Sabarmati Gas Limited v. Shah Alloys Limited
- Citation
- 2023 INSC 10; [2023] 4 S.C.R. 188
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Ajay Rastogi, Justice C.T. Ravikumar Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, Justice 2016 – Ss. 6, Justice 238a, Justice 252 – Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, Justice 1985 – Ss. 16, Justice 25 – Limitation Act, Justice 1963 – S.5, Justice 14 and Art. 137 – Insolvency and Bankruptcy (Application to R. 5
- Decided
- 4 Jan 2023
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 1669/2020
- Sections
- 5, 8, 9, 22, 137, 238A, 7, 22(5), 62, 22(1), 16, 17
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:26 am. Original source ↗
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A B C D E F G H 188 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 4 S.C.R.[2023] 4 S.C.R. 188
SABARMATI GAS LIMITED
v.
SHAH ALLOYS LIMITED
(Civil Appeal No. 1669 of 2020)
JANUARY 04, 2023
[AJAY RASTOGI AND C. T. RAVIKUMAR, JJ.] Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – ss. 6, 8, 9, 62, 238A, 252 – Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 – ss. 16, 17, 22, 25 – Limitation Act, 1963 – s.5,14 and Art. 137 – Insolvency and Bankruptcy (Application to Adjudicating Authority), Rules 2016 – r. 5, Form no. 3 – Appellant and respondent entered into a Gas Sales Agreement (GSA) whereunder the appellant was having the obligation to supply natural gas – Thereafter, the respondent made default in the payment of the invoices – Respondent approached BIFR and it was declared a ‘sick unit’ – Appellant sought the permission of the BIFR for initiating proceedings against the respondent for recovery of outstanding dues – Shortly thereafter, the SICA was repealed w.e.f 01.12.2016 by coming into force of IBC – Upon BIFR becoming functus officio, appellant issued demand notice u/s.8 of IBC – Respondent declined the liability to pay the amount demanded – Appellant filed an application u/s. 9 of the IBC before NCLT seeking initiation of CIRP in its capacity as operational creditor of the respondent – The said application was dismissed by the NCLT on the grounds of being barred by limitation and existence of a ‘pre-existing dispute’ between the appellant and the respondent – The appeal against the decision of NCLT was also dismissed by NCLAT – Issues before the Supreme Court: Whether in computation of the period of limitation in regard to an application filed u/s. 9, IBC the period during which the operational creditor’s right to proceed against or sue the corporate debtor that remain suspended by virtue of s.22 (1) of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions Act, 1985) (SICA) can be excluded, as provided u/s.22
(5) of SICA and Whether the respondent has raised a dispute which is describable as ‘pre-existing dispute’ between itself and the appellant warranting dismissal of application u/s. 9 of the IBC at the threshold – Held: When the limitation period for initiating CIRP u/s. 9, IBC is to be reckoned from the date of default, as opposed to A B C D E F G H the date of commencement of IBC and the period prescribed therefor, is three years as provided by s.137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and the same would commence from the date of default and is extendable only by application of s.5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 it is incumbent on the Adjudicating Authority to consider the claim for condonation of the delay – In the absence of provisions for exclusion of period in respect of an application u/s. 9, IBC, despite the combined reading of s.238A, IBC and the provisions under the Limitation Act what is legally available to such a party is to assign the same as a sufficient cause for condoning the delay u/s. 5 of the Limitation Act – As far as ‘pre-existing dispute is concerned’, considering the nature of the dispute of the respondent as referred hereinbefore in respect of the claim made by the appellant, there is no reason to disagree with the concurrent findings of the Tribunals that there existed a ‘preexisting dispute’ between the parties before the receipt of demand notice u/s. 8, IBC – The dismissal of the application u/s. 9, IBC on the ground of ‘pre-existing dispute’ cannot be held to be patently illegal or perverse.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1. With respect to Section 7, IBC will proprio vigore apply to Section 9, IBC. In short, as relates an application under Section 9, IBC the date of coming into force of IBC, viz, 01.12.2016 would not form the trigger point of limitation and the period of limitation for an application for initiating of CIRP under Section 9, IBC would be three years from the date when the right to apply accrues as provided by Article 137 of the Limitation Act and further that the right to apply under the IBC would accrue on the date when default occurs and it is extendable only by application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. [Para 23][209-E-F]
2. When the limitation period for initiating CIRP under Section 9, IBC is to be reckoned from the date of default, as opposed to the date of commencement of IBC and the period prescribed therefor, is three years as provided by Section 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and the same would commence from the date of default and is extendable only by application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 it is incumbent on the Adjudicating Authority to consider the claim for condonation of the delay when SABARMATI GAS LIMITED v. SHAH ALLOYS LIMITED A B C D E F G H 190 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 4 S.C.R.
