M/S South Indian Bank Ltd. & Ors. v. Naveen Mathew Philip & Anr. Etc. Etc.
- Citation
- 2023 INSC 379; [2023] 4 S.C.R. 18
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Sanjiv Khanna, Justice Became So From the Month of March 2022 – Meanwhile, Justice In An Slp, Justice Order Passed By
- Decided
- 17 Apr 2023
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 2861/2023
- Sections
- 13(4), 13(2), 17(1), 14, 20, 17, 18
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:26 am. Original source ↗
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A B C D E F G H 18 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 4 S.C.R.[2023] 4 S.C.R. 18 M/S SOUTH INDIAN BANK LTD. & ORS.
v.
NAVEEN MATHEW PHILIP & ANR. ETC. ETC.
(Civil Appeal Nos. 2861-62 of 2023)
APRIL 17, 2023
[SANJIV KHANNA AND M. M. SUNDRESH, JJ.] Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002:
Writ Jurisdiction of High Court under – Matter pertaining to default in payment of outstanding dues by the borrowers – Issuance of notices u/s. 13(4) – Writ petitions by the borrowers challenging the notices before the High Court – Debt Recovery tribunal was not functional at the time when said writ petitions were filed– However, became so from the month of March 2022 – Meanwhile, in an SLP, order passed by this Court to transfer the pending matters to the concerned tribunals when they start functioning with their respective Presiding Officers duly in-charge – Notwithstanding the said order, the High Court took upon itself to decide the said petitions and allowed the borrower to make deferred payment in 12 months – Appeal before this Court – Appellant’s case that the relief granted by the High Court may not be disturbed while pressing for reiteration of law which might guide the High Court in not entertaining such writ petitions in the future – Held: In view of the fair stand of the appellant, the relief granted by the High Court not to be disturbed – Powers conferred under Article 226 are rather wide but are required to be exercised only in extraordinary circumstances – In matters where the legislature has provided for a specific mechanism for appropriate redressal, constitutional remedy not to be resorted to – Constitution of India – Art. 226.
SARFAESI Act – Purpose and Object – Discussed.
Writ:
Writ of certiorari – Issuance of, when – Held: Is to be issued over a decision when the Court finds that the process does not conform to the law or statute – Writ is not to be issued to remedy all violations – Writ court cannot substitute itself with the decision- A B C D E F G H making authority while finding fault with the process – When a tribunal is constituted,it is expected to determine issues of fact and law, including a statutory violation – Constitution of India – Art. 226.
Writ of mandamus – Issuance of – Writ petition before the High Court in commercial matters against the private individual seeking issuance of mandamus – Held: Writ of Mandamus is a prerogative writ – In the absence of any legal right, the Court cannot exercise the said power – More circumspection is required in a financial transaction, particularly when one of the parties would not come within the purview of Art. 12.
Judicial deprecation: Interference of the High Courts in matters pertaining to the SARFAESI Act – Held: Said practice is deprecated – Request to the High Courts not to entertain such cases – When a statute prescribes a particular mode, an attempt to circumvent shall not be encouraged by a writ court – A litigant cannot avoid the non-compliance of approaching the tribunal which requires the prescription of fees and use the constitutional remedy as an alternative – Constitution of India – Article 226. Judicial notice: Commercial matters, where an effective and efficacious alternative forum has been constituted through a statute – Interference by certain High Court invoking Art. 226 in such matters leading to a regular supply of cases before this Court – Judicial notice taken by this Court.
Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmad Ishaque (1955) 1 SCR 1104; Mardia Chemicals Ltd. v. Union of India, (2004) 4 SCC 311 : [2004] 3 SCR 982– relied on.
Radha Krishan Industries v. State of H.P. (2021) 6 SCC 771; Phoenix Arc Private Limited vs. Vishwa Bharati Vidya Mandir & Ors. (2022) 5 SCC 345; Federal Bank Ltd. vs. Sagar Thomas & Ors. (2003) 10 SCC 733 :
[2003] 4 Suppl. SCR 121; State Bank of India vs.
Arvindra Electronics (P) Ltd. 2022 SCC Online SC 1522; United Bank of India vs. Satywati Tondon & Others (2010) 8 SCC 110 : [2010] 9 SCR 1; Authorized Officer, State Bank of Travancore & Another vs.
