Kali Charan and Others v. State of U.P. and Others
- Citation
- 2024 INSC 898; [2024] 11 S.C.R. 1064
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Bhushan Ramkrishna Gavai, Justice Sandeep Mehta
- Decided
- 26 Nov 2024
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 13119/2024
- Sections
- 5, 4(1), 4, 9, 5A, 6, 17, 17(1), 17(4), 17(2), 19, 3
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:24 am. Original source ↗
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[2024] 11 S.C.R. 1064 : 2024 INSC 898 Kali Charan and Others v.
State of U.P. and Others (Civil Appeal No. 13119 of 2024)
26 November 2024 [B.R. Gavai and Sandeep Mehta,* JJ.] Issue for Consideration Whether the present acquisition is a part of the integrated development plan of ‘Yamuna Expressway” undertaken by respondent No.3-Yamuna Expressway Industrial Development Authority (YEIDA); Whether the application of Sections 17(1) and 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was legal and justified in the instant case, thereby justifying the decision of the State Government to dispense with the enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act; Whether the view taken by the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Kamal Sharma validating the questioned acquisition while relying upon Nand Kishore lays down the correct proposition of law or whether the Division Bench in the case of Shyoraj Singh was justified in applying the principles laid down in Radhy Shyam case and quashing the acquisition proceedings in question.
Headnotes† Land acquisition – Present acquisition if a part of the integrated development plan of ‘Yamuna Expressway” undertaken by respondent No.3-YEIDA:
Held: Yes – Development of land parcels for industrial, residential, and recreational purposes is complementary to the construction of the Yamuna Expressway – The objective of the acquisition is to integrate land development with the Yamuna Expressway’s construction, thereby promoting overall growth serving the public interest – Thus, the Expressway and the development of adjoining lands are considered to be inseparable components of the overall project – Appeals filed by the landowners dismissed, while that of the YEIDA are allowed. [Para 38] * Author [2024] 11 S.C.R. 1065Kali Charan and Others v. State of U.P. and Others Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – ss.17 (1), (4) – Application of ss.17(1) and 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, if was legal and justified in the instant case, justifying the decision of the State Government to dispense with the enquiry under s.5-A of the Act:
Held: Yes – The invocation of ss.17(1) and 17(4) was legal and justified in this case – The urgency clause was applied in accordance with the planned development of the Yamuna Expressway, as held in the decision of this Court in Nand Kishore. [Para 38] Land acquisition – View taken by the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Kamal Sharma validating the questioned acquisition while relying upon Nand Kishore, if lays down the correct proposition of law or whether the Division Bench in the case of Shyoraj Singh was justified in applying the principles laid down in Radhy Shyam case and quashing the acquisition proceedings in question:
Held: Kamal Sharma extensively considered the factual matrix and also examined the original records of the State Government to arrive at the satisfaction that the invocation of the urgency clause was absolutely justified with regard to the acquisition in question – High Court also exhaustively considered the entire sequence of judicial pronouncements in respect of the acquisition in question before arriving at the aforesaid conclusion and acted in an equitable manner while affirming the acquisition proceedings and directing the grant of additional compensation – The view of the Division Bench in Kamal Sharma, which relied upon Nand Kishore is the correct proposition of law – Judgment of the High Court in Shyoraj Singh, which relied on Radhy Shyam is not a correct legal interpretation – Shyoraj Singh set aside as it does not lay down good law and is per incuriam as it was passed overlooking the earlier precedents – Kamal Sharma has already granted additional compensation of 64.7% to the landowners, to be offered as ‘No Litigation Bonus’ in consonance with the Government order dated 04.11.15, thus there is no scope for further enhancement in compensation – 64.7% enhancement in compensation to apply in rem, ensuring uniform benefits to all affected landowners under the present land acquisition. [Paras 38, 43, 44] 1066 [2024] 11 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports Case Law Cited Shyoraj Singh and Others v. State of U.P. Writ-C No. 30747 of 2010 – held not good law; per incuriam.
