China Development Bank v. Doha Bank Q.P.S.C. & Ors.
- Citation
- 2024 INSC 1029; [2024] 12 S.C.R. 2043
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- Justice Abhay S. Oka, Justice Pankaj Mithal
- Decided
- 19 Dec 2024
- Case number
- No. 7298/2022
- Sections
- 5(7), 5(8), 7(1), 5, 15, 2050, 7, 3(6), 14, 126, 32, 30(2)
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:24 am. Original source ↗
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[2024] 12 S.C.R. 2043 : 2024 INSC 1029 China Development Bank v.
Doha Bank Q.P.S.C. & Ors.
(Civil Appeal No. 7298 of 2022)
20 December 2024 [Abhay S Oka* and Pankaj Mithal, JJ.] Issue for Consideration Whether the appellants can be classified as ‘Financial Creditors’ within the meaning of s.5(7) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.
Headnotes† Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – ss.5(7), 5(8) – ‘Financial creditors’ – Classification of the appellant as ‘financial creditors’ – Guarantee as financial debt – Requirement of occurrence of default – 1st respondent-bank claims to be a direct lender and secured financial creditor of reliance RITL- Corporate debtor – Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process initiated by National Company Law Tribunal in respect of RITL – Claims invited from the creditors – Appellants submitted their claims and Resolution Professional classified them as financial creditors, and were included in the Committee of Creditors- CoC – 1st respondent challenged the admission of the claims of the appellants before NCLT that the appellants were not direct lenders of the corporate debtor, and it was impermissible to admit them as financial creditors on the basis of various terms of the deeds of hypothecation-DoH – Meanwhile, the NCLT approved the resolution plan – In appeal, the NCLAT directed the NCLT to decide the application – NCLT dismissed the application, upholding the status of the appellants as financial creditors – In appeal, the NCLAT holding that the DoH is not a deed of guarantee and the only parties to the DoH were the Chargors and Security Trustee, and Chargors cannot be treated as guarantors, set aside the order passed by the NCLT and remanded the case for taking consequential actions resulting from de-recognising the first four appellants as financial creditors – Sustainability:
*Author 2044 [2024] 12 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Held: Not sustainable – When clause (i) of s.5(8) is applicable, it is not necessary that the Financial Creditor actually tenders any amount to the Corporate Debtor – DoH is a Document creating hypothecation – Only the title of a document cannot be a decisive factor in deciding the nature of the document or the transactions affected by the document – Only because the title of the document contains the word hypothecation, it cannot be concluded that guarantee is not a part of this document – Appellants are Secured Lenders within the meaning of the Master Security Trustee Agreement-MSTA – Two RCom entities-RCom and RTL, are the obligors being the borrowers of the appellants – Parties to DoH are Security Trustees acting on behalf of the appellants, the Corporate Debtor who is not the borrower of the appellants and the other three Reliance entities – Corporate Debtor undertook to discharge the liability of the RCom and RTL, the borrowers of the appellants – RCom and RTL are third parties as far as Corporate Debtor is concerned – Furthermore, s.7(1) provides that Financial Creditor can initiate CIRP against the Corporate Debtor when there is a default on the part of the Corporate Debtor – Moment it is established that the financial debt is owed to any