Baby Sakshi Greola v. Manzoor Ahmad Simon and Another
- Citation
- 2024 INSC 963; [2024] 12 S.C.R. 958
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Bhushan Ramkrishna Gavai, Justice K.V. Viswanathan
- Decided
- 11 Dec 2024
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 14290/2024
- Sections
- 166, 168
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:24 am. Original source ↗
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[2024] 12 S.C.R. 958 : 2024 INSC 963 Baby Sakshi Greola v.
Manzoor Ahmad Simon and Another (Civil Appeal No. 14290 of 2024)
11 December 2024 [B.R. Gavai* and K.V. Viswanathan, JJ.] Issue for Consideration Appellant (a minor at the time of the accident) sustained grievous injuries and suffered disability and moderate mental retardation. MACT awarded compensation of Rs.5,90,750/- with interest at 7.5% per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition. High Court granted a further amount of Rs.5,60,000/- with interest at 9% per annum from the date of filing till realization. Appellant sought further enhancement of the compensation.
Headnotes† Motor Vehicle Accident – Appellant sustained grievous injuries in a road traffic accident when she was 7 years old and suffered disability and moderate mental retardation – Compensation awarded – Enhancement of:
Held: Even though the Doctor (PW-3) on assessment of the appellant opined that the disability suffered by her was 75%, however, the disability of the appellant should be treated to be 100% for all practical purposes – Taking notional income is not the correct approach – Instead, the minimum wages payable to a skilled workman in the concerned State has to be taken into consideration because, that would be the minimum amount which the appellant would have earned on becoming a major – The minimum wage payable to a skilled workman in the State of Delhi at the time of the accident, i.e. 02.06.2009, was Rs. 4,358/- per month – To arrive at the compensation to be awarded under the head of loss of income and earnings due to disability, 40% added for future prospects and a multiplier of 18 applied in view of the age of the appellant – Therefore, the compensation under loss of income/earning capacity would be Rs. [4,358 + (40% of 4,358)] x 12 x 18 = Rs.13,17,859/-, rounded off to Rs. 13,18,000/- – Further, the appellant will remain dependant on another person * Author [2024] 12 S.C.R. 959Baby Sakshi Greola v. Manzoor Ahmad Simon and Another for the rest of her life even though the physical age will increase, but her mental age will be that of a child studying in the 2nd Standard/Class – High Court only enhanced the compensation under the head of pain and suffering from Rs.50,000/- as awarded by the Tribunal to Rs.1,00,000/- which is not commensurate to the impact the unfortunate accident has on the appellant and her family – In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, compensation of Rs.15,00,000/- award under the head of pain and suffering – Also, the compensation awarded under the head of loss of marriage prospects by the High Court is inadequate and is enhanced to Rs. 5,00,000/- – Rs.9,42,000/- awarded under the head of attendant charges as the appellant would be dependent on a skilled attendant throughout her life and on a full-time basis – Compensation awarded under Future Medical Treatment enhanced to Rs.5,00,000/- as the appellant would be requiring medical assistance in the form of medicines, diapers, etc. to live a relatively comfortable life – Impugned judgment quashed and set aside – Total compensation of Rs. 50,87,000/- with 9% rate of interest awarded. [Paras 27, 29, 31, 33, 38, 40, 43, 46, 48, 49, 51, 53] Case Law Cited National Insurance Company Limited v. Pranay Sethi and Others 2017 INSC 1068 : [2017] 13 SCR 100 : (2017) 16 SCC 680 – followed.
Kajal v. Jagdish Chand and Others, 2020 INSC 135 : [2020] 3 SCR 622 : (2020) 4 SCC 413; Master Ayush v. Branch Manager, Reliance General Insurance Company Limited and Another, 2022 INSC 363 : [2022] 1 SCR 831 : (2022) 7 SCC 738; K.S. Muralidhar v. R. Subbulakshmi and Another, 2024 INSC 886 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3385; General Manager, Kerala State Road Transport Corporation, Trivandrum v. Susamma Thomas (Mrs.) and Others (1994) 2 SCC 176 – relied on.
List of Acts Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.
