Asma Lateef & Anr v. Shabbir Ahmad & Ors
- Citation
- 2024 INSC 36; [2024] 1 S.C.R. 517
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 3 Judges: Justice Bhushan Ramkrishna Gavai, Justice Dipankar Datta, Justice Aravind Kumar
- Decided
- 12 Jan 2024
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 9695/2013
- Sections
- 47, 331, 2(2), 9, 38, 229B, 41, 52, 2(9), 58, 144
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* Author [2024] 1 S.C.R. 517 : 2024 INSC 36 Asma Lateef & Anr.
v.
Shabbir Ahmad & Ors.
(Civil Appeal No. 9695 of 2013)
12 January 2024 [B.R. Gavai, Dipankar Datta* and Aravind Kumar, JJ.] Issue for Consideration Whether the order dated 05.08.1991 (vide which application u/ rr.5 and 10 of Or.VIII, CPC was allowed by the Trial Court for pronouncement of judgment against defendant no.2 in the suit) suffered from a jurisdictional error so grave that the decree drawn up subsequently is incapable of execution by the Executing Court and an objection that it is inexecutable was available to be raised u/s. 47, CPC by the respondents 1 to 3.
Headnotes Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – rr. 5, 10 of Or. VIII and s.47 – Respondents 1 to 3 had filed an objection u/s. 47 of the CPC in an execution application filed before the Executing Court by the appellants-plaintiffs – It was urged, based on the case pleaded therein, that the decree put to execution was inexecutable – The Executing Court allowed the objections and the execution application was dismissed – However, the Revisional Court directed the Executing Court to proceed with the execution of decree – Respondents 1 to 3 filed application u/Art. 227 against the revisional order – The High Court quashed the order passed by the Revisional Court and relegated the parties to the remedy of having their rights, in respect of the suit property, adjudicated by the appropriate forum – Propriety:
Held: Appellants-plaintiffs had instituted a civil suit against the three defendants-K (defendant no.1), K’s son S (defendant no.2) and R (defendant no.3) – K filed his written statement on 05.12.1990 and inter-alia contended that suit was barred by s.331 of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 – No written statements was filed by other two defendants – Appellants 518 [2024] 1 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports moved an application u/rr. 5, 10 of Or.VIII, CPC for pronouncement of judgment against S (defendant no.2) and the same was allowed – K passed away and the suit against him was dismissed as abated – In the instant case, the trial Court is presumed to be aware of the fact that the written statement of K was on record or else it would not have fixed the next date for settling ‘issues’ – In a situation where maintainability of the suit was in question and despite S not having filed his written statement, it was not a case where the Trial Court could simply pronounce judgment without even recording a satisfaction that it had the jurisdiction to try the suit and adjudicate the contentious issue(s), not to speak of pronouncing its verdict against S without assigning a single reason by treating the averments in the plaint to be admitted – The High Court rightly observed that even on pronouncement of judgment against S, the lis remained alive as against K and decision on the objection as to maintainability could have resulted in a contrary decision – In the matter at hand, the filing of the written statement by K denying the averments made in the plaint warranted that the appellants’ claims be proved by evidence, oral and/or documentary, instead of decreeing the suit against one of the defendants in a most slipshod manner – As far as the objection available to the respondents 1 to 3 u/s. 47 of CPC is concerned, it is the settled position of law that the powers of an executing court, though narrower than an appellate or revisional court, can be exercised to dismiss an execution application if the decree put to execution is unmistakably found to suffer from an inherent lack of jurisdiction of the court that made the same rendering it a nullity in the eyes of law – The Executing Court and the High Court were right in holding that the objection raised by the respondents 1 to 3 to the executability of the decree was well-founded – Further, the decision rendered by a court on the merits of a controversy in favour of the plaintiff without first adjudicating on its competence to decide such controversy would amount to a decision being rendered on an illegal and erroneous assumption of jurisdiction and, thus, be assailable as lacking in inherent jurisdiction and be treated as a nullity in the eyes of law; as a logical corollary, the order dated 05.08.1991 is held to be ab initio void and the decree drawn up based thereon is inexecutable – That apart, the order dated 05.08.1991 does not reveal any adjudication leading to determination of the rights of the parties in relation to any of the matters in controversy in the suit and, therefore, the decree since drawn up is not a formal expression of [2024] 1 S.C.R. 519Asma Lateef & Anr. v. Shabbir Ahmad & Ors. an adjudication/determination since there has been no adjudication/ determination so as to conform to the requirements of a decree within the meaning of section 2(2) of CPC – Therefore, the trial Court had no authority to decree the suit against S in exercise of its power u/r.10 of Or.VIII, CPC – No reason to interfere with the judgment of the High Court. [Paras 6,20,29,41,50,52] Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – r.10 of Or. VIII – Scope and extent of power – Discussed. [Paras 13, 14, 15, 16, 17] Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – rr. 5, 10 of Or. VIII – When the defendant defaults in filing written statement – What is required by the plaintiff:
Held: In a given case, the defendant defaults in filing written statement and the first alternative were the only course to be adopted (pronouncing judgment against defendant), it would tantamount to a plaintiff being altogether relieved of its obligation to prove his case to the satisfaction of the court – Generally, in order to be entitled to a judgment in his favour, what is required of a plaintiff is to prove his pleaded case by adducing evidence – Rule 10, in fact, has to be read together with Rule 5 of Order VIII and the position seems to be clear that a trial court, at its discretion, may require any fact, treated as admitted, to be so proved otherwise than by such admission – Since facts are required to be pleaded in a plaint and not the evidence, which can be adduced in course of examination of witnesses, mere failure or neglect of a defendant to file a written statement controverting the pleaded facts in the plaint, in all cases, may not entitle him to a judgment in his favour unless by adducing evidence he proves his case/claim. [Para 18] Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Jurisdiction – Essence of: Held: The essence really is that a court must not only have the jurisdiction in respect of the subject matter of dispute for the purpose of entertaining and trying the claim but also the jurisdiction to grant relief that is sought for – Once it is conceded that the jurisdiction on both counts is available, it is immaterial if jurisdiction is exercised erroneously – An erroneous decision cannot be labelled as having been passed ‘without jurisdiction’ – It is, therefore, imperative that the distinction between a decision lacking in inherent jurisdiction and a decision which suffers from an error committed in the exercise of jurisdiction is borne in mind. [Para 35] 520 [2024] 1 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Jurisdiction – Determination of question of jurisdiction by civil Court:
Held: Jurisdiction is the entitlement of the civil court to embark upon an enquiry as to whether the cause has been brought before it by the plaintiff in a manner prescribed by law and also whether a good case for grant of relief claimed been set up by him – As and when such entitlement is established, any subsequent error till delivery of judgment could be regarded as an error within the jurisdiction – The enquiry as to whether the civil court is entitled to entertain and try a suit has to be made by it keeping in mind the provision in section 9, CPC and the relevant enactment which, according to the objector, bars a suit – The question of jurisdiction has to be determined at the commencement and not at the conclusion of the enquiry. [Para 38] Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Jurisdiction – Question of jurisdiction at the stage when a Court considers the question of grant of interim relief:
Held: Where interim relief is claimed in a suit before a civil court and the party to be affected by grant of such relief, or any other party to the suit, raises a point of maintainability thereof or that it is barred by law and also contends on that basis that interim relief should not to be granted, grant of relief in whatever form, if at all, ought to be preceded by formation and recording of at least a prima facie satisfaction that the suit is maintainable or that it is not barred by law – It would be inappropriate for a court to abstain from recording its prima facie satisfaction on the question of maintainability, yet, proceed to grant protection pro tem on the assumption that the question of maintainability has to be decided as a preliminary issue under Rule 2 of Order XIV, CPC – That could amount to an improper exercise of power – If the court is of the opinion at the stage of hearing the application for interim relief that the suit is barred by law or is otherwise not maintainable, it cannot dismiss it without framing a preliminary issue after the written statement is filed but can most certainly assign such opinion for refusing interim relief – However, if an extraordinary situation arises where it could take time to decide the point of maintainability of the suit and non-grant of protection pro tem pending such decision could lead to irreversible consequences, the court may proceed to make an appropriate order in the manner justifying the [2024] 1 S.C.R. 521Asma Lateef & Anr. v . Shabbir A h m a d & O r s . course of action it adopts – In other words, such an order may be passed, if at all required, to avoid irreparable harm or injury or undue hardship to the party claiming the relief and/or to ensure that the proceedings are not rendered infructuous by reason of non-interference by the court. [Para 39] Judgment/Order – Cardinal principle of:
Held: It is one of the cardinal principles of the justice delivery system that any verdict of a competent judicial forum in the form of a judgment/order, that determines the rights and liabilities of the parties to the proceedings, must inform the parties what is the outcome and why one party has succeeded and not the other - the ‘why’ constituting the reasons and ‘what’ the conclusion – Apart from anything else, insistence of the requirement for the reason(s) to support the conclusion guarantees application of mind by the adjudicator to the materials before it as well as provides an avenue to the unsuccessful party to test the reasons before a higher court – All civil courts in the country have to regulate their judicial work in accordance with the terms of the provisions of the CPC – Any egregious breach or violation of such provisions, would be ultra vires. [Paras 47, 48] Case Law Cited Balraj Taneja v. Sunil Madan, [1999] 2 Suppl. SCR 258 : (1999) 8 SCC 396; Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi v.