once the proceeding concerned is found filed beyond the period of limitation. As relates Section 5 of the Limitation Act showing ‘sufficient cause’ is the only criterion for condoning delay. ‘Sufficient Cause’ is the cause for which a party could not be blamed. There is a legal bar for initiation of proceedings against an industrial company by virtue of Section 22 (1), SICA and obviously, when a party was thus legally disabled from resorting to legal proceeding for recovering the outstanding dues without the permission of BIFR and even on application permission therefor was not given the period of suspension of excludable in legal proceedings is computing the period of limitation for the enforcement of such right in terms of Section 22(5), SICA. In the absence of provisions for exclusion of such period in respect of an application under Section 9, IBC, despite the combined reading of Section 238A, IBC and the provisions under the Limitation Act what is legally available to such a party is to assign the same as a sufficient cause for condoning the delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. In such eventuality, in accordance with the factual position obtained in any particular case viz., the period of delay and the period covered by suspension of right under Section 22 (1), SICA etc., the question of condonation of delay has to be considered lest it will result in injustice as the party was statutorily prevented from initiating action against the industrial company concerned. [Paras 24, 25][209-H; 210-A-F]
3. The existence of a ‘pre-existing dispute’ should entail dismissal of an application filed under Section 9 IBC at the threshold. Therefore, the question is whether the respondent had raised a dispute describable as a ‘pre- existing dispute’ so as to entail dismissal of application of the appellant under Section 9, IBC. In the contextual situation it is only apposite to be remindful of the observation in Mobilox Innovations (P) Ltd. that in doing the act of separating the grain from chaff the Court need not to be satisfied that the defence is likely to succeed. It is enough that a dispute exists between the parties and in other words, what is to be seen is whether there was a plausible contention requiring investigation for the purpose of adjudication. Taking note of the nature of the dispute of the respondent as referred A B C D E F G H hereinbefore in respect of the claim made by the appellant, there is no reason to disagree with the concurrent findings of the Tribunals that there existed a ‘pre-existing dispute’ between the parties before the receipt of demand notice under Section 8, IBC. In other words, the dismissal of the application under Section 9, IBC on the ground of ‘pre-existing dispute’ cannot be held to be patently illegal or perverse. [Paras 32, 38][213-A-B; 217-E-G] Mobilox Innovations (P) Ltd. v. Kirusa Software (P) Ltd.
(2018) 1 SCC 353; B.K. Educational Services Private Limited v. Parag Gupta and Associates (2019) 11 SCC 633 : [2018] 12 SCR 794; Babulal Vardharji Gurjar v.
Veer Gurjar Aluminium Industries Private Limited and Anr. (2020) 15 SCC 1; Macquarie Bank Limited v. Shilpi Cable Technologies Limited (2018) 2 SCC 674 : [2017] 13 SCR 751 – relied on.
