Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai and Others v. Vivek V. Gawde Etc. Etc.
- Citation
- 2024 INSC 985; [2024] 12 S.C.R. 843
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Dipankar Datta, Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra
- Decided
- 13 Dec 2024
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 14506/2024
- Sections
- 105H, 105F, 105B(1), 68, 105B, 3, 53A, 64(3), 105F(1), 105C, 9, 5
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:24 am. Original source ↗
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[2024] 12 S.C.R. 843 : 2024 INSC 985 Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai and Others v.
Vivek V. Gawde Etc. Etc.
(Civil Appeal No(s). 14506-14523 of 2024)
13 December 2024 [Dipankar Datta* and Prashant Kumar Mishra, JJ.] Issue for Consideration By way of the impugned order, whether the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in framing points for determination by the Inquiry Officer acting in a quasi-judicial capacity under the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 with respect to the pending inquiry proceedings for eviction against the respondents; whether the order was passed by the Principal Judge as a persona designata, so as to be amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or whether the same was passed in the capacity of a judicial authority to be amenable to Article 227 jurisdiction. Headnotes† Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 – Chapter V-A – Constitution of India – Article 226, 227 – Proceedings pertaining to eviction of unauthorised occupants of public premises – Whether the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in framing points for determination by the Inquiry Officer directing that the proceedings be conducted in consonance with the principles of natural justice:
Held: Yes – High Court exceeded the ambit of its writ and supervisory jurisdiction in framing points for determination in a summary proceeding, more so when the proceedings were at the embryonic stage of notice having been issued to the respondents – Having directed that the proceedings be conducted in consonance with the principles of natural justice, the High Court overstepped its limits and took unto itself a duty which the Act entrusts the statutory authority to exercise – High Court at best, could have moulded relief as deemed fit and proper, but in framing issues for the Inquiry Officer to determine, it went far beyond its domain by substituting its own wisdom for that of the civil court – Furthermore, * Author 844 [2024] 12 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports the proceedings for eviction can be continued by the Inquiry Officer by adhering to principles of natural justice, even in the absence of regulations being framed u/s.105H – s.105H does not place an embargo on the Inquiry Officer to proceed until regulations were framed – Much of the utility in ensuring that public premises are made free of unauthorised occupants would be lost on such technical pleas based raised and examined on a provision of law which is not imperative in terms – Impugned order entertaining writ petitions filed by the respondents which were not maintainable, set aside. [Paras 20, 22, 34, 35] Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 – s.105F – Constitution of India – Article 226, 227 – Proceedings pertaining to eviction of unauthorised occupants of public premises – Appeals filed by respondents under section 105F before the Principal Judge, City Civil Court against the order of the Inquiry Officer – Appeal held not maintainable – Writ petition filed by the respondents challenging the order of the Principal Judge – Maintainability: Held: Not maintainable – Writ petition of the respondents seeking quashing of the decision of a civil court by issuing a writ of certiorari was not maintainable and ought to have been dismissed at the threshold with respect to its primary relief – An order of the civil court could only be challenged under Article 227 and not Article 226 thereof – Appellate order under challenge before the High Court was rendered by a civil court, and it is trite that orders passed by a civil court cannot be challenged in a writ petition under Article 226 – Furthermore, the petition of the respondents also failed to merit the exercise of the High Court’s supervisory powers under Article 227 and should have been rejected. [Paras 15, 14, 18] Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 – Proceedings pertaining to eviction of unauthorised occupants of public premises – Inquiry Officer was an officer of the first appellant- Corporation – Eviction proceedings were challenged inter alia on the ground that institutional bias vitiated the proceedings – One of the points framed by the High Court for determination of the Inquiry Officer was as to whether the proceedings were vitiated by institutional bias as the same were being conducted by an officer of the first appellant:
Held: If the officers have no personal interest in the lis, bias cannot be imputed, especially since, the officer is acting not in his capacity [2024] 12 S.C.R. 845Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai & Ors. v. Vivek V. Gawde Etc. Etc.