Rajabhai Abdul Rehman, [1971] 1 SCR 66 : (1970) 1 SCC 670; Dhurandhar Prasad Singh v. Jai Prakash University, [2001] 3 SCR 1129 : (2001) 6 SCC 534;
Official Trustee v. Sachindra Nath Chatterjee, [1969] SCR 92 : AIR 1969 SC 823; Rafique Bibi v. Sayed Waliuddin, [2003] 3 Suppl. SCR 100 : (2004) 1 SCC 287 – relied on.
Surjit Singh and Others v. Harbans Singh and Others, [1995] 3 Suppl. SCR 354 : (1995) 6 SCC 50; Manohar Lal v. Ugrasen, [2010] 7 SCR 346 : (2010) 11 SCC 557; Hukam Chand v. Om Chand, (2001) 10 SCC 715;
Nagubai Ammal v. B. Shama Rao, [1956] SCR 451 :
AIR 1956 SC 593; Swaran Lata Ghosh v. H.K. Banerjee, [1969] 3 SCR 976 : (1969) 1 SCC 709; Balvant N.
Viswamitra v. Yadav Sadashiv Mule, [2004] 3 Suppl.
SCR 519 : (2004) 8 SCC 706 – referred to.
522 [2024] 1 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports Hirday Nath Roy v. Ramachandra Barna Sarma, 1920 SCC OnLine Cal 85 : ILR LXVIII, Cal 138 – referred to.
Books and Periodicals Cited Hon’ble P.B. Mukharji, CJ., The New Jurisprudence:
The Grammar of Modern Law – referred to.
List of Acts Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ; Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950.
List of Keywords Jurisdictional error; Essence of jurisdiction; Question of jurisdiction; Lack in inherent jurisdiction; Cardinal principle of judgment; Powers of an executing court; Objection against execution of decree; Executability of the decree; Inexecutable decree; Requirements of a decree.
Case Arising From CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 9695 of 2013. From the Judgment and Order dated 04.02.2011 of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in CMWP No.15236 of 2009.
Appearances for Parties Ms. Meenakshi Arora, Sr. Adv., Rahul Narayan, Shashwat Goel, Vishal Kr. Kaushik, Advs. for the Appellants.
Ms. Preetika Dwivedi, Abhishek Chaudhary, Adarsh Upadhyay, Advs. for the Respondents.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment Dipankar Datta, J.
The Challenge
1. Respondents 1 to 3 had filed an objection under section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“CPC”, hereafter) in an execution application filed before the Executing Court by the appellants. It was urged, based on the case pleaded therein, that the decree put to [2024] 1 S.C.R. 523Asma Lateef & Anr. v . Shabbir A h m a d & O r s . execution was inexecutable. The Executing Court, on 19 th March, 2008, allowed the objections of the respondents 1 to 3, resulting in dismissal of the execution application.
2. A revision was carried by the appellants from the order dated 19 th March, 2008 before the Revisional Court which, vide its order dated 21st February, 2009, dismissed the objection filed by the respondents 1 to 3 and directed the Executing Court to proceed with the execution of the decree whilst treating such objection as non-maintainable.
3. The revisional order dated 21 st February, 2009 was challenged by the respondents 1 to 3 in an application under Article 227 of the Constitution1 before the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad (“High Court”, hereafter). The High Court, by its judgment and order dated 4th February, 2011, quashed the order passed by the Revisional Court and relegated the parties to the remedy of having their rights, in respect of the suit property, adjudicated by the appropriate forum.
