Ramji Lal Bairwa & Anr. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors.
- Citation
- 2024 INSC 846; [2024] 11 S.C.R. 641
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice C.T. Ravikumar, Justice Sanjay Kumar
- Decided
- 7 Nov 2024
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 3403/2023
- Sections
- 482, 7, 372, 2, 320, 173(2)
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:24 am. Original source ↗
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[2024] 11 S.C.R. 641 : 2024 INSC 846 Ramji Lal Bairwa & Anr.
v.
State of Rajasthan & Ors.
(Criminal Appeal No. 3403 of 2023)
07 November 2024 [C.T. Ravikumar* and Sanjay Kumar, JJ.] Issue for Consideration Issue arose as regards whether a third party to a criminal proceeding got locus standi to challenge the order quashing the FIR lodged against the teacher by the father of the minor victim under the Penal Code, POCSO Act and SC/ST Act, for sexually assaulting the minor girl pursuant thereto based on a compromise arrived at by the parties, in a Special Leave Petition u/Art.136; and whether the power to quash criminal proceedings or FIR in regard to heinous and serious offences having serious impact on society, is exercisable merely because the offender and victim or parents of the victim arrived at a compromise.
Headnotes† Constitution of India – Art. 136 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s. 482 – Penal Code, 1860 – ss. 354A, 342, 509, and 504 – Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 – ss. 7 and 8 – Schedule Cast and Schedule Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 – School teacher sexually assaulted the girl student in the Higher Secondary aged 16 years, by rubbing her breast – FIR lodged against the teacher by the father of the minor victim under Penal Code, POCSO Act and SC/ST Act – Three weeks later the offender and the complainant entered into a compromise, and the teacher filed petition u/s. 482 for quashing the FIR – Thereafter, the High Court quashed the FIR and all further proceedings – Appellant, ordinary men residing in the same District to which the complainant belongs, challenged the order quashing the FIR and all further proceedings u/Art. 32 which was converted into a Special Leave Petition u/Art. 136 – High Court, if has power to quash the proceedings and the FIR in regard to heinous and serious offence having serious impact on society, merely because * Author 642 [2024] 11 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports the offender and victim or parents of the victim arrived at a compromise – Third party to a criminal proceeding, if has locus standi to challenge the order quashing the FIR and all further proceedings pursuant thereto based on a compromise arrived at by the parties:
Held: Rubbing the breast of a child would constitute an offence of ‘sexual assault’ u/s.7 of POCSO Act – Commission of such offences against the children should be viewed as heinous and serious – Commission of such offences cannot be taken lightly as offences of private nature and in fact, such offences are bound to be taken as offences against the society – Objects and reasons for the enactment of the POCSO Act, show that quashment of proceeding initiated under POCSO Act abruptly by invoking the power u/s.482, without permitting it to mature into a trial, except on extremely compelling reasons, would go against the very intention of the legislature behind the enactment – Power u/s.482 cannot be used to quash proceedings based on compromise if it is in respect of heinous offence which are not private in nature and have a serious impact on the society – Without even referring to the alleged offence and thereby without looking into the nature and gravity of the offence, solely relying upon the compromise, impugned order was passed – High Court misread and misapplied the law laid down to quash the FIR and all further proceedings based in pursuance thereof – Statement annexed to the FIR of the complainant itself reveal that the teacher had put pressure on the complainant to restrain him from lodging report, and thereafter, compromise was entered immediately – Despite the said position, the Court did not chose to consider whether the compromise entered into between the parties could be acted upon or not, in the interest of justice, taking note of the serious allegations levelled against the teacher – Right to a third party to prefer petition u/Art.136 is certainly to be recognised and respected in a case where seemingly miscarriage of justice had occurred and still, neither State nor victim or any relative falling under the term ‘victim’ approached this Court – In view of compromise entered into between the parties, chance of conviction is remote and bleak also cannot be a ground to abruptly terminate the investigation, by quashing FIR and all further proceedings pursuant thereto, by invoking the power u/s.482 – Thus, the impugned order of High Court quashed and set aside. [Paras 12, 20, 25-28, 32, 33] [2024] 11 S.C.R. 643Ramji Lal Bairwa & Anr. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. Case Law Cited Gian Singh v. State of Punjab [2012] 8 SCR 753 : (2012) 10 SCC 303 – relied on.
