State Through Central Bureau of Investigation v. Hemendhra Reddy & Another. Etc.
- Citation
- 2023 INSC 460; [2023] 7 S.C.R. 134
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Surya Kant, Justice J.B. Pardiwala Code of Criminal Procedure, Justice 1973 – Ss. 169, Justice 173(2)
- Decided
- 28 Apr 2023
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 1300/2023
- Sections
- 173, 173(8), 173(2), 169, 17, 13(1), 156(3), 13, 13(2), 109, 207, 170
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:25 am. Original source ↗
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A B C D E F G H 134 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.[2023] 7 S.C.R. 134
STATE THROUGH CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
v.
HEMENDHRA REDDY & ANOTHER. ETC.
(Criminal Appeal Nos. 1300-1302 of 2023)
APRIL 28, 2023
[SURYA KANT AND J.B. PARDIWALA, JJ.] Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – ss. 169, 173(2), 173(8) – Further Investigation – Whether the High Court was justified in quashing the entire prosecution instituted by the CBI against the accused persons for the alleged offences on the ground that the CBI could not have undertaken further investigation under subsection (8) of s.173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and filed a charge-sheet having once already submitted a final report under sub-section (2) of the s.173 of the CrPC (closure report) – Held: There is no bar against conducting further investigation u/s. 173(8) of the CrPC after the final report submitted u/s. 173(2) of the CrPC has been accepted – Prior to carrying out a further investigation u/s. 173(8) of the CrPC, it is not necessary for the Magistrate to review or recall the order accepting the final report – Further investigation is merely a continuation of the earlier investigation, hence it cannot be said that the accused are being subjected to investigation twice over – Moreover, investigation cannot be put at par with prosecution and punishment so as to fall within the ambit of Clause (2) of Article 20 of the Constitution – The principle of double jeopardy would, therefore, not be applicable to further investigation – There is nothing in the CrPC to suggest that the court is obliged to hear the accused while considering an application for further investigation u/s. 173(8) of the CrPC – Impugned orders passed by the High Court set aside.
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.173 – Delay in trial on account of further investigation – Held: It is settled law that the criminal offence is considered as a wrong against the State and the Society even though it has been committed against an individual – Normally, in serious offences, prosecution is launched by the State and a Court of law has no power to throw away prosecution solely on the ground of delay – Mere delay in approaching a Court of law A B C D E F G H would not by itself afford a ground for dismissing the case – Though it may be a relevant circumstance in reaching a final verdict. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – ss. 169, 173 – Distinction between – Section 169 of the CrPC is silent in making report to the Magistrate, however the Investigating Officer is under an obligation to submit its report to the Magistrate under Section 173 of the CrPC – Though Section 169 of the CrPC does not contemplate making a report, it contemplates of obtaining a bond with or without sureties from the accused to appear if and when so required before the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence on a police report and such report is contemplated under Section 173 of the CrPC.
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – Non-compliance to second proviso to s. 17 – A superior police officer of the rank of Superintendent of Police or any officer higher in rank is required to pass an order before an investigation, if any, for offence u/s. 13(1)(e) is commenced – The argument canvassed on behalf of the accused persons is that there is no such order of the police officer not below the rank of Superintendent of Police in the charge-sheet – Held: In the instant case, this issue was not raised before the High Court – Even otherwise, this is a question of fact and a matter of record – If it is the case of the accused that there is no such order on record, the same may be pointed out to the trial court in the course of the trial – It is for the trial court to verify the record, look into it and take an appropriate call on this issue in accordance with law.
Maxim – Nullum tempus aut locus occurrit regi – discussed. Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: Section 169 of CrPC
1. Section 169 of the CrPC is silent in making report to the Magistrate, however the Investigating Officer is under an obligation to submit its report to the Magistrate under Section 173 of the CrPC. Thus, though Section 169 of the CrPC does not contemplate making a report, it contemplates of obtaining a bond with or without sureties from the accused to appear if and when so required before the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance STATE THROUGH CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION v.
HEMENDHRA REDDY & ANOTHER. ETC.
A B C D E F G H 136 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.
of the offence on a police report and such report is contemplated under Section 173 of the CrPC. [Para 39][153-A-B] What is the meaning of the term “Further Investigation”?
2. In Rama Chaudhary Vs. State of Bihar reported in (2009) 6 SCC 346, this Court held that, “further investigation within the meaning of provision of Section 173(8) CrPC is additional; more; or supplemental. “Further investigation”, therefore, is the continuation of the earlier investigation and not a fresh investigation or reinvestigation to be started ab initio wiping out the earlier investigation altogether.” [Para 48][156-B-C] What are the alternatives before a Magistrate when a “Final Report” is filed?
3. Wherever a final report forwarded by the Investigating Officer to a Magistrate under Section 173(2)(i) of the CrPC is placed before him, several situations may arise. The report may conclude that an offence appears to have been committed by a particular person and persons, and in such a case the Magistrate may either:(1) accept the report and take cognizance of offence and issue process, (2) may disagree with the report and drop the proceeding or may take cognizance on the basis of report/material submitted by the investigation officer, (3) may direct further investigation under Section 156(3) and require police to make a report as per Section 173(8) of the CrPC. (4) may treat the protest complaint as a complaint, and proceed under Sections 200 and 202 of the CrPC. [Para 49][156-C-F] What is the prime consideration for “Further Investigation”?
