Khalsa University and Another v. The State of Punjab and Another
- Citation
- 2024 INSC 751; [2024] 10 S.C.R. 445
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Bhushan Ramkrishna Gavai, Justice K.V. Viswanathan
- Decided
- 3 Oct 2024
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 10999/2024
- Sections
- 5, 13A, 13, 11, 6
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:24 am. Original source ↗
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[2024] 10 S.C.R. 445 : 2024 INSC 751 Khalsa University and Another v.
The State of Punjab and Another (Civil Appeal No. 10999 of 2024)
03 October 2024 [B.R. Gavai* and K.V. Viswanathan, JJ.] Issue for Consideration The High Court dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellants inter-alia seeking a writ in the nature of certiorari praying for quashing “The Khalsa University (Repeal) Act, 2017” dated 17 th July 2017. The issues which arises for consideration are: Whether an enactment for giving out a differential treatment to a single entity is valid in law or not; whether the Impugned Act is liable to be struck down on the ground of manifest arbitrariness. Headnotes† Khalsa University (Repeal) Act, 2017 – Whether an enactment for giving out a differential treatment to a single entity is valid in law or not:
Held: It is a settled position of law that though a legislation affecting a single entity or a single undertaking or a single person would be permissible in law, it must be on the basis of reasonable classification having nexus with the object to be achieved – There should be a reasonable differentia on the basis of which a person, entity or undertaking is sought to be singled out from the rest of the group – Further, if a legislation affecting a single person, entity or undertaking is being enacted, there should be special circumstances requiring such an enactment – Such special circumstances should be gathered from the material taken into consideration by the competent legislature and shall include the Parliamentary/Legislative Debates – Also, wherever this Court has upheld the legislation affecting the single entity, institution or undertaking, it found that it was done in emergent and extreme circumstances preceded by enquiries, parliamentary debates, etc. – It was done when the legislature took into consideration the relevant material and found it expedient to do so – In the instant * Author 446 [2024] 10 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports case, the impugned Act is a single entity legislation repealing the 2016 Act by which the Khalsa University was established – The Khalsa University has specifically averred that it has been singled out by the State Government amongst 16 Universities – It has also been averred that there is absolutely no reason or justification whereby the Khalsa University could be ordered to be shut down in such a discriminatory manner – The reply filed by the respondent no.1 does not deal with the submissions made by the appellants on the ground of discrimination – No material is placed on record as to what was the compelling and emergent situation so as to enact a law which could affect the Khalsa University (appellant No.1) – No material is placed on record to show that there were any discussions prior to the Impugned Act being passed or as to what material was placed and taken into consideration by the competent legislature – Since the Khalsa University had specifically pleaded a ground regarding discrimination, it was incumbent upon the respondents to have dealt with the said challenge – Therefore, the Impugned Act singled out the Khalsa University (appellant No.1) amongst 16 private Universities in the State and no reasonable classification has been pointed out to discriminate the Khalsa University (appellant No.1) against the other private Universities – The Impugned Act therefore would be discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. [Paras 48, 53, 58, 59] Khalsa University (Repeal) Act, 2017 – Constitution of India – Art.14 – Whether the Impugned Act (Khalsa University (Repeal) Act, 2017) is liable to be struck down on the ground of manifest arbitrariness:
Held: The only reasoning given in the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Impugned Act is that the Khalsa College has, over a period of time, become a significant icon of Khalsa heritage and the University established in 2016 is likely to shadow and damage its character and pristine glory – It is to be noted that the Khalsa College which was established in 1892 is not a part of the Khalsa University – During the course of hearing, a specific statement has been made by the appellants that the Khalsa College would not be affiliated with the Khalsa University – The maps have been placed on record which show the placement of Khalsa College in the campus along with the other institutions – The perusal of the [2024] 10 S.C.R. 447Khalsa University and Another v. The State of Punjab and Another said map would clearly reveal that it is only the Khalsa College established in 1892 which is a heritage one – All other buildings have been subsequently constructed having no resemblance with the Khalsa College building – It can thus be seen that the very foundation that Khalsa University would shadow and damage the character and pristine glory of Khalsa College which has, over a period of time, become a significant icon of Khalsa heritage is on a non-existent basis – It could thus be seen that the Impugned Act, which was enacted with a purpose which was non-existent, would fall under the ambit of manifest arbitrariness and would therefore be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution – Therefore, this Court is of the considered view that the Impugned Act is also liable to be set aside on the same ground. [Paras 64, 65] Khalsa University (Repeal) Act, 2017 – Khalsa University Act, 2016 – Punjab Private Universities Policy, 2010 – Whether Khalsa University (Repeal) Act, 2017 is unconstitutional: Held: Khalsa University (Repeal) Act, 2017 is struck down as being unconstitutional – The consequent direction is also issued to the effect that the Khalsa University Act, 2016 would be deemed to be in force and status quo as it obtained on 29.05.2017 would stand restored. [Para 66(iii)] Constitution of India – Art.14 – Differential treatment to a single entity – Charanjit Lal Chowdhury v. Union of India [1950] 1 SCR 869 – discussed. [Paras 26-39] Case Law Cited Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v. Union of India [1950] 1 SCR 869 : 1950 SCC 833 : AIR 1951 SC 41; D.S. Reddy v. Chancellor, Osmania University and Others [1967] 2 SCR 214 : 1966 INSC 259; S.P. Mittal v. Union of India and Others [1983] 1 SCR 729 : (1983) 1 SCC 51 : 1982 INSC 81; Shayara Bano v. Union of India and Others (Ministry of Women and Child Development Secretary and Others [2017] 9 SCR 797 : (2017) 9 SCC 1 : 2017 INSC 785 – followed.