M/S SOUTH INDIAN BANK LTD. & ORS. v. NAVEEN
MATHEW PHILIP & ANR. ETC. ETC.
A B C D E F G H 20 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 4 S.C.R.
Mathew K.C. (2018) 3 SCC 85 : [2018] 1 SCR 233;
Varimadugu OBI Reddy vs. B. Sreenivasulu & Others (2023) 2 SCC 168 – referred to.
Case Law Reference (2022) 5 SCC 345 referred to Para 11, 17 [2003] 4 Suppl. SCR 121 referred to Para 11, 17 [2010] 9 SCR 1 referred to Para 11, 17 [2018] 1 SCR 233 referred to Para 11, 17 (2023) 2 SCC 168 referred to Para 11, 17 [1955] 1 SCR 1104 relied on Para 14 [2004] 3 SCR 982 relied on Para 15 (2021) 6 SCC 771 referred to Para 16 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 2861- 2862 of 2023.
From the Judgment and Order dated 19.10.2022 of the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam in WA Nos. 1492 and 1497 of 2022. K. V. Vishwanathan, Sr. Adv., A. Karthik, Arsh Khan, Ms. Smrithi Suresh, Ms. Sreepriya K, Advs. for the Appellants.
Shyam Divan, Sr. Adv., Nishe Rajen Shonker, Mrs. Anu K Joy, Abraham C. Mathew, Alim Anvar, Advs. for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
M. M. SUNDRESH, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. Seeking enforcement of a unilateral offer concerning private financial transactions, while questioning the steps taken to recover the dues on the failure to comply with the one-time settlements, extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court was sought to be invoked. Acceding to the request made by duly interfering with the action taken by the Appellants, orders were passed, in exercise of the powers conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by the High Court of Kerala, which are impugned in the present appeals.
A B C D E F G H
3. Heard Mr. K.V. Vishwanathan, learned Senior Counsel for the Appellants and Mr. Shyam Divan, learned Senior Counsel for the Respondents.
4. Two loans were obtained by the Respondents, being a housing / KCC overdraft loan and a business loan. The accounts of the Respondents were declared as non-performing assets (“NPA”) on 27.05.2021. Notices under Section 13(2) of the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as “SARFAESI Act”) were issued on 07.08.2021 and 12.08.2021, respectively, which were duly replied to by the Respondents on 28.10.2021, seeking twelve months’ time to repay the loan.
5. Strangely enough, within 3 days of the reply dated 28.10.2021, prior to the expiry of the statutory period prescribed, a challenge was laid to the demand notice issued under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act, by filing Writ Petition No. 23940 of 2021. Entertaining the said lis, a direction was issued to the Appellants to consider the proposal placed. In due compliance of the aforesaid order, the Respondents were allowed to remit the dues accrued in five installments instead of twelve. The extended benefit conferred was not utilized by the Respondents, and therefore, a reminder was also sent. Receiving no response, two notices under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act, were issued on 02.12.2021 and 20.12.2021.
6. Impugning the aforesaid notices, two writ petitions were filed by the Respondents, being Writ Petition No. 30238 of 2021 and 30450 of 2021 questioning the action taken, through a writ of certiorari while praying for a positive direction to accept the unilateral offers made. It is to be noted that the Debt Recovery Tribunal, though was not functional at the time of filing the aforesaid Writ Petitions, became so from the month of March, 2022.
7. Taking note of the then prevailing situation resulting in the post of Presiding Officer lying vacant for proper adjudication in various Tribunals, an order was passed by this Court in Special Leave Petition No. 10911 dated 16.12.2021, “Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner has brought to our notice the difficulty being faced by parties on account of non-appointment of members in DRTs and DRATs. M/S SOUTH INDIAN BANK LTD. & ORS. v. NAVEEN MATHEW PHILIP & ANR. ETC. ETC. [M. M. SUNDRESH, J.] A B C D E F G H 22 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 4 S.C.R.
He requested that the matters before DRT and DRAT can be directed to be considered by other Tribunals like Central Administrative Tribunal, Armed Forces Tribunal and Industrial Tribunal within the State.
With a view to resolve the problem being faced by the parties, for the time being and purely as a stop-gap arrangement, we request the concerned High Court(s) to entertain the matters falling within the jurisdiction of DRTs and DRATs under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, till further orders.