4. As observed in Hasanbhai Valibhai Qureshi v. State of Gujarat and Others reported in (2004) 5 SCC 347, the prime consideration for further investigation is to arrive at the truth and do real and substantial justice. The hands of investigating agency for further investigation should not be tied down on the ground of mere delay. In other words, the mere fact that there may be further delay in concluding the trial should not stand in the way of further investigation if that would help the court in arriving at the truth and do real and substantial and effective justice. [Para 50][156-G-H; 157-A] A B C D E F G H
5. A conspectus of the various decisions of the Supreme Court rendered in cases where final reports (closure reports) had already been submitted and accepted makes the position of law very clear that even after the final report is laid before the Magistrate and is accepted, it is permissible for the investigating agency to carry out further investigation in the case. In other words, there is no bar against conducting further investigation under Section 173(8) of the CrPC after the final report submitted under Section 173(2) of the CrPC has been accepted. It is also evident, that prior to carrying out a further investigation under Section 173(8) of the CrPC, it is not necessary for the Magistrate to review or recall the order accepting the final report. [Para 76][171-B-C]
6. The final conclusion can be summarized as: (i) Even after the final report is laid before the Magistrate and is accepted, it is permissible for the investigating agency to carry out further investigation in the case. In other words, there is no bar against conducting further investigation under Section 173(8) of the CrPC after the final report submitted under Section 173(2) of the CrPC has been accepted; (ii) Prior to carrying out further investigation under Section 173(8) of the CrPC it is not necessary that the order accepting the final report should be reviewed, recalled or quashed; (iv) Further investigation is merely a continuation of the earlier investigation, hence it cannot be said that the accused are being subjected to investigation twice over. Moreover, investigation cannot be put at par with prosecution and punishment so as to fall within the ambit of Clause (2) of Article 20 of the Constitution. The principle of double jeopardy would, therefore, not be applicable to further investigation; (v) There is nothing in the CrPC to suggest that the court is obliged to hear the accused while considering an application for further investigation under Section 173(8) of the CrPC. [Para 77][171- D-G] Delay in Trial on account of Further Investigation
7. The general rule of criminal justice is that “a crime never dies”. The principle is reflected in the well-known maxim nullum tempus aut locus occurrit regi (lapse of time is no bar to Crown in proceeding against offenders). It is settled law that the criminal STATE THROUGH CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION v.
HEMENDHRA REDDY & ANOTHER. ETC.
A B C D E F G H 138 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.
offence is considered as a wrong against the State and the Society even though it has been committed against an individual. Normally, in serious offences, prosecution is launched by the State and a Court of law has no power to throw away prosecution solely on the ground of delay. Mere delay in approaching a Court of law would not by itself afford a ground for dismissing the case. Though it may be a relevant circumstance in reaching a final verdict. [Para 84][181-G-H] Non-compliance of the Second Proviso to Section 17 of the 1988 Act
8. The Second proviso to Section 17 of the 1988 Act directs that the offence referred to under clause (e) of sub section (1) of Section 13 of the 1988 Act shall not be investigated without the order of a police officer not below the rank of a Superintendent of Police. Thus, from the Second proviso, it is clear that an investigation into the offence referred to in clause (e) of sub section (1) of Section 13 of the 1988 Act even by any police officer enumerated in clauses (a) to (c) or any Police Officer authorized in that behalf by the State Government as per the first proviso, can be undertaken only by an order of the police officer not below the rank of Superintendent of Police. Thus, the Second proviso is in the nature of additional safe guard for the public servant who are accused of the offence punishable under Section 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act against an investigation by a police officer without the knowledge and consent of superior police officer not below the rank of Superintendent of Police. A superior police officer of the rank of Superintendent of Police or any officer higher in rank is required to pass an order before an investigation, if any, for such offence is commenced. It is needless to point-out that, before directing such investigation, the Superintendent of Police or an officer superior to him is required to apply his mind to the information and come to an opinion that the investigation on such allegations is necessary. The argument canvassed on behalf of the accused persons is that there is no such order of the police officer not below the rank of Superintendent of Police in the chargesheet. This issue was not even raised before the High Court. Even otherwise, this is a question of fact and a matter of record. If it is the case of the accused that there is no such order A B C D E F G H on record, the same may be pointed out to the trial court in the course of the trial. It is for the trial court to verify the record, look into it and take an appropriate call on this issue in accordance with law. [Para 88][183-F-H; 184-A-D] Rama Chaudhary Vs. State of Bihar (2009) 6 SCC 346 : [2009] 5 SCR 482; Hasanbhai Valibhai Qureshi v.
State of Gujarat and Others (2004) 5 SCC 347 : [2004] 3 SCR 762; Ramchandran v. R. Udhayakumar and Others (2008) 5 SCC 413 : [2008] 8 SCR 439; K.
Chandrasekhar v. State of Kerala and Others (1998) 5 SCC 223 : [1998] 3 SCR 72; Sri Bhagwan Samardha Sreepada Vallabha Venkata Vishwanandha Maharaj v.
State of A.P. and Others (1999) 5 SCC 740 : [1999] 3 SCR 870; Hemant Dhasmana v. Central Bureau of Investigation and Another (2001) 7 SCC 536 : [2001] 1 Suppl. SCR 646; Union Public Service Commission v. S. Papaiah and Others (1997) 7 SCC 614 : [1997] 4 Suppl. SCR 56; Ram Lal Narang v. State (Delhi Administration) (1979) 2 SCC 322 : [1979] 2 SCR 923;
State of Andhra Pradesh v. A.S. Peter (2008) 2 SCC 383 : [2007] 13 SCR 517; Nirmal Singh Kahlon v. State of Punjab and Others (2009) 1 SCC 441 : [2008] 14 SCR 1049; Kari Choudhary v. Mst. Sita Devi and Others (2002) 1 SCC 714 : [2001] 5 Suppl. SCR 588;
Official Liquidator v. Dayanand and Others (2008) 10 SCC 1 : [2008] 15 SCR 331; Pooja Pal v. Union of India and Others (2016) 3 SCC 135 : [2016] 11 SCR 560 – relied on.
Vinay Tyagi v. Irshad Ali alias Deepak and Others (2013) 5 SCC 762 : [2012] 13 SCR 1005; Vinubhai Haribhai Malaviya v. State of Gujarat (2019) 17 SCC 1 : [2019] 15 SCR 936; Luckose Zachariah alias Zak Nedumchira Luke and Others v. Joseph Joseph and Others (2022) SCC Online SC 241; H.N. Rishbud v.
State of Delhi AIR 1955 SC 196 : [1955] SCR 1150;
Kamlapati Trivedi v. State of West Bengal 1980 (2) SCC 91 : [1979] 2 SCR 717; State of Rajasthan v. Aruna Devi and Others (1995) 1 SCC 1 : [1994] 5 Suppl. SCR STATE THROUGH CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION v.
