State of Himachal Pradesh and Others v. M/S A.J. Infrastructures Pvt. Ltd and Anr.
- Citation
- 2023 INSC 446; [2023] 4 S.C.R. 773
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice S. Ravindra Bhat, Justice Dipankar Datta Himachal Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, Justice In View of the Decision in Central Bank of India Case, Justice Any Observation in the Decision Impugned in Ca No.8980
- Decided
- 28 Apr 2023
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 8980/2012
- Sections
- 16, 35, 151, 26E, 14, 16A, 14(7), 16B, 73(3), 38, 26, 34(1)
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:26 am. Original source ↗
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A B C D E F G H 773[2023] 4 S.C.R. 773
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AND OTHERS
v.
M/S A.J. INFRASTRUCTURES PVT. LTD AND ANR.
(Civil Appeal No. 8980-8981/2012)
APRIL 28, 2023
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT AND DIPANKAR DATTA, JJ.] Himachal Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1968– s.16-B– Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 – s.35–Held: s.16-B of the HPGST Act is not ultra vires any provision of law – It is a perfectly valid piece of legislation and is not ultra vires the Constitution and/ or the Banking Companies Act as erroneously held in the decision of the High Court impugned in CA No.9212 of 2012– Further, in view of the decision in Central Bank of India case, any observation in the decision impugned in CA No.8980 of 2012 touching upon s.16-B of the HPGST Act vis-à-vis s.35 of the SARFAESI Act is of no effect–Himachal Pradesh Land Revenue Act, 1954.
Himachal Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1968– s.16-B – “Tax to be first charge on property” – Himachal Pradesh Land RevenueAct, 1954 – Chapter VI– Held: s.16-B would be attracted only after determination of the liability and upon any sum becoming due and payable; and it is only thereafter that the charge, if any, would operate – In the present case, proceedings were not initiated upon notice to the defaulters and the sum they owed to the department had not been finally determined in accordance with law–Thus, question of the State resorting to the provisions contained in Chapter VI of the HPLR Act for recovering the dues, if at all, as arrears of land revenue did not arise–Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002. Practice and Procedure – Held: A decision on the constitutional validity of a provision should be invited not in vacuum but when the justice of the case demands such a decision – Decision on an infructuous writ petition is inconsequential and can never be of any effect.
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – s.151 – Held: When the law provides a specific remedy, it is not open to a party to take recourse A B C D E F G H 774 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 4 S.C.R.
to s.151 – It preserves the inherent powers of the court to do justice in a case where the party has no other remedy under the CPC– Practice and Procedure.
Disposing of the appeals, the Court HELD:1.1A law, which the State legislature had the competence to enact, has been outlawed by the High Court while hearing a writ petition which was rendered infructuous due to developments subsequent to its filing and prior to its disposal but such developments had not been brought to the notice of the High Court. For all intents and purposes, the High Court by its judgment and order dated 2nd January, 2008 decided an infructuous writ petition and, in the process, outlawed section 16-B of the HPGST Act when the same was not at all warranted.It was also a clear but inadvertent error on the part of this Court to dismiss only the special leave petition against PNB as infructuous; the appropriate course for this Court ought to have been to dismiss the writ petition of PNB itself as infructuous having regard to the clear stand taken by PNB in its aforesaid affidavit dated 30th September, 2010 that nothing survived for a decision on the writ petition on the date it was decided in view of release of the property from mortgage. In view of dismissal of the special leave petition qua PNB by the order dated 8th April, 2011, the judgment and order outlawing section 16-B of the HPGST Act can be examined.[Paras 29, 31 and 32][788-G-H; 789- E-G] A.R. Antulay vs. R.S. Nayak (1988) 2 SCC 602 : [1988] 1 Suppl. SCR 1– referred to.