P.S.R. Sadhanantham v. Arunachalam [1980] 2 SCR 873 : (1980) 3 SCC 141; Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar and Ors [1987] 1 SCR 702 : (1987) 1 SCC 288; Amanullah and Anr. v. State of Bihar [2016] 2 SCR 1027 : (2016) 6 SCC 699; V.S Achuthanandan v. R. Balakrishna Pillai [2011] 2 SCR 762 : (2011) 3 SCC 317; Rajiv Ranjan Singh ‘Lalan’ v. Union of India [2006] Supp. 4 SCR 742 : (2006) 6 SCC 613; Simranjit Singh Mann v. Union of India [1992] Supp. 1 SCR 592 : (1992) 4 SCC 653; Bar Council of Maharashtra v. M.V. Dabholkar [1976] 1 SCR 306 : (1975) 2 SCC 702; S.P. Gupta v. Union of India (1981) Supp. SCC 87; Attorney General for India v. Satish and Anr [2021] 10 SCR 955 : (2022) 5 SCC 545; Ramakant Rai v. Madan Rai and Ors. [2003] Supp. 4 SCR 17 : (2003) 12 SCC 395; Arunachalam v. P.S.R. Sadhanantham [1979] 3 SCR 482 : (1979) 2 SCC 297; Mohan Lal v. Ajit Singh [1978] 3 SCR 823 : (1978) 3 SCC 279; State of M.P. v. Laxmi Narayan [2019] 2 SCR 864 : (2019) 5 SCC 688; Sunil Raikwar v. State and Another (2021) SCC OnLine Del 258 – referred to.
Books and Periodicals Cited Marcus Tullins Cicero (106-43 BC) in ‘De Officiis’ (on duties) – referred to.
List of Acts Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012; Schedule Cast and Schedule Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989; Penal Code, 1860; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
List of Keywords Locus standi of third party to challenge criminal proceeding; Sexually assaulting minor girl; Compromise between the parties; Power to quash criminal proceedings or FIR; Heinous and serious offences; Rubbing the breast of a child; Quashing the FIR; Offence having serious impact on society; Locus standi; Offences of private nature; Offences against the society; Objects and reasons for the enactment of the POCSO Act; Right to a third party to prefer petition u/Art.136; Miscarriage of justice.
644 [2024] 11 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports Case Arising From CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
3403 of 2023 From the Judgment and Order dated 04.02.2022 of the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jaipur in SBCRMP No. 1348 of 2022 Appearances for Parties R Basant, Sr. Adv., Amicus Curiae.
Chetan Bairwa, Vikas Jain, Ms. Shrawani Verma, Advs. for the Appellants.
Milind Kumar, Ashutosh Shekhar Paarcha, Ms. Neha Kapoor, Pankaj Singhal, Ms. Ashima Gupta, Sarad Kumar Singhania, Anuj Bhandari, Gaurav Jain, Rajat Gupta, Mrs. Disha Bhandari, Mrs. Anjali Doshi, Aviral Saxena, Manu Krishnan, Jatin Bhatt, Sanawar, Harshit Gahlot, Advs. for the Respondents.
R. H. A. Sikander, Intervener.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment C.T. Ravikumar, J.
1. The renowned American poet H. W. Longfellow penned to the effect that a torn jacket might soon be mended, but a bruised heart of a child would be beyond reviviscence. Certainly, it contains the gospel truth as relates a child subjected to sexual assault, be it aggravated or penetrative; or any kind of sexual abuse or exploitation. It is more so, in the case of a female child as it may hound her and hack her family life.
On pedagogy Marcus Tullins Cicero (106-43 BC) in ‘De Officiis’ (on duties) said: “What nobler employment, or more valuable to the State, than that of the man who instructs the rising generation?”
