Kailash Vijayvargiya v. Rajlakshmi Chaudhuri and Others
- Citation
- 2023 INSC 494; [2023] 6 S.C.R. 135
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice M.R. Shah, Justice Sanjiv Khanna Code of Criminal Procedure
- Decided
- 4 May 2023
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 1581/2021
- Sections
- 156(3), 202, 190, 156, 468, 156(1), 154(1), 482, 200, 203, 2, 204
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:25 am. Original source ↗
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A B C D E F G H
KAILASH VIJAYVARGIYA
v.
RAJLAKSHMI CHAUDHURI AND OTHERS
(Criminal Appeal No. 1581 of 2021 Etc.)
MAY 04, 2023
[M. R. SHAH AND SANJIV KHANNA, JJ.] Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 :
s. 156(3) – Police officer’s power to investigate cognizable case – Application u/s. 156(3) by the victim-complainant alleging rape by the appellants; and sought direction to police to investigate the matter treating the complaint as an FIR – Prior to filing of the said application, the victim filed several complaints before the police authorities, who conducted an enquiry and found that there was delay of two years in filing the complaint and refused to register the same – Dismissal of the application u/s. 156(3) by the Magistrate – Revision application thereagainst, allowed by the High Court, setting aside the order of the Magistrate holding that the Magistrate at that stage could not verify the veracity of allegations – Issuance of direction to the Magistrate to re-consider the application u/s. 156(3) – On remand, the Magistrate passed an order u/s. 156(3) directing registration of the FIR – On appeal, held: It is impermissible and contrary to law to adjudicate on merits the allegations and determine the facts as baseless, without further scrutiny and examination – Thus, the High Court was correct in remitting the matter to the Magistrate for further examination – Magistrate, while passing a subsequent order u/s. 156(3) directing registration of the FIR, misread the order and directions given by the High Court – Magistrate was required to examine, apply his judicious mind and then exercise discretion whether or not to issue directions u/s. 156(3) or whether he should take cognizance and follow the procedure u/s. 202 – He could also direct a preliminary inquiry by the Police – In view thereof, the order passed by the High Court remanding the matter back to the Magistrate is upheld – The subsequent order passed by the Magistrate on remand, directing registration of FIR is remitted back to the Magistrate to apply his judicial mind and exercise the discretion u/s. 156(3) or to take cognizance u/s. 202 of the Code. [2023] 6 S.C.R. 135 A B C D E F G H 136 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 6 S.C.R.
ss. 156 (3) and 202 – Power of the Magistrate to direct investigation at pre-cognizance u/s. 156(3) and post-cognizance stages u/ss. 200-210 – Distinction between – Held: Power u/s.156(3) is to be exercised before the Magistrate takes cognizance u/s. 190 – Once the Magistrate takes cognizance, the Magistrate has discretion to take recourse to his powers u/s. 202 – Magistrate exercises a very limited power u/s.156(3) whereas, u/s. 202, the Magistrate can analyse the veracity of the complaint made and appreciate whether there are grounds to proceed further.
Disposing of the appeals, the Court HELD: 1.1 The invocation of power under Section 156(3)
CrPC is wider as held in Priyanka Srivastava’s case , yet there are limits within which the Magistrate must act. When the Magistrate is satisfied that the allegations made disclose commission of a cognizable offence, he must stay his hands, direct registration of an FIR and leave it to the investigative agency to unearth the facts and ascertain the truth of the allegations. The Magistrate in terms of the ratio in Lalita Kumari’s case can for good reasons direct preliminary enquiry. [Para 22][164-F-H]
1.2. The operandi for registration of information in a cognizable offence and eventual investigation is not limited to Police, and sub-section (3) to Section 156, subject to legal stipulations, gives the ameliorating power to a Magistrate empowered under Section 190 to order an investigation in a cognizable offence. Two different powers vested with two distinct authorities, namely the Police and the Magistrate, who discharge distinct functions and roles under the Code as indicated above are not entirely imbricating. The power of Magistrate to direct investigation falls under two limbs of the Code: one is precognizance stage under Section 156(3), and another on cognizance under Chapter XIV (‘Conditions Requisite for Initiation of Proceedings’; Sections 190-199) read with Chapter XV (‘Complaints to Magistrates’; Sections 200-210). These two powers are different and there also lies a procedural distinction between the two. [Para 23, 24][165-B-D] A B C D E F G H
1.3. The direction for registration of an FIR should not be issued in a routine manner. The Magistrate is required to apply his mind and exercise his discretion in a judicious manner. If the Magistrate finds that the allegations made before him disclose commission of a cognizable offence, he can forward the complaint to the Police for investigation under Section 156 and thereby save valuable time of the Magistrate from being wasted in inquiry as it is primarily the duty of the Police to investigate. However, the Magistrate also has the power to take cognizance and take recourse to procedure under Section 202 of the Code and postpone the issue of process where the Magistrate is yet to determine existence of sufficient ground to proceed. In a third category of cases, the Court may not take cognizance or direct registration of an FIR, but direct preliminary inquiry in terms of the dictum in Lalita Kumari’s case. [Para 27][167-D-F] 1.4 In the instant case, the preliminary inquiries conclude that in the communications made to the police between 2018 to 2020, there is no allegation that rape took place on 29th November 2018. As per the report the complainant had failed to give any logical and satisfactory account for the delay in lodging the complaint. The accused assert that the complaint is an abuse of the process of law and has been filed to put pressure on the accused in view of the rape case filed by her against the third person. At the same time, it is noticeable that the complainant/ informant has made several allegations of rape, sexual harassment, etc. against persons with whom she had been acquainted and working. The complainant/informant has pleaded threat and harassment at the hands of the persons named as perpetrators, who are people of influence and power as the ground and reason for delay. She pleads that period of limitation prescribed in section 468 of the Code does not apply to an offence punishable with imprisonment exceeding three years. While examining the question of delay in making the complaint, the courts must remain alive to the fact that it is difficult for a woman to come forward and make a statement alleging rape or sexual assault. [Paras 33 and 34][171-B-F] KAILASH VIJAYVARGIYA v. RAJLAKSHMI CHAUDHURI
AND OTHERS
A B C D E F G H 138 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 6 S.C.R.
