Amod Kumar Kanth v. Association of Victim of Uphaar Tragedy and Anr.
- Citation
- 2023 INSC 397; [2023] 6 S.C.R. 669
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 3 Judges: Justice K.M. Joseph, Justice B.V. Nagarathna, Justice Aravind Kumar Code of Criminal Procedure, Justice 337, Justice 338, Justice Ipc and U/S.14, Justice Cinematograph Act R/W the Rules – Appellant Filed Petition U/S.482, Justice Crpc Challenging the Order Issuing Summons – Dismissed – On Appeal, Justice Held: When Considering the Question Of
- Decided
- 20 Apr 2023
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 1359/2017
- Sections
- 197, 14, 482, 319, 173(8), 304A, 170, 319CR, 197(1), 190
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:25 am. Original source ↗
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A B C D E F G H 669[2023] 6 S.C.R. 669
AMOD KUMAR KANTH
v.
ASSOCIATION OF VICTIM OF UPHAAR TRAGEDY AND
ANR.
(Criminal Appeal No. 1359 of 2017)
APRIL 20, 2023
[K. M. JOSEPH, B.V. NAGARATHNA AND ARAVIND KUMAR, JJ.] Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.197 –Ambit of – Uphaar Tragedy case – Closure report filed by the CBI against the appellant was rejected by the Magistrate,who instead took cognizance on the protest petition filed by the first respondent and issued summons against the appellant – Cognizance was taken for offences u/ss.304A, 337, 338, IPC and u/s.14, Cinematograph Act r/w the Rules – Appellant filed petition u/s.482, CrPC challenging the order issuing summons – Dismissed – On appeal, held: When considering the question of cognizance being taken in the absence of sanction and thereby s.197 being flouted it is not to be conflated and thereby confused with the question as to whether an offence has been committed – The salutary purpose behind s.197 is protection being accorded to public servants – The most important question which must be posed and answered by the Court when dealing with the argument that sanction is not forthcoming is whether the officer was acting in the exercise of his official duties – Even an officer who acts in the purported exercise of his official power is given the protection u/s.197– In the present case, having regard to the admitted facts, it cannot be said that the appellant was not acting in the discharge of his official functions –The subtle and nuanced distinction between the question as to whether the offence has been committed and if an offence has been committed, whether a sanction is required for prosecuting a public servant who is alleged to have committed the same, must not be lost sight of – Magistrate and the High Court overlooked this distinction – Magistrate erred in taking cognizance against the appellant contrary to the demands of s.197 –Impugned order set aside –Proceedings challenged in s.482 stand quashed–Penal Code, 1860– ss.304A, 337, 338 – Cinematograph Act, 1952 – s.14.
A B C D E F G H 670 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 6 S.C.R.
D. Devaraja v. Owais Sabeer Hussain (2020) 7 SCC 695 : [2020] 6 SCR 453; Indra Devi v. State of Rajasthan and Another (2021) 8 SCC 768; State of Haryana and Others v. Bhajan Lal and Others 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : [1990] 3 Suppl. SCR 259; Sukhpal Singh Khaira v. State of Punjab (2023) 1 SCC 289;
Abdul Wahab Ansari v. State of Bihar, (2000) 8 SCC 500 : [2000] 3 Suppl. SCR 747; Surinderjit Singh Mand v. State of Punjab, (2016) 8 SCC 722 : [2016] 5 SCR 653; Devinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2016) 12 SCC 87 : [2016] 6 SCR 295; Sushil Ansal v. State through CBI 2014 (6) SCC 173 : [2014] 9 SCR 571; Shantaben Bhurabhai Bhuriya v. Anand Athabhai Chaudhari and Others 2021 SCC Online SC 974; MCD v. Uphaar Tragedy Victims Assn. (2011) 14 SCC 481: [2011] 16 SCR 1 – referred to.
Case Law Reference [2020] 6 SCR 453 referred to Para 5 [1990] 3 Suppl. SCR 259 referred to Para 7 [2000] 3 Suppl. SCR 747 referred to Para 13 [2016] 5 SCR 653 referred to Para 14 [2016] 6 SCR 295 referred to Para 15 [2014] 9 SCR 571 referred to Para 16, 29 [2011] 16 SCR 1 referred to Para 32 CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.1359 of 2017.