person, he/she becomes a Financial Creditor – On facts, the appellant has a claim – No requirement incorporated in the definition of ‘financial debt’ u/s.5(8) that a debt becomes financial debt only when default occurs – U/s.5(7) any person to whom financial debt is owed becomes a Financial Creditor even if there is no default in payment of debt – Thus, for submitting the claim by a Financial Creditor, no requirement of actual default – Impugned order of the NCLAT quashed and set aside and that of the NCLT restored. [Paras 48, 49, 52, 53, 55, 56, 59, 61, 62, 66, 68] Case Law Cited C.C., C.E. and S.T. Bangalore (Adjudication) & Ors. v. Northern Operating Systems Pvt. Ltd, 2022 INSC 598 : [2022] 18 SCR 901 : AIR 2022 SC 2450; Phoenix ARC Pvt. Ltd. v. Ketulbhai Ramubhai Patel, 2021 INSC 59 : [2021] 1 SCR 1043 : (2021) 2 SCC 799; Kotak Mahindra Bank Limited v. A. Balakrishnan, 2022 INSC 630 : [2022] 5 SCR 1072 : (2022) 9 SCC 186; Orator Marketing Pvt. Ltd. v. Samtex Desinz Pvt. Ltd, 2021 INSC 359 : [2021] 6 SCR 742 : (2023) 3 SCC 753; Maitreya Doshi v. Anand Rathi Global Finance Ltd. & Ors, 2022 INSC 1004 : [2022] 15 SCR 536 : AIR 2022 SC 4595; M.C. Chacko v. State Bank of Travancore, 1969 [2024] 12 S.C.R. 2045China Development Bank v. Doha Bank Q .P.S.C. & Ors. INSC 151: [1970] 1 SCR 658 : (1969) 2 SCC 343; Vistra ITCL (India) Ltd. & Ors. v. Dinkar Venkatasubramanian, 2023 INSC 500 [2023] 6 SCR 806 : (2023) 7 SCC 324; B.K. Muniraju v. State of Karnataka & Ors., 2008 INSC 208 : [2008] 2 SCR 992 : (2008) 4 SCC 451; Union of India v. D.N. Revri & Co. and Ors., 1976 INSC 208 : [1977] 1 SCR 483 : (1976) 4 SCC 147; Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Company Limited v. Maharashtra Electricity Regulatory Commission & Ors., 2021 INSC 644 : [2021] 5 SCR 1056 : (2022) 4 SCC 657; Committee of Creditors of Essar Steel India Limited v. Satish Kumar Gupta & Ors, 2019 INSC 1256 : [2019] 16 SCR 275 : (2020) 8 SCC 531; Anuj Jain, Interim Resolution Professional for Jaypee Infratech Limited v. Axis Bank Limited & Ors, 2020 INSC 227 : [2020] 8 SCR 291 : (2020) 8 SCC 401 – referred to.
Essar Steel Ltd. v. Gramercy Emerging Market Fund, 2002 SCC OnLine Guj 319; Western Coalfields Limited & Anr. v. Rajesh s/o Nandlal Biyani, 2011 SCC OnLine Bom 1217 : (2012) 2 Mah LJ 394 – referred to.
List of Acts Contract Act, 1872; Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. List of Keywords Financial creditors; Secured creditors; Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process; Committee of creditors; Deeds of hypothecation; NCLT; NCLAT; Master Security Trustee Agreement; Guarantee as financial debt; Security Trustee; Chargors; Resolution plan; Guarantor; Direct lender; Corporate debtor; Nomenclature of documents; Promise to discharge liability of third party; Occurence of default; Moratorium; Requirement of occurrence of default; Financial debt.
Case Arising From CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 7298 of 2022 From the Judgment and Order dated 09.09.2022 of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal in CAAT (I) No. 414 of 2021 With Civil Appeal No(s). 7407, 7615 and 7328 of 2022 and Civil Appeal No. 7434 of 2023 2046 [2024] 12 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Appearances for Parties Neeraj Kishan Kaul, Chetan Kapadia, Darius Khambata, Sr. Advs., Syed Jafar Alam, Siddharth Ranade, Nishi Bhankharia, Ms. Kaazvin Kapadia, Deepak Joshi, Raghav Agrawal, Rohan Rajadhyaksha, Rajendra Barot, Ms. Liz Mathew, Nilang Desai, Ms. Saloni Thakkar, Ms. Nafisa Khandeparkar, Abhinjan Jha, Bharat Makkar, Harshil Goda, Madhur Arora, Ms. Mallika Agarwal, Nisarg Bhardwaj, Advs. for the Appellant.