Paramjeet Singh Patheja v. ICDS Ltd. (2006) 13 SCC 322 : [2006] 8 Suppl. SCR 178; Kailash Nath Agarwal and Ors. v. Pradeshiya Industrial & Investment Corporation of U.P. Ltd. and Anr. (2003) 4 SCC 305 :
[2003] 1 SCR 1159; KSL & Industries Ltd. v. M/s.
Arihant Threads Ltd. (2015) 1 SCC 166 : [2014] 14 SCR 1097; Innoventive Industries Ltd. v. ICICI Bank and Anr. (2018) 1 SCC 407 : [2017] 8 SCR 33 – referred to.
Case Law Reference [2006] 8 Suppl. SCR 178 referred to Para 6 [2003] 1 SCR 1159 referred to Para 11 [2014] 14 SCR 1097 referred to Para 12 [2018] 12 SCR 794 relied on Para 20 (2020) 15 SCC 1 referred to Para 21 [2017] 13 SCR 751 relied on Para 27 [2017] 8 SCR 33 referred to Para 31 SABARMATI GAS LIMITED v. SHAH ALLOYS LIMITED A B C D E F G H 192 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 4 S.C.R.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1669 of 2020.
From the Judgment and Order dated 19.12.2019 of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi in Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 820 of 2019.
Shyam Divan, Sr. Adv., Piyush Joshi, Senthil Jagadeesan, Ms. Sumiti Yadava, Ms. Sonakshi Malhan, Sajal Jain, Ms. Pemya Raj, Advs. for the Appellant.
Gurukrishna Kumar, Sr. Adv., Ms. Gauri Rasgotra, Sumit Attri, Ms. Ritu Anand Vishwakarma, Satatya Anand, Ms. Ena Kapur, M/s. Cyril Amarchand Mangaldas, Advs. for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
C. T. RAVIKUMAR, J.
1. This appeal under Section 62 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) is preferred by Sabarmati Gas Limited (hereinafter referred to as the appellant) against the final judgment dated 19.12.2019 of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) in Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 820 of 2019. As per the same the NCLAT dismissed the appeal preferred by the appellant against order dated 27.06.2019 in CP (IB) No. 516/9/NCLT/AHM/2018 of the National Company Law Tribunal, Ahmedabad Bench, (NCLT) dismissing the application filed under Section 9 of the IBC, in its capacity as operational creditor of ‘Shah Alloys Limited’ (hereinafter referred to as the ‘respondent’).
2. In the captioned appeal mainly, twin questions of law call for consideration id est :-
(i) Whether in computation of the period of limitation in regard to an application filed under Section 9, IBC the period during which the operational creditor’s right to proceed against or sue the corporate debtor that remain suspended by virtue of Section 22 (1) of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions Act, 1985)
(SICA) can be excluded, as provided under Section 22
(5) of SICA?
A B C D E F G H
(ii) Whether the respondent has raised a dispute which is describable as ‘pre-existing dispute’ between itself and the appellant warranting dismissal of application under Section 9 of the IBC at the threshold?
While considering the stated twin questions certain other allied questions of relevance may also crop up for consideration, which we will state and consider at the appropriate time. The respondent -corporate debtor was the petitioner in Case No. 13 of 2010 before the Board for Industrial and Financial Re-construction (BIFR) and the appellant herein was the applicant in Miscellaneous Application No. 432 of 2013 in Case No. 13 of 2010.
3. Heard learned Senior Counsel for the appellant Shri Shyam Divan and Mr. S. Guru Krishna Kumar, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent.
