Sanjeevkumar Harakchand Kankariya v. Union of India & Ors.
- Citation
- 2024 INSC 1004; [2024] 12 S.C.R. 866
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice C.T. Ravikumar, Justice Sanjay Karol
- Decided
- 19 Dec 2024
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 14742/2024
- Sections
- 89, 16, 21, 20(1), 16A, 43, 43(2), 49, 2, 43(1), 34, 20
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:24 am. Original source ↗
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[2024] 12 S.C.R. 866 : 2024 INSC 1004 Sanjeevkumar Harakchand Kankariya v.
Union of India & Ors.
(Civil Appeal No. 14742 of 2024)
19 December 2024 [C.T. Ravikumar and Sanjay Karol,* JJ.] Issue for Consideration Issue arose whether in view of the inconsistency between the Court Fees Act, 1870 and Maharashtra Court Fees Act, 1959, if any, would the appellant be entitled to a complete refund of court fees per the former, since it is a Central legislation. Headnotes† Court Fees Act, 1870 – Maharashtra Court Fees Act, 1959 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – s.89 – Settlement of disputes outside the Court – Court fees – Complete refund of – Entitlement – Civil dispute filed by the appellant which was resolved through mediation u/s.89 CPC – Trial court allowed refund of court fees only to the extent of 50% – Appellant filed writ petition seeking complete refund of court fees on the ground that the civil court erred by allowing refund only to the extent of 50% in view s.16 of the CFA, 1870; that as per s.21 of the LSA Act,1987 when a matter is referred to Lok Adalat u/s.20(1) of the said Act and a compromise or settlement is arrived, the court fee paid in such a matter shall also be refunded in accordance with CFA, 1870; that the said Act being a Central legislation, would override the State enactment – High Court rejected the petition – Correctness:
Held: Entry 11A List III cannot govern the refund of court fees when a matter is settled by methods of alternate dispute resolution, in the face of Entry 3 List II simply by the use of the words “administration of justice” in the former – Reference to CFA, 1870 in respect of refund of court fees when the matter is settled by way of an award of Lok Adalat does not mean that the same shall be extended to the settlement of dispute by mediation for the simple reason that * Author [2024] 12 S.C.R. 867Sanjeevkumar Harakchand Kankariya v. Union of India & Ors. Lok Adalat and mediation are two distinct methods and cannot be equated – High Court made suggestion to the State legislature that the differences in the court fees in Lok Adalat, vis-à-vis, the forms of ADR should be done away to promote the adaptation of such methods of dispute resolution among the public – State legislature carried out such an amendment to the MCFA, 1959 and s.16A has been introduced therein – Effect would be that for the time when the amendment to the MCFA, 1959 granting partial or complete refund, as the case may be, in accordance with s.43 as amended, the persons whose matters were settled by way of ADR would not be entitled to 100% refund – Any matter settled under the processes mentioned in s.89 CPC after the coming into force of the said amendment, such parties to receive refund of court fees in its entirety – Total amount of court fees paid by the appellant, in respect of the refund of which the matter has travelled up to this Court was approximately Rs. 5 lakhs – Considering the fact that the original dispute was settled amicably and that the amount of court fees involved is not excessive, the same can be refunded to him. [Paras 20-24] Case Law Cited Pushpabai Shankerlal Sura v. The Official Liquidator, Sholapur Oil Mills Ltd. 1968 SCC OnLine Bom 62; Salem Advocate Bar Assn. (II) v. Union of India [2005] Supp. 1 SCR 929 : (2005) 6 SCC 344; High Court of Madras v. MC Subramaniam [2021] 1 SCR 552 : (2021) 3 SCC 560; Rangathan v. In the Court of District Judge, Trichirapalli; K.S Periyaswamy v. State of Karnataka 2019 SCC OnLine Kar 3032; Maharishi Shankarrao Mohite-Patil Sahakar