Gopal Jain, P. Chidambaram, Sr. Advs., S.S. Shroff, Saurav Panda, Vaijayant Paliwal, Ms. Charu Bansal, Ms. Mohana Nijhawan, Ms. Mehak Nayak, Ms. Payal Dubey, M/s. Juris Corp., Dhruv Malik, Ms. Palak Nenwani, Abhijnan Jha, Sanjay Kapur, Ms. Megha Karnwal, Surya Prakash, Advs. for the Respondents.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment Abhay S. Oka, J.
FACTUAL ASPECTS
1. These appeals take exception to the judgment dated 9 th September 2022 of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi (for short, ‘the NCLAT’). The appellants in this batch of appeals (for short, ‘appellants’), except the appellant in Civil Appeal No.7434 of 2023, were parties to the appeals preferred by 1 st to 4th respondents in Civil Appeal No. 7298 of 2022.
2. The issue involved in these appeals is whether the appellants can be classified as ‘Financial Creditors’ within the meaning of sub-section
(7) of Section 5 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (for short, ‘the IBC’). Another issue may arise in the event it is held that the appellants are not ‘Financial Creditors’. The issue will be whether the appellants can be classified as ‘Secured Creditors’ and paid commensurate to their security interest.
3. 1st respondent-Doha Bank claims to be a direct lender and secured Financial Creditor of Reliance Infratel Limited (for short, ‘RITL’ or ‘the Corporate Debtor’). A Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) was initiated by the adjudicating authority (NCLT) in respect of RITL-Corporate Debtor at the instance of Ericsson India Private [2024] 12 S.C.R. 2047China Development Bank v. Doha Bank Q .P.S.C. & Ors. Limited, and the Interim Resolution Professional (IRP) was appointed. We are concerned in this case with Reliance Communications Infrastructure Ltd. (for short, ‘RCIL’), Reliance Communications Ltd. (for short, ‘RCom’), Reliance Telecom Ltd. (for short, ‘RTL’) and RITL. These companies are hereinafter collectively referred to as “RCom entities”.
4. Public announcements were made under Section 15 of the IBC inviting claims from creditors. The appellants submitted their claims as Financial Creditors of the Corporate Debtor. While admitting the claim of the appellants, the Resolution Professional classified the appellants as Financial Creditors. Accordingly, the appellants were included in the Committee of Creditors (for short, ‘the COC’). The 1 st Respondent-Doha Bank, made applications before the NCLT to challenge the admission of the claims of the appellants (except the appellant in Civil Appeal No.7434 of 2023) as Financial Creditors. The contention of the 1 st respondent-Doha Bank was that the said appellants were not direct lenders of the Corporate Debtor, and it was impermissible to admit them as Financial Creditors on the basis of various terms of the Deeds of Hypothecation.
5. During the pendency of 1st respondent-Doha Bank’s Application, a Resolution Applicant submitted a Resolution Plan for the Corporate Debtor, which the CoC approved in its meeting held on 2 nd March 2020. After that, the 5th respondent-RP filed an application for grant of approval to the Resolution Plan. By order dated 3 rd December 2020, the NCLT approved the Resolution Plan. The approval was granted without deciding the pending application made by the 1 st respondent-Doha Bank, filed for objecting to the status of the appellants as Financial Creditors. The 6 th Respondent preferred an appeal before the NCLAT to challenge the approval of the Resolution Plan. By the order dated 19 th January 2021, the NCLAT directed the NCLT to decide the application of the 1 st Respondent-Doha Bank. The NCLAT disposed of the appeal by observing that depending on the outcome of the application of the 1st Respondent, the order approving the Resolution Plan could be reconsidered.
6. The appellants have relied upon the Deeds of Hypothecation dated 4th March 2011, 9th March 2011, 12 th February 2012 and 15 th September 2018 (collectively referred to as “the DoH”). The DoH were executed jointly by each of the Rcom entities (described therein as Chargors), including the Corporate Debtor (RCIL), to create a charge over their 2048 [2024] 12 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports property for securing the repayment of the facilities advanced by the appellants. The RCom entities agreed to provide their assets as security and further undertook to pay any shortfall of debts owed by each of the RCom entities. All the RCom entities pooled their resources to provide security for the facilities availed by any of the entities, ensuring that each entity was individually liable to pay the debt of all the entities. According to the case of the appellants, in terms of the DoH, if there is any default by any entity, all the RCom entities were liable to make good the shortfall in recovery of the amounts after realisation of hypothecated assets.