4. Consideration of the questions, mentioned above and to be mentioned hereinafter, is called for, in the following factual background: The respondent, for its manufacturing needs, required commercial supply of natural gas. To facilitate the same on 30.05.2008 the appellant and the respondent entered into a Gas Sales Agreement (GSA) whereby and whereunder the appellant was having the obligation to supply natural gas conforming to the specifications laid down in Annexure-2, appended to GSA and it also forms part of the contract. Going by clause 11.2 of GSA, notwithstanding any dispute in relation to any amount invoiced, the respondent could not withhold payment in accordance with the GSA. According to the appellant, the respondent defaulted payment of invoices inasmuch as it made only partial irregular payments from November, 2011. Meanwhile, the respondent approached BIFR to get it declared as a ‘sick unit’ and for recommendation of a plan for its rehabilitation, in terms of the provisions under SICA. The reference was admitted by BIFR as case No. 13 of 2010 and as per order dated 31.08.2010 the respondent was declared as a ‘sick company’. It is the case of the appellant that by virtue of Section 22 of SICA there was a moratorium on the respondent and therefore, it could not have proceeded against the respondent for outstanding dues, thenceforth, without obtaining the permission of the BIFR. On 07.08.2012 the appellant stopped the gas supply and then, intervened in the pending proceedings before the BIFR viz., 13 of 2010. On 08.03.2013, as per Miscellaneous Application No. SABARMATI GAS LIMITED v. SHAH ALLOYS LIMITED [C. T. RAVIKUMAR, J.] A B C D E F G H 194 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 4 S.C.R.
432 of 2013 the appellant sought permission of the BIFR for initiating proceedings against the respondent for recovery of an outstanding dues of Rs. 4,71,56,095/-. On 09.09.2015, the BIFR passed an order thereon. Shortly thereafter, to be precise, w.e.f. 01.12.2016, SICA was repealed.
5. According to the appellant, BIFR became functus officio and all proceedings pending before it, including the case of the respondent, were abated and several sections of IBC, including Sections 8 and 9, came into effect on 01.12.2016. Hence, after the enactment of IBC, the appellant issued a demand notice on 01.04.2017, under Section 8 of the IBC read with Rule 5 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy (Application to Adjudicating Authority), Rules 2016, in Form No. 3 demanding payment of operational debt of Rs. 4,71,56,094.76/-. On 10.04.2017, the respondent gave a reply to the aforesaid demand notice stating that there was shortfall in supply of natural gas and also a huge loss due to the disconnection of gas supply. Raising such contentions, the respondent declined the liability to pay the amount demanded. Thereafter, the appellant filed an application under Section 9 of the IBC before NCLT, Ahmedabad seeking initiation of Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) in its capacity as Operational Creditor of the respondent. The said application was dismissed by the NCLT as per order dated 27.06.2019 on the grounds of being barred by limitation and existence of a ‘pre-existing dispute’ between the appellant and the respondent. It is the appeal challenging the same before the NCLAT that ultimately culminated in the impugned judgment.
6. We will firstly consider the first question of law arising on account of dismissal of the appellant’s application under Section 9, IBC on the ground of being barred by limitation. In the light of the aforesaid factual backdrop and contentions the appellant would contend that the NCLT and NCLAT had failed to look into and appreciate the cumulative effect of sub-sections (1) and (5) of Section 22 of SICA while dismissing the application under Section 9, IBC as barred by limitation. In elaboration of the contention, it is submitted that the NCLT and NCLAT had failed to appreciate that the respondent was admitted as a ‘sick company’ by the BIFR as per its order dated 31.08.2010 and hence, by virtue of subsection (5) of Section 22, SICA the period of suspension under SICA viz., from 31.08.2010 to 01.12.2016, ought to have been excluded while calculating the period of limitation. According to the appellant, since the application under Section 9, IBC was filed on 20.08.2018 granting the benefit of such exclusion would have, certainly, put the application well A B C D E F G H within the limitation period of 3 years as provided under Article 137 of the Limitation Act. The learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance on the decision in Paramjeet Singh Patheja v. ICDS Ltd.1, particularly paragraph 43 (vii) therein, to support the contention that there was a statutory bar for laying or continuing with any legal proceeding for realisation of a right vested by law on the appellant.
