Manik Majumder and Others v. Dipak Kumar Saha (Dead) Through LRs. & Others
- Citation
- 2023 INSC 34; [2023] 4 S.C.R. 140
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice M.R. Shah, Justice B.V. Nagarathna * Registration Act, Justice 1908 – Ss. 32
- Decided
- 13 Jan 2023
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 2965/2022
- Sections
- 33(1), 60, 32, 33, 100, 67, 18, 6, 26, 58, 65, 144
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:26 am. Original source ↗
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A B C D E F G H 140 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 4 S.C.R.[2023] 4 S.C.R. 140
MANIK MAJUMDER AND OTHERS
v.
DIPAK KUMAR SAHA (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. & OTHERS
(Civil Appeal No. 2965 of 2022)
JANUARY 13, 2023
[M. R. SHAH AND B. V. NAGARATHNA, JJ.] Registration Act, 1908 – ss. 32, 33 and 60 – Execution of sale deed on the strength of a deed of Power of Attorney – Nonproduction of the deed of power of attorney – Effect of, to the case of plaintiff in the suit – Power of attorney (PoA) executed outside India – Presumption as to correctness of the PoA – On facts, PoA allegedly executed in East Pakistan by the original owner in favour of respondent No. 2 – Respondent No. 2 thereafter executed two sale deeds transferring the suit property firstly in his own favour and then in favour of his wife – Respondents then filed suit for declaration of title over the subject land and recovery of khas possession from the appellants – Respondent no. 2 claimed his ownership on the basis of sale deed executed by the respondent no. 1 in his own favour on the basis of PoA executed by the original owner, however, the same PoA not produced before the trial court – Appellant’s case that they are the owner of the part of the suit property and have been in possession for more than 40 years – Trial court dismissed the suit since no right, title or interest was established in favour of respondent No.2 for want of PoA for proper execution of the sale deed in his favour; and that the provisions of s. 33(1)(c) not complied with – First appellate court upheld the same – However, the High Court allowed the Second Appeal by drawing presumption u/s. 60 in respect of PoA by virtue of endorsement – High Court directed the appellants to handover the vacant possession of the suit land to the respondent – On appeal, held: In view of the difference of opinion, the matter referred to the larger bench – Reference to larger Bench – Power of attorney. Referring the matter to larger Bench, the Court Per M.R. SHAH, J.
HELD: 1.1 When the plaintiffs claimed title on the basis of the aforesaid two sale deeds dated 2.9.1968 and 29.09.1968, it was for the plaintiffs to prove even the execution of the sale deeds. A B C D E F G H The defendants were not required to challenge the sale deeds in the suit filed by the plaintiffs, who prayed for a decree for a declaration of title in their