Kamal Sharma v. State of U.P. thru Special Secretary Industrial Development and Ors Writ-C No. 26767 of 2010 – held good law. Kalicharan v. State of U.P. and others SLP(C) No. 15782 of 2023; Nand Kishore Gupta and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others [2010] 11 SCR 356 : (2010) 10 SCC 282; Radhy Shyam (dead) through LRs. and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others [2011] 8 SCR 359 : (2011) 5 SCC 553; Dev Sharan and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others [2011] 3 SCR 728 : (2011) 4 SCC 769; Devender Kumar Tyagi and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others [2011] 15 SCR 641 : (2011) 9 SCC 164; Darshan Lal Nagpal (Dead) by LRs. v. Government of NCT of Delhi and Others [2012] 2 SCR 595 : (2012) 2 SCC 327; Anand Singh and Another v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others [2010] 9 SCR 133 : (2010) 11 SCC 242; Narendra Road Lines Pvt. Ltd. v. State of UP and Others SLP(C) No. 17808 of 2010 : Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 29682 of 2009; Yogesh Kumar v. State of U.P. CMWP No.10782/2013; Natthi v. State of U.P. Thru. Secr. Industrial Devp. & Ors. Writ-C No. 20585 of 2010 : SLP(C) No. 014705-014710 of 2011; Karnail Singh v. State of Haryana [2009] 11 SCR 470 : (2009) 8 SCC 539; Savitri Devi v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others [2015] 7 SCR 512 : (2015) 7 SCC 21; Sahara India Commercial Corporation Limited and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2017) 11 SCC 339; Noida Industrial Development Authority v. Ravindra Kumar and Others [2022] 1 SCR 1113 : (2022) 13 SCC 468; Yamuna Expressway Industrial Authority v. Shakuntla Education and Welfare Society [2022] 5 SCR 1034 : (2022) SCC OnLine SC 655 – referred to.
List of Acts Land Acquisition Act, 1894; U.P. Industrial Area Development Act, 1976.
List of Keywords Land acquisition; Acquisition proceedings; Integrated development of lands abutting the Yamuna Expressway; Acquisition of the abutting lands; Integrated development plan of ‘Yamuna Expressway”; Development of adjoining lands; Integrated project; [2024] 11 S.C.R. 1067Kali Charan and Others v. State of U.P. and Others Yamuna Expressway Industrial Development Authority (YEIDA); Urgency clause; Jewar Airport; Master Plan; Industrial, residential, and recreational purposes; Objective of the acquisition; Integrate land development with the Yamuna Expressway construction; Public interest; Land parcels; Enquiry; ‘in rem’; Additional compensation; Enhancement in compensation; Landowners; Policy for Planned Development along the Taj Expressway.
Case Arising From CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 13119 of 2024 From the Judgment and Order dated 26.05.2023 of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in WC No. 56629 of 2011 With Civil Appeal Nos. 13120, 13121-13122, 13123-13124, 13125, 13126, 13127, 13128, 13129, 13130, 13131, 13132, 13133, 13134, 13135, 13136, 13137, 13138-13139, 13140-13141, 13142-13143, 13144-13157, 13158-13162, 13163, 13164, 131165, 13166, 13167, 13168, 13169, 13170, 13171, 13172, 13173, 13174 and 13175 of 2024 Appearances for Parties Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General, Sharan Dev Singh Thakur, AAG, Jayant Bhushan, Niranjan Reddy, V.K. Shukla, Chinmoy Pradip Sharma, Ranjit Kumar, Gopal Jain, Rajive Bhalla, Mohd Shoeb Alam, Sr. Advs., Anand Mishra-1, Ms. Vandita Nain, Ms. Ayushi Rajput, Amar Gupta, Divyam