List of Keywords Motor vehicle accident; Road traffic accident; Compensation; Enhancement; Minor at the time of the accident; Grievous 960 [2024] 12 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports injuries; Moderate mental retardation; Disability; 100% disability; Disability Certificate; Mental disability; Physical disability; Multiplier; Dependent; Minimum wages; Skilled worker; Notional income; Loss of income and earning capacity; Future prospects; Physical age; Mental age; Child studying in the 2nd Standard/Class; Pain and suffering; Loss of marriage prospects; Marriage/companionship; Non-pecuniary loss; Attendant charges; Skilled attendant; Unskilled attendant; Future Medical Treatment; Medical assistance; Jointly and severally liable; Driver-cum-owner; Insurance company; Guardian.
Case Arising From CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 14290 of 2024 From the Judgment and Order dated 07.11.2017 of the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in MACA No. 1107 of 2011 Appearances for Parties Mrs. Aruna Mehta, Ms. Manjeet Chawla, Advs. for the Appellant. Ravi Bakshi, Manvendra Pr. Singh, Yash Pal Dhingra, Ms. Sayma, Advs. for the Respondents.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment B.R. Gavai, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The present appeal calls into question the correctness and validity of the final judgment and order passed by a learned Single Judge of the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi dated 7th November 2017 in MAC. APP. 1107/2011.
3. The appellant had approached the High Court seeking enhancement of the compensation awarded on account of injuries suffered in a motor vehicle accident. The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Central District, Delhi (hereinafter referred to as “Tribunal”) had by a judgment and order dated 13th June 2011 awarded compensation of Rs. 5,90,750/- along with interest at the rate of 7.5% per annum [2024] 12 S.C.R. 961Baby Sakshi Greola v. Manzoor Ahmad Simon and Another from the date of filing of the claim petition. The learned Single Judge of the High Court, vide impugned judgment and order, disposed of the appeal filed by the appellant seeking enhancement by granting a further amount of Rs. 5,60,000/- along with interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of filing till realization. Aggrieved thereby, the appellant has approached this Court.
4. The facts, in brief, giving rise to the present appeal are as follows: 4.1 On 2nd June, 2009, the appellant, aged seven years, was going on foot along with her mother and brother to her house from National Bal Bhawan, Kotla Road, New Delhi. At about 01:00 PM, when they reached a red light on Deen Dayal Upadhyay Marg and Vishnu Digambar Marg, ITO, Delhi, and were crossing the road on a zebra crossing, a car bearing Registration No. DL-3C-AX-1502 being driven at a high speed, hit the appellant, as a result of which, she sustained grievous injuries. 4.2 On 3rd September 2009, the appellant, through her father, filed a claim petition for grant of compensation under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as “MV Act”), before the learned Tribunal against the driver-cum-owner of the offending vehicle and United India Insurance Company Limited, New Delhi arrayed as Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 respectively. 4.3 The learned Tribunal framed three issues for its consideration. First, whether the appellant had suffered grievous injuries on account of the road accident on 2nd June 2009, due to rash and negligent driving of vehicle by Respondent No. 1. Second, whether the appellant is entitled to any compensation, if so, to what amount and from whom. Third, as to what relief should be granted to the appellant.
4.4 The appellant got examined five witnesses in support of her claim. Respondent No. 1 was proceeded ex-parte and Respondent No. 2 did not lead any evidence.
4.5 The learned Tribunal, on appreciation of the evidence, decided the first two issues in favour of the appellant. The learned Tribunal held the respondents jointly and severally liable to make the payment of compensation to the appellant.