HEMENDHRA REDDY & ANOTHER. ETC.
A B C D E F G H 140 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.
274; N.P. Jharia v. State of M.P. (2007) 7 SCC 358 :
[2007] 8 SCR 618; Japani Sahoo v. Chandra Sekhar Mohanty (2007) 7 SCC 394 : [2007] 8 SCR 582;
Commissioner of Police, Delhi and Another v. Registrar, Delhi High Court, New Delhi (1996) 6 SCC 323 : [1996] 7 Suppl. SCR 432 – referred to.
Divakar Singh v. A. Ramamurthi Naidu AIR 1919 Mad 751; State v. Mehar Singh and Ors. 1974 Crl LJ 970 – referred to.
King-Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad, Vol. LXXI Indian Appeals, 203 – referred to.
Case Law Reference [2012] 13 SCR 1005 referred to Para 17 (ii), 33 (i)
[2019] 15 SCR 936 referred to Para 33 (ii)
[1955] SCR 1150 referred to Para 43 [2009] 5 SCR 482 relied on Para 48 [2004] 3 SCR 762 relied on Para 50 [2008] 8 SCR 439 relied on Para 51 [1998] 3 SCR 72 relied on Para 51 [1999] 3 SCR 870 relied on Para 53 [2001] 1 Suppl. SCR 646 relied on Para 54 [1997] 4 Suppl. SCR 56 relied on Para 55 [1979] 2 SCR 923 relied on Para 57 [2007] 13 SCR 517 relied on Para 58 [2008] 14 SCR 1049 relied on Para 59 [1979] 2 SCR 717 referred to Para 66 [1994] 5 Suppl. SCR 274 referred to Para 68 [2007] 8 SCR 618 referred to Para 74 [2001] 5 Suppl. SCR 588 relied on Para 75 [2008] 15 SCR 331 relied on Para 82 A B C D E F G H [2007] 8 SCR 582 referred to Para 84 [1996] 7 Suppl. SCR 432 referred to Para 86 [2016] 11 SCR 560 relied on Para 87 CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal Nos.1300-1302 of 2023.
From the Judgment and Order dated 15.12.2015 in CRLOP Nos.11101 and 15873 of 2015 and dated 08.01.2016 in CRLOP No.411 of 2016 of the High Court of Judicature at Madras.
Jayant K. Sud, ASG, Praveena Gautam, Mrs. Suhasini Sen, Mrs. Saudamini Sharma, Amit Sharma B, Santosh Kumar, P V Yogeswaran, Arvind Kumar Sharma, Advs. for the Appellant.
Suresh Babu, C. K. Sasi, Abdulla Naseeh V T, Ms. Meena K Poulose, Navin Suresh, Advs. for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
J. B. PARDIWALA, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. Since the issues raised in all the captioned appeals are the same those were taken up for hearing analogously and are being disposed of by this common judgment and order.
3. The principal question of law that falls for the consideration of this Court in the present litigation is whether the High Court was justified in quashing the entire prosecution instituted by the CBI against the accused persons for the alleged offences on the ground that the CBI could not have undertaken further investigation under sub section (8) of Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, ‘the CrPC’) and filed a chargesheet having once already submitted a final report under sub section (2) of the Section 173 of the CrPC (closure report)? In other words, whether the High Court was right in taking the view that the Special Court could not have taken cognizance upon the chargesheet filed by the CBI based on further investigation having once already filed a closure report in the past and the same having been accepted by the court concerned at the relevant point of time? STATE THROUGH CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION v.
HEMENDHRA REDDY & ANOTHER. ETC.
A B C D E F G H 142 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.
FACTUAL MATRIX
4. The respondent No. 3 herein D. Dwarakanadha Reddy (Accused No. 1) joined the services of the Customs Department as a Preventive Officer in the year 1993.
5. In January, 2003, the respondent No. 3 was promoted as an Appraiser in Customs Department.
6. On 30.06.2006, the office of Superintendent of Police (CBI) was in receipt of the following information:
(i) D. Dwarakanadha Reddy (A-1) was holding the post of Appraiser, Customs Department since 2004, and his main income was his salary.
(ii) His wife D. Sujana Reddy (A-2) has no agricultural land in her name and does business in the name of M/s Sujana Engineers.
(iii) That the couple had acquired assets worth Rs. 64, 41, 690.92 lakh between 01.04.2001 and 31.03.2005, however their combined income during the said period was Rs. 50, 95, 371.57/-, comprising of salary income of A-1, agricultural income of A-2, business income of A-2, bank interest, housing loan from the Andhra Bank, capital gain on sale of property, rewards given to A-1 etc.
(iv) During the period between 01.04.2001 and 31.03.2005, they incurred expenditure of Rs. 12, 74, 347.16/-, leaving them with the savings of Rs. 38, 21, 024.41/-.
(v) Therefore, their total disproportionate assets were worth Rs. 26, 20, 666.51/- as on 31.03.2005.
In such circumstances referred to above, an FIR in RC MA 1 2006 A 0027 was registered by the CBI under Section 13(1)(e) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short, ‘the 1988 Act’) along with Section 109 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, ‘the IPC’).
7. On 24.12.2008, the CBI/ACB filed an application before the Principal Special Judge for CBI Cases, Chennai, with a prayer to close the proceedings and return the documents for the purpose of regular departmental action against the accused No. 1 (respondent No. 3). The application stated inter alia as follows:
A B C D E F G H “After completion of investigation it has come to light that the accused cannot be prosecuted. Hence, Final Report u/s. 173 Cr.PC is being filed which may be accepted.”
8. It was further prayed that the documents seized during the course of investigation be returned so that the same could be used in the regular departmental action that may be initiated against the accused No. 1.
9. The aforesaid application filed by the CBI was taken up by the Special Court and the following order dated 29.01.2009 came to be passed:
“ORDER This petition is filed by the Petitioner/Complainant u/s. 173 Cr.PC praying to close the FIR and to retain the documents collected during the investigation to be used in the Regular Departmental Action against A1 .