1.2 Since the writ petition had been rendered infructuous on the date it was decided, it was not necessary for the High Court to pronounce on the validity of section 16-B. A decision on the constitutional validity of a provision should be invited not in vacuum but when the justice of the case demands such a decision. Hence, it is held that the decision on an infructuous writ petition is inconsequential and can never be of any effect. The issue as to whether section 16-B of the HPGST Act is ultra vires any provision of law including the supreme law of the country is no longer res integra. What appears to be of significance in the light A B C D E F G H of the decision in Central Bank of India is that the findings in the judgments and orders disposing of the writ petitions impugned in two of the four civil appeals ~ the first dated 7th September, 2007 and the other dated 2nd January, 2008 ~ with regard to the scope, ambit and applicability of section 35 of the SARFAESI Act, more particularly the latter holding section 16-B of the HPGST Act as ultra vires the Constitution and the Banking Companies Act, loses its basis and can no longer be held to be legal and valid. Section 35 of the SARFAESI Act could not have been construed as conferring any right on a secured creditor to claim priority over dues of the State in the absence of a provision in that behalf which presently can now be claimed, subject to other conditions being fulfilled, in view of section 26E of the SARFAESI Act. Pertinently, the High Court while seized of the writ petition of PNB was not at all concerned with the SARFAESI Act as such. The matter had travelled to the High Court from proceedings under the DRT Act. There was, thus, no occasion for the High Court to pronounce on the validity of section 16-B of the HPGST Act based on what was held by its coordinate Bench in M/s A.J. Infrastructures Pvt. Ltd.. The High Courtwas therefore in clear error.Section 16-B of the HPGST Act is a perfectly valid piece of legislation and is not ultra vires the Constitution and/or the Banking Companies Act as erroneously held in the decision of the High Court dated 2nd January, 2008. Also, following the decision in Central Bank of India, any observation in the decision dated 7th September, 2007 touching upon section 16-B of the HPGST Act vis-à-vis section 35 of the SARFAESI Act is of no effect. [Paras35, 38-40][790-B-D; 793-C-H] Central Bank of India vs. State of Kerala (2009) 4 SCC 94 : [2009] 3 SCR 735 – relied on.
M/s A.J. Infrastructures Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of H.P. and others CWP No. 306/2007 dated 7th September, 2007 – referred to.
1.3 From the excerpt of the impugned judgment and order of the High Court dated 2nd January, 2008 it is clear that proceedings were not initiated upon notice to the defaulters and the sum they owed to the department had not been finally determined 28 in accordance with law. In view thereof, question STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH v. M/S A.J.
INFRASTRUCTURES PVT. LTD
A B C D E F G H 776 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 4 S.C.R.
of the State resorting to the provisions contained in Chapter VI of the HPLR Act for recovering the dues, if at all, as arrears of land revenue did not arise.The State and its department either overlooked or were ignorant of the requirement of law that section 16-B would be attracted only after determination of the liability and upon any sum becoming due and payable; and that, it is only thereafter that the charge, if any, would operate. No relevant documentary evidence having been placed before the High Court, when CWP 306 of 2007 was being heard, to indicate that necessary steps under the HPGST Act had been initiated by the State and its officers, the third issue has to be answered by holding that the State not having taken steps as required by law for realization of its dues, there was no determination of liability, a fortiori, question of taking recourse to the HPLR Act for recovery of dues as arrears of land revenue did not arise. Without such determination of liability, no red entry marks could have been inserted in the revenue records and the High Court was right in holding that the State ought not to have refused mutation.The appellants (State and its officers) are not entitled to any relief except the declaration that section 16-B of the HPGST Act is not ultra vires any provision of law. In view of section 16-B having been outlawed by the High Court on 2nd January, 2008, this declaration shall not enure to the benefit of the State in respect of cases that are old and have been closed but would be effective once again from this ay. [Paras 48, 49 and 51][795-F-G; 796-B-E; 797-C-D] State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur vs. National Iron & Steel Rolling Corporation and Ors. (1995) 2 SCC 19 :
[1994] 6 Suppl. SCR 566 – referred to.
Case Law Reference [1994] 6 Suppl. SCR 566 referred to Para 11 [1988] 1 Suppl. SCR 1 referred to Para 27 [2009] 3 SCR 735 relied on Para 36 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos.8980- 8981 of 2012.
From the Judgment and Order dated 07.09.2007 of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh at Shimla in CWP No.306 of 2007 and CMP No.1160 of 2008.
A B C D E F G H With Civil Appeal Nos. 9212-9213 of 2012.
Abhinav Mukerji, Bihu Sharma, Akshay C. Shrivastava, Ms.