Agarwal, Pranav Tanwar, Mohit Sharma, Ms. Parul Shukla, Ms. Shubhangi Pandey, Ms. Divya Jyoti Singh, Vineet Nagar, Kshitiz Ahuja, Shekhar Bhatia, Kapil Chaudhary, Samyak Jain, Rajat Sehgal, Ms. Vandana Anand, Anurag Rawal, Amit Singh, Akash Nagar, Jaibir Singh Nagar, Suresh Chand Nagar, Ms. Ruchi B Nagar, Kuldeep Nagar, Nafees Chaudhary, Surender Kumar, Yashpal Bbhati, Vijender Kumar, Ankit Bhati, Arvind Tanwar, Siddhartha Jha, Rakesh Mishra, Pankaj Dubey, Ms. Rishu Mishra, D.N. Dubey, Ambuj Sharma, Sanjay Sarin, Tarun Rana, Ms. Gagan Deep Kaur, Ms. Lavanya Paul, Dinkar Kalra, Susheel Tomar, Sanjeev Malhotra, Nischal Kumar Neeraj, Yogesh Tiwari, Sarthak Nema, Abhinav Singh Parihar, Sanjay K. Agrawal, Syed Imtiyaz Ali, Aftab Ali Khan, Moazzam Khan, Ms. Sheetal Rawat, Mumtaz Alam Siddiqui, Ali Safeer Farooqi, Ms. Phaguni Bajpayi, 1068 [2024] 11 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports Mansur Ali Khan, Rahat Ali Chaudhary, Ms. Ruchira Goel, Siddharth Thakur, Adit Jayeshbhai Shah, Sharanya Singh, Mustafa Sajad, Abhinav Parihar, Ms. Neema, Vikrant Singh Bais, Vikas Upadhyay, Mrs. Ankita Kashyap, Ms. Nimisha Swarup, Nitin Gaur, Arjun Singh Tomar, Alok Shankar, Vivek Sharma, Deepesh Srivastava, Ms. Rachana Sharma, Advs. for the appearing parties.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment Mehta, J.
Table of Contents* INTRODUCTION ........................................................................ 4 BATCH NO. 1 – LANDOWNERS’ APPEALS @ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITIONS ..................................................................... 5 BATCH NO. 2 – YEIDA APPEALS @ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITIONS ................................................................................ 6 BRIEF FACTS ............................................................................. 6 S U B M I S S I O N S O N B E H A L F O F L A N D O W N E R S (APPELLANTS IN BATCH NO. 1) .............................................. 15
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF YEIDA (RESPONDENT NO.
3 IN BATCH NO. 1) .................................................................... 26 DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS ................................................. 38 CONCLUSION ............................................................................ 44
1. Delay in filing application(s) for setting aside of abatement is condoned.
2. Abatement is set aside.
3. Delay in filing the application(s) for substitution is condoned.
4. Application(s) for substitution is allowed.
* Ed. Note: Pagination as per the original Judgment.
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 1069Kali Charan and Others v. State of U.P. and Others
5. Application(s) for transposition is allowed.
6. Application(s) for intervention/impleadment is allowed.
7. Leave granted.
INTRODUCTION
8. The present batch of civil appeals @ special leave petitions arise out of the land acquisition proceedings initiated by respondent No.1-State of Uttar Pradesh 1 for planned development in the District Gautam Budh Nagar, Uttar Pradesh, through respondent No.3-Yamuna Expressway Industrial Development Authority 2 by invoking ‘urgency provisions’ incorporated in Sections 17(1) and 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 3 .
9. Arguments on all the appeals @ special leave petitions have been heard analogously and are being disposed of vide this common judgment.