4.6 The appellant was awarded the following compensation: 962 [2024] 12 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports S. No. Head Amount (In ₹)
1. Medicines and Medical Treatment 32,000/-
2. Loss of Earning Capacity due to Disability 1,68,750/-
3. Pain and Suffering 50,000
4. Future Treatment 30,000/-
5. Attendant Charges 15,000/-
6. Loss of Amenities of Life 1,00,000/-
7. Loss of Future Prospect 1,00,000/-
8. Special Education Expenditure 75,000/-
9. Conveyance and Special Diet 20,000/- Total 5,90,750/- 4.7 Vide judgment and order dated 13th June 2011, the learned Tribunal, therefore, held that the appellant is entitled to a compensation of Rs. 5,90,750/-. The appellant was also held entitled to interest at the rate of 7.5% per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition i.e. 3rd September 2009. 4.8 Seeking enhancement of the compensation awarded by the learned Tribunal, the appellant approached the High Court. 4.9 The learned Single Judge of the High Court, on appreciation of the material placed on record, enhanced the compensation as follows (in bold):
S. No. Head Amount (In ₹)
1. Medicines and Medical Treatment 32,000/-
2. Loss of Earning Capacity due to Disability 1,68,750/-
3. Pain and Suffering 50,000 + 50,000 = 1,00,000/-
4. Future Treatment 30,000/- [2024] 12 S.C.R. 963Baby Sakshi Greola v. Manzoor Ahmad Simon and Another
5. Attendant Charges 15,000 + 4,10,000 = 4,25,000/-
6. Loss of Amenities of Life 1,00,000/-
7. Loss of Future Prospect 1,00,000/-
8. Special Education Expenditure 75,000/-
9. Conveyance and Special Diet 20,000/-
10. Loss of Marriage Prospects 1,00,000/- Total 5,90,750 + 5,60,000 = 11,51,000/- 4.10 Vide impugned judgment and order dated 7th November 2017, the learned Single Judge of the High Court, therefore, enhanced the compensation by Rs.5,60,000/- to Rs.11,51,000/- along with interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition till realization.
4.11 Challenging the compensation awarded by the High Court, the appellant has filed the present appeal.
5. We have heard Smt. Aruna Mehta, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant and Shri Ravi Bakshi, learned counsel appearing on behalf of Respondent No. 2 (United India Insurance Company Limited).
6. Smt. Mehta submitted that the compensation awarded by the Tribunal as enhanced by the High Court deserves reconsideration by this Court. Placing reliance on the evidence of Dr. Monica Juneja (PW-3) who examined the appellant, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellant has sustained 75% mental moderate retardation and has no control over the passage of her urine. Further, it is submitted that the disability of the appellant is in relation to the whole body and is non-progressive. She submitted that children with moderate mental retardation are generally able to learn skills up to the level of a child of 2nd standard/class as adults and can work under close supervision only. She further submitted that, the appellant will 964 [2024] 12 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports require close supervision of an attendant for her day-to-day work. She further submitted that the appellant would need admission in a special school or training by a special education teacher and that due to her condition, the appellant’s marriage prospects may be severely affected.
7. Smt. Mehta submitted that, taking into consideration the condition of the appellant, the High Court has erred in granting only Rs. 4,25,000/towards the attendant charges by taking minimum wages of unskilled worker (Rs. 3,934/- per month) for a part time attendant. She further submitted that, the High Court has failed to award suitable amount of compensation under the head pain and suffering, as well as for future medical treatment of the appellant.
8. The learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on three judgments of this Court viz. Kajal v. Jagdish Chand and Others,1 Master Ayush v. Branch Manager, Reliance General Insurance Company Limited and Another2 and K.S. Muralidhar v. R. Subbulakshmi and Another.3
9. Per contra, Shri Bakshi, learned counsel appearing for Respondent No. 2 (Insurance Company) submitted that the High Court has rightly followed the settled principles of law and increased the compensation. He submitted that the High Court has been very liberal in awarding an additional sum of Rs.5,60,000/- over and above the amount awarded by the Tribunal.
10. Placing reliance on the Disability Certificate dated 10th January 2011, the learned counsel for Respondent No. 2 submitted that there is a likelihood of improvement in the condition of the appellant. He therefore, submitted that, this Court should not interfere with the amount awarded by the High Court.
11. To consider the present case, it would be appropriate to refer to the evidence of Smt. Prakashi Devi (PW-2), mother of the appellant, who had the misfortune to recount the incident before the Tribunal. It is stated by Smt. Prakashi Devi (PW-2) that on 2nd June 2009 when she was going back from National Bal Bhawan to her home, along 1 2020 INSC 135 : [2020] 3 SCR 622 : (2020) 4 SCC 413 2 2022 INSC 363 : [2022] 1 SCR 831 : (2022) 7 SCC 738 3 2024 INSC 886 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3385 [2024] 12 S.C.R. 965Baby Sakshi Greola v. Manzoor Ahmad Simon and Another with her children on foot, they had to cross the road. When they were crossing the road, on a zebra crossing meant for pedestrians, a Tata Safari car bearing registration number DL-3C-AX-4502, driven by Respondent No.1, at a very high speed, hit her daughter (appellant/ Baby Sakshi) with great force as a result of which her daughter sustained grievous injuries to her brain, sustained fracture over left side of femur and lacerated injuries all over her body.