Pratishtha Vij, Varinder Kumar Sharma, Advs. for the Appellants. A. Venayagam Balan, Sanjay Kapur, Ms. Megha Karnwal, Surya Prakash, Arjun Bhatia, Ms. Astha Gumber, Advs. for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DIPANKAR DATTA, J.
Preface
1. A thin thread connects the two sets of civil appeals1, which areat the instance of the State of Himachal Pradesh (for brevity, “the State”, hereafter) and its officers.Since the provisions of law emerging for consideration are almost the same in terms, though in different fact situations, these appealswere heard one after the other andshall stand disposed of by this common judgment and order.
Civil Appeal Nos.8980-8981/2012
2. Civil Appeal No. 8980 of 2012 is directed against the judgment and order of the High Court dated 7thSeptember, 2007 allowinga writ petition2 presented before it by M/s. A.J. Infrastructures (Pvt.) Ltd., the first respondent, on 6th March, 2007. The operative portion of the order reads as follows:- “For all the aforesaid reasons, the writ petition is allowed. Order rejecting petitioner’s application for not mutating the entry in their name is quashed and set aside. The respondents no. 1 to 5 are directed to delete the adverse entry showing the sales tax dues of M/s Regent Rubber and M/s Eastman Rubber in relation to the property comprising in Khasra No. 254/2/1, Khatauni Nos. 7 Min, 14 Min, Measuring 3 Bighas 7 Bishwas, situated at Village Moginand, Kala-Amb, Tehsil Nahan, District Sirmour, HP and further respondent no. 3 is directed to mutate the property in the name of petitioner company. The petitioner shall be entitled to costs, which is quantified at Rs, 25,000/from respondents no. 1 to 5.”
1 Civil Appeal Nos. 8980-8981/2012 and Civil Appeal Nos. 9212-9213/2012 2 CWP No. 306/2007 STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH v. M/S A.J.
INFRASTRUCTURES PVT. LTD
A B C D E F G H 778 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 4 S.C.R.
3. Aggrieved by the judgment and order dated 7th September, 2007, the official respondents in the writ petition applied for a review3.By an order dated 29th October, 2009, the High Court proceeded to dispose of the application for review by, inter alia, the following order:- “The present application of review has been filed after delay of more than one year without proper and satisfactory explanation. No sufficient material has been placed on record for reviewing the order dated 07-09-07, which may be brought within four corners and provisions of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC, as observed in foregoing decisions. Therefore, only for taking different view, the said order dated 07-09-09 cannot be reviewed. In these circumstances, the present application for reviewing the order dated 07-09-09 is dismissed on the ground of delay as well as on the merits.”
The said order dated October 29, 2009 is challenged in C.A. No. 8981 of 2012.
4. The facts pleaded in the writ petition reveal that the first respondent had purchased the subject property (described in full in the operative part of the order dated 7th September, 2007, extracted above) in an auction conducted by the State Bank of Patiala (for brevity “State Bank”, hereafter) on 18th January, 2005 in exercise of power conferred by the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (for brevity, “the SARFAESI Act”, hereafter).The subject property was initially mortgaged on 11th October, 1999 with the Himachal Pradesh Financial Corporation (for brevity “HPFC”, hereafter) by M/s. Regent Rubber Private Limited (for brevity “Regent”, hereafter). Due to breach committed by Regent, HPFC took over the property and sold it in an open auction to M/s Eastman Rubber (for brevity “Eastman”, hereafter). The subject property was thereafter mortgaged by Eastman with the State Bank. However, Eastman too having committed default in liquidating its dues, the subject property was eventually put up for sale in an open auction on 18th January, 2005 under rules 8 and 9 of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 (for brevity “SARFAESI Rules”, hereafter).
5. The first respondent emerged as the highest bidder in the auction by quoting a sum of Rs. 50,01,000/-.Within the stipulated time, the first 3 CMP No. 1160/2008 A B C D E F G H respondent paid the entire bid amount whereupon in accordance with the provisions of rule 9(6) and (10) of the SARFAESI Rules, sale certificate dated 21st July, 2005 was issued to the following effect:- “receipt of the sale price in full and handed over the delivery and possession of the scheduled property. The sale of the scheduled property was made free from all encumbrances known to the secured creditor listed below on deposit of the money demanded by the undersigned.”