10. In total, 35 civil appeals @ special leave petitions are preferred both by landowners and YEIDA which can be categorized into two batches as mentioned below:
BATCH NO. 1 - LANDOWNERS’ APPEALS @ SPECIAL LEAVE
PETITIONS
11. A total of 29 civil appeals @ special leave petitions have been filed by the landowners challenging the decision of the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in “Kamal Sharma v. State of U.P. thru Special Secretary Industrial Development and Ors4 ”. The appeal @ special leave petition titled “Kalicharan v. State of U.P. and others 5” is being treated as the lead matter in this batch. BATCH NO. 2 - YEIDA APPEALS @ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITIONS
12. The YEIDA has filed 6 appeals @ special leave petitions challenging various decisions of the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court 1 hereinafter being referred to as ‘State’ 2 hereinafter being referred to as ‘YEIDA’ 3 hereinafter being referred to as “the Act”
4 Writ-C No. 26767 of 2010; hereinafter referred to as ‘Kamal Sharma’ 5 SLP(C) No. 15782 of 2023 1070 [2024] 11 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports invalidating the self-same land acquisition proceedings for integrated development of notified areas including the decision in “Shyoraj Singh and Others v. State of U.P.6 ”. The appeal @ special leave petition titled “YEIDA v. Shyoraj Singh and Ors.7 ” is being treated as the lead matter in this batch.
BRIEF FACTS
13. The chronology of events leading to the filing of these civil appeals are as follows.
14. For the sake of convenience, we shall refer to the factual context as noticed in Writ-C No. 26767 of 2010 titled as “Kamal Sharma v. State of U.P. thru Special Secretary Industrial Development and Ors.8 (lead matter in Batch No.1)filed before the Allahabad High Court.
15. Upon receipt of a proposal from the Director, Land Acquisition Directorate, Rajswa, Uttar Pradesh, with prior approval of the State Government, a notification dated 26 th February, 2009 was issued under Section 4(1) 9 read with Sections 17(1) 10 and 17(4) 11 of the Act for the acquisition of the tracts of lands in question for planned development in the District Gautam Budh Nagar, Uttar Pradesh. The relevant portion of the aforesaid notification is extracted below: - “Under sub-section (1) of section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (Act No. 1 of 1894), the Governor hereby 6 Writ-C No. 30747 of 2010; hereinafter referred to as ‘Shyoraj Singh’ 7 SLP(C) Nos. 19512-19513 of 2023 8 Supra, Note 4 9 4. Publication of preliminary notification and power of officers thereupon. –
(1) Whenever it appears to the [appropriate Government] the land in any locality [is needed or] is likely to be needed for any public purpose [or for a company], a notification to that effect shall be published in the Official Gazette [and in two daily newspapers circulating in that locality of which at least one shall be in the regional language], and the Collector shall cause public notice of the substance of such notification to be given at convenient places in the said locality [(the last of the dates of such publication and the giving of such public notice , being hereinafter referred to as the date of the publication of the notification)]. 10 17. Special powers in case of urgency. –
(1) In cases of urgency, whenever the [appropriate Government], so directs, the Collector, though no such award has been made, may, on the expiration of fifteen days from the publication of the notice mentioned in section 9, sub-section (1). [take possession of any land needed for a public purpose]. Such land shall thereupon vest absolutely in the [Government], free from all encumbrances. 11 17. Special powers in case of urgency. –
(4) In the case of any land to which, in the opinion of the [appropriate Government], the provisions of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) are applicable, the [appropriate Government] may direct that the provisions of section 5A shall not apply, and, if it does so direct, a declaration may be made under section 6 in respect of the land at any time [after the date of the publication of the notification] under section 4, sub-section (1).
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 1071Kali Charan and Others v. State of U.P. and Others notifies for the information of the general public that the land mentioned in the Schedule below shall be earmarked for public purposes, namely, the Yamuna Expressway Industrial Development Authority in District Gautam Budh Nagar for Planned Development.
Because the Governor is of the opinion that the provisions or sub-section (1) of section 17 of the said Act apply to the said land, because the said land is urgently needed for planned development in district Gautam Buddha Nagar through Yamuna Expressway Industrial Development Authority and in view of this urgency, it is also necessary that the possible delay in conducting the Investigation under Section 5-A of the said Act should be avoided. Therefore, the Governor also directs under sub-section (4) of Section 17 of the said Act that the provisions of Section 5-A of the said Act shall not apply.”