1.5 Every criminal case, it is stated, is a voyage of discovery in which truth is the quest. Right from the inception of the judicial system, it has been accepted that discovery, vindication and establishment of truth are the primary purposes underlying the existence of the courts of justice. However, the supremacy of truth is easier to assert than to define. Often this task becomes difficult when contradictory factual positions are asserted duly supported and affirmed on oath. In adversarial systems, the process of ascertaining truth requires compliance of procedures and rules of evidence, and limit the role of the adjudicator, in acting as an investigator to verify veracity of the allegations and counter-allegations till evidence and material is laid and examined as per codified procedural law. Yet it is believed that clash of adversaries is best calculated to getting out the facts. In a welldesigned system, judicial findings of formal legal truth should coincide with the substantive truth. This can happen when the facts as asserted by the contestants are skilfully explored in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law. Abuse of law must be checked, if possible, at the very threshold, albeit when it is possible and also as per the procedure prescribed by law. [Para 35][171-F-H; 172-A-B]
1.6. When a complaint is presented before a Magistrate, he has two options. One is to pass an order contemplated by Section 156(3). The second one is to direct examination of the complainant on oath and the witness present, and proceed further in the manner provided by Section 202. An order under Section 156(3) is in the nature of a peremptory reminder or intimation to the police to exercise its plenary power of investigation under Section 156(1). However, once the Magistrate has taken cognizance under Section 190 of the Code, he cannot ask for an investigation by the Police. After cognizance has been taken, if the Magistrate wants any investigation, it will be under Section 202, whose purpose is to ascertain whether there is prima facie case against the person accused of the offence and to prevent issue of process in a false or vexatious complaint intended to harass the person named. Such examination is provided, therefore, to find out whether there is or not sufficient ground for proceeding further. [Para 36][173-B-D] A B C D E F G H 1.7 The question of the merits of the allegations, and what procedure the Magistrate should follow is not gone into as this is an aspect which the Magistrate must first consider and decide judiciously and as per the law. What is impermissible and contrary to law is an adjudication on merits of the allegations and determination of the facts as baseless, without further scrutiny and examination. Therefore, the High Court was correct in remitting the matter to the judicial magistrate for further examination. [Para 37][173-E-F] 1.8 The Magistrate, on remand, has passed an order under Section 156(3) directing registration of the FIR. He has misread the order and directions given by the High Court. The Magistrate is required to examine, apply his judicious mind and then exercise discretion whether or not to issue directions under Section 156(3) or whether he should take cognizance and follow the procedure under Section 202. He can also direct a preliminary inquiry by the Police in terms of the law laid down by this Court in Lalita Kumari’s case. [Para 38][173-G] 1.9 The accused do not have any right to appear before the Magistrate before summons are issued. However, the law gives them a right to appear before the revisionary court in proceedings, when the complainant challenges the order rejecting an application under section 156(3) of the Code. The appellants, therefore, had appeared before the High Court and contested the proceedings. They have filed several papers and documents before the High Court and this Court. To be fair to them, the copies of the papers and documents filed before the High Court and this Court would also be forwarded and kept on record of the Magistrate who would, thereupon, examine and consider the matter. However, the complainant/informant would be entitled to question the genuineness and the contents of the said documents. [Para 39][174-A-C]
1.10. In view thereof, while affirming the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court remanding the matter back to the Magistrate, the subsequent order passed by the Magistrate on remand, pursuant to the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court is set aside and the matter is remitted back to KAILASH VIJAYVARGIYA v. RAJLAKSHMI CHAUDHURI
AND OTHERS
A B C D E F G H 140 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 6 S.C.R.
the Magistrate to examine and apply his judicial mind and then exercise discretion whether or not to issue directions under section 156(3) or whether he can take cognizance and follow the procedure under section 202. He can also direct the preliminary enquiry by the police in terms of the law laid down by this Court in the case of Lalita Kumari. [Para 40][174-D-E] Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh and Others (2014) 2 SCC 1 : [2013] 14 SCR 713 – followed.
Priyanka Srivastava v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2015) 6 SCC 287 : [2015] 4 SCR 108 – relied on.
Mukul Roy v. The State of West Bengal 2018 SCC Online Cal. 4861; Maksud Saiyed v. State of Gujarat (2008) 5 SCC 668 : [2007] 9 SCR 1113; Anil Kumar v.