7. Thereafter, the NCLT heard the application of the 1 st respondent and dismissed it, upholding the status of the appellants (except the appellant in Civil Appeal No.7434 of 2023) as the Financial Creditors. An appeal was preferred by 1 st to 4th respondents against the said order. By the impugned judgment and order, the NCLAT held that the DoH is not a deed of guarantee. It was held that the only parties to the DoH were the Chargors and the Security Trustee. The only object of the DoH was to create a charge on the property of the Chargors. Therefore, the Chargors cannot be treated as guarantors. Hence, the NCLAT set aside the order passed by the NCLT and remanded the case to the NCLT for taking consequential actions resulting from de-recognising the first four appellants herein as Financial Creditors.
8. At this stage, we may note that as far as Civil Appeal No.7434 of 2023 is concerned, the appeal is preferred by a Bank that was not a party to the appeal before the NCLAT. However, the NCLT dealt with the issue of the appellant’s qualification as a Financial Creditor.
SUBMISSIONS OF THE APPELLANTS
Submissions in Civil Appeal No.7298 of 2022, Civil Appeal No.7615 of 2022 and Civil Appeal No.7434 of 2023
9. Very detailed submissions have been made by the learned counsel appearing for the parties. The learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants in some of the appeals firstly referred to the factual aspects of the case. He pointed out that the RCom entities entered into the Master Security Trustee Agreement (MSTA) with Axis Trustees Services Limited (security trustee). Pursuant to the MSTA, the Security Trustees executed the aforementioned four DoH on behalf of the appellants and other lenders whereunder, the RCom entities, including [2024] 12 S.C.R. 2049China Development Bank v. Doha Bank Q .P.S.C. & Ors. the Corporate Debtor, agreed to provide their common pooled assets as security for the loans availed by them. The DoH further provided that in the event of any default by the RCom entities, each of the RCom entities is liable to make a good shortfall in recovery of the amounts in default. The learned senior counsel submitted that this obligation to pay the shortfall is a promise to pay, which is in the nature of a guarantee.
10. He pointed out that the CIRP was initiated by the NCLT for RITL- Corporate Debtor, RTL and RCom. He pointed out that on 2 nd March 2020, in their capacity as Secured Financial Creditors, the appellants, along with other Financial Creditors, unanimously approved the Resolution Plan submitted by Reliance Digital Platform and Project Services Ltd. He pointed out that the appellants by their letter dated 2 nd March 2020 addressed to the RP, pointed out that there were voting in favour of the RP in their capacity as ‘Secured Financial Creditors’.
11. The learned senior counsel pointed out that under the DoH, the Corporate Debtor has undertaken a three-fold obligation under the DoH. Firstly, under clause 2 of the DoH, the Corporate Debtor, in its capacity as Chargor and Obligor, has covenanted to pay the appellants the amount due under the relevant facilities availed by RCom and RTL. Secondly, under clause 3 of the DoH, the Corporate Debtor created a charge over its entire asset pool on a first-ranking pari passu basis for the benefit of the secured creditors, including the appellants and others. The learned senior counsel pointed out that the entire asset pool is the subject matter of the approved Resolution Plan. Thirdly, under sub-clauses (ii) and (iii) of clause 5 of the DoH, the Corporate Debtor unambiguously, unequivocally and expressly agreed to make good the shortfall in realisation of the outstanding debt to the appellants, in the event charged assets were not sufficient to satisfy the outstanding debts owed to the appellants. He submitted that the Corporate Debtor in its capacity as a Chargor, in addition to hypothecating its properties, has undertaken to pay the appellants the amounts due and payable under the relevant facilities granted to RCom and RTL, which amounts to a guarantee in terms of Section 5(8).