12. Smt. Prakashi Devi (PW-2) stated that her daughter has become permanently partially disabled from her skull area. Further, her daughter cannot enjoy her life like a normal person and cannot walk properly. The prospect of her marriage has been ruined due to the unfortunate accident. Her daughter will not get any government job in her remaining life. Thus, life has become just like hell for her and her daughter will have to suffer trauma and loss of amenities of life.
13. It was also stated by the mother of the appellant (PW-2), that she wanted to make her daughter a badminton player but all her hopes have now vanished due to the unfortunate accident. It was stated by her that the appellant was a brilliant student and had she not met with the accident, she would have got a job of at least Rs. 25,000- 30,000/- per month, but as a result of the accident she has become a dull student.
14. It would also be appropriate to refer to the evidence of Dr. Monica Juneja (PW-3), who proved the Disability Certificate dated 10th January 2011. As per the said certificate, the appellant has suffered 75% disability, which is permanent in nature on account of moderate mental retardation. This disability is in relation to the whole body, which is non-progressive. It is stated in the certificate that this is a case of road traffic accident with Subarachnoid Haemorrhage with healed fracture femur left with moderate mental retardation which means she has an Intelligence Quotient of 41 and social Quotient of 43.
15. It is recorded in the testimony of Dr. Monica Juneja (PW-3) that, children with moderate mental retardation are generally able to learn skills up to the level of 2nd Standard/Class as adults and can work under close supervision only. Further, the appellant also has severe apathy and has no control over passage of her urine. Because of severe apathy, the appellant has no interest in playing or 966 [2024] 12 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports interacting with other children. The appellant would require very close supervision of an attendant for her day-to-day care. The appellant would also require admission in a special school or training by a special education teacher.
16. Dr. Monica Juneja (PW-3) has also stated that, due to all these problems, her marriage prospects may be affected. However, her possibility of procreation is not affected on account of mental retardation.
17. This Court, in the case of Kajal (supra), had an opportunity to consider a case with identical facts. In the said case, a girl (Kajal) aged 12 sustained brain injuries on account of an accident. The accident had very serious consequences on her. Kajal was examined for an assessment of her disability. It was assessed that, because of the head injury, Kajal is left with very low IQ and severe weakness in all her four limbs, she suffers from severe hysteria and severe urinary incontinence. Her disability had been assessed as 100%.
18. This Court, in the said case, referred to a number of cases where the principles for grant of compensation have been enunciated. Cases from foreign jurisdiction as well as cases of this Court were relied upon to extract the principles to be applied while assessing compensation. It would be apposite to refer to the following paragraphs of the said case:
“8. In Phillips v. London & South Western Railway Co. [Phillips v. London & South Western Railway Co. (1879) [L.R.] 5 Q.B.D. 78 (CA)], Field, J., while emphasising that damages must be full and adequate, held thus : (QBD p. 79) “… You cannot put the plaintiff back again into his original position, but you must bring your reasonable common sense to bear, and you must always recollect that this is the only occasion on which compensation can be given.
The plaintiff can never sue again for it. You have, therefore, now to give him compensation once and for all. He has done no wrong, he has suffered a wrong at the hands of the defendants and you must take care to give him full fair compensation for that which he has suffered.”
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 967Baby Sakshi Greola v. Manzoor Ahmad Simon and Another Besides, the Tribunals should always remember that the measures of damages in all these cases “should be such as to enable even a tortfeasor to say that he had amply atoned for his misadventure”.