Sakhar Karkhana Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra 2019 SCC OnLine Bom 628; Girnar Traders (3) v. State of Maharashtra [2011] 3 SCR 1 : (2011) 3 SCC 1; Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore [1958] 1 SCR 895 : AIR 1958 SC 255; Calcutta Gas Co. (Proprietary) Ltd. v. State of West Bengal [1962] Supp. 3 SCR 1 : AIR 1962 SC 1044; J.K. Cotton Spinning & Weaving v. State of U.P. [1961] 3 SCR 185 : AIR 1961 SC 1170; British Airways PLC v. Union of India [2001] Supp. 5 SCR 152 : (2002) 2 SCC 96; Jamshed N. Guzdar v. State of Maharashtra [2005] 1 SCR 223 : (2005) 2 SCC 591; In Re The Special Courts Bill, 1978 [1979] 2 SCR 476 : (1979) 1 SCC 380; State of T.N. v. G.N. Venkataswamy [1994] Supp. 1 SCR 322 : (1994) 5 SCC 314; M. Karunanidhi v. Union 868 [2024] 12 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports of India [1979] 3 SCR 254 : (1979) 3 SCC 431; Ujagar Prints (II) v. Union of India [1989] 1 SCR 344 : (1989) 3 SCC 488; Afcons Infrastructure Ltd. v. Cherian Varkey Construction Co. (P) Ltd. [2010] 8 SCR 1053 : (2010) 8 SCC 24; State of Punjab v. Jalour Singh [2008] 1 SCR 922 : (2008) 2 SCC 660; Perry Kansagra v. Smriti Madan Kansagra [2019] 3 SCR 991 : (2019) 20 SCC 753 – referred to.
Books and Periodicals Cited ‘Principles of Statutory Interpretation’, 14th Ed. by Justice G.P. Singh – referred to.
List of Acts Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987; Court Fees Act, 1870; Code of Civil Procedure 1908; Bombay Court Fees Act, 1959; Mediation Act, 2023; Maharashtra Court Fees Act, 1959; Constitution of India; Maharashtra Act No. X of 2018.
List of Keywords Inconsistency between the Court Fees Act, 1870 and Maharashtra Court Fees Act, 1959; Complete refund of court fees; Central legislation; Maharashtra State Legislature; Refund; Court fees; Civil dispute; Mediation u/s.89 CPC; Refund of court fees only to the extent of 50%; Lok Adalat; Compromise or settlement; Alternate dispute resolution; Administration of justice; Award of Lok Adalat; Settlement of dispute by mediation; Lok Adalat and mediation, two distinct methods.
Case Arising From CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 14742 of 2024 From the Judgment and Order dated 01.10.2014 of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay at Aurangabad in WP No. 4919 of 2014 Appearances for Parties Sandeep Sudhakar Deshmukh, Nishant Sharma, Advs. for the Appellant.
Vikramjeet Banerjee, A.S.G., Akshay Nain, Akshit Pradhan, Bhuvan Mishra, Ms. Ruchi Gour Narula, Ms. Aarushi Singh, Arvind Kumar [2024] 12 S.C.R. 869Sanjeevkumar Harakchand Kankariya v. Union of India & Ors. Sharma, Ms. Rukmini Bobde, Siddharth Dharmadhikari, Aaditya Aniruddha Pande, Ms. Soumya Priyadarshinee, Amit Srivastava, Amlaan Kumar, Vinayak Aren, Advs. for the Respondents. Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment Sanjay Karol, J.
Leave granted.
THE CHALLENGE
2. This appeal questions the correctness of the judgment and order dated 1st October, 2014 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay (Aurangabad Bench) between the self-same parties, whereby the High Court refused the prayer of the appellant herein seeking -
(a) a writ, order, order or direction to the State of Maharashtra to initiate a complete refund of court fees of all litigants including the appellant whose proceedings before the Civil Courts were disposed of in accordance with Section 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure 19081;
(b) quashing of notification dated 8th May, 2013 issued by the Law and Judiciary Department, Government of Maharashtra bearing No. HCA.2010/C.R 87/D192 as contrary to the provisions of the Court Fees Act, 18703 read with certain provisions of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 19874;
(c) a declaration to the effect that Respondent No.2 i.e. State of Maharashtra had no authority in law to issue a notification contrary to the provisions of the CFA, 1870; and
(d) that all such notifications and rules running contrary thereto be quashed and set aside.
