Kaushal Kishor v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.
- Citation
- 2023 INSC 4; [2023] 8 S.C.R. 581
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 5 Judges: Justice S. Abdul Nazeer, Justice Bhushan Ramkrishna Gavai, Justice A.S. Bopanna, Justice V. Ramasubramanian, Justice Exhaustive
- Decided
- 3 Jan 2023
- Case number
- WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) No. 113/2016
- Sections
- 1, 254, 568, 154, 499, 6(1), 9(4), 9, 7(1), 3(1), 15(2), 8
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A B C D E F G H
KAUSHAL KISHOR
v.
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.
(Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 113 of 2016)
JANUARY 03, 2023
[S. ABDUL NAZEER, B. R. GAVAI, A. S. BOPANNA, V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN AND B. V. NAGARATHNA, JJ.] Constitution of India – Arts. 19(1)(a) and 19(2) – Are the grounds specified in Article 19(2) in relation to which reasonable restrictions on the right to free speech can be imposed by law, exhaustive, or can restrictions on the right to free speech be imposed on grounds not found in Article 19(2) by invoking other fundamental rights – Held: The grounds lined up in Art.19(2) for restricting the right to free speech are exhaustive – Under the guise of invoking other fundamental rights or under the guise of two fundamental rights staking a competing claim against each other, additional restrictions not found in Article 19(2), cannot be imposed on the exercise of the right conferred by Article 19(1)(a) upon any individual.
Constitution of India – Arts. 19 and 21 – Can a fundamental right under Article 19 or 21 be claimed other than against the ‘State’ or its instrumentalities – Held (per V. Ramasubramanian, J.) (for S. Abdul Nazeer, B.R. Gavai and A.S. Bopanna, JJ., and himself): A fundamental right under Article 19/21 can be enforced even against persons other than the State or its instrumentalities – Held (per B.V. Nagarathna, J.): The rights in the realm of common law, which may be similar or identical in their content to the Fundamental Rights under Article 19/21, operate horizontally – However, the Fundamental Rights under Arts. 19 and 21, may not be justiciable horizontally before the Constitutional Courts except those rights which have been statutorily recognised and in accordance with the applicable law – However, they may be the basis for seeking common law remedies – But a remedy in the form of writ of Habeas Corpus, if sought against a private person on the basis of Article 21 can be before a Constitutional Court i.e., by way of Article 226 before the High Court or Article 32 read with Article 142 before the Supreme Court.
[2023] 8 S.C.R. 581 A B C D E F G H 582 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 8 S.C.R.
Constitution of India – Art. 21 – Whether the State is under a duty to affirmatively protect the rights of a citizen under Art.21 even against a threat to the liberty of a citizen by the acts or omissions of another citizen or private agency – Held (per V.
Ramasubramanian, J.) (for S. Abdul Nazeer, B.R. Gavai and A.S. Bopanna, JJ., and himself): The State is under a duty to affirmatively protect the rights of a person under Article 21, whenever there is a threat to personal liberty, even by a non-State actor – Held (per B.V. Nagarathna, J.): The duty cast upon the State under Article 21 is a negative duty not to deprive a person of his life and personal liberty except in accordance with law – The State has an affirmative duty to carry out obligations cast upon it under statutory and constitutional law, which are based on the Fundamental Right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution – Such obligations may require interference by the State where acts of a private actor may threaten the life or liberty of another individual –Failure to carry out the duties enjoined upon the State under statutory law to protect the rights of a citizen, could have the effect of depriving a citizen of his right to life and personal liberty – When a citizen is so deprived of his right to life and personal liberties, the State would have breached the negative duty cast upon it under Art.21. Doctrines / Principles – Principle of Collective Responsibility – Can a statement made by a Minister, traceable to any affairs of State or for protecting the Government, be attributed vicariously to the Government itself, especially in view of the principle of Collective Responsibility – Held (per V. Ramasubramanian, J.) (for S. Abdul Nazeer, B.R. Gavai and A.S. Bopanna, JJ., and himself) : A statement made by a Minister even if traceable to any affairs of the State or for protecting the Government, cannot be attributed vicariously to the Government by invoking the principle of collective responsibility – Held (per B.V. Nagarathna, J.): A statement made by a Minister if traceable to any affairs of the State or for protecting the Government, can be attributed vicariously to the Government by invoking the principle of collective responsibility, so long as such statement represents the view of the Government also – If such a statement is not consistent with the view of the Government, then it is attributable to the Minister personally.
A B C D E F G H Tort – Constitutional Tort – Whether a statement by a Minister, inconsistent with the rights of a citizen under Part III of the Constitution, constitutes a violation of such constitutional rights and is actionable as ‘Constitutional Tort” – Held (per V. Ramasubramanian, J.) (for S. Abdul Nazeer, B.R. Gavai and A.S. Bopanna, JJ., and himself) : A mere statement made by a Minister, inconsistent with the rights of a citizen under Part III of the Constitution, may not constitute a violation of the constitutional rights and become actionable as Constitutional tort – But if as a consequence of such a statement, any act of omission or commission is done by the officers resulting in harm or loss to a person/citizen, then the same may be actionable as a constitutional tort – Held (Per B.V. Nagarathna, J.): A proper legal framework is necessary to define the acts or omissions which would amount to constitutional tort and the manner in which the same would be redressed or remedied on the basis of judicial precedent.
Answering the Reference, the Court Per V. Ramasubramanian, J. (For S. Abdul Nazeer, B.R.
Gavai, and A.S. Bopanna, JJ. and himself) (Majority opinion) HELD: 1. The restrictions under clause (2) of Article 19 are comprehensive enough to cover all possible attacks on the individual, groups/classes of people, the society, the court, the country and the State. This is why this Court repeatedly held that any restriction which does not fall within the four corners of Article 19(2) will be unconstitutional. [Para 28][635-E-F]
2. That the Executive cannot transgress its limits by imposing an additional restriction in the form of Executive or Departmental instruction was emphasised by this Court in Bijoe Emmanuel vs. State of Kerala. The Court made it clear that the reasonable restrictions sought to be imposed must be through “a law” having statutory force and not a mere Executive or Departmental instruction. The restraint upon the Executive not to have a back-door intrusion applies equally to Courts. While Courts may be entitled to interpret the law in such a manner that the rights existing in blue print have expansive connotations, the Court cannot impose additional restrictions by using tools of interpretation. [Para 29][635-H; 636-A-B] KAUSHAL KISHOR v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.
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3. Since the eight heads of restrictions contained in clause
(2) of Article 19 seek to protect: (i) the individual – against the infringement of his dignity, reputation, bodily autonomy and property; (ii) different sections of society professing and practicing, different religious beliefs/sentiments - against offending their beliefs and sentiments; (iii) classes/groups of citizens belonging to different races, linguistic identities etc.against an attack on their identities; (iv) women and children – against the violation of their special rights; (v) the State - against the breach of its security; (vi) the country - against an attack on its sovereignty and integrity; (vii) the Court – against an attempt to undermine its authority, and therefore the restrictions contained in clause (2) of Article 19 are exhaustive and no further restriction need to be incorporated. [Para 32][639-D-G]
4. In any event, the law imposing any restriction in terms of clause (2) of Article 19 can only be made by the State and not by the Court. The role envisaged in the Constitutional scheme for the Court, is to be a gate-keeper (and a conscience keeper) to check strictly the entry of restrictions, into the temple of fundamental rights. The role of the Court is to protect fundamental rights limited by lawful restrictions and not to protect restrictions and make the rights residual privileges. Clause (2) of Article 19 saves (i) the operation of any existing law; and (ii) the making of any law by the State. Therefore, it is not for the court to add one or more restrictions than what is already found. [Para 33][639-H; 640-A-B]
5. The exercise of all fundamental rights by all citizens is possible only when each individual respects the other person’s rights. This Court has always struck a balance whenever it was found that the exercise of fundamental rights by an individual, caused inroads into the space available for the exercise of fundamental rights by another individual. The emphasis even in the Preamble on “fraternity” is an indication that the survival of all fundamental rights and the survival of democracy itself depends upon mutual respect, accommodation and willingness to co-exist in peace and tranquility on the part of the citizens. The Fundamental Duty enjoined upon every citizen of the country under Article 51-A(e) to “promote harmony and the spirit of A B C D E F G H common brotherhood amongst all the people of India transcending religious, linguistic and regional or sectional diversities and to renounce practices derogatory to the dignity of women”, is also an indicator that no one can exercise his fundamental right in a manner that infringes upon the fundamental right of another. [Para 40][640-B-E]
6. The grounds lined up in Article 19(2) for restricting the right to free speech are exhaustive. Under the guise of invoking other fundamental rights or under the guise of two fundamental rights staking a competing claim against each other, additional restrictions not found in Article 19(2), cannot be imposed on the exercise of the right conferred by Article 19(1)(a) upon any individual. [Para 45][652-B-D]
7. Wherever Constitutional rights regulate and impact only the conduct of the Government and Governmental actors, in their dealings with private individuals, they are said to have “a vertical effect”. But wherever Constitutional rights impact even the relations between private individuals, they are said to have “a horizontal effect”. [Para 47][652-E-F]
8. After defining the expression “the State” in Article 12 and after declaring all laws inconsistent with or in derogation of the fundamental rights to be void under Article 13, Part -III of the Constitution proceeds to deal with rights. There are some Articles in Part- III where the mandate is directly to the State and there are other Articles where without injuncting the State, certain rights are recognized to be inherent, either in the citizens of the country or in persons. In fact, there are two sets of dichotomies that are apparent in the Articles contained in Part III. One set of dichotomy is between (i) what is directed against the State; and (ii) what is spelt out as inhering in every individual without reference to the State. The other dichotomy is between
(i) citizens; and (ii) persons. The Articles of Part-III are in the form of a directive to the State, while others are not. This is an indication that some of the rights conferred by Part -III are to be honored by and also enforceable against, non--State actors. [Para 73, 74][664-C-D; 667-A] KAUSHAL KISHOR v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.
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9. The original thinking of this Court that these rights can be enforced only against the State, changed over a period of time. The transformation was from “State” to “Authorities” to “instrumentalities of State” to “agency of the Government” to “impregnation with Governmental character” to “enjoyment of monopoly status conferred by State” to “deep and pervasive control” to the “nature of the duties/functions performed”. Therefore “A fundamental right under Article 19/21 can be enforced even against persons other than the State or its instrumentalities “. [Para 78][678-F-G; 679-A]
10. The expression “the State” is not used in Article 21. This Article 21 guarantees every person that he shall not be deprived of his life and liberty except according to the procedure established by law. Going by the scheme of Part -III it is clear that the State has two obligations, (i) not to deprive a person of his life and liberty except according to procedure established by law; and (ii) to ensure that the life and liberty of a person is not deprived even otherwise. Article 21 does not say “the State shall not deprive a person of his life and liberty”, but says that “no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty”. [Para 81][679-D, E]
11. The understanding of this Court in A.K. Gopalan, that deprivation of personal liberty required a physical restraint, underwent a change in Kharak Singh and Gobind . From there, the law marched to the next stage in Satwant Singh Sawhney vs. D. Ramarathnam, Assistant Passport Officer, New Delhi where a Constitution Bench of this Court held by a majority, that the right to personal liberty included the right of locomotion and right to travel abroad. It was held in the said decision that “liberty” in our Constitution bears the same comprehensive meaning as is given to the expression “liberty” by the 5th and 14th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and the expression “personal liberty” in Article 21 only excludes the ingredients of “liberty” enshrined in Article 19 of the Constitution. The Court went on to hold that “the expression “personal liberty” in Art. 21 takes in the right of loco-motion and to travel abroad, but the right to move throughout the territories of India is not covered by it inasmuch as it is specially provided in Art. 19. [Para 88][683-F-H; 684-A] A B C D E F G H
12. Technological eavesdropping except in accordance with the procedure established by law was frowned upon by the Court. This was at a time when mobile phones had not become the order of the day and the State monopoly was yet to be replaced by private players such as intermediaries/service providers. Today, the infringement of the right to privacy is mostly by private players and if fundamental rights cannot be enforced against non--State actors, this right will go for a toss. [Para 97][688-D, E]
13. The expression “collective responsibility” can be traced to some extent, to Article 75(3) insofar as the Union is concerned and to Article 164(2) insofar as the States are concerned. But in both the Articles, it is the Council of Ministers who are stated to be collectively responsible to the House of the People/Legislative Assembly of the State. Generally collective responsibility of the Council of Ministers either to the House of the People or to the Assembly should be understood to correlate to the decisions and actions of the Council of Ministers and not to every statement made by every individual Minister. [Para 112][693-F, G]
14. What follows from the discussion is, (i) that the concept of collective responsibility is essentially a political concept; (ii) that the collective responsibility is that of the Council of Ministers; and (iii) that such collective responsibility is to the House of the People/Legislative Assembly of the State. Generally, such responsibility correlates to (i) the decisions taken; and (ii) the acts of omission and commission done. It is not possible to extend this concept of collective responsibility to any and every statement orally made by a Minister outside the House of the People/Legislative Assembly. A statement made by a Minister even if traceable to any affairs of the State or for protecting the Government, cannot be attributed vicariously to the Government by invoking the principle of collective responsibility. [Para 126, 137][701-A, B; 704-E]
15. This Court and the High Courts have been consistent in invoking Constitutional tort whenever an act of omission and commission on the part of a public functionary, including a KAUSHAL KISHOR v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.
A B C D E F G H 588 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 8 S.C.R.
Minister, caused harm or loss. But the matter pre-eminently deserves a proper legal framework so that the principles and procedure are coherently set out without leaving the matter open ended or vague. In fact, the First Report of the Law Commission submitted a draft bill way back in 1956. This Court recommended a legislative measure in Kasturi Lal in 1965 and a bill called Government (Liability in Torts) Bill was introduced in 1967. But nothing happened in the past 55 years. In such circumstances, courts cannot turn a blind eye but may have to imaginatively fashion the remedy to be provided to persons who suffer injury or loss, without turning them away on the ground that there is no proper legal frame work. Therefore, “A mere statement made by a Minister, inconsistent with the rights of a citizen under Part -III of the Constitution, may not constitute a violation of the constitutional rights and become actionable as Constitutional tort. But if as a consequence of such a statement, any act of omission or commission is done by the officers resulting in harm or loss to a person/citizen, then the same may be actionable as a constitutional tort”. [Para 153, 154][715-F-H; 716-A, B] Sahara India Real Estate Corporation Limited v.
Securities and Exchange Board of India (2012) 10 SCC 603 : [2012] 12 SCR 256; Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v.
Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1 : [2017] 10 SCR 569;
A. Sanjeevi Naidu v. State of Madras (1970) 1 SCC 443 : [1970] 3 SCR 505 and State of Karnataka v.
Union of India. (1977) 4 SCC 608 : [1978] 2 SCR 1 – followed.
Express Newspapers (Private) Ltd. v. The Union of India [1959] SCR 12; Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. v. The Union of India [1962] 3 SCR 842; Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala (1986) 3 SCC 615 : [1986] 3 SCR 518;
Ram Jethmalani v. Union of India (2011) 8 SCC 1 :
[2011] 8 SCR 725; Secretary, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, Govt. of India v. Cricket Association of Bengal (1995) 2 SCC 161 : [1995] 1 SCR 1036;
Ramlila Maidan Incident, in re. (2012) 5 SCC 1 : [2012] 4 SCR 971; R. Rajagopal alias R. R. Gopal v. State of A B C D E F G H T.N (1994) 6 SCC 632 : [1994] 4 Suppl. SCR 353;
People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) v. Union of India (2003) 4 SCC 399 : [2003] 2 SCR 1136; Noise Pollution (V.), in Re (2005) 5 SCC 733 : [2005] 1 Suppl. SCR 624; Thalappalam Service Cooperative Bank Ltd.
v. State of Kerala (2013) 16 SCC 82 : [2013] 14 SCR 475; Subramanian Swamy v. Union of India, Ministry of Law (2016) 7 SCC 221 : [2016] 3 SCR 865;
Asha Ranjan v. State of Bihar (2017) 4 SCC 397 : [2017] 1 SCR 945; Railway Board representing the Union of India v. Niranjan Singh (1969) 1 SCC 502 : [1969] 3 SCR 548; Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Prof.
Manubhai D. Shah (1992) 3 SCC 637 : [1992] 3 SCR 595; S. Krishnan v. State of Madras AIR 1951 SC 301 : [1951] SCR 621; Pt. Parmanand Katara v. Union of India (1989) 4 SCC 286 : [1989] 3 SCR 997; Shakti Vahini v. Union of India & Ors. (2018) 7 SCC 192 :
[2018] 3 SCR 770; R.K. Jain v. Union of India (1993)
4 SCC 119 : [1993] 3 SCR 802; Secretary, Jaipur Development Authority, Jaipur v. Daulat Mal Jain (1997) 1 SCC 35 : [1996] 6 Suppl. SCR 584; Vineet Narain v. Union of India (1998) 1 SCC 226 : [1997] 6 Suppl. SCR 595; Common Cause, A Registered Society v. Union of India (1999) 6 SCC 667 : [1999] 3 SCR 1279 and State (NCT of Delhi) v. Union of India (2018) 8 SCC 501 : [2018] 7 SCR 1 – relied on.
Amish Devgan v. Union of India (2021) 1 SCC 1 – distinguished.
Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras AIR 1950 SC 124 : [1950] SCR 594; Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India (1970) 1 SCC 248 : [1970] 3 SCR 530;
Satwant Singh Sawhney v. D. Ramarathna m, Assistant Passport Officer, New Delhi AIR 1967 SC 1836 : [1967] 2 SCR 525; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978)
1 SCC 248 : [1978] 2 SCR 621; Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India & Ors. (1984) 3 SCC 161 :
[1984] 2 SCR 67; National Human Rights Commission v. State of Arunachal Pradesh & Anr. (1996) 1 SCC KAUSHAL KISHOR v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.
A B C D E F G H 590 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 8 S.C.R.
742 : [1996] 1 SCR 278; Mr. ‘X’ v. Hospital ‘Z’ (1998)
8 SCC 296 : [1998] 1 Suppl. SCR 723; People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) v. Union of India (1997) 1 SCC 301 : [1996] 10 Suppl. SCR 321; M/s. Kasturi Lal Ralia Ram Jain v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1965 SC 1039 : [1965] 1 SCR 375; State of Rajasthan v. Mst. Vidhyawati AIR 1962 SC 933 : [1962] Suppl.
SCR 989; Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar (1983) 4 SCC 141 : [1983] 3 SCR 508; Nilabati Behera (Smt.) Alias Lalita Behera (Through the Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee) v. State of Orissa (1993) 2 SCC 746 : [1993] 2 SCR 581; Jumuna Prasad Mukhariya v. Lachhi Ram [1955] 1 SCR 608; People’s Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India (1982) 3 SCC 235 : [1983] 1 SCR 456; Bodhisattwa Gautam v. Subhra Chakraborty (Ms.) (1996) 1 SC 490 : [1995] 6 Suppl. SCR 731;
M. C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath (2000) 6 SCC 213 : [2000] 1 Suppl. SCR 389; P. D. Shamdasani v. Central Bank of India Ltd. [1952] SCR 391; State of West Bengal v.
Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights, West Bengal (2010) 3 SCC 571 : [2010] 2 SCR 979;
S. Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram (1989) 2 SCC 574 :
[1989] 2 SCR 204; Union of India v. K.M.
Shankarappa (2001) 1 SCC 582 : [2000] 5 Suppl.
SCR 117; Indibly Creative Private Limited v.
Government of West Bengal (2020) 12 SCC 436 : [2019] 5 SCR 679; State of Maharashtra vs. Sarangdharsingh Shivdassingh Chavan (2011) 1 SCC 577 : [2010] 15 SCR 1145; Manoj Narula v. Union of India (2014) 9 SCC 1 : [2014] 9 SCR 965; R. Sai Bharathi v.
J. Jayalalitha (2004) 2 SCC 9 : [2003] Suppl. SCR 85;
Praga Tools Corporation v. Shri C.A. Imanual (1969) 1 SCC 585 : [1969] 3 SCR 773; Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotasav Smarak Trust v. V. R. Rudani (1989) 2 SCC 691 : [1989] 2 SCR 697; M. C. Mehta v. Union of India AIR 1987 SC 1086 : [1987] 1 SCR 819; Binny Ltd. v.
V. Sadasivan (2005) 6 SCC 657 : [2005] 2 Suppl.
SCR 421; Society for Unaided Private Schools of A B C D E F G H Rajasthan v. Union of India (2012) 6 SCC 1 : [2012] 2 SCR 715; Pravasi Bhalai Sangathan v. Union of India (2014) 11 SCC 477 : [2014] 4 SCR 446; Kodungallur Film Society v. Union of India (2018) 10 SCC 713 :
[2018] 12 SCR 695; Brij Bhushan v. The State of Delhi AIR 1950 SC 129 : [1950] SCR 605; State of Madras v. V. G. Row (1952) 1 SCC 410; Smt. Vidya Varma v. Dr.
Shiv Narain Varma AIR 1956 SC 108 : [1955] 2 SCR 983; Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi (1975) 1 SCC 421 : [1975] 3 SCR 619;
Lucknow Development Authority v. M.K. Gupta (1994)
1 SCC 243 : [1993] 3 Suppl. SCR 615; Chairman, Railway Board & Ors. v. Chandrima Das (Mrs.) & Ors.
(2000) 2 SCC 465 : [2000] 1 SCR 480; M. C. Mehta v.
Kamal Nath (1997) 1 SCC 388 : [1996] 10 Suppl. SCR 12; Vellore Citizens’ Welfare Forum v. Union of India (1996) 5 SCC 647 : [1996] 5 Suppl. SCR 241; Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action v. Union of India (1996) 3 SCC 212 : [1996] 2 SCR 503; Consumer Education & Research Centre & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. (1995) 3 SCC 42 : [1995] 1 SCR 626; Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan (1997) 6 SCC 241 : [1997] 3 Suppl. SCR 404; Medha Kotwal Lele & Ors. v. Union of India (2013) 1 SCC 297 : [2012] 9 SCR 895; Githa Hariharan (Ms.) & Anr. v. Reserve Bank of India & Anr. (1999) 2 SCC 228 : [1999] 1 SCR 669; Indian Medical Association v. Union of India (2011) 7 SCC 179 : [2011] 6 SCR 599; Jeeja Ghosh v. Union of India (2016) 7 SCC 761 : [2016] 4 SCR 638; Zee Telefilms Ltd. v. Union of India (2005) 4 SCC 649 : [2005] 1 SCR 913; Janet Jeyapaul v. SRM University (2015) 16 SCC 530 76; A. K. Gopalan v. State of Madras AIR 1950 SC 27 : [1950] SCR 88; R. D. Shetty v.
International Airport Authority (1979) 3 SCC 489 :
[1979] 3 SCR 1014; Andi Mukta v. V. R. Rudani (1989)
2 SCC 691 : [1989] 2 SCR 697; Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra (2011) 1 SCC 694 :
[2010] 15 SCR 201; Kharak Singh v. State of U.P. AIR 1963 SC 1295 : [1964] 1 SCR 332; Mohd. Arif Alias KAUSHAL KISHOR v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.