7. Resisting the contentions of the appellant and supporting the impugned judgment the respondent would contend that both NCLT and NCLAT had rightly appreciated the factual positions thereon obtained in the case on hand and appliedthe provisions correctly, to arrive at the finding that the application filed by the appellant under Section 9, IBC was barred by limitation. According to the respondent there is discrepancy between the stand of the appellant in the Section 9 application and the Demand Notice under Section 8, of the IBC as relates the quantum of alleged outstanding dues. It is also contended that such a discrepancy also exists with respect to the date of cause of action inasmuch as going by Section 9 application the alleged debt fell due on and from November, 2011 and as per the Demand Notice the so-called debt fell due on and from 9th July, 2012 and in either case, Section 9 application was barred by limitation as it was filed only in the year 2018. To wit, beyond 3 years from the alleged default. The benefit of exclusion of period under Section 22(5) of the SICA is not available to the appellant for computing the period of limitation in respect of an application under Section 9, IBC, it is further contended. According to the respondent, Section 22 (1), SICA did not accord a blanket protection against running of cause of action and it is intended to suspend legal proceedings of coercive nature so as to secure assets of an enterprise. In other words, the contention is that filing application for recovery was permissible and Section 22 (1), SICA did not forbid the same and it interdicted only execution or distress or the like against the properties of the industrial company concerned in the contingencies contemplated thereof.
8. When Sections 8 and 9, IBC came into force only with effect from 01.12.2016, the question of initiation of the CIRP by filing an application under Section 9 was possible only from 01.12.2016. But the question is whether any party, which falls under the expression ‘Operational Creditor’ under the IBC claims to have operational debt
1 (2006) 13 SCC 322
SABARMATI GAS LIMITED v. SHAH ALLOYS LIMITED [C. T. RAVIKUMAR, J.] A B C D E F G H 196 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 4 S.C.R.
due from an industrial company and the cause of action for recovery of the same had accrued much earlier than 01.12.2016, but prevented from enforcing the right against such company in view of statutory prohibition under Section 22 (1), SICA, could initiate CIRP despite the passage of three years since the cause of action claiming the protection of exclusion of the period of suspension by virtue of Section 22 (5), SICA? 8.1 In that context it is only apt to refer to the afore-mentioned relevant provisions under SICA. Section 22(1), SICA was as follows: “22. Suspension of legal proceedings, contracts, etc. – (1) Where in respect of an industrial company, an inquiry under section 16 is pending or any scheme referred to under section 17 is under preparation or consideration or a sanctioned scheme is under implementation or where an appeal under section 25 relating to an industrial company is pending, then, notwithstanding anything contained in the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956) or any other law or the memorandum and articles of association of the industrial company or any other instrument having effect under the said Act or other law, no proceedings for the winding up of the industrial company or for execution, distress or the like against any of the properties of the industrial company or for the appointment of a receiver in respect thereof [and no suit for the recovery of money or for the enforcement of any security against the industrial company or of any guarantee in respect of any loans or advance granted to the industrial company] shall lie or be proceeded with further, except with the consent of the Board or, as the case may be, the Appellate Authority.”
8.2 Section 22(5), SICA, relied on by the appellant for seeking exclusion of the period from 31.08.2010 to 01.12.2016 while computing the period of limitation, was as hereunder: - “22. Suspension of legal proceedings, contracts, etc. – (1)… (2)… (3)… (4)… A B C D E F G H
(5) In computing the period of limitation for the enforcement of any right, privilege, obligation or liability, the period during which it or the remedy for the enforcement thereof remains suspended under this section shall be excluded.”
9. Thus, Section 22 (1), SICA as extracted above, would make it clear that there was a statutory bar to take to any proceeding for realisation of a right referred to in the said Section against an industrial company when once an enquiry under Section 16, SICA is pending against it or any scheme referred to under Section 17 thereof is under preparation or consideration or a sanctioned scheme is under implementation or where an appeal under Section 25 relating to an industrial company is pending, except with the consent of the Board or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be. As noticed earlier, SICA came to be repealed and IBC came into force (Sections 7 to 9 and various other Sections), on the same day viz, on 01.12.2016.