1 Hereinafter ‘CPC’ 2 Hereafter, “the impugned notification”
3 CFA, 1870
4 LSA Act, 1987 870 [2024] 12 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
THE FACTUAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND
3. The factual background which led the appellant to prefer the writ petition before the High Court was that he had entered into an agreement to sell a certain property located at Aurangabad. However, the said Agreement could not be performed and as such, he preferred Special Civil Suit No.274 of 2013 before the Court of the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Aurangabad, praying for a direction of specific performance of the contract. The dispute was referred to mediation under Section 89 CPC and, amicably resolved. The terms of settlement were presented to the Court and the Civil Suit was disposed of in terms of the said compromise. A request for refund of court fees was allowed only to the extent of 50%. 3.1 The appellant contended before the High Court that the learned Civil Court fell in error by allowing refund only to the extent of 50% in view Section 16 of the CFA, 1870. It was further contended that as per Section 21 of the LSA Act,1987 when a matter is referred to Lok Adalat under Section 20(1) of the said Act and a compromise or settlement is arrived at therein, the Court Fee paid in such a matter shall also be refunded in accordance with CFA, 1870. Still further it was argued that the said Act being a Central legislation, would override the State enactment. 3.2 The High Court’s observations can be summarized thus:-
(a) The CFA, 1870 is a pre-constitutional enactment which no longer applies to the State of Maharashtra after the enactment of the Bombay Court Fees Act, 19595.
In reaching this conclusion, reliance was placed on a judgment of a co-ordinate bench in Pushpabai Shankerlal Sura v. The Official Liquidator, Sholapur Oil Mills Ltd.6
(b) The use of CFA, 1870 in LSA, 1987 is a case of “legislation by incorporation”, the same analogy cannot be applied to the orders passed by courts on settlement of disputes. Decrees passed by courts on the basis of settlement cannot be equated to awards passed by Lok Adalat. Since the BCFA, 1959 would be applicable, no error can be found in the State issuing a notification under Section 43(2) thereof. 5 Hereinafter, BCFA, 1959.
6 1968 SCC OnLine Bom 62 [2024] 12 S.C.R. 871Sanjeevkumar Harakchand Kankariya v. Union of India & Ors. 3.3 Disposing of the writ petition, the Court made the following observations:
“16. While disposing of the writ petition, we deem it appropriate to recommend the State Government to issue necessary notification or to bring out necessary amendment incorporating provision in respect of refund of Court fees to the extent of 100% in respect of the matters which are disposed of by the Courts on adaptation of any of the modes prescribed under section 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Such a step would be in consonance with the directives issued by the Supreme Court in Salem Advocates Bar Association v. Union of India (supra), as well as it would bring parity with the provisions of section 21 of the Legal Services Authorities Act and section 16 of the Court Fees Act, 1870. Thus, in order to bring uniformity in the matter of refund of Court fees and to eliminate discrepancies so far as matters disposed of in view of the award passed by Lok Adalat, and such of those matters which are disposed of in terms of the settlement arrived at on the basis of observance of any of the modes prescribed under section 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a direction needs to be issued by the State of Maharashtra to take effective steps. Such a positive move will also give boost to the movement of Alternate Disputes Resolution, which, in fact, curtails precious time of the Court as well as avoids unnecessary and prolonged indulgence in litigation before the Court. We hope and trust that respondent-State would consider this suggestion earnestly and take measures expeditiously.”
4. We have heard Mr. Sandeep Sudhakar Deshmukh, learned Advocateon- Record for the Appellant, Mr. Vikramjit Banerjee, learned Additional Solicitor General, and Ms. Rukmini Bobde, Learned Counsel, for the Respondents. We have also perused the parties’ written submissions. 4A. Submissions on behalf of Appellants 4A.1 Section 16 of the CFA, 1870 contemplates a refund of court fees in its entirety if the dispute inter se the parties is settled. The same is irrespective of the stage of the lis.
872 [2024] 12 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports 4A.2 The Constitution of India in its Federal structure provides for the distribution of powers as enumerated in the lists under Schedule VII. Administration of justice is Entry No.11 – A in List III. The process of settlement of disputes through alternative dispute resolution7 mechanisms is a concept embedded in the effective administration of justice, and, therefore the CFA, 1870 as also the legislations governing court fees in the States, are in concurrent operation. It, therefore, submitted that the State cannot be permitted to legislate to an extent such as it may repeal this Central Legislation.