4. This appeal, by special leave, registers a challenge to the said judgment and order of the High Court.
Factual Conspectus
5. Having regard to the nature and extent of controversy raised at the stage of execution, a decision on this appeal does not necessitate noting the facts triggering it and the rival contentions in great depth; however, we propose to briefly narrate the essential facts and submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties before recording our conclusions.
6. The relevant facts, shorn of unnecessary details, are noticed hereunder:
a. Appellants claimed that their great-grandmother, one Khatoon Jannat Bibi, had orally gifted them a certain property (“suit property”, hereafter) on 16 th August, 1988 whereafter a memorandum recording the same was also executed before the relevant tehsildar and that they were in peaceful possession of the same continuously.
b. Appellants, as plaintiffs, through their power of attorney holder, 1 Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 15236 of 2009 524 [2024] 1 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports instituted a civil suit2 (“Suit”, hereafter) before the Trial Court under section 38 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (“Specific Relief Act”, hereafter) against three defendants - a son of Khatoon Jannat Bibi named Asad Ullah Kazmi [defendant no. 1] (“Kazmi”, hereafter), Kazmi’s son Samiullah [defendant no. 2] and one purported caretaker, Mr. Ram Chandra Yadav [defendant no. 3] in respect of the suit property, more particularly described in the plaint. Appellants prayed for a permanent injunction against the three defendants from interfering with the appellants’ peaceful possession of the suit property.
c. Kazmi, sometime in 1990, initiated proceedings for declaration of rights before the Sub-Divisional Officer under section 229B of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (“UPZA & LR Act”, hereafter); the said proceedings were, however, dismissed on 27th February, 1999 [4 (four) years after his death].
d. In the Suit, an application for interim injunction was filed by the appellants. The Trial Court on 31 st May, 1990, allowed the application and directed Kazmi and Samiullah to maintain status quo with regard to the suit property, and directed them not to interfere with the appellants’ peaceful possession thereof. e. Kazmi filed his written statement in the Suit on 5 th December, 1990 where he inter alia contended that the Suit was barred by section 331 of the UPZA & LR Act and not maintainable before a civil court since the suit property was bhoomidhari land. It was further averred that the Suit was barred by section 41(h) of the Specific Relief Act; he also contended that his son Samiullah, the defendant no.2, had no concern with the suit property as long as his father (Kazmi) was alive and, hence, Samiullah had been wrongly impleaded as the defendant no.2. Kazmi also denied that Khatoon Jannat Bibi had the right to make any oral gift; inasmuch as she had only a life interest in the property, after her demise, the same devolved upon him exclusively.
f. It is to be noted that no written statement was filed on behalf 2 Original Suit No. 58 of 1990 [2024] 1 S.C.R. 525Asma Lateef & Anr. v . Shabbir A h m a d & O r s . of the other two defendants.
g. Upon the appellants moving an application under Rules 5 and 10 of Order VIII, CPC for pronouncement of judgment against Samiullah, the same was allowed by the Trial Court by its order dated 5 th August, 19913, to which we propose to advert in course of our analysis.
h. Subsequently, the Trial Court, on 10 th October, 1991, framed 11 (eleven) issues for consideration in the Suit, of which the very first one was on its competency to try the Suit.
i. Kazmi passed away on 15 th July, 1995, after which his sons, Samiullah and Fariduddin [respondents 4 and 5 herein] transferred the suit property to the respondents 1 to 3 (“Purchasers”, hereafter) vide a sale deed dated 3 rd November, 1997. The Suit against Kazmi remained pending even after his demise, and none of his other heirs or legal representatives were brought on record as substituted defendants. The Suit against Kazmi was finally dismissed as abated on 27 th April, 2009. j. Appellants, as purported decree holders, filed an execution application4 before the Executing Court, on 16th December, 1997, praying that respondents 4 and 5 be punished for violating the order dated 5 th August, 1991 and that the sale deed dated 3 rd November, 1997 in favour of the Purchasers be declared invalid. k. The Executing Court, vide an interim order passed on 16 th January, 1998, restrained the Purchasers from interfering in any manner with the suit property.
l. Thereupon, the Purchasers filed their objection under section 47, CPC wherein they submitted, inter alia, that the order dated 5th August, 1991 was neither a judgment nor a decree and could not be executed.
m. Further, on 7th December, 2004, the appellants filed a contempt petition5 against the respondents alleging contempt of orders dated 31 st May, 1990 and 5 th August 1991, and the Executing 3 The decree was signed on 11 th November, 1991.
