Criminal Appeal No. 1056 of 2024)
20 February 2024 [Sudhanshu Dhulia* and Prasanna Bhalachandra Varale, JJ.] Issue for Consideration Whether benefit of s.5 r/w. ss. 2 and 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963 can be availed in an appeal against acquittal.
Headnotes Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s. 378 – Limitation Act, 1963 – s. 5 r/w. ss.2 and 3 – Appellant herein faced trial u/s. 135(1)(b) of the Customs Act – Acquitted – Appeal against the acquittal u/s. 378 of Cr.P.C. was filed before the High Court along with an application for condonation of delay – The said application was allowed – Against the said order, the appellant moved u/s. 482 of Cr.P.C. on the grounds that s.5 of the Limitation Act would not apply in case of an appeal against acquittal since the period of filing an appeal against acquittal, has been prescribed u/s. 378(5) of CrPC itself, where there is no provision for condonation of delay – Propriety: Held: There is no doubt that where a special law prescribes a period of limitation, s.5 of the Limitation Act would have no application, subject only to the language used in the special statute – The language prescribing a period of limitation is an important factor as well – In the instant case, there is no such exclusionary provision u/s. 378 of CrPC, or at any other place in the Code – The benefit of s.5 r/w. ss.2 and 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963 can therefore be availed in an appeal against acquittal – There is no force in the contentions raised by the appellants as regards the non-application of s.5 of the Limitation Act in the present case. [Para 11] Case Law Cited Kaushalya Rani v. Gopal Singh [1964] 4 SCR 982;
Mangu Ram v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, [1976] 2 SCR 260 : (1976) 1 SCC 392 – referred to.
[2024] 2 S.C.R. 639Mohd Abaad Ali & Anr. v. Directorate of Revenue Prosecution Intelligence Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narain Mishra, [1974] 3 SCR 31 : AIR 1974 SC 480; Gopal Sardar v. Karuna Sardar, [2004] 2 SCR 826 : 2004 (4) SCC 252 – held inapplicable.
Anjanabai v. Yeshwantrao Daulatrao Dudhe ILR (1961)
Bom 135 – referred to.
List of Acts Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Limitation Act, 1963. List of Keywords Exclusionary provision; Benefit of s. 5 of Limitation Act in appeal against acquittal.
Case Arising From CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 1056 of 2024 From the Judgment and Order dated 20.01.2017 of the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in CRLMA No. 13802 of 2016 and CRLLP No. 330 of 2013 Appearances for Parties Md. Shahid Anwar, Vijay Agarwal, Chetan, Mukul, Advs. for the Appellants.
Vikramjit Banerjee, A.S.G., Mukesh Kumar Maroria, Mrs. Priyanka Das, Nachiketa Joshi, Mrs. Merusagar Samantaray, Ishaan Sharma, Advs. for the Respondent.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment Sudhanshu Dhulia, J.
Leave granted.
1. The present appellant was one of the four accused in a case instituted, inter-alia under Section 135(1)(b) of Customs Act, 1962. He faced trial (S.C. No. 33 of 2009) where he was ultimately acquitted by the Additional Sessions Judge, North, Delhi vide order dated 06.10.2012. 640 [2024] 2 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports
2. Against the order of acquittal, the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence filed an appeal before the High Court on 27.06.2013. That appeal against acquittal filed under Section 378 of CrPC was accompanied by a delay condonation application, since the appeal was belated by 72 days. The delay condonation application was allowed by the Delhi High Court on 18.05.2016.
3. An application was then moved by the present appellant before the High Court under Section 482 of CrPC for recalling of the said order on grounds that Section 5 of the Limitation Act would not apply in case of an appeal against acquittal since the period of filing an appeal against acquittal, has been prescribed under Section 378(5) of CrPC itself, where there is no provision for condonation of delay. By order dated 20.01.2017 the Delhi High Court nonetheless dismissed the application for recall filed by the appellant, although no reasons were assigned while dismissing the application under Section 482.
4. This order has been challenged before us on the grounds that the High Court has committed a patent error in allowing the belated appeal against acquittal filed by public servant as the High Court has no powers to condone the delay since the provisions of the Limitation Act would not be applicable as Section 378 is a self-contained Code as far as limitation is concerned since there is no period prescribed in the Limitation Act for filing a appeal against acquittal.
5. In support of his argument, the learned counsel for the appellant Mr. Vijay Kumar Aggarwal, has relied upon the judgment of this Court in Kaushalya Rani v. Gopal Singh [1964] 4 SCR 982. The facts of Kaushalya Rani are as follows: Kaushalya Rani had filed a case against one Gopal Singh under Section 493 IPC and alternatively under Section 496 IPC, alleging that Gopal Singh had deceitfully made her believe that he is her lawfully married husband and thus had sexual intercourse with her. Gopal Singh faced a trial in which he was acquitted by the Trial Court and an appeal against acquittal was filed by Kaushalya Rani under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (hereafter referred to as the “old CrPC”), under Section 417. The appeal was filed beyond the period of 60 days as provided under sub-section (4) of Section 417, i.e., the then prevailing Criminal Procedure Code. The appeal was dismissed on grounds of limitation by the Punjab & Haryana High Court. This matter was thus taken by Kaushalya Rani before this Court. The case was filed [2024] 2 S.C.R. 641Mohd Abaad Ali & Anr. v . D i r e c t o r a t e o f Revenue P r o s e c u t i o n Intelligence before this Court on a certificate of fitness granted by the Punjab & Haryana High Court and the question for determination before this Court was whether the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 (i.e. Act 9 of 1908 i.e. the old Limitation Act) would apply to an application for special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal under sub-section 3 of Section 417 of the old CrPC.
