Mahesh Damu Khare v. The State of Maharashtra & Anr.
- Citation
- 2024 INSC 897; [2024] 11 S.C.R. 886
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice B.V. Nagarathna, Justice N Kotiswar Singh
- Decided
- 26 Nov 2024
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 4882/2024
- Sections
- 482, 376, 420, 8, 156(1), 155(2), 561, 375, 90
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:24 am. Original source ↗
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[2024] 11 S.C.R. 886 : 2024 INSC 897 Mahesh Damu Khare v.
The State of Maharashtra & Anr.
(Criminal Appeal No. 4882 of 2024)
26 November 2024 [B.V. Nagarathna and Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh,* JJ.] Issue for Consideration The High Court dismissed the petition filed u/s.482 of CrPC for quashing FIR registered u/ss.376, 420, 504 and 506 IPC holding, inter alia, that the offence under Section 376 of IPC is an offence against the society which would require further investigation into the matter and does not warrant interference.
Headnotes† Penal Code, 1860 – s.376, 420, 504 and 506 – Complainant filed a complaint alleging that the appellant had cheated on her by forcibly engaging in sexual intercourse without her consent in his house and in the rented rooms from 2008 to 2017 by giving false promises of marriage, depositing fixed amount in her bank account and also promising to purchase a house for her – FIR was registered – Appellant sought to quash the said FIR, however, the petition was dismissed by the High Court: Held: In the instant case, even assuming that the appellant had made the promise since 2008 when they met for the first time, the fact that they remained unmarried for a long period till 2017 without there being any protest or objection by the complainant, does not indicate the intention at the initial stage itself to make the promise falsely to marry the complainant – Making an allegation of non-fulfilment of promise to marry without undue delay by the promissee would, on the other hand, be an indicator of a false promise being made from the initial stage – In the present case, what is not in dispute is that the physical relationship between the appellant and the complainant continued for a long period of about a decade and as such it is difficult to infer that the appellant had made a false promise since the initial stage and continued to make false promises to marry her on the basis of which she also *Author [2024] 11 S.C.R. 887Mahesh Damu Khare v.
The State of Maharashtra & Anr.
continued to have physical relationship with him – The longer the duration of the physical relationship between the partners without protest and insistence by the female partner for marriage would be indicative of a consensual relationship rather than a relationship based on false promise of marriage by the male partner and thus, based on misconception of fact – The criminal liability attached to such false promise would be diluted after such a long passage of time and in light of the fact that no protest was registered by the complainant during all those years – Such a prolonged continuation of physical relationship without demurral or remonstration by the female partner, in effect takes out the sting of criminal culpability and neutralises it – It appears that discontinuance of financial support to the complainant, rather than the alleged resiling from the promise to marry by the appellant appears to be the triggering point for making the allegation by the complainant after a long consensual relationship for about nine years – In light of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, in the present case no prima facie case has been made out about commission of an offence of rape punishable under Section 376 IPC – Further, on perusal of the FIR it is also noted that no allegations of cheating have been made against the appellant to fall within the scope of Section 420 IPC nor of any of the offences under Sections 504 and 506 of the IPC – Therefore, under the circumstances, the appellant is entitled to the relief claimed for quashing the complaint/FIR. [Paras 25, 27, 28, 30, 34, 35] Case Law Cited State of Haryana and Ors. v. Bhajan Lal and Ors. [1992] Supp. 3 SCR 735 : (1992) Supp 1 SCC 335; Neeharika Infrastructure Private Limited v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. [2021] 4 SCR 1044 : (2021) 19 SCC 401; Shambhu Kharwar v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr. [2022] 7 SCR 156 : 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1032; Niam Ahmed v. State (NCT of Delhi) [2023] 1 SCR 1061 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 89; Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana [2013] 6 SCR 544 : (2013) 7 SCC 675 – relied on.
R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab [1999] Supp. 1 SCR 121 : AIR 1960 SC 866 – referred to.
List of Acts Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012; Penal Code, 1860.
888 [2024] 11 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports List of Keywords False promise of marriage; Forciable sexual intercourse; Consent; Long consensual relationship; Misconception of fact; Quashing of FIR; Rape; Cheating; Harassment.