A B C D E F G H 592 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 8 S.C.R.
Ashfaq v. Registrar, Supreme Court of India & Ors.
(2014) 9 SCC 737 : [2014] 11 SCR 1009; Gobind v.
State of Madhya Pradesh (1975) 2 SCC 148 : [1975] 3 SCR 946; Suchita Srivastava & Anr. v. Chandigarh (2009) 9 SCC 1 : [2009] 13 SCR 989; Devika Biswas v. Union of India (2016) 10 SCC 726; District Registrar and Collector, Hyderabad & Anr. v. Canara Bank & Ors. (2005) 1 SCC 496 : [2004] 5 Suppl. SCR 833;
Indian Woman says Gang-raped on orders of village Court published in Business and Financial News dated 23-1-2014, in Re (2014) 4 SCC 786 : [2014] 4 SCR 264; Lata Singh v. State of U.P. (2006) 5 SCC 475 : [2006] 3 Suppl. SCR 350; Arumugam Servai v.
State of Tamil Nadu (2011) 6 SCC 405 : [2011] 5 SCR 488; The State of Bihar v. Abdul Majid AIR 1954 SC 245 : [1954] SCR 786 and Khatri (II) vs. State of Bihar (1981) 1 SCC 627 : [1981] 2 SCR 408 – referred to.
John Meskell v. Córas Iompair Éireann 1973 IR 121 1972 IR 330; Murtagh Properties Limited v. Cleary 121 1972 IR 330; Shelly v. Kraemer 334 U.S. 1 (1948);
Lûth Luth (1958) BVerfGE 7, 198; Gitlow v. New York 286 US 652 (1925); “Civil Rights Cases” 109 US 3 (1883); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co 392 US 409 (1968);
New York Times v. Sullivan 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Du Plessis and Others v. De Klerk and Another 1996 ZACC 10; Khumalo v. Holomisa (2002) ZACC 12; Governing Body of the Juma Musjid Primary School & Others v.
Essay N.O. and Others (CCT 29/10) [2011] ZACC 13;
2011 (8) BCLR 761 (CC); Douglas v. Hello! Ltd. [2001] QB 967; X v. Y [2004] EWCA Civ 662; Plattform “Ärzte Für Das Leben” v. Austria [1988] ECHR 15 X and Y v. The Netherlands [1985] ECHR 4 Marsh v. Alabama 326 US 501 (1946) – referred to.
Anup Surendranath - Article on “Life and Personal Liberty” in The Oxford Handbook of the Indian Constitution (South Asia Edition), 2016 and Frances Kamm, Morality, Mortality Vol.2, Oxford University Press, 1996 – referred to.
A B C D E F G H Per B.V. Nagarathna, J. (Partly dissenting)
HELD: 1. The freedom of speech and expression as envisaged under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution means the right to free speech and to express opinions through various media such as by word of mouth, through the print or electronic media, through pictographs, writings, graphics or any other manner that can be discerned by the mind. The right includes the freedom of press. The content of this right also includes propagation of ideas through publication and circulation, the right to seek information and to acquire or impart ideas. In short, the right to free speech would include every nature of right that would come within the scope and ambit of free speech. Hence, Article 19(1)(a) in very broad and in wide terms states that all citizens shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression. The said right can be curtailed only by reasonable restrictions which are enumerated in Article 19(2) thereof which can be imposed by the State under the authority of law but not by exercise of executive power in the absence of any law. Further, the nature of restrictions on right to free speech must be reasonable, and in the interest of the sovereignty and integrity of India, security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence. (Article 19(2)). For a country like ours which is a Parliamentary Democracy, freedom of speech and expression is a necessary right as well as a concomitant for the purpose of not only ensuring a healthy democracy but also to ensure that the citizens could be well informed and educated on governance. The dissemination of information through various media, including print and electronic media or audio visual form, is to ensure that the citizens are enlightened about their rights and duties, the manner in which they should conduct themselves in a democracy and for enabling a debate on the policies and actions of the Governments and ultimately for the development of the Indian society in an egalitarian way. The right to freedom of speech and expression in Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution has its genesis in the Preamble of the Constitution which, inter alia, speaks of liberty of thought, expression, belief. Since, India is a sovereign democratic republic and we follow a parliamentary system of democracy, liberty of thought and expression is a KAUSHAL KISHOR v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.
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significant freedom and right under our constitutional setup. [Para 12.3, 12.4, 12.5][730-E-H; 731-A-F]
2. The Constitution of India confers under Article 19(1)(a), the right to freedom of speech and expression to all its citizens. The State has a corelative duty to abstain from interference with such right except as provided in Article 19(2) of the Constitution which are reasonable restrictions on the right conferred under Article 19(1)(a). The extent of such duty depends upon the content of speech. For instance, in respect of speech that is likely to be adverse to the interests of sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality; or speech that constitutes contempt of court, defamation or is of such nature as would be likely to incite the commission of an offence, the duty of the State to abstain from interference, is nil. This principle is Constitutionally reflected under Article 19(2) which enables the State to enact law which would impose reasonable restrictions on such speech as described under eight grounds which are the basis for reasonable restrictions. [Para 14.1][736-A-D]
3. The extent of protection of speech would depend on whether, such speech would constitute a ‘propagation of ideas’ or would have any social value. If the answer to the said question is in the affirmative, such speech would be protected under Article 19(1)(a); if the answer is in the negative, such speech would not be protected under Article 19(1)(a). In respect of speech that does not form the content of Article 19(1)(a), the State has no duty to abstain from interference having regard to Article 19(2) of the Constitution and only the grounds mentioned therein. [Para 14.1][736-G-H; 737-A]
4. Having noted that the protective perimeter within which a person can exercise his/her rights depends on the degree to which the State is duty bound to protect the right, it may also be said as a corollary that in respect of speech that does not form the content of Article 19(1)(a), the State has no duty to abstain from interference and therefore, speech such as hate speech, defamatory speech, etc. would lie outside the protective perimeter within which a person can exercise his right to freedom of speech. Such speech can be subjected to restrictions or restraints. While A B C D E F G H restrictions on the right to freedom of speech and expression are required to be made only under the grounds listed under Article 19(2), by the State, restraints on the said right, do not gather their strength from Article 19(2). Restraints on the right to freedom of speech and expression are governed by the content of Article 19(1)(a) itself; i.e., any kind of speech, which does not conform to the content of the right under Article 19(1)(a), may be restrained. Questions pertaining to the voluntary or binding nature of such restraint, the force behind the same, the persons on whom such restraints are to be imposed, the manner in which compliance thereof could be achieved, etc., are aspects left to be deliberated upon and answered by the Parliament. However, the finding made hereinabove is only to the extent of clarifying that any kind of speech, which does not form the content of Article 19(1)(a), may be restrained as such speech does not constitute an exchange of ideas, in a manner compatible with the ethos cultivated in a civilised society. Such restraints need not be traceable only to Article 19(2), which exhaustively lists eight grounds on which restrictions may be imposed on the right to freedom of speech and expression by the state. [Para 14.1][737- B-H]
5. Article 19(1)(a) serves as a vehicle through which dissent can be expressed. The right to dissent, disagree and adopt varying and individualistic points of view inheres in every citizen of this Country. In fact, the right to dissent is the essence of a vibrant democracy, for it is only when there is dissent that different ideas would emerge which may be of help or assist the Government to improve or innovate upon its policies so that its governance would have a positive effect on the people of the country which would ultimately lead to stability, peace and development which are concomitants of good governance. [Para 15.2][739-C-D]
6. Equality, liberty and fraternity are the foundational values embedded in the Preamble of our Constitution. ‘Hate speech’, in the sense discussed, strikes at each of these foundational values, by marking out a society as being unequal. It also violates fraternity of citizens from diverse backgrounds, the sine-qua-non of a cohesive society based on plurality and multi-culturalism such KAUSHAL KISHOR v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.
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as in India that is, Bharat. Democracy, being one of the basic features of our Constitution, it is implicit that in a rule by majority there would be a sense of security and inclusiveness. Further, the Preamble of the Constitution which envisages, inter alia, fraternity, assures that the dignity of individuals cannot be dented by means of unwarranted speech being made by fellow citizens, including public functionaries. Thus, the Preamble of the Constitution and the values thereof assuring the people of India not only justice, liberty, equality but also fraternity and unity and integrity of the nation, must remind every citizen of this Country irrespective of the office or position or power that is held, of the sublime ideals of the Constitution and to respect them in their true letter and spirit. There is an inbuilt constitutional check to ensure that the values of the Constitution are not in any way undermined or violated. It is high time that we, as a society in general and as individuals in particular, re-dedicate ourselves to the sacred values of the Constitution and promote them not only at our individual level but at the macro level. Any kind of speech which undermines the values for which our Constitution stands would cause a dent on our social and political values. [Para 26, 27.3][762-C, D; 764-G-H; A-D]
7. The status of the violator of the right, is also an essential parameter for distinction between the two rights and corresponding remedies. Where the interference with a recognized right is by the State or any other entity recognized under Article 12, a claim for the violation of a fundamental right would lie under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution before this Court or before the High Court respectively. Where interference is by an entity other than State or its instrumentalities, an action would lie under common law and to such extent, the legal scheme recognises horizontal operation of such rights. Though the content of the Fundamental Right may be identical under the Constitution with the common law right, it is only the common law right that operates horizontally except when those Fundamental Rights have been transformed into statutory rights under specific enactments or where horizontal operation has been expressly recognised under the Constitution. [Para 42, 43][780- F-H; 781-A-B] A B C D E F G H
8. Recognising a horizontal approach of Fundamental Rights between citizens inter se would set at naught and render redundant, all the tests and doctrines forged by this Court to identify “State” for the purpose of entertaining claims of fundamental rights violations. Had the intention of this Court been to allow Fundamental Rights, including the rights under Articles 19 and 21, to operate horizontally, this Court would not have engaged in evolving and refining tests to determine the true meaning and scope of “State” as defined under Article 12. This Court would have simply entertained claims of fundamental rights violations against all persons and entities, without deliberating on fundamental questions as to maintainability of the writ petitions. Although this Court has significantly expanded the scope of “State” as defined under Article 12, such expansion is based on considerations such as the nature of functions performed by the entity in question and the degree of control exercised over it by the State as such. This is significantly different from recognising horizontality of the fundamental rights under Articles 19 and 21, except while seeking a writ in the nature of habeas corpus. Such a recognition would amount to disregarding the jurisprudence evolved by this Court as to the scope of Article 12 of the Constitution. Another aspect that needs consideration is that a Writ Court, does not ordinarily adjudicate to issue Writs in cases where alternate and efficacious remedies exist under common law or statutory law particularly against private persons. Therefore, even if horizontal operation of the Fundamental Rights under Article 19/21 is recognised, such recognition would be of no avail because the claim before a Writ Court of fundamental rights violations would fail on the ground that the congruent common law right which is identical in content to the Fundamental Right, may be enforced by having recourse to common law remedies. Therefore, on the ground that there exists an alternate and efficacious remedy in common law, the horizontal claim for fundamental rights violations would fail before a Writ Court. [Para 43][785-A-G]
9. The duty cast upon the State under Article 21 is a negative duty not to deprive a person of his life and personal liberty except in accordance with law. The State has an affirmative duty to carry out obligations cast upon it under statutory and constitutional KAUSHAL KISHOR v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.
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law, which are based on the Fundamental Right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. Such obligations may require interference by the State where acts of a private actor may threaten the life or liberty of another individual. Failure to carry out the duties enjoined upon the State under statutory law to protect the rights of a citizen, could have the effect of depriving a citizen of his right to life and personal liberty. When a citizen is so deprived of his right to life and personal liberties, the State would have breached the negative duty cast upon it under Article
21. [Para 44][792-D-G]
10. A statement made by a Minister if traceable to any affairs of the State or for protecting the Government, can be attributed vicariously to the Government by invoking the principle of collective responsibility, so long as such statement represents the view of the Government also. If such a statement is not consistent with the view of the Government, then it is attributable to the Minister personally. [Para 45][793-D-E]
11. A proper legal framework is necessary to define the acts or omissions which would amount to constitutional tort and the manner in which the same would be redressed or remedied on the basis of judicial precedent. Particularly, it is not prudent to treat all cases where a statement made by a public functionary resulting in harm or loss to a person/citizen, as a constitutional tort, except in the context of the answer given to Question No. 4 . It is for the Parliament in its wisdom to enact a legislation or code to restrain, citizens in general and public functionaries, in particular, from making disparaging or vitriolic remarks against fellow citizens, having regard to the strict parameters of Article 19(2) and bearing in mind the freedom under Article 19(1) (a) of the Constitution of India. [Para 66, 67][801-B-D] Pravasi Bhalai Sangathan v. Union of India (2014) 11 SC 477 : [2014] 4 SCR 446; K. S. Puttaswamy (Retd.)
v. Union of India (2019) 1 SCC 1 : [2018] 8 SCR 1;
Subramanian Swamy v. Union of India (2016) 7 SCC 221 : [2016] 3 SCR 865; His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru v. State of Kerala (1973) 4 SCC 225; People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India (2005) 2 SCC 436 : [2005] 1 SCR 494; P. D.
A B C D E F G H Shamdasani v. Central Bank of India Ltd. A.I.R. 1952 SC 59 : [1952] SCR 391; Zoroastrian Cooperative Housing Society Limited v. District Registrar, Cooperative Societies (Urban) (2005) 5 SCC 632 :
[2005] 3 SCR 592; Ramakrishna Mission v. Kago Kunya (2019) 16 SCC 303 : [2019] 5 SCR 452;
Parmanand Katara v. Union of India A.I.R. 1989 SC 2039 : [1989] 3 SCR 997; National Human Rights Commission v. State of Arunachal Pradesh (1996) 1 SCC 742 : [1996] 1 SCR 278; Gaurav Kumar Bansal v. Union of India (2015) 2 SCC 130 : [2014] 7 SCR 725 and Swaraj Abhiyan v. Union of India (2016) 7 SCC 498 – relied on.
Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras A.I.R. 1950 SC 124 : [1950] SCR 594; S. Khushboo v. Kanniammal (2010) 5 SCC 600 : [2010] 5 SCR 322; Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015) 5 SCC 1 : [2015] 5 SCR 963;
Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. v. Union of India A.I.R. 1962 SC 305 : [1962] 3 SCR 842; Life Insurance Corporation vs. Prof. Manubhai D. Shah (1992) 3 SCC 637 : [1992] 3 SCR 595; Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar A.I.R. 1962 SC 955 : [1962] Suppl. SCR 769;
Directorate General of Doordarshan v. Anand Patwardhan (2006) 8 SCC 433 : [2006] 5 Suppl.
SCR 403; Hamdard Dawakhana (Wakf) Lal Kuan v.
Union of India A.I.R 1960 SC 554 : [1960] 2 SCR 671; Indian Express Newspaper (Bombay) Pvt. Ltd. v.
Union of India (1985) 1 SCC 641 : [1985] 2 SCR 287;
Tata Press Limited v. Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Limited (1995) 5 SCC 139 : [1995] 2 Suppl. SCR 467;
Union of India v. Motion Picture Association A.I.R.
1999 SC 2334 : [1999] 3 SCR 875; National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India (2014) 5 SCC 438 : [2014] 5 SCR 119; Prabha Dutt v. Union of India (1982) 1 SCC 1 : [1982] 1 SCR 1184; Swapnil Tripathi v. Supreme Court of India (2018) 10 SCC 639 : [2018] 11 SCR 57; Union of India v. Naveen Jindal (2004) 2 SCC 510 : [2004] 1 SCR 1038; Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala (1986) 3 SCC 615 : [1986] 3 SCR 518; Amish KAUSHAL KISHOR v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.
A B C D E F G H 600 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 8 S.C.R.
Devgan v. Union of India (2021) 1 SCC 1; Charu Khurana v. Union of India (2015) 1 SCC 192 : [2014] 12 SCR 259; In Re. Noise Pollution (V) (2005) 5 SCC 733 : [2005] 1 Suppl. SCR 624; Additional District Magistrate, Jabalpur vs. Shivkant Shukla A.I.R. 1976 SC 1207 : [1976] Suppl. SCR 172 ; Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology (2002) 5 SCC 111 : [ 2002] 3 SCR 100; Zee Telefilms Ltd. v.
Union of India (2005) 4 SCC 649 : [2005] 1 SCR 913;
Janet Jeyapaul v. S.R.M. University (2015) 16 SCC 530; Union of India v. Paul Manickam (2003) 8 SCC 342 : [2003] 4 Suppl. SCR 618; Mohd. Ikram Hussain v. State of Uttar Pradesh A.I.R. 1964 SC 1625 : [1964] 5 SCR 86; Nirmaljit Kaur (2) v. State of Punjab (2006)
9 SCC 364 : [2005] 5 Suppl. SCR 514; Union of India v. Paul Manickam (2003) 8 SCC 342 : [2003] 4 Suppl.
SCR 618; Pt. Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar (1983) 4 SCC 141 : [1983] 3 SCR 508; Sebastian M. Hongray v.
Union of India (1984) 3 SCC 82 : [1984] 3 SCR 544;
Bhim Singh v. State of J&K (1985) 4 SCC 677; People’s Union for Democratic Rights v. Police Commissioner (1989) 4 SCC 730; Saheli v. Commissioner of Police (1990) 1 SCC 422 : [1989] 2 Suppl. SCR 488; State of Maharashtra v. Ravikant S. Patil (1991) 2 SCC 373;
Kumari v. State of Tamil Nadu (1992) 2 SCC 223;
Shakuntala Devi v. Delhi Electric Supply Undertaking (1995) 2 SCC 369; Tamil Nadu Electricity Board v.
Sumanth (2000) 4 SCC 543 : [2000] 3 SCR 708;
Railway Board v. Chandrima Das (2000) 2 SCC 465 :
[2000] 1 SCR 480; Sabastian M. Hongray v. Union of India A.I.R. 1984 SC 1026 : [1984] 3 SCR 544; Bhim Singh, MLA v. State of Jammu and Kashmir A.I.R. 1986 SC : 494; Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa (1993) 2 SCC 746 : [1993] 2 SCR 581; D. K. Basu v. State of West Bengal (1997) 1 SCC 416 : [1996] 10 Suppl. SCR 284; Hindustan Paper Corporation Ltd. v. Ananta Bhattacharjee (2004) 6 SCC 213; Chairman, Railway Board v. Chandrima Das (2000) 2 SCC 465 : [2000] 1 A B C D E F G H SCR 480; Kumari v. State of Tamil Nadu (1992) 2 SCC 223; Tamil Nadu Electricity Board v. Sumathi Das (2000) 4 SCC 543 : [2000] 3 SCR 708; and Delhi Jal Board v.
National Campaign for Dignity & Rights of Sewerage & amp; Allied Workers (2011) 8 SCC 568 :
[2011] 12 SCR 34 – referred to.
Chaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire 315 U.S.568 (1942); R v. James Keegstra [1990] 3 SCR 697; Canada Human Rights Commission v. Taylor [1990] 3 SCR 892;
Pat Eatock v. Andrew Bolt (2011) FCA and Peninsular;
Oriental Steam Navigation Co. v. Secy. of State (1868- 69) 5 Bom HCR APP 1 and Saskatchewan Human Rights Commission v. William Whatcott 2013 SCC 11 – referred to.
Case Law Reference In the judgment of V. Ramasubramanian, J.
[1965] 1 SCR 375 referred to Para 9 (iv)
[1983] 3 SCR 508 referred to Para 9 (iv)
[1993] 2 SCR 581 referred to Para 9 (v)
[2013] 14 SCR 475 relied on Para 10 (i)
[1994] 4 Suppl. SCR 353 relied on Para 10 (i)
[2003] 2 SCR 1136 relied on Para 10 (i)
[1955] 1 SCR 608 referred to Para 10 (i)
[2011] 8 SCR 725 relied on Para 10 (i)
[2012] 12 SCR 256 followed Para 10 (i)
[2016] 3 SCR 865 relied on Para 10 (i)
[2005] 1 Suppl. SCR 624 relied on Para 10 (i)
[2017] 1 SCR 945 relied on Para 10 (i)
[1983] 1 SCR 456 referred to Para 10 (ii)
[1995] 6 Suppl. SCR 731 referred to Para 10 (ii)
[2000] 1 Suppl. SCR 389 referred to Para 10 (ii)
KAUSHAL KISHOR v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.
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[2017] 10 SCR 569 followed Para 10 (ii)
[1952] SCR 391 referred to Para 10 (ii)
[2010] 2 SCR 979 referred to Para 10 (iii)
[1989] 2 SCR 204 referred to Para 10 (iii)
[2000] 5 Suppl. SCR 117 referred to Para 10 (iii)
[2019] 5 SCR 679 referred to Para 10 (iii)
[1989] 3 SCR 997 relied on Para 10 (iii)
(2021) 1 SCC 1 distinguished Para 10 (iv)
[2010] 15 SCR 1145 referred to Para 10 (iv)
[1996] 6 Suppl. SCR 584 relied on Para 10 (iv)
[2014] 9 SCR 965 referred to Para 10 (iv)
[2003] 6 Suppl. SCR 85 referred to Para 10 (iv)
[1999] 3 SCR 1279 relied on Para 10 (v)
[1962] 3 SCR 842 relied on Para 10 (vi)
[1969] 3 SCR 773 referred to Para 10 (xii)
[1989] 2 SCR 697 referred to Para 10 (xii)
[1987] 1 SCR 819 referred to Para 10 (xiii)
[2005] 2 Suppl. SCR 421 referred to Para 10 (xiii)
[2012] 2 SCR 715 referred to Para 10 (xiv)
[2014] 4 SCR 446 referred to Para 10 (xxiii)
[2018] 12 SCR 695 referred to Para 10 (xxiii)
[1950] SCR 594 referred to Para 15 [1950] SCR 605 referred to Para 17 (1952) 1 SCC 410 referred to Para 20 A B C D E F G H [1959] SCR 12 relied on Para 28 [1986] 3 SCR 518 relied on Para 29 [1995] 1 SCR 1036 relied on Para 30 [2012] 4 SCR 971 relied on Para 30 [1969] 3 SCR 548 relied on Para 43 (ix)
[1992] 3 SCR 595 relied on Para 43 (ix)
[1955] 2 SCR 983 referred to Para 76 (ii)
[1975] 3 SCR 619 referred to Para 76 (iii)
[1993] 3 Suppl. SCR 615 referred to Para 76 (vii)
[2000] 1 SCR 480 referred to Para 76 (viii)
[1996] 10 Suppl. SCR 12 referred to Para 76 (ix)
[1996] 5 Suppl. SCR 241 referred to Para 76 (ix)
[1996] 2 SCR 503 referred to Para 76 (ix)
[1995] 1 SCR 626 referred to Para 76 (x)
[1997] 3 Suppl. SCR 404 referred to Para 76 (xi)
[2012] 9 SCR 895 referred to Para 76(xi)
[1999] 1 SCR 669 referred to Para 76 (xii)
[2011] 6 SCR 599 referred to Para 76 (xiii)
[2016] 4 SCR 638 referred to Para 76(xv)
[2005] 1 SCR 913 referred to Para 76 (xvi)
(2015) 16 SCC 530 referred to Para 76 (xvi)
[1950] SCR 88 referred to Para 78 [1951] SCR 621 relied on Para 78 [1979] 3 SCR 1014 referred to Para 78 [1989] 2 SCR 697 referred to Para 78 KAUSHAL KISHOR v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.
