Digambar and Another v. The State of Maharashtra and Another
- Citation
- 2024 INSC 1019; [2024] 12 S.C.R. 1533
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Bhushan Ramkrishna Gavai, Justice K.V. Viswanathan
- Decided
- 19 Dec 2024
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 5542/2024
- Sections
- 482, 498, 498A, 312, 313, 156(1), 155(2)
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:24 am. Original source ↗
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[2024] 12 S.C.R. 1533 : 2024 INSC 1019 Digambar and Another v.
The State of Maharashtra and Another (Criminal Appeal No. 5542 of 2024)
20 December 2024 [B.R. Gavai* and K.V. Viswanathan, JJ.] Issue for Consideration Whether the High Court should have exercised its inherent powers u/s.482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash the criminal proceedings u/ss.498-A, 312, 313 and 34 of the Penal Code, 1860.
Headnotes† Penal Code, 1860 – ss.498-A, 312, 313 and 34 – The complainant filed FIR against her husband and her parents-in-law (appellants) u/ss.498-A, 312, 313 and 34 of the Penal Code, 1860 – The appellants along with their son filed a criminal application u/s.482 of the Cr.P.C. praying for quashing and setting aside of the FIR before the High Court – The said application was dismissed by the High Court – During the pendency of appeals before the Supreme Court, son of the appellants herein expired, therefore his appeal was disposed of as abated:
Held: The ingredients for an offence to be made out u/s.498-A of IPC require that there has to be cruelty inflicted against the victim which either drives her to commit suicide or cause grave injury to herself or lead to such conduct that would cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health – The second part of this Section refers to harassment with a view to satisfy an unlawful demand for any property or valuable security raised by the husband or his relatives – In the present case, no allegations which would fulfill the requirement of the second part are found – As far as first part of the section is concerned, the allegations levelled in the FIR do not reveal the existence of any such allegations – The only allegation that referred to an injury being inflicted against the complainant is a vague statement that the son of the appellants herein used to beat her, but there is no specific allegation of any such injury *Author 1534 [2024] 12 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports being caused by the appellants herein – In the latter half of the FIR, it is alleged that the complainant was given poisonous food by the appellants herein and was coerced into consuming the same – This led to the miscarriage – Through the perusal of the statement of the doctor, it is revealed that the complainant herself stated that the pregnancy was revealed to her when she tested it herself using a pregnancy testing kit and this was stated to be seven days before her visit to the hospital, i.e. on the day of the alleged incident – It is mentioned in the FIR that the complainant used to live in a separate house due to the alleged harassment by the appellants and their son – Furthermore, there is not even a whisper in the FIR about the complainant conveying the news of the pregnancy to the appellants or their son – It is unusual that when the allegations u/ss.312 and 313 of IPC are levelled against the appellants, such an important fact surrounding her pregnancy and its knowledge to the appellants is not to be found in the FIR – Furthermore, the complaint was lodged after the notice of Divorce was given by the complainant, wherein, there was no allegation of the cruelty or the miscarriage caused by the appellants – These facts lead to conclude that the proceedings were initiated with an ulterior motive of pressurizing the son of the appellant herein to consent to the divorce according to the terms of the complainant and the proceedings were used as a weapon by the complainant in the personal discord between the couple – Thus, this was a fit case wherein the High Court should have exercised its inherent powers u/s.482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash the criminal proceedings. [Paras 18, 23, 24, 27, 29, 31, 32, 36] Case Law Cited Dara Lakshmi Narayana and Others v. State of Telangana and Another, 2024 INSC 953 : [2024] 12 SCR 559 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3682; Jayedeepsinh Pravinsinh Chavda and Others v. State of Gujarat, 2024 INSC 960 : [2024] 12 SCR 43 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3679; State of Haryana and Others v. Bhajan Lal and Others, 1990 INSC 363 : [1992] Supp. 3 SCR 735 : (1992) Supp. 1 SCC 335 – referred to.
List of Acts Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Penal Code, 1860.