(emphasis supplied)
16. Since the land was sought to be acquired by invoking urgency provisions under Sections 17(1) and 17(4) of the Act, the landowners made representations to the Chief Executive Officer(‘CEO’) of YEIDA requesting that their land may not be acquired because the status of the land was ‘Abadi Bhoomi’ which was being used by the landowners as dwelling units and for rearing their cattle. The functionaries/authorities concerned did not accede to the request of the landowners and the State Government issued the notification dated 19th February, 2010 under Section 6 of the Act.
17. The landowners challenged the acquisition of their lands by filing numerous writ petitions before the Allahabad High Court, primarily seeking the relief of quashing the acquisition proceedings undertaken by invoking Sections 4 and 6 read with Sections 17(1) and 17(4) of the Act on several grounds which may be broadly categorized as below:-
(i) That the State Government arbitrarily invoked Section 17(1) and Section 17(4) of the Act and deprived the landowners of their valuable right to raise objections under Section 5-A of the Act. 1072 [2024] 11 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports
(ii) That a bare reading of the notification issued under Section 4 would reflect that there was no material with the State Government for invoking the urgency clause in the matter of acquisition of land for planned development.
(iii) That there was no genuine public purpose behind the acquisition and thus, the impugned action was illegal, arbitrary and unjustified.
18. These writ petitions were decided by the Allahabad High Court taking divergent views which are assailed in these appeals by special leave.
19. The Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court vide judgment dated 24th April, 2017 allowed the Writ-C No. 30747 of 2010 titled Shyoraj Singh and quashed the land acquisition notifications in question holding that the grounds being taken in the impugned notifications for invocation of the urgency clause were arbitrary and bad in law. The learned Division Bench in Shyoraj Singh summoned the original records from the State Government and perused the same to arrive at the following conclusions: -
(i) The Division Bench referred to two letters issued by the authorities of the District Gautam Budh Nagar, the details of which are as follows:
(a) A letter justifying the invocation of the urgency clause signed by the Additional Chief Executive Officer of Yamuna Expressway, Tehsildar, Naib Tehsildar, and Lekhpal. The relevant extract from the said letter is as below: - “Yamuna expressway urgently needs the proposed land for planned industrial development.
In the event of delay in the acquisition, there is a strong possibility of increasing encroachment on the proposed land, due to which public interest project of planned industrial development will adversely be affected.”
“Hearing and disposal of written/oral objections will definitely take years and there will be unexpected delays which will stall the planned development.”
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 1073Kali Charan and Others v. State of U.P. and Others
(b) A letter issued in 2010 by the District Magistrate, recording a satisfaction that the prevailing facts and circumstances justified the invocation of the powers under Section 17 of the Act for dispensing with the hearing of objections under Section 5-A of the Act. The relevant extract from the said letter is as below:
“Due to the need to complete the project without delay in the acquisition of the said land, it is necessary to take possession of the proposed land with immediate effect. In the case of using Section 17 of LAA, the provisions of Section 5-A of the Act become extinct and I fully agree with the justification of ending the opportunity of hearing to the land owners.”
With reference to the aforesaid letters, the Division Bench observed that the two grounds mentioned for invoking urgency clause were: (1) That there are chances of unauthorized construction/encroachment on the said land. (2) Large number of landowners would be affected by the acquisition and hearing such large number of landowners would delay the project. The Division Bench in Shyoraj Singh held that the above-noted factors did not furnish legally acceptable justification for the exercise of power under Section 17(1) of the Act by the State Government because the acquisition was primarily meant to cater to private interests in the name of industrial development of the District and no material was produced on record to show that the State Government and/or agencies/instrumentalities of the State were intending to establish industrial units on the acquired tracts of land. Further, the justification for invoking urgency provisions, that the land will be encroached on, had no substance as the land was already in possession of the recorded tenure holders.
(ii) The Division Bench also observed that the notification under Section 4 of the Act was published on 26 th February, 2009 but thereafter, the State Government took nearly one year to publish the notification under Section 6 12 of the Act. The time 12 Published on 19th Feb, 2010.