9. In Mediana, In re [Mediana, In re, 1900 AC 113 (HL)], Lord Halsbury held : (AC pp. 116-17)
“… Of course the whole region of inquiry into damages is one of extreme difficulty. You very often cannot even lay down any principle upon which you can give damages; nevertheless, it is remitted to the jury, or those who stand in place of the jury, to consider what compensation in money shall be given for what is a wrongful act. Take the most familiar and ordinary case :
how is anybody to measure pain and suffering in moneys counted? Nobody can suggest that you can by any arithmetical calculation establish what is the exact amount of money which would represent such a thing as the pain and suffering which a person has undergone by reason of an accident. In truth, I think it would be very arguable to say that a person would be entitled to no damages for such things. What manly mind cares about pain and suffering that is past? But nevertheless the law recognises that as a topic upon which damages may be given.”
10. The following observations of Lord Morris in his speech in H. West & Son Ltd. v. Shephard [H. West & Son Ltd. v. Shephard, 1964 AC 326 : (1963) 2 WLR 1359 (HL)], are very pertinent : (AC p. 346)
“… Money may be awarded so that something tangible may be procured to replace something else of the like nature which has been destroyed or lost. But money cannot renew a physical frame that has been battered and shattered. All that Judges and courts can do is to award sums which must be regarded as giving reasonable compensation. In the process there must be 968 [2024] 12 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports the endeavour to secure some uniformity in the general method of approach. By common assent awards must be reasonable and must be assessed with moderation. Furthermore, it is eminently desirable that so far as possible comparable injuries should be compensated by comparable awards.”
In the same case, Lord Devlin observed (at p. 357) that the proper approach to the problem was to adopt a test as to what contemporary society would deem to be a fair sum, such as would allow the wrongdoer to “hold up his head among his neighbours and say with their approval that he has done the fair thing?”, which should be kept in mind by the court in determining compensation in personal injury cases.
11. Lord Denning while speaking for the Court of Appeal in Ward v. James [Ward v. James (1966) 1 QB 273 : (1965) 2 WLR 455 : (1965) 1 All ER 563 (CA)], laid down the following three basic principles to be followed in such like cases : (QB pp. 299-300)
“First, assessibility : In cases of grave injury, where the body is wrecked or the brain destroyed, it is very difficult to assess a fair compensation in money, so difficult that the award must basically be a conventional figure, derived from experience or from awards in comparable cases. Secondly, uniformity : There should be some measure of uniformity in awards so that similar decisions are given in similar cases; otherwise there will be great dissatisfaction in the community, and much criticism of the administration of justice. Thirdly, predictability : Parties should be able to predict with some measure of accuracy the sum which is likely to be awarded in a particular case, for by this means cases can be settled peaceably and not brought to court, a thing very much to the public good.”
(emphasis in original)
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 969Baby Sakshi Greola v. Manzoor Ahmad Simon and Another
12. The assessment of damages in personal injury cases raises great difficulties. It is not easy to convert the physical and mental loss into monetary terms. There has to be a measure of calculated guesswork and conjecture. An assessment, as best as can, in the circumstances, should be made.
13. McGregor’s Treatise on Damages, 14th Edition, Para 1157, referring to heads of damages in personal injury actions states:
“The person physically injured may recover both for his pecuniary losses and his nonpecuniary losses. Of these the pecuniary losses themselves comprise two separate items viz.
the loss of earnings and other gains which the plaintiff would have made had he not been injured and the medical and other expenses to which he is put as a result of the injury, and the courts have sub-divided the non-pecuniary losses into three categories viz. pain and suffering, loss of amenities of life and loss of expectation of life.”
14. In Concord of India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nirmala Devi [Concord of India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nirmala Devi (1979) 4 SCC 365 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 996 : 1980 ACJ 55], this Court held : (SCC p. 366, para 2)
“2. … the determination of the quantum must be liberal, not niggardly since the law values life and limb in a free country in generous scales.”
15. In R.D. Hattangadi v. Pest Control (India) (P) Ltd. [R.D. Hattangadi v. Pest Control (India) (P) Ltd. (1995) 1 SCC 551 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 250], dealing with the different heads of compensation in injury cases this Court held thus : (SCC p. 556, para 9)
“9. Broadly speaking while fixing the amount of compensation payable to a victim of an accident, the damages have to be assessed separately as pecuniary damages and special damages.