4 Execution Application No. 58 of 1997 5 Civil Misc Contempt Petition No. 62 of 2004 526 [2024] 1 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports Court order dated 16 th January, 1998 by interfering with the appellants’ possession of the suit property.
n. These events were followed by the proceedings and the judgments/orders referred to in paragraphs 1 to 4 hereinabove. Impugned Judgment
7. The Purchasers invoked the appropriate jurisdiction of the High Court by challenging the order dated 21 st February, 2009 of the Revisional Court. The High Court formulated two points for determination, viz.
(i) whether the petitioners before it (respondents 1 to 3 herein), who are subsequent purchasers of the suit property, had any right to maintain an objection under section 47, CPC against execution of the decree? and (ii) whether the order dated 5 th August, 1991, passed in purported exercise of power under Rule 10 of Order VIII, CPC decreeing the suit against Samiullah alone is without jurisdiction and a nullity which is non est and inexecutable in nature? The High Court also framed an ancillary point as to whether the sale deed dated 23 rd November, 1997 made by Samiullah in favour of the Purchasers was null and void.
8. While the two main points were answered in the affirmative, the ancillary point was answered in the negative. In course of rendering its judgment, the High Court held the order dated 5 th August, 1991, and consequently the decree drawn on the basis thereof, to be beyond jurisdiction and a nullity. The High Court was also of the opinion that the revisional order dated 21 st February, 2009 deserved to be set aside and the writ petition allowed, which it duly ordered. The parties were granted liberty to take recourse to available legal remedies to have determination of the title to the suit property adjudicated. Certain salient observations made by the High Court in the impugned judgment are summarised below for convenience: a. The order dated 5 th August 1991, passed by the Trial Court, in the Suit, restrained only the defendant no.2 from interfering with the peaceful enjoyment of the appellants’ rights relating to the suit property, but did not restrict the sons of Kazmi from dealing with or transferring the same.
b. The transfer of the suit property was not in derogation of section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (“ToP Act”, hereafter) and that the Purchasers could object to the [2024] 1 S.C.R. 527Asma Lateef & Anr. v . Shabbir A h m a d & O r s . appellants’ execution application.
c. It is a cardinal principle that to succeed in a suit for permanent prohibitory injunction, the plaintiff must either establish title, proprietary rights over the suit property or prove possession over the same; however, the Trial Court had not found either the title of the plaintiffs or proved their possession in respect of the suit property.
d. A court need not always pronounce judgment on the facts of a plaint or on those admitted due to non-filing of a written statement or want of specific denial. A court has the option of pronouncing judgment only in cases where it deems it prudent; it also has the option to pass such an appropriate order as it seems fit.
e. A reading of Rules 1, 5 and 10 of Order VIII, CPC show that they concern themselves with only a single defendant to a suit and not several defendants. The Trial Court, instead, could have proceeded to hear the Suit ex parte under Rule 11 of Order IX, CPC since Kazmi’s written statement was on the record. Hence, the Trial Court had no authority in law to decree the Suit against one defendant without adjudicating upon the controversy involved.
f. The order dated 5 th August, 1991 was not a judgment within the scope of section 2(9) read with Rule 4(2) of Order XX, CPC and did not meet the basic requirements of a “judgment” and a decree as per section 2(9) and 2(2), CPC, respectively. Rival Contentions
9. Ms. Meenakshi Arora, learned senior counsel for the appellants while seeking our interference with the impugned judgment submitted as under:
a. The High Court fell into error by not appreciating the fact that the Executing Court exceeded its jurisdiction by going behind the order dated 5 th August, 1991 and the decree that was drawn up in terms thereof, returning a finding that the same was not executable.