1074 [2024] 11 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports of one year consumed by the State Government in publishing the notification under Section 6 of the Act was by itself sufficient to infer that there was absolutely no urgency that could have justified the invocation of the urgency clause, thereby depriving the landowners of an opportunity of hearing under Section 5-A of the Act.
20. However, another Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court while dealing with a batch of 73 writ petitions challenging the very same land acquisition proceedings took a different view from Shyoraj Singh and dismissed the writ petitions filed by the landowners, the lead matter being Writ-C No. 26767 of 2010 titled “Kamal Sharma v. State of U.P.”. The Division Bench while upholding the acquisition proceedings held that it could not be accepted that the entire exercise for invocation of urgency clause was mechanical or there was no material with the State for recording the subjective satisfaction to this effect. The reasons assigned by the Division Bench in Kamal Sharma were as follows: -
(i) A perusal of the Master plan and the facts established that the land required for development of Yamuna Expressway [‘Planned development through Yamuna Expressway’] was for an integrated project. The land was initially acquired for the Yamuna Expressway and, thereafter, for developing land parcels alongside the Expressway as townships.
(ii) The original record of the State contains a categorical statement that the State Government, after scrutinizing the record had accepted the proposal applying mind to the fact that, in case the objections under Section 5-A of the Act were invited, it would adversely affect and cause delay in execution of the project of public importance. The said decision was made looking at the enormity of the project which required the acquisition of the lands spread over a large area of 18,000 hundred acres (approx.) comprising 16 villages. The development of the village ‘Abadi Bhoomi’s by YEIDA was also linked to the development of the land alongside the Expressway. It was not the case of non-application of mind and no fault in the decision-making process could be demonstrated.
(iii) There was no post-notification delay, inasmuch as, in two or three acquisition notifications, which were the subject matter of [2024] 11 S.C.R. 1075Kali Charan and Others v. State of U.P. and Others challenge in the present writ petitions, wherein one year time has been consumed in the issuance of the Section 6 notification, the delay has beenduly explained by the State.
21. In Kamal Sharma, the Division Bench distinguished Shyoraj Singh noting that the said judgment failed to consider the fact that the acquisition was proposed for an integrated project and that the Division Bench did not deal with the argument that looking at the large number of tenure holders, the hearings would have resulted into the project of tremendous importance being delayed. Further, it was noted that the reasons given for justifying the invocation of the urgency clause had not been examined in the context in which they were made, and also the decision of this Court in the case of Nand Kishore Gupta and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others.13 was not considered.
22. The Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court while delivering the judgment in Kamal Sharma, validated the acquisition proceeding in question and granted an enhanced compensation of 64.7% to the landowners.
23. During the course of arguments, this Court was apprised of the fact that out of total 410 writ petitioners(landowners) before the High Court, only 96 have challenged the judgment in Kamal Sharma by filing civil appeals @ special leave petitions in Batch No. 1.
24. It is in this backdrop of the conflicting decisions rendered by the Division Benches of the Allahabad High Court, that the two batches of civil appeals @ special leave petitions i.e. Batch No.1 and Batch No.2, have been preferred by the landowners and YEIDA before this Court.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF LANDOWNERS (APPELLANTS
IN BATCH NO. 1): -
25. Learned counsel representing the landowners implored the Court to grant relief in favour of the appellants as prayed for in Batch No.1 wherein lead matter is “Kalicharan and others v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and others14 ” and negate the challenge to the judgment in 13 [2010] 11 SCR 356 : (2010) 10 SCC 282; hereinafter referred to as ‘Nand Kishore’ 14 supra 1076 [2024] 11 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports Shyoraj Singh. They advanced the following pertinent submissions for assailing the questioned land acquisition proceedings:-
(i) That the Division Bench of Allahabad High Court, while rendering the judgment dated 26th May, 2023 in Kamal Sharma, in effect sat in appeal over the judgment dated 24 th April, 2017 in Shyoraj Singh rendered by a coordinate bench of the same High Court which dealt with an identical controversy both in facts and law. It was fervently contended that the Division Bench of Allahabad High Court, while dealing with the subsequent batch of writ petitions in Kamal Sharma should have followed the judgment passed in Shyoraj Singh as a matter of judicial discipline.