10. A two-Judge Bench decision of this Court in Paramjeet Singh Patheja’s case (supra), more particularly, paragraph 43 (vii), is relied on by the appellant to support its claim for exclusion of the period from 31.08.2010 to 01.12.2016 while computing the period of limitation for filing applicants under Section 9, IBC. It, in so far as relevant reads thus: - “43. For the foregoing discussions we hold:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(v)
(vi)
………
(vii) It is a well-established rule that a provision must be construed in a manner which would give effect to its purpose and to cure the mischief in the light of which it was enacted. The object of Section 22, in protecting guarantors from legal proceedings pending a reference to BIFR of the principal SABARMATI GAS LIMITED v. SHAH ALLOYS LIMITED [C. T. RAVIKUMAR, J.] A B C D E F G H 198 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 4 S.C.R.
debtor, is to ensure that a scheme for rehabilitation would not be defeated by isolated proceedings adopted against the guarantors of a sick company. To achieve that purpose,it is imperative that the expression “suit” in Section 22 be given its plain meaning, namely, any proceedings adopted for realization of a right vested in a party by law. This would clearly include arbitration proceedings.”
(Emphasis added)
11. In the light of the position settled thus, in Paramjeet Singh Patheja’s Case (supra), it is relevant to refer to an earlier two-Judge Bench decision of this court in Kailash Nath Agarwal and Ors. v. Pradeshiya Industrial & Investment Corporation of U.P. Ltd. and Anr.2 That was also a case, involving consideration of the question as to whether Section 22, SICA, afford protection to guarantors of sick company or only to the sick company. It is relevant to note in this context that the decision in Kailash Nath Agarwal’s Case (supra)was not brought to the notice of the later bench while deciding Paramjeet Singh Patheja’s Case (supra). In other words, the latter case was decided per incuriam. In Kailash Nath Agarwal’s Case, after considering contentions akin to those raised in Paramjeet Singh Patheja’s Case, this court held that the words “proceedings” and again “suit” had to be construed differently as carrying different meanings, since, they had been raised to denote different things. It was concluded that Section 22 (1), SICA only prohibits recovery against the industrial company and there would be no protection offered to guarantors against the recovery proceedings.
12. The above conflicting decisions need not detain us from considering the issue further in the light of a subsequent three-Judge Bench decision of this court in KSL & Industries Ltd. Vs. M/s. Arihant Threads Ltd3. The three-judge bench, after noting the contentions raised before and the findings of the two-judge bench in Kailash Nath Agarwal’s case (supra), found that it did not deal with the question regarding the scope of protection afforded to the industrial company concerned, under Section 22 (1) of SICA. Having observed thus, the three-Judge Bench went on to consider the said question. In that regard, paragraphs 32, 33 and 53 are relevant and reads thus:
2 (2003) 4 SCC 305
3 (2015) 1 SCC 166
A B C D E F G H “32. As observed earlier, Sub-section (1) of Section 22 may be divided into two parts. In one part, it provides that “no proceedings’’ be instituted for the winding up of the industrial company or for execution, distress or the like against any of the properties of such industrial company, and in the second part it provides that “no suit” for the recovery of money or for the enforcement of any security against the industrial company or of any guarantee in respect of any loans or advances granted to the industrial company, “shall lie or be proceeded with further, except with the consent of the Board or, as the case may be, the Appellate Authority.”
33. Undoubtedly, the present proceedings viz. “application for recovery” cannot specifically be described as proceedings for execution, distress or the like against any of the properties, but it is certainly a proceeding which results in and in fact had resulted in the execution and distress against the property of the Company and is therefore liable to be construed as a proceeding for the execution, distress or the like against any of the properties of the industrial company. We are of the view that such a construction would be within the intendment of Parliament wherever the proceedings for recovery of a debt which has been secured by a mortgage or pledge of the property of the borrower are instituted. Surely, there is no purpose in construing that Parliament intended that such an application for recovery by summary procedure should lie or be proceeded with, but only its execution be interdicted or inhibited especially. In this context, it may be remembered that the proceedings by way of an application for recovery according to a summary procedure as provided under the RDDB Act are not referred to in Section 22 simply because the RDDB Act had not then been enacted.