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 1535Digambar and Another v. The State of Maharashtra and Another List of Keywords Cruelty; Miscarriage; FIR quashing; Inherent power of High Court; Vague allegations; Ulterior motive of pressurizing; Divorce proceedings; Concocted complaint; Revenge; Discord between couple.
Case Arising From CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
5542 of 2024 From the Judgment and Order dated 23.01.2020 of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay at Aurangabad in CRLA No. 859 of 2019 Appearances for Parties Shirish K. Deshpande, Ms. Rucha Pravin Mandlik, Mohit Gautam, Apoorv Sharma, Rishi Didwania, Advs. for the Appellants. Samrat Krishnarao Shinde, Siddharth Dharmadhikari, Aaditya Aniruddha Pande, Ms. Prachiti Deshpande, Dr. R. R. Deshpande, Bhagwanr Deshpande, Advs. for the Respondents.
Judgment/Order of the Supreme Court Judgment B.R. Gavai, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The present appeal challenges the final judgment and order dated 23rd January 2020 passed in Criminal Application 859 of 2019, vide which the learned Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay at Aurangabad dismissed the application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 1 for quashing and setting aside the First Information Report 2 No. 339 of 2018 dated 6 th November 2018 registered with Shivaji Nagar Police Station, Latur for offences punishable under Sections 498-A, 312, 313 and 34 1 “CrPC” hereinafter 2 “FIR” hereinafter 1536 [2024] 12 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 3 filed against the husband of the complainant-Madhav Suryawanshi and the present appellants- Digambar Suryawanshi (Appellant No. 1) and Kashibai Suryawanshi (Appellant No. 2) (Parents-in-law of the complainant)
3. Shorn of details, the facts leading up to the present appeal are as under:
3.1. As per the FIR, the complainant and Madhav Suryawanshi (Son of the appellants) were married on 26 th March 2006. Two daughters were born out of the wedlock. After the birth of the second daughter in 2011, the complainant’s husband and the appellants demanded a son from her. They berated her and insulted her and inflicted physical and mental cruelty, stating that she was giving birth to only daughters. Due to the ill-treatment, she began residing separately from the month of February 2018. It was further alleged that the appellants used to instigate their son (Husband of the complainant) against the complainant. He would beat her citing the reason that she was not giving birth to a male child.
3.2. It is further alleged in the FIR that, on 28 th November 2016, the appellants along with the complainant’s husband visited her in Latur. The appellants asked the complainant to eat a meal prepared by them, which she refused to consume initially. However, they coerced her to eat it despite her protests. On the next day, she had stomach pain in the morning, and she started bleeding. This led to her baby being aborted in her womb. On 5 th December 2016, she visited the doctor along with her sisters and it was discovered that a piece of the foetus is still in her womb, and she was treated for the same. Based on these facts, alleging about the forced abortion and physical and mental cruelty, the complaint was made.
3.3. The appellants along with their son filed a criminal application under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. praying for quashing and setting aside of the FIR No. 339 of 2018 before the High Court. 3 “IPC” hereinafter [2024] 12 S.C.R. 1537Digambar and Another v. The State of Maharashtra and Another
3.4. During its pendency, the Family Court at Latur vide order dated 20 th May 2019 granted a decree of Divorce by mutual consent and dissolved the marriage between the complainant and the son of the appellants.
3.5. The High Court, vide impugned judgment and final order dated 23 rd January 2020 dismissed the application filed under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. for quashing of the FIR No. 339 of 2018.
3.6. Being aggrieved thereby, the present appeal was filed. Notice was issued by this Court vide order dated 2 nd June 2020. During the pendency of the matter, the chargesheet came to be filed on 8 th February 2021.
4. We have heard Shri Shirish K. Deshpande, learned counsel for the appellants, Shri Samrat Krishnarao Shinde, learned counsel for Respondent No.1-State of Maharashtra and Smt. Prachiti Deshpande for Respondent No. 2- Complainant.
5. Shri Deshpande submits that the appellants before this Court have no active role to play. They have merely been roped into the complaint as they are the parents-in-law of the complainant.