6. This Court on its interpretation of sub-section 4 of Section 4171 of old CrPC and Section 29(2) of the old Limitation Act i.e. Indian Limitation Act, 1908 held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act would not apply in an application for leave to appeal under sub-section 3 of Section 417 of the old CrPC before High Court, in as much as Section 417 is a special code in itself and the limitation prescribed therein is 60 days and the court has no power to relax such a limitation to condone the delay. Relying upon a full Bench judgment of the Bombay High Court [Anjanabai v. Yeshwantrao Daulatrao Dudhe ILR (1961) Bom 135] which held that Section 417(4) was special law within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. Thus, the appeal was dismissed while relying on Section 29(2) of the old Limitation Act. For ready convenience of this Court, Section 29(2) of the old Limitation Act is reproduced below:
“(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed therefore by the first schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply, as if such period were prescribed therefor in that schedule, and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any 1 Section 417 of the old CrPC is as follows:
417 (1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (5), the State Government may, in any case, direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal to the High Court from an original or appellate order of a acquittal passed by any Court other than a High Court.
(2) If such an order of acquittal is passed in any case in which the offence has been investigated by the Delhi Special Police Establishment constituted under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 (XXXV of 1946), the Central Government may also direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal to the High Court from the order of acquittal.
(3) If such an order of acquittal is passed in any case instituted upon the complaint and the High Court, on an application made to it by the complainant in this behalf, grants special leave to appeal from the order of acquittal, the complainant may present such an appeal to the High Court.
(4) No application under sub-section (3) for the grant of special leave to appeal from the order of acquittal shall be entertained by the High Court after the expiry of sixty days from the date of that order of acquittal.
(5) If, in any case, the application under sub-section (3) for the grant of special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal is refused, no appeal from that order of acquittal shall lie under sub-section (1). 642 [2024] 2 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports suit, appeal or application by any special or local law—
(a) the provisions contained in Section 4, Sections 9 to 18, and Section 22 shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law; and
(b) the remaining provisions of this Act shall not apply.” A perusal of the aforesaid provision clearly shows that where there is a special or local law prescribing the period of limitation in any suit, appeal or application which is different from the period of limitation prescribed in the first schedule of the Limitation Act, the applicability of the Limitation Act will be only as regarding Section 4 and Sections 9 to 18 & 22 of the Limitation Act. The meaning thereby afforded is that Section 5 of the old Act was expressly excluded in cases where special law or local law provides for a period of limitation. The learned counsel for the appellant would argue that although in the present case, we are dealing with present Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 and the new Limitation Act, 1963 however, the provisions in the present Code for appeal against acquittal i.e., under Section 378 of CrPC are of similar nature regarding the prescription of a period of limitation for filing an appeal and therefore the law as laid down by Kaushalya Rani (supra), would apply in the present case as well.
7. This submission of the learned counsel is not correct. Subsequent to the decision of this Court in Kaushalya Rani (supra), this Court in Mangu Ram v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi (1976) 1 SCC 392, while dealing with a similar problem of limitation (in an appeal against acquittal), distinguished Kaushalya Rani as Kaushalya Rani was dealing with the old Criminal Procedure Code,1898 and the old Limitation Act, 1908, where provisions were differently worded. Under Section 378 of the new CrPC read with Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 though a limitation is prescribed, yet Section 29(2) of 1963 Act, does not exclude the application of Section 5. Section 29(2) of Limitation Act, 1963 reads as under:- “(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period [2024] 2 S.C.R. 643Mohd Abaad Ali & Anr. v . D i r e c t o r a t e o f Revenue P r o s e c u t i o n Intelligence prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only insofar as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.” (emphasis supplied)
The crucial difference here is of applicability of Section 5 of Limitation Act. In both the Limitation Acts, i.e. Limitation Act of 1908 and the present Limitation Act of 1963, the provision of extension of time of limitation is given in Section 5 of the two Acts. Whereas 1908 Act specifically states that Section 5 will not apply when the period of limitation is given in special Acts, the 1963 Act makes Section 5 applicable even in the special laws when a period of limitation is prescribed, unless it is expressly excluded by such special law. A comparative provision of Section 29(2) in the two Acts is given below:- Section 29(2) of the Old Limitation Act of 1908 Section 29(2) of the new Limitation Act of 1963
(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed therefor by the first schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply as if such period were prescribed therefor in that schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law:
(a) the provisions contained in section 4, sections 9 to 18, and section 22 shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law; and
(b) the remaining provisions of this Act shall not apply.
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