2. May be a jinx on pedagogy unfortunate, unconscionable and unpardonable things happen, though not often-times. The following factual narration will unravel the raison d’etre for the above prelude: - [2024] 11 S.C.R. 645Ramji Lal Bairwa & Anr. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. FIR No.6/2022 dated 08.01.2022 was registered at Sardar Gangapur City Police Station, District Sawai Madhopur, Rajasthan at the instance of the 4 th respondent, the father of the victim involved in the case, against the 3rd respondent herein under Sections 354A, 342, 509 and 504 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, ‘the IPC’) and Sections 7 and 8 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (for short, ‘the POCSO Act’) and Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s), 3( 1)(b) & 3(2) (vii) of the Schedule Cast and Schedule Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (for short, ‘the SC/ST Act’). The allegations thereunder are to the effect that on 06.01.2022 when the victim child, then a student of Class XI in Higher Secondary School was alone in the classroom, the 3rd respondent, who is a teacher, came there. After gazing through the window to ensure that nobody is there near to the classroom, he reached behind her and started patting her cheeks and soon put his hand inside bodice and rubbed her breast. In anguish and anger, she got up and ran away. The accused followed to stop her and hurled abuses with ugly words like ‘dedh Chamar’ etc. Thereupon, she sat down near the gate and beseeched the teachers for help, but it was of no avail. They persuaded her to be tight-lipped about the incident. Though, the Principal came to know about it, he only took her signature on a blank paper. Meanwhile, one teacher came to the residence of the 4 th respondent and took his wife to the school telling that her daughter was not feeling well. On reaching there his wife found the daughter in a deadly terrified and numbed state and she could say nothing to the mother. But, on reaching home, she divulged the incident, to the mother viz., the wife of the 4th respondent and she, in turn, informed him on his mobile phone as he was away in another village for employment purpose. On the next day, the 4 th respondent came back home and the victim narrated the whole incident to him and then, he lodged the aforesaid FIR.
3. Obviously, the subject FIR was filed on 08.01.2022. The third respondent herein compromised the matter with the fourth respondent, who is the father of the victim, on 31.01.2022 and thereupon, moved S.B (Crl.) Misc. Petition No.1348/2022 before the High Court of Rajasthan at Jaipur under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short the ‘Cr.P.C.’), seeking quashment of the said FIR and all further proceedings thereon. As per the impugned order dated 04.02.2022 the High Court, despite the opposition by 646 [2024] 11 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports the learned public prosecutor, allowed the said petition and quashed the subject FIR and all further proceedings in pursuance thereof. The impugned order would reveal that based on the fact that the 3rd respondent has settled the dispute amicably with the 4 th respondent and relying on the decision of this Court in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab,1 the High Court quashed the FIR and all further proceedings therefrom. The High Court held thus:- “…The offence alleged in this matter is non compoundable, however Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab [(2012) 10 SCC 303] has propounded that if it is convinced that offences are entirely personal in nature and do not affect the public peace or tranquillity and where it feels that quashing of such proceedings on account of compromise would bring about peace and would secure ends of justice, the High Court should not hesitate to quash the same by exercising the inherent powers vested in it. It is observed that in such cases, the prosecution becomes the lame prosecution and pursuing such a lame prosecution would be a waste of time and energy. That will also unsettle the compromise and obstruct restoration of peace. This court is aptly guided by the principles propounded by Hon’ble the Supreme Court and feels that whether dispute is essentially inter se between the parties, either they are relatives, neighbours or having business relationship and which does not affect the society at large, then in such cases, with a view to maintain harmonious relationships between the two sides & for restitution of relationship. and with a view to end-up the dispute in between them permanently, the High Court should exercise its inherent power to quash the FIR and all other subsequent proceedings initiated thereto.”