6. After issuance of the sale certificate, the State Bank by its letter dated 24th February, 2006 informed various authorities including the taxation department of the State of sale of the subject property to the first respondent. In due course of time, the first respondent obtained permission from the State vide order dated 17th August, 2006 and consequently was able to have the sale deed executed and registered on 6th September, 2006.
7. The first respondent having applied for mutation of the subject property in its name, an order of rejection thereof came to be passed on 22nd December, 2006 in the circumstances noted now. On 18th January, 2005, an ex parte assessment order under the provisions of the Himachal Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1968 (for brevity “HPGST Act”, hereafter) was passed in relation to the assessment years 1998-1999, 1999-2000, 2000-2001 and 2001-2002 against Regent and Eastman amounting to Rs. 19,03,845/- and Rs.13,73,115/- respectively. Having regard to the date of the ex parte assessment order, it is quite but natural that when the first respondent offered its bid for purchasing the subject property in the auction ultimately conducted (on 18th January, 2005), any outstanding liability of either Regent or Eastman could not and was not reflected in any official record. However, in view of this liability of Regent and Eastman, the application of the first respondent for mutation in respect of the subject property in its name stood rejected. Such order revealed that on the asking of the Excise and Taxation Officer, Nahan, District Sirmour, entries in red ink had been made by the Tehsildar, Nahan pertaining to demand of arrears of tax payable by Regent and Eastman under the provisions of the HPGST Act.
8. The order of rejection dated 22nd December, 2006 was assailed in the writ petitionand orders were sought seeking (i) deletion of adverse entries regarding the sales tax liability of Regent and Eastman; (ii) direction upon the tehsildar to mutate the subject property, after quashing STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH v. M/S A.J.
INFRASTRUCTURES PVT. LTD [DIPANKAR DATTA, J.] A B C D E F G H 780 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 4 S.C.R.
of the order dated 22nd December 2006;and (iii) declaring the action of the excise and taxation officeras illegal, unjust and without the authority of law.
9. Upon a contested hearing, a Division Bench of the High Court allowed the writ petition on terms noted above in paragraph 2 supra.
10. We consider it appropriate to reproduce certain other paragraphs from the impugned judgment dated 7th September, 2007, hereunder:- “Undoubtedly, Section 16-B of the Tax Act also contains a non-obstante clause, which makes the amount of tax payable by a dealer to be a first charge on the property of the dealer. There is, thus, obviously a conflict between the provisions of the two statutes.
The powers are absolute and in view of the non obstante clause contained in Section 35 of the Act, would have an overriding effect over all inconsistent provisions contained in any other law. The Act being a special statute, enacted later in point in time and that too by the Central Government (sic, Parliament), in our view, would override the inconsistent provisions contained in the Tax Act. This is in the scheme of constitutional provisions also. Therefore, the Bank is well within its right to take over the property and sell the same notwithstanding the 1st charge of the State on the property of the dealer.
The issue needs to be examined from another perspective.
Under the provisions of the Tax Act, the Assessing Authority is required to assess the amount of tax due from the dealer on the basis of returns filed. If the Assessing Authority is not satisfied that the returns furnished are correct and complete or that no returns have been filed at all he shall serve a notice, give an opportunity of hearing and as the case may arise, adopt the best judgment method and assess the amount of tax due from the dealer. This is so provided under section 14 of the Tax Act. The amount so assessed is required to be paid by the assessee within the time stipulated in the notice to be issued by the Assessing Authority, failing which the amount due is recoverable as arrears of land revenue as provided for under section 16, which, however, in view of non obstante clause A B C D E F G H contained in section 16A comes into operation only after the dealer failed to pay the amount due when a notice in writing is issued to him. Now, in the present case no notice of demand, as stipulated under section 14(7) or section 16A has been issued to any of the dealers.The action of respondent no. 5 in asking respondents no. 3 and 4 and also the action of respondents no. 4 in acting upon the request of respondent no. 5 to make entries (in red ink) of arrears of tax due recoverable as land revenue in the revenue record is thus bad in law. For the very same reason, in spite of No Objection issued by the State for getting the sale deed executed is thus in gross violations of the provisions of the Tax Act.