Chandan Banerjee and Others v. Krishna Prosad Ghosh and Others [2021] 11 SCR 720 : (2022) 15 SCC 453 : 2021 INSC 516; State of Tamil Nadu and Another v. National South Indian River Interlinking Agriculturist Association [2021] 7 SCR 479 : 448 [2024] 10 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports (2021) 15 SCC 534 : 2021 INSC 777; Dharam Dutt and Others v. Union of India and Others [2003] Supp. 6 SCR 151 : (2004) 1 SCC 712 : 2003 INSC 667; P. Venugopal v. Union of India [2008] 8 SCR 1 (2008) 5 SCC 1 : 2008 INSC 607; Natural Resources Allocation, In re, Special Reference No. 1 of 2012 [2012] 9 SCR 311 : (2012) 10 SCC 1; Ajay Hasia and Others v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi and Others [1981] 2 SCR 79 : (1981) 1 SCC 722 : 1980 INSC 218; Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice S.R. Tendolkar [1959] 1 SCR 279 : [AIR 1958 SC 538 : 1959 SCR 279]; Raja Bira Kishore Deb v. State of Orissa [1964] 7 SCR 32 – referred to. List of Acts Khalsa University (Repeal) Act, 2017; Khalsa University Act, 2016; Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Company (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1950; The Sholapur Mill Act; Companies Act; Essential Supplies Act; Osmania University (Second Amendment) Act, 1966; Auroville (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1980; Indian Council of World Affairs Act, 2001; Societies Registration Act, 1860; All-India Institute of Medical Sciences Act, 1956; Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946; Constitution of India.
List of Keywords Khalsa University (Repeal) Act, 2017; Differential treatment; Reasonable classification; reasonable differentia; Parliamentary/ Legislative Debates; Arbitrariness; Article 14 of the Constitution; Special treatment; Discriminatory character; Equal protection; Mismanagement; Maladministration.
Case Arising From CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 10999 of 2024 From the Judgment and Order dated 01.11.2017 of the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in CWP No. 17150 of 2017 Appearances for Parties P.S. Patwalia, Sr.Adv., Ashok K. Mahajan, Advs. for the Appellants. Shadan Farasat, A.A.G., Siddhant Sharma, Abhishek Babbar, Ms. Sheetal Dubey, Ravinder Agarwal, Lekh Raj Singh, Advs. for the Respondents.
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 449Khalsa University and Another v. The State of Punjab and Another Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment B.R. Gavai, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The present appeal challenges the final judgment and order dated 1st November 2017 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in C.W.P. No. 17150 of 2017 (O&M), whereby the High Court dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellants inter-alia seeking a writ in the nature of certiorari praying for quashing “The Khalsa University (Repeal) Act 2017” dated 17 th July 2017.
FACTS:
3. The facts giving rise to this appeal lie in a narrow compass. 3.1 In the year 2010, the State of Punjab framed the Punjab Private Universities Policy, 2010. 1 3.2 The Khalsa College Charitable Society, Amritsar, 2 (appellant No.2 herein), which was in existence since 1892, submitted a proposal to the State Government for setting up a self-financing University in the State of Punjab on the basis of the 2010 Policy. 3.3 On 5 th March 2011, the Higher Education Department, Government of Punjab, after examining the proposal, issued a Letter of Intent to Khalsa Society for establishing and running the Khalsa University, Amritsar. 3 3.4 On 7th November 2016, the Punjab Vidhan Sabha passed The Khalsa University Act, 2016 4 (Punjab Act No. 44 of 2016). The 2016 Act received the assent of the Hon’ble Governor of Punjab on 7th November 2016 and the same was published in the Punjab Government Gazette Extraordinary on 17 th November 2016. 1 Hereinafter referred to as the “2010 Policy”
2 Hereinafter referred to as the “Khalsa Society”
3 Hereinafter referred to as “Khalsa University”
4 Hereinafter referred to as “2016 Act”
450 [2024] 10 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports 3.5 The Khalsa University (appellant No.1 herein), after its establishment, was imparting courses in 26 programmes and 215 students were admitted for the Academic Session 2016-17. 3.6 On 18 th January 2017, the Registrar of Khalsa University communicated to the Principal Secretary, Department of Higher Education, Government of Punjab, that they have enacted the Statutes of the Khalsa University in consonance with the 2010 Policy, the 2016 Act and University Grants Commission 5 guidelines.