From the Judgment and Order dated 03.10.2013 of the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in CRLM No.2746 of 2010.
R. Basant, Mathai M Paikaday, Sr. Advs., Ms. Liz Mathew, Ms. Biji Rajesh, A.K. Singh, Ms. Mohini Priya, Akshay Sahay, Ms. Mallika Agarwal, Ms. Vasudha Jain, Sudarshan Singh Rawat, Sajjan Singh Nahar, Sanjay Jain, Advs. for the Appellant.
Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General, K. M. Nataraj, A.S.G., KTS Tulsi, Sr. Adv., Sukant Vikram, Aditya Pratap Singh, Mrs. Pallavi Malhotra, A B C D E F G H Avish Bhati, T A Khan, B K Satija, Ms. Swati Ghildiyal, Shantnu Sharma, Sharath Nambiar, Arvind Kumar Sharma, Mukesh Kumar Maroria, Shreekant Neelappa Terdal, Shailesh Madiyal, Veer Vikrant Singh, Indira Bhakar, Dr. N. Visakamurthy, Advs. for the Respondents.
The following Judgment of the Court was delivered :
JUDGMENT
(1) By the impugned order, the High Court has dismissed the petition filed by the appellant under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Cr.P.C.’ for brevity). The petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. was filed against the order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge Metropolitan Magistrate rejecting the closure report filed by the Central Bureau of Investigation (hereinafter referred to as ‘CBI’ for short) which was filed against the appellant. The closure report filed by the CBI was not accepted by the Magistrate, who instead took cognizance on the protest petition filed by the first respondent before us (Association of Victims of Uphaar Tragedy). As noted by the learned Judge in the impugned judgment on 13.06.1997, 59 persons lost their lives and over 100 persons received serious injuries while viewing a film sitting in the balcony of Uphaar theater. The unfortunate and tragic incident led to a criminal prosecution against 16 accused. While the trial was ongoing, an application was filed under Section 319 Cr.P.C. against inter alia the present appellant. It is not in dispute that no orders were immediately passed thereon. The trial against the 16 accused culminated in the judgment dated 23.11.2007. The learned Sessions Judge while disposing of Sessions Case No. 13/07 ordered the CBI to conduct a further investigation under Section 173(8) of the Cr.P.C. The learned Sessions Judge, no doubt, proceeded to find the accused who were arraigned in Sessions Case No. 13/2007 guilty of various charges. It is after so finding and awarding appropriate sentences as against them that further investigation was ordered vide the judgment dated 23.11.2007. The CBI after investigation filed a closure report on 05.03.2009. It is therein stated that no criminal act was found against any officer other than those who were chargesheeted earlier. The first respondent thereupon, filed protest petition dated 13.05.2009. As already noticed, rejecting the closure report but accepting the complaint in the protest petition the Magistrate issued summons against the appellant. Cognizance has been taken for offences under Section 304A, 337, 338 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and the provisions under Section 14 of AMOD KUMAR KANTH v. ASSOCIATION OF VICTIM OF
UPHAAR TRAGEDY AND ANR.
A B C D E F G H 672 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 6 S.C.R.
the Cinematograph Act, 1952 read with the Rules. It is the order issuing summons that was the subject matter of the proceeding under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. and which has finally culminated in the impugned order.
(2) We have heard Shri R. Basant, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant. We have also heard Shri K.M. Nataraj, learned Additional Solicitor General, who appears on behalf of the additional Respondent namely Delhi Police. Besides, we have also heard Smt. Aparajita, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the CBI. We further heard Shri K.T.S. Tulsi, learned senior counsel who appears on behalf of the first respondent.
(3) Shri Basant, learned senior counsel for the appellant would essentially address three contentions before us. First and foremost, he would contend that the impugned order upholding the order of the Magistrate taking cognizance and issuing summons is afflicted with an incurable illegality. The illegality consists in both the Courts overlooking the mandatory command in Section 197 of the Cr.P.C. In other words, cognizance has been taken against the appellant for the offences comprehended within the ambit of Section 197 Cr.P.C. without seeking and obtaining sanction as is contemplated under Section 197. The Magistrate has proceeded to take cognizance in the teeth of the unambiguous bar against such cognizance. He would submit that on this short point the impugned order must perish.