970 [2024] 12 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Pecuniary damages are those which the victim has actually incurred and which are capable of being calculated in terms of money; whereas non-pecuniary damages are those which are incapable of being assessed by arithmetical calculations. In order to appreciate two concepts pecuniary damages may include expenses incurred by the claimant : (i) medical attendance;
(ii) loss of earning of profit up to the date of trial; (iii) other material loss. So far as nonpecuniary damages are concerned, they may include : (i) damages for mental and physical shock, pain and suffering, already suffered or likely to be suffered in the future; (ii) damages to compensate for the loss of amenities of life which may include a variety of matters i.e.
on account of injury the claimant may not be able to walk, run or sit; (iii) damages for loss of expectation of life i.e. on account of injury the normal longevity of the person concerned is shortened; (iv) inconvenience, hardship, discomfort, disappointment, frustration and mental stress in life.”
16. In Raj Kumar v. Ajay Kumar [Raj Kumar v. Ajay Kumar (2011) 1 SCC 343 : (2011) 1 SCC (Civ) 164 : (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 1161], this Court laid down the heads under which compensation is to be awarded for personal injuries : (SCC p. 348, para 6)
“6. The heads under which compensation is awarded in personal injury cases are the following:
Pecuniary damages (Special damages)
(i) Expenses relating to treatment, hospitalisation, medicines, transportation, nourishing food, and miscellaneous expenditure.
(ii) Loss of earnings (and other gains) which the injured would have made had he not been injured, comprising:
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 971Baby Sakshi Greola v. Manzoor Ahmad Simon and Another
(a) Loss of earning during the period of treatment;
(b) Loss of future earnings on account of permanent disability.
(iii) Future medical expenses.
Non-pecuniary damages (General damages)
(iv) Damages for pain, suffering and trauma as a consequence of the injuries.
(v) Loss of amenities (and/or loss of prospects of marriage).
(vi) Loss of expectation of life (shortening of normal longevity).
In routine personal injury cases, compensation will be awarded only under heads (i), (ii)(a) and (iv). It is only in serious cases of injury, where there is specific medical evidence corroborating the evidence of the claimant, that compensation will be granted under any of the heads (ii)(b), (iii), (v) and (vi) relating to loss of future earnings on account of permanent disability, future medical expenses, loss of amenities (and/or loss of prospects of marriage) and loss of expectation of life.”
17. In K. Suresh v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd.
[K. Suresh v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. (2012) 12 SCC 274 : (2013) 2 SCC (Civ) 279 : (2013) 4 SCC (Cri) 638], this Court held as follows : (SCC p. 276, para 2) “2. … There cannot be actual compensation for anguish of the heart or for mental tribulations.
The quintessentiality lies in the pragmatic computation of the loss sustained which has to be in the realm of realistic approximation.
Therefore, Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for brevity “the Act”) stipulates that there should be grant of “just compensation”.
Thus, it becomes a challenge for a court of law to determine “just compensation” which is neither a bonanza nor a windfall, and simultaneously, should not be a pittance.””
972 [2024] 12 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
19. This Court, in the said case, thereafter, formulated various heads such as loss of earnings, expenses related to treatment, attendant charges, pain and suffering and loss of amenities, loss of marriage prospects, future medical treatment. Ultimately, this Court enhanced the compensation awarded by the High Court from Rs. 25,78,501/to Rs.62,27,000/-.
20. In another case titled Master Ayush (supra), this Court was called upon to adjudicate on an appeal filed by a 5-year-old victim of a road accident seeking enhancement of compensation awarded by the Tribunal.
21. In the said case, Ayush was left as a paraplegic patient as a result of the accident. He was examined by two doctors. He was not able to move both his legs and had complete sensory loss in the legs, urinary incontinence, bowel constipation and bed sore. Ayush was aged about 5 years on the date of the accident, hence, he lost his childhood and became dependant on other(s) for his routine work.
22. This Court, in the said case, relying on the decision of Kajal (supra) enhanced the compensation under the head of loss of future earnings due to permanent disability for life, medical expenses, future medical expenses, pain and suffering and loss of amenities, loss of marriage prospects, attendant charges and conveyance charges. This Court enhanced the compensation awarded to the appellant therein from Rs.13,46,805/- to Rs.49,93,000/-.
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