3.7 On 6 th April 2017, the Superintendent of Higher Education Department, Government of Punjab, communicated to Khalsa University that no admission process will be started till the Statues of the University are approved by the State Government. The same was reiterated by another communication dated 17th May 2017. 3.8 On 30 th May 2017, the State Government promulgated an Ordinance thereby repealing the 2016 Act. Shortly thereafter, the Punjab Vidhan Sabha passed The Khalsa University (Repeal) Act 2017. 6 The Impugned Act received assent of the Hon’ble Governor on 4 th July 2017 and the same was published in the Punjab Government Gazette Extraordinary on 17th July 2017. 3.9 Aggrieved by the communications dated 6 th April 2017 and 17 th May 2017, the promulgation of the Ordinance and passing of the Impugned Act, the Khalsa University and Khalsa Society (hereinafter referred to as “appellants”) filed a Writ Petition being C.W.P. No. 17150 of 2017 (O&M) before the Punjab and Haryana High Court.
3.10 Vide final judgment and order dated 1 st November 2017, the High Court dismissed the Writ Petition filed by the appellants. Being aggrieved thereby, the present appeal arises.
SUBMISSIONS:
4. We have heard Shri P.S. Patwalia, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants and Shri Shadan Farasat, learned 5 Hereinafter referred to as “UGC”
6 Hereinafter referred to as the “Impugned Act”
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 451Khalsa University and Another v. The State of Punjab and Another Additional Advocate General (AAG) appearing on behalf of the respondents.
5. Shri Patwalia, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants submits that the Impugned Act is patently arbitrary, mala fide, discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
6. Shri Patwalia submits that the mala fides in passing of the Impugned Act are apparent inasmuch as the statements made by Captain Amarinder Singh, who at the relevant time was in the opposition, would clearly show that he was opposed to the establishment of the Khalsa University. It is submitted that Captain Amarinder Singh had made public statements that he was “touchy” about the Khalsa College, that he would not permit the ruling party to tinker with the status of the same and that, after he comes to power, he will reverse the decision. It is submitted that immediately after Captain Amarinder Singh became the Chief Minister of Punjab in 2017, an Ordinance was promulgated repealing the 2016 Act, and shortly thereafter, the said Ordinance got the imprimatur of the legislature by the passing of the Impugned Act dated 17 th July 2017.
7. Shri Patwalia further submitted that the State of Punjab had come up with the 2010 Policy and under the said Policy, 16 Universities were established, however, it was only the Khalsa University which was picked up and abolished. He submitted that picking up a single University out of 16 Universities which were established as per the 2010 Policy is patently arbitrary, discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.
8. Shri Patwalia further submitted that the Impugned Act is passed on a non-existent factual matrix. He submitted that the Statement of Objects and Reasons 7 of the Impugned Act shows that the only reason for passing it is to “protect the heritage character of Khalsa College”. He submitted that the SOR shows that the Impugned Act was passed on the basis that the Khalsa College has, over a period of time, become a significant icon of Khalsa Heritage and the Khalsa University established in 2016 was likely to shadow and damage its character and pristine glory. He submitted that the Khalsa College 7 Hereinafter referred to as “SOR”
452 [2024] 10 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports was established in 1892 and the appellants had clearly given an undertaking that the establishment of the Khalsa University would not touch the Khalsa College. He submitted that the Khalsa Society comprises of various other establishments apart from Khalsa College and that the Khalsa University was established to provide affiliation for only three colleges namely Khalsa College of Pharmacy, Khalsa College of Education and Khalsa College for Women. He submits that all the three institutions were started after more than half a century of establishment of Khalsa College. It is submitted that Khalsa University (appellant No.1) had also planned/established various other colleges or institutions which would be affiliated to it, however, the same was to be done without in any way affecting the Khalsa College. As such, it is submitted that the reasoning given in the SOR that the Impugned Act was being passed only to protect the heritage character of Khalsa College is formed on a factually erroneous matrix.
9. Shri Patwalia further submitted that the Impugned Act was patently arbitrary, discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. It is submitted that the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of Shayara Bano v. Union of India and Others (Ministry of Women and Child Development Secretary and Others) 8 has held that the ground of manifest arbitrariness is also available for examining the validity of a legislation. It is submitted that if it is found that the legislative enactment is not based on an intelligible differentia, then such a classification would not be permissible and the enactment would be liable to be struck down on the ground of manifest arbitrariness.
10. Per contra, Shri Farasat, learned AAG appearing on behalf of the respondents submits that a reasonable classification having a nexus with the object to be achieved is permissible under Article 14 of the Constitution. He submits that merely because Khalsa University (appellant No.1) has been singled out as against the other Universities established under the 2010 Policy cannot be a ground for holding the Impugned Act to be invalid.