1. Heard the learned Public Prosecutor. Perused the FIR, report and connected records. Reason stated in the report is convincing. Hence Final Report is accepted and FIR is closed and permitted to retain the documents collected during the investigation to be used in the regular Departmental Action against A1.
Pronounced by me in the Open Court, this the 29th day of January 2009.
Principal Spl. Judge for CBI Cases”
10. On 24.02.2012, departmental proceedings were initiated against the accused No. 1.
11. It appears from the materials on record that at the end of the departmental proceedings, the possession of disproportionate assets could not be established. However, an administrative warning was issued to the accused No. 1 for the lapse on his part to intimate his department the fact of having obtained a loan of Rs. 3, 00, 000/- (Rupees Three Lakh) from the Andhra Bank jointly along with his wife. An administrative warning was also issued in regard to not intimating the correct expense incurred by the accused No. 1 towards the construction of the house. STATE THROUGH CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION v.
HEMENDHRA REDDY & ANOTHER. ETC. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.] A B C D E F G H 144 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.
12. On 26.06.2013, the CBI filed the Crl. MP 3833/2013 in RC MA 1 2006 A0027 under Section 173(8) of the CrPC, seeking to reopen and undertake further investigation of the case, stating inter alia as follows:
“…the prosecution had filed final report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. before this Hon’ble Court on 24.12.2008 with a prayer to close the FIR as a mistake of fact…”
“… It is humbly submitted that now new evidences emerged to prove the allegation levelled against the above said accused persons and to substantiate the charge of possession of the disproportionate to the known sources of income of A-1 and A-2. Hence, it is just and necessary to re-open and further investigate the above case U/s. 173(8) Cr.P.C. in the interest of justice.”
13. The Special Court allowed the aforesaid application vide order dated 28.06.2013, holding inter alia as under:
“Heard. According to the prosecution, the prosecution is in possession of new evidences to substantiate the allegation of possession of disproportionate assets to the known sources of income against the accused persons. Hence, it is just and proper to order for re-opening of the case.”
14. On 01.03.2014, the CBI issued a letter/summons No. RC 27/ A/2006/ CBI/ACB/Chennai/0799 to the Deputy Commissioner of Customs, CIV-Vigilance Customs House, Chennai, requiring the presence of the respondent No.3 D. Dwarakanadha Reddy in connection with the investigation in RC 27(A)/06.
15. On 13.03.2014, respondent No. 3 filed Crl. O.P. of No. 6371 of 2014 before the Madras High Court seeking quashing of the proceedings related to the summons dated 1.03.2014. The respondent No. 3 stated that he had attended the summons and during the interrogation he was asked to produce documents which were “either not in existence or not available with the petitioner or already available with CBI”.
16. On 21.03.2014, the CBI filed its counter affidavit to the above referred petition filed by the respondent No. 3, stating specifically that: “3. It is submitted that in the year 2013 CBI received certain information/materials warranting the re-opening of the A B C D E F G H investigation of this closed case. Accordingly Shri G.
Palaniappan, Inspector of Police, CBI/ACB, Chennai filed a petition in the Hon’ble Court of Principal Special Judge for CBI Cases, Chennai seeking the orders of the said court for re-opening of investigation and the Hon’ble Court of PSJ, Chennai had issued order dt. 28.06.2.013 ordering the reopening investigation of this case.”
17. The High Court vide its order dated 11.09.2014 rejected the Crl. O.P. No. 6371 of 2014, holding inter alia as under:
(i) In the year 2013, the CBI came into possession of certain fresh materials warranting the re-opening of the investigation against the accused persons.
(ii) Under 173(8) of the CrPC, a police officer can carry on further investigation even after a report under Section 173(2) of the CrPC is submitted, in view of Section 173(8) of the CrPC and held in Vinay Tyagi v. Irshad Ali alias Deepak and Others reported in (2013) 5 SCC 762, with the only rider being that the police should seek formal permission from the Court.
(iii) Acceptance of the final report by the Magistrate does not debar him from taking cognizance if on further investigation, fresh material comes to light.
(iv) In the CBI counter, it is stated that fresh material was received in the year 2013 which warranted reopening of the investigation.
(v) The Magistrate’s power to order further investigation under Section 156(3) of the CrPC does not conflict with the power of the police to investigate further in light of Section 173(8) of the CrPC, and therefore the Magistrate can order reopening of the investigation.
(vi) This can of course only be done when fresh material comes to the knowledge of the investigating officer which he did not have before as in the present case.
(vii) Since the CBI has collected fresh material connected with the case which were not available earlier, it cannot be said that the Special Court has acted beyond its jurisdiction in reopening the investigation.
STATE THROUGH CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION v.
HEMENDHRA REDDY & ANOTHER. ETC. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.] A B C D E F G H 146 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.
18. On 17.12.2014, the CBI filed its detailed chargesheet against the respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 respectively alleging inter alia as follows:
(i) That the Respondent No.1, Hemendra Reddy, the brotherin-law of D. Sujana (A-2) was a farmer at Chenna Reddy Garu Palli, Chithoor Dist.
(ii) The Respondent No.3, was found to be in possession of assets/pecuniary resources in his name and in the names of his family members D. Sujana and Hemendra Reddy to the tune of Rs. 61, 11, 989/- as against their known sources of income of Rs. 59, 90, 135/- during the period between 01.01.1998 and 30.06.2005.
19. On 2.06.2015, the respondent No. 2 herein filed Crl. O.P. No. 15873 of 2015 before the Madras High Court, seeking quashing of the chargesheet.
20. On 27.04.2015, the respondent No. 1 herein filed Crl. O.P. No. 11101 of 2015, seeking quashing of the chargesheet.
21. On 14.09.2015, the CBI filed its counter to all the aforesaid petitions.
22. On 15.12.2015, the High Court allowed the Crl. O.P. No. 11101 of 2015 and Crl. O.P. No. 15873 of 2015 respectively by a common order, holding inter alia as follows:
(i) That on receipt of a final report under Section 173 of the CrPC, the Magistrate has three options – either to accept the report and close the case, to disagree with the report and proceed with the case or to order further investigation under Section 156(3) of the CrPC.