Case Arising From CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.
4882 of 2024 From the Judgment and Order dated 12.02.2018 of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in CRWP No. 5190 of 2017 Appearances for Parties Ms. Mrunal Dattatraya Buva, Dhairyashil Salunkhe, Gunnam Venkateswara Rao, Advs. for the Appellant.
Ms. Yugandhara Pawar Jha, Siddharth Dharmadhikari, Aaditya Aniruddha Pande, Bharat Bagla, Sourav Singh, Aditya Krishna, Ms. Preet S. Phanse, Adarsh Dubey, Advs. for the Respondents. Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, J.
Leave granted.
2. The present appeal has been filed challenging the order dated 12.02.2018 passed by the Bombay High Court in Criminal Writ Petition (CRWP) No. 5190 of 2017 by which the High Court dismissed the petition filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short “CrPC”) by the present appellant seeking quashing of the FIR being CR No. 302 of 2017 dated 15.08.2017 filed by the complainant (Respondent no. 2 herein) registered with Kharghar Police Station, Navi Mumbai for offences punishable under Sections 376, 420, 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short “IPC”) holding, inter alia, that the offence under Section 376 of IPC is an offence against the society which would require further investigation into the matter and does not warrant interference.
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 889Mahesh Damu Khare v.
The State of Maharashtra & Anr.
3. The brief facts leading to the filing of the said Writ Petition as culled from the records may be stated as follows:
3.1 The appellant claims to be a social worker since 1985 and is engaged in various socio-political activities, who provides help and assistance to the needy whenever sought. It was contended that in 2012 the appellant was approached by the complainant (Respondent no. 2) seeking help in resolving the issue of kidnapping of her elder daughter which he successfully accomplished. Thereafter, the complainant started visiting the office of the appellant and was regularly assisting in the socio-political works of the appellant. The appellant also on her request used to extend financial help for support and education of the children of the complainant. The complainant, however, continued to seek more financial assistance from the appellant which he could not afford any longer and accordingly, helped her to find employment.
3.2 It is the case of the appellant that the complainant continued to seek more attention and financial help from the appellant, because of which the appellant tried to ignore her, to which she became aggressive and started issuing threats not only to the appellant but also to his family members to extort more money from the appellant which led to filing of several complaints against the complainant (Respondent no. 2) by the wife of the appellant. In all, five complaints were lodged with Nerul Police Station by the appellant, his wife and his office staff against the harassment tactics of the complainant for extorting money from the appellant. However, the complainant continued her aggressive, abusive behaviour towards the appellant and family members.
4. The appellant, to his shock, learnt later that a complaint was filed by Respondent no. 2 as a counter blast which was registered as FIR No. 302 of 2017 dated 15.08.2017 under Sections 376, 420, 504 and 506 of the IPC stating, inter alia, as follows:-
(i) The complainant was married in 1994 by performing Christian rituals out of which two daughters were born. Her husband died in the year 2003. Thereafter, she came to reside at Sarsole in Navi Mumbai and was looking for a job as she had no means of livelihood. While looking for a job she was introduced to the appellant who was also in need of a helper to look after his ailing wife.
890 [2024] 11 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports
(ii) Accordingly, she met the appellant in 2008. The appellant told the complainant that his wife had skin disease, thyroid problem and paralytic stroke and the complainant has to look after his wife at his own residence at Kharghar Sector 12, behind HDFC ATM.
(iii) Accordingly, on the next day in the morning she went to the house of the appellant along with her daughter. It was alleged that the appellant was with his second wife Kalpana at home and the wife asked her daughter to sit with her and sent the complainant to the bedroom to massage the feet of the appellant and while massaging the appellant citing reasons of illness of both his wives, told her that he would marry her and thereafter, had sexual intercourse with her forcibly without her consent. Thereafter, the appellant continued to exploit her sexually many times again and again by giving false promises of marriage.