11. The learned AAG submits that there is a presumption with regard to the validity of a legislative action. He submits that the burden with 8 [2017] 9 SCR 797 : (2017) 9 SCC 1 : 2017 INSC 785 [2024] 10 S.C.R. 453Khalsa University and Another v. The State of Punjab and Another regard to invalidity is on the person who challenges it. It is submitted that the classification is based on the fact that the Khalsa College had, over a period of century, received a heritage status. The name “Khalsa” was identified with the Khalsa College. He submitted that the establishment of Khalsa University tinkered with the heritage status of Khalsa College.
12. The learned AAG further submitted that the Khalsa University and the Khalsa College have been established in the same premises and therefore there is a possibility of confusion being caused in the minds of a general observer. He further submitted that it was, over a period of time, the Khalsa College had earned a huge reputation and was playing a leading role in Punjabi socio-religious society. It is submitted that the establishment of a private University could diminish its nature. It is submitted that there was further a possibility that Khalsa Society (appellant No.2) would allocate greater attention and resources to the private university and neglect Khalsa College which has a historic value. To buttress his submissions, he relies on the judgments of this Court in the cases of Chandan Banerjee and Others v. Krishna Prosad Ghosh and Others9 and State of Tamil Nadu and Another v. National South Indian River Interlinking Agriculturist Association.10
13. Shri Farasat further submitted that the appellants had no vested right in their status as a University. It is submitted that shortly after the 2016 Act was enacted, the Impugned Act came to be enacted. During that short period, a few students were admitted, however, the Impugned Act also took care of the said students inasmuch as the colleges where they were studying were affiliated with the other Universities. He therefore submits that there is no merit in the appeal and the appeal deserves to be dismissed.
CONSIDERATION:
14. The facts in the present case are not in dispute. The Government of Punjab, Department of Higher Education had come up with the 2010 Policy. The 2010 Policy was framed in order to attract high quality private sector investment and expertise in the realm of higher 9 [2021] 11 SCR 720 : (2022) 15 SCC 453 : 2021 INSC 516 10 [2021] 7 SCR 479 : (2021) 15 SCC 534 : 2021 INSC 777 454 [2024] 10 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports education and provides for establishment and incorporation of private self-financed Universities in the State of Punjab. By the 2010 Policy, it was decided to permit establishment of self-financed universities which shall not receive any grant or aid from the State Government. However, it provided for laying down a rationale proposal and welldefined conditions for the establishment of such universities in order to safeguard the interest of the stakeholders, ex-students, staff members and genuine promoters.
15. In furtherance of the 2010 Policy, Khalsa Society (appellant No.2) applied to the State Government for establishing Khalsa University. The State Government vide communication dated 5 th March 2011 issued Letter of Intent to the Khalsa Society on various conditions mentioned therein.
16. Subsequently, the 2016 Act came to be enacted on 7 th November 2016. It will be relevant to refer to the SOR of the 2016 Act, which read thus:
“STATEMENT OF OBJECTS AND REASONS As the Punjab Private Universities Policy - 2010 has been formulated to provide greater access and to ensure quality in higher education, the Government of Punjab wishes to allow the establishment of self financed private universities to supplement the efforts of the State Universities. The object of the Khalsa University is to impart comprehensive education at all levels to achieve excellence and to promote research and teaching in areas of Education, Engineering and Technology, Languages, Laws, Life Sciences and other courses under the general heads of the Arts and Humanities, Social Sciences etc.
2. As the establishment of such private self financed universities requires a broadly uniform set of guidelines for ensuring academic standards, prevention of commercialization and mismanagement etc., it deemed, therefore, expedient to provide for promulgation of ‘The Khalsa University Bill- 2016.”
17. Subsequent to the enactment of the 2016 Act, Khalsa University (appellant No.1) received a communication dated 15 th February 2017 from the UGC informing it that, in view of its establishment, its name [2024] 10 S.C.R. 455Khalsa University and Another v. The State of Punjab and Another has been included in the list maintained by the UGC. It was also informed to it that it was required to follow the UGC (Establishment of and Maintenance of Standards in Private Universities) Regulations, 2003.
18. It appears that thereafter there was a change of regime in the Government of Punjab. It further appears that from April, 2017 onwards, Khalsa University started receiving communications that it should not admit any more students till the Statutes of the University were approved by the State Government.
19. Thereafter on 30 th May 2017, the State Government promulgated an Ordinance thereby repealing the 2016 Act. The Impugned Act came to be passed by Punjab Vidhan Sabha, which received the assent of the Hon’ble Governor on 4 th July 2017 and published in the Punjab Government Gazette (Extraordinary) on 17 th July 2017.
20. The SOR of the Impugned Act read thus:
“STATEMENT OF OBJECTS AND REASONS The Khalsa University (Repeal) Ordinance, 2017 aims to repeal the Khalsa University Act, 2016 with a view to protect heritage character of Khalsa College, Amritsar. The Khalsa College, Amritsar has, over a period of time, become a significant icon of Khalsa Heritage and the University established in 2016 is likely to shadow and damage its character and pristine glory. Therefore, the Act ibid is proposed to be repealed.”