(ii) That the Magistrate is only empowered to direct “further investigation” and not to direct a “re-investigation/ de-novo investigation”.
(iii) In terms of the judgment in Vinay Tyagi(supra)no investigation agency is empowered to conduct a fresh, denovo or reinvestigation once a report under Section 173(2) of the CrPC is filed.
(iv) The petition seeking “re-opening”/ “further investigation” was filed after a lapse of 4 years.
A B C D E F G H
(v) In order to empower the Magistrate to permit further investigation, something should have been pending before the Magistrate, but no matter was pending as the investigation had already been closed.
(vi) The Special Court thus had no power to grant permission to conduct a further investigation.
(vii) The judgment of Vinay Tyagi (supra) had not been brought to the attention of the High Court at the time of deciding Crl. O.P. No. 6371 of 2014.
23. It appears that the respondent No. 3 herein also filed Crl. O.P. No. 411 of 2016, seeking quashing of the chargesheet. The High Court vide order dated 08.01.2016 allowed the Crl. O.P. No. 411 of 2016 filed by D. Dwarakanadha Reddy in terms of the order passed by it dated 15.12.2015, holding that the same principles and reasonings would apply to the petition filed by the D. Dwarakanadha Reddy too.
24. Thus, the High Court ultimately quashed the entire prosecution, essentially on the ground that the Special Court (CBI) had no jurisdiction/ power to grant permission to the CBI to conduct further investigation. In other words, the High Court took the view that the chargesheet filed against the accused persons was the outcome of the materials collected during the course of the further investigation, which by itself was illegal and, therefore, the criminal proceedings would not be maintainable in the eye of law. It appears that the High Court was also cognizant of the fact that a Co-ordinate Bench had earlier set at rest all the issues vide order dated 11.09.2014 passed in the Crl. O.P. No. 6371 of 2014. However, the same was not looked into on the ground that the said order passed by the Co-ordinate Bench was per incuriam and, therefore, not binding to another Co-ordinate Bench.
25. In such circumstances referred to above, the CBI is herein before this Court with the present appeals.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE CBI
26. Mr. Jayant K. Sud, the learned Additional Solicitor General of India, appearing for the CBI vehemently submitted that the High Court committed a serious error in passing the impugned orders thereby leading to a serious miscarriage of justice.
STATE THROUGH CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION v.
HEMENDHRA REDDY & ANOTHER. ETC. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.] A B C D E F G H 148 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.
27. The learned counsel further submitted that the law is well settled that further investigation can be undertaken under sub section
(8) of Section 173 of the CrPC even after the closure report is filed and accepted by the court concerned. He would submit that new material/ evidence surfaced and came in the hands of the CBI on the basis of which an appropriate application was filed before the Special Court, seeking permission to undertake the further investigation. He further submitted that the application filed by the CBI was duly considered and the Special Court permitted the CBI to re-open the case and undertake further investigation.
28. The learned counsel further submitted that the respondent No. 3 (Accused No. 1) had questioned the entire action on the part of the CBI in seeking to re-open the case and undertake further investigation before the High Court by filing Crl. O.P. No. 6371 of 2014 and the High Court by a detailed order had declined to interfere. According to the learned counsel, the order passed by a Co-ordinate Bench of the High Court in Crl. O.P. No. 6371 of 2014 was binding to another Co-ordinate Bench and same could not have been over-looked or ignored on the ground that while deciding Crl. O.P. No. 6371 of 2014, the attention of the High Court was not drawn to the decision of this Court in the case of Vinit Tyagi (supra). Mr. Sud further submitted that it is not that the decision of this Court in Vinit Tyagi (supra) was not considered in the earlier round of the litigation i.e., while deciding Crl. O.P. No. 6371 of 2014 as is evident from para 5 of the order passed by the High Court dated 11.09.2014 in Crl. O.P. No. 6371 of 2014.
29. In such circumstances as referred to above, the learned counsel prays that there being merit in all his appeals, those may be allowed and the impugned order be set aside.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE ACCUSED
PERSONS
30. On the other hand, all the appeals have been vehemently opposed by the learned counsel appearing for the accused persons, submitting that no error, much less an error of law could be said to have been committed by the High Court in passing the impugned orders. The learned counsel would submit that the acceptance of a closure report by the Special Court (CBI) would terminate the proceedings finally and the same would thereafter operate as a legal bar for the investigating agency to undertake any further investigation in connection with the alleged A B C D E F G H offence. The learned counsel laid much stress on the fact that for the purpose of granting permission to conduct further investigation, something must be pending before the court concerned in the primary report to enable to file a supplementary report. In the instant case, according to the learned counsel, nothing was pending at the time of passing the order under Section 173(8) of the CrPC. It was pointed out that the FIR was closed and all the evidence collected during the investigation was ordered to be returned to the CBI for the purpose of departmental proceedings. In such circumstances, according to the learned counsel, there was no scope for further investigation and even if further investigation is ordered then it is as good as re-investigation or fresh investigation or de novo investigation, which is otherwise not permissible in law.
31. The learned counsel submitted that further investigation cannot be ordered at any point of time. It was argued that in the case on hand, the further investigation was undertaken after a period of four years from the date of the closure report. If further investigation is permitted to be undertaken after an indefinite period of time, the same would result in delaying the trial thereby violating the Article 21 of the Constitution, i.e., the right of the accused to have a speedy trial.
32. The learned counsel further submitted that one additional issue arises in the present litigation relating to non-compliance of the mandatory requirement under Section 17(Second proviso) of the 1988 Act. According to the learned counsel the chargesheet in C.C.No.13 of 2015 on the file of the XIII Additional Special Judge for CBI Cases, Chennai, was filed by Mr. Syed Bazlullah ASP/CBI/ACB/Chennai. Upon perusal of the chargesheet which was served on the accused by the Magistrate under Section 207 of the CrPC, it was noticed that the same does not include the order passed by an officer not below the Rank of Superintendent of Police, as mandatorily required under Section 17(Second proviso) of the 1988 Act, conferring powers to Mr. Syed Bazlullah to investigate this case in RC MA 1 2006 A 0027 for an offence under Section 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act, which thereon got culminated into the chargesheet in C.C.No.13 of 2015. It was argued that the noncompliance of Section 17(Second proviso) of the 1988 Act is an illegality that vitiates the entire trial.