(ii) That if at all the Division Bench in Kamal Sharma was of a view that Shyoraj Singh did not lay down the correct position of law, then the question of law should have been referred to a larger Bench rather than taking a divergent view in a Bench with a composition of same number of Judges.
(iii) That the land acquisition notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act were dated 26 th February, 2009 and 19 th February 2010, respectively. The above-mentioned dates demonstrate that about one years’ time was taken by the State Government for issuance of the final declaration notification under Section 6 after the proposal under Section 4 of the Act was issued and thus, there was pre and post notification delay which could not have been ignored and had to be taken into account. In this background there could not have been any justification for the dispensation of few weeks’ time to the landowners to file objections under Section 5-A of the Act, on the ground of urgency. On this aspect, reliance was placed upon Radhy Shyam (dead) through LRs. and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, 15 wherein this Court observed as follows: - “82. In this case, the Development Authority sent the proposal sometime in 2006. The authorities up to the level of the Commissioner completed the exercise of 15 [2011] 8 SCR 359 : (2011) 5 SCC 553; hereinafter referred to as ‘Radhy Shyam’ [2024] 11 S.C.R. 1077Kali Charan and Others v. State of U.P. and Others survey and preparation of documents by the end of December 2006 but it took one year and almost three months for the State Government to issue notification under Section 4 read with Sections 17(1) and 17(4).
If this much time was consumed between the receipt of proposal for the acquisition of land and issue of notification, it is not possible to accept the argument that four to five weeks within which the objections could be filed under sub-section (1) of Section 5-A and the time spent by the Collector in making enquiry under sub-section (2) of Section 5-A would have defeated the object of the acquisition.”
Reliance in this regard was also placed on Dev Sharan and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others,16 wherein this Court observed as below: - “37[Ed.: Para 37 corrected vide Official Corrigendum No. F.3/Ed.B.J./16/2011 dated 16-3-2011.]. Thus the time which elapsed between publication of Section 4(1) and Section 17 notifications, and Section 6 declaration in the local newspapers is 11 months and 23 days i.e. almost one year. This slow pace at which the government machinery had functioned in processing the acquisition, clearly evinces that there was no urgency for acquiring the land so as to warrant invoking Section 17(4) of the Act.
38. In Para 15 of the writ petition, it has been clearly stated that there was a time gap of more than 11 months between Section 4 and Section 6 notifications, which demonstrates that there was no urgency in the State action which could deny the petitioners their right under Section 5-A. In the counter which was filed in this case by the State before the High Court, it was not disputed that the time gap between Section 4 notification read with Section 17, and Section 6 notification was about 11 months.”
16 [2011] 3 SCR 728 : (2011) 4 SCC 769 1078 [2024] 11 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports Learned counsel for the appellants also placed reliance on Devender Kumar Tyagi and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others,17 wherein, this Court, while dealing with a post-notification delay of almost two years, held as follows: “28. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, it is clear that this Court, vide its order dated 17-8-2004 [(2011) 12 SCC 572], has issued a direction to the respondents to relocate the bone mills and allied industries causing environment pollution and health hazards as per the recommendations of CPCB and, inter alia, the respondents were also directed to identify the area for relocation. Pursuant to this, the respondents have filed an affidavit in the month of December 2004 specifying the construction of the Leather City Project at Hapur in Ghaziabad.
Subsequently, it was only after the lapse of two years, the State Government had issued a Notification under Section 4 on 3-7-2006 and the same was published on 4-7-2006. Thereafter, the State Government took more than 17 months in order to make a declaration of the notification under Section 6 from the date of publication of the notification under Section 4 of the LA Act. In view of the above circumstances, it is crystal clear that the government functionary has proceeded at very slow pace at two levels, that is, prior to the issuance of the notification under Section 4 and post the issuance of the notification under Section 4, for acquisition of the land for construction of the Leather City Project, which undoubtedly is a public purpose.