We make it clear that once the Tribunal(s) is/are constituted, the matters can be relegated to the Tribunals by the High Court(s). List the matter on 21-1-2022.”
8. As could be seen, the order is self-explanatory, making it clear that it is only an interim arrangement, and therefore, the pending matters ought to be transferred to the concerned Tribunals when they start functioning with their respective Presiding Officers duly in-charge. The aforesaid matter was disposed of by the order dated 12.09.2022, “1. Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner states that since the post in the Debt Recovery Tribunal has been filled up, the cause does not survive.
2. The Special Leave Petition is accordingly disposed of without this Court expressing any opinion on the question of law raised.
3. Pending applications, if any, stands disposed of.”
9. Notwithstanding the orders passed above by this Court, the High Court took upon itself to decide the issues raised, on merit, by allowing the Respondents to make deferred payment in 20 installments, a relief which was more than the one prayed for. The installments were modified by the learned Division Bench in Writ Appeal No. 1492 of 2022 and 1497 of 2022, to 12 months as originally prayed for by the Respondents while declining to interfere with the decision of the learned Single Judge on merit. Impugning the aforesaid orders, the lender bank has filed the present appeals.
10. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Appellants fairly submitted that the relief granted by the High Court may not be disturbed while pressing for the reiteration of law which might guide the High A B C D E F G H Court in not entertaining such writ petitions in the future. It is further submitted that the High Court has exercised writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, even after the Debt Recovery Tribunal became functional, in about 185 cases pertaining to the Appellants alone. After the filing of the Special Leave Petitions, 35 Writ Petitions have been filed. Resultantly, the Appellants are not in a position to proceed further to recover the amounts due from the defaulting borrowers/ guarantors, defeating the object of the SARFAESI Act itself.
11. Learned Senior Counsel brought to the notice of this Court that a writ petition involving private individuals over a financial transaction is not maintainable. Despite the position being settled, the interference by various High Courts continues. The very objective of the Act 54 of 2002 is being frustrated by such interference. The alternative remedy being effective and efficacious, the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, either be a writ of certiorari or mandamus, ought not to have been invoked. One has to see the impact on the Appellants of the repeated interference by the High Court. The learned Senior Counsel took us through the following decisions:
• Phoenix Arc Private Limited vs.Vishwa Bharati Vidya Mandir & Ors., (2022) 5 SCC 345.
• Federal Bank Ltd. vs. Sagar Thomas & Ors., (2003) 10
SCC 733.
• State Bank of India vs. Arvindra Electronics (P) Ltd., 2022 SCC Online SC 1522.
• United Bank of India vs. Satywati Tondon & Others, (2010)
8 SCC 110
• Authorized Officer, State Bank of Travancore & Another vs. Mathew K.C., (2018) 3 SCC 85 • Varimadugu OBI Reddy vs. B. Sreenivasulu & Others,
(2023) 2 SCC 168.
12. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Respondents submitted that at the time of filing the Writ Petitions, the Tribunal was not functioning. The power available under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot be taken away, notwithstanding the existence of the M/S SOUTH INDIAN BANK LTD. & ORS. v. NAVEEN MATHEW PHILIP & ANR. ETC. ETC. [M. M. SUNDRESH, J.] A B C D E F G H 24 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 4 S.C.R.
Tribunal. While appreciating the stand taken by the Appellants, it is submitted that when extreme steps are taken, a litigant may not have any other option except to approach the writ court.
13. In view of the fair stand taken by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Appellants, we do not wish to interfere with the impugned orders passed. We may, however, reiterate the settled position of law on the interference of the High Court invoking Article 226 of the Constitution of India in commercial matters, where an effective and efficacious alternative forum has been constituted through a statute. We are also constrained to take judicial notice of the fact that certain High Courts continue to interfere in such matters, leading to a regular supply of cases before this Court. One such High Court is that of Punjab & Haryana.