33. In support of the aforesaid submissions, reliance has been placed on the following case law:
STATE THROUGH CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION v.
HEMENDHRA REDDY & ANOTHER. ETC. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.] A B C D E F G H 150 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.
(i) Vinay Tyagi v. Irshad Ali alias Deepak and Others reported in (2013) 5 SCC 762;
(ii) Vinubhai Haribhai Malaviya v. State of Gujarat reported in (2019) 17 SCC 1; and
(iii) Luckose Zachariah alias Zak Nedumchira Luke and Others v. Joseph Joseph and Others reported in (2022)
SCC Online SC 241.
ANALYSIS
34. Section 169 of the CrPC reads as under:
“169. Release of accused when evidence deficient.— If, upon an investigation under this Chapter, it appears to the officer in charge of the police station that there is not sufficient evidence or reasonable ground of suspicion to justify the forwarding of the accused to a Magistrate, such officer shall, if such person is in custody, release him on his executing a bond, with or without sureties, as such officer may direct, to appear, if and when so required, before a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence on a police report, and to try the accused or commit him for trial.”
35. The perusal of the aforesaid Section would reveal that the Investigating Officer is under an obligation to release such person, who is in custody on executing a bond with or without sureties, if evidence is not sufficient and/or there are no reasonable grounds of suspicion to forward such person to the Magistrate.
36. The plain reading of Section 169 of the CrPC, therefore, postulates that when the Investigating Officer reports his action to the learned Magistrate, it will not be a report, however it will be a report of his action either by the Investigating Officer or by the Officer in-charge of the police station.
37. Section 173 of the CrPC states about the steps to be taken by the Investigating Officer after the completion of the investigation. The Officer in-charge of the police station is required to forward the report under said Section to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence in prescribed form.
38. Section 173 of the CrPC reads thus:
A B C D E F G H “173.Report of police officer on completion of investigation.—
(1) Every investigation under this Chapter shall be completed without unnecessary delay.
(1A) The investigation in relation to an offence under sections 376, 376A, 376AB, 376B, 376C, 376D, 376DA, 376DB or 376E from the date on which the information was recorded by the officer in charge of the police station.
(2)(i) As soon as it is completed, the officer in charge of the police station shall forward to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence on a police report, a report in the form prescribed by the State Government, stating—
(a) the names of the parties;
(b) the nature of the information;
(c) the names of the persons who appear to be acquainted with the circumstances of the case;
(d) whether any offence appears to have been committed and, if so, by whom;
(e) whether the accused has been arrested;
(f) whether he has been released on his bond and, if so, whether with or without sureties;
(g) whether he has been forwarded in custody under section 170.
(h) whether the report of medical examination of the woman has been attached where investigation relates to an offence under sections 376, 376A, 376AB, 376B, 376C, 376D, 376DA, 376DB or section 376E of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).
(ii) The officer shall also communicate, in such manner as may be prescribed by the State Government, the action taken by him, to the person, if any, by whom the information relating to the commission of the offence was first given.
(3) Where a superior officer of police has been appointed under section 158, the report shall, in any case in which the State Government by general or special order so directs, be submitted through that officer, and he may, pending the orders STATE THROUGH CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION v.
HEMENDHRA REDDY & ANOTHER. ETC. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.] A B C D E F G H 152 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.
of the Magistrate, direct the officer in charge of the police station to make further investigation.
(4) Whenever it appears from a report forwarded under this section that the accused has been released on his bond, the Magistrate shall make such order for the discharge of such bond or otherwise as he thinks fit.
(5) When such report is in respect of a case to which section 170 applies, the police officer shall forward to the Magistrate along with the report—
(a) all documents or relevant extracts thereof on which the prosecution proposes to rely other than those already sent to the Magistrate during investigation;
(b) the statements recorded under section 161 of all the persons whom the prosecution proposes to examine as its witnesses.
(6) If the police officer is of opinion that any part of any such statement is not relevant to the subject-matter of the proceedings or that its disclosure to the accused is not essential in the interests of justice and is inexpedient in the public interest, he shall indicate that part of the statement and append a note requesting the Magistrate to exclude that part from the copies to be granted to the accused and stating his reasons for making such request.
(7) Where the police officer investigating the case finds it convenient so to do, he may furnish to the accused copies of all or any of the documents referred to in sub-section (5).
(8) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to preclude further investigation in respect of an offence after a report under sub-section (2) has been forwarded to the Magistrate and, where upon such investigation, the officer in charge of the police station obtains further evidence, oral or documentary, he shall forward to the Magistrate a further report or reports regarding such evidence in the form prescribed; and the provisions of sub-sections (2) to (6) shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to such report or reports as they apply in relation to a report forwarded under sub-section (2).”
(Emphasis supplied)
A B C D E F G H
39. Thus, Section 169 of the CrPC is silent in making report to the Magistrate, however the Investigating Officer is under an obligation to submit its report to the Magistrate under Section 173 of the CrPC. Thus, though Section 169 of the CrPC does not contemplate making a report, it contemplates of obtaining a bond with or without sureties from the accused to appear if and when so required before the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence on a police report and such report is contemplated under Section 173 of the CrPC. Clauses (d) and (f) of Section 173(2)(i) of the CrPC read as under: “173(2)(i) xxx xxx
(d) whether any offence appears to have been committed and, if so, by whom;
xxx xxx xxx
(f) whether he has been released on his bond and, if so, whether with or without sureties”.
40. Section 173(8) of the CrPC deals with further investigation and supplementary report. In the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (for short, ‘the Old Code’), there was no identical provision to that of Section 173(8) of the CrPC. The same is a newly added provision in the CrPC. It was added on the recommendation of the Law Commission in its 41st Report that the right of the police to make further investigation should be statutorily affirmed.
41. In the Old Code, there was no provision prescribing the procedure to be followed by the police for fresh investigation, when fresh facts came to light, upon the submission of the police report and subsequent to taking cognizance by the Magistrate. There was, also, no express provision prohibiting further investigation by the police.