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[2010] 15 SCR 201 referred to Para 85 [1964] 1 SCR 332 referred to Para 86 [2014] 11 SCR 1009 referred to Para 86 [1970] 3 SCR 530 referred to Para 86 [1975] 3 SCR 946 referred to Para 87 [1967] 2 SCR 525 referred to Para 88 [1978] 2 SCR 621 referred to Para 90 [1984] 2 SCR 67 referred to Para 91 [1996] 1 SCR 278 referred to Para 93 [1998] 1 Suppl. SCR 723 referred to Para 94 [2009] 13 SCR 989 referred to Para 96 (2016) 10 SCC 726 referred to Para 96 [1996] 10 Suppl. SCR 321 referred to Para 97 [2004] 5 Suppl. SCR 833 referred to Para 98 [2014] 4 SCR 264 referred to Para 99 [2006] 3 Suppl. SCR 350 referred to Para 99 [2011] 5 SCR 488 referred to Para 99 [2018] 3 SCR 770 relied on Para 100 [1970] 3 SCR 505 followed Para 111 [1978] 2 SCR 1 followed Para 113 [1993] 3 SCR 802 relied on Para 113 [1997] 6 Suppl. SCR 595 relied on Para 121 [2018] 7 SCR 1 relied on Para 125 [1954] SCR 786 referred to Para 146 A B C D E F G H [1962] Suppl. SCR 989 referred to Para 146 [1981] 2 SCR 408 referred to Para 146 In the judgment of B. V. Nagarathna, J.
[1950] SCR 594 referred to Para 12.6 (i)
[2010] 5 SCR 322 referred to Para 12.6 (ii)
[2015] 5 SCR 963 referred to Para 12.6 (iii)
[1962] 3 SCR 842 referred to Para 15.1 [1992] 3 SCR 595 referred to Para 15.1 [1962] Suppl. SCR 769 referred to Para 15.3 (ii)
[2006] 5 Suppl. SCR 403 referred to Para 15.3 (iii)
[1960] 2 SCR 671 referred to Para 15.4 (i)
[1985] 2 SCR 287 referred to Para 15.4 (ii)
[1995] 2 Suppl. SCR 467 referred to Para 15.4 (iii)
[1999] 3 SCR 875 referred to Para 15.5 (i)
[2014] 5 SCR 119 referred to Para 15.5 (ii)
[1982] 1 SCR 1184 referred to Para 15.5 (ii)
[2018] 11 SCR 57 referred to Para 15.5 (ii)
[2004] 1 SCR 1038 referred to Para 15.5 (ii)
[1986] 3 SCR 518 referred to Para 15.5 (ii)
[2014] 4 SCR 446 relied on Para 16.2 (2021) 1 SCC 1 referred to Para 16.3 [1990] 3 SCR 697 referred to Para 21 (i)
[1990] 3 SCR 892 referred to Para 21 (i)
[2014] 12 SCR 259 referred to Para 22 KAUSHAL KISHOR v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.
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[2005] 1 Suppl. SCR 624 referred to Para 22 [2018] 8 SCR 1 relied on Para 24 [2016] 3 SCR 865 relied on Para 27.1 (1973) 4 SCC 225 relied on Para 36 [1976] Suppl. SCR 172 referred to Para 37 [2005] 1 SCR 494 relied on Para 39 [1952] SCR 391 relied on Para 43 (ii) (a)
[2005] 3 SCR 592 relied on Para 43 (ii) (b)
[2002] 3 SCR 100 referred to Para 43 (iii)
[2005] 1 SCR 913 referred to Para 43 (iii)
(2015) 16 SCC 530 referred to Para 43 (iii)
[2019] 5 SCR 452 referred to Para 43 (iii)
[2003] 4 Suppl. SCR 618 referred to Para 43 (iii)
[1964] 5 SCR 86 referred to Para 43 (iii)
[2005] 5 Suppl. SCR 514 referred to Para 43 (iii)
[2003] 4 Suppl. SCR 618 referred to Para 43 (iii)
[1989] 3 SCR 997 relied on Para 44 (i)
[1996] 1 SCR 278 relied on Para 44 (ii)
[2014] 7 SCR 725 relied on Para 44 (iii)
(2016) 7 SCC 498 relied on Para 44 (iv)
[1983] 3 SCR 508 referred to Para 51 [1984] 3 SCR 544 referred to Para 51 (1985) 4 SCC 677 referred to Para 51 (1989) 4 SCC 730 referred to Para 51 A B C D E F G H [1989] 2 Suppl. SCR 488 referred to Para 51 (1991) 2 SCC 373 referred to Para 51 (1992) 2 SCC 223 referred to Para 51 (1995) 2 SCC 369 referred to Para 51 [2000] 3 SCR 708 referred to Para 51 [2000] 1 SCR 480 referred to Para 51 [1983] 3 SCR 508 referred to Para 54 [1984] 3 SCR 544 referred to Para 54 A.I.R. 1986 SC 494 referred to Para 54 [1993] 2 SCR 581 referred to Para 55 [1996] 10 Suppl. SCR 284 referred to Para 56 (2004) 6 SCC 213 referred to Para 56 [2000] 1 SCR 480 referred to Para 57 (1992) 2 SCC 223 referred to Para 59 [2000] 3 SCR 708 referred to Para 60 [2011] 12 SCR 34 referred to Para 63 CRIMINAL ORIGINAL/CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION:
Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 113 of 2016.
Under Article 32 of The Constitution of India With Special Leave Petition @ (Diary) No. 34629 of 2017 Ms. Aparjitha Singh, Sr.Adv. (A.C.) Ms. Uttara Babbar, Ms. Shipra Jain, Advs.
Kaleeswaram Raj, Ms. Thulasi K. Raj, Ms. Radhalakshmi R., Suvidutt M. S., Ms. Somlagna Biswas, Rishesh Sikarwar, Aman Khullar, KAUSHAL KISHOR v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.
A B C D E F G H 608 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 8 S.C.R.
Mrs. Renu Yadav, Samerjit Singh Chaudhry, Hitesh Kumar Sharma, Akhileshwar Jha, Ms. Mirdula Singh Chauhan, Ms. Sandhya Singh for Ms. Manju Jetley, Advs. for the Petitioner.
R. Venkataramani, AG, Tushar Mehta, SG, Balbir Singh, Ms. Madhavi Divan, ASGs, R. Bala, Pradeep Rai, Ms. Garima Prasad, Sr. Advs., Naman Tandon, Samarvir Singh, Presenjeet Mohapatra, Rajat Nair, Ankur Talwar, Kanu Agrawal, Anirudh Bhatt, Shyam Gopal, Ms. Monica Benjamin, Ms. Sujatha Bagadhi, Ms. Shraddha Deshmukh, Udai Khanna, Ms. Anu S., Mayank Pandey, Vinayak Mehrotra, Chitvan Singhal, Ms. Sonali Jain, Abhishek Kumar Pandey, Arvind Kumar Sharma, Mukesh Kumar Maroria, Ajay Vikram Singh, Ms. Rajshree Rai, Vinay Kumar, Shashank Rai, Arnav Mittal, Ms. Ritika Gaur, Ms. Banshika Garg, Vipin Bharti, Amrendra Kumar Singh, Ms. Priyanka Singh, Ms. Pranjali Goel, Sharjeel Ahamad, Mrs. Swarupama Chaturvedi, Pradeep Misra, Abhishek, Lakshmi Raman Singh, Advs. for the Respondents. Ranjith B. Marar, Ms. Lakshmi N. Kaimal, Arun Poomulli, Santhosh M. Jose, Keshav Raj Nair, Ashu Jain, Davesh Kumar Sharma, Ms. Preetha Chandran, Abhijith Sreekumar, Joseph Kurian, Advs. for the Intervenor.
The Judgments of the Court were delivered by
V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.
PRELUDE
Said the Tamil Poet-Philosopher Tiruvalluvar of the Tamil Sangam age (31, BCE) in his classic “Tirukkural”. Emphasizing the importance of sweet speech, he said that the scar left behind by a burn injury may heal, but not the one left behind by an offensive speech. The translation of this verse by G.U. Pope in English reads thus:
“In flesh by fire inflamed, nature may thoroughly heal the sore;
In soul by tongue inflamed, the ulcer healeth never more.” A B C D E F G H A Sanskrit Text contains a piece of advice on what to speak and how to speak.
The meaning of this verse is: “Speak what is true; speak what is pleasing; Do not speak what is unpleasant, even if it is true; And do not say what is pleasing, but untrue; this is the eternal law.” The “Book of Proverbs” (16:24) says:
“Pleasant words are a honeycomb, sweet to the soul and healing to the bones”
Though religious texts of all faiths and ancient literature of all languages and geographical locations are full of such moral injunctions emphasising the importance of sweet speech (more than free speech), history shows that humanity has consistently defied those diktats. The present reference to the Constitution Bench is the outcome of such behaviour by two honourable men, who occupied the position of Ministers in two different States.
I. Questions formulated for consideration
1. By an order dated 05.10.2017, a Three Member Bench of this Court directed Writ Petition (Criminal) No.113 of 2016 to be placed before the Constitution Bench, after two learned senior counsel, appointed as amicus curiae, submitted that the questions arising for consideration in the writ petition were of great importance. Though the Bench recorded, in its order dated 05.10.2017, the questions that were submitted by the learned amicus curiae, the Three Member Bench did not frame any particular question, but directed the matter to be placed before the Constitution Bench.
2. At this juncture, a Special Leave Petition (Diary) No.34629 of 2017 arising out a judgment of the Kerala High Court came up before the same Three Member Bench. Finding that the questions raised in the said SLP were also similar, this Court passed an order on 10.11.2017, KAUSHAL KISHOR v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.
[V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.] A B C D E F G H 610 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 8 S.C.R.
directing the said SLP also to be tagged with Writ Petition (Criminal) No.113 of 2016.
3. Thereafter, the Constitution Bench, by an order dated 24.10.2019, formulated the following five questions to be decided by this Court:- “…1) Are the grounds specified in Article 19(2) in relation to which reasonable restrictions on the right to free speech can be imposed by law, exhaustive, or can restrictions on the right to free speech be imposed on grounds not found in Article 19(2) by invoking other fundamental rights?
2) Can a fundamental right under Article 19 or 21 of the Constitution of India be claimed other than against the ‘State’ or its instrumentalities?
3) Whether the State is under a duty to affirmatively protect the rights of a citizen under Article 21 of the Constitution of India even against a threat to the liberty of a citizen by the acts or omissions of another citizen or private agency?
4) Can a statement made by a Minister, traceable to any affairs of State or for protecting the Government, be attributed vicariously to the Government itself, especially in view of the principle of Collective Responsibility?
5) Whether a statement by a Minister, inconsistent with the rights of a citizen under Part Three of the Constitution, constitutes a violation of such constitutional rights and is actionable as ‘Constitutional Tort”? …”
II. A brief backdrop
4. Without a brief reference to the factual matrix, the questions to be answered by us may look abstract. Therefore, we shall now refer to the background facts in both these cases.
5. Writ Petition (Criminal) No.113 of 2016 was filed under Article 32 of the Constitution praying for several reliefs including monitoring the investigation of a criminal complaint in FIR No.0838/2016 under Section 154 Cr.P.C., for the offences under Sections 395, 397 and 376-D read with the relevant provisions of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (for short, ‘POCSO Act’) and for the trial of the case outside the State and also for registering a complaint against the A B C D E F G H then Minister for Urban Development of the Government of U.P. for making statements outrageous to the modesty of the victims. The case of the petitioner in Writ Petition (Criminal) No.113 of 2016 in brief was that on 29.7.2016 when he and the members of his family were travelling from Noida to Shahjahanpur on National Highway 91 to attend the death ceremony of a relative, they were waylaid by a gang. According to the writ petitioner, the gang snatched away cash and jewelry in the possession of the petitioner and his family members and they also gang raped the wife and minor daughter of the petitioner. Though an FIR was registered on 30.7.2016 for various offences and newspapers and the television channels reported this ghastly incident, the then Minister for Urban Development of the Government of U.P. called for a press conference and termed the incident as a political conspiracy. Therefore, the petitioner apprehended that there may not be a fair investigation. The petitioner claims that he was also offended by the irresponsible statement made by the Minister and hence he was compelled to file the said writ petition for the reliefs stated supra.
6. Insofar as Special Leave Petition (Diary) No.34629 of 2017 is concerned, the same arose out of a judgment of the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court dismissing two writ petitions. The writ petitions were filed in public interest on the ground that the then Minister for Electricity in the State of Kerala issued certain statements in February 2016, 7.4.2017 and 22.4.2017. These statements were highly derogatory of women. Though according to the petitioners in the public interest litigation, the political party to which the Minister belonged, issued a public censure, no action was taken officially against the Minister. Therefore, the petitioner in one writ petition prayed among other things for a direction to the Chief Minister to frame a Code of Conduct for the Ministers who have subscribed to the oath of office as prescribed by the Constitution with a further direction to the Chief Minister to take suitable action if any of the Ministers failed to live upto the oath. The prayer in the second writ petition was for a direction to the concerned Authorities to take action against the Minister for his utterances.
7. Both the writ petitions were dismissed by a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court, on the ground that the prayer of the public interest writ petitioners were in the realm of moral values and that the question whether the Chief Minister should frame a code of conduct for the Ministers of his cabinet or not, is not within the domain of the Court to KAUSHAL KISHOR v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.
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decide. Therefore, challenging the said common order, the petitioner in one of those public interest writ petitions has come up with Special Leave Petition (Diary) No.34629 of 2017. Since the questions raised by the petitioner in the Special Leave Petition overlapped with the questions raised in the Writ Petition, they have been tagged together. III. Contentions
8. We have heard Shri R. Venkataramani, learned Attorney General for India, Ms. Aparajita Singh, learned senior counsel who assisted us as amicus curiae, Shri Kaleeswaram Raj, learned counsel for the petitioner in the special leave petition and Shri Ranjith B. Marar, learned counsel appearing for the person who sought to intervene/implead. III.A. Preliminary note submitted by learned Attorney General for India
9. The learned Attorney General for India submitted a preliminary note containing his submissions question-wise, which can be summed up as follows:- Question No.1
(i) On question No.1 it is his submission that as a matter of constitutional principle, any addition, alteration or change in the norms or criteria for imposition of restrictions on any fundamental right has to come up through a legislative process. The restrictions already enumerated in clauses (2) and (6) of Article 19 have to be taken to be exhaustive. Therefore, the Court cannot, under the guise of invoking any other fundamental right such as the one in Article 21, impose restrictions not found in Article 19(2). Under the Constitutional scheme, there can be no conflict between two different fundamental rights or freedoms.
Question No. 2
(ii) The Constitution itself sets out the scheme of claims of fundamental rights against the State or its instrumentalities and it has also enacted in respect of breaches or violations of fundamental rights by persons other than State or its instrumentalities. Any proposition, to add or insert subjects or matters in respect of which claims can be made against persons other than the State, would amount to Constitutional A B C D E F G H change. The concept of State action propounded and applied in US Constitutional Law and the enactment of 42 US Code § 1983 have to be seen in the context of peculiar state of affairs dealing with governmental and official immunities from legal proceedings. In view of specific provisions in Articles 15(2), 17, 23 and 24 of the Indian Constitution, there may not be a strict need to take recourse to the law obtaining in the USA. Claims against persons other than the State, either through enacted law or otherwise must be confined to constitutionally enacted subjects or matters. Question No. 3
(iii) There are sufficient Constitutional and legal remedies available for a citizen whose liberty is threatened by any person. Beyond the Constitutional and legal remedy and protection available, there may not be any other additional duty to affirmatively protect the right of a citizen under Article 21. Cases of infringement of fundamental rights are taken care of under Articles 32 and 226.
Question No. 4
(iv) Conduct of public servants like a Minister, if it is traceable to the discharge of public duty or the duties of the office, is subject to scrutiny of the law. Sanction for prosecution can be granted if misconduct is committed under colour of office. Such misconduct including statements that may be made by a Minister cannot be linked to the principles of collective responsibility. The concept of vicarious liability is incapable of being applied to situations and no government can ever be vicariously liable for malfeasance or misconduct of Minister not traceable to statutory duty or statutory violations for the purpose of legal remedies. Ministerial misdemeanors, which have nothing to do with the discharge of public duty and not traceable to the affairs of the State, will have to be treated as acts of individual violation and individual wrong. To extend in the abstract, the liability of the State to such situations or instances without necessary limitations can be problematic. Post M/s. Kasturi Lal Ralia Ram Jain vs.
The State of Uttar Pradesh1 and following Rudul Sah vs.
1 AIR 1965 SC 1039
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State of Bihar2, this Court has treated misconduct of public servants or officers and consequent infringement of Constitutional rights as ground for grant of compensation. However, there is need for clarity and certainty as far as the conceptual basis is concerned. This may be better resorted through enacted law.
Question No. 5
(v) While the principle of Constitutional tort has been conceived in Nilabati Behera (Smt.) alias Lalita Behera (Through the Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee) vs. State of Orissa3, and subsequently applied to provide in regard to the constitutional remedies, the matter pre-eminently deserves a proper legal framework in order that the principles and procedures are coherently set out without leaving the matter open-ended or vague.
III.B. Notes of submissions by Amicus
10. Ms. Aparajita Singh, learned senior counsel and amicus curiae submitted a written note question-wise, which can be summed up as follows:- Question No. 1
(i) The right to free speech under Article 19(1)(a) is subject to clearly defined restrictions under Article 19(2). Therefore, any law seeking to limit the right under Article 19(1)(a) has to necessarily fall within the limitations provided under Article 19(2). Whenever two fundamental rights compete, the Court will balance the two to allow the meaningful exercise of both. This conundrum is not new, as the rights under Article 21 and under Article 19(1)(a) have been interpreted and balanced on numerous occasions. Take for instance the Right to Information Act, 2005. The Act balances the citizen’s right to know under Article 19(1)(a) with the right to fair investigation and right to privacy under Article 21. This careful balancing was explained by this Court in Thalappalam Service Cooperative Bank Ltd.
2 (1983) 4 SCC 141
3 (1993) 2 SCC 746
A B C D E F G H vs. State of Kerala4. The decision of this Court in R.
Rajagopal alias R.R. Gopal vs. State of T.N.5 is another example of reading down the restrictions (in the form of defamation) on the right to free speech under Article 19(2), in its application to public officials and public figures in larger public interest. Again, in People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) vs. Union of India6, the right to privacy of the spouse of the candidate contesting the election was declared as subordinate to the citizens’ right to know under Article 19(1)(a). In Jumuna Prasad Mukhariya vs. Lachhi Ram7, a challenge to Sections 123(5) and 124(5) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (as they prevailed at that time) was rejected, on the ground that false personal attacks against the contesting candidate was not violative of the right to free speech. But when it comes to private citizens who are not public functionaries, the right to privacy under Article 21 was held to trump the right to know under Article 19(1)(a). This was in the case of Ram Jethmalani vs. Union of India8, which concerned the right to privacy of account holders. In Sahara India Real Estate Corporation Limited vs. Securities and Exchange Board of India9, this Court struck a balance between the right of the media under Article 19(1)(a) with the right to fair trial under Article 21. The argument that free speech under Article 19(1)(a) was a higher right than the right to reputation under Article 21 was rejected by this Court in Subramanian Swamy vs. Union of India, Ministry of Law10 in which Section 499 IPC was under challenge. The right to free speech was balanced with the right to pollution free life in Noise Pollution (V.), in Re11 and the right to fair trial of the accused was balanced with the right to fair trial of the victim in Asha Ranjan vs. State of Bihar12.
4 (2013) 16 SCC 82
5 (1994) 6 SCC 632
6 (2003) 4 SCC 399
7 (1955) 1 SCR 608
8 (2011) 8 SCC 1
9 (2012) 10 SCC 603
10 (2016) 7 SCC 221
11 (2005) 5 SCC 733
12 (2017) 4 SCC 397
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Question No. 2
(ii) There are some fundamental rights which are specifically granted against non-State actors. Article 15(2)(a) – access to shops, public restaurants, hotels and places of public entertainment, Article 17 – untouchability, Article 23 – forced labour and Article 24- prohibition of employment of children in factories, mines etc., are rights which are enforceable against private citizens also. Some aspects of Article 21 such as the right to clean environment have been enforced against private parties as well. The State is also under a Constitutional duty to ensure that the rights of its citizens are not violated even by non-State actors and ensure an environment where each right can be exercised without fear of undue encroachment. In People’s Union for Democratic Rights vs. Union of India13, while rejecting the contention of the State that it was the obligation of the private party i.e., the contractor to follow the mandate of Article 24 of the Constitution and the relevant laws, it was clarified that the primary obligation to protect fundamental rights was that of the State even in the absence of an effective legislation. In Bodhisattwa Gautam vs. Subhra Chakraborty (Ms.)14, interim compensation was awarded holding that fundamental rights under Article 21 can be enforced even against private bodies and individuals. Public law remedy has been repeatedly resorted to even against non-State actors when their acts have violated the fundamental rights of other citizens. Award of damages against non-State actors for violation of the right to clean environment under Article 21 was laid down in M.C. Mehta vs. Kamal Nath15. Similarly, the majority and concurring opinion in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy vs. Union of India16, while elaborating on the duty of the State and non-State actors to protect the rights of citizens, pointed out that recognition and enforcement of claims qua non-State actors may require legislative intervention. However, when it comes
13 (1982) 3 SCC 235
14 (1996) 1 SC 490
15 (2000) 6 SCC 213
16 (2017) 10 SCC 1
A B C D E F G H to Article 19, a Constitution Bench in P.D. Shamdasani vs. Central Bank of India Ltd.17, has held it to be inapplicable against private persons.
Question No. 3
(iii) Fundamental rights of citizens enshrined in the Constitution are not only negative rights against the State but also constitute a positive obligation on the State to protect those rights. The Constitution Bench in State of West Bengal vs. Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights, West Bengal18, while upholding the power of the Constitutional Court to transfer an investigation to the CBI without the consent of the concerned State, emphasized the duty of the State to conduct a fair investigation which is a fundamental right of the victim under Article 21. The majority judgment in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (supra), defines the positive obligation of the State to ensure the meaningful exercise of the right of privacy. In S. Rangarajan vs. P. Jagjivan Ram19, this Court has categorically laid down that the State cannot plead its inability to protect the fundamental rights of the citizens. In Union of India vs. K.M. Shankarappa20, Section 6(1) of the Cinematograph Act, 1952 which granted the Central Government, the power to review the decision of the quasi-judicial Tribunal under the Act, was sought to be defended on the ground of law and order. The contention was rejected holding that it was the duty of the Government to ensure law and order. In Indibly Creative Private Limited vs. Government of West Bengal21, the negative restraint and positive obligation under Article 19(1) (a) has been explained. In Pt. Parmanand Katara vs. Union of India22, it was held that even the doctors in Government hospitals are duty bound to fulfil the constitutional obligation of the State under Article 21.