14. A writ of certiorari is to be issued over a decision when the Court finds that the process does not conform to the law or statute. In other words, courts are not expected to substitute themselves with the decision-making authority while finding fault with the process along with the reasons assigned. Such a writ is not expected to be issued to remedy all violations. When a Tribunal is constituted, it is expected to go into the issues of fact and law, including a statutory violation. A question as to whether such a violation would be over a mandatory prescription as against a discretionary one is primarily within the domain of the Tribunal. So also, the issue governing waiver, acquiescence, and estoppel. We wish to place reliance on the decision of this Court in Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmad Ishaque, (1955) 1 SCR 1104, “Then the question is whether there are proper grounds for the issue of certiorari in the present case. There was considerable argument before us as to the character and scope of the writ of certiorari and the conditions under which it could be issued. The question has been considered by this Court in Parry & Co. v. Commercial Employees’ Association, Madras [(1952) SCR 519], Veerappa Pillai v. Raman and Raman Ltd. & Others [(1952) SCR 583], Ibrahim Aboobaker v. Custodian General [(1952) SCR 696] and quite recently in T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa [(1955) SCR 250]. On these authorities, the following propositions may be taken as established: (1) Certiorari will be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction, as when an inferior Court or Tribunal acts without jurisdiction or in excess of it, or A B C D E F G H fails to exercise it. (2) Certiorari will also be issued when the Court or Tribunal acts illegally in the exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction, as when it decides without giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard, or violates the principles of natural justice.
(3) The Court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exercise of a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. One consequence of this is that the Court will not review findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal, even if they be erroneous. This is on the principle that a Court which has jurisdiction over a subjectmatter has jurisdiction to decide wrong as well as right, and when the Legislature does not choose to confer a right of appeal against that decision, it would be defeating its purpose and policy, if a superior Court were to re-hear the case on the evidence, and substitute its own findings in certiorari. These propositions are well-settled and are not in dispute.
(4) The further question on which there has been some controversy is whether a writ can be issued, when the decision of the inferior Court or Tribunal is erroneous in law. This question came up for consideration in Rex v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal; Ex parte Shaw [(1951) 1 K.B. 711], and it was held that when a Tribunal made a “speaking order” and the reasons given in that order in support of the decision were bad in law, certiorari could be granted. It was pointed out by Lord Goddard, C.J. that that had always been understood to be the true scope of the power. Walsall Overseers v. London and North Western Ry. Co. [(1879) 4 A.C. 30] and Rex v. Nat Bell Liquors Ld. [(1922) 2 A.C. 28] were quoted in support of this view. In Walsall Overseers v. London and North Western Ry. Co. [(1879) 4 A.C. 30] Lord Cairns, L.C. observed as follows:
“If there was upon the face of the order of the court of quarter sessions anything which showed that order was erroneous, the Court of Queen’s Bench might be asked to have the order brought into it, and to look at the order, and view it upon the face of it, and if the court found error upon the face of it, to put an end to its existence by quashing it.” In Rex v. Nat Bell Liquors Ld. [(1922) 2 A.C. 128] Lord Sumner said:
M/S SOUTH INDIAN BANK LTD. & ORS. v. NAVEEN MATHEW PHILIP & ANR. ETC. ETC. [M. M. SUNDRESH, J.] A B C D E F G H 26 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 4 S.C.R.
“That supervision goes to two points; one is the area of the inferior jurisdiction and the qualifications and conditions of its exercise; the other is the observance of the law in the course of its exercise.”
The decision in Rex v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal; Ex parte Shaw [(1951) 1 K.B. 711] was taken in appeal, and was affirmed by the Court of Appeal in Rex v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal; Ex parte Shaw [(1952) 1 K.B. 338]. In laying down that an error of law was a ground for granting certiorari, the learned Judges emphasised that it must be apparent on the face of the record. Denning, L.J. who stated the power in broad and general terms observed:
“It will have been seen that throughout all the cases there is one governing rule: certiorari is only available to quash a decision for error of law if the error appears on the face of the record.”
The position was thus summed up by Morris, L.J.
“It is plain that certiorari will not issue as the cloak of an appeal in disguise. It does not lie in order to bring an order or decision for rehearing of the issue raised in the proceedings. It exists to correct error of law where revealed on the face of an order or decision, or irregularity, or absence of, or excess of, jurisdiction where shown”.