12. The learned senior counsel pointed out the findings recorded in paragraph 8 of the order made by the NCLT. Relying upon Section 2050 [2024] 12 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports 126 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (for short, ‘the Contract Act’), he submitted that a contract of guarantee is a contract to perform the promise or discharge the liability of a third person in case of a default. He submitted that since the Corporate Debtor undertook to pay the amounts due and payable by other RCom entities, it was a contract to perform or discharge the liability of a third party in the event of default by the original borrower. Moreover, clauses 5(iii) and 16(viii) of the DoH provided that upon the occurrence of an event of default, the Security Trustee was authorised to take steps against the Corporate Debtor without having any obligation to first proceed against the borrower.
13. The learned senior counsel rebutted the 1 st respondent’s contention that clause 5(iii) was a standard clause included in hypothecation deeds. He submitted that unlike the sample hypothecation deeds relied upon by the 1st respondent, where the borrower himself provides security, as per the DoH in the present case, the Corporate Debtor, being a third party, undertook to pay the shortfall amount. In that sense, the promise to pay is in the nature of a guarantee. Therefore, the appellants were entitled to file a claim as Financial Creditors. The learned senior counsel submitted that every word stated in the contract has to be given its due meaning, and no part of the contract and words used thereunder could be said to be redundant.
14. He submitted that there is a fallacy in the 1st respondent’s submission that the appellants were not entitled to file a claim in Form-C since there was no default or the shortfall as on 20th May 2019. The learned senior counsel distinguished between a claim submitted pursuant to the public announcement under Section 15 of the IBC and the requirement of the existence of debt and default for the purposes of filing an application under Section 7 of the IBC. He submitted that the claim as defined under Section 3(6) of the IBC arises without any default taking place at the time of filing the claim.
15. He also dealt with the contention raised by the respondents that the appellants’ rights as secured creditors under the MSTA and the DoH cannot survive after moratorium comes into force under Section 14 of the IBC. He urged that the moratorium only bars any action for recovery or enforcement outside the resolution process and therefore, there is a provision for filing claims to the RP. Once the CIRP commences, creditors cannot enforce any rights under [2024] 12 S.C.R. 2051China Development Bank v. Doha Bank Q .P.S.C. & Ors. the documents and are required to file their claims for outstanding dues with the RP.
16. He submitted that the definition of ‘financial debt’ under Section 5(8) of the IBC is inclusive and not exhaustive. He relied upon the decisions of this Court in the cases of Kotak Mahindra Bank Limited v. A. Balakrishnan 1 and Orator Marketing Pvt. Ltd. v. Samtex Desinz Pvt. Ltd. 2 He submitted that the debt need not be directly disbursed to the Corporate Debtor. He relied upon another decision of this Court in the case of Maitreya Doshi v. Anand Rathi Global Finance Ltd. & Ors. 3 He submitted that the Security Trustee under the DoH is acting for the benefit of the secured lenders like the appellants who are the direct and intended beneficiaries under the DoH. He submitted that the beneficiary to a contract can enforce such a contract even when it is not a party to the same. He relied upon the decisions of this Court in the cases of M.C. Chacko v. State Bank of Travancore 4 and Essar Steel Ltd. v. Gramercy Emerging Market Fund.5
17. The learned senior counsel submitted that the entire CIRP of the Corporate Debtor has proceeded on the basis that the appellants are Financial Creditors of the Corporate Debtor. They have participated and voted as Financial Creditors. Therefore, at this belated stage, when the proceeds of the approved Resolution Plan have been realised and are pending distribution, the entire process cannot be overturned, and the appellants cannot be removed from the list of Financial Creditors.
18. In the alternative, the learned counsel contended that appellants are entitled to receive a payout commensurate to their security interest. The learned counsel submitted that the RP accepted that the appellants were secured Financial Creditors. Therefore, the security interest of the appellants cannot be extinguished during the CIRP of the Corporate Debtor, and the appellants ought to be paid at least the commensurate value as per the security interest held
1 2022 INSC 630 : (2022) 9 SCC 186
2 2021 INSC 359 : (2023) 3 SCC 753
3 2022 INSC 1004 : AIR 2022 SC 4595
4 1969 INSC 151 : (1969) 2 SCC 343
5 2002 SCC OnLine Guj 319 2052 [2024] 12 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports in the event their status as Financial Creditors is not accepted. He relied upon a decision of this Court in the case of Vistra ITCL (India) Ltd. & Ors. v. Dinkar Venkatasubramanian 6 on the entitlement of the secured creditor.