17 1952 SCR 391
18 (2010) 3 SCC 571
19 (1989) 2 SCC 574
20 (2001) 1 SCC 582
21 (2020) 12 SCC 436
22 (1989) 4 SCC 286
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Question No. 4
(iv) The Minister being a functionary of the State, represents the State when acting in his official capacity. Therefore, any violation of the fundamental rights of the citizens by the Minister in his official capacity, would be attributable to the State. The State also has a positive obligation to protect the rights of citizens under Article 21, whether the violation is by its own functionaries or a private person. It would be preposterous to suggest that while the State is under an obligation to restrict a private citizen from violating the fundamental rights of other citizens, its own Minister can do so with impunity. However, the factum of violation would need to be established on the facts of a given case. It would involve a detailed inquiry into questions such as (a) whether the statement by the Minister was made in his personal or official capacity; (b) whether the statement was made on a public or private issue; (c) whether the statement was made on a public or private platform. In Amish Devgan vs. Union of India23, while dealing with hate speech, the impact of the speech of “a person of influence” such as a Government functionary, was explained. State of Maharashtra vs. Sarangdharsingh Shivdassingh Chavan24, provides a clear instance of direct interference with the investigation by a Chief Minister. The Court held the action of the Chief Minister to be “wholly unconstitutional” and contrary to the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and imposed costs on the State. The concurring opinion emphasizes the responsibility that the oath of office casts on the Minister under the Constitution. In Secretary, Jaipur Development Authority, Jaipur vs.
Daulat Mal Jain25, while dealing with a case involving the misuse of public office by a Minister, this Court elaborated on the responsibility and liability of the Ministerial office under the Constitution. The importance of the Oath of Office under the Constitution was also emphasized by the
23 (2021) 1 SCC 1
24 (2011) 1 SCC 577
25 (1997) 1 SCC 35
A B C D E F G H Constitution Bench in Manoj Narula vs. Union of India26. However, the Ministerial code of conduct was held to be not enforceable in a court of law in R. Sai Bharathi vs. J. Jayalalitha27, as it does not have any statutory force. An argument can be made that the Minister is personally bound by the oath of his office to bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of India under Articles 75(4) and 164(3) of the Constitution. The Constitution imposes a solemn obligation on the Minister as a Constitutional functionary to protect the fundamental rights of the citizens. The code of conduct for Ministers (Both for Union and States)
specifically lays down that the Code is in addition to the “. . . observance of the provisions of the Constitution, the Representation of the People Act, 1951”. Therefore, a Constitutional functionary is duty bound to act in a manner which is in consonance with this constitutional obligation of the State.
Question No. 5
(v) The State acts through its functionaries. Therefore, the official act of a Minister which violates the fundamental rights of the citizens, would make the State liable under constitutional tort. The principle of sovereign immunity of the State for the tortious acts of its servant, has been held to be inapplicable in the case of violation of fundamental rights. The principle of State liability under Constitutional tort was expounded in Nilabati Behera (supra). In Common Cause, A Registered Society vs. Union of India.28, the position in the case of a public functionary was explained. III.C. Written submissions of Shri Kaleeswaram Raj, Advocate for the SLP petitioner
11. Shri Kaleeswaram Raj, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in the special leave petition submitted an elaborate note. This note is divided into several chapters dealing with the nature and extent of the freedom of speech, the restrictions on the same, the horizontality
26 (2014) 9 SCC 1
27 (2004) 2 SCC 9
28 (1999) 6 SCC 667
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of fundamental rights, constitutional rights and constitutional values, statements made by Ministers and collective responsibility, self-regulation as the best mode of regulation, hate speech not being a protected speech and the way forward. The contents of this note are summarized as follows:-
(i) The Constitutional mandate of freedom of expression and free speech is to be preserved without imposing unconstitutional restrictions. It is a right available to everyone including political personalities.
(ii) But even while upholding such a right, efforts should be taken to frame a voluntary code of conduct for Ministers etc., to ensure better accountability and transparency;
(iii) There is an imperative need to evolve a device such as Ombudsman to act as a Constitutional check on the misuse of the freedom of expression by public functionaries using the apparatus of the State;
(iv) The right under Article 19(1)(a) is limited by restrictions expressly indicated in Article 19(2), under which the restrictions should be reasonable and must be provided for by law, by the State. Therefore this Court cannot provide for any additional restriction by an interpretative exercise or otherwise;
(v) It is too remote to suggest that the right of a victim under Article 21 stands violated if there is a statement by someone that the case was born out of political conspiracy. Therefore, there is actually no conflict of any other right with Article 21;
(vi) Unlike Article 25 which makes the right thereunder subject to public order, morality and health, Article 19(1)(a) does not contain such restrictions. As held by this Court in Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. vs. The Union of India29, freedom of speech can be restricted only in the interest of security of the State, friendly relations with foreign states, public order, decency or morality or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence. It cannot be
29 (1962) 3 SCR 842
A B C D E F G H curtailed, in the interest of the general public, as in the case of freedom to carry on business;
(vii) Restricting speech by public figures, such as politicians, on serious crimes will have great impact on the freedom of speech. Such criticism which calls out true conspiracies and true miscarriage of justice, plays an important role in a democracy;
(viii) In so far as the enforcement of fundamental rights against non-State actors is concerned, the vertical approach is giving way to the concept of horizontal application. The vertical approach connotes a situation where the enforceability is only against the Government and not against private actors. But with Nation States gradually moving from laissez faire governance to welfare governance, the role of the State is ever expanding, which justifies the shift.
(ix) While the South African Constitution has adopted a horizontal application by providing in Section 9(4) of the Bill of Rights of Final Constitution of 1996 that no person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds in terms of sub-Section (3) which sets out the grounds that bind the State, the judiciary itself has adopted a direct horizontal effect, in Ireland as could be seen from the decisions in John Meskell vs. Córas Iompair Éireann30 and Murtagh Properties Limited vs. Cleary31.
In John Meskell (supra), the Irish Supreme Court granted damages against the employer who dismissed the employee for not joining a particular union after serving a due notice to persuade him. In Murtagh Properties Limited (supra), the High Court recognized and enforced the right to earn livelihood without any discrimination based on sex against a private employer. Countries like Canada and Germany have developed indirect horizontal application, meaning thereby that the rights regulate the laws and statutes, which in turn regulate the conduct of citizens;
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(x) In the Indian context, direct horizontal effect has limited application as can be seen from Articles 15(2), 17 and 24;
(xi) Paradigm cases of horizontality should be distinguished from ordinary cases. For instance, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Shelly vs. Kraemer32 a covenant contained in a contract prohibiting the sale of houses in a neighbourhood to African- Americans, as unenforceable, for they have the effect of denying equal protection under the laws. The Federal Constitutional Court of Germany took a similar view in Lûth33 case (1958) where a call for boycott of a film directed by a person who had worked on anti-semitic Nazi propaganda was challenged. The German Court held that there was an objective order of values that must affect all spheres of law;
(xii) It has been repeatedly held by this Court that the power under Article 226 is available not only against the Government and its instrumentalities but also against “any person or authority”. A reference may be made in this regard to two decisions namely Praga Tools Corporation vs. Shri C.A. Imanual34 and Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotasav Smarak Trust vs.V.R. Rudani35;
(xiii) There are several instances where this Court has issued writs under Article 32 against non-State actors. Broadly those cases fall under two categories, namely, (i) private players performing public duties/functions; and (ii) non-State actors performing statutory activities that impact the rights of citizens. Cases which fall under these two categories have been held by this Court to be amenable to writ jurisdiction as seen from several decisions including M.C. Mehta vs. Union of India36. Absent any of these parameters, the Court has refused to exercise writ jurisdiction as seen from Binny Ltd. vs. V. Sadasivan.37; 32 334 U.S. 1 (1948)
33 Luth (1958) BVerfGE 7, 198
34 (1969) 1 SCC 585
35 (1989) 2 SCC 691
36 AIR 1987 SC 1086
37 (2005) 6 SCC 657
A B C D E F G H
(xiv) Even in jurisdictions where socio economic rights have been elevated in status to that of constitutional rights, the enforcement of those rights were made available only against the State and not against private actors, as held by this Court in Society for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan vs. Union of India38;
(xv) On the issue of potential conflict of rights, it is important to bear in mind the distinction between constitutional rights and constitutional values. On a formal level, values are understood teleologically as things to be promoted or maximized. Rights, on the other hand, are not to be promoted but rather to be respected. It would not show proper concern for a right to allow the violation of one right in order to prevent the violation of other rights. This would promote the non-violation of rights, but it would not respect rights39;
(xvi) Instead of values whose satisfaction is to be maximized, rights act as constraints on the actions of the state. They confer individuals with a sphere of liberty that is inviolable. Rights thereby act as restrictions on the government on how to pursue values, including constitutional values. It is, therefore, crucially important that we draw a distinction between the constitutional rights and constitutional values. Not every increase in liberty or every improvement in leading a dignified life is a constitutional right. This position has been accepted by this Court;
(xvii) As held by this Court in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy, the Court will strike a balance, wherever a conflict between two sets of fundamental rights is projected. Strictly speaking, what is actually conceived by some and noted in several decisions including Justice K.S. Puttaswamy, is not the conflict of rights in abstractum, at a doctrinal level, but the conflict in the notion/invocation/practice of rights;
(xviii) On the issue of statements made by Ministers and collective responsibility, a reference has to be made to Articles 75(3) and 164(2). Both these Articles speak of collective
38 (2012) 6 SCC 1
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responsibility of the Council of Ministers. Though the language employed in these Articles indicate that such a collective responsibility is to the House of the People/ Legislative Assembly, it is actually a responsibility to the people at large. Since every utterance by a Minister will have a direct bearing on the policy of the Government, there is an imperative need for a voluntary code of conduct. As pointed out by this Court in Common Cause (supra), collective responsibility has two meanings, namely, (i) that all members of the Council of Ministers are unanimous in support of its policies and exhibit such unanimity in public; and (ii) that they are personally and morally responsible for its success and failure;
(xix) Individual aberrations on the part of Ministers are serious threats to constitutional governance and as such the head of the Council of Ministers has a duty to ensure that such breaches do not happen;
(xx) A code of conduct to self-regulate the speeches and actions of Ministers is constitutionally justifiable and this Court can definitely examine its requirement. Ideally, a Minister is not supposed to breach his collective responsibility towards the Cabinet and the Legislature and hence, it is advisable to have a cogent code of conduct as occurring in advanced democracies;
(xxi) While it is not possible to impose additional restrictions on the freedom of speech, it is certainly desirable to have a code of conduct for public functionaries, as followed in other jurisdictions. The Court may keep in mind the fact that this Court in Sahara India Real Estate Corporation Limited (supra) cautioned against framing guidelines across the board to restrict the freedom of Press;
(xxii) Coming to hate speeches, there has been a steep increase in the number of hate speeches since 2014. From May- 2014 to date, there have been 124 reported instances of A B C D E F G H derogatory speeches by 45 politicians. Social media platforms have connived the proliferation of targeted hate speech. Such speeches provide fertile ground for incitement to violence;
(xxiii) On the role of the Court in dealing with the question of hate speech, the decisions in Pravasi Bhalai Sangathan vs.
Union of India40; Kodungallur Film Society vs. Union of India41 and Amish Devgan (supra) lay down broad parameters;
(xxiv) At the international level, the definition of hate speech was formulated in the UN Strategy and Plan of Action on Hate Speech, to mean “… any kind of communication in speech, writing or behavior, that attacks or uses pejorative or discriminatory language with reference to a person or a group on the basis of who they are, in other words, based on their religion, ethnicity, nationality, race, colour, descent, gender or other identity factor.”
The Role and Responsibilities of Political Leaders in Combating Hate Speech and Intolerance (Provisional version) dated 12 March 2019, was submitted by the Committee on Equality and Non-Discrimination to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. The Assembly passed the resolution adopting the text proposed by rapporteur Ms. Elvira Kovacs, Serbia;
(xxv) Finally, the way forward is, (i) for the legislature to adopt a voluntary model code of conduct for persons holding public offices, which would reflect Constitutional morality and values of good governance; and (ii) the creation of an appropriate mechanism such as Ombudsman, in accordance with the Venice principles and Paris principles. Till such an
40 (2014) 11 SCC 477
41 (2018) 10 SCC 713
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Ombudsman is constituted, the National and State Human Rights Commissions have to take pro-active measures, in terms of the provisions of Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993.
IV. Discussion and Analysis Question No. 1
12. Question No.1 referred to us, is as to whether the grounds specified in Article 19(2) in relation to which reasonable restrictions on the right to free speech can be imposed by law are exhaustive, or can restrictions on the right to free speech be imposed on grounds not found in Article 19(2) by invoking other fundamental rights?
History of evolution of clause (2) of Article 19
13. For finding an answer to this question, it may be necessary and even relevant to take a peep into history. Since Dr. B.R. Ambedkar’s original draft in this regard followed Article 40(6) of the Irish Constitution, the original draft of the Advisory Committee included restrictions such as public order, morality, sedition, obscenity, blasphemy and defamation. Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel suggested the inclusion of libel also. These restrictions were sought to be justified by citing the decision in Gitlow vs. New York42.
14. Since the country had witnessed large scale communal riots at that time, Sir Alladi Krishnaswamy Iyer forcefully argued for the inclusion of security and defence of the State or national security as one of the restrictions. Discussion also took place about restricting speech that is intended to spoil communal harmony and speech which is seditious in nature. With suggestions, counter suggestions and objections so articulated, the initial report of the Sub-Committee on Fundamental Rights underwent a lot of changes. The evolution of clauses (1) and (2) of Article 19 stage by stage, from the time when the draft report was submitted in April 1947, upto the time when the Constitution was adopted, can be presented in a tabular form43 as follows:
42 286 US 652 (1925)
43 Sourced from the article “Arguments from Colonial Continuity- the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951” (2008) of Burra, Arudra, Assistant Professor, Department of Humanities and Social Sciences , IIT (Delhi), A B C D E F G H 627KAUSHAL KISHOR v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.
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15. Immediately after the adoption of the Constitution, this Court had an occasion to deal with a challenge to an order passed by the Government of Madras in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 9(1-A) of the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, 194944, banning the entry and circulation of a weekly journal called ‘Cross Roads’ printed and published in Bombay. The ban order was challenged on the ground that it was violative of Article 19(1)(a). The validity of the statutory provision under which the ban order was issued, was also attacked on the basis of Article 13(1) of the Constitution. A Seven Member Constitution Bench of this Court, while upholding the challenge in Romesh Thappar vs. State of Madras45 held as follows: - “[12] We are therefore of opinion that unless a law restricting freedom of speech and expression is directed solely against the undermining of the security of the State or the overthrow of it, such law cannot fall within the reservation under clause (2) of Art. 19, although the restrictions which it seeks to impose may have been conceived generally in the interests of public order. …”
16. An argument was advanced in Romesh Thappar (supra) that Section 9(1-A) of the 1949 Act could not be considered wholly void, as the securing of public safety or maintenance of public order would include the security of the State and that therefore the said provision, as applied to the latter purpose was covered by Article 19(2). However, the said argument was rejected on the ground that where a law purports to authorise the imposition of restrictions on a fundamental right, in language wide enough to cover restrictions, both within or without the limits of Constitutionally permissible legislative action affecting such right, it is not possible to uphold it even so far as it may be applied within the Constitutional limits, as it is not severable.
17. On the same date on which the decision in Romesh Thappar was delivered, the Constitution Bench of this Court also delivered another judgment in Brij Bhushan vs. The State of Delhi46. It also arose out of a writ petition under Article 32 challenging an order passed by the Chief Commissioner of Delhi in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 7(1)(c) of the East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949, requiring the Printer and the Publisher as well as the Editor of an English weekly by name 44 1949 Act
45 AIR 1950 SC 124
46 AIR 1950 SC 129
A B C D E F G H ‘Organizer’, to submit for scrutiny, before publication, all communal matters and news and views about Pakistan including photographs and cartoons, other than those derived from the official sources. Following the decision in Romesh Thappar, the Constitution Bench held that the imposition of pre-censorship on a journal is a restriction on the liberty of the Press, which is an essential part of the right to freedom of speech and expression. The Bench went on to hold that Section 7(1)(c) of the East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949 does not fall within the reservation of clause (2) of Article 19.
18. After aforesaid two decisions, the Parliament sought to amend the Constitution through the Constitution (First Amendment) Bill, 1951. In the Statement of Objects and Reasons to the First Amendment, it was indicated that the citizen’s right to freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a) has been held by some Courts to be so comprehensive as not to render a person culpable, even if he advocates murder and other crimes of violence. Incidentally, the First Amendment also dealt with other issues, about which we are not concerned in this discussion. Clause (2) of Article 19 was substituted by a new clause under the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951. For easy appreciation of the metamorphosis that clause (2) of Article 19 underwent after the first amendment, we present in a tabular column, Article 19(2) pre-first amendment and post-first amendment as under: -
19. It is significant to note that Section 3(1)(a) of the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, declared that the newly substituted clause
(2) of Article 19 shall be deemed always to have been enacted in the amended form, meaning thereby that the amended clause (2) was given retrospective effect.
20. Another important feature to be noted in the amended clause
(2) of Article 19 is the inclusion of the words ‘reasonable restrictions’. Thus, the test of reasonableness was introduced by the first amendment KAUSHAL KISHOR v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.
[V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.] A B C D E F G H 630 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 8 S.C.R.
and the same fell for jural exploration within no time, in State of Madras vs. V.G. Row47. The said case arose out of a judgment of the Madras High Court quashing a Government Order declaring a society known as ‘ People’s Education Society’ as an unlawful association and also declaring as unconstitutional, Section 15(2)(b) of the Indian Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908, as amended by the Indian Criminal Law Amendment (Madras) Act, 1950. While upholding the judgment of the Madras High Court, this Court indicated as to how the test of reasonableness has to be expounded. The relevant portion of the judgment reads as follows: - “23. It is important in this context to bear in mind that the test of reasonableness, wherever prescribed, should be applied to each individual statute impugned, and no abstract standard, or general pattern of reasonableness can be laid down as applicable to all cases. The nature of the right alleged to have been infringed, the underlying purpose of the restrictions imposed, the extent and urgency of the evil sought to be remedied thereby, the disproportion of the imposition, the prevailing conditions at the time, should all enter into the judicial verdict. In evaluating such elusive factors and forming their own conception of what is reasonable, in all the circumstances of a given case, it is inevitable that the social philosophy and the scale of values of the Judges participating in the decision should play an important part, and the limit to their interference with legislative judgment in such cases can only be dictated by their sense of responsibility and self-restraint and the sobering reflection that the Constitution is meant not only for people of their way of thinking but for all, and that the majority of the elected representatives of the people have, in authorizing the imposition of the restrictions, considered them to be reasonable.”
21. After the First Amendment to the Constitution, the country witnessed cries for secession, with parochial tendencies showing their ugly head, especially from a southern State. Therefore, a National Integration Conference was convened in September-October, 1961 to find ways and means to combat the evils of communalism, casteism,
47 (1952) 1 SCC 410
A B C D E F G H regionalism, linguism and narrow mindedness. This Conference decided to set up the National Integration Council. Accordingly, it was constituted in 1962. The constitution of the Council assumed significance in the wake of the Sino-India war in 1962. This National Integration Council had a Committee on national integration and regionalism. This Committee recommended two amendments to the Constitution, namely, (i) the amendment of clause (2) of Article 19 so as to include the words “the sovereignty and integrity of India” as one of the restrictions; and (ii) the amendment of 8 Forms of oath or affirmation contained in the Third Schedule. Until 1963, no one taking a constitutional oath was required to swear that they would “uphold the sovereignty and integrity of India”. But, the Constitution (Sixteenth Amendment) Act, 1963 expanded the forms of oath to ensure that “every candidate for the membership of a State Legislature or Parliament, and every aspirant to, and incumbent of, public office” – to quote its Statement of Objects and Reasons – “pledges himself . . . to preserve the integrity and sovereignty of the Union of India.” Thus, by the Constitution (Sixteenth Amendment) Act, 1963, “the sovereignty and integrity of India”, was included as an additional ground of restriction on the right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a).
22. Having seen the history of evolution of clause (2) of Article 19, let us now turn to the first question.
Two parts of Question No.1
23. Question No.1 is actually in two parts. The first part raises a poser as to whether reasonable restrictions on the right to free speech enumerated in Article 19(2) could be said to be exhaustive. The second part of the Question raises a debate as to whether additional restrictions on the right to free speech can be imposed on grounds not found in Article 19(2), by invoking other fundamental rights.
First part of Question No.1
24. The judicial history of the evolution of clause (2) of Article 19 which we have captured above shows that lot of deliberations went into the articulation of the restrictions now enumerated. The draft Report of the Sub-Committee on Fundamental Rights itself underwent several changes until the Constitution was adopted in November, 1949. In the form in which the Constitution was adopted in 1949, the restrictions related to (i) libel; (ii) slander; (iii) defamation; (iv) contempt of court; KAUSHAL KISHOR v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.
[V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.] A B C D E F G H 632 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 8 S.C.R.
(v) any matter which offends against decency or morality; and (vi) any matter which undermines the security of the State or tends to overthrow the State.
25. After the 1st and 16th Amendments, the emphasis is on reasonable restrictions relating to, (i) interests of sovereignty and integrity of India; (ii) the security of the State; (iii) friendly relations with foreign states; (iv) public order; (v) decency or morality; (vi) contempt of court;
(vii) defamation; and (viii) incitement to an offence.
26. A careful look at these eight heads of restrictions would show that they save the existing laws and enable the State to make laws, restricting free speech with a view to afford protection to (i) individuals (ii) groups of persons (iii) sections of society (iv) classes of citizens (v) the Court (vi) the State and (vii) the country. This can be demonstrated by providing in a table, the provisions of the Indian Penal Code that make some speech or expression a punishable offence, thereby impeding the right to free speech, the heads of restriction under which they fall and the category/class of person/persons sought to be protected by the restriction:
Table of Provisions under IPC restricting freedom of speech and expression 48 Subject matter of challenge pending before this Court. A B C D E F G H 633KAUSHAL KISHOR v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.
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A B C D E F G H
27. We have taken note of, in the above Table, only the provisions of the Indian Penal Code that curtail free speech. There are also other special enactments such as The Scheduled Castes and The Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, The Prevention of Insults to National Honour Act, 1971 etc., which also impose certain restrictions on free speech. From these it will be clear that the eight heads of restrictions contained in clause (2) of Article 19 are so exhaustive that the laws made for the purpose of protection of the individual, sections of society, classes of citizens, court, the country and the State have been saved.
28. The restrictions under clause (2) of Article 19 are comprehensive enough to cover all possible attacks on the individual, groups/classes of people, the society, the court, the country and the State. This is why this Court repeatedly held that any restriction which does not fall within the four corners of Article 19(2) will be unconstitutional. For instance, it was held by the Constitution Bench in Express Newspapers (Private) Ltd. vs. The Union of India49, that a law enacted by the legislature, which does not come squarely within Article 19(2) would be struck down as unconstitutional. Again, in Sakal Papers (supra), this Court held that the State cannot make a law which directly restricts one freedom even for securing the better enjoyment of another freedom.