42. The said omission was sought to be supplied for the first time by a two-Judge Bench of the Madras High Court as early as in 1919 in Divakar Singh v. A. Ramamurthi Naidu reported in AIR 1919 Mad 751, where it was observed that:
“ Another contention is put forward that when a report of investigation has been sent in under Section 173 of the Cr PC, the police has no further powers of investigation, but this argument may be briefly met by the remark that the number of investigations into a crime is not limited by law and that STATE THROUGH CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION v.
HEMENDHRA REDDY & ANOTHER. ETC. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.] A B C D E F G H 154 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.
when one has been completed another may be begun on further information received.”.
43. After recognition of the right of the police to make repeated investigations under the Old Code in Divakar’s case, a three-Judge Bench of this Court in H.N. Rishbud v. State of Delhi reported in AIR 1955 SC 196, held that:- “It does not follow, however, that the invalidity of the investigation is to be completely ignored by the Court during trial. When the breach of such a mandatory provision is brought to the knowledge of the Court at a sufficiently early stage, the Court, while not declining cognizance, will have to take the necessary steps to get the illegality cured and the defect rectified, by ordering such reinvestigation as the circumstances of an individual case may call for. Such a course is not altogether outside the contemplation of the scheme of the Code as appears from Section 202 under which a Magistrate taking cognizance on a complaint can order investigation by the police. Nor can it be said that the adoption of such a course is outside the scope of the inherent powers of the Special Judge, who for purposes of procedure at the trial is virtually in the position of a Magistrate trying a warrant case.”
44. Some High Courts were also of the view that with the submission of a chargesheet under Section 173, the power of the police to investigate into an offence comes to an end and the Magistrate’s cognizance of the offence started. For instance, in State v. Mehar Singh and Ors. reported in 1974 Crl LJ 970, a Full Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana held that the police became functus officio once the Court took cognizance of an offence on the filing of a chargesheet by the police and thereafter, further investigation by the police was not permissible.
45. It was, however, observed that in light of the decision in H.N. Rishbud (supra), it would be open to the Magistrate to ‘suspend cognizance’ and direct the police to make further investigation into the case and submit a report.
46. The said inconsistency and incongruity in the judicial decisions was recognized by the Law Commission in its 41st Report (under Clause A B C D E F G H 14.23) and it was recommended that the right of the police to make further investigation should be statutorily affirmed. Accordingly, in the CrPC, Section 173(8), came to be introduced, which statutorily empowered the police to undertake further investigation after submission of the final report under Section 173(2) of the CrPC. Conspicuously, it still did not confer such powers on the Magistrate to direct further and/ or fresh investigation after submission of the final report by the Police.
47. Section 173(8) of the CrPC may be fragmented or dissected as under:
(1) Further investigation can be done in respect of an offence wherein report under Section 173(2) has been forwarded to the Magistrate; and
(2) During further investigation, the officer-in-charge has power
(a) to obtain further evidence, oral or documentary,
(b) to forward to the Magistrate, a further report or reports regarding such evidence in the form prescribed,
(3) The provisions of sub sections (2) to (6) shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to such further report or reports. Sub section (1) of Section 173 of the CrPC provides that every investigation by the police shall be completed without unnecessary delay and sub section (2) of Section 173 of the CrPC provides that as soon as such investigation is completed, the officer in charge of the police station shall forward to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence on a police report, a report in the form prescribed by the State Government.
Under sub section (2) of the Section 173 of the CrPC, a police report (chargesheet or Challan) is filed by the police after investigation is complete.
Sub section (8) of Section 173 of the CrPC, states that nothing in the section shall be deemed to preclude any further investigation in respect of an offence after a report under sub-section (2) has been forwarded to the Magistrate.
Thus, even where chargesheet or Challan has been filed by the police under sub section (2) of Section 173 of the CrPC, the police can undertake further investigation in respect of an offence under sub section
(8) of Section 173 of the CrPC. (Reference: Article titled “Different STATE THROUGH CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION v.
HEMENDHRA REDDY & ANOTHER. ETC. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.] A B C D E F G H 156 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.
Aspects of Section 173(8) of the CrPC” by D. Nageswara Rao, Prl.JCJ, Manthani.)
What is the meaning of the term “Further Investigation”?
48. In Rama Chaudhary Vs. State of Bihar reported in (2009) 6 SCC 346, this Court held that, “further investigation within the meaning of provision of Section 173(8) CrPC is additional; more; or supplemental. “Further investigation”, therefore, is the continuation of the earlier investigation and not a fresh investigation or reinvestigation to be started ab initio wiping out the earlier investigation altogether.”
What are the alternatives before a Magistrate when a “Final Report” is filed?
49. Wherever a final report forwarded by the Investigating Officer to a Magistrate under Section 173(2)(i) of the CrPC is placed before him, several situations may arise. The report may conclude that an offence appears to have been committed by a particular person and persons, and in such a case the Magistrate may either:
(1) accept the report and take cognizance of offence and issue process,
(2) may disagree with the report and drop the proceeding or may take cognizance on the basis of report/material submitted by the investigation officer,
(3) may direct further investigation under Section 156(3) and require police to make a report as per Section 173(8) of the CrPC.
(4) may treat the protest complaint as a complaint, and proceed under Sections 200 and 202 of the CrPC.
What is the prime consideration for “Further Investigation”?
50. As observed in Hasanbhai Valibhai Qureshi v. State of Gujarat and Others reported in (2004) 5 SCC 347, the prime consideration for further investigation is to arrive at the truth and do real and substantial justice. The hands of investigating agency for further investigation should not be tied down on the ground of mere delay. In other words, the mere fact that there may be further delay in concluding the trial should not stand in the way of further investigation if that would A B C D E F G H help the court in arriving at the truth and do real and substantial and effective justice.