M.K. Aiyappa (2013) 10 SCC 705 : [2013] 9 SCR 869;
Ramdev Food Products Private Limited v. State of Gujarat (2015) 6 SCC 439 : [2015] 5 SCR 283; Suresh Kankra v. State of U.P. & Another (Criminal Appeal No. 52/2022, decided on 07.01.2022); Srinivas Gundluri and Others v. SEPCO Electric Power Construction Corporation (2010) 8 SCC 206; Anju Chaudhary v. State of U.P. (2013) 6 SCC 384 : [2012] 13 SCR 901; Assistant Collector of Customs, Bombay v. L.R. Melwani AIR 1970 SC 962 : [1969] SCR 438;
Krishna Lal Chawla v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2021) 5 SCC 435; Abhinandan Jha v. Dinesh Mishra AIR 1968 SC 117 : [1967] SCR 668; State of Haryana and Others v. Bhajan Lal and Others, (1992) 1 Supp SCC 335 :
[1990] 3 Suppl. SCR 259; Mohd. Yusuf v. Afaq Jahan (Smt) and Another (2006) 1 SCC 627 : [2006] 1 SCR 1; HDFC Securities Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra (2017)
1 SCC 640 : [2016] 8 SCR 968; Chandra Deo Singh v.
Prokash Chandra Bose Alias Chabi Bose and Another AIR 1963 SC 1430 : [1964] SCR 639; Jasraj Inder Singh v. Hemraj Multanchand (1977) 2 SCC 155 :
[1977] 2 SCR 973; Gopal Das Sindhi and Others v.
State of Assam and Another AIR 1961 SC 986; Suresh Chand Jain v. State of M.P. and Another (2001) 2 SCC A B C D E F G H 628 : [2001] 1 SCR 257; Mona Panwar v. High Court of Judicature of Allahabad through its Registrar and Others (2011) 3 SCC 496 : [2011] 2 SCR 413 – referred to.
Case Law Reference [2007] 9 SCR 1113 referred to Para 3.6 [2013] 9 SCR 869 referred to Para 3.6 [2015] 5 SCR 283 referred to Para 3.6 [2012] 13 SCR 901 referred to Para 4.2 [1969] SCR 438 referred to Para 5.7 (2021) 5 SCC 435 referred to Para 7 [1967] SCR 668 referred to Para 18 [1990] 3 Suppl. SCR 259 referred to Para 21 [2013] 14 SCR 713 followed Para 22, 27, 38 [2015] 4 SCR 108 relied on. Para 22, 27 [2006] 1 SCR 1 referred to Para 29 [2016] 8 SCR 968 referred to Para 31 [1964] SCR 639 referred to Para 32 [1977] 2 SCR 973 referred to Para 35 [2001] 1 SCR 257 referred to Para 36 [2011] 2 SCR 413 referred to Para 36 CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
1581 of 2021.
From the Judgment and Order dated 01.10.2021 of the High Court at Calcutta in CRR No. 92 of 2021.
With Criminal Appeal Nos. 1582 and 1583 of 2021.
Mahesh Jethmalani, Maninder Singh, P. S. Patwalia, Sr. Advs., Kabir Shankar Bose, Amit Mishra, Amit Tiwari, Kanika Singhal, Ms. Mughda Pandey, Surjendu Sankar Das, Ms. Annie Mittal, Ms. Swarupama Chaturvedi, Ms. Kanika Singhal, Dheeraj Trivedi, Debu KAILASH VIJAYVARGIYA v. RAJLAKSHMI CHAUDHURI
AND OTHERS
A B C D E F G H 142 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 6 S.C.R.
Chowdhury, Arvind Gupta, Ms. Saumya Kapoor, Siddhant Yadav, Nachiketa Joshi, Amit Tiwai, Santosh Kumar, Praneet Pranav, Vedansh Anand, Ayush Anand, Advs. for the Appellant.
R. Basant, Bikash Ranjan Bhattacharya, Sr. Advs., Suhaan Mukerji, Vishal Prasad, Akshay Sahay, Sayandeep Paharii, M/s. Plr Chambers and Co., Rauf Rahim, Ali Asghar Rahim, Arvind C., Advs. for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
M. R. SHAH, J.
1. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment and order dated 01.10.2021 passed by the High Court of Calcutta in Criminal Revision Application No. 92/2021, by which the High Court has allowed the said revision application preferred by respondent no.1 herein – original complainant (victim) and has quashed and set aside order dated 12.11.2020 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Alipore (for short, ‘learned CJM’) rejecting the petition filed by respondent no.1 herein – original complainant under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure,1973 (Code/Cr.PC) original respondent nos. 2 to 4 (alleged accused) have preferred the present appeals.
2. The facts leading the present appeals in a nutshell are as under: That respondent no.1 herein – original complainant lodged a complaint under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. in the Court of learned CJM, making allegations against the appellants herein alleging that she was raped by all the three appellants on 29.11.2018 at about 5:00 p.m. at the residence of original accused no.3 – Kailash Vijayvargiya, when she was invited to discuss another Crime No. 1 of 2018 registered against their colleagues filed by her. That it was prayed to direct the Officer in Charge of Bhowanipore Police Station to start investigation into the matter after treating the complaint as an FIR.