29. That the Executive cannot transgress its limits by imposing an additional restriction in the form of Executive or Departmental instruction was emphasised by this Court in Bijoe Emmanuel vs. State of Kerala50.
49 1959 SCR 12
KAUSHAL KISHOR v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.
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The Court made it clear that the reasonable restrictions sought to be imposed must be through “a law” having statutory force and not a mere Executive or Departmental instruction. The restraint upon the Executive not to have a back-door intrusion applies equally to Courts. While Courts may be entitled to interpret the law in such a manner that the rights existing in blue print have expansive connotations, the Court cannot impose additional restrictions by using tools of interpretation. What this Court can do and how far it can afford to go, was articulated by B. Sudharshan Reddy, J., in Ram Jethmalani (supra) as follows: “85. An argument can be made that this Court can make exceptions under the peculiar circumstances of this case, wherein the State has acknowledged that it has not acted with the requisite speed and vigour in the case of large volumes of suspected unaccounted for monies of certain individuals. There is an inherent danger in making exceptions to fundamental principles and rights on the fly. Those exceptions, bit by bit, would then eviscerate the content of the main right itself. Undesirable lapses in upholding of fundamental rights by the legislature, or the executive, can be rectified by assertion of constitutional principles by this Court. However, a decision by this Court that an exception could be carved out remains permanently as a part of judicial canon, and becomes a part of the constitutional interpretation itself. It can be used in the future in a manner and form that may far exceed what this Court intended or what the constitutional text and values can bear. We are not proposing that Constitutions cannot be interpreted in a manner that allows the nation-State to tackle the problems it faces. The principle is that exceptions cannot be carved out willy-nilly, and without forethought as to the damage they may cause.
86.One of the chief dangers of making exceptions to principles that have become a part of constitutional law, through aeons of human experience, is that the logic, and ease of seeing exceptions, would become entrenched as a part of the constitutional order. Such logic would then lead to seeking exceptions, from protective walls of all fundamental
50 (1986) 3 SCC 615
A B C D E F G H rights, on grounds of expediency and claims that there are no solutions to problems that the society is confronting without the evisceration of fundamental rights. That same logic could then be used by the State in demanding exceptions to a slew of other fundamental rights, leading to violation of human rights of citizens on a massive scale.”
30. Again, in Secretary, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, Govt. of India vs. Cricket Association of Bengal51, this Court cautioned that the restrictions on free speech can be imposed only on the basis of Article 19(2). In Ramlila Maidan Incident, in re.52, this Court developed a three-pronged test namely, (i) that the restriction can be imposed only by or under the authority of law and not by exercise of the executive power; (ii) that such restriction must be reasonable; and (iii) that the restriction must be related to the purposes mentioned in clause (2) of Article 19.
31. That the eight heads of restrictions contained in clause (2) of Article 19 are exhaustive can be established from another perspective also. The nature of the restrictions on free speech imposed by law/ judicial pronouncements even in countries where a higher threshold is maintained, are almost similar. To drive home this point, we are presenting in the following table, a comparative note relating to different jurisdictions:
51 (1995) 2 SCC 161
52 (2012) 5 SCC 1
KAUSHAL KISHOR v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.
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A B C D E F G H
32. Since the eight heads of restrictions contained in clause (2) of Article 19 seek to protect:
(i) the individual – against the infringement of his dignity, reputation, bodily autonomy and property;
(ii) different sections of society professing and practicing, different religious beliefs/sentiments - against offending their beliefs and sentiments;
(iii) classes/groups of citizens belonging to different races, linguistic identities etc.- against an attack on their identities;
(iv) women and children – against the violation of their special rights;
(v) the State - against the breach of its security;
(vi) the country - against an attack on its sovereignty and integrity;
(vii) the Court – against an attempt to undermine its authority, we think that the restrictions contained in clause (2) of Article 19 are exhaustive and no further restriction need to be incorporated.
33. In any event, the law imposing any restriction in terms of clause (2) of Article 19 can only be made by the State and not by the Court. The role envisaged in the Constitutional scheme for the Court, is to be a gate-keeper (and a conscience keeper) to check strictly KAUSHAL KISHOR v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.
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the entry of restrictions, into the temple of fundamental rights. The role of the Court is to protect fundamental rights limited by lawful restrictions and not to protect restrictions and make the rights residual privileges. Clause (2) of Article 19 saves (i) the operation of any existing law; and (ii) the making of any law by the State. Therefore, it is not for us to add one or more restrictions than what is already found. Second part of Question No.1
34. The second part of Question No.1 is as to whether additional restrictions on the right to free speech can be imposed on grounds not found in Article 19(2) by invoking other fundamental rights.
35. This part of Question No.1 already stands partly answered while dealing with the first part of Question No.1. The decisions of this Court in Express Newspapers (Private) Ltd. (supra), the Cricket Association of Bengal (supra)and Ramlila Maidan Incident, in re. (supra), provide a complete answer to the question whether additional restrictions on the right to free speech can be imposed on grounds not found in Article 19(2).
36. The question whether additional restrictions can peep into Article 19(2), by invoking other fundamental rights, also stands answered by this Court in Sakal Papers. In Sakal Papers, the Central Government issued an order called Daily Newspaper (Price and Page) Order, 1960 in exercise of the power conferred under the Newspaper (Price and Page) Act, 1956, fixing the maximum number of pages that might be published by a newspaper according to the price charged. Therefore, the publisher of a Marathi Newspaper challenged the constitutionality of both the Act and the Order. One of the arguments raised on behalf of the State in the said case was that there are two aspects of the activities of newspapers namely, (i) the dissemination of news and views; and (ii) the commercial aspect. While the former would fall under Article 19(1)(a), the latter would fall under Article 19(1)(g).
37. Since these two rights are independent and since the restrictions on the right under Article 19(1)(g) can be placed in the interest of the general public under Article 19(6), it was contended by the State in Sakal Papers that the Act and the Order are saved by clause (6) of Article 19. But the said argument of the State was rejected by the Constitution Bench in Sakal Papers, in the following words:
A B C D E F G H “It may well be within the power of the State to place, in the interest of the general public, restrictions upon the right of a citizen to carry on business but it is not open to the State to achieve this object by directly and immediately curtailing any other freedom of that citizen guaranteed by the Constitution and which is not susceptible of abridgement on the same grounds as are set out in cl. (6) of Art. 19. Therefore, the right of freedom of speech cannot be taken away with the object of placing restrictions on the business activities of a citizen. Freedom of speech can be restricted only in the interests of the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign State, public order, decency or morality or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence. It cannot, like the freedom to carry on business, be curtailed in the interest of the general public. If a law directly affecting it is challenged it is no answer that the restrictions enacted by it are justifiable under cls. (3) to (6). For, the scheme of Art. 19 is to enumerate different freedoms separately and then to specify the extent of restrictions to which they may be subjected and the objects for securing which this could be done. A citizen is entitled to enjoy each and every one of the freedoms together and cl. (1) does not prefer one freedom to another. That is the plain meaning of this clause. It follows from this that the State cannot make a law which directly restricts one freedom even for securing the better enjoyment of another freedom. All the greater reason, therefore, for holding that the State cannot directly restrict one freedom by placing an otherwise permissible restriction on another freedom.”
38. We are conscious of the fact that Sakal Papers was a case where the petitioner before the Court had two different fundamental rights and the law made by the State fell within the permitted restrictions upon the exercise of one of those two fundamental rights. However, the restriction traceable to clause (6) of Article 19 was not available in clause
(2) of Article 19. It is in such circumstances that this Court held that the restriction validly imposed upon the exercise of one fundamental right cannot automatically become valid while dealing with another fundamental right of the same person, the restriction of which stands Constitutionally on different parameters.
39. In Sakal Papers the conflict was neither between one individual’s fundamental right qua another individual’s fundamental right KAUSHAL KISHOR v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.
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nor one fundamental right qua another fundamental right of the same individual. It was a case where a restriction validly made upon a fundamental right was held invalid qua another fundamental right of the same individual. In the cases on hand, what is sought to be projected is a possible conflict arising out of the exercise of a fundamental right by one individual, in a manner infringing upon the free exercise of the fundamental right of another person. But this conflict is age old.
40. The exercise of all fundamental rights by all citizens is possible only when each individual respects the other person’s rights. As acknowledged by the learned Attorney General and Ms. Aparjita Singh, learned Amicus, this Court has always struck a balance whenever it was found that the exercise of fundamental rights by an individual, caused inroads into the space available for the exercise of fundamental rights by another individual. The emphasis even in the Preamble on “fraternity” is an indication that the survival of all fundamental rights and the survival of democracy itself depends upon mutual respect, accommodation and willingness to co-exist in peace and tranquility on the part of the citizens. Let us now see a few examples. The Fundamental Duty enjoined upon every citizen of the country under Article 51-A (e) to “promote harmony and the spirit of common brotherhood amongst all the people of India transcending religious, linguistic and regional or sectional diversities and to renounce practices derogatory to the dignity of women”, is also an indicator that no one can exercise his fundamental right in a manner that infringes upon the fundamental right of another.
41. As articulated by Jeevan Reddy, J. in Cricket Association of Bengal, no one can exercise his right of speech in such a manner as to violate another man’s right. In paragraph 152 of the decision in Cricket Association of Bengal, Jeevan Reddy, J. said : “Indeed it may be the duty of the State to ensure that this right is available to all in equal measure and that it is not hijacked by a few to the detriment of the rest. This obligation flows from the Preamble to our Constitution, which seeks to secure all its citizens liberty of thought, expression, belief and worship………...Under our Constitutional scheme, the State is not merely under an obligation to respect the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part-III but under an equal obligation to ensure conditions in which those rights can be meaningfully and effectively enjoyed by one and all.”
A B C D E F G H
42. The above passage from the opinion of Jeevan Reddy, J., in Cricket Association of Bengal, was quoted with approval by the Constitution Bench in Sahara India Real Estate Corporation Limited case.
43. There are several instances where this Court either struck a balance or placed on a slightly higher pedestal, the fundamental right of one over that of the other. Interestingly, the competing claims arose in many of those cases, in the context of Article 19(1)(a) right of one person qua Article 21 right of another. Let us now take a look at some of them.
(i) In R. Rajagopal (supra), the rights pitted against one another were the freedom of expression under Article 19(1)(a) and the right to privacy of the Officers of the Government under Article 21. This Court propounded:
“26. We may now summarise the broad principles flowing from the above discussion:
(1) The right to privacy is implicit in the right to life and liberty guaranteed to the citizens of this country by Article 21. It is a “right to be let alone”. A citizen has a right to safeguard the privacy of his own, his family, marriage, procreation, motherhood, child-bearing and education among other matters. None can publish anything concerning the above matters without his consent — whether truthful or otherwise and whether laudatory or critical. If he does so, he would be violating the right to privacy of the person concerned and would be liable in an action for damages. Position may, however, be different, if a person voluntarily thrusts himself into controversy or voluntarily invites or raises a controversy.
(2) The rule aforesaid is subject to the exception, that any publication concerning the aforesaid aspects becomes unobjectionable if such publication is based upon public records including court records. This is for the reason that once a matter becomes a matter of public record, the right to privacy no longer subsists and it becomes a legitimate subject for comment by press and media among others. We are, however, of the opinion KAUSHAL KISHOR v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.
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that in the interests of decency [Article 19(2)] an exception must be carved out to this rule, viz., a female who is the victim of a sexual assault, kidnap, abduction or a like offence should not further be subjected to the indignity of her name and the incident being publicised in press/media.
(3) There is yet another exception to the rule in (1) above — indeed, this is not an exception but an independent rule. In the case of public officials, it is obvious, right to privacy, or for that matter, the remedy of action for damages is simply not available with respect to their acts and conduct relevant to the discharge of their official duties. This is so even where the publication is based upon facts and statements which are not true, unless the official establishes that the publication was made (by the defendant) with reckless disregard for truth. In such a case, it would be enough for the defendant (member of the press or media) to prove that he acted after a reasonable verification of the facts; it is not necessary for him to prove that what he has written is true. Of course, where the publication is proved to be false and actuated by malice or personal animosity, the defendant would have no defence and would be liable for damages. It is equally obvious that in matters not relevant to the discharge of his duties, the public official enjoys the same protection as any other citizen, as explained in (1) and (2) above. It needs no reiteration that judiciary, which is protected by the power to punish for contempt of court and Parliament and legislatures protected as their privileges are by Articles 105 and 104 respectively of the Constitution of India, represent exceptions to this rule.
(4) So far as the Government, local authority and other organs and institutions exercising governmental power are concerned, they cannot maintain a suit for damages for defaming them.
(5) Rules 3 and 4 do not, however, mean that Official Secrets Act, 1923, or any similar enactment or provision having the force of law does not bind the press or media. A B C D E F G H
(6) There is no law empowering the State or its officials to prohibit, or to impose a prior restraint upon the press/ media.”
(ii) In People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) (supra), the rights that were perceived as competing with each other were the right to privacy of the spouse of a candidate contesting election qua the voter’s right to information. In his separate but near concurring opinion, P. Venkatarama Reddi, J. articulated the position thus:
“121. … …When there is a competition between the right to privacy of an individual and the right to information of the citizen, the former right has to be subordinated to the latter right as it serves the larger public interest. …”
(iii) In Noise Pollution (V.), in Re (supra), the rights that competed with one another, were the rights enshrined in Article 19(1)(a) and Article 21. The clash was between individuals and the persons in the neighborhood. This Court held:
“11. Those who make noise often take shelter behind Article 19(1)(a) pleading freedom of speech and right to expression. Undoubtedly, the freedom of speech and right to expression are fundamental rights but the rights are not absolute. Nobody can claim a fundamental right to create noise by amplifying the sound of his speech with the help of loudspeakers. While one has a right to speech, others have a right to listen or decline to listen. Nobody can be compelled to listen and nobody can claim that he has a right to make his voice trespass into the ears or mind of others. Nobody can indulge into aural aggression. If anyone increases his volume of speech and that too with the assistance of artificial devices so as to compulsorily expose unwilling persons to hear a noise raised to unpleasant or obnoxious levels, then the person speaking is violating the right of others to a peaceful, comfortable and pollution-free life guaranteed KAUSHAL KISHOR v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.
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by Article 21. Article 19(1)(a) cannot be pressed into service for defeating the fundamental right guaranteed by Article 21. …”
(iv) In Ram Jethmalani the right to know, inhering in Article 19(1)(a) and the right to privacy under Article 21, were seen to be in conflict. Right to privacy was asserted by individuals holding bank accounts in other countries. The court had to balance the same with the citizens’ right to know. This Court propounded as follows:
“84. The rights of citizens, to effectively seek the protection of fundamental rights, under clause (1)
of Article 32 have to be balanced against the rights of citizens and persons under Article 21. The latter cannot be sacrificed on the anvil of fervid desire to find instantaneous solutions to systemic problems such as unaccounted for monies, for it would lead to dangerous circumstances, in which vigilante investigations, inquisitions and rabble rousing, by masses of other citizens could become the order of the day. The right of citizens to petition this Court for upholding of fundamental rights is granted in order that citizens, interalia, are ever vigilant about the functioning of the State in order to protect the constitutional project. That right cannot be extended to being inquisitors of fellow citizens. An inquisitorial order, where citizens’ fundamental right to privacy is breached by fellow citizens is destructive of social order. The notion of fundamental rights, such as a right to privacy as part of right to life, is not merely that the State is enjoined from derogating from them. It also includes the responsibility of the State to uphold them against the actions of others in the society, even in the context of exercise of fundamental rights by those others.”
(v) In Sahara India Real Estate Corporation Limited freedom of press and the right to fair trial were the competing rights. In this case, the Constitution Bench was dealing with a question whether an order for postponement of publication of the proceedings pending before a Court, would constitute A B C D E F G H a restriction under Article 19(1)(a) and as to whether such restriction is saved under Article 19(2). This question was answered by the Constitution Bench in para 42 as follows: “42. At the outset, we must understand the nature of such orders of postponement. Publicity postponement orders should be seen in the context of Article 19(1)(a) not being an absolute right. The US clash model based on collision between freedom of expression (including free press) and the right to a fair trial will not apply to the Indian Constitution. In certain cases, even the accused seeks publicity (not in the pejorative sense) as openness and transparency is the basis of a fair trial in which all the stakeholders who are a party to a litigation including the Judges are under scrutiny and at the same time people get to know what is going on inside the courtrooms. These aspects come within the scope of Article 19(1) and Article 21. When rights of equal weight clash, the Courts have to evolve balancing techniques or measures based on recalibration under which both the rights are given equal space in the constitutional scheme and this is what the “postponement order” does, subject to the parameters mentioned hereinafter. But, what happens when the courts are required to balance important public interests placed side by side. For example, in cases where presumption of open justice has to be balanced with presumption of innocence, which as stated above, is now recognised as a human right.
These presumptions existed at the time when the Constitution was framed [existing law under Article 19(2)] and they continue till date not only as part of rule of law under Article 14 but also as an Article 21 right. The constitutional protection in Article 21 which protects the rights of the person for a fair trial is, in law, a valid restriction operating on the right to free speech under Article 19(1)(a), by virtue of force of it being a constitutional provision. Given that the postponement orders curtail the freedom of expression of third parties, such orders have to be passed only in cases in which there is real and substantial risk of prejudice to fairness KAUSHAL KISHOR v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.
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of the trial or to the proper administration of justice which in the words of Justice Cardozo is “the end and purpose of all laws”. However, such orders of postponement should be ordered for a limited duration and without disturbing the content of the publication. They should be passed only when necessary to prevent real and substantial risk to the fairness of the trial (court proceedings), if reasonable alternative methods or measures such as change of venue or postponement of trial will not prevent the said risk and when the salutary effects of such orders outweigh the deleterious effects to the free expression of those affected by the prior restraint. The order of postponement will only be appropriate in cases where the balancing test otherwise favours non-publication for a limited period. …”
(vi) In Thalapplam Service Cooperative Bank Ltd. (supra), theright to know held as part of Article 19(1)(a) and the right to privacy being part of Article 21 were perceived as competing with each other, in a matter between holders of accounts in cooperative banks and members of the public who wanted details. This Court in paragraph 64 held:
“64. Recognising the fact that the right to privacy is a sacrosanct facet of Article 21 of the Constitution, the legislation has put a lot of safeguards to protect the rights under Section 8(j), as already indicated. If the information sought for is personal and has no relationship with any public activity or interest or it will not subserve larger public interest, the public authority or the officer concerned is not legally obliged to provide those information. Reference may be made to a recent judgment of this Court in Girish Ramchandra Deshpande v. Central Information Commr., (2013) 1 SCC 212, wherein this Court held that since there is no bona fide public interest in seeking information, the disclosure of said information would cause unwarranted invasion of privacy of the individual under Section 8(1)(j) of the Act. Further, if the authority finds that information sought for can be made available in the larger public interest, then A B C D E F G H the officer should record his reasons in writing before providing the information, because the person from whom information is sought for, has also a right to privacy guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution.”
(vii) In Subramanian Swamy (supra), the right to freedom of speech of an individual guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) qua the right to dignity and reputation of another individual guaranteed under Article 21 were the competing rights. In this case, the Court held as follows:
“98. Freedom of speech and expression in a spirited democracy is a highly treasured value. Authors, philosophers and thinkers have considered it as a prized asset to the individuality and overall progression of a thinking society, as it permits argument, allows dissent to have a respectable place, and honours contrary stances. There are proponents who have set it on a higher pedestal than life and not hesitated to barter death for it. Some have condemned compelled silence to ruthless treatment. William Dougles has denounced regulation of free speech like regulating diseased cattle and impure butter. The Court has in many an authority having realised its precious nature and seemly glorified sanctity has put it in a meticulously structured pyramid. Freedom of speech is treated as the thought of the freest who has not mortgaged his ideas, may be wild, to the artificially cultivated social norms; and transgression thereof is not perceived as a folly. Needless to emphasise, freedom of speech has to be allowed specious castle, but the question is: should it be so specious or regarded as so righteous that it would make reputation of another individual or a group or a collection of persons absolutely ephemeral, so as to hold that criminal prosecution on account of defamation negates and violates right to free speech and expression of opinion…”
(viii) In Asha Ranjan (supra), the right to free trial, of an accused vis-à-vis the victim, came up for consideration. The Court propounded in paragraph 61:
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“61. Be it stated, circumstances may emerge that may necessitate for balancing between intra-fundamental rights. It has been distinctly understood that the test that has to be applied while balancing the two fundamental rights or inter fundamental rights, the principles applied may be different than the principle to be applied in intraconflict between the same fundamental right. To elaborate, as in this case, the accused has a fundamental right to have a fair trial under Article 21 of the Constitution. Similarly, the victims who are directly affected and also form a part of the constituent of the collective, have a fundamental right for a fair trial. Thus, there can be two individuals both having legitimacy to claim or assert the right. The factum of legitimacy is a primary consideration. It has to be remembered that no fundamental right is absolute and it can have limitations in certain circumstances. Thus, permissible limitations are imposed by the State. The said limitations are to be within the bounds of law. However, when there is intraconflict of the right conferred under the same article, like fair trial in this case, the test that is required to be applied, we are disposed to think, it would be “paramount collective interest” or “sustenance of public confidence in the justice dispensation system”. An example can be cited. A group of persons in the name of “class honour”, as has been stated in Vikas Yadav v. State of U.P., (2016) 9 SCC 541: (2016) 3 SCC (Cri) 621], cannot curtail or throttle the choice of a woman. It is because choice of woman in choosing her partner in life is a legitimate constitutional right. It is founded on individual choice that is recognised in the Constitution under Article 19, and such a right is not expected to succumb to the concept of “class honour” or “group thinking”. It is because the sense of class honour has no legitimacy even if it is practised by the collective under some kind of a notion. Therefore, if the collective interest or the public interest that serves the public cause and further has the legitimacy to claim or assert a fundamental right, then only it can put forth that their right should be A B C D E F G H protected. There can be no denial of the fact that the rights of the victims for a fair trial is an inseparable aspect of Article 21 of the Constitution and when they assert that right by themselves as well as the part of the collective, the conception of public interest gets galvanised. The accentuated public interest in such circumstances has to be given primacy, for it furthers and promotes “Rule of Law”. …”
(ix) In Railway Board representing the Union of India vs. Niranjan Singh53, a trade union worker was charged of the misconduct of addressing meetings within the railway premises, in contravention of the directions issued by the employer. When he sought protection under clauses (a),
(b) and (c) of Article 19(1), this Court rejected the same by holding “that the exercise of those freedoms will come to an end as soon as the right of someone else to hold his property intervenes.” This Court went on to state that “the validity of that limitation is not to be judged by the test prescribed in sub-Articles (2) and (3) of Article 19”.
(x) In Life Insurance Corporation of India vs. Prof.