21. The Impugned Act, which consists of three sections, reads thus: “Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Punjab in the Sixty-eight year of the Republic of India as follows: -
1. (1) This Act may be called the Khalsa University (Repeal) Act, 2017.
(2) It shall be deemed to have come into force with effect from the 30th day of May, 2017.
2. The Khalsa University Act, 2016 (Punjab Act No.44 of 2016), is hereby repealed: - Provided that admission to the affected students shall be given in other appropriate educational institutions of the 456 [2024] 10 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports State of Punjab as per their eligibility, so that the interests of the students are not prejudicially affected.
3. The Khalsa University (Repeal) Ordinance, 2017 (Punjab Ordinance No. l of 2017), is also hereby repealed.”
22. It is thus clear that by the 2016 Act under the 2010 Policy of the State Government, Khalsa University was established as one of the private universities. The Impugned Act has been enacted with the sole purpose of repealing the 2016 Act by which the Khalsa University was established. It is also clear that the Impugned Act deals with only a single entity/institution i.e. the Khalsa University.
23. At the outset, we clarify that we do not propose to go into the question with regard to the allegation of mala fides attributed to any individual involved in the passing of the Impugned Act. In fact, the former Chief Minister of Punjab Captain Amarinder Singh was arrayed as respondent No.2 in the present appeal, however, by an order dated 8th August 2018, the name of Captain Amarinder Singh was deleted. Be that as it may, for the purpose of the present appeal, we propose to examine only two questions.
24. The first question is, whether an enactment for giving out a differential treatment to a single entity is valid in law or not and secondly, whether the Impugned Act is liable to be struck down on the ground of manifest arbitrariness.
A. Whether an enactment for giving out a differential treatment to a single entity is valid in law or not?
25. For considering the first issue, we propose to examine certain landmark judgments of this Court on the issue.
26. In the case of Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v. The Union of India and Others,11 the Constitution Bench of this Court was faced with a situation where the Governor General of India had promulgated an Ordinance on the basis of a finding that, on account of mismanagement and neglect, a situation had arisen concerning the affairs of the Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Company Ltd. 12 which had not only prejudicially affected the production of an essential commodity but 11 [1950] 1 SCR 869 : 1950 INSC 36 12 Hereinafter referred to as “Sholapur Mill”
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 457Khalsa University and Another v. The State of Punjab and Another also had caused serious unemployment amongst a certain section of the community. On account of such an emergency, a situation had arisen which rendered it necessary to make a special provision for the proper management and administration of the Sholapur Mill. The aforesaid Ordinance was subsequently re-enacted in the form of an Act of the Legislature called the Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Company (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1950.13 The net result of the Sholapur Mill Act was that the Managing Agents of the Sholapur Mill were dismissed and the Directors holding the office automatically vacated their office.
27. The Sholapur Mill Act was challenged on various grounds. One of the grounds was that since the application of the said Act was found to affect only one person, it was, therefore, plainly discriminatory in character and within the constitutional inhibition of Article 14 of the Constitution. The said ground was rejected by the Constitution Bench by a majority of 3:2.
28. One of the arguments that was made before this Court was that there would be other companies wherein similar allegations of mismanagement and neglect would be available. It was sought to be argued that the provisions of the Companies Act were sufficient to deal with the said situation. However, the passing of an enactment whereby the Sholapur Mill was singled out for giving a “special treatment” was not permissible under Article 14 of the Constitution. While rejecting the said contention, Saiyid Fazl Ali, J. (one of the Judges forming part of the majority) observed thus:
“…….The Government of India, as a matter of precaution and lest it should be said that they were going to interfere unnecessarily in the affairs of the Company and were not allowing the existing provisions of the law to take their own course, consulted other interests and placed the matter before the Standing Committee of the Industrial Advisory Council where a large number of leading industrialists of the country were present, and ultimately it was realised that this was a case where the Government could rightly and properly intervene and there would be no occasion for any criticism coming from any quarter. It appears 13 Hereinafter referred to as “Sholapur Mill Act”.
458 [2024] 10 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports from the discussion on the floor of the House that the total number of weaving and spinning mills which were closed down for one reason or the other was about 35 in number. Some of them are said to have closed for want of cotton, some due to overstocks, some for want of capital and some on account of mismanagement. The Minister for Industry, who sponsored the Bill, in explaining what distinguished the case of Sholapur Mill from the other mills against whom there might be charges of mismanagement, made it clear in the course of the debate that “certain conditions had to be fulfilled before the Government can and should intervene”, and he set out these conditions as follows:
(1) The undertaking must relate to an industry which is of national importance. Not each and every undertaking which may have to close down can be taken charge of temporarily by the Government.
(2) The undertaking must be an economic unit.
If it appears that it is completely uneconomic and cannot be managed at all, there is no sense in the Government taking charge of it. If anything, it will mean the Government will have to waste money which belongs to the taxpayer on an uneconomic unit.