2.1 It was the case on behalf of the complainant in the complaint before the learned CJM that she was a member of the State Committee of the Bhartiya Janata Party in the State of West Bengal. As a person involved in active politics, she has acquaintance with the leaders of the State at national level. On the allegation of rape, she filed a written complaint before the Officer in Charge, Behala (Woman) Police Station against one Amalendu Chattopadhyay. The said complaint was registered as Case No. 01/2018 dated 31/08/2018 under Sections 417/376/406/313/ A B C D E F G H 120B IPC. The investigation of the said case resulted in filing of the charge sheet against the above-named Amalendu Chattopadhyay. It was further alleged that since the filing of the charge sheet, she was pressurised by the appellants, namely, Pradeep Joshi, Jishnu Basu and Kailash Vijayvargiya, national level leaders of the said party to withdraw the case against Amalendu Chattopadhyay. On the pretext of having a discussion over the said matter, the appellants asked her to come at the residential apartment of accused – Kailash Vijayvargiya. It was further alleged in the complaint that she tried to inform the matter to the Officer in Charge of the Bhowanipore Police Station but the police suggested her to meet them in response to such call.
That she went to the residential apartment of the accused – Kailash Vijayvargiya on 29.11.2018 at about 5:00 p.m. The other accused were present in the said apartment from before. It was further alleged that the appellants committed rape upon her against her will one by one. Therefore, it was alleged that she became the victim of libido of the leaders of the said political party occupying position at national level. It was further alleged in the complaint that after the incident she was threatened with dire consequences. She was threatened by the appellants that in the event she takes any legal steps against them, her son would also be killed. It was further alleged that subsequently also she was subjected to physical assault and mental torture and she lodged complaints against the accused before different police stations, such as, Sarsuna P.S. Case No. 131/2019 under Sections 341/506(ii)/34 IPC and Bolpur P.S. Case No. 89/2020 under Sections 341/323/325/506/34 IPC. It was further alleged and so stated in the complaint that over the incident dated 29.11.2018, she tried to make the complaint with the local police station but police refused to accept such complaint from her. She also informed the matter to the higher authorities of the police but they also failed to take any action against the accused by registering an FIR. It appears that the respondent informed the Officer in Charge of Behala Police Station on 14.08.2020 about the alleged rape by the accused persons allegedly on 9.8.2018.
2.2 She filed a complaint before the DCP (South Division), 34, Park Street, Kolkata on 5.10.2020. According to her, she filed a written complaint before the concerned police station, i.e., P.S. Bhowanipore on 27.10.2020. She filed another complaint to the Deputy Commissioner of Police on 04.11.2020. According to the complainant, despite the aforesaid KAILASH VIJAYVARGIYA v. RAJLAKSHMI CHAUDHURI AND OTHERS [M. R. SHAH, J.] A B C D E F G H 144 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 6 S.C.R.
complaints to the various authorities making specific allegations against the accused persons having committed a rape upon her on 29.11.2018, FIR has not been lodged and no investigation has been carried out and therefore she filed an application in the Court of the learned CJM, Alipore under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. on 12.11.2020 and requested to direct the concerned police officer to register an FIR and investigate into the matter. 2.3 That the learned CJM, by a detailed order dated 12.11.2020 and after giving cogent reasons, dismissed the said application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C.
2.4 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order passed by the learned CJM, dismissing the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. filed by the complainant, the complainant preferred Revision Application before the High Court being Criminal Revision Application No. 92/2021. By the impugned judgment and order, the High Court has allowed the said revision application and has quashed and set aside order dated 12.11.2020 passed by the learned CJM, dismissing the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., mainly relying upon the decision of this Court in the case of Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh and others, reported in (2014) 2 SCC 1 and holding that as held by this Court in the case of Lalita Kumari (supra), the police authority in case of preliminary inquiry prior to the registration of a case concerning cognizable offence, has no jurisdiction to verify the veracity of the allegations and therefore a Magistrate cannot verify the truth and veracity of the allegations contained in the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. and therefore the learned CJM acted contrary to the law laid down by this Court in the case of Lalita Kumari (supra), while entering into the truth and veracity of the allegations. It has been further held that the learned CJM ought not to have dismissed the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. on the ground that there was a delay of two years in lodging the complaint, which aspect can be considered only at the time of trial.
2.5 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court, quashing and setting aside the order passed by the learned CJM dated 12.11.2020 dismissing the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. and remanding the matter to the learned CJM to reconsider the application filed by the complainant under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. in light of the observations made in the impugned judgment and order and pass a reasoned order, the original respondents – alleged accused have preferred the present appeals.
A B C D E F G H
3. S/Shri Mahesh Jethmalani, Maninder Singh and P.S. Patwalia, learned Senior Advocates have appeared on behalf of the respective appellants. Shri R. Basant, learned Senior Advocate has appeared on behalf of the State of West Bengal and Shri Bikash Ranjan Bhattacharya, learned Senior Advocate has appeared on behalf of the original complainant.
3.1 Learned Senior Advocate Shri Mahesh Jethmalani appearing on behalf of one of the appellants-accused has vehemently submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the High Court has committed a grave error in quashing and setting aside the well-reasoned order passed by the learned CJM dismissing the complaint under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C.