4. The appellants state that they are ordinary men residing in the very same Tehsil and District to which the 4th respondent belongs. They moved this Court challenging the order quashing the subject FIR and all further proceedings therefrom under Article 32 of the Constitution of India contending that the FIR registered against the 3 rd respondent 1 [2012] 8 SCR 753 : (2012) 10 SCC 303 [2024] 11 S.C.R. 647Ramji Lal Bairwa & Anr. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. carried serious allegation of commission of acts involving offence(s) under various sections of the IPC, and POCSO Act; that they are not purely private in nature; that they are offences against the society, that the quashment of the subject FIR was solely based on compromise between the third respondent accused and the fourth respondent, the father of the minor victim and that the first respondent State did not choose to challenge the said order dated 04.02.2022 though it was so quashed ignoring the opposition of the public prosecutor. They would further contend that the offences alleged against the 3 rd respondent were serious offences having impact on the society and letting off the third respondent untried might result in recurrence of such instances besides it being injustice to the victim and society as a whole. On 30.09.2022, this Court issued notice and taking note of the involvement of important issues in the matter, requested Mr. R. Basant, learned Sr. advocate to assist the Court as amicus curiae, which request was graciously accepted by the learned counsel. On 13.10.2022, Mr. Aviral Saxena, learned advocate, agreed to assist the learned Senior Counsel. On 02.12.2022, upon hearing the learned counsel appearing for the parties and the learned amicus curiae and taking note of difficulty to continue the writ petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India this Court converted the writ petition into Special Leave Petition under Article 136 of the Constitution of India and further ordered thus:- “Let the parties address the Court on merits on the next date of hearing. List on 20.01.2023”
5. The learned counsel appearing respectively for the third and fourth respondents vehemently challenged the locus standi of the appellants to challenge the order dated 04.02.2022 passed thereon as they were not parties to the above mentioned Crl. Misc. Petition. Besides challenging the locus standi of the appellants they would contend that the quashment of the subject FIR and all further proceedings therefrom is legally permissible in view of the law laid down by this Court in Gian Singh’s case (supra) and the reason for such interference and consequential quashment are specifically mentioned in the impugned order. According to the said respondents the appellants besides being total strangers to the Misc. Petition and are not at all affected by the impugned order. Meanwhile Delhi Commission for Protection of Child Rights (DCPCR) have filed an intervention application seeking permission to assist the Court for proper adjudication of the issues 648 [2024] 11 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports raised in the Special Leave Petition. Considering the nature of the issues involved and the fact that intervention is sought for by the Commission for Protection for Child Rights we have heard learned counsel for the intervenor, besides the learned amicus curae Sri R. Basant, with the able assistance of Mr. Avival Saxena and the learned counsel for the parties.
6. Considering the conspectus of facts and taking note of the rival contentions, the following twin questions of relevance arise for consideration in this appeal: - (I.) Whether a third party to a criminal proceeding got locus standi to challenge the order quashing the FIR concerned and all further proceedings pursuant thereto based on a compromise arrived at by the parties, in a Special Leave Petition under Article 136 of the Constitution of India?
(II.) Whether the power to quash criminal proceedings or complaint or FIR in regard to heinous and serious offences having serious impact on society, is exercisable merely because the offender and victim or parent(s) of the victim arrived at a compromise, relying on the dictum laid down by this Court in Gian Singh’s case (supra)?
7. Needless to say, that answers to the above questions would decide the fate of this appeal. For answering the first question, various factors have to be looked into. Necessarily the questions as to whether the offender is accused of commission of offence(s) involving moral turpitude or against the society or whether they are purely of private nature have to be taken note of. As some of the offence(s) alleged fall under special statute relating children, the very object and purpose of the said enactment may also require consideration in the above regard. The learned amicus curiae relied on various decisions of this Court to drive home the point that when criminal proceedings are abruptly terminated based on compromise between the offender and the victim or on behalf of the victim by the parent(s), despite the alleged offence being one having impact on the society and of heinous and serious in nature and still, the State did not take up the matter further in accordance with law, ignoring the fact that such quashment of the proceedings was done disregarding the opposition of the public prosecutor, a public spirited person should be having the locus standi to challenge such an order in the interest [2024] 11 S.C.R. 649Ramji Lal Bairwa & Anr. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. of justice. It is furthermore submitted that in such circumstances if a public-spirited person is non-suited on the ground of locus standi it would only help the offender to escape even without facing the trial. Such situations may result in recurrence of commission of such offences detrimental to the interests of the society. To buttress the point that a spirited citizen has the locus standi to petition under Article 136 of the Constitution of India to ensure that justice is done, the learned amicus curiae relied on the decisions of this Court in P.S.R. Sadhanantham v. Arunachalam,2 Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar and Ors., 3 Amanullah and Anr. v. State of Bihar 4 and V.S Achuthanandan v. R. Balakrishna Pillai.5 The learned counsel for the intervenor also endorsed the said submissions and contentions made by the learned amicus curiae on the question of locus standi.
8. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the third respondent, who is the accused on whose instance the subject FIR was quashed, contended that it is impermissible for a third party/strangers to interfere in criminal proceedings. In support of the said contention, he relied on various decisions such as Rajiv Ranjan Singh ‘Lalan’ v. Union of India,6 Simranjit Singh Mann v. Union of India7 and Bar Council of Maharashtra v. M.V. Dabholkar.8
9. It is disheartening to note that with tooth and nail, the learned counsel appearing for the fourth respondent, the father of the victim, challenged the appellants’ locus standi to maintain the Special Leave Petition against the impugned order whereunder the FIR registered against the third respondent, the accused was quashed based on the compromise between third and the fourth respondents. It is contended that since none of the fundamental rights under part III of the appellants are infringed, they could not maintain a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India and merely because the petition filed by them under Article 32 was converted to one 2 [1980] 2 SCR 873 : (1980) 3 SCC 141 3 [1987] 1 SCR 702 : (1987) 1 SCC 288 4 [2016] 2 SCR 1027 : (2016) 6 SCC 699 5 [2011] 2 SCR 762 : (2011) 3 SCC 317 6 [2006] Supp. 4 SCR 742 : (2006) 6 SCC 613 7 [1992] Supp. 1 SCR 592 : (1992) 4 SCC 653 8 [1976] 1 SCR 306 : (1975) 2 SCC 702 650 [2024] 11 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports under Article 136, of the Constitution of India, the appellants would not acquire locus standi to challenge the order dated 04.02.2022 passed by the High Court in exercise of its power under Section 482, Cr. P.C. The learned counsel relied on the decision of this Court in S.P. Gupta v. Union of India9 in support his contentions.
10. Before dealing with the contentions on behalf of the respondents and also the submissions of the learned amicus curiae and the counsel for the intervenor, we think it only appropriate to refer to certain relevant aspects of the POCSO Act. As introduction to the POCSO Act, what actually actuated the Parliament to enact ‘POCSO Act’ has been stated thus:- “Sexual offences against children are not adequately addressed by the existing laws. A large number of such offences are neither specifically provided with nor are they adequately penalised. Such offences against children need to be defined explicitly and countered through adequate penalties as an effective deterrence. This Act provides for protection of children from offences of sexual assault, sexual harassment and pornography with due regard for safeguarding the interest and well-being of children.”
11. Contextually, it is worthy to refer to the statement of objects and reasons for the enactment of the POCSO Act. It reads as follows: - “STATEMENT OF OBJECTS AND REASONS Article 15 of the Constitution, inter alia, confers upon the State powers to make special provision for children. Further, article 39, inter alia, provides that the State shall in particular direct its policy towards securing that the tender age of children are not abused and their childhood and youth are protected against exploitation and they are given facilities to develop in a healthy manner and in conditions of freedom and dignity.
2. The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Children, ratified by India on 11th December, 1992, requires the State Parties to undertake all appropriate national, bilateral 9 (1981) Supp. SCC 87 [2024] 11 S.C.R. 651Ramji Lal Bairwa & Anr. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. and multilateral measures to prevent (a) the inducement or coercion of a child to engage in any unlawful sexual activity; (b) the exploitative use of children in prostitution or other unlawful sexual practices; and (c) the exploitative use of children in pornographic performances and materials.