53. Moreover, we have found nothing contrary in the intention of the SICA to exclude a recovery application from the purview of Section 22, indeed there could be no reason for such exclusion since the purpose of the provision is to protect the properties of a sick company, so that they may be dealt with in the best possible way for the purpose of its revival by the BIFR. In State of Punjab v. The Okara Grain Buyers Syndicate SABARMATI GAS LIMITED v. SHAH ALLOYS LIMITED [C. T. RAVIKUMAR, J.] A B C D E F G H 200 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 4 S.C.R.
Ltd. MANU/SC/0023/1963: AIR 1964 SC 669, the Court articulated the importance of preserving the beneficent purpose of the statute and observed:
14. … We shall therefore proceed to examine the provisions of the Act on the footing that the test for determining whether the Government is bound by a statute is whether it is expressly named in the provision which it is contended binds it, or whether it “is manifest that from the terms of the statute, that it was the intention of the legislature that it shall be bound”, and that the intention to bind would be clearly made out if the beneficent purpose of the statute would be wholly frustrated unless the Government were bound.”
13. Thus, it is obvious that the three-Judge Bench in KSL & Industries Ltd. (supra) considered the question whether a recovery application under the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1963 (RDDB Act) would lie or be proceeded with against a sick company in view of the Bar contained in Section 22 (1) of SICA. Evidently, even after finding that an ‘application for recovery’ under RDDB Act could not specifically be described as proceedings for execution, distress or the like against any of the properties, it was held that it is certainly a proceeding which may result in the execution and distress against the property of the company and is therefore, liable to be construed as a proceeding for the execution, distress or the like against any of the properties of the industrial company. Accordingly, it was held that such a construction would be within the intendment of the Parliament. Moreover, it was held therein that there would be no purpose in construing the Parliament intended that such an application for recovery by summary procedure should lie or be proceeded with, but only its execution be interdicted or inhibited. That apart the three-Judge Bench found nothing contrary in the intention of the SICA to exclude a recovery application from the purview of a Section 22 thereof, taking note of the fact that the purpose of the said provision is to protect the properties of sick company, so that they may be dealt with in the best possible way for the purpose of its revival by BIFR.
14. In view of the provisions under Section 22 (1) of SICA and the decisions in Paramjeet Singh case (Supra) and in KSL & Industries Limited (supra), it is worthwhile to note that in the case on hand it was A B C D E F G H the industrial company (respondent herein) that approached the BIFR under the provisions of SICA and got it declared as ‘sick company’ by filing Case No. 13 of 2010; that it is thereafter that the appellant filed Miscellaneous Application No. 432/2013 thereon praying, inter-alia, to permit it under Section 22 of SICA to approach a Civil Court of appropriate jurisdiction for recovery of the above-mentioned dues along with interest; that the said application was disposed of only on 09.09.2015, as per Annexure-A40 proceedings, that too, only with a direction to the respondent company to incorporate the dues of the applicant in the DRS and that as per Annexure-A40, Case No.13 of 2010 and M.A. No. 292/2014 filed thereon, were then, posted for hearing. In short, Case No. 13 of 2010 was pending before the BIFR when SICA was repealed w.e.f. 01.12.2016 and Sections 8 and 9, IBC took its effect from 01.12.12016. Thus, obviously, proceedings under SICA were then pending before the BIFR when the default from the part of the respondent allegedly occurred and by virtue of Section 22 (1), SICA and the decisions referred above, the appellant could not have, then, resorted to any legal proceedings for enforcing any right which may result in recovery from the properties of the respondent company. For the same reasons, the contention of the respondent that pending the proceedings before the BIFR the appellant could have resorted to arbitration proceedings also has to fail.