3.2 It is submitted that the High Court ought to have appreciated that the learned CJM dismissed the application under section 156(3) Cr.P.C. upon verifying the truth and veracity of the allegations made in the application, more particularly considering the fact that there was a delay of almost two years after the date of the alleged incident which has not been explained. It is submitted that therefore the learned CJM was well within its jurisdiction to verify the truth and veracity of the allegations made in the application when such serious allegations were made after a period of almost two years after the date of the alleged incident and that in between though number of other complaints were filed against the accused and others, at no point of time, any allegation of rape on 29.11.2018 was made.
3.3 It is submitted that while passing the impugned judgment and order and quashing and setting aside the order passed by the learned CJM, the High Court has wrongly relied upon and/or considered and/or applied the decision of this Court in the case of Lalita Kumari (supra). 3.4 It is submitted that the High Court has materially erred in observing that while considering the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., Magistrate has no jurisdiction at all to verify the truth and veracity of the allegations.
3.5 It is submitted that the observations made by the High Court in the impugned judgment and order that while considering the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., Magistrate has no jurisdiction to even prima facie verify the truth and veracity of the allegations made in the application are just contrary to the law laid down by this Court in the case of Priyanka KAILASH VIJAYVARGIYA v. RAJLAKSHMI CHAUDHURI AND OTHERS [M. R. SHAH, J.] A B C D E F G H 146 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 6 S.C.R.
Srivastava v. State of Uttar Pradesh, reported in (2015) 6 SCC 287. It is submitted that the same is also contrary to the decision of the coordinate Bench of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Mukul Roy v. The State of West Bengal, 2018 SCC Online Cal. 4861, expressly following the judgment in Priyanka Srivastava (supra).
3.6 Learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellants have also heavily relied upon the decisions of this Court in the cases of Maksud Saiyed v. State of Gujarat, reported in (2008) 5 SCC 668; Anil Kumar v. M.K. Aiyappa, reported in (2013) 10 SCC 705; and Ramdev Food Products Private Limited v. State of Gujarat, reported in (2015) 6 SCC 439 and decision of this Court in the case of Suresh Kankra v. State of U.P. & another (Criminal Appeal No. 52/2022, decided on 07.01.2022), in support of their submission that the Magistrate was well within its jurisdiction to verify the truth and veracity of the allegations made in the application, more particularly when such a serious allegation of rape was made after a period of two years after the date of the alleged incident.
3.7 It is further submitted that the learned Single Judge of the High Court is not right and/or justified in taking a contrary view than the view taken by the co-ordinate Bench in the case of Mukul Roy (supra). It is submitted that if the learned Single Judge of the High Court was of the opinion that the view taken in the case of Mukul Roy (supra) is not a correct law, in that case, propriety demands that the learned Single Judge ought to have referred the matter to the larger Bench, rather than taking a contrary view.
3.8 It is submitted that even otherwise the learned Single Judge ought to have appreciated that the decision of the High Court in the case of Mukul Roy (supra) was expressly following the judgment of this Hon’ble Court in the case of Priyanka Srivastava (supra). It is submitted that therefore also, the learned Single Judge ought not to have taken a contrary view.
3.9 It is further submitted by the learned Senior Advocates appearing on behalf of the appellants that in the present case even the SHO after receiving the complaint in the month of October, 2020 conducted a preliminary enquiry as per the law laid down by this Court in the case of Lalita Kumari (supra) and thereafter refused to register the FIR. A B C D E F G H 3.10 Learned Senior Advocates appearing on behalf of the respective appellants have taken us to the number of emails and messages sent to one of the appellants – Kailash Vijayvargiya from 30.11.2018, i.e., the next day after the alleged incident up till March, 2020. It is submitted that if he had committed the rape on 29.11.2018, as alleged, in that case, subsequently there was no reason for her to send emails and messages to the appellant – Kailash Vijayvargiya.
3.11 It is further submitted that in between 29.11.2018 and October, 2020, the complainant filed various complaints before various police stations against the very accused. The first complaint was filed on 12.12.2019 (Sarsuna case). The said complaint categorically mentions that she met the appellant, however, complaint does not make any mention of the alleged incident of rape. It is submitted that in the said FIR, the only allegations were that she was called by the top-level leaders for 4 times in the last year, November 2018 and each time they locked her for 4 to 5 hours and pressurised her to withdraw the case. It is submitted that the said FIR was registered as FIR No. 131/2019. It is submitted that the said case has been closed now, as a closure report dated 16.06.2020 was filed in the aforesaid case.
3.12 It is submitted that thereafter one another complaint dated 6.2.2020 was filed, however, there was no mention of any particular date of the alleged rape incident. It is submitted that thereafter one another complaint was filed on 12.03.2020 wherein she did not mention about the alleged rape incident at all. It is submitted that after a period of two years of alleged incident of rape, the complainant filed a complaint dated 27.10.2020 in which for the first time she stated that in order to pressurise her to withdraw the 2018 case against Amalendu Chattopadhyay, the appellants called her at the apartment of appellant no.1 – Kailash Vijayvargiya and raped her on 29.11.2018. It is submitted that therefore the learned CJM rightly observed that as there was an unexplained and inordinate delay of two years in making the complaint against the alleged offence, it casts doubt regarding the truth and veracity of the allegations contained in the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C.