(4) He would elaborate and submit on the facts, as to what transpired as follows. Somewhere in the year 1976, a decision was taken by the Lieutenant Governor of Delhi to reduce the price of cinema tickets. Bearing in mind that this decision would cause a financial loss to the theater owners, it was decided to permit the theaters to be fitted with more seats so that from the revenue earned thereunder, the loss caused by the reduction in the price of the cinema tickets could be offset. On the strength of the said decision which was taken in 1976, theaters in Delhi came to be equipped with more seats. The appellant took over as Deputy Commissioner of Police on 02.02.1979. In his capacity as the DCP, he also came to be entrusted with the duties of a licensing officer under the Cinematograph Act, 1952 and the Rules. He continued in this official position till 26.05.1980. There was a change of policy brought about by the Lieutenant Governor. The earlier decision which was taken in the year 1976 to increase seats came to be revoked. This was done A B C D E F G H on 27.07.1979. The appellant, according to the learned senior counsel, issued orders to the cinema theaters directing them to remove the extra seats and to report compliance by 04.08.1979 failing which their licenses would be suspended. The notification dated 27.07.1979 issued by the Lieutenant Governor and the order passed by the appellant dated 28.07.1979 came to be impugned in a batch of writ petitions in the High Court of Delhi. The High Court of Delhi passed an interim order dated 02.08.1979 granting protection to the owners, in that, the direction to remove the extra seats was kept in abeyance but they were forbidden from issuing tickets in regard to the additional seats. A joint inspection came to be carried out on 05.10.1979. The joint inspection recommended the complete removal of the additional seats. The appellant on 22.10.1979 filed a counter affidavit before the High Court. Therein it is pointed out that the appellant stoutly opposed the plea of the writ petitioners that additional seats may be allowed to be preserved. On 29.11.1979, it is pointed out that the High Court rejected the report of the joint inspection team. The High Court also did not find favour with the stand taken by the appellant in the counter affidavit. The High Court by its judgment dated 29.11.1979, in short, directed the appellant to look into the matter and find out whether the seats could be continued on their being a substantial and not too rigid and inflexible compliance. Show cause notices was issued on 06.12.1979 to the theater owners. On 19.12.1979, joint inspection was carried out by the Executive Engineer (PWD), Chief Fire Officer and the Assistant Commissioner of Police (Licensing). A hearing was afforded to the theater owners. This included the owners of the UphaarTheater. This took place on 20.12.1979. It is, thereafter, that on 24.12.1979, according to the appellant, on the recommendations of the committee, the appellant ordered the removal of 06 seats in the balcony and 56 seats in the rest of the floor of Uphaar Theater. This means a total of 62 additional seats out of the total of 100 seats which had been put in place on the strength of the notification issued in 1976 came to be ordered to be removed. It is stated by the appellant that annual inspections were carried out subsequently. The appellant came to be transferred and he vacated the post on 26.05.1980. There was another inspection which was conducted on 09.06.1983 and 17.06.1983 by a joint inspection team comprising the licensing branch of the Delhi Police. The Municipal Corporation of Delhi and the Delhi Fire Services also were part of the team. Large scale safety violations were found. The license of Uphaar theater came to be suspended on 27.06.1983. AMOD KUMAR KANTH v. ASSOCIATION OF VICTIM OF
UPHAAR TRAGEDY AND ANR.
A B C D E F G H 674 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 6 S.C.R.