Submissions in Civil Appeal no. 7407 of 2022
19. The learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants in Civil Appeal No. 7407 of 2022 also made detailed submissions and pointed out the factual aspects of the case. The learned senior counsel pointed out that the appellants’ claim as Financial Creditors was admitted by the RP in August 2019. He referred to the relevant portion of the minutes of the CoC meeting held on 2nd August 2019. He pointed out that the extracts of the minutes show that in response to the query made whether there was any deed of guarantee, the learned counsel appearing for the RP made it clear that while there was no deed of guarantee, there was a legal obligation in the DoH under which, the Corporate Debtor had undertaken to pay the shortfall. The learned senior counsel analysed clause 5(iii) of the DoH. He pointed out that the Chargors (including the Corporate Debtor) have agreed to accept the Security Trustee’s account of the expenses, sales and realisation and to pay on demand by the Security Trustee any shortfall. He pointed out that Clause 2.15 of MSTA clarifies that the security created under the DoH is in addition to and independent of any other rights or remedies available to the appellants in law, equity or otherwise. More importantly, there is a personal covenant to pay on the part of the Chargors. He pointed out that clause 5(iii) of the DoH provides protection to the Security Trustee precisely because there is an obligation on the Chargors to pay the shortfall/ deficiency in payment of debt. When there are no recoveries from the sale of the charged properties, the entirety of the amount of default by RCom would be rendered in shortfall or deficiency and form part of the Corporate Debtor’s liability to pay. He pointed out that in the present case, the Corporate Debtor has not merely provided security for RCom’s dues but has also expressly undertaken to pay any shortfall or deficiency that may arise in the recovery of the amounts from RCom following the realisation from the sale of the security. Therefore, clause 5(iii) of the DoH contains the ingredients
6 2023 INSC 500 : (2023) 7 SCC 324
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 2053China Development Bank v. Doha Bank Q .P.S.C. & Ors. of a contract of guarantee under Section 126 of the Contract Act. Relying upon the definition of financial debt under Section 5(8) of the IBC, he submitted that the facility availed by RCom undoubtedly falls within the definition of financial debt and especially, clause (a) of sub-section (8) of Section 5 of the IBC. Therefore, the guarantee provided by RITL-Corporate Debtor for such a financial facility would be a financial debt, which would entitle the appellant to be classified as a Financial Creditor.
20. He submitted that a sentence or term in a document is not determinative of the real nature of the document and obligations thereunder. He relied upon the decision of this Court in the case of B.K. Muniraju v. State of Karnataka & Ors.7 , to state that the nature of the document or transaction between the parties to the contract is to be read as a whole and is not to be determined by the nomenclature/title of a contract. He submitted that the rights flow from the contents of the document. He submitted that as held by this Court in the case of Union of India v. D.N. Revri & Co. and Ors.8 , a contract must be interpreted in such a manner so as to give efficacy to the contract between the parties rather than to invalidate the same. Moreover, a contract must be read as a whole and attempts should be made to harmonise the terms. He submitted that as held in the case of Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Company Limited v. Maharashtra Electricity Regulatory Commission & Ors. 9, the Court should not rewrite a contract in the guise of interpreting the terms thereof.
21. In reference to the argument regarding the extinguishment of the claim of the appellant due to the moratorium under Section 14 of the IBC, he submitted that Section 14 does not extinguish any right. The learned senior counsel also relied upon a decision of this Court in the case of Committee of Creditors of Essar Steel India Limited v. Satish Kumar Gupta & Ors.10 He submitted that the provisions of the IBC ensure that successful resolution applicant starts running the business of the Corporate Debtors on a fresh slate.