3.13 It is further submitted by the learned Senior Advocates appearing for the respective appellants that while passing order dated 12.11.2020, the learned CJM made some pertinent observations to highlight that there was an inordinate delay in making the first police complaint against the alleged offence and that there existed sufficient KAILASH VIJAYVARGIYA v. RAJLAKSHMI CHAUDHURI AND OTHERS [M. R. SHAH, J.] A B C D E F G H 148 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 6 S.C.R.
inconsistencies to raise doubts regarding the truth and veracity of the allegations contained in the application under Section 156(3). It is submitted that firstly, the learned CJM observed that according to the complainant the alleged offence took place on 29.11.2018, however, attempt to initiate criminal proceedings was made for the first time only on 27.10.2020 – the date when a complaint was lodged at the Bhowanipore Police Station. This was after a gap of about two years from the date of the alleged offence.
3.14 It is submitted that thereafter the learned CJM further noted that the complainant in her application under Section 156(3) has stated that she made several complaints before various police stations against the accused persons and their men for the physical attacks carried out on her, however, no such complaint finds mention of the alleged offence of rape. Therefore, the learned CJM noted that possibility of false implication cannot be ruled out, especially when the same complainant made several other complaints against the same accused in that period in which no allegation of rape on 29.11.2018 was made.
3.15 It is further submitted that the learned CJM also further observed that the complainant in her complaint to Behala Police Station dated 14.08.2020 had accused one of the appellants – Kailash Vijayvargiya of raping her at Hotel Peerless Inn on 09.08.2018, however, the learned CJM did not find any mention of such incident in her application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C.. The learned CJM further observed that Behala Police Station Case No. 01/2018 against Amalendu Chattopadhyay and others was filed on 31.08.2018, that was much after the alleged rape by Kailash Vijayvargiya at Hotel Peerless Inn, however, even that complaint made to the Behala Police Station finds no mention of such incident. Therefore, considering the unexplained delay of about two years in making the complaint along with several inconsistencies in the allegations, the learned CJM concluded that allegations appear to be unbelievable and therefore rightly rejected Section 156(3) application of the complainant.
3.16 It is further submitted by the learned Senior Advocates appearing on behalf of the appellants that in the instant case, the learned CJM found the explanation for delay by the complainant wholly unsatisfactory. It is submitted that it is no doubt true that delay is not always fatal in the case of rape, particularly if adequately explained, however, there must be at least some credibility in the explanation for A B C D E F G H delay. It is submitted that in the first information report for rape, a delay of almost 2 years after the date of the alleged incident is a factor that of necessity would itself put any judicial mind on guard regarding the veracity of the complainant’s allegations. It is submitted that the learned CJM however did not dismiss the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. solely on the ground of delay, but examined her conduct since the date of the alleged rape till the filing of Section 156(3) application and found that her conduct contradicted her explanation for delay. That she was not a timid victim inasmuch as she was an experienced social/political worker; had a history of filing FIRs including for rape; had earlier filed FIRs against the accused in the instant case for other offences and indeed had invoked police powers against several powerful people. It is submitted that therefore complainant is not a person who could be easily intimidated or silenced into inaction for an act of rape committed on her. It is submitted that therefore the learned CJM committed no error in dismissing the application under Section 156(3) which ought not to have set aside by the High Court on wrong application of law holding that at the stage of considering the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., the Magistrate has no jurisdiction at all to consider the truth and veracity of the allegations in the complaint/application. It is submitted that the High Court has wrongly applied the ratio in Lalita Kumari (supra), which lays down the guidelines for the police and the investigating officer and not applicable to a Magistrate exercising the jurisdiction under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C.
3.17 It is submitted that the High Court has observed that as held by this Court in the case of Lalita Kumari (supra), when the police officer at the stage of registering the FIR has no jurisdiction to verify the veracity and truth of the allegations, how a Magistrate in exercise of powers under Section 156(3) can verify the veracity of the allegations in the complaint. It is submitted that the directions issued by this Court in the case of Lalita Kumari (supra) shall be confined to the police and shall not be applicable to a Magistrate exercising the jurisdiction under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C.
3.18 It is further submitted that even the subsequent conduct on the part of the complainant creates serious doubts about her credibility. It is submitted that the complainant having realised the serious doubt that her delayed complaint casts upon the veracity of her allegations completely, before this Court in the counter affidavit, she has stated on KAILASH VIJAYVARGIYA v. RAJLAKSHMI CHAUDHURI AND OTHERS [M. R. SHAH, J.] A B C D E F G H 150 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 6 S.C.R.
oath and has come out with a case now that she had in fact lodged a complaint with the police against the alleged rape incident on 29.11.2018 by lodging complaint on the very next day at 11:00 a.m.at the Behala Police Station. It is submitted that that was not her case even in the application under Section 156(3) and/or even in the complaints before the concerned police officers. It is submitted that even the learned Senior Advocate for the State of West Bengal has informed the Court that there was no such record of the complaint being filed. It is submitted that thus the complainant has made a false statement before this Court on oath only to get out of delay and to get out the fact that till October, 2020, no complaint was given by her in respect of the alleged incident of rape on 29.11.2018.