From 1980-1997, it is pointed out that the theater in question was inspected every year. The suspension order passed against the theater in question was the subject matter of challenge in the two writ petitions and the suspension was kept in abeyance. The theater continued to operate. It is nearly 17 years after the order dated 24.12.1979, on 13.06.1997 that a fire broke out which led to the unfortunate passing away of 59 persons besides injury to several others. He would, therefore, point out that, at best or at worst, what could be projected against the appellant could not take it out of the ambit of Section 197. In other words, it could not be said despite all that has happened that he was not exercising power which flowed from his office. He did whatever he did in the discharge of his official functions. Section 197 immunisesa person if his act is in exercise of his official power. Whichever way one looks at it, whatever he has done, or even if there is an excess, even if there has been negligence, he would be entitled in law to the protection afforded by Section 197 of the Cr.P.C. The Courts have ignored this salutary principle enshrined in Section 197 of the Cr.P.C. The principle enshrined by Section 197 of the Cr.P.C. is intended to protect public servants. It is not to be confused with the question as to whether an offence has been committed. The law mandates that once the person against whom cognizance is taken was holding a public office within the meaning of Section 197 of the Cr.P.C. and the act or omission attributed to him is done in the discharge of his official duties or in the purported exercise of his official duties, it would be completely illegal for the judicial officer concerned to move the law forward against him by taking cognizance in the absence of sanction. In the facts of the case before the Court, he would submit that it was clear that whatever he did or did not, it arose within the discharge of his official functions. In this regard, he drew inspiration from the following decisions:
(5) In D. Devaraja v. Owais Sabeer Hussain (2020) 7 SCC 695, he drew our attention to the following:
“71. If the act alleged in a complaint purported to be filed against the policeman is reasonably connected to discharge of some official duty, cognizance thereof cannot be taken unless requisite sanction of the appropriate Government is obtained under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and/or Section 170 of the Karnataka Police Act.
A B C D E F G H
74. It is well settled that an application under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code is maintainable to quash proceedings which are ex facie bad for want of sanction, frivolous or in abuse of process of court. If, on the face of the complaint, the act alleged appears to have a reasonable relationship with official duty, where the criminal proceeding is apparently prompted by mala fides and instituted with ulterior motive, power under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code would have to be exercised to quash the proceedings, to prevent abuse of process of court.”
(6) Next, he drew our attention to Indra Devi v. State of Rajasthan and Another (2021) 8 SCC 768 to the following paragraphs: “10. We have given our thought to the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties. Section 197 CrPC seeks to protect an officer from unnecessary harassment, who is accused of an offence committed while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duties and, thus, prohibits the court from taking cognizance of such offence except with the previous sanction of the competent authority. Public servants have been treated as a special category in order to protect them from malicious or vexatious prosecution. At the same time, the shield cannot protect corrupt officers and the provisions must be construed in such a manner as to advance the cause of honesty, justice and good governance. (See Subramanian Swamy v. Manmohan Singh [Subramanian Swamy v. Manmohan Singh, (2012) 3 SCC 64 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 1041 : (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 666] .) The alleged indulgence of the officers in cheating, fabrication of records or misappropriation cannot be said to be in discharge of their official duty. However, such sanction is necessary if the offence alleged against the public servant is committed by him “while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty” and in order to find out whether the alleged offence is committed “while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty”, the yardstick to be followed is to form a prima facie view whether the act of omission for which the accused was charged had a reasonable connection with the discharge of his duties. (See State of Maharashtra v. Budhikota Subbarao [State of Maharashtra v. Budhikota Subbarao, (1993) 3 SCC 339 : 1993 SCC (Cri) 901] .) The real question, AMOD KUMAR KANTH v. ASSOCIATION OF VICTIM OF
UPHAAR TRAGEDY AND ANR.
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therefore, is whether the act committed is directly concerned with the official duty.
11. We have to apply the aforesaid test to the facts of the present case. In that behalf, the factum of Respondent 2 not being named in the FIR is not of much significance as the alleged role came to light later on. However, what is of significance is the role assigned to him in the alleged infraction i.e. conspiring with his superiors. What emerges therefrom is that insofar as the processing of the papers was concerned, Surendra Kumar Mathur, the Executive Officer, had put his initials to the relevant papers which was held in discharge of his official duties. Not only that, Sandeep Mathur, who was part of the alleged transaction, was also similarly granted protection. The work which was assigned to Respondent 2 pertained to the subject-matter of allotment, regularisation, conversion of agricultural land and fell within his domain of work. In the processing of application of Megharam, the file was initially put up to the Executive Officer who directed the inspection and the inspection was carried out by the Junior Engineer and only thereafter the Municipal Commissioner signed the file. The result is that the superior officers, who have dealt with the file, have been granted protection while the clerk, who did the paper work i.e. Respondent 2, has been denied similar protection by the trial court even though the allegation is of really conspiring with his superior officers. Neither the State nor the complainant appealed against the protection granted under Section 197 CrPC qua these two other officers.