Manubhai D. Shah54, two fundamental rights were not competing or in conflict with each other. But the right to free speech and the right to propagate one’s ideas, in the context of censorship under the Cinematograph Act, 1952 and in the context of a State institution refusing to publish an Article in an in-house magazine were in question. In Paragraph 23 of the Report, this Court said: “every right has a corresponding duty or obligation and so is the fundamental right of speech and expression. The freedom conferred by Article 19(1((a) is therefore not absolute as perhaps in the case of the US First Amendment: it carries with it certain responsibilities towards fellow citizens and society at large. A citizen who exercises this right must remain conscious that his fellow citizen too has a similar right. Therefore, the right must be so exercised as not to come in direct conflict with the right of another citizen.”
53 (1969) 1 SCC 502
54 (1992) 3 SCC 637
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44. The series of decisions discussed above shows that whenever two or more fundamental rights appeared either to be on a collision course or to be seeking preference over one another, this Court has dealt with the same by applying well-established legal tools. Therefore, we are of the view that under the guise of invoking other fundamental rights, additional restrictions, over and above those prescribed in Article 19(2), cannot be imposed upon the exercise of one’s fundamental rights.
45. In fine, we answer Question No.1 in the following manner: “The grounds lined up in Article 19(2) for restricting the right to free speech are exhaustive. Under the guise of invoking other fundamental rights or under the guise of two fundamental rights staking a competing claim against each other, additional restrictions not found in Article 19(2), cannot be imposed on the exercise of the right conferred by Article 19(1)(a) upon any individual.”
Question No.2
46. The second question referred to us is as to whether a fundamental right under Article 19 or 21 can be claimed against anyone other than the State or its instrumentalities. Actually, the question is not about “claim” but about “enforceability”.
47. To use the phraseology adopted by the philosophers of Law, the question on hand is as to whether Part III of the Constitution has a “vertical” or “horizontal” effect. Wherever Constitutional rights regulate and impact only the conduct of the Government and Governmental actors, in their dealings with private individuals, they are said to have “a vertical effect”. But wherever Constitutional rights impact even the relations between private individuals, they are said to have “a horizontal effect”.
48. In his scholarly article, “The ‘Horizontal Effect’ of Constitutional Rights”, published in Michigan Law Review (Volume 2. Issue 3, 2003) Stephen Gardbaum, states that the horizontal position has been adopted to varying degrees in Ireland, Canada, Germany, South Africa and European Union. According to the learned author, this issue has also been the topic of sustained debate in the United Kingdom following the enactment of the Human Rights Act of 199855. 55 Interestingly The Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 was enacted in India five years before a similar Act came in United Kingdom.
A B C D E F G H
49. No jurisdiction in the world appears to be adopting, at least as on date, a purely vertical approach or a wholly horizontal approach. A vertical approach provides weightage to individual autonomy, choice and privacy, while the horizontal approach seeks to imbibe Constitutional values in all individuals. These approaches which appear to be bipolar opposites, raise the age-old question of ‘individual vs. society’.
50. Even in countries where the individual reigns supreme, as in the United States, the Thirteenth Amendment making slavery and involuntary servitude a punishable offence, has actually made inroads into individual autonomy. Therefore, some scholars think that the Thirteenth Amendment provided a shift from the ‘purely vertical’ approach in a direct way. Subsequently, an indirect effect of the horizontality was found in certain decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, two of which are of interest.
51. After the American Civil War (1861-1865), the Reconstruction Era began in the United States. During this period, the Fourteenth Amendment came (1866-1868) followed by the Civil Rights Act, 1875 (also called Enforcement Act or Force Act). This Civil Rights Act, 1875 entitled everyone, to access accommodation, public transport and theaters regardless of race or color. Finding that despite the Act, they were excluded from “whites only” facilities in hotels, theaters etc., the victims of discrimination (African-Americans) filed cases. All those five cases were tagged together and the U.S. Supreme Court held in (year 1883) what came to be known as “Civil Rights Cases”56 that the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments did not empower Congress to outlaw racial discrimination by private individuals. But after nearly 85 years, this decision was overturned in Jones vs. Alfred H. Mayer Co57 wherein it was held that Congress could regulate sale of private property to prevent racial discrimination. This was done in terms of 42 U.S. Code § 1982 which entitled all citizens of the United States to have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.
52. But a good 20 years before the decision in Jones (supra) was delivered, the U.S. Supreme Court had an occasion to consider a clash between contractual rights and Constitutional rights. It was in Shelly (supra) where an African-American family (Shellys) who purchased a 56 109 US 3 (1883)
57 392 US 409 (1968)
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property in a neighbourhood in St. Louis, Missouri was sought to be restrained from taking possession, because of a racially restrictive covenant contained in an Agreement of the year 1911 to which a majority of property owners in the neighbourhood were parties. The covenant restricted the sale of any property or part thereof for a term of 50 years to African-Americans and Asian-Americans. The Missouri Supreme Court upheld the racially restricted covenant. But the U.S. Supreme Court reversed it holding that the enforcement of such covenants violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In other words the contractual rights were trumped by the Constitutional obligations.
53. Then came the decision in New York Times vs. Sullivan58. It was a case where the City Commissioner in Montgomery, Alabama filed an action for libel against the New York Times for publishing an allegedly defamatory statement in a paid advertisement. The jury awarded damages and the judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Alabama. However, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the decision and held that the First Amendment which prohibited a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to the public official’s official conduct except in the case of actual malice, bound the plaintiff from exercising his private right.
54. The above decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court were seen by scholars as indicating a shift from a ‘purely vertical approach’ to a ‘horizontal approach’.
55. While the U.S. Constitution represented (to begin with) a purely vertical approach, the Irish Constitution was found to be on the opposite side of the spectrum, with the rights provided therein having horizontal effect. Article 40 of the Irish Constitution deals with Personal Rights under the Chapter “Fundamental Rights”. Sub-Article (3) of Article 40 states that “The State guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate the personal rights of the citizen”. In other words, two rights are guaranteed namely
(i) respect for the personal rights of the citizen; and (ii) to defend and vindicate the personal rights of its citizen.
56. The second clause of sub-Article (3) of Article 40 of the Irish Constitution states that “The State shall, in particular, by its laws protect 58 376 U.S. 254 (1964)
A B C D E F G H as best it may from unjust attack and, in the case of injustice done, vindicate the life, person, good name, and property rights of every citizen”.
57. The above provisions have been interpreted by the Irish Supreme Court as imposing a positive obligation on all State actors, including the Courts to protect and enforce the rights of individuals. It appears that full horizontal effect was given by the Irish Supreme Court to Constitutional rights such as freedom of association, freedom from sex discrimination and the right to earn a livelihood. For instance, the Irish Supreme Court had an occasion to consider in John Meskell, the Constitutional rights of citizens to form associations and unions guaranteed by Article 40.6.1. This case arose out of an agreement reached between certain trade unions and the employer to terminate the services of all workers and to reemploy them on condition that they agree to be members of the specified trade unions at all times. One employee whose services were terminated was not reemployed, as he refused to accept the special condition. Therefore, he sued the company for damages and claimed a declaration that his dismissal was a violation of the Constitutional rights. Holding that the Constitutional right of citizens to form associations and unions necessarily recognized a correlative right to abstain from joining associations and unions, the Irish Supreme Court awarded damages on the ground that the non-State actors actually violated the Constitutional right of the plaintiff. In other words, the Constitutional rights were considered to have horizontal effect.
58. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 also provides horizontal effect to certain rights. Section 8.2 of the said Constitution states: “A provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or a juristic person if, and to the extent that, it is applicable, taking into account the nature of the right and the nature of any duty imposed by the right.”
59. The manner in which Section 8.2 has to be applied is spelt out in Section 8.3. The same reads thus:
“8. Application …..
3. When applying a provision of the Bill of Rights to a natural or juristic person in terms of subsection (2), a court - KAUSHAL KISHOR v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.
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a. in order to give effect to a right in the Bill, must apply, or if necessary develop, the common law to the extent that legislation does not give effect to that right; and b. may develop rules of the common law to limit the right, provided that the limitation is in accordance with section 36(1).”
60. Section 9 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa guarantees equality before law and equal protection and the benefit of the law to everyone. Section 9.3 mandates the State not to unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone, on one or more grounds including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language, and birth. If Section 9.3 is a mandate against the State, what follows in Section 9.4 is a mandate against every person. Section 9.4 reads as follows:
“9. Equality …..
4. No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds in terms of sub-section (3). National legislation must be enacted to prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination.”
61. Again, Section 10 recognises the right to human dignity. While doing so, it employs a language, which applies to non-State actors also. Section 10 states that “Everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity respected and protected”.
62. During the period from April 1994 to February 1997, when the Republic of South Africa had an Interim Constitution, the Constitutional Court of South Africa had an occasion to deal with a defamation action in Du Plessis and Others vs. De Klerk and Another59. The defamation action was instituted by an Airline company, against a newspaper for publishing an article implicating the Airline in the unlawful supply of arms to UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola). After the Interim Constitution came into force, the defendant-newspaper raised a defence that they were insulated against the defamation action, under Section 15 of the Constitution which protected the freedom of the press.
59 1996 ZACC 10
A B C D E F G H The Transvaal Provincial Division of the Supreme Court referred two issues to the Constitutional Court. One of the issues was whether Chapter 3 (fundamental rights) of the Constitution was applicable to legal relationships between private parties. The majority (11:2) of the Court held that Chapter 3 could not be applied directly to the common law in actions between private parties. But they left open the question whether there were particular provisions of the Chapter that could be so applied. However, the Court held that in terms of Section 35(3) of the Interim Constitution, Courts were obliged in the application and development of common law, to have due regard to the spirit, purport and objects of Chapter 3. The majority held that it was the task of the Supreme Court to apply and develop the common law as required by Section 35(3).
63. Interestingly, the dissenting opinion given by Kriegler, J. became the subject matter of lot of academic debate. To begin with, Kriegler, J. rejected the idea that the debate was one of “verticality versus horizontality”. He said that Chapter 3 rights do not operate only as against the State but also horizontally as between individuals where Statutes are involved. Calling “direct horizontality” as a bogeyman, Kriegler, J. said as follows:
“The Chapter has nothing to do with the ordinary relationships between private persons or associations. What it does govern, however, is all law, including that applicable to private relationships. Unless and until there is a resort to law, private individuals are at liberty to conduct their private affairs exactly as they please as far as the fundamental rights and freedoms are concerned. As far as the Chapter is concerned a landlord is free to refuse to let a flat to someone because of race, gender or whatever; a white bigot may refuse to sell property to a person of colour; a social club may blackball Jews, Catholics or Afrikaners if it so wishes. An employer is at liberty to discriminate on racial grounds in the engagement of staff; a hotelier may refuse to let a room to a homosexual; a church may close its doors to mourners of a particular colour or class. But none of them can invoke the law to enforce or protect their bigotry. One cannot claim rescission of a contract or specific performance thereof if such claim, albeit well-founded at common law, infringes a KAUSHAL KISHOR v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.
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Chapter 3 right. One cannot raise a defence to a claim in law if such defence is in conflict with a protected right or freedom. The whole gamut of private relationships is left undisturbed. But the state, as the maker of the laws, the administrator of laws and the interpreter and applier of the law, is bound to stay within the four corners of Chapter 3. Thus, if a man claims to have the right to beat his wife, sell his daughter into bondage or abuse his son, he will not be allowed to raise as a defence to a civil claim or a criminal charge that he is entitled to do so at common law, under customary law or in terms of any statute or contract. That is a far cry from the spectre of the state placing its hand on private relationships. On the contrary, if it were to try to do so by legislation or administrative action, sections 4, 7(1) and the whole of Chapter 3 would stand as a bastion of personal rights.”
64. After the Final Constitution was adopted and it came into force on February 4, 1997, the first case to come up on this issue was Khumalo vs. Holomisa60. In this case, Bantu Holomisa, the leader of the South African opposition political party sued a newspaper for publishing an article alleging as though he was under a police investigation for his involvement with a gang of bank robbers. Heavy reliance was placed in this case on the majority decision of the Constitutional Court of South Africa in Du Plessis (supra). But as pointed out earlier, Du Plessis was a case which was decided at a time when South Africa had only an Interim Constitution. Therefore, while dealing with Khumalo (supra), the Constitutional Court of South Africa applied the Final Constitution, as it had come into force by then. What is relevant for our purpose is the opinion of the Constitutional Court in paragraph 33 which dealt with the enforcement of the rights against non-State actors. Paragraph 33 reads thus:
“[33] In this case, the applicants are members of the media who are expressly identified as bearers of constitutional rights to freedom of expression. There can be no doubt that the law of defamation does affect the right to freedom of expression. Given the intensity of the constitutional right in question, coupled with the potential invasion of that right which could
60 (2002) ZACC 12
A B C D E F G H be occasioned by persons other than the state or organs of state, it is clear that the right to freedom of expression is of direct horizontal application in this case as contemplated by section 8(2) of the Constitution. The first question we need then to determine is whether the common law of defamation unjustifiably limits that right. If it does, it will be necessary to develop the common law in the manner contemplated by section 8(3) of the Constitution.”
65. The horizontal effect was taken to another extreme by the Constitutional Court of South Africa in Governing Body of the Juma Musjid Primary School & Others vs. Essay N.O. and Others61 wherein it was held that an eviction order obtained by the owner of a private land on which a public school was located, could not be enforced as it would impact the students’ right to basic education and the best interests of the child under the South African Constitution (Sections 28 and 29). The Court held that a private landowner and non-State actor has a Constitutional obligation not to impair the right to basic education under Section 29 of the Constitution. The relevant portion reads thus: “[57] In order to determine whether the right to a basic education in terms of section 29(1)(a) binds the Trust, section 8(2) requires that the nature of the right of the learners to a basic education and the duty imposed by that right be taken into account. From the discussion in the previous paragraphs of the general nature of the right and the MEC’s obligation in relation to it, the form of the duty that the right to a basic education imposed on the Trustees emerges. It is clear that there is no primary positive obligation on the Trust to provide basic education to the learners. That primary positive obligation rests on the MEC. There was also no obligation on the Trust to make its property available to the MEC for use as a public school. A private landowner may do so, however, in accordance with section 14(1) of the Act which provides that a public school may be provided on private property only in terms of an agreement between the MEC and the owner of the property. [58] This Court, in Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, made it clear 61 (CCT 29/10) [2011] ZACC 13; 2011 (8) BCLR 761 (CC)
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that socio-economic rights (like the right to a basic education) may be negatively protected from improper invasion. Breach of this obligation occurs directly when there is a failure to respect the right, or indirectly, when there is a failure to prevent the direct infringement of the right by another or a failure to respect the existing protection of the right by taking measures that diminish that protection. It needs to be stressed however that the purpose of section 8(2) of the Constitution is not to obstruct private autonomy or to impose on a private party the duties of the state in protecting the Bill of Rights. It is rather to require private parties not to interfere with or diminish the enjoyment of a right. Its application also depends on the intensity of the constitutional right in question, coupled with the potential invasion of that right which could be occasioned by persons other than the State or organs of State.”
66. Coming to the United Kingdom, they ratified the European Convention on Human Rights in 1951. But the rights conferred by the Convention had to be enforced by British citizens only in the European Court of Human Rights, for a long time. Finding that it took an average of five years to get an action in the European Court of Human Rights after all domestic remedies are exhausted and also finding that on an average, the same costed £30,000, a white paper was submitted in 1997 under the title “Rights Brought Home”. This led to the enactment of the Human Rights Act, 1998 by the Parliament of the United Kingdom. It came into force on 2.10.2000 (coincidentally Gandhi Jayanti Day). This Act sought to incorporate into the domestic law, the rights conferred by the European Convention, so that the citizens need not go to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. After the enactment of the Human Rights Act, the horizontal effect of Convention Rights became the subject matter of debate in several cases.
67. For instance, Douglas vs. Hello! Ltd.62 was a case where the right to privacy of an individual was pitted against the right of free speech and expression. In that case, a magazine called OK! was given the exclusive right to publish the photographs of the wedding reception of a celebrity couple that took place at New York. On the day of the wedding, certain paparazzo had infiltrated the venue and took few 62 [2001] QB 967 A B C D E F G H unauthorized photographs which were shared with potential competitor viz. Hello! Ltd. (another magazine). Hello! published the photographs in the next issue of their magazine even before Ok! could publish it. The question before the Court of Appeal (Civil Division) was whether there was violation of right to privacy, among others and whether it could be enforced against a private person. The Court said:
“49. It follows that the ECtHR has recognised an obligation on member states to protect one individual from an unjustified invasion of private life by another individual and an obligation on the courts of a member state to interpret legislation in a way which will achieve that result.
50. Some, such as the late Professor Sir William Wade, in Wade & Forsyth Administrative Law (8th Ed.) p 983, and Jonathan Morgan, in Privacy, Confidence and Horizontal Effect:” Hello” Trouble (2003) CLJ 443, contend that the Human Rights Act should be given ‘full, direct, horizontal effect’. The courts have not been prepared to go this far.… …
102. To summarise our conclusion at this stage:
disregarding the effect of the OK! contract, we are satisfied that the Douglases’ claim for invasion of their privacy falls to be determined according to the English law of confidence. That law, as extended to cover private and personal information, protected information about the Douglases’ wedding.”
68. In X vs. Y63, the Court of Appeals dealt with the case of an employee X, who was cautioned by the Police for committing a sex offence with another man in a public bathroom. The offence occurred when X was off duty. On finding about the incident, the employer Y suspended X and dismissed him after a disciplinary hearing. The dismissal was challenged as violative of Convention Rights. An argument was raised that these rights are not enforceable against private parties. Though on facts, the claim of the dismissed employee was dismissed, the legal issue was articulated by the Court thus:
63 [2004] EWCA Civ 662 KAUSHAL KISHOR v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.
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“55. The applicant invoked articles 8 and 14 of the Convention in relation to his cause of action in private law.
(1) As appears from the authorities cited in section C above, article 8 is not confined in its effect to relations between individuals and the state and public authorities. It has been interpreted by the Strasbourg court as imposing a positive obligation on the state to secure the observance and enjoyment of the right between private individuals.
(2) If the facts of the case fall within the ambit of article 8, the state is also under a positive obligation under article 14 to secure to private individuals the enjoyment of the right without discrimination, including discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation.
(3) A person’s sexual orientation and private sex life fall within the scope of the Convention right to respect for private life (see ADT v. UK [2000] 2 FLR 697) and the right to non-discrimination in respect that right. Interference with the right within article 8.1 has to be justified under article 8.2.”
69. In Plattform “Ärzte Für Das Leben” vs. Austria64, a question arose as to the enforceability of the right to freedom of assembly against non-State actors, who obstructed the assembly. The case arose out of these facts. On 28 December 1980, the anti-abortion NGO “Ärzte für das Leben” (Physicians for Life) organised a religious service and a march to the clinic of a doctor who carried out abortions in Stadl-Paura. A number of counter-demonstrators disrupted the march to the hillside by mingling with the marchers and shouting down their recitation. At the end of the ceremony, special riot-control units – which had until then been standing by – formed a cordon between the opposing groups. One person caught in the act of throwing eggs was fined. The association lodged a disciplinary complaint against police for failing to protect the demonstration, which was refused. When the matter was taken to the Constitutional Court, it held that it had no jurisdiction over the case. Therefore, the association applied to the European Commission on 13 September 1982, alleging violation of Articles 9 (conscience and religion), 10 (expression), 11 (association) and 13 (effective remedy) of the European Convention on Human Rights. The European Court on Human Rights held:
64 [1988] ECHR 15 A B C D E F G H “32. A demonstration may annoy or give offence to persons opposed to the ideas or claims that it is seeking to promote. The participants must, however, be able to hold the demonstration without having to fear that they will be subjected to physical violence by their opponents; such a fear would be liable to deter associations or other groups supporting common ideas or interests from openly expressing their opinions on highly controversial issues affecting the community. In a democracy the right to counter-demonstrate cannot extend to inhibiting the exercise of the right to demonstrate.
Genuine, effective freedom of peaceful assembly cannot, therefore, be reduced to a mere duty on the part of the State not to interfere: a purely negative conception would not be compatible with the object and purpose of Article 11 (art. 11). Like Article 8 (art. 8), Article 11 (art. 11) sometimes requires positive measures to be taken, even in the sphere of relations between individuals, if need be (see, mutatis mutandis, the X and Y v. the Netherlands judgment of 26 March 1985, Series A no. 91, p. 11, § 23)”
70. In X and Y vs. The Netherlands65, a privately-run home for children with mental disabilities was sued on the ground that a 16-yearold inmate was subjected to sexual assault. When the case was dismissed by the domestic court on a technical plea, the father of the victim approached the European Court of Human Rights. ECHR outlined the extent of State obligation on the protection of the right to life even against private persons as follows:
“23. The Court recalls that although the object of Article 8 (art. 8) is essentially that of protecting the individual against arbitrary interference by the public authorities, it does not merely compel the State to abstain from such interference: in addition to this primarily negative undertaking, there may be positive obligations inherent in an effective respect for private or family life (see the Airey judgment of 9 October 1979, Series A no. 32, p. 17, para. 32). These obligations may involve the adoption of measures designed to secure respect for private life even in the sphere of the relations of individuals between themselves.”
65 [1985] ECHR 4 KAUSHAL KISHOR v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.
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71. Having taken an overview of the theoretical aspect of “verticality vs horizontality” and the approach of Constitutional Courts in other jurisdictions, let us now come back to the Indian context.
72. Part-III of the Indian Constitution begins with Article 12 which defines the expression “the State” to include the Government and the Parliament of India and the Government and the Legislature of each of the States and all local or other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India.
73. After defining the expression “the State” in Article 12 and after declaring all laws inconsistent with or in derogation of the fundamental rights to be void under Article 13, Part-III of the Constitution proceeds to deal with rights. There are some Articles in Part-III where the mandate is directly to the State and there are other Articles where without injuncting the State, certain rights are recognized to be inherent, either in the citizens of the country or in persons. In fact, there are two sets of dichotomies that are apparent in the Articles contained in Part III. One set of dichotomy is between (i) what is directed against the State; and (ii) what is spelt out as inhering in every individual without reference to the State. The other dichotomy is between (i) citizens; and (ii) persons. This can be illustrated easily in the form of a table as follows:
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A B C D E F G H
74. The above table would show that some of the Articles of Part-III are in the form of a directive to the State, while others are not. This is an indication that some of the rights conferred by Part-III are to be honored by and also enforceable against, non-State actors.
75. For instance, the rights conferred by Articles 15(2)(a) and (b), 17, 20(2), 21, 23, 24, 29(2) etc., are obviously enforceable against non- State actors also. The owner of a shop, public restaurant, hotel or place of entertainment, though a non-State actor cannot deny access to a citizen of India on grounds only of religion, race etc., in view of Article 15(2)(a). So is the case with wells, tanks, bathing ghats, roads and places of public resort maintained wholly or partly out of State funds or dedicated to the use of general public, in view of Article 15(2)(b). The right not to be enforced with any disability arising out of untouchability is available against non-State actors under Article 17. The right against double jeopardy, and the right against self-incrimination available under sub-Articles (2) and (3) of Article 20 may also be available even against non-State actors in the case of prosecution on private complaints. We need not elaborate more, as the table given above places all rights in perspective.