6. It was further submitted that, if such a serious offence was committed by the appellants on 28 th November 2016, it should have been mentioned in the notice of Divorce sent by the complainant on 15th May 2018 as it is alleged in the FIR, that the son of the appellants had also allegedly played a role in that incident. There is not even a whisper of this incident in this notice. The complaint was filed after the notice of Divorce, and it was merely filed to mount the pressure on the appellants and their son. This clearly shows that the complaint is concocted, and it was filed as an afterthought only with an intent to take revenge on the appellants.
7. Shri Deshpande further submitted that even if it is believed that the complainant allegedly found a piece of foetus in her womb after she was examined by the doctor, it does not automatically mean that some poisonous substance was given by the appellants to her as there is not an iota of evidence to that effect.
8. It was further submitted that since the appellants and their son did not succumb to the pressure applied through the complaint and did 1538 [2024] 12 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports not favourably respond to the notice of Divorce, another FIR was registered on 25 th February 2019 against the son of the appellants for offences punishable under Sections 307, 336 and 427 of the IPC alleging that the son of the appellants had tried to kill her on the road in broad daylight.
9. It was further submitted that these pressure tactics compelled the son of the appellants to cooperate with the complainant and the Divorce for mutual consent was granted on 20 th May 2019 by the Family Court at Latur. It was further submitted by Shri Deshpande, that after a bare reading of the allegations levelled in the FIR, they seem to be absurd and are inherently improbable. There is no circumstance where a conclusion can be reached that there is sufficient material to proceed against the appellants.
10. Lastly, it was submitted that the contents of the chargesheet clearly reveal that the appellants herein had no role to play in the miscarriage suffered by the complainant. The Doctor’s statement reproduced in the chargesheet clearly states that the complainant had visited the hospital due to severe abdominal pain and bleeding. The doctor clearly stated that it was possible that the foetus became inanimate due to the abortion pills in the woman’s diet and that seems to be the reason for the excessive bleeding. No opinion was given as to when the pills were ingested and in what form were they ingested, and hence, no role of the appellants herein could be established.
11. Per contra, Shri Samrat Krishnarao Shinde, learned counsel for Respondent No.1-State of Maharashtra submitted that the allegations levelled in the FIR prima facie disclose the commission of offences under Section 498-A, 312, 313 and 34 of the IPC. The complainant was consistently harassed after the birth of the second daughter as the appellants and their son wanted a male child and therefore mental and physical cruelty was inflicted upon the complainant.
12. It was further submitted by Shri Shinde that the appellants herein instigated their son against the complainant and played a major role in the harassment and the cruelty inflicted against the complainant. The appellants herein also played a role in the miscarriage suffered by the complainant.
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 1539Digambar and Another v. The State of Maharashtra and Another
13. Shri Shinde further submitted that the reliability and the truthfulness of the allegations cannot be examined at this stage. He submits that the High Court has rightly held that, it cannot be presumed that the complainant must have made false allegations to obtain divorce from the appellants’ son. All of these points must be examined by the competent Trial Court when the trial is being conducted. He therefore submits, that no grounds for interference with the impugned order passed by the High Court are made out.
14. Smt. Prachiti Deshpande, learned counsel for Respondent No.2- Complainant has supported the contentions raised by the learned counsel for Respondent No.1.
15. At the outset, it is relevant to mention that the son of the appellants, i.e. the former husband of the complainant was also a petitioner in the proceedings before the High Court, which were filed for quashing. He had also filed a separate Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 3298 of 2020 against the same which had been tagged with the present appeal. However, the son of the appellants herein expired and therefore his appeal was disposed of as abated vide order dated 10th December 2024.
16. In the present case, the allegations raised by the complainant in the FIR will have to be examined to find out whether the allegations, when taken at their face value, would constitute any offence or make out a case against the appellants under Sections 498-A, 312, 313 and 34 of the IPC.