12. We are, thus, not able to appreciate why a similar protection ought not to be granted to Respondent 2 as was done in the case of the other two officials by the trial court and High Court, respectively. The sanction from the competent authority would be required to take cognizance and no sanction had been obtained in respect of any of the officers. It is in view thereof that in respect of the other two officers, the proceedings were quashed and that is what the High Court has directed in the present case as well.”
(7) Next, the learned senior counsel for the appellant would contend that the Court must not be oblivious to the facts of the case as well. The appellant’s acts or omissions are traceable to the year 1979-1980. The incident in question took place a good 17 years thereafter. Annual A B C D E F G H inspections took place. Other officers have had powers of oversight and exercised it from time to time. Several theaters apart from Uphaar theater had extra seats. It is only in this unfortunate case that the occurring of the fire in 1997 has led to the entire proceedings. He would submit that following the principle in State of Haryana and Others v. Bhajan Lal and Others 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, it is a fit case where no criminality can be attached to the alleged acts and omissions.
(8) Thirdly, he would also submit that, as noticed, in this narration above, though an application was filed to take action under Section 319 of the Cr.P.C. pending the trial against the original accused, no orders were passed thereon. It received final attention of the Court only when the matter was finally disposed of by way of the judgment convicting the original accused.
(9) The Court, he would point out, departed from the requirement of the law by directing investigation under Section 173(8) after the trial was concluded and judgment was pronounced. This is according to him, not permissible in law. He drew our attention to Sukhpal Singh Khaira v. State of Punjab (2023) 1 SCC 289:
“39.(I) Whether the trial court has the power under Section 319CrPC for summoning additional accused when the trial with respect to other co-accused has ended and the judgment of conviction rendered on the same date before pronouncing the summoning order?
The power under Section 319 CrPC is to be invoked and exercised before the pronouncement of the order of sentence where there is a judgment of conviction of the accused. In the case of acquittal, the power should be exercised before the order of acquittal is pronounced. Hence, the summoning order has to precede the conclusion of trial by imposition of sentence in the case of conviction. If the order is passed on the same day, it will have to be examined on the facts and circumstances of each case and if such summoning order is passed either after the order of acquittal or imposing sentence in the case of conviction, the same will not be sustainable.”
(10) He also presses for our consideration the aspect that the appellant is a highly decorated officer with an impeccable track record. AMOD KUMAR KANTH v. ASSOCIATION OF VICTIM OF
UPHAAR TRAGEDY AND ANR.
A B C D E F G H 678 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 6 S.C.R.
(11) Shri K. M. Nataraj, learned Additional Solicitor General, who appears for the additional respondent-Delhi Police would submit that the Delhi Police is the authority which sanctions prosecution under Section 197 of the Cr.P.C.