4A.3 Section 21 of the LSA Act, 1987 specifically contemplates a reference to refund of court fees in terms of the provisions of
CFA, 1870.
4A.4 It is submitted that Section 89 CPC was inserted into the statute book in 1999 empowered by the 129th Report of the Law Commission of India. The statement of objects and reasons thereof prescribes the intention of encouraging the settlement of disputes through ADR mechanisms. If the contention of the State is accepted that the CFA, 1870 is repealed in so far as the State of Maharashtra is concerned and the MCFA, 1959 holds the field, it is submitted that the intention of the legislature in inserting Section 89 into the CPC, would be frustrated. 4A.5 It is submitted that in order to protect the fulcrum of the insertion of Section 89 CPC, harmonious construction of all the statutes is to be adopted. Without doing the same, the said section would be rendered otiose.
4B. Submissions on behalf of Respondent(s)
4B.1 The CFA, 1870 was an ‘existing law’ within the meaning of Article 366 of the Constitution of India, and by virtue of Article 372 of the Constitution, it continued to operate as law till such time ‘until altered or repealed or amended by a competent legislature.’ 4B.2 The erstwhile State of Bombay, being the competent state legislature as described under Article 372 read with Article 246(2) 7 Hereinafter, ADR [2024] 12 S.C.R. 873Sanjeevkumar Harakchand Kankariya v. Union of India & Ors. superseded the CFA, 1870 with the BCFA, 1959, renamed the Maharashtra Court Fees Act,8 by an amendment in 2012. Section 49 of the MCFA, 1959 read with Schedule 4 thereof, explicitly repealed the CFA, 1870 in so far as Entries 3 and 66 of the List II of the Constitution are concerned. As such, CFA, 1870 has no application in the State of Maharashtra, which would, obviously, include Section 16 thereof, which provides for 100% refund of court fees if the case is settled through one of the modes mentioned in Section 89, CPC.
4B.3 Section 43 of the MCFA,1959 governs the refund of court fees in the circumstances specified therein. The impugned notification dated 8th May, 2013 was passed under sub-section 2 of Section 43, which specifies hundred percent repayment of court fees in certain specified circumstances- relating to social and welfare legislations, and for other matters it provides for fifty percent, and in yet other cases, the refund percentage is twenty-five. 4B.4 Even if the impugned notification is found to be unconstitutional, the appellant would still be bound by Section 43(1) of the MCFA, 1959. The appellant has not challenged the vires of the said section.
4B.5 This Court and various High Courts, it is submitted, have recognized court fees as a state subject. Reference is made to decisions of this Court in Salem Advocate Bar Assn. (II) v. Union of India;9 High Court of Madras v. MC Subramaniam10 as being entirely distinguishable from the present facts. For High Courts, reliance is placed on Rangathan v. In the Court of District Judge, Trichirapalli; K.S Periyaswamy v. State of Karnataka;11 Maharishi Shankarrao Mohite-Patil Sahakar Sakhar Karkhana Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra.12 In these judgments, it is submitted that the respective High Courts permitted a hundred percent refund of court fees recognizing that the settlement arrived at was under the LSA Act, 1987. 8 Hereinafter, MCFA, 1959 9 [2005] Supp. 1 SCR 929 : (2005) 6 SCC 344 10 [2021] 1 SCR 552 : (2021) 3 SCC 560 11 2019 SCC OnLine Kar 3032 12 2019 SCC OnLine Bom 628 874 [2024] 12 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports 4B.6 It was also submitted that subsequently, in 2018, a provision, identical to Section 16 CFA, 1870 came to be inserted into the MCFA, 1959 by Maharashtra Act No. X of 2018.
4B.7 In view of the above submissions, it is prayed that the High Court has rightly rejected the challenge to the impugned notification, on grounds of inconsistency with Section 16 of the CFA, 1870.