(3) There must be a technical report as regards the condition of the plants, machinery, etc., which either as they stand, or after necessary repairs and reconditioning can be properly utilised.
(4) Lastly, and this is of considerable importance, there must be a proper enquiry held before the Government takes any action. The enquiry should show that managing agents have so misbehaved that they are no longer fit and proper persons to remain in charge of such an important undertaking.
[Parliamentary Debates, Vol. III, No. 14, 31- 3-1950 at pp. 2394-95] [2024] 10 S.C.R. 459Khalsa University and Another v. The State of Punjab and Another It appears from the same proceedings that Sholapur Mill is one of the largest mills in Asia and employs 13,000 workers. Per shift, it is capable of producing 25 to 30 thousand pounds of yarn, and also one lakh yards of cloth. It was working two shifts when it was closed down on 29-8-1949. The closure of the Mill meant a loss of 25 lakhs yards of cloth and one-anda-half lakhs pounds of yarn per month. Prior to 1947, the highest dividend paid by the Company was Rs 525 per share and the lowest Rs 100, and, in 1948, when the management was taken over by the managing agents who have been removed by the impugned Act, the accounts showed a loss of Rs 30 lakhs, while other textile companies had been able to show very substantial profits during the same period.
Another fact which is brought out in the proceedings is that the managing agents had acquired control over the majority of the shares of the Company and a large number of shareholders who were dissatisfied with the management had been rendered powerless and they could not make their voice heard. By reason of the preponderance of their strength, the managing agents made it impossible for a Controller under the Essential Supplies Act to function and they also made it difficult for the Company to run smoothly under the normal law.
It was against this background that the Act was passed, and it is evident that the facts which were placed before the legislature with regard to Sholapur Mill were of an extraordinary character, and fully justified the Company being treated as a class by itself. There were undoubtedly other mills which were open to the charge of mismanagement, but the criteria adopted by the Government which, in my opinion, cannot be said to be arbitrary or unreasonable, is not applicable to any of them. As we have seen, one of the criteria was that a mere allegation of mismanagement should not be enough and no drastic step such as is envisaged in the Act should be taken without there being a complete 460 [2024] 10 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports enquiry. In the case of Sholapur Mill, a complete enquiry had been made and the revelations which were made as a result of such enquiry were startling.” [emphasis supplied]
29. It can thus be seen that Fazl Ali, J. found that before the Act was passed, the matter was placed before the Standing Committee of the Industrial Advisory Council where a large number of leading industrialists of the country were present. It was ultimately realized that, that was a case where the Government could rightly and properly intervene. It was further found that when the matter was discussed on the floor of the House, it emerged that there were about 35 weaving and spinning mills which were closed for one reason or the other. Some of them were closed for want of cotton, some due to overstock, some for want of capital and some on account of mismanagement. However, while singling out the Sholapur Mill, the Parliament had taken into consideration various factors. One of them was that the undertaking was related to an industry which was of national importance. It was found that the Sholapur Mill was one of the largest mills in Asia and employed 13,000 workers. Another factor was that it was an economic unit and was working in two shifts before it was closed down. It was further found that prior to 1947, the highest dividend paid by the Company was Rs. 525/- per share and the lowest was Rs. 100/-. It was further noticed that only when the management was taken over by the Managing Agents, Sholapur Mill started showing losses. It was further found that the Managing Agents had acquired the control over the majority of the shares of the Sholapur Mill and a large number of shareholders who were dissatisfied with the management had been rendered powerless. It was further found that, by reason of the preponderance of their strength, the managing Agents made it impossible for a Controller under the Essential Supplies Act to function. In the totality of the circumstances, the Court found that a situation of an extraordinary character had arisen which fully justified the Sholapur Mill being treated as a class by itself. It was further found that though the other companies were also open to the charge of mismanagement, however, the criterion made applicable by the Government to Sholapur Mill for singling out could not be said to be arbitrary or unreasonable. It could further be noticed that 4 reasons were given by the Government for singling out the Sholapur Mill.
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 461Khalsa University and Another v. The State of Punjab and Another
30. It will also be pertinent to note the observations made by Mukherjea, J. (who again formed a part of the majority) in the said judgment, which read thus:
“It must be admitted that the guarantee against the denial of equal protection of the laws does not mean that identically the same rules of law should be made applicable to all persons within the territory of India in spite of differences of circumstances and conditions.
As has been said by the Supreme Court of America, “equal protection of laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws [Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 30 L Ed 220 : 118 US 356 at p. 369 (1886) : 1886 SCC OnLine US SC 188] ” (L Ed p.