3. The data collected by the National Crime Records Bureau shows that there has been increase in cases of sexual offences against children. This is corroborated by the ‘Study on Child Abuse: India 2007’ conducted by the Ministry of Women and Child Development. Moreover, sexual offences against children are not adequately addressed by the existing laws. A large number of such offences are neither specifically provided for nor are they adequately penalised. The interests of the child, both as a victim as well as a witness, need to be protected. It is felt that offences against children need to be defined explicitly and countered through commensurate penalties as an effective deterrence.
4. It is, therefore, proposed to enact a self contained comprehensive legislation inter alia to provide for protection of children from the offences of sexual assault, sexual harassment and pornography with due regard for safeguarding the interest and well being of the child at every stage of the judicial process, incorporating childfriendly procedures for reporting, recording of evidence, investigation and trial of offences and provision for establishment of Special Courts for speedy trial of such offences.
5. The Bill would contribute to enforcement of the right of all children to safety, security and protection from sexual abuse and exploitation.
6. The notes on clauses explain in detail the various provisions contained in the Bill.
7. The Bill seeks to achieve the above objectives.”
12. The objects and reasons for the enactment of the POCSO Act, as extracted above, would undoubtedly show that quashment of proceeding initiated under POCSO Act abruptly by invoking the 652 [2024] 11 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports power under Section 482, Cr. PC without permitting it to mature into a trial, except on extremely compelling reasons ex facie malafidely initiated or initiated solely to settle the score etc., would go against the very intention of the legislature behind the enactment. As noted earlier, it is the inadequacy of the existing laws to address certain issues relating sexual offences against the children that made the legislature to come up with the aforesaid legislation with a view to protect and respect the privacy and confidentiality of children and to ensure their physical, emotional, intellectual and social development. The POCSO Act also addressed the lack of provisions defining various offences against the children and also adequate penal provisions therefor. A careful scanning of the various provisions under the POCSO Act would reveal that with a view to achieve the aforesaid objects and purposes various offences against the children are specifically defined and provisions for adequate penalisation are also inserted in the Act. Obviously, rubbing the breast of a child would constitute an offence of ‘sexual assault’ under Section 7 of POCSO Act, punishable with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than three years and may extend to five years and also fine. They would reveal that the commission of such offences against the children should be viewed as heinous and serious. Needless to say, that commission of such offences cannot be taken lightly as offences of private nature and in fact, such offences are bound to be taken as offences against the society. In the decision in Attorney General for India v. Satish and Anr.10 at paragraph 38, this Court held thus:- “The act of touching any sexual part of the body of a child with sexual intent or any other act involving physical contact with sexual intent, could not be trivialised or held insignificant or peripheral so as to exclude such act from the purview of “sexual assault” under Section 7. As held by this Court in Balram Kumawat v. Union of India, the law would have to be interpreted having regard to the subject-matter of the offence and to the object of the law it seeks to achieve. The purpose of the law cannot be to allow the offender to sneak out of the meshes of law.”
10 [2021] 10 SCR 955 : (2022) 5 SCC 545 [2024] 11 S.C.R. 653Ramji Lal Bairwa & Anr. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors.
13. This Court went on to hold that the legislature had incorporated certain statutory presumptions having regard to the seriousness of the offences under the POCSO Act.
14. Bearing in mind the aforesaid aspects we will consider the submissions and contentions made relying on the aforementioned decisions.
15. With respect to the decisions relied on by the learned counsel for the third respondent, it can be seen that they deal with the locus standi of a third party to petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. But then, this Court has already passed an order on 02.12.2022 converting the petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India as a Special Leave Petition under Article 136 of the Constitution of India and further ordered to list the matter for hearing the parties on merits. Hence, the fact is that the present matter has already shed its character as a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India pursuant to the order of this Court on 02.12.2022. The power of this Court to pass such an order cannot be disputed in view of the inherent power in this Court or in view of the power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. In this context, it is also relevant to refer to Article 136 of Constitution of India and the following decisions of this Court describing the nature of power of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.
“Article 136 (1) Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, the Supreme Court may, in its discretion, grant special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or made by any court or tribunal in the territory of India.
(2) Nothing in clause (1) shall apply to any judgment, determination, sentence or order passed or made by any court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed Forces.”
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