17. Firstly, the allegations under Section 498-A of the IPC must be examined. The said provision reads as under:
“498A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty.- Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, “cruelty” means— 1540 [2024] 12 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
(a) any willful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or
(b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand.”
18. The ingredients for an offence to be made out under Section 498-A of IPC require that there has to be cruelty inflicted against the victim which either drives her to commit suicide or cause grave injury to herself or lead to such conduct that would cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health. The second part of this Section refers to harassment with a view to satisfy an unlawful demand for any property or valuable security raised by the husband or his relatives. In the present case, no allegations which would fulfil the requirement of the second part are found.
19. A perusal of the FIR shows that the allegations made by the complainant are that in the year 2015, the appellants inflicted mental and physical cruelty upon her as she could not give birth to a male child. Such allegations made by the complainant appear to be vague as no specific instances of harassment are mentioned. No specific role or allegation is levelled on either of the appellants and no specific incident of physical or mental cruelty has been mentioned. A mere omnibus statement has been made that the physical and mental cruelty was afflicted because the complainant could not provide a male child. Furthermore, it is merely mentioned that the appellants would instigate the husband to harass the complainant, but again, no specific or precise instances are mentioned as to how the appellants instigated their son and what acts were committed by him as a direct result of such instigation.
20. It would be appropriate to refer to a recent decision of this Court in Criminal Appeal 5199 of 2024 titled as Dara Lakshmi Narayana and [2024] 12 S.C.R. 1541Digambar and Another v. The State of Maharashtra and Another Others vs. State of Telangana and Another.4 This court dealt with the ingredients of Section 498-A and whether the same are attracted through vague allegations raised by the complainant (wife). It was observed that:
“17. The issue for consideration is whether, given the facts and circumstances of the case and after examining the FIR, the High Court was correct in refusing to quash the ongoing criminal proceedings against the appellants arising out of FIR No. 82 of 2022 dated 01.02.2022 under Section 498A of the IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Act.
18. A bare perusal of the FIR shows that the allegations made by respondent No.2 are vague and omnibus. Other than claiming that appellant No.1 harassed her and that appellant Nos.2 to 6 instigated him to do so, respondent No.2 has not provided any specific details or described any particular instance of harassment. She has also not mentioned the time, date, place, or manner in which the alleged harassment occurred. Therefore, the FIR lacks concrete and precise allegations.
19. Further, the record reveals that respondent No.2 on 03.10.2021 left the matrimonial house leading appellant No.1 to file a police complaint on 05.10.2021. When the police officials traced her, respondent No.2 addressed a letter dated 11.11.2021 to the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Thirupathur Sub Division requesting to close the complaint made by appellant No.1. In the said letter, respondent No.2 admitted that she left her matrimonial house after quarrelling with appellant No.1 as she was talking to a person by name Govindan over the phone for the past ten days continuously. She further admitted that appellant No.1 was taking good care of her. She also stated that she will not engage in such actions in future. Despite that, in 2021 itself, respondent No.2 once again 4 2024 INSC 953 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3682 1542 [2024] 12 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports left the matrimonial house leaving appellant No.1 and also her minor children.
20. Losing hope in the marriage, appellant No.1 issued a legal notice to respondent No.1 seeking divorce by mutual consent on 13.12.2021. Instead of responding to the said legal notice issued by appellant No.1, respondent No.2 lodged the present FIR 82 of 2022 on 01.02.2022 registered with Neredmet Police Station, Rachakonda under Section 498A of the IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Act.
21. Given the facts of this case and in view of the timing and context of the FIR, we find that respondent No.2 left the matrimonial house on 03.10.2021 after quarrelling with appellant No.1 with respect to her interactions with a third person in their marriage. Later she came back to her matrimonial house assuring to have a cordial relationship with appellant No.1. However, she again left the matrimonial house. When appellant No.1 issued a legal notice seeking divorce on 13.12.2021, the present FIR came to be lodged on 01.02.2022 by respondent No.2. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the FIR filed by respondent No. 2 is not a genuine complaint rather it is a retaliatory measure intended to settle scores with appellant No. 1 and his family members.
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