QUESTION FOR CONSIDERATION
5. The question presented for this Court’s adjudication was, considering the submissions as afore-stated is whether in view of the inconsistency between the CFA, 1870 and the MCFA, 1959, if any, would the appellant be entitled to a complete refund of court fees per the former, since it is a Central legislation? Allied thereto, would be the question of whether the Maharashtra State Legislature could have enacted the provision and brought out a notification giving refunds in ways contrary to and distinct from the manner and method provided in the Central Legislation?
RELEVANT PROVISIONS
6. As is clear from the above, the present case involves the interpretation of various legislative provisions falling within both Central and State Legislations. For reference, they are extracted hereinbelow :- “CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
PART XI
RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNION AND THE
STATES CHAPTER I.—LEGISLATIVE RELATIONS Distribution of Legislative Powers “246. (2) Notwithstanding anything in clause (3), Parliament, and, subject to clause (1), the Legislature of any State also, have power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List III in the Seventh Schedule (in this Constitution referred to as the “Concurrent List”).” … … …… “372. (1) Notwithstanding the repeal by this Constitution of the enactments referred to in article 395 but subject [2024] 12 S.C.R. 875Sanjeevkumar Harakchand Kankariya v. Union of India & Ors. to the other provisions of this Constitution, all the law in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of this Constitution shall continue in force therein until altered or repealed or amended by a competent Legislature or other competent authority.
(2) For the purpose of brining the provisions of any law in force in the territory of India into accord with the provisions of this Constitution, the President may by order make such adaptations and modifications of such law, whether by way of repeal or amendment, as may be necessary or expedient, and provide that the law shall, as from such date as may be specified in the order, have effect subject to the adaptations and modifications so made, and any such adaptation or modification shall not be questioned in any court of law.
(3) Nothing in clause (2) shall be deemed—
(a) to empower the President to make any adaptation or modification of any law after the expiration of three years from the commencement of this Constitution; or
(b) to prevent any competent Legislature or other competent authority from repealing or amending any law adapted or modified by the President under the said clause.
Explanation I.—The expression “law in force” in this article shall include a law passed or made by a Legislature or other competent authority in the territory of India before the commencement of this Constitution and not previously repealed, notwithstanding that it or parts of it may not be then in operation either at all or in particular areas. Explanation II.—....
Explanation III.—....
Explanation IV.—....
List II—State List 1.
1. ...
2. ...
876 [2024] 12 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
3. ***Officers and servants of the High Court; procedure in rent and revenue courts; fees taken in all courts except the Supreme Court.
List III—Concurrent List x x x x [11A. Administration of Justice; constitution and organisation of all courts, except the Supreme Court and the High Courts.]
PART XXI
[TEMPORARY, TRANSITIONAL AND SPECIAL PROVISIONS]
372. (1) Notwithstanding the repeal by this Constitution of the enactments referred to in article 395 but subject to the other provisions of this Constitution, all the law in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of this Constitution shall continue in force therein until altered or repealed or amended by a competent Legislature or other competent authority.
(2) For the purpose of brining the provisions of any law in force in the territory of India into accord with the provisions of this Constitution, the President may by order1 make such adaptations and modifications of such law, whether by way of repeal or amendment, as may be necessary or expedient, and provide that the law shall, as from such date as may be specified in the order, have effect subject to the adaptations and modifications so made, and any such adaptation or modification shall not be questioned in any court of law.
(3) Nothing in clause (2) shall be deemed—
(a) to empower the President to make any adaptation or modification of any law after the expiration of 2[three years] from the commencement of this Constitution; or
(b) to prevent any competent Legislature or other competent authority from repealing or amending any law adapted or modified by the President under the said clause.
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 877Sanjeevkumar Harakchand Kankariya v. Union of India & Ors. Explanation I.—The expression “law in force” in this article shall include a law passed or made by a Legislature or other competent authority in the territory of India before the commencement of this Constitution and not previously repealed, notwithstanding that it or parts of it may not be then in operation either at all or in particular areas.”
COURT FEES ACT, 1870
16. [ Refund of fee [Section 16 repealed by Act 5 of 1908 and again inserted by Act 46 of 1999, Section 34.] Where the Court refers the parties to the suit to any one of the mode of settlement of dispute referred to in section 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), the plaintiff shall be entitled to a certificate from the Court authorising him to receive back from the Collector, the full amount of the fee paid in respect of such plaint.]”
LEGAL SERVICES AUTHORITIES ACT, 1987
“21. Award of Lok Adalat.—1 (1) Every award of the Lok Adalat shall be deemed to be a decree of a civil court or, as the case may be, an order of any other court and where a compromise or settlement has been arrived at, by a Lok Adalat in a case referred to it under sub-section
(1) of section 20, the court-fee paid in such case shall be refunded in the manner provided under the Court-fees Act, 1870 (7 of 1870).
(2) Every award made by a Lok Adalat shall be final and binding on all the parties to the dispute, and no appeal shall lie to any court against the award.”
MAHARASHTRA COURT FEES ACT, 1959
Section 43. Repayment of fee in certain circumstances.
(1) When any suit in a Court or any proceeding instituted by presenting a petition to a Court under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (XXV of 1955), is settled by agreement of parties before any evidence is recorded, or any appeal or cross objection is settled by agreement of parties 878 [2024] 12 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports before it is called on for effective hearing by the Court, half the amount of the fee paid by the plaintiff, petitioner, appellant, or respondent on the plaint, petition, appeal or cross objection, as the case may be, shall be repaid to him by the Court :
Provided that, no such fee shall be repaid if the amount of fee paid does not exceed twenty-five-rupees or the claim for repayment is not made within one year from the date on which the suit, proceeding, appeal or cross objection was settled by agreement.
(2) The State Government may, from time to time, by order, provide for repayment to the plaintiffs, petitioners, complaints under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), appellants or respondents of any part of the fee paid by them on plaints, petitions, complaints under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), appeals or cross objections, in suits complaints under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), proceedings or appeals disposed of under such circumstances and subject to such conditions as may be specified in the order.
Explanation.- For the purpose of this section, effective hearing shall exclude the dates when the appeal is merely adjourned without being heard or argued.”
ANALYSIS AND CONSIDERATION
7. The sum and substance of the case put forward by the appellant is that this case pertains not merely to court fees as an issue, but the larger issue of administration of justice, as that consequently, by virtue of Entry 11-A to the VII Schedule to the Constitution of India, the issue of refund of court fees, since it involves settlement of disputes by alternate mechanisms, which is an aspect of the administration of justice. Harmonious Construction needs to be adopted of all the provisions involved, i.e., CFA, 1870, MCFA 1959, LSA Act, 1987, and that the MCFA, 1959 being a State Legislation, cannot be allowed to override the Central Legislation(s).
8. Keeping in view the contentions raised, adjudication of this dispute would involve the analysis of the provisions cited from the lens of the [2024] 12 S.C.R. 879Sanjeevkumar Harakchand Kankariya v. Union of India & Ors. doctrine of pith and substance and harmonious construction. Before proceeding to the merits of the instant case, it would be apposite to refer to certain pronouncements in this regard.
8.1 The Doctrine of Pith and Substance The examination of the application of this doctrine has arisen before this Court on numerous occasions. For instance, a Bench of five Judges in Girnar Traders (3) v. State of Maharashtra,13 observed thus:
“173. The doctrine of pith and substance can be applied to examine the validity or otherwise of a legislation for want of legislative competence as well as where two legislations are embodied together for achieving the purpose of the principal Act. Keeping in view that we are construing a federal Constitution, distribution of legislative powers between the Centre and the State is of great significance. Serious attempt was made to convince the Court that the doctrine of pith and substance has a very restricted application and it applies only to the cases where the court is called upon to examine the enactment to be ultra vires on account of legislative incompetence.
174. We are unable to persuade ourselves to accept this proposition. The doctrine of pith and substance finds its origin from the principle that it is necessary to examine the true nature and character of the legislation to know whether it falls in a forbidden sphere. This doctrine was first applied in India in Prafulla Kumar Mukherjee v. Bank of Commerce Ltd. [(1946-47) 74 IA 23 : AIR 1947 PC 60] The principle has been applied to the cases of alleged repugnancy and we see no reason why its application cannot be extended even to the cases of present kind which ultimately relates to statutory interpretation founded on source of legislation.
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