15. Now, we will have to consider the purported intent of Section 22 (5), SICA. The intention appears to be to protect the interest of such a party who was prevented from lawfully enforcing the right to seek for recovery of dues during the operative period of the bar under Section 22 (1), SICA, if it is otherwise available even after the conclusion of proceedings before the BIFR, to the extent specifically mentioned therein. According to us, any other understanding of the provisions under Section 22 (5) would be wholly pointless and purposeless. When the appellant being a party to BIFR in the sense, on intervention obtained an order to the respondent company to incorporate its dues in the Draft Rehabilitation Scheme (DRS) in an application seeking permission to effect recovery of the dues and such a stage had not reached till 01.12.2016, whether there would be any justification to hold that on the repeal of SICA it could not claim the benefit flowing from the provisions under Section 22
(5) of SICA, subject to the provisions under the relevant laws governing the appropriate forum chosen?
SABARMATI GAS LIMITED v. SHAH ALLOYS LIMITED [C. T. RAVIKUMAR, J.] A B C D E F G H 202 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 4 S.C.R.
16. In the contextual situation, it is apropos to refer to Section 252 of IBC which reads thus: - “252. The Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions)
Repeal Act, 2003 shall be amended in the manner specified in the Eighth Schedule.”
16.1 The Eighth Schedule would reveal the nature and manner of amendment specified thereunder as substitution to sub-clause (b) of Section 4, of SICA Repeal Act, 2003 w.e.f. 01.12.2016, as hereunder: “(b) On such date as may be notified by the Central Government in this behalf, any appeal preferred to the Appellate Authority or any reference made or inquiry pending to or before the Board or any proceeding of whatever nature pending before the Appellate Authority or the Board under the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (1 of 1986) shall stand abated: Provided that a company in respect of which such appeal or reference or inquiry stands abated under this clause may make reference to the National Company Law Tribunal under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 within one hundred and eighty days from the commencement of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 in accordance with the provisions of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016:
Provided further that no fees shall be payable for making such reference under Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 by a company whose appeal or reference or inquiry stands abated under this clause.”.
(Emphasis added)
17. A perusal of the substituted sub-clause (b), as extracted above would reveal that reference made or inquiry pending or any proceeding of whatever nature, before the Board under SICA would stand abated upon its notification by the Central Government. The first proviso to sub-clause (b) only makes reference to the time limit applicable to the company in respect of which the appeal or reference or enquiry or any such proceeding thus stood abated under the said sub-clause. Going by the said proviso, such a company may make reference to NCLT under IBC within 180 days from the commencement of IBC and in accordance A B C D E F G H with the provisions thereof. Subsequently, the stated amendment was notified by the Central Government under S.O. 3569 (E) dated 25.11.2016. It is thus clear that on account of repeal of SICA under Repeal Act (1 of 2003) w.e.f. 01.12.2016, any pending proceeding or enquiry under SICA, initiated by an industrial company would get abated and the prescription of such period of 180 days became applicable only to such a company. A scanning of the stated sub-clause (b) and the provisos would not reveal or indicate prescription of any such specific time limit as regards the opposite parties in the abated reference, inquiry or proceeding for proceeding with their available remedy under IBC. In the said circumstances, if such an opposite party falls within the expression ‘operational creditor’, under IBC, it could only be taken that it should be governed by the provisions under the IBC in regard to the period of limitation for approaching the Adjudicating Authority. In this context, it is also relevant to note that as relates the company whose reference or inquiry or any proceeding got abated, as mentioned, it need not pay any fee for making reference under IBC, in terms of the second proviso to the substituted sub-clause (b) of Section 4 of the SICA Repeal Act. Needless to say, that this exemption is not available to other parties to the abated proceedings, or reference or inquiry concerned.
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