528 [2024] 1 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports b. Samiullah had been provided ample opportunity to file his written statement but had failed to do so. In any event, the order dated 5 th August, 1991 had not been challenged, and had attained finality.
c. The Trial Court, vide an interim order dated 31 st May, 1990, had directed Kazmi and Samiullah to maintain status quo and not interfere with the peaceful possession of the suit property, by the appellants. The High Court had erroneously held that a perusal of the aforementioned order did not indicate any rider placed upon the parties from alienating the suit property, and that the sale deed dated 3 rd November, 1997 was validly entered into. d. The Purchasers were purchasers pendente lite and could not have purchased the suit property without leave of the Trial Court. The decisions in Surjit Singh and Others v. Harbans Singh and Others6 and Manohar Lal v. Ugrasen7 were referred to in support of the contentions that the transfer of property during pendency of proceedings and also in contravention of the interim order of injunction was impermissible.
e. Further, the Purchasers forcibly dispossessed the appellants of their peaceful possession of the suit property on 10 th October, 2004 in gross violation of the injunction order dated 16th January, 1998 passed by the Executing Court.
f. Reliance placed by the High Court on Balraj Taneja v. Sunil Madan8 was misplaced in the present case as this Court, in Balraj Taneja (supra), while holding that reasons must be given while decreeing a suit under Rule 10 of Order VIII, CPC, was seized of a matter where the decree was challenged in appellate proceedings. In the present case, the decree was sought to be declared inexecutable in execution proceedings, far beyond the reach of such a narrow jurisdiction.
10. Ms. Preetika Dwivedi, learned counsel for the Purchasers (respondents 1 to 3) in support of upholding of the impugned judgment, submitted as under:
6 (1995) 6 SCC 50
7 (2010) 11 SCC 557
8 (1999) 8 SCC 396
[2024] 1 S.C.R. 529Asma Lateef & Anr. v. Shabbir Ahmad & Ors. a. The order dated 5 th August, 1991 passed by the Trial Court is not a judgment within the scope of section 2(9) read with Rule 4 of Order XX, CPC and the principle of law laid down in Balraj Taneja (supra) was rightly applied by the High Court.
b. The High Court had rightly granted all the parties liberty to have the title to the suit property adjudicated by the appropriate forum; hence, it could not be said that the appellants were prejudiced in any manner whatsoever. Further, any question relating to the title, and validity of the sale deed in favour of the Purchasers could be determined by the appropriate forum.
c. At the time of purchase, the names of Kazmi’s sons, i.e. respondents 4 and 5, were present in the land revenue records pertaining to the suit property, after which the Purchasers’ names have been inserted through mutation.
d. As per the law laid down in Hukam Chand v. Om Chand9 and Nagubai Ammal v. B. Shama Rao10, the transfer of the suit property was not in violation of section 52, ToP Act since the statute did not put an absolute embargo on the transfer of such property pendente lite.
Analysis
11. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the impugned judgment as well as the other materials on record.
12. The sole question of law which arises for a decision in this appeal is: Whether the order dated 5 th August, 1991 suffered from a jurisdictional error so grave that the decree drawn up subsequently is incapable of execution by the Executing Court and an objection that it is inexecutable was available to be raised under section 47, CPC by the respondents 1 to 3?
13. Prior to answering the above question, we consider it appropriate to examine the scope and extent of power exercisable under Rule 10 of Order VIII, CPC.
9 (2001) 10 SCC 715
10 AIR 1956 SC 593
530 [2024] 1 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports
14. Rule 10 of Order VIII, CPC, used as the primary source of power by the Trial Court in passing the order dated 5th August, 1991 against Samiullah, postulates the procedure that could be adopted when a party fails to present its written statement upon the same being called for by the court. Rule 10 reads as follows:
“10. Procedure when party fails to present written statement called for by Court.— Where any party from whom a written statement is required under rule 1 or rule 9 fails to present the same within the time permitted or fixed by the Court, as the case may be, the Court shall pronounce judgment against him, or make such order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit and on the pronouncement of such judgment a decree shall be drawn up.”
15. We have no hesitation to hold that Rule 10 is permissive in nature, enabling the trial court to exercise, in a given case, either of the two alternatives open to it. Notwithstanding the alternative of proceeding to pronounce a judgment, the court still has an option not to pronounce judgment and to make such order in relation to the suit it considers fit. The verb ‘shall’ in Rule 10 [although substituted for the verb ‘may’ by the Amendment Act of 1976] does not elevate the first alternative to the status of a mandatory provision, so much so that in every case where a party from whom a written statement is invited fails to file it, the court must pronounce the judgment against him. If that were the purport, the second alternative to which ‘shall’ equally applies would be rendered otiose.