226), and this means “subjection to equal laws applying alike to all in the same situation [Southern Railway Co. v. Greene, 54 L Ed 536 : 216 US 400 at p. 412 (1910) : 1910 SCC OnLine US SC 59] ” (L Ed p. 539). In other words, there should be no discrimination between one person and another if as regards the subject-matter of the legislation their position is the same. I am unable to accept the argument of Mr Chari that a legislation relating to one individual or one family or one body corporate would per se violate the guarantee of the equal protection rule. There can certainly be a law applying to one person or to one group of persons and it cannot be held to be unconstitutional if it is not discriminatory in its character [ Willis : Constitutional Law at p. 580.] . It would be bad law: “if it arbitrarily selects one individual or a class of individuals, one corporation or a class of corporations, and visits a penalty upon them which is not imposed upon others guilty of like delinquency [Gulf, Colorado and Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Ellis, 41 L Ed 666 : 165 US 150 at 159 (1897) : 1897 SCC OnLine US SC 20] ….” (L Ed p. 669 : US p. 159) The legislature undoubtedly has a wide field of choice in determining and classifying the subject of its laws, and if the law deals alike with all of a certain class, it is normally not obnoxious to the charge of denial of equal protection; but the classification should never be arbitrary. It must always rest upon some real and substantial 462 [2024] 10 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports distinction bearing a reasonable and just relation to the things in respect to which the classification is made; and classification made without any substantial basis should be regarded as invalid [Southern Railway Co. v. Greene, 54 L Ed 536 : 216 US 400 at p. 412 (1910) : 1910 SCC OnLine US SC 59].
The question is whether judged by this test the impugned Act can be said to have contravened the provision embodied in Article 14 of the Constitution. Obviously, the Act purports to make provisions which are of a drastic character and against the general law of the land as laid down in the Indian Companies Act, in regard to the administration and management of the affairs of one Company in Indian territory. The Act itself gives no reason for the legislation but the Ordinance, which was a precursor of the Act, expressly stated why the legislation was necessary. It said that owing to mismanagement and neglect, a situation had arisen in the affairs of the Company which prejudicially affected the production of an essential commodity and caused serious unemployment amongst a certain section of the community. Mr Chari’s contention in substance is that there are various textile companies in India situated in a similar manner as Sholapur Company, against which the same charges could be brought and for the control and regulation of which all the reasons that are mentioned in the Preamble to the Ordinance could be applied. Yet, it is said, the legislation has been passed with regard to this one Company alone. The argument seems plausible at first sight, but on a closer examination I do not think that I can accept it as sound. It must be conceded that the legislature has a wide discretion in determining the subject-matter of its laws. It is an accepted doctrine of the American courts and which seems to me to be well founded on principle, that the presumption is in favour of the constitutionality of an enactment and the burden is upon him who attacks it to show that there has been a transgression of constitutional principles. As was said by the Supreme Court of America in Middleton v.
Texas Power and Light Co. [Middleton v. Texas Power [2024] 10 S.C.R. 463Khalsa University and Another v. The State of Punjab and Another and Light Co., 63 L Ed 527 : 249 US 152, 157 (1919) :
1919 SCC OnLine US SC 50] : (L Ed p. 531) “… [It must be presumed] that a legislature understands and correctly appreciates the needs of its own people, that its laws are directed to problems made manifest by experience and that its discriminations are based upon adequate grounds.” (US p. 157) This being the position, it is for the petitioner to establish facts which would prove that the selection of this particular subject by the legislature is unreasonable and based upon arbitrary grounds. No allegations were made in the petition and no materials were placed before us to show as to whether there are other companies in India which come precisely under the same category as Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Company and the reasons for imposing control upon the latter as mentioned in the Preamble to the Ordinance are applicable to them as well. Mr Chari argues that these are matters of common knowledge of which we should take judicial notice. I do not think that this is the correct line of approach. It is quite true that the legislature has, in this instance, proceeded against one company only and its shareholders; but even one corporation or a group of persons can be taken as a class by itself for the purpose of legislation, provided it exhibits some exceptional features which are not possessed by others. The courts should prima facie lean in favour of constitutionality and should support the legislation if it is possible to do so on any reasonable ground, and it is for the party who attacks the validity of the legislation to place all materials before the court which would go to show that the selection is arbitrary and unsupportable. Throwing out of vague hints that there may be other instances of similar nature is not enough for this purpose. We should bear in mind that a corporation, which is engaged in production of a commodity vitally essential to the community, has a social character of its own, and it must not be regarded as the concern primarily or only of those who invest their money in it. If its possibilities are large and it had a 464 [2024] 10 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports prosperous and useful career for a long period of time and is about to collapse not for any economic reason but through sheer perversity of the controlling authority, one cannot say that the legislature has no authority to treat it as a class by itself and make special legislation applicable to it alone in the interests of the community at large. The combination of circumstances which are present here may be of such unique character as could not be existing in any other institution. But all these, I must say, are matters which require investigation on proper materials which we have not got before us in the present case. In these circumstances I am constrained to hold that the present application must fail on the simple ground that the petitioner made no attempt to discharge the prima facie burden that lay upon him and did not place before us the materials upon which a proper decision on the point could be arrived at. In my opinion, therefore, the attack on the legislation on the ground of the denial of equal protection of law cannot succeed. We have not even before us any statement on oath by