Therefore, the above series of the events amply exhibit the lethargical and lackadaisical attitude of the State Government. In the light of the above circumstances, the respondents are not justified in invoking the urgency provisions under Section 17 of the LA Act, thereby, depriving the appellants of their valuable right to raise objections and opportunity of 17 [2011] 15 SCR 641 : (2011) 9 SCC 164 [2024] 11 S.C.R. 1079Kali Charan and Others v. State of U.P. and Others hearing before the authorities in order to persuade them that their property may not be acquired.
Further reliance was placed on the case of Darshan Lal Nagpal (Dead) by LRs. v. Government of NCT of Delhi and Others,18 wherein,this Court observed as below:
“36. It needs no emphasis that majority of the projects undertaken by the State and its agencies/ instrumentalities, the implementation of which requires public money, are meant to benefit the people at large or substantially a large segment of the society. If what the High Court has observed is treated as a correct statement of law, then in all such cases the acquiring authority will be justified in invoking Section 17 of the Act and dispense with the inquiry contemplated under Section 5-A, which would necessarily result in depriving the owner of his property without any opportunity to raise legitimate objection. However, as has been repeatedly held by this Court, the invoking of the urgency provisions can be justified only if there exists real emergency which cannot brook delay of even few weeks or months. In other words, the urgency provisions can be invoked only if even small delay of few weeks or months may frustrate the public purpose for which the land is sought to be acquired. Nobody can contest that the purpose for which the appellants’ land and land belonging to others was sought to be acquired was a public purpose but it is one thing to say that the State and its instrumentality wants to execute a project of public importance without loss of time and it is an altogether different thing to say that for execution of such project, private individuals should be deprived of their property without even being heard.”
(iv) That one of the grounds taken by the State for invoking the urgency clause was that there were chances of unauthorized 18 [2012] 2 SCR 595 : (2012) 2 SCC 327 1080 [2024] 11 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports construction/encroachments on the land subject to acquisition. This stand was questioned by placing reliance on Radhy Shyam, wherein this Court observed that it is highly unlikely that the recorded tenure holders would encroach or allow encroachments on their own land when they are admittedly in the possession of the same. The relevant extract as relied upon is quoted hereinbelow: - “83. The apprehension of the respondents that delay in the acquisition of land will lead to enormous encroachment is totally unfounded. It is beyond the comprehension of any person of ordinary prudence to think that the landowners would encroach their own land with a view to frustrate the concept of planned industrial development of the district.”
(v) That there was no material before the State Government to show the existence of any unforeseeable emergency warranting invocation of the urgency clause under Sections 17(1) and 17(4) of the Act, thereby denying the landowners of their right to file objections against acquisition of their lands.
(vi) That the lands under acquisition were to be utilized for commercial and residential purposes and such development work, would take ample time in planning and execution, thus there could have been no justification for the invocation of urgency clause. Reliance in this regard was placed on the following observations in Radhy Shyam:- “80......Even if planned industrial development of the district is treated as public purpose within the meaning of Section 4, there was no urgency which could justify the exercise of power by the State Government under Section 17(1) and 17(4). The objective of industrial development of an area cannot be achieved by pressing some buttons on the computer screen. It needs a lot of deliberations and planning keeping in view various scientific and technical parameters and environmental concerns. The private entrepreneurs, who are desirous of making investments in the State, take their own time in setting up the industrial units. Usually, the State Government and its agencies/ [2024] 11 S.C.R. 1081Kali Charan and Others v. State of U.P. and Others instrumentalities would give them two to three years to put up their factories, establishments, etc. Therefore, time required to ensure compliance with the provisions contained in Section 5A cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be portrayed as delay that will frustrate the purpose of acquisition.”
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