Difference between “Further Investigation” and “Reinvestigation”
51. There is no doubt that “further investigation” and “reinvestigation” stand altogether on a different footing. In Ramchandran v. R. Udhayakumar and Others reported in (2008) 5 SCC 413, this Court has explained the fine distinction between the two relying on its earlier decision in K. Chandrasekhar v. State of Kerala and Others reported in (1998) 5 SCC 223. We quote paras 7 and 8 as under: “7. At this juncture it would be necessary to take note of Section 173 of the Code. From a plain reading of the above section it is evident that even after completion of investigation under sub-section (2) of Section 173 of the Code, the police has right to further investigate under sub-section (8), but not fresh investigation or reinvestigation. This was highlighted by this Court in K. Chandrasekhar v. State of Kerala [(1998) 5 SCC 223 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 1291] . It was, inter alia, observed as follows : (SCC p. 237, para 24)
“24. The dictionary meaning of ‘further’ (when used as an adjective) is ‘additional; more; supplemental’. ‘Further’ investigation therefore is the continuation of the earlier investigation and not a fresh investigation or reinvestigation to be started ab initio wiping out the earlier investigation altogether. In drawing this conclusion we have also drawn inspiration from the fact that sub-section (8) clearly envisages that on completion of further investigation the investigating agency has to forward to the Magistrate a ‘further’ report or reports—and not fresh report or reports—regarding the ‘further’ evidence obtained during such investigation.”
8. In view of the position of law as indicated above, the directions of the High Court for reinvestigation or fresh investigation are clearly indefensible. We, therefore, direct that instead of fresh investigation there can be further investigation if required under Section 173(8) of the Code. The same can be done by CB CID as directed by the High Court.”
STATE THROUGH CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION v.
HEMENDHRA REDDY & ANOTHER. ETC. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.] A B C D E F G H 158 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.
Position of Law on the subject of “Further Investigation”
52. In King-Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad, Vol. LXXI Indian Appeals, 203 the Privy Council delineated the powers of the police to investigate. It was held thus:
“Just as it is essential that every one accused of a crime should have free access to a Court of justice, so that he may be duly acquitted if found not guilty of the offence with which he is charged, so it is of the utmost importance that the judiciary should not interfere with the police in matters which are within their province and into which the law imposes on them the duty of inquiry. In India, as has been shown, there is a statutory right on the part of the police to investigate the circumstances of an alleged cognizable crime without requiring any authority from the judicial authorities, and it would, as their Lordships think, be an unfortunate result if it should be held possible to interfere with those statutory rules by an exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the Court. The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary, not overlapping, and the combination of individual liberty with a due observance of law and order is only to be obtained by leaving each to exercise its own function, always, of course, subject to the right of the Courts to intervene in an appropriate case when moved under Section 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code to give directions in the nature of Habeas Corpus.”
53. In Sri Bhagwan Samardha Sreepada Vallabha Venkata Vishwanandha Maharaj v. State of A.P. and Others reported in (1999) 5 SCC 740, it was held in paras 10 and 11:
“10. Power of the police to conduct further investigation, after laying final report, is recognised under Section 173(8) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Even after the court took cognizance of any offence on the strength of the police report first submitted, it is open to the police to conduct further investigation. This has been so stated by this Court in Ram Lal Narang v. State (Delhi Admn.) [(1979) 2 SCC 322 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 479 : AIR 1979 SC 1791] . The only rider provided by the aforesaid decision is that it would be desirable that the police should inform the court and seek formal permission to make further investigation.
A B C D E F G H
11. In such a situation the power of the court to direct the police to conduct further investigation cannot have any inhibition. There is nothing in Section 173(8) to suggest that the court is obliged to hear the accused before any such direction is made. Casting of any such obligation on the court would only result in encumbering the court with the burden of searching for all the potential accused to be afforded with the opportunity of being heard. As the law does not require it, we would not burden the Magistrate with such an obligation.”
54. In Hemant Dhasmana v. Central Bureau of Investigation and Another reported in (2001) 7 SCC 536, it was held:
“15. When the report is filed under the sub-section the Magistrate (in this case the Special Judge) has to deal with it by bestowing his judicial consideration. If the report is to the effect that the allegations in the original complaint were found true in the investigation, or that some other accused and/or some other offences were also detected, the court has to decide whether cognizance of the offences should be taken or not on the strength of that report. We do not think that it is necessary for us to vex our mind, in this case, regarding that aspect when the report points to the offences committed by some persons. But when the report is against the allegations contained in the complaint and concluded that no offence has been committed by any person, it is open to the court to accept the report after hearing the complainant at whose behest the investigation had commenced. If the court feels on a perusal of such a report that the alleged offences have in fact been committed by some persons the court has the power to ignore the contrary conclusions made by the investigating officer in the final report. Then it is open to the court to independently apply its mind to the facts emerging therefrom and it can even take cognizance of the offences which appear to it to have been committed, in exercise of its power under Section 190(1)(b) of the Code. The third option is the one adumbrated in Section 173(8) of the Code. …
16. Although the said sub-section does not, in specific terms, mention about the powers of the court to order further investigation, the power of the police to conduct further STATE THROUGH CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION v.
HEMENDHRA REDDY & ANOTHER. ETC. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.] A B C D E F G H 160 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.
investigation envisaged therein can be triggered into motion at the instance of the court. When any such order is passed by a court which has the jurisdiction to do so, it would not be a proper exercise of revisional powers to interfere therewith because the further investigation would only be for the ends of justice. …”
55. In Union Public Service Commission v. S. Papaiah and Others reported in (1997) 7 SCC 614, it was held in Para 13: “The Magistrate could, thus in exercise of the powers under Section 173(8) CrPC direct the CBI to “further investigate” the case and collect further evidence keeping in view the objections raised by the appellant to the investigation and the “new” report to be submitted by the investigating officer would be governed by sub-sections (2) to (6) of Section 173 CrPC.”.
56. This Court in Hasanbhai (supra) held thus:
“12. Sub-section (8) of Section 173 of the Code permits further investigation, and even dehors any direction from the court as such, it is open to the police to conduct proper investigation, even after the court took cognisance of any offence on the strength of a police report earlier submitted. All the more so, if as in this case, the Head of the Police Department also was not satisfied of the propriety or the manner and nature of investigation already conducted.
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