the petitioner that what has been alleged against this particular Company may be said against other companies as well. If there was any such statement, the respondents could have placed before us the whole string of events that led up to the passing of this legislation. If we are to take judicial notice of the existence of similar other badly managed companies, we must take notice also of the facts which appear in the parliamentary proceedings in connection with this legislation which have been referred to by my learned Brother, Fazl Ali, J. in his judgment and which would go to establish that the facts connected with this corporation are indeed exceptional and the discrimination that has been made can be supported on just and reasonable grounds. I purposely refrain from alluding to these facts or basing my decision thereon as we had no opportunity of investigating them properly during the course of the hearing. As matters stand, no proper materials have been placed before us by either [2024] 10 S.C.R. 465Khalsa University and Another v. The State of Punjab and Another side and as I am unable to say that the legislature cannot be supported on any reasonable ground, I think it to be extremely risky to overthrow it on mere suspicion or vague conjectures. If it is possible to imagine or think of cases of other companies where similar or identical conditions might prevail, it is also not impossible to conceive of something “peculiar” or “unusual” to this corporation which led the legislature to intervene in its affairs. As has been laid down by the Supreme Court of America, “The Legislature is free to recognise degrees of harm and it may confine its restrictions to those classes of cases where the need is deemed to be the clearest [Radice v. New York, 68 L Ed 690 : 264 US 292 (1924) : 1924 SCC OnLine US SC 62] .” (L Ed p. 695). We should bear in mind that a corporation, which is engaged in production of a commodity vitally essential to the community, has a social character of its own, and it must not be regarded as the concern primarily or only of those who invest their money in it. If its possibilities are large and it had a prosperous and useful career for a long period of time and is about to collapse not for any economic reason but through sheer perversity of the controlling authority, one cannot say that the legislature has no authority to treat it as a class by itself and make special legislation applicable to it alone in the interests of the community at large. The combination of circumstances which are present here may be of such unique character as could not be existing in any other institution. But all these, I must say, are matters which require investigation on proper materials which we have not got before us in the present case. In these circumstances I am constrained to hold that the present application must fail on the simple ground that the petitioner made no attempt to discharge the prima facie burden that lay upon him and did not place before us the materials upon which a proper decision on the point could be arrived at. In my opinion, therefore, the attack on the legislation on the ground of the denial of equal protection of law cannot succeed.”
[emphasis supplied] 466 [2024] 10 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports
31. It can be seen that His Lordship rejected the arguments that the legislation relating to one individual or one family or one body corporate would violate the guarantee of the equal protection rule. His Lordship further held that there can be certainly a law applying to one person or to one group of persons and it cannot be held to be unconstitutional if it is not discriminatory in its character. However, it would be bad law if it arbitrarily selects one individual or a class of individuals, one corporation or a class of corporations, and visits a penalty upon them which is not imposed upon others guilty of like delinquency. The contention of the appellants therein as recorded by His Lordship was that there were various textile companies in India situated in a similar manner as the Sholapur Mill, but the legislation was passed only with regard to one Company i.e. the Sholapur Mill. While dealing with the said contention, His Lordship observed that neither any allegations were made in the petition nor any materials were placed before the Court to show as to whether there were other companies in India which came precisely under the same category as that of Sholapur Mill. His Lordship found that the legislature can enact a law in respect of one undertaking or a group of persons by treating them as a class by itself provided it exhibits some exceptional features which are not possessed by others. His Lordship further observed that the courts should prima facie lean in favour of constitutionality and support the legislation if it is possible to do so on any reasonable ground. It has been held that it is for the party who attacks the validity of the legislation to place all materials before the court which would go to show that the selection was arbitrary and unsupportable. His Lordship specifically noticed that leave aside placing any material on record, there was not even any allegation/statement placed on record by the petitioner therein.
32. Patanjali Sastri and Das, JJ. disagreed with the majority in the said case. Sastri, J. observed thus:
“It is obvious that the legislation is directed solely against a particular Company and shareholders and not against any class or category of companies and no question, therefore, of reasonable legislative classification arises. If a law is made applicable to a class of persons or things and the classification is based upon differentia having a rational relation to the object sought to be attained, it can be no objection to [2024] 10 S.C.R. 467Khalsa University and Another v. The State of Punjab and Another its constitutional validity that its application is found to affect only one person or thing. For instance, a law may be passed imposing certain restrictions and burdens on joint stock companies with a share capital of, say, Rs 10 crores and upwards, and it may be found that there is only one such Company for the time being to which the law could be applied. If other such companies are brought into existence in future the law would apply to them also, and no discrimination would thus be involved. But the impugned Act, which selects this particular Company and imposes upon it and its shareholders burdens and disabilities on the ground of mismanagement and neglect of duty on the part of those charged with the conduct of its undertaking, is plainly discriminatory in character and is, in my judgment, within the constitutional inhibition of Article 14. Legislation based upon mismanagement or other misconduct as the differentia and made applicable to a specified individual or corporate body is not far removed from the notorious parliamentary procedure formerly employed in Britain of punishing individual delinquents by passing bills of attainder, and should not, I think, receive judicial encouragement.
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