76. That takes us to the question as to how the Courts in India have dealt with cases where there were complaints of infringement by non-State actors, of fundamental rights, other than those covered in column 2 of the Table in para 73 above. To begin with, this Court was weary of extending the enforcement of fundamental rights against private individuals. But this reluctance changed over a period of time. Let us now see how the law evolved:
(i) In P.D. Shamdasani (supra), a Five Member Bench of this Court was dealing with a writ petition under Article 32, filed by a person who lost a series of proceedings both civil and otherwise, against the Central Bank of India Limited, which was at that time a company incorporated under Companies Act. The grievance of the petitioner in that case was that the shares held by him in the company were sold by the bank in exercise of its right of lien for recovery of a debt. Therefore, the petitioner pitched his claim under Article 19(1)(f) and Article 31(1)(which was available at that time). But while making a comparison between Article 31(1) (as it stood at that time) and Article 21, both of which contained a declaration in the same negative form, this Court KAUSHAL KISHOR v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.
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observed in P.D. Shamdasani as follows: “There is no express reference to the State in Article 21. But could it be suggested on that account that that Article was intended to afford protection to life and personal liberty against violation by private individuals? The words “except by procedure established by law” plainly exclude such a suggestion”.
(ii) The aforesaid principle in P.D. Shamdasani was reiterated by another Five Member Bench of this Court in Smt. Vidya Varma vs. Dr. Shiv Narain Varma66 holding that the language of Article 31(1) and Article 21 are similar and that they do not apply to invasions of a right by a private individual and that consequently no writ will lie in such cases.
(iii) In Sukhdev Singh vs. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi67 two questions arose before a Constitution Bench of this Court. One of the questions was whether an employee of a statutory corporation is entitled to protection of Articles 14 and 16 against the corporation on the premise that these statutory corporations are authorities within the meaning of Article 12. In his separate but concurring opinion, Mathew, J. pointed out that the concept of State has undergone drastic changes in recent years and that today State cannot be conceived of simply as a coercive machinery wielding the thunderbolt of authority. The learned Judge quoted the decision of the US Supreme Court in Marsh vs. Alabama68, where a person who was a Jehovah’s witness was arrested for trespassing and distributing pamphlets, in a company town owned by a corporation. Though the property in question was private, the Court said that the operation of a town was a public function and that therefore, the private rights of the corporation must be exercised within constitutional limitations. After quoting the decision in Marsh, K.K. Mathew, J. went on to hold as follows:
“95. But how far can this expansion go? Except in very few cases, our Constitution does not, through its own
66 AIR 1956 SC 108
67 (1975) 1 SCC 421
68 326 US 501 (1946)
A B C D E F G H force, set any limitation upon private action. Article 13(2) provides that no State shall make any law which takes away or abridges the rights guaranteed by Part III. It is the State action of a particular character that is prohibited. Individual invasion of individual right is not, generally speaking, covered by Article 13(2). In other words, it is against State action that fundamental rights are guaranteed. Wrongful individual acts unsupported by State authority in the shape of laws, customs, or judicial or executive proceeding are not prohibited.
Articles 17, 23 and 24 postulate that fundamental rights can be violated by private individuals and that the remedy under Article 32 may be available against them. But, by and large, unless an act is sanctioned in some way by the State, the action would not be State action. In other words, until some law is passed or some action is taken through officers or agents of the State, there is no action by the State…”
(iv) In People’s Union for Democratic Rights (supra) this Court pointed out that the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 24 is enforceable against everyone, including the contractors. The Court went a step further by holding that the Union of India, the Delhi Administration and the Delhi Development Authority have a duty to ensure that this Constitutional obligation is obeyed by the contractors. Going further, this Court held that certain fundamental rights such as those found in Articles 17, 23 and 24 are enforceable against the whole world.
(v) S. Rangarajan (supra) was a case where a division Bench of the Madras High Court revoked the ‘U’ certificate issued to a Tamil feature film, on the ground that it offended the reservation policy. The Government of Tamil Nadu supported the decision of the High Court on the ground that several organizations in Tamil Nadu were agitating that the film should be banned as it hurt the sentiments of people belonging to the reserved categories. After pointing out that this Court was amused and troubled by the stand taken by the State Government, this Court indicated that KAUSHAL KISHOR v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.
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it is the duty of the State to protect the freedom of expression since it is a liberty granted against the State and that the State cannot plead its inability to handle the hostile audience problem. Holding that the State cannot negate the rule of law and surrender to blackmail and intimidation, this Court said that it the obligatory duty of the Court to prevent it and protect the freedom.
(vi) In Smt. Nilabati, this Court made a distinction between,
(i) the decision in Kasturi Lal upholding the State’s plea of sovereign immunity for tortious acts of its servants, which was confined to the sphere of liability in tort; and
(ii) the State’s liability for contravention of fundamental rights to which the doctrine of sovereign immunity has no application in the constitutional scheme. In paragraph 34, which contains the separate but concurring opinion of Dr. A.S. Anand, J., the law was summarised as follows:- “34. The public law proceedings serve a different purpose than the private law proceedings. The relief of monetary compensation, as exemplary damages, in proceedings under Article 32 by this Court or under Article 226 by the High Courts, for established infringement of the indefeasible right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution is a remedy available in public law and is based on the strict liability for contravention of the guaranteed basic and indefeasible rights of the citizen. The purpose of public law is not only to civilize public power but also to assure the citizen that they live under a legal system which aims to protect their interests and preserve their rights. Therefore, when the court moulds the relief by granting “compensation”
in proceedings under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution seeking enforcement or protection of fundamental rights, it does so under the public law by way of penalising the wrongdoer and fixing the liability for the public wrong on the State which has failed in its public duty to protect the fundamental rights of the citizen. The payment of compensation in such cases is not to be understood, as it is generally understood in a civil action for damages A B C D E F G H under the private law but in the broader sense of providing relief by an order of making ‘monetary amends’ under the public law for the wrong done due to breach of public duty, of not protecting the fundamental rights of the citizen. The compensation is in the nature of ‘exemplary damages’ awarded against the wrongdoer for the breach of its public law duty and is independent of the rights available to the aggrieved party to claim compensation under the private law in an action based on tort, through a suit instituted in a court of competent jurisdiction or/and prosecute the offender under the penal law.”
(vii) In Lucknow Development Authority vs. M.K. Gupta69 this Court pointed out that the administrative law of accountability of public authorities for their arbitrary and even ultra vires actions has taken many strides and that it is now accepted by both by this Court and English Courts that the State is liable to compensate for the loss or injury suffered by a citizen due to arbitrary actions of its employees.
(viii) The decision in Bodhisattwa Gautam (supra), arose under special circumstances. A girl student of a college lodged a complaint against a Lecturer for alleged offences under Sections 312, 420, 493, 496 and 498-A IPC. The Lecturer moved the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing the complaint. The High Court dismissed the quash petition. When the Lecturer filed a special leave petition, this Court not only dismissed the SLP but also issued notice suo motu on the question as to why he should not be asked to pay reasonable monthly maintenance during the pendency of the prosecution. Finally, this Court ordered payment of a monthly interim compensation after holding that what was violated was the fundamental right of the women under Article 21 and that therefore a remedy can be provided by this Court under Article 32 even against the nonstate actor (namely the accused). This decision was cited with approval in Chairman, Railway Board & Ors. vs.
Chandrima Das (Mrs.) & Ors.70.
69 (1994) 1 SCC 243
70 (2000) 2 SCC 465
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(ix) As rightly highlighted by the learned amicus, this Court has awarded damages against non-State actors under the environmental law regime, whenever they were found to have violated the right under Article 21. For instance this Court was concerned with a case in M.C. Mehta vs. Kamal Nath71 where a company built a club on the banks of River Beas, partly taken on lease from the Government and partly by encroaching into forest land and virtually turning the course of the River. Invoking the “polluter pays principle” and “precautionary principle” landscaped in Vellore Citizens’ Welfare Forum vs. Union of India72 and also applied in Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action vs.
Union of India73, this Court held the owner of the private motel to be liable to pay compensation towards the cost of restoration of the ecology of the area. Thereafter, a show cause notice was issued to the motel as to why they should not be asked to pay compensation to reverse the degraded environment and as to why a pollution fine should not be imposed. In response, the motel contended before this Court that though in proceedings under Article 32 it was open to this Court to grant compensation to the victims whose fundamental rights were violated or who are victims of arbitrary Executive action or victims of atrocious behavior of public authorities, the Court cannot impose any fine on those who are guilty of that action. The motel also contended that fine is a component of criminal jurisprudence and hence the imposition of fine would be violative of Articles 20 and
21. This Court, even while accepting the said argument in so far as the component of fine is concerned, directed the issue of fresh notice to the motel to show cause why exemplary damages be not awarded, in addition to the damages already awarded. Thereafter, this Court held in M.C. Mehta vs. Kamal Nath (supra at footnote no.15) as follows:- “10. In the matter of enforcement of fundamental rights under Article 21, under public law domain, the Court, in
71 (1997) 1 SCC 388
72 (1996) 5 SCC 647
73 (1996) 3 SCC 212
A B C D E F G H exercise of its powers under Article 32 of the Constitution, has awarded damages against those who have been responsible for disturbing the ecological balance either by running the industries or any other activity which has the effect of causing pollution in the environment. The Court while awarding damages also enforces the “POLLUTER-PAYS PRINCIPLE” which is widely accepted as a means of paying for the cost of pollution and control. To put in other words, the wrongdoer, the polluter, is under an obligation to make good the damage caused to the environment.”
(x) In Consumer Education & Research Centre & Ors. vs.
Union of India &Ors.74, this Court held that in appropriate cases the Court could give appropriate directions to the employer, be it the State or its undertaking or private employer, to make the right to life meaningful, to prevent pollution of work place, protection of environment, protection of the health of the workmen and to preserve free and unpolluted water for the safety and health of the people. The Court was dealing in that case with the occupational health hazards and diseases afflicting the workmen employed in asbestos industries. In paragraph 29 of the Report, this Court said, “…It is therefore settled law that in public law claim for compensation is a remedy available under Article 32 or Article 226 for the enforcement and protection of fundamental and human rights. … It is a practical and inexpensive mode of redress available for the contravention made by the State, its servants, its instrumentalities, a company or a person in the purported exercise of their powers and enforcement of the rights claimed either under the statutes or licence issued under the statute or for the enforcement of any right or duty under the Constitution or the law.”
(xi) In Vishaka vs. State of Rajasthan.75, this Court laid down guidelines, in the absence of a legislation, for the enforcement
74 (1995) 3 SCC 42
75 (1997) 6 SCC 241
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of the right to gender equality of working women, in a class action petition that was filed to enforce fundamental rights of working women and to prevent sexual harassment of women in workplace. The guidelines imposed an obligation upon both public and private employers not to violate the fundamental rights guaranteed to working women under Article 14, 15, 19(1)(g) and 21. In Medha Kotwal Lele & Ors. vs. Union of India76, this Court noted that even after 15 years of the judgment in Vishaka (supra), many States had not made the necessary amendments or failed to effectively implement the guidelines. This Court issued a direction in Paragraph 44.4 :
“44.4 The State functionaries and private and public sector undertakings/organisations/bodies/ institutions, etc. shall put in place sufficient mechanism to ensure full implementation of Vishaka [Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, (1997) 6 SCC 241 : 1997 SCC (Cri) 932] guidelines and further provide that if the alleged harasser is found guilty, the complainant victim is not forced to work with/under such harasser and where appropriate and possible the alleged harasser should be transferred. Further provision should be made that harassment and intimidation of witnesses and the complainants shall be met with severe disciplinary action.”
(xii) In Githa Hariharan (Ms.) & Anr. vs. Reserve Bank of India & Anr.77, this Court was dealing with a challenge to Section 6(a) of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 and Section 19(b) of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 which declared the father to be the natural guardian of the person and property of a minor son and unmarried daughter. The mother was recognised as the natural guardian under these provisions “after the father”. These provisions resulted in hardship to spouses separated from each other while dealing with the wards. Reading the obligations of the State under certain International Conventions like CEDAW into the right to dignity of women and gender
76 (2013) 1 SCC 297
77 (1999) 2 SCC 228
A B C D E F G H equality, traceable to Article 21 and 14, this Court read down the word “after” to mean “in the absence of”. By such interpretation, this Court invoked fundamental rights to interpret a word in the sphere of family law.
(xiii) In Indian Medical Association vs. Union of India.78, the policy of an Army College of Medical Sciences to admit only those who are wards of army personnel, based on scores obtained in an entrance test, was under challenge. The question that came up for consideration was whether this discriminatory practice by a private entity would be in violation of Article 15 of the Constitution. This Court in Paragraph 187 stated:
“187. Inasmuch as education, pursuant to T.M.A. Pai [(2002) 8 SCC 481], is an occupation under sub-clause
(g) of clause (1) of Article 19, and it is a service that is offered for a fee that takes care of all the expenses of the educational institution in rendering that service, plus a reasonable surplus, and is offered to all those amongst the general public, who are otherwise qualified, then such educational institutions would also be subject to the discipline of clause (2) of Article 15. In this regard, the purport of the above exposition of clause (2) of Article 15, when read in the context of egalitarian jurisprudence inherent in Articles 14, 15, 16 and Article 38, and read with our national aspirations of establishing a society in which equality of status and opportunity, and justice, social, economic and political, would imply that the private sector which offers such facilities ought not to be conducting their affairs in a manner which promote existing discriminations and disadvantages.”
(xiv) In Society for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan (supra), the constitutionality of Section 12 of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 was challenged on the ground that it violated Articles 19(1)(g) and 30 of those who had established schools in the private
78 (2011) 7 SCC 179
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sector. While upholding the Constitutionality of the provision, which required all schools, private and State-funded, to reserve 25% of its intake for students from disadvantaged background, this Court held:
“222. The provisions referred to above and other provisions of international conventions indicate that the rights have been guaranteed to the children and those rights carry corresponding State obligations to respect, protect and fulfil the realisation of children’s rights. The obligation to protect implies the horizontal right which casts an obligation on the State to see that it is not violated by non-State actors. For non-State actors to respect children’s rights casts a negative duty of nonviolation to protect children’s rights and a positive duty on them to prevent the violation of children’s rights by others, and also to fulfil children’s rights and take measures for progressive improvement. In other words, in the spheres of non-State activity there shall be no violation of children’s rights.”
(xv) In Jeeja Ghosh vs. Union of India79, the petitioner, a disabled person suffering from cerebral palsy, was unceremoniously ordered off a SpiceJet aircraft by the flight crew on account of the disability. The petition was filed for putting in place a system to ensure such a violation of human dignity and inequality is not meted out to similarly placed persons. This Court observed as follows:
“10. It is submitted by the petitioner that the Union of India (Respondent 1) has an obligation to ensure that its citizens are not subject to such arbitrary and humiliating discrimination. It is a violation of their fundamental rights, including the right to life, right to equality, right to move freely throughout the territory of India, and right to practise their profession. The State has an obligation to ensure that these rights are protected — particularly for those who are disabled. …”
79 (2016) 7 SCC 761
A B C D E F G H This Court awarded compensation to the petitioner against the private Airline on the ground that the airline, though a private enterprise, ought not to have violated her fundamental right.
(xvi) In Zee Telefilms Ltd. vs. Union of India80, this Court held that though BCCI does not fall within the purview of the term “State”, it discharges public duties and that therefore even if a remedy under Article 32 is not available, the aggrieved party can always seek a remedy before the ordinary courts of law or by way of a writ petition under Article 226. This Court pointed out that the violator of a constitutional right could not go scot-free merely because it is not a State. The said logic was extended by this Court to a “Deemed to be University” in Janet Jeyapaul vs. SRM University81, on the ground that though it is a private university, it was discharging “public functions”, by imparting education.
77. All the above decisions show that on a case-to-case basis, this Court applied horizontal effect, considering the nature of the right violated and the extent of obligation on the part of the violator. But to enable the courts to have certain basic guidelines in place, for dealing with such cases, this Court developed a tool in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy. While affirming the right to privacy as a fundamental right, this Court laid down the landscape as follows:
“397. Once we have arrived at this understanding of the nature of fundamental rights, we can dismantle a core assumption of the Union’s argument: that a right must either be a common law right or a fundamental right. The only material distinctions between the two classes of right—of which the nature and content may be the same—lie in the incidence of the duty to respect the right and in the forum in which a failure to do so can be redressed. Common law rights are horizontal in their operation when they are violated by one’s fellow man, he can be named and proceeded against in an ordinary court of law. Constitutional and fundamental rights, on the other hand, provide remedy against the violation of a valued interest by the “State”, as an
80 (2005) 4 SCC 649
81 (2015) 16 SCC 530
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abstract entity, whether through legislation or otherwise, as well as by identifiable public officials, being individuals clothed with the powers of the State. It is perfectly possible for an interest to simultaneously be recognised as a common law right and a fundamental right. Where the interference with a recognised interest is by the State or any other like entity recognised by Article 12, a claim for the violation of a fundamental right would lie. Where the author of an identical interference is a non-State actor, an action at common law would lie in an ordinary court.
398. Privacy has the nature of being both a common law right as well as a fundamental right. Its content, in both forms, is identical. All that differs is the incidence of burden and the forum for enforcement for each form.”
78. Thus, the answer to Question No. 2 is partly found in the 9- Judge Bench decision in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy itself. We have seen from the line of judicial pronouncements listed above that after A.K. Gopalan vs. State of Madras82 lost its hold, this Court has expanded the width of Article 21 in several areas such as health, environment, transportation, Education and Prisoner’s life etc. As Vivian Bose, J., put it in a poetic language in S. Krishnan vs State of Madras83 "Brush aside for a moment the pettifogging of the law and forget for the nonce all the learned disputations about this and that, and “and” or “or “, or “may” and “must “. Look past the mere verbiage of the words and penetrate deep into the heart and spirit of the Constitution.”. The original thinking of this Court that these rights can be enforced only against the State, changed over a period of time. The transformation was from “State” to “Authorities” to “instrumentalities of State” to “agency of the Government” to “impregnation with Governmental character” to “enjoyment of monopoly status conferred by State” to “deep and pervasive control”84 to the “nature of the duties/ functions performed”85. Therefore, we would answer Question No. 2 as follows:
82 AIR 1950 SC 27
83 AIR 1951 SC 301
84 R.D. Shetty vs International Airport Authority (1979) 3 SCC 489 85 Andi Mukta vs V.R. Rudani (1989) 2 SCC 691 A B C D E F G H “A fundamental right under Article 19/21 can be enforced even against persons other than the State or its instrumentalities”
Question No. 3
79. “Whether the State is under a duty to affirmatively protect the rights of a citizen under Article 21 of the Constitution of India even against a threat to the liberty of a citizen by the acts or omissions of another citizen or private agency?” is the third question referred to us.
80. Before we proceed further, it is necessary to make a small correction. Article 21 right is available not only to citizens but to all persons. Therefore, the word ‘citizen’ mentioned in Question No.3 has to be read as ‘person’.
81. As we have pointed out in the Table under paragraph 73 above, the expression “the State” is not used in Article 21. This Article 21 guarantees every person that he shall not be deprived of his life and liberty except according to the procedure established by law. Going by the scheme of Part-III which we have outlined both in the preceding paragraphs and in the Table in paragraph 73, it is clear that the State has two obligations, (i) not to deprive a person of his life and liberty except according to procedure established by law; and (ii) to ensure that the life and liberty of a person is not deprived even otherwise. Article 21 does not say “the State shall not deprive a person of his life and liberty”, but says that “no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty”.
82. When the Constitution was adopted, our understanding of the words “life” and “personal liberty” was not as it has evolved over the past seven decades. Similarly, it was not imagined or conceived at that time that anyone other than the State is capable of depriving the life and personal liberty of a person, except by committing a punishable offence. But with the expanding horizons of our philosophical understanding of law, life and liberty and the advancement of science and technology, we have come to realize that “life is not an empty dream” and “our hearts are not muffled drums beating funeral marches to the grave”86, nor is “life a tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury signifying nothing”87.
86 From H.W. Longfellow in “A Psalm of life”
87 From Shakespeare in Macbeth KAUSHAL KISHOR v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.
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83. Over a period of time, this Court has interpreted ‘the right to life’ to include, (i) livelihood; (ii) all those aspects of life which go to make a man’s life meaningful, complete and worth living; (iii) something more than mere survival or animal existence; (iv) right to live (and die) with human dignity; (v) right to food, water, decent environment, medical care and shelter etc.; (vi) all that gives meaning to a man’s life, such as his tradition, culture, heritage and protection of that heritage in its full measure; and (vii) the right to Privacy. There are certain jurisdictions which have taken this right to include “the right to be forgotten” or the “right not to be remembered”.
84. When the word “life” was understood to mean only physical existence, the deprivation of the same was generally conceived to be possible only by the State, except in cases where someone committed an offence punishable under the Penal Code. But the moment the right to life under Article 21 was developed into a bouquet of rights and science and technology intruded into all spheres to life, the deprivation of the right by non-State actors also became possible. Another development that has taken place in the past 3 to 4 decades is that several of the functions of the Government have either been out-sourced to non-State actors or been entrusted to public-private partnerships. This is why, the High Courts and this Court modulated the tests to be applied for finding out the maintainability of an action under Article 226 or Article 32. Once upon a time, the maintainability of a petition under Article 32/226 depended upon “who the respondent was”. Later, the focus shifted to “the nature of the duties/functions performed” by the respondent, for finding out his amenability to the jurisdiction under Article 226.
85. Life and personal liberty are two different things, even while being an integral part of a whole and they have different connotations. Question No. 3 is so worded that the focus is not on ‘deprivation of life’ but on (i) ‘deprivation of personal liberty’ and that too by the acts or omissions of another person or private agency; and (ii) the duty of the State to affirmatively protect it. Therefore, we shall, in our discussion, focus more on two aspects, namely, (i) deprivation of personal liberty by non-State actors; and (ii) the duty of the State. An elaborate exposition of the expression “personal liberty” and its origin in Greek civilization may be found in the judgment of this Court in Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre vs. State of Maharashtra88. Suffice it to say for our purpose
88 (2011) 1 SCC 694
A B C D E F G H that in this judgment, this Court identified in paragraph 53 of the Report that Article 21 guarantees two rights, namely, (i) right to life; and (ii) right to personal liberty. Therefore, because of the manner in which Question No. 3 is framed, we shall try to confine our discussion to personal liberty, though at times both may overlap or get interchanged.