(12) Shri K. M. Nataraj, would submit that it is indispensable for taking cognizance against a public servant within the meaning of Section 197 of the Cr.P.C., that the sanctioning authority grants sanction. He would in this regard appear to us to support the contention taken by the appellant. He also seeks fortification from the following case law:
(13) He drew our attention to Abdul Wahab Ansari v. State of Bihar, (2000) 8 SCC 500 wherein this Court held:
7. Previous sanction of the competent authority being a precondition for the court in taking cognizance of the offence if the offence alleged to have been committed by the accused can be said to be an act in discharge of his official duty, the question touches the jurisdiction of the Magistrate in the matter of taking cognizance and, therefore, there is no requirement that an accused should wait for taking such plea till the charges are framed. In Suresh Kumar Bhikamchand Jain v. Pandey Ajay Bhushan [(1998) 1 SCC 205 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 1] a similar contention had been advanced by Mr Sibal, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants in that case. In that case, the High Court had held on the application of the accused that the provisions of Section 197 get attracted. Rejecting the contention, this Court had observed: (SCC pp. 217-18, para 23)
“The legislative mandate engrafted in sub-section (1) of Section 197 debarring a court from taking cognizance of an offence except with a previous sanction of the Government concerned in a case where the acts complained of are alleged to have been committed by a public servant in discharge of his official duty or purporting to be in the discharge of his official duty and such public servant is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Government touches the jurisdiction of the court itself. It is a prohibition imposed by the statute from taking cognizance, the accused after appearing before the court on process being issued, by an application indicating that Section 197(1) is attracted merely assists the court to A B C D E F G H rectify its error where jurisdiction has been exercised which it does not possess. In such a case there should not be any bar for the accused producing the relevant documents and materials which will be ipso facto admissible, for adjudication of the question as to whether in fact Section 197 has any application in the case in hand. It is no longer in dispute and has been indicated by this Court in several cases that the question of sanction can be considered at any stage of the proceedings.” The Court had further observed: (SCC pp. 218-19, para 24) “The question of applicability of Section 197 of the Code and the consequential ouster of jurisdiction of the court to take cognizance without a valid sanction is genetically different from the plea of the accused that the averments in the complaint do not make out an offence and as such the order of cognizance and/or the criminal proceedings be quashed. In the aforesaid premises we are of the considered opinion that an accused is not debarred from producing the relevant documentary materials which can be legally looked into without any formal proof, in support of the stand that the acts complained of were committed in exercise of his jurisdiction or purported jurisdiction as a public servant in discharge of his official duty thereby requiring sanction of the appropriate authority.”
9. Coming to the second question, it is now well settled by the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in MatajogDobey v. H.C. Bhari [AIR 1956 SC 44 : (1955) 2 SCR 925] that in the matter of grant of sanction under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the offence alleged to have been committed by the accused must have something to do, or must be related in some manner, with the discharge of official duty. In other words, there must be a reasonable connection between the act and the discharge of official duty; the act must bear such relation to the duty that the accused could lay a reasonable claim, but not a pretended or fanciful claim, that he did it in the course of the performance of his duty. In the said case it had been further held that where a power is conferred or a duty imposed by statute or otherwise, and there is nothing said expressly inhibiting the exercise of the power or the performance of the duty by any limitations or restrictions, it is reasonable to hold that AMOD KUMAR KANTH v. ASSOCIATION OF VICTIM OF
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it carries with it the power of doing all such acts or employing such means as are reasonably necessary for such execution, because it is a rule that when the law commands a thing to be done, it authorises the performance of whatever may be necessary for executing its command. This decision was followed by this Court in Suresh Kumar Bhikamchand Jain case [(1998) 1 SCC 205 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 1] and in a recent judgment of this Court in the case of Gauri Shankar Prasad v. State of Bihar [(2000) 5 SCC 15 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 872] . The aforesaid case has full force even to the facts of the present case inasmuch as in the said case, the Court had observed: (SCC p. 21, para 14)
“[I]t is manifest that the appellant was present at the place of occurrence in his official capacity as Sub-Divisional Magistrate for the purpose of removal of encroachment from government land and in exercise of such duty, he is alleged to have committed the acts which form the gravamen of the allegations contained in the complaint lodged by the respondent. In such circumstances, it cannot but be held that the acts complained of by the respondent against the appellant have a reasonable nexus with the official duty of the appellant. It follows, therefore, that the appellant is entitled to the immunity from criminal proceedings without sanction provided under Section 197 CrPC.”
It is not necessary for us to multiply authorities on this point and bearing in mind the ratio of the aforesaid cases and applying the same to the facts of the present case as indicated in the complaint itself, we have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the appellant had been directed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate to be present with police force and remove the encroachment in question and in course of discharge of his duty to control the mob, when he had directed for opening of fire, it must be held that the order of opening of fire was in exercise of the power conferred upon him and the duty imposed upon him under the orders of the Magistrate and in that view of the matter the provisions of Section 197(1) applies to the facts of the present case. Admittedly, there being no sanction, the cognizance taken by the Magistrate is bad in law and unless the same is quashed qua the appellant, it will be an abuse of the process of Court. Accordingly, we allow this appeal A B C D E F G H and quash the criminal proceeding, so far as the appellant is concerned.
(14) He also brought to the notice of the Court, the decision in Surinderjit Singh Mand v. State of Punjab, (2016) 8 SCC 722:
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