In Veerappa Pillai v. Raman & Raman Ltd. [(1952) SCR 583], it was observed by this Court that under article 226 the writ should be issued “in grave cases where the subordinate tribunals or bodies or officers act wholly without jurisdiction, or in excess of it, or in violation of the principles of natural justice, or refuse to exercise a jurisdiction vested in them, or there is an error apparent on the face of the record”. In T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa [(1955) SCR 250] the law was thus stated:
“An error in the decision or determination itself may also be amenable to a writ of ‘certiorari’ but it must be a manifest error apparent on the face of the proceedings, e.g., when it is based on clear ignorance or disregard of the provisions of A B C D E F G H law. In other words, it is a patent error which can be corrected by ‘certiorari’ but not a mere wrong decision.”
15. The object and reasons behind the Act 54 of 2002 are very clear as observed by this Court in Mardia Chemicals Ltd. v. Union of India, (2004) 4 SCC 311. While it facilitates a faster and smoother mode of recovery sans any interference from the Court, it does provide a fair mechanism in the form of the Tribunal being manned by a legally trained mind. The Tribunal is clothed with a wide range of powers to set aside an illegal order, and thereafter, grant consequential reliefs, including re-possession and payment of compensation and costs. Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act gives an expansive meaning to the expression “any person”, who could approach the Tribunal.
16. Approaching the High Court for the consideration of an offer by the borrower is also frowned upon by this Court. A writ of mandamus is a prerogative writ. In the absence of any legal right, the Court cannot exercise the said power. More circumspection is required in a financial transaction, particularly when one of the parties would not come within the purview of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. When a statute prescribes a particular mode, an attempt to circumvent shall not be encouraged by a writ court. A litigant cannot avoid the non-compliance of approaching the Tribunal which requires the prescription of fees and use the constitutional remedy as an alternative. We wish to quote with profit a recent decision of this Court in Radha Krishan Industries v. State of H.P., (2021) 6 SCC 771, “25. In this background, it becomes necessary for this Court, to dwell on the “rule of alternate remedy” and its judicial exposition. In Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks (1998) 8 SCC 1, a two-Judge Bench of this Court after reviewing the case law on this point, noted: (SCC pp. 9-10, paras 14-15)
“14. The power to issue prerogative writs under Article 226 of the Constitution is plenary in nature and is not limited by any other provision of the Constitution. This power can be exercised by the High Court not only for issuing writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights contained in Part III of the Constitution but also for “any other purpose”.
M/S SOUTH INDIAN BANK LTD. & ORS. v. NAVEEN MATHEW PHILIP & ANR. ETC. ETC. [M. M. SUNDRESH, J.] A B C D E F G H 28 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 4 S.C.R.
15. Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court, having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. But the High Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions one of which is that if an effective and efficacious remedy is available, the High Court would not normally exercise its jurisdiction. But the alternative remedy has been consistently held by this Court not to operate as a bar in at least three contingencies, namely, where the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights or where there has been a violation of the principle of natural justice or where the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. There is a plethora of case-law on this point but to cut down this circle of forensic whirlpool, we would rely on some old decisions of the evolutionary era of the constitutional law as they still hold the field”.
(emphasis supplied)
26. Following the dictum of this Court in Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks [(1998) 8 SCC 1], in Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. [(2003) 2 SCC 107], this Court noted that: (Harbanslal Sahniacase, SCC p. 110, para 7) “7. So far as the view taken by the High Court that the remedy by way of recourse to arbitration clause was available to the appellants and therefore the writ petition filed by the appellants was liable to be dismissed is concerned, suffice it to observe that the rule of exclusion of writ jurisdiction by availability of an alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion. In an appropriate case, in spite of availability of the alternative remedy, the High Court may still exercise its writ jurisdiction in at least three contingencies: (i) where the writ petition seeks enforcement of any of the fundamental rights; (ii) where there is failure of principles of natural justice; or (iii) where the orders or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. (See Whirlpool Corpn.v. Registrar of Trade Marks[(1998) 8 SCC 1].) The present case attracts applicability of the first two contingencies. Moreover, as noted, the appellants’ dealership, which is their bread and butter, came to A B C D E F G H be terminated for an irrelevant and non-existent cause. In such circumstances, we feel that the appellants should have been allowed relief by the High Court itself instead of driving them to the need of initiating arbitration proceedings.”
(emphasis supplied)
27. The principles of law which emerge are that:
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