3.19 Making above submissions, it is submitted that the present case is a glaring example of abuse of process and abuse of law. It is submitted that accusation of rape is prima facie false and manufactured with an intent to extort or blackmail the accused on the pretext of these false allegations. It is submitted that such a serious allegation of rape after a period of about two years from the date of alleged incident have been made to tarnish the image of the appellants and to take a political revenge and to finish the political career of the appellants. Therefore, it is prayed to allow the present appeals and quash and set aside the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court. It is submitted that during the pendency of the present proceedings, despite the fact that the present appeals were pending before this Court, the learned CJM has passed an order dated 08.10.2021 directing the Officer in Charge of Bhowanipore Police Station for treating the application as an FIR and pursuant to the order of the learned CJM, FIR No. 221/2021 has been registered against the appellants. It is submitted that the said FIR is lodged consequent to the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court. It is submitted that therefore if the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court is set aside, in that case, all subsequent consequential orders and subsequent registration of the FIR also deserve to be quashed and set aside.
4. Shri R. Basant, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the State of West Bengal has vehemently submitted that the Magistrate is not authorised to inquire into the credibility of the complainant and the acceptability of the allegations at the stage of application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C.
A B C D E F G H 4.1 It is submitted that the Constitution Bench judgment in the case of Lalita Kumari (supra)holds that a police officer cannot refuse to register an FIR if it discloses commission of a cognizable offence. It is submitted that the preliminary enquiry contemplated in Lalita Kumari (supra) by a police officer is only to ascertain whether a cognizable offence is revealed or not. It is submitted that if the police officer wrongly or incorrectly refuses to register an FIR, the complainant has no option in law but to file a complaint under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. 4.2 It is submitted that though the judgment in Priyanka Srivastava (supra) empowers the Magistrate to consider the credibility of the complainant and the acceptability of the allegations also at the stage of application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., in view of the prior decisions of this Court in the cases of Srinivas Gundluri and others v. SEPCO Electric Power Construction Corporation, reported in (2010) 8 SCC 206; and Anju Chaudhary v. State of U.P., reported in (2013) 6 SCC 384, the plea that the veracity and/or credibility of the complainant and the acceptability of the allegations raised can be gone into by the Magistrate at Section 156(3) stage does not appear to be correct. 4.3 It is submitted that the Magistrate is approached by the complainant alleging that the police officer has not registered the FIR. Hence, there cannot be a mismatch between the duty of the police officer under section 154(1) and the contours of the jurisdiction of the Magistrate under Section 156(3) at the pre-cognizance stage. It is submitted that if so understood, the test of veracity enabled in Priyanka Srivastava (supra) can only be to ascertain whether a cognizable offence is in fact made out or not. It cannot receive an interpretation, divorced of the context and the dictum in Lalita Kumari (supra). If so, there will be a mismatch between Section 154(1) and Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. It is submitted that the decision of this Court in the case of Priyanka Srivastava (supra)cannot lead to a conclusion that the Magistrate can delve into the credibility of the complainant/witnesses and the acceptability of the allegations made by her. It is submitted that Priyanka Srivastava(supra) was not intended to confer such a jurisdiction. 4.4 It is further submitted that if the Magistrates were given powers to dismiss the complaint as soon as he chooses not to make a reference under Section 156(3), it would virtually be quashing the complaint by arriving at a premature conclusion without any evidence on record that the complainant cannot be believed. It is submitted that KAILASH VIJAYVARGIYA v. RAJLAKSHMI CHAUDHURI AND OTHERS [M. R. SHAH, J.] A B C D E F G H 152 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 6 S.C.R.
this would in effect amount to the Magistrate arrogating to himself the inherent powers conferred on the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. It is submitted that at the stage of Section 156(3), the Magistrate will not have any material which would enable him to take a decision on the credibility of the complainant or the acceptability of the allegations in the complaint.
4.5 It is further submitted that firstly the learned CJM could have exercised the discretion to direct the concerned police officer to register an FIR as the complaint reveals the commission of a cognizable offence. It is submitted that the police officer having not chosen to register an FIR, the Magistrate if he is satisfied certainly has to refer the complaint to the police station under Section 156(3) to register an FIR. It is submitted that alternatively if the learned Magistrate chooses not to refer the complaint to the police under Section 156(3), in any case, he could not have dismissed the complaint and must have proceeded to the stage of Section 200/202 Cr.P.C. and take an appropriate decision under Section 203 or 204 Cr.P.C. It is submitted that the petition made by the complainant dated 27.10.2020 inter alia praying for action by the Magistrate to direct investigation, amounts to a “complaint” under Section 2(d) Cr.P.C. It is submitted that therefore the Magistrate has the discretion to decide whatever action needs to be taken in the given facts of the case, under Section 156(3) or Section 200/202 Cr.P.C.