Further the right of the respondent-State to have a first charge on the property of the dealer can be only if there is proper adjudication and determination of the amount due under the Tax Act and in the absence thereof, it cannot be said that the tax is due and payable by the dealer. Till such time, the same is done, there cannot be any crystallization of charge. The charge of the State is not a floating charge.
In the instant case the Bank had already exercised its right and taken possession of the property much prior to the assessment order dated 18-01-05 passed by the Assessing Authority. In fact before the said date the property itself had been advertised to be sold by public auction. No notice of demand was ever issued under Section 14 and 16A before action under section 16 of the Tax Act was taken. Assuming that the first charge stood created prior to the passing of the order of assessment, in our view the provisions of section 35 of the Act would override the inconsistent provisions of section 16B of the Tax Act leading to the only conclusion and that there is no prior charge on the property except for that of the Bank with whom the property was mortgaged. Thus, in our view, looking from all angles the action of the State cannot be upheld.
The creation of 1st charge or status of encumbrance of property was recorded for the 1st time on 11-07-06. The record of rights, i.e. revenue record did not reflect any status of encumbrance of the property or creation of 1st charge in spite STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH v. M/S A.J.
INFRASTRUCTURES PVT. LTD [DIPANKAR DATTA, J.] A B C D E F G H 782 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 4 S.C.R.
of the fact that the respondents were duly informed about the auction and issuance of the sale certificate by the Bank in favour of the petitioner. It was only when the State was satisfied about the non-encumbrance that the permission to transfer the property in the name of the petitioner was accorded. In fact, based on the revenue record the Bank considered the property to be encumbered and accepted the same as a security. It took over the same and put it to auction as a secured asset which stands purchased by the petitioner as such.”
(emphasis ours)
Civil Appeal Nos.9212-9213/2012
11. Punjab National Bank (for brevity “PNB”, hereafter)
sanctioned term loan to M/s Superrugs (India) Pvt. Ltd. (for brevity “borrower”, hereafter) for manufacturing carpets. The loan that was provided by PNB to the borrower was secured by mortgage of its factory premises situated at Baddi Industrial Area, District Solan.Shri R.T. Tejpal and Shri Durga Dass stood as guarantors (for brevity “guarantors”, hereafter). The loan account of the borrower became irregular. A recovery suit was instituted by PNB against the borrower and the guarantors for Rs. 42.29 lacs. Upon introduction of the Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (for brevity “DRT Act”, hereafter) and constitution of the Debts Recovery Tribunals, the suit was transferred to the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Jaipur (for brevity “DRT, Jaipur”, hereafter). Consent decree was passed on 12th November, 1998 in favour of PNB and against the borrower and the guarantors. Part payment was made by the borrower towards satisfaction of the decree, but balance payment was not made resulting in PNB levying execution of the recovery certificate for an amount of Rs.2,65,97,162.50 before the DRT, Jaipur on14th May, 1999. Subsequently, the proceedings for execution were transferred to the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Chandigarh (for brevity “DRT, Chandigarh”, hereafter) on 2nd January, 2000. During pendency of the proceedings, the Assistant Excise and Taxation Commissioner, District Solan (for brevity “Commissioner”, hereafter), issued a notice in ‘The Tribune’ in its edition dated 12thFebruary, 2000 for auction of the property that was mortgaged by the borrower. Auction was fixed for 3rd March, 2001 for recovery of arrears of sales tax amounting to Rs.32,72,365/-, which was recoverable A B C D E F G H as arrears of land revenue under the Himachal Pradesh Land Revenue Act, 1954 (for brevity “HPLR Act”, hereafter). PNB moved an application before the Recovery Officer attached to the DRT, Chandigarh for stay of auction whereupon the said recovery officer considering the law laid downby this Court in State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur vs. National Iron & Steel Rolling Corporation and Ors.4 concluded that the claim of PNB against the mortgaged property had become secondary in view of the auction initiated by the State for recovery of sales tax dues. This resulted in PNB invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 by filing a writ petition5against the State, the Commissioner, the Recovery Officer of the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Chandigarh, the borrower and the guarantors.