86. The expression “personal liberty” appearing in Article 21 was held by this Court in A.K. Gopalan (supra) to mean freedom from physical restraint of a person by incarceration or otherwise. However, the understanding of the expression “personal liberty” got enlarged in Kharak Singh vs. State of U.P.89 It was a case where a person who was originally charged for the offence of dacoity and later released for lack of evidence, was put under surveillance by the Police, and his name included in the history-sheet under the U.P. Police Regulations. As a result, he was required to make frequent visits to the Police Station. Sometimes the Police made domiciliary visits at night to his house. They would knock at the door, disturb his sleep and ask to report to the Police, whenever he went out of the village. Though by a majority, the Constitution Bench held in Kharak Singh (supra) that the regulation permitting domiciliary visits is unconstitutional, the majority upheld the Police surveillance on the ground that (at that time) right to privacy had not become part of the fundamental rights. But K. Subba Rao, J. speaking for himself and J.C. Shah, J. held that the concept of personal liberty in Article 21 is comprehensive enough to include privacy. The thinking reflected in A.K. Gopalan that physical restraint was necessary to constitute infringement of personal liberty, was completely changed by K. Subba Rao, J. in his minority opinion in Kharak Singh. Giving a completely new dimension to personal liberty, K. Subba Rao, J. said: “(31) …The expression is wide enough to take in a right to be free from restrictions placed on his movements. The expression “coercion” in the modern age cannot be construed in a narrow sense. In an uncivilized society where there are no inhibitions, only physical restraints may detract from personal liberty, but as civilization advances the psychological restraints are more effective than physical ones. The scientific methods used to condition a man’s mind are in a real sense physical restraints, for they engender physical fear channelling one’s actions through anticipated and expected grooves. So also
89 AIR 1963 SC 1295
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creation of conditions which necessarily engender inhibitions and fear complexes can be described as physical restraints. Further, the right to personal liberty takes in not only a right to be free from restrictions placed on his movements, but also free from encroachments on his private life. It is true our Constitution does not expressly declare a right to privacy as a fundamental right, but the said right is an essential ingredient of personal liberty. Every democratic country sanctifies domestic life; it is expected to give him rest, physical happiness, peace of mind and security. In the last resort, a person’s house, where he lives with his family, is his “castle”; it is his rampart against encroachment on his personal liberty. The pregnant words of that famous Judge, Frankfurter J., in (1948) 338 US 25, pointing out the importance of the security of one’s privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police, could have no less application to an Indian home as to an American one. If physical restraints on a person’s movements affect his personal liberty, physical encroachments on his private life would affect it in a larger degree. Indeed, nothing is more deleterious to a man’s physical happiness and health than a calculated interference with his privacy. We would, therefore, define the right of personal liberty in Art. 21 as a right of an individual to be free from restrictions or encroachments on his person, whether those restrictions or encroachments are directly imposed or indirectly brought about by calculated measures. It so understood, all the acts of surveillance under Regulation 236 infringe the fundamental right of the petitioner under Art. 21 of the Constitution.”
As pointed out by Rohinton Nariman, J., in Mohd. Arif alias Ashfaq vs. Registrar, Supreme Court of India & Ors.90 "The minority judgment of Subba Rao and Shah, JJ. eventually became law in Rustom Cavasjee Cooper vs. Union of India91(Bank Nationalisation case), where the 11-Judge Bench finally discarded the view expressed in A.K. Gopalan and held that various fundamental rights contained in different articles are not mutually exclusive …”.
87. If U.P. Police Regulations were challenged in Kharak Singh, identical Regulations issued by the State of Madhya Pradesh were
90 (2014) 9 SCC 737
91 (1970) 1 SCC 248
A B C D E F G H challenged in Gobind vs. State of Madhya Pradesh92. Though this Court upheld the impugned Regulations, K.K. Mathew, J. pointed out: “25. Rights and freedoms of citizens are set forth in the Constitution in order to guarantee that the individual, his personality, and those things stamped with his personality shall be free from official interference except where a reasonable basis for intrusion exists. “Liberty against Government” a phrase coined by Professor Corwin expresses this idea forcefully. In this sense, many of the fundamental rights of citizens can be described as contributing to the right to privacy.
*** *** ***
27. There are two possible theories for protecting privacy of home. The first is that activities in the home harm others only to the extent that they cause offence resulting from the mere thought that individuals might be engaging in such activities and that such ‘harm’ is not constitutionally protectible by the State.The second is that individuals need a place of sanctuary where they can be free from societal control. The importance of such a sanctuary is that individuals can drop the mask, desist for a while from projecting on the world the image they want to be accepted as themselves, an image that may reflect the values of their peers rather than the realities of their natures.[See 26 Stanford Law Rev. 1161, 1187]”
88. Thus, the understanding of this Court in A.K. Gopalan, that deprivation of personal liberty required a physical restraint, underwent a change in Kharak Singh and Gobind (supra). From there, the law marched to the next stage in Satwant Singh Sawhney vs. D. Ramarathnam, Assistant Passport Officer, New Delhi93 where a Constitution Bench of this Court held by a majority, that the right to personal liberty included the right of locomotion and right to travel abroad. It was held in the said decision that “liberty” in our Constitution bears the same comprehensive meaning as is given to the expression “liberty” by the 5th and 14th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and the expression “personal liberty” in Article 21 only excludes the ingredients of “liberty” enshrined in Article 19 of the Constitution.
92 (1975) 2 SCC 148
93 AIR 1967 SC 1836
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The Court went on to hold that “the expression “personal liberty” in Art. 21 takes in the right of loco-motion and to travel abroad, but the right to move throughout the territories of India is not covered by it inasmuch as it is specially provided in Art. 19.”
89. Satwant Singh (supra) was the case of a businessman, who was directed to surrender his passport, with a view to prevent him from travelling out of India, on account of an investigation pending against him under the Export and Import Control Act. It must be noted that this case was before the enactment of The Passports Act, 1967.
90. After The Passports Act came into force, the decision of the 7-Judge Bench in Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India94 came. It was held therein that the right to travel abroad is part of the right to personal liberty and that the same cannot be deprived except according to the procedure established by law.
91. Next came the decision in Bandhua Mukti Morcha vs. Union of India & Ors.95. It was a case where a letter addressed by an NGO to the Court exposing the plight of persons working in stone quarries under inhuman conditions, was treated as a public interest litigation. Some of those workers were actually bonded labourers. After this Court issued notice to the State Governments and the lessees of the quarries, a preliminary objection was raised as to the maintainability of the writ petition. While rejecting the preliminary objection, this Court broadly indicated how the fundamental rights of those bonded labourers were violated and what were the duties of the State and the Court in cases of that nature. The relevant portion of the decision reads thus: “9. … We should have thought that if any citizen brings before the Court a complaint that a large number of peasants or workers are bonded serfs or are being subjected to exploitation by a few mine lessees or contractors or employers or are being denied the benefits of social welfare laws, the State Government, which is, under our constitutional scheme, charged with the mission of bringing about a new socio-economic order where there will be social and economic justice for everyone and equality of status and opportunity for all, would welcome an enquiry by the Court, so that if it is found that there are in fact bonded labourers or even
94 (1978) 1 SCC 248
95 (1984) 3 SCC 161
A B C D E F G H if the workers are not bonded in the strict sense of the term as defined in the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976 but they are made to provide forced labour or are consigned to a life of utter deprivation and degradation, such a situation can be set right by the State Government. Even if the State Government is on its own enquiry satisfied that the workmen are not bonded and are not compelled to provide forced labour and are living and working in decent conditions with all the basic necessities of life provided to them, the State Government should not baulk an enquiry by the Court when a complaint is brought by a citizen, but it should be anxious to satisfy the Court and through the Court, the people of the country, that it is discharging its constitutional obligation fairly and adequately and the workmen are being ensured social and economic justice. …”
92. Therefore, three major breakthroughs happened, the first in Kharak Singh, the second in Satwant Singh and Maneka Gandhi (supra) and the third in Bandhua Mukti Morcha (supra). The first breakthrough was the opinion, though of a minority, that physical restraint was not a necessary sine qua non for the deprivation of personal liberty and that even a psychological restraint may amount to deprivation of personal liberty. The second breakthrough was the opinion in Satwant Singh and Maneka Gandhi that the right of locomotion and to travel abroad are part of the right to personal liberty. The third breakthrough was the opinion in Bandhua Mukti Morcha that the State owed an obligation to take corrective measures when there was an infraction of Article 21.
93. In National Human Rights Commission vs. State of Arunachal Pradesh & Anr.96, this Court was confronted with a situation where private citizens, namely, the All Arunachal Pradesh Students’ Union held out threats to forcibly drive chakmas, out of the State. The National Human Rights Commission itself filed a writ petition under Article 32. While allowing the writ petition and issuing directions, this Court indicated the role of the State in the following words:
“20. …Thus the State is bound to protect the life and liberty of every human being, be he a citizen or otherwise, and it cannot permit any body or group of persons, e.g., the AAPSU, to threaten
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the Chakmas to leave the State, failing which they would be forced to do so. No State Government worth the name can tolerate such threats by one group of persons to another group of persons; it is duty-bound to protect the threatened group from such assaults and if it fails to do so, it will fail to perform its constitutional as well as statutory obligations. Those giving such threats would be liable to be dealt with in accordance with law. The State Government must act impartially and carry out its legal obligations to safeguard the life, health and well-being of Chakmas residing in the State without being inhibited by local politics. …”
94. In Mr. ‘X’ vs. Hospital ‘Z’97, the appellant had accompanied a patient to the hospital for treatment and offered to donate blood, for the purpose of surgery. Before allowing him to donate blood, samples were taken from “X”. It was detected that he was HIV positive. The fact that Mr. “X” tested positive was disclosed by the hospital to the fiancée of Mr. “X”. Therefore, the proposal for marriage was called off and Mr. “X” was ostracised by the community. Mr. “X” sued the hospital for damages, pitching his claim on the right to privacy and the duty of confidentiality that the hospital had in their relationship with him. Though this Court partly agreed with Mr. “X” the court found that the disclosure made by the hospital actually saved the life of a lady. But while dealing with a right under Article 21 vis-à-vis the hospital (a private hospital), this Court held as follows :- “27. Right of privacy may, apart from contract, also arise out of a particular specific relationship which may be commercial, matrimonial, or even political. As already discussed above, doctor-patient relationship, though basically commercial, is, professionally, a matter of confidence and, therefore, doctors are morally and ethically bound to maintain confidentiality. In such a situation, public disclosure of even true private facts may amount to an invasion of the right of privacy which may sometimes lead to the clash of one person’s “right to be let alone” with another person’s right to be informed.
28. Disclosure of even true private facts has the tendency to disturb a person’s tranquillity. It may generate many complexes in him and may even lead to psychological problems. He may,
97 (1998) 8 SCC 296
A B C D E F G H thereafter, have a disturbed life all through. In the face of these potentialities, and as already held by this Court in its various decisions referred to above, the right of privacy is an essential component of the right to life envisaged by Article 21. The right, however, is not absolute and may be lawfully restricted for the prevention of crime, disorder or protection of health or morals or protection of rights and freedom of others.”
95. In Pt. Parmanand Katara (supra), a human rights activist filed a writ petition under Article 32 seeking a direction to the Union of India that every injured person brought for treatment to a hospital should instantaneously be given medical aid to preserve life and that the procedural Criminal Law should be allowed to operate thereafter. The basis of the said writ petition was a report about a scooterist who got injured in a road traffic accident, being turned away by the nearby hospital on the ground that they were not authorized to handle medico-legal cases. Before the victim could be taken to an authorized hospital located 20 kilometers away, he died, which prompted the writ petition. While issuing directions, this Court expressed an opinion about the affirmative duty of court in paragraph 8 as follows:- “8. Article 21 of the Constitution casts the obligation on the State to preserve life. The provision as explained by this Court in scores of decisions has emphasized and reiterated with gradually increasing emphasis that position. A doctor at the government hospital positioned to meet this State obligation is, therefore, duty bound to extend medical assistance for preserving life. Every doctor whether at a government hospital or otherwise has the professional obligation to extend his services with due expertise for protecting life. No law or State action can intervene to avoid/delay the discharge of the paramount obligation cast upon members of the medical profession. The obligation being total, absolute and paramount, laws of procedure whether in statutes or otherwise which would interfere with the discharge of this obligation cannot be sustained and must, therefore, give way.…”
That the State has an obligation to help preserve life, guaranteed under Article 21 was spelt out clearly in Pt. Parmanand Katara. What applies to life applies equally to personal liberty. This is because there may be cases involving both the right to life as well as liberty. KAUSHAL KISHOR v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.
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96. For instance, in Suchita Srivastava & Anr. vs. Chandigarh Administration98,this Court had an occasion to consider the reproductive rights of a mentally-challenged woman. This right was read as part of the right to life and liberty under Article 21. In Devika Biswas vs. Union of India.99, this Court considered certain issues concerning the entire range of conduct and management, under the auspices of State Governments, of sterilization procedures, either in camps or in accredited centres and held that the right to health and reproductive rights of a person are part of the right under Article 21. While doing so, this Court quoted with approval the decision in Bandhua Mukti Morcha where the obligation of the State to ensure that the fundamental rights of weaker sections of society are not exploited, was underlined.
97. Tapping of telephones in exercise of the power conferred by Section 5(2) of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885 became the subject matter of challenge in People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) vs. Union of India100. This Court held that conversation on telephone is an important facet of a man’s private life and that tapping of telephone would infringe Article 21. Technological eavesdropping except in accordance with the procedure established by law was frowned upon by the Court. This was at a time when mobile phones had not become the order of the day and the State monopoly was yet to be replaced by private players such as intermediaries/service providers. Today, the infringement of the right to privacy is mostly by private players and if fundamental rights cannot be enforced against non-State actors, this right will go for a toss.
98. In District Registrar and Collector, Hyderabad & Anr. vs. Canara Bank & Ors.101, what was under challenge was an amendment made to The Indian Stamp Act, 1899 by the State of Andhra Pradesh, empowering a public officer to inspect the registers, books, papers and documents kept in any premises, including a private place where such registers, books etc., are kept. Taking cue from the decision in R. Rajagopal and Maneka Gandhi, this Court held in paragraphs 55 and 56 of the decision as follows:- “55. The A.P. Amendment permits inspection being carried out by the Collector by having access to the documents which are
98 (2009) 9 SCC 1
99 (2016) 10 SCC 726
100 (1997) 1 SCC 301
101 (2005) 1 SCC 496
A B C D E F G H in private custody i.e. custody other than that of a public officer. It is clear that this provision empowers invasion of the home of the person in whose possession the documents “tending” to or leading to the various facts stated in Section 73 are in existence and Section 73 being one without any safeguards as to probable or reasonable cause or reasonable basis or materials violates the right to privacy both of the house and of the person. We have already referred to R. Rajagopal case [(1994) 6 SCC 632] wherein the learned Judges have held that the right to personal liberty also means life free from encroachments unsustainable in law, and such right flowing from Article 21 of the Constitution.
56. In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India [(1978) 1 SCC 248] a seven-Judge Bench decision, P.N. Bhagwati, J. (as His Lordship then was) held that the expression “personal liberty” in Article 21 is of the widest amplitude and it covers a variety of rights which go to constitute the personal liberty of man and some of them have been raised to the status of distinct fundamental rights and given additional protection under Article 19 (emphasis supplied). Any law interfering with personal liberty of a person must satisfy a triple test: (i) it must prescribe a procedure; (ii) the procedure must withstand the test of one or more of the fundamental rights conferred under Article 19 which may be applicable in a given situation; and (iii) it must also be liable to be tested with reference to Article 14. As the test propounded by Article 14 pervades Article 21 as well, the law and procedure authorising interference with personal liberty and right of privacy must also be right and just and fair and not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive. If the procedure prescribed does not satisfy the requirement of Article 14 it would be no procedure at all within the meaning of Article 21.”
99. In Indian Woman says Gang-raped on orders of village Court published in Business and Financial News dated 23-1-2014, in Re102, this Court was dealing with a suo motu writ petition relating to the gang-rape of a women under orders of a community panchayat as punishment for having a relationship with a man belonging to a different community. After taking note of two earlier decisions, one in Lata Singh vs. State of U.P.103 which dealt with honour killings of youngsters involved
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in inter-caste, inter-religious marriages and the other in Arumugam Servai vs. State of Tamil Nadu104, which dealt with khap panchayats, this Court opined in paragraph 16 as follows:- “16. Ultimately, the question which ought to consider and assess by this Court is whether the State police machinery could have possibly prevented the said occurrence. The response is certainly a “yes”. The State is duty-bound to protect the fundamental rights of its citizens; and an inherent aspect of Article 21 of the Constitution would be the freedom of choice in marriage. Such offences are resultant of the State’s incapacity or inability to protect the fundamental rights of its citizens.”
In fact, this Court observed in the aforesaid decision that the obligation of the State does not get extinguished upon payment of compensation and that the rehabilitation of the victims of such nature was a must.
100. In Shakti Vahini vs. Union of India & Ors.105, while dealing with a writ petition seeking a direction to the State Governments and Central Government to take preventive measures to combat honour crimes and to submit a National/State plan of action, this Court issued a slew of directions directing the State Governments to take both punitive and remedial measures, on the ground that the State has a positive obligation to protect the life and liberty of persons. In paragraph 49 this Court said, “We are disposed to think so, as it is the obligation of the State to have an atmosphere where the citizens are in a position to enjoy their fundamental rights.” After quoting the previous decision in S. Rangarajan (supra), which arose out of the infringement of the freedom of expression in respect of a cinematograph film, this Court said in Shakti Vahini (supra) as follows:- “49. … We are absolutely conscious that the aforesaid passage has been stated in respect of a different fundamental right, but the said principle applies with more vigour when the life and liberty of individuals is involved. We say so reminding the States of their constitutional obligations to comfort, nurture the sustenance of fundamental rights of the citizens and not
104 (2011) 6 SCC 405
105 (2018) 7 SCC 192
A B C D E F G H to allow any hostile group to create any kind of trench in them.”
101. At last, while dealing with the right to privacy, in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy, this Court made it clear that, “it is a right which protects the inner sphere of the individuals from interference by both the State and non-State actors”.
102. Before we conclude this chapter, we must point out that some academics feel that the same level of justification for infringement by the State, for all rights recognized by the Court, end up being problematic106 and that the idea of a hierarchy of rights, as articulated by Das, J. in A.K. Gopalan may have to be examined. In fact, Rohinton Nariman, J. articulated this idea in Mohd. Arif (supra) where the question was as to whether a petition for review in the Supreme Court should be heard in open Court at least in death penalty cases. The learned Judge said:
“36. If a pyramidical structure is to be imagined, with life on top, personal liberty (and all the rights it encompasses under the new doctrine) immediately below it and other fundamental rights below personal liberty it is obvious that this judgment will apply only to death sentence cases. In most other cases, the factors mentioned by Krishna Iyer, J. in particular the Supreme Court’s overcrowded docket, and the fact that a full oral hearing has preceded judgment of a criminal appeal on merits, may tilt the balance the other way.”
Therefore, the importance of the right to personal liberty over and above all the other rights guaranteed under Articles 19 and 14 need hardly to be over-emphasized.
103. Therefore, our answer to Question No.3 would be that the State is under a duty to affirmatively protect the rights of a person under Article 21, whenever there is a threat to personal liberty, even by a non-State actor.
Question No.4
104. Question No.4 referred to us is this: “Can a statement made by a Minister, traceable to any affairs of the State or for protecting the 106 Anup Surendranath in his Article “Life and Personal Liberty” in The Oxford Handbook of the Indian Constitution (South Asia Edition), 2016 KAUSHAL KISHOR v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.
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Government, be attributed vicariously to the Government itself, especially in view of the principle of Collective Responsibility?”
105. The above question revolves around the role and responsibility of a Minister and the vicarious liability/responsibility of a Government to any statement made by him. For answering the said question, we may need to understand the role of a Minister under our Constitutional scheme.
106. Part V of the Constitution providing for matters connected with “The Union” contains five chapters, dealing respectively with, (i) the Executive; (ii) Parliament; (iii) Legislative powers of the President;
(iv) the Union Judiciary; and (v) Comptroller and Auditor General of India. Part VI of the Constitution dealing with “The States” contains six chapters, dealing respectively with, (i) general provision containing the definitions; (ii) the Executive; (iii) the State Legislature; (iv) Legislative power of the Governor; (v) the High Courts in the States; and (vi) Subordinate Courts.
107. While Articles 74 and 75 provide for, (i) ‘Council of Ministers to aid and advise the President’; and (ii) ‘Other provisions as to Ministers’, insofar as the Union is concerned, Articles 163 and 164 provide for, (i) ‘Council of Ministers to aid and advise the Governor’; and (ii) ‘Other provisions as to Ministers’, insofar as the States are concerned. Similarly, Article 77 provides for the conduct of business of the Government of India and Article 166 provides for the conduct of business of the Government of a State. The duties of the Prime Minister are dealt with in Article 78 and the duties of Chief Ministers are dealt with in Article 167.
108. Article 75(3) states that “the Council of Ministers shall be collectively responsible to the House of the People.” Similarly, Article 164(2) states “the Council of Ministers shall be collectively responsible to the Legislative Assembly of the State”.
109. Generally, all executive action of the Government of India shall be expressed to be taken in the name of the President under Article 77(1). However, for more convenient transaction of the business of the Government of India, the President shall make Rules. These Rules shall also provide for the allocation of the business among Ministers. This is under Article 77(3). Similar provisions are found in sub-Articles (1) and
(3) of Article 166.
A B C D E F G H
110. There are special duties assigned to the Prime Minister and the Chief Ministers, under Articles 78 and 167 respectively.
111. While dealing with the scheme of Article 166(3), the Constitution Bench of this Court pointed out in A. Sanjeevi Naidu vs. State of Madras107, that under our Constitution, the Governor is essentially a constitutional head and the administration of the State is run by the Council of Ministers. Since it is impossible for the Council of Ministers to deal with each and every matter that comes before the Government, the Governor is authorized under Article 166(3) to make Rules for the more convenient transaction of the business of the Government of the State and for allocation amongst its Ministers the business of the Government. In paragraph 10 of the said decision, the Constitution Bench spoke about “joint responsibility” and not about collective responsibility. The relevant portion of paragraph 10 reads as follows: “10. The cabinet is responsible to the Legislature for every action taken in any of the Ministries. That is the essence of joint responsibility. That does not mean that each and every decision must be taken by the cabinet. The political responsibility of the Council of Ministers does not and cannot predicate the personal responsibility of the Council of Ministers to discharge all or any of the Governmental functions. Similarly an individual Minister is responsible to the Legislature for every action taken or omitted to be taken in his ministry. This again is a political responsibility and not personal responsibility. …”
112. The expression “collective responsibility” can be traced to some extent, to Article 75(3) insofar as the Union is concerned and to Article 164(2) insofar as the States are concerned. But in both the Articles, it is the Council of Ministers who are stated to be collectively responsible to the House of the People/Legislative Assembly of the State. Generally collective responsibility of the Council of Ministers either to the House of the People or to the Assembly should be understood to correlate to the decisions and actions of the Council of Ministers and not to every statement made by every individual Minister.
113. In State of Karnataka vs. Union of India.108, a Seven Member Constitution Bench of this Court, while dealing with a challenge
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made by the State of Karnataka in the form of a civil suit under Article 131, to the appointment by the Central Government, of a commission of enquiry against the Chief Minister of Karnataka, had an occasion to consider the exposition of the words “collective responsibility” appearing in Article 164(2). After indicating that collective responsibility is basically political in origin and mode of operation, Beg, C.J. opined in the said case as follows:
“46. The object of collective responsibility is to make the whole body of persons holding Ministerial office collectively, or, if one may so put it, “vicariously” responsible for such acts of the others as are referable to their collective volition so that, even if an individual may not be personally responsible for it, yet, he will be deemed to share the responsibility with those who may have actually committed some wrong. …
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