7 2008 INSC 208 : (2008) 4 SCC 451
8 1976 INSC 208 : (1976) 4 SCC 147
9 2021 INSC 644 : (2022) 4 SCC 657
10 2019 INSC 1256 : (2020) 8 SCC 531
2054 [2024] 12 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
22. The learned senior counsel also refuted 1 st respondent’s submission that Clause 5(iii) of the DoH becomes an impossibility since moratorium prohibits enforcement of security interest under the DoH. He submitted that the guarantee under clause 5(iii) of the DoH is not contingent upon the enforcement of the security interest.
23. In the alternative, the learned counsel submitted that in any event, the appellant is entitled to retain the security interest and be classified as a secured creditor. He submitted that in the Resolution Plan, other creditors include those creditors who have a claim against the Corporate Debtor but are neither Financial Creditors nor Operational Creditors. He submitted that while voting in favour of the Resolution Plan, the appellant made it clear that its approval was subject to the appellants being considered as Financial Creditors. Even while approving the Resolution Plan, the NCLT permitted the distribution of the payment to the Financial Creditors including the appellants and stated that the same shall abide by and subject to the outcome of the application filed by the 1 st Respondent.
24. The learned senior counsel also relied upon the decision of this Court in the case of Vistra ITCL (India) Ltd. 6 to contend that IBC recognises the rights of secured creditors. He submitted that the requirement to relinquish the security interest is only during the liquidation process and not during the CIRP. Therefore, the question of whether the appellant has relinquished its security interest does not arise. Submissions in Civil Appeal no. 7328 of 2022
25. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 7328 of 2022 also made detailed submissions which are similar to the submissions made in Civil Appeal No. 7407 of 2022.
Submissions of 1st to 4th Respondents
26. On behalf of 1st to 4th respondents, it was submitted by the learned senior counsel that the DoH is only a simple document hypothecating certain properties of the borrowers (RCom entities) in favour of the appellants/third party lenders represented by the Security Trustee. The learned senior counsel submitted that in the present case, the DoH has only two parties: the Chargor (including the Corporate Debtor and three other RCom entities) and the Security Trustee. He submitted that without the presence of the three parties, namely the [2024] 12 S.C.R. 2055China Development Bank v. Doha Bank Q .P.S.C. & Ors. Guarantor, Principal Debtor and Creditor, a guarantee could not come into existence. Therefore, the DoH does not meet the requirement of Section 126 of the Contract Act. Reliance was placed on the decision of this Court in the case of Phoenix ARC Pvt. Ltd. v. Ketulbhai Ramubhai Patel.11
27. Our attention was invited to clause 5(iii) of the DoH. The learned senior counsel submitted that it only contains the process of enforcement of security by the Security Trustee. He submitted that the relevant part of clause 5(iii) of the DoH means that the Chargors have agreed to accept the Security Trustee’s accounts of sales, realisation and expenses. The Chargors have agreed that upon demand of the Security Trustee, they will pay such shortfall or deficiency in the expenses. The learned senior counsel urged that the effect of a contract means as it reads, and it is not open for a Court to supplement or add to a contract since a contract is entered into on the basis of commercial decisions of the parties.
28. The learned counsel submitted that even assuming that a portion of clause 5(iii) of the DoH is a separate agreement, it is manifestly a contingent contract as per Section 32 of the Contract Act. The contingency would have arisen only when the hypothecated properties were sold, expenses were incurred, and there was a shortfall in realisation. He relied upon a decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Western Coalfields Limited & Anr. v. Rajesh s/o Nandlal Biyani.12 His submission is that the contingent contract ceased to exist when the moratorium was declared under Section 14 of the IBC with effect from 15th May 2018, since after the moratorium, hypothecated property could not be sold either in fact or in law. As the hypothecated property could not be sold, there was no question of sale or realisation. As there would not be a shortfall, the question of meeting the shortfall would not arise.
29. The learned counsel further submitted that the enforcement of security is left out of the domain of CIRP as it focuses on revival of a Corporate Debtor as opposed to the process of liquidation. After the moratorium applies, the enforcement of security becomes impossible.