12. Prayer in the writ petition was for orders restraining sale by auction of the mortgaged property of the borrower at Baddi, District Solan for recovery of arrears of sales tax dues, and to strike down section 16-B of the HPGST Act as ultravires the provisions of the Constitution, the DRT Act, the Transfer of Property Act, 1872, the Contract Act, 1872 and the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970 (for brevity “Banking Companies Act”, hereafter).
13. The State and the Commissioner contested the writ petition by contending that the borrowerowed Rs. 32,72,365/ to the Government of Himachal Pradesh on account of arrears of sales tax which had been declared as arrears under the HPLR Act. It was further contented that the State is competent to recover the amount as it has a first charge on the property of the dealer under section 16-B of the HPGST Act read with section 73(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure (for brevity “the CPC”, hereafter). It was further contented that it is wrong on the part of the PNB to contend that its debtis prior in point of time. Section 16-B of the HPGST Act had come into force with effect from 21st October, 1994 whereas the consent decree was passed in favour of PNB on 12th November, 1998. This being the position, the provisions of section 16-B of the HPGST Act would apply and that PNB was not entitled to any relief. Reference was made to the decision of this Court in State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur (supra) where this Court consideredsection 11-AAAA of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1954, which
4(1995) 2 SCC 19
5 CWP No. 239 of 2001 STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH v. M/S A.J.
INFRASTRUCTURES PVT. LTD [DIPANKAR DATTA, J.] A B C D E F G H 784 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 4 S.C.R.
is parimateria with section 16-B of the HPGST Act, creating a first charge on the property of the dealer. In the light of the said decision, the contention of PNB that it had the prior right to recovery of the debt was claimed to be devoid of substance and, in fact, misconceived.
14. The writ petition of PNB come to be allowed by the High Court vide its judgment and order dated 2nd January, 2008. The judgment and order dated 7th September, 2007 rendered by the High Court on the writ petition6 titled M/s A.J. Infrastructures Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of H.P. and others, being the judgment and order impugned in Civil Appeal No. 8980of 2012,was relied upon. Although while deciding M/s A.J. Infrastructures Pvt. Ltd. (supra) the High Court had not declared section 35 of the SARFAESI Act as ultra vires, the Division Bench of the High Court in seisin of the writ petition of PNB proceeded a step further and held section 16-B of the HPGST Act to be inconsistent with section 35 of the SARFAESIAct; and,then declared the said section as ultra vires the Constitution and the Banking Companies Act. The writ petition filed by PNB was, accordingly, allowed and it was held that PNB was entitled to sell the mortgaged property ofthe borrower in accordance with law.
15. The Division Bench of the High Court also recorded as follows :- “In the present case, the mortgage was created in the year 1984 and the consent decree was passed on 12.11.1998 in favour of the petitioner bank and against respondents No. 4 to 6. There is nothing on record to show that any notice of demand was firstly issued under Sections 14 and 16 A before action under Section 16 of the Sales Tax Act was taken. The copies of the notice of demand issued and when it was issued have not been placed on record by respondents No. 1 & 2 except by pleading about their right to sell the property and recover the amount as arrears of land revenue in preference to the petitioner bank. Therefore, in view of the decision in Dena Bank’s case it is clear that it only gives preferential right to the State to recover the sales tax in preference to unsecured creditors but once the property in question already stood mortgaged and they had proceeded prior in time, they 6CWP No. 306/2007 A B C D E F G H can recover the amount in pursuance of the consent decree passed in their favour, the State has no preferential right to sell the property and, therefore, the petitioner bank is entitled to sell the mortgaged property and realize the arrears of amount due to them and State shall be entitled to recover the balance amount, if any, left with the bank or in the alternative, they are at liberty to proceed against respondents No. 4 to 6 for recovery of the amount by proceeding against them in accordance with law. The Division Bench in the above case has already taken the view that the provisions of Section 35 of the Act would override the inconsistent provisions of Section 16B of the Tax Act and as such, there provisions of the Sales Tax Act Section 16B as they are inconsistent with Section 35 of the Act are declared ultravires of the Constitution.”
(emphasis ours)
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