16. At this stage, we consider it apposite to take a quick look at Balraj Taneja (supra) to examine the scope of Rule 10 of Order VIII. Therein, this Court ruled that a court is not supposed to pass a mechanical judgment invoking Rule 10 of Order VIII, CPC merely on the basis of the plaint, upon the failure of a defendant to file a written statement. The relevant paragraphs of the judgment are reproduced below for convenience:
“29. As pointed out earlier, the court has not to act blindly upon the admission of a fact made by the defendant in his written statement nor should the court proceed to pass judgment blindly merely because a written statement has [2024] 1 S.C.R. 531Asma Lateef & Anr. v . Shabbir A h m a d & O r s . not been filed by the defendant traversing the facts set out by the plaintiff in the plaint filed in the court. In a case, specially where a written statement has not been filed by the defendant, the court should be a little cautious in proceeding under Order 8 Rule 10 CPC. Before passing the judgment against the defendant it must see to it that even if the facts set out in the plaint are treated to have been admitted, a judgment could possibly be passed in favour of the plaintiff without requiring him to prove any fact mentioned in the plaint. It is a matter of the court’s satisfaction and, therefore, only on being satisfied that there is no fact which need be proved on account of deemed admission, the court can conveniently pass a judgment against the defendant who has not filed the written statement. But if the plaint itself indicates that there are disputed questions of fact involved in the case regarding which two different versions are set out in the plaint itself, it would not be safe for the court to pass a judgment without requiring the plaintiff to prove the facts so as to settle the factual controversy. Such a case would be covered by the expression ‘the court may, in its discretion, require any such fact to be proved’ used in sub-rule (2) of Rule 5 of Order 8, or the expression ‘may make such order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit’ used in Rule 10 of Order 8.”
No doubt this decision was rendered considering that the verb used in the provision is ‘may’, but nothing substantial turns on it.
17. What emerges from a reading of Balraj Taneja (supra), with which we wholeheartedly concur, is that only on being satisfied that there is no fact which need to be proved on account of deemed admission, could the court pass a judgment against the defendant who has not filed the written statement; but if the plaint itself suggests involvement of disputed questions of fact, it would not be safe for the court to pass a judgment without requiring the plaintiff to prove the facts. Balraj Taneja (supra) also lays down the law that provision of Rule 10 of Order VIII, CPC is by no means mandatory in the sense that a court has no alternative but to pass a judgment in favour of the plaintiff, if the defendant fails or neglects to file his written statement. 532 [2024] 1 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports
18. If indeed, in a given case, the defendant defaults in filing written statement and the first alternative were the only course to be adopted, it would tantamount to a plaintiff being altogether relieved of its obligation to prove his case to the satisfaction of the court. Generally, in order to be entitled to a judgment in his favour, what is required of a plaintiff is to prove his pleaded case by adducing evidence. Rule 10, in fact, has to be read together with Rule 5 of Order VIII and the position seems to be clear that a trial court, at its discretion, may require any fact, treated as admitted, to be so proved otherwise than by such admission. Similar is the position with section 58 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. It must be remembered that a plaint in a suit is not akin to a writ petition where not only the facts are to be pleaded but also the evidence in support of the pleaded facts is to be annexed, whereafter, upon exchange of affidavits, such petition can be decided on affidavit evidence. Since facts are required to be pleaded in a plaint and not the evidence, which can be adduced in course of examination of witnesses, mere failure or neglect of a defendant to file a written statement controverting the pleaded facts in the plaint, in all cases, may not entitle him to a judgment in his favour unless by adducing evidence he proves his case/claim.
19. Having noted what Rule 10 of Order VIII postulates, the order dated 5th August, 1991 may be examined now since it is the genesis of the present litigation before us. The order made by the Trial Court on 5th August, 1991, reads as below:
“68-C application moved by the plaintiffs under Order-8 Rule-5 (2) & (3) read with Rule 10 CPC. According to the plaintiff, Samiullah son of Asad Ullah Kazmi, defendant no. 1 has been impleaded as defendant no. 1 (sic, defendant no. 2) as he was also threatening to encroach the right of the plaintiff in the disputed property. He appeared through counsel and moved application and has also filed affidavits 50-C & 57-C but he failed to file any written statement. It is clear that so many date has been given for written statement and lastly it was 29.4.91, which was fixed for written statement and for issues, but the defendant has (sic, not) filed written statement and on this ground the plaintiff has moved the above application 68-C.
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