(iv) According to the complainant, she worked in the house of the appellant for two months and thereafter, left the job since she got a private job at Belapur and as the wife of the appellant suspected a relationship between the appellant and the complainant. It was alleged that since the appellant did not want to lose her, the appellant arranged a rented room for the complainant at Sector 2, LIG Colony, Nerul and the appellant used to come every day to her house. After staying for about a year, the appellant arranged another rented room for the complainant at Shrivane, Nerul Sector 1, Navi Mumbai in December 2010, where the complainant was residing with her daughters. It was alleged that the appellant used to come to the complainant’s house every day and had sexual intercourse with the complainant forcibly and without her consent by giving false promise of marriage.
(v) It was also alleged that whenever the complainant asked him to marry her, he avoided the same on one pretext or other. Thereafter, the appellant avoided visiting her since March 2017 and he used to abuse and beat her when she asked for money for her daily needs. According to the complainant, he ended the relationship with her by informing her to do whatever she wanted and to forget the promise of marriage. Thereafter, she made several calls to the appellant as to why he was not coming, but the appellant did not receive her calls.
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 891Mahesh Damu Khare v.
The State of Maharashtra & Anr.
(vi) It was also alleged that on 05.07.2017, the first wife of the appellant named Kavita abused and bullied the complainant by making calls over her mobile phone and told her to earn her livelihood by making her daughter do business as her elder daughter did who had love marriage and ran away.
(vii) Accordingly, the complainant (Respondent no. 2) filed the said complaint alleging that the appellant had cheated on her by forcibly engaging in sexual intercourse without her consent in his house at Kharghar Sector-12 and also in the rented rooms at Nerul Sector-2 and at Shirvane, Nerul from year 2008 to 2017 by giving false promises of marriage, depositing fixed amount in her bank account and also promising to purchase a house for her at Navi Mumbai.
5. Consequently, an FIR case was registered against the appellant who then moved the Session Court seeking anticipatory bail in CR No. 302 of 2017 in which he was granted an interim protection vide order dated 16.08.2017 and was ultimately granted anticipatory bail vide order dated 12.09.2017 by observing, inter alia, that the very fact that the complainant had indulged in sexual relations for a long period of 10 years goes to show that the sexual relation was not forcible but was consensual.
6. According to the appellant, the complainant being aggrieved by the grant of anticipatory bail to the appellant, lodged another FIR by making false allegations being FIR No. 319/2017 dated 05.10.2017 with Nerul Police Station against the appellant under Sections 354, 506 of the IPC and Section 8 of Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 alleging that the appellant had molested her daughter at her home on 30.12.2016 and on 25.01.2017 at 8 pm.
7. As against the aforesaid second FIR, the appellant again approached the Sessions Court, Thane to secure anticipatory bail in CR No. 319 of 2017 which was granted vide order dated 23.10.2017, in which the Sessions Court Judge observed that the complainant did not raise any complaint against the appellant immediately after the first or second incident and after 10 to 11 years she lodged the FIR and the second FIR was in respect of outraging the modesty of the complainant’s daughter which occurred in December 2016 or January 2017 which could have been mentioned in the first FIR dated 15.08.2017.
892 [2024] 11 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports
8. After the appellant was granted anticipatory bail in both the FIRs by the competent courts primarily on the ground that these allegations have been made belatedly, thus throwing doubt on the credibility of these allegations as it appears to be a case of consensual relationship, the appellant approached the Bombay High Court seeking quashing of the FIR being CR No. 302 of 2017 registered with Kharghar Police Station by filing Writ Petition No. 5190 of 2017 which, however, was dismissed by the High Court against which the present appeal has been preferred.
9. While dismissing the petition seeking quashing of the FIR, the High Court noted that:
“The petitioner herein denies having any relationship with the Respondent No.2 and it is the case of the petitioner that he has been roped in a false case by the Respondent No.2. In our view, those would be the aspects in respect of the investigation that would be carried out and the offence being one under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code which is considered to be an offence against the society, we do not deem it appropriate to interfere in our writ jurisdiction. The reliance placed on the order passed by a Division Bench of this Court sitting at Nagpur does not further the case of the petitioner as the facts involved in the said case stand apart from the facts involved in the present case, as in the said case it appears that the accused had approached the Court on the ground that the relationship between the parties was consensual, such are not the facts in the instant case. The above Writ Petition is accordingly dismissed.”