11 2021 INSC 59 : (2021) 2 SCC 799
12 2011 SCC OnLine Bom 1217 : (2012) 2 Mah LJ 394 2056 [2024] 12 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
30. The learned senior counsel submitted that the DoH does not contain any promise by the Corporate Debtor to discharge the liability of any of the borrowers to any other lender. As there are no third parties to the document, it cannot be termed as a guarantee. He submitted that clause 5(iii) of the DoH is found in every standard draft of a deed of hypothecation.
31. He submitted that there are other clauses in the DoH, such as clauses 2, 3, 5 and 9, which indicate that the Corporate Debtor has merely created a security in favour of the Security Trustee, which represents the lenders. The Corporate Debtor has not agreed to discharge the obligations of any borrower. The mere security interest created by hypothecation or mortgage does not constitute a financial debt as held by this Court in the case of Anuj Jain, Interim Resolution Professional for Jaypee Infratech Limited v. Axis Bank Limited & Ors.13
32. The learned counsel submitted that when financial debt is intact, a lender would remain a Financial Creditor and can make a claim before the RP. However, when the claim made by the Financial Creditor is based on a contingent event, a lender cannot become a Financial Creditor until the contingent event has happened and the debt is crystalised/accrued. In the facts of the case, a contingent event has never happened, and therefore, financial debt has not been crystallised.
33. He submitted that MSTA did not require a guarantee to be executed in favour of the Security Trustee. In fact, the recitals in the MSTA clearly indicate that the requirement on Obligors was to hypothecate property as security for due repayment of the secured facilities availed by each Obligor. It was submitted that the appellants are contract lenders of the three RCom entities and not the Corporate Debtor since the Corporate Debtor has not availed any loans or facilities from the appellants.
34. The learned senior counsel submitted that the Corporate Debtor in its financial statement before and after commencement of the CIRP had not treated the MSTA and the DoH as a guarantee. It is submitted that the Corporate Debtor had not provided any guarantee
13 2020 INSC 227 : (2020) 8 SCC 401
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 2057China Development Bank v. Doha Bank Q .P.S.C. & Ors. under the MSTA or the DoH. The learned senior counsel submitted that a perusal of Form-C filled in by the appellants shows that no guarantee was provided to the appellants/third party lenders. This position was further clarified in the minutes of the CoC meeting dated 2 nd August 2019. Even the RP accepted that there was no deed of guarantee. The learned senior counsel submitted that the IBC cannot be used for recovery as it is a mechanism to rehabilitate and revive the Corporate Debtor. He urged that the appellants are attempting to use the CIRP as a mode of recovery of their loans from the RCom entities. He submitted that if the DoH is treated as a guarantee, all such hypothecation deeds creating security interest will have to be construed as a guarantee in order to qualify as financial debt.
35. He submitted that the Resolution Plan has been passed in compliance with Sections 13(2) and 13(4) of the IBC and once a Resolution Plan is approved, it cannot be challenged before the forum.
36. The appellants voted and approved the Resolution Plan which extinguished their security while their status as Financial Creditors was under challenge in the pending application filed by the 1 st Respondent-Doha Bank. Now, the appellants cannot be permitted to turn back and rewrite the Resolution Plan. The learned senior counsel urged that allowing any member of the CoC to agree to the Resolution Plan by unilaterally reserving its right to seek amendment, would run contrary to fundamental principles of the IBC and set a dangerous precedent.
37. The learned senior counsel submitted that even if the CoC accepts the appellants as Financial Creditors, the same would have no consequence on the CIRP of the Corporate Debtor or the Resolution Plan since the plan has been duly approved by 100 per cent majority of the CoC in conformity with Section 30(2) of the IBC. The learned senior counsel submitted that once the Resolution Plan has been approved by this Court, the appellants cannot be allowed to challenge the same. He submitted that while voting in favour of the Resolution Plan, the appellants opted to take an approach of forgoing the benefit of their security.
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