4.6 It is submitted that therefore, resort to Section 156(3) is also “taking action under the Code” and therefore the complaint does not cease to be a complaint because the complainant has inter alia requested for action under Section 156(3) also. It is submitted that the jurisdiction of the Magistrate under Section 156(3) and Sections 200/202 Cr.P.C does not depend upon the prayer/choice/preference of the complainant. Formal requirements of filing a list of witnesses and documents under Section 204 Cr.P.C. relate to a post-cognizance stage and the filing or non-filing of such list cannot affect the status of the petition as a complaint under Section 2(d) Cr.P.C. It is submitted that when presented with such a complaint, the Magistrate certainly has a discretion to make a pre-cognizance reference under Section 156(3) or alternatively take a post-cognizance action under Sections 200/202 Cr.P.C. If a petition answers the definition of a complaint under Section 2(d), all these courses are open and available to the Magistrate. It is submitted that therefore when the Magistrate does not choose to proceed under Section 156(3), A B C D E F G H the Magistrate cannot dismiss the complaint merely because he finds the resort to Section 156(3) not advisable. It is submitted that the Magistrate must still continue under Sections 200/202 Cr.P.C. and pass orders dismissing the complaint under Section 203 Cr.P.C. or issue a process under Section 204 Cr.P.C.
5. While opposing the present appeals, Shri Bikash Ranjan Bhattacharya, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the original complainant has vehemently submitted that in the present case the complaint filed by the complainant discloses commission of a cognizable offence. It is submitted that therefore it was the duty of the concerned police officer to register an FIR and investigate into the matter. It is submitted that however as the concerned police officer failed to register an FIR and investigate into the matter, the Magistrate in exercise of powers under Section 156(3) has to direct registration of an FIR and direct the concerned police officer to investigate into the allegations made in the FIR.
5.1 It is submitted that at the stage of registering an FIR, neither the police officer nor even the Magistrate at the stage of 156(3) have any jurisdiction and/or authority to hold a detailed enquiry/preliminary enquiry. It is submitted that the failure of the police to comply with Sections 156(1) and 156(2) Cr.P.C. requires the Magistrate to pass an order directing such an investigation. It is submitted that the purpose and object is to prima facie ensure that the ingredients of any cognizable offence are satisfied.
5.2 It is submitted that as mandated by the Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Lalita Kumari (supra), the moment a complaint discloses the ingredients of any cognizable offence, the registration of an FIR becomes mandatory and any investigation consequent thereto is to prima facie satisfy that an offence so alleged is apparently cognizable. It is submitted that at that stage, the only requirement is to satisfy whether the allegations made in the FIR disclose commission of a cognizable offence or not and not beyond that. 5.3 It is further submitted by the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the original complainant that as held by this Court in the case of Lalita Kumari (supra), reasonableness or credibility of information is not a condition precedent for registration of an FIR. It is further observed and held that use of word “shall” in Section 154 Cr.P.C. KAILASH VIJAYVARGIYA v. RAJLAKSHMI CHAUDHURI AND OTHERS [M. R. SHAH, J.] A B C D E F G H 154 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 6 S.C.R.
is a mandate to register the FIR and the rule of literal construction would apply. It is submitted that as per the decision of this Court in the case of Lalita Kumari (supra), only in exceptional cases, before registering the FIR, the preliminary enquiry by the concerned police officer is held to be permissible. It is submitted that, however, when the offence alleged is against the woman and when there are serious allegations of rape made, there is no question of holding any further preliminary enquiry at the stage of Section 156(3) application.
5.4 It is submitted that in the case of Priyanka Srivastava (supra), in paragraphs 29 & 30, it was observed that Magistrates were issuing process directing lodging of FIR in a stereotype and routine manner and therefore this Court observed and held that “to curb litigants from filing frivolous petitions, there should be prior applications under Sections 154(1) and 154(3) and that the petition under Section 156(3) should be supported by an affidavit”. It is submitted that the observations in paragraph 30, viz, in appropriate cases, the Magistrate could verify the truth and also verify the veracity of the allegations has to be read with the observations in earlier paragraphs wherein it was held that a Magistrate should take note of the allegations in entirety; the date of the incident and whether any cognizable case is remotely made out. It is submitted that therefore reliance placed by the learned Senior Advocates on behalf of the appellants on Priyanka Srivastava(supra) to contend that the judgment is an authority for the proposition that a Magistrate may verify the veracity of the allegations and thereby conduct a mini trial is wholly misplaced. It is submitted that at that stage the preliminary judicial act is to ensure whether any cognizable offence is remotely made out/disclosed. It is submitted that therefore decisions of this Court in the cases of Lalita Kumari (supra) and Priyanka Srivastava (supra) have to be harmoniously construed and read.
5.5 It is further submitted that noting the rise of crime against women, the Criminal Amendment Act (13 of 2013) was promulgated amending Section 154(1) Cr.P.C, Section 173(1A) Cr.P.C and Section 166A, IPC. It is submitted that the procedural requirement to compulsorily register an FIR was already existing in Section 154 Cr.P.C. but required the judicial interpretation in Lalita Kumari (supra) to be a mandate. The insertion of section 166A to the IPC has made the non-registration of complaint as FIR containing a cognizable offence, liable to penal consequences against the public servant (police). It is submitted that A B C D E F G H therefore it is the duty of the police to register the FIR on the basis of the complaint disclosing commission of a cognizable offence and nonregistration of a complaint as FIR is now offence.
5.6 It is submitted that even in complaint cases, it is only the prima facie satisfaction which is to be recorded and the scope of enquiry under Section 202 Cr.P.C. is restricted only to finding out the truth of the allegations in order to determine whether process should be issued or not and the inquiry even at that stage does not partake the character of a full-dress trial which can take place only after process is issued. Reliance is placed on paragraphs 40 & 41 of the decision of this Court in the case of Anju Chaudhary (supra).
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