10. Ms. Mrunal Dattatraya Buva, learned counsel for the appellant submits that the High Court made an error in declining to quash the FIR by ignoring the aspect of consensual sex between the parties which is clearly evident from the factual matrix of the case which would take out the sting of criminal culpability attached to the offence of rape. It was submitted that if the above allegations made in the FIR were examined in the proper context, it would clearly indicate that the sexual relationship between the appellant and the complainant was on the basis of consent, and would not amount to forcible sexual act perpetrated by the appellant as alleged.
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 893Mahesh Damu Khare v.
The State of Maharashtra & Anr.
According to the appellant, the complainant herself admits that she was in a relationship with the appellant since they met for the first time in 2008 which continued till 2017. Though it was alleged that the appellant had sexual relationship with her against her consent, it would be inconceivable that the appellant would force himself upon her for so many years without there being any protest or complaint from the side of complainant (Respondent no. 2). This behaviour of the complainant clearly shows that it was a consensual relationship and the allegation of rape was concocted only after the appellant refused to provide any further financial assistance to her or succumb to her demand of marrying her.
11. Though notice was served on complainant (Respondent no. 2), no one appeared on her behalf and only the State-respondent appeared and contested without filing any counter affidavit.
12. It was contended on behalf of the State-respondent that whether the said relationship was consensual or not is a matter of fact which will come out during the course of investigation and trial and it is not a fit case where this Court should intervene with the criminal process initiated against the appellant and consequently, the decision of the Bombay High Court in refusing to quash the FIR does not warrant interference.
13. In order to appreciate the rival contentions of the parties, it would be necessary to revisit the relevant laws.
As far as the scope of Section 482 of CrPC which has been invoked by the appellant for quashing the FIR is concerned, it is a saving clause which deals with the inherent powers of the High Court to pass any order as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the CrPC, or to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.
14. Law relating to quashing of FIRs has already been well-settled as reiterated by this Court in the State of Haryana and Ors. vs. Bhajan Lal and Ors. 1 in which this Court held as below:
“102. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their 1 [1992] Supp. 3 SCR 735 : (1992) Supp. 1 SCC 335 894 [2024] 11 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2).
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(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously Instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.
15. It is to be noted that while considering these aspects, the Court does not have to go in detail by way of minute examination about the correctness or otherwise of the facts alleged and the Court has to examine the same by taking a prima facie view of the matter based on the materials on record and if on consideration of the factual matrix of the allegations, no prima facie case is made out of commission of any offence of which cognizance can be taken, the High Court would be within its power to intervene and quash any such complaint or FIR in exercise of the inherent power under Section 482 CrPC. In this regard, one may also refer to the decision of this Court in R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab,2 wherein this Court while dealing with Section 561-A, the counterpart provision of Section 482 in the erstwhile Code, observed that the High Courts should be cautious in interfering with a criminal proceeding at the stage of investigation. However, there are certain cases where the court, to prevent the abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice can quash the criminal proceedings. The said cases of exceptions have been reiterated in the case of Neeharika Infrastructure Private Limited v. State of Maharashtra & Ors.,3 by stating as below: 2 [1999] Supp. 1 SCR 121 : AIR 1960 SC 866 3 [2021] 4 SCR 1044 : (2021) 19 SCC 401 [2024] 11 S.C.R. 895Mahesh Damu Khare v.
The State of Maharashtra & Anr.
“(i) Where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the criminal proceeding in respect of the offence alleged. Absence of the requisite sanction may, for instance, furnish cases under this category.
(ii) Where the allegations in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged; in such cases no question of appreciating evidence arises; it is a matter merely of looking at the complaint or the first information report to decide whether the offence alleged is disclosed or not.
(iii) Where the allegations made against the accused person do constitute an offence alleged but there is either no legal evidence adduced in support of the case or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. In dealing with this class of cases it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is manifestly and clearly inconsistent with the accusation made and cases where there is legal evidence which on its appreciation may or may not support the accusation in question. In exercising its jurisdiction under Section 561-A the High Court would not embark upon an enquiry as to whether the evidence in question is reliable or not. That is the function of the trial Magistrate, and ordinarily it would not be open to any party to invoke the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction and contend that on a reasonable appreciation of the evidence the accusation made against the accused would not be sustained.”
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