as an executive official, but as a quasi-judicial authority – High Court in the impugned order already rendered a finding on the issue by holding that though the Inquiry Officer was an officer of the first appellant, in the inquiry proceedings, he is an independent quasi-judicial officer under the Act – It ought not to frame a point despite such determination. [Para 31] Case Law Cited LIC v. Nandini J. Shah [2018] 2 SCR 277 : (2018) 15 SCC 356; Radhey Shyam v. Chhabi Nath [2015] 3 SCR 197 : (2015) 5 SCC 423; Rajendra Diwan v. Pradeep Kumar Ranibala [2019] 17 SCR 1089 : (2019) 20 SCC 143; Mohd. Yunus v. Mohd. Mustaqim [1984] 1 SCR 211 : (1983) 4 SCC 566; W.B. Central School Service Commission v. Abdul Halim [2019] 9 SCR 1089 : (2019) 18 SCC 39; Municipal Council, Neemuch v. Mahadeo Real Estate [2019] 12 SCR 532 : (2019) 10 SCC 738; Accountant and Secretarial Services (P) Ltd. v. Union of India [1988] Supp. 1 SCR 493 : (1988) 4 SCC 324; Delhi Financial Corpn. v. Rajiv Anand (2004) 11 SCC 625 – referred to.
List of Acts Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, 1888; Limitation Act, 1963; Transfer of Property Act, 1882.
List of Keywords Eviction; Unauthorised occupants; Public premises; Proceedings for eviction; Inquiry Officer; Quasi-judicial authority; Executive official; Principles of natural justice, Absence of regulations; Writ and supervisory jurisdiction; Jurisdiction exceeded; Points for determination framed; Summary proceeding; Civil court; Writ of certiorari; Executive official Article 227, Article 226; Appellate order; Institutional bias.
Case Arising From CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 14506-14523 of 2024 From the Judgment and Order dated 19-07-2022 of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in WP Nos. 5983, 5984, 5985, 5986, 5993, 5994, 5995, 5996, 5997, 5999, 6000, 6003, 6004, 6005, 6010, 6011, 6067 and 6069 of 2022 846 [2024] 12 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Appearances for Parties Dhruv Mehta, Sr. Adv., Ashish Wad, Manoj Wad, Mrs. Tamali Wad, Ms. Swati Arya, Ms. Akriti Arya, Ms. Nishi Sangatani, M/s. J.S. Wad and Co, Advs. for the Appellants.
Rajendra Pai, Sr. Adv., Aloukik Pai, Akshay Pai, Anand Dilip Landge, Mrs. Sangeeta S Pahune Patil, Sumit Kumar, Advs. for the Respondents.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment Dipankar Datta, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The appellants are aggrieved by the common judgment and order dated 19th July, 20221 passed on a batch of writ petitions under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution by a learned Judge of the High Court of Bombay.
3. The operative part of the impugned order expedites proceedings for eviction pending before the Inquiry Officer under the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, 18882 against the respondents in the manner directed within 12 months. This direction could not have and has not left the appellants aggrieved; however, they are seriously aggrieved for an altogether different reason, i.e. the learned Judge has framed points for determination by the Inquiry Officer. According to the appellants, proceedings for eviction of unauthorised occupants of public premises are summary in nature where, upon a show cause notice being issued, the noticee is required to place his defence which the Inquiry Officer, as the delegate of the Municipal Commissioner, is required to consider, reasonably, and proceed to determine, in accordance with fair procedure, as to whether the noticee is indeed an unauthorised occupant. Also, the Inquiry Officer is under obligation to bear in mind the provisions in Chapter V-A of the Act titled ‘P ower to evict Persons from corPoration Premises’, which is a code in itself, 1 impugned order, hereafter 2 Act, hereafter [2024] 12 S.C.R. 847Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai & Ors. v. Vivek V. Gawde Etc. Etc.
while so proceeding. In the present cases, the appellants submit, the learned Judge took upon himself the burden of framing points for determination and has, in effect, laid down a procedure which is not only contrary to the provisions of Chapter V-A of the Act but in the process has nullified binding decisions of the High Court and this Court and thrown legal principles asunder, by acting entirely in excess of jurisdiction.
4. Before proceeding further, it would be worthwhile to notice the basic facts triggering these appeals.
4.1. The respondents are occupants and/or legal heirs of the original occupants who were allotted the subject premises on leave and license basis in the 1960s, owing to their employment with the appellants.
4.2. In 2007, eviction proceedings were initiated against the respondents under the provisions of the Act. The respondents knocked the doors of the High Court, invoking its writ jurisdiction, seeking to convert their tenancy to permanent ownership on the basis of a resolution which had allegedly been passed by the Municipal Commissioner. The High Court firmly struck down such challenge by holding that the land belonged to the people and could not be the subject of State largesse, especially when the terms of the respective allotments categorically stated that the license would terminate upon the occupant’s retirement from municipal service. This Court, vide order dated 01st May, 2017 dismissed the challenge to the order of the High Court refusing to nullify the eviction proceedings, thus, stamping its approval on initiation and continuation of such proceedings.
4.3. Notices were issued to the respondents under section 105B(1) of the Act, directing them to vacate the premises which triggered the second round of litigation by the respondents. They assailed the same, inter alia, on the ground of breach of principles of natural justice. The High Court by its order dated 8th December, 2021 allowed the challenge with a direction to the Inquiry Officer to decide the eviction proceedings de novo.
4.4. It is the re-commencement of these inquiry proceedings which has ultimately resulted in the present round of litigation. Put on notice, the respondents wished the Inquiry Officer to decide two 848 [2024] 12 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports primary contentions: (i) whether in the absence of regulations framed under section 105H of the Act, the proceedings should continue; and (ii) whether the Municipal Commissioner ought to refer the dispute to any independent forum for a decision in a just, fair and unbiased manner. By an order dated 21st March, 2022, the Inquiry Officer ruled against the respondents. Aggrieved thereby, the respondents presented an appeal before the Principal Judge, City Civil and Sessions Court, Mumbai under section 105F of the Act. The appellate authority by its order dated 4th May, 2022 refused to interfere and dismissed the appeals as not maintainable. Still aggrieved, the respondents, in yet another challenge, invoked the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution and assailed the eviction proceedings premised on the same points that were raised before the Inquiry Officer, i.e., (i) regulations not having been framed under section 105H of the Act, proper conduct of the proceedings cannot even be thought of; and (ii) institutional bias has vitiated the proceedings and the rule nemo debet esse judex in propria sua causa breached to the utter prejudice and detriment of the noticees, inasmuch as the Inquiry Officer being the delegate of the Municipal Commissioner would be unlikely to derogate from the authority’s decision to evict them.
5. The High Court, in the impugned judgment, commenced with deciding the issue in favour of the appellants herein by holding that mere lack of regulations could not be a valid ground for keeping the proceedings in abeyance. It was further held that though the Inquiry Officer was an employee of the first appellant, he was acting in a quasi-judicial capacity under section 68 of the Act in an independent manner, and was thus duly authorized to conduct the inquiry proceedings and pass appropriate orders on the basis of evidence adduced.
6. However, after holding that the Inquiry Officer was so authorised, the High Court, in an apparent volte face which is unexplainable, proceeded to frame the following 9 (nine) points for determination with respect to the pending inquiry proceedings:
“Points for determination in the Inquiry proceedings before Respondent No. 2.
A. Whether the Applicant (MCGM) proves that the premises in the aforesaid 18 enquiries are Municipal staff quarters? [2024] 12 S.C.R. 849Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai & Ors. v. Vivek V. Gawde Etc. Etc.
B. Whether the Applicant (MCGM) proves that upon retirement of the employees, their possession of the said premises in the aforesaid 18 enquiries has/had become unauthroized (sic, unauthorized)
C. Whether the Applicant (MCGM) proves that the proceedings under section 105B of the MMC Act, 1888 in the aforesaid 18 enquiries are within the period of limitation prescribed under Article 137 under the Schedule to the Indian Limitation Act, 1963?
D. Whether the Opponents prove that the proceedings u/s 105B in the aforesaid enquiries are barred by the law of limitation and are required to be dismissed under Section 3 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963?
E. Whether the Applicant (MCGM) proves that the Enquiry Officer has the jurisdiction to try and decide the question raised by the Opponents relating to their continuation in possession of the enquiry premises u/s 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882?
F. Whether the Opponents prove that they are entitled to continue in possession of the premises in the aforesaid 18 enquiries u/s 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 irrespective of the proceedings u/s 105B of the MMC Act, 1888?
G. Whether the Opponents prove that the proceedings u/s 105B are vitiated by “institutional bias” (Nemo judex in causa sua i.e., No one can be a judge in their own case) as the Enquiry Officer being a delegate of the Municipal Commissioner cannot decide the enquiry proceedings contrary to the stand of the Municipal Commissioner in his representation/notice dated 20/12/2007 sent to the Government of Maharashtra under the second proviso to section 64(3) of the MMC Act, 1888 for cancellation of the Improvement Committee Resolution No. 208 dated 10/08/1989 and the Municipal Corporation Resolution No. 343 of 1989 dated 01/09/1989 or any other or further letter sent by the Municipal Commissioner to the Government of Maharashtra including letter dated 850 [2024] 12 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports 16/09/2017 pursuant to the meeting dated 03/05/2017 presided by the Chief Minister?
H. Whether the Opponents prove that the State Government is a proper and necessary party to the proceedings u/s. 105B of the MMC Act, 1888 and the proceedings ought to be dismissed for its non-joinder?
I. Whether the Opponents prove that the Enquiry Officer does not have powers to summarily decide the proceedings u/s. 105B of the MMC Act, 1888 without the regulations u/s. 105H prepared by the Municipal Commissioner?”
7. The appellants have assailed the impugned order on the grounds that Chapter V-A of the Act being a complete code in itself, the High Court effectively granted a premium to the dilatory tactics being adopted by the respondents who are none else but unauthorised occupants of public premises.
8. These appeals stem from the third round of litigation initiated by the respondents before the High Court and it is the second which has reached the Supreme Court. The proceedings, pertaining to eviction of unauthorised occupants despite having commenced a decade and a half back, on 28th January, 2009 to be precise, have not progressed much due to repeated forays made by the respondents questioning the jurisdiction of the Inquiry Officer to proceed against them. Assuming that this judgment terminates the third round of litigation, without there being a review, the Inquiry Officer has to resume proceedings from the stage of inquiry allowing the parties to lead evidence. Upon evidence being led by both parties, it is the appellants’ assertion that it would be for the Inquiry Officer to identify the contentious issues that arise for decision by him and by assigning reasons in support of the conclusions reached qua such issues, he is required to submit a report for consideration by the Municipal Commissioner. Even before the stage for leading evidence having matured, the appellants allege that the High Court has unnecessarily interfered and deflected the course of justice.
9. On the contrary, the respondents have voiced in chorus that the approach of the High Court is one that sub-serves justice with a view to secure the precious right to life of the respondents by narrowing down the controversy so that the proceedings could be taken to its logical conclusion as early as possible. Mr. Pai, learned senior [2024] 12 S.C.R. 851Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai & Ors. v. Vivek V. Gawde Etc. Etc.
counsel for the respondents, however, has been fair in conceding certain points but having regard to the long pendency of the eviction proceedings, we do not wish to decide any point resting on such concession.
10. Having recorded thus, we now proceed to adjudicate the lis on merits.
11. We deem it fit to commence the discussion with an examination of the constitutional provisions invoked by the respondents before the High Court i.e. under Articles 226 and 227. Challenge was laid in the writ petitions to an order passed by the Principal Judge, City Civil Court, Mumbai, in appeals under section 105F of the Act. Such order held the respondents’ appeals to be not maintainable. In their writ petition, the respondents sought, inter alia, a writ of certiorari to quash the orders passed by the Principal Civil Judge and that of the Inquiry Officer. We shall first proceed to examine the challenge laid to the former.
12. A perusal of section 105F(1) would be of profit. It reads: 105F. Appeals. (1) An appeal shall lie from every order of the Commissioner, made in respect of any corporation premises, under section 105B or section 105C, to an appellate officer who shall be the principal Judge of the City Civil Court of Bombay or, such other judicial officer in Brihan Mumbai of not less than ten years’ standing, as the principal Judge may designate in this behalf.
13. The question that arises is, whether the order was passed by the Principal Judge as a persona designata, so as to be amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 or whether the same was passed in the capacity of a judicial authority for the same to be amenable to Article 227 jurisdiction? This question has been emphatically answered by a 3-Judge Bench decision of this Court in LIC v. Nandini J. Shah,3 wherein this Court with respect to a similar provision of appeal in the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 held that:
“34. ***We are not called upon to consider the question as to whether the Estate Officer, while exercising powers invested in him, acts as a court or has the trappings of a
3 (2018) 15 SCC 356
852 [2024] 12 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports court. The only question that we have attempted to answer is whether the appointment of the Appellate Officer referred to in Section 9 of the Act before whom an appeal shall lie, is in the capacity of persona designata or as a court.
35. Sub-section (1) of Section 9 is the core provision to be kept in mind for answering the point in issue. It postulates that an appeal shall lie from every order of the Estate Officer, passed under the Act, to an Appellate Officer. As to who shall be the Appellate Officer, has also been specified in the same provision. It predicates the District Judge of the district in which the public premises are situated or such other judicial officer in that district of not less than 10 years’ standing as the District Judge to be designated for that purpose. The first part of the provision does suggest that the appeal shall lie to an Appellate Officer, however, it does not follow therefrom that the Appellate Officer is persona designata. Something more is required to hold so. Had it been a case of designating a person by name as an Appellate Officer, the concomitant would be entirely different. However, when the Appellate Officer is either the District Judge of the district or any another judicial officer in that district possessing necessary qualification who could be designated by the District Judge, the question of such investiture of power of an appellate authority in the District Judge or Designated Judge would by no standards acquire the colour or for that matter trappings of persona designata. In the first place, the power to be exercised by the Appellate Officer in terms of Section 9 is a judicial power of the State which is quite distinct from the executive power of the State. Secondly, the District Judge or designated judicial officer exercises judicial authority within his jurisdiction. Thirdly, as the Act predicates the Appellate Officer is to be a District Judge or judicial officer, it is indicative of the fact of a pre-existing authority exercising judicial power of the State. Fourthly, the District Judge is the creature of Section 5 of the Maharashtra Civil Courts Act, 1869, who presides over a District Court invariably consisting of more than one Judge in the district concerned. The District Court exercises original and appellate jurisdiction by virtue of Sections 7 and 8 respectively, of the 1869 Act [2024] 12 S.C.R. 853Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai & Ors. v. Vivek V. Gawde Etc. Etc.
and is the principal court of original civil jurisdiction in the district within the meaning of CPC, as per Section 7 of that Act. As per Section 8 of the Act of 1869, the District Court is the court of appeal from all decrees and orders passed by the subordinate courts from which an appeal lies under any law for the time being in force.
***
39. Indeed, the expression used in Section 9 is ‘Appellate Officer’ and not ‘appellate authority’ as has been used in Section 6-C of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, considered by the Supreme Court in Thakur Das [ Thakur Das v. State of M.P., (1978) 1 SCC 27 :
1978 SCC (Cri) 21]. That, however, would neither make any difference nor undermine the status of the District Judge or the designated judicial officer so as to reckon their appointment as persona designata. The thrust of Section 9(1) is to provide for remedy of an appeal against the order of the Estate Officer before the District Judge who, undeniably, is a pre-existing authority and head of the judiciary within the district, discharging judicial power of the State including power to condone the delay in filing of the appeal and to grant interim relief during the pendency of the appeal. Though described as an Appellate Officer, the District Judge, for deciding an appeal under Section 9, can and is expected to exercise the powers of the civil court.
***
59. Reverting to the facts of the present case, the respondents had resorted to remedy of writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. In view of our conclusion that the order passed by the District Judge (in this case, Judge, the Bombay City Civil Court at Mumbai) as an Appellate Officer is an order of the subordinate court, the challenge thereto must ordinarily proceed only under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and not under Article 226.***”
(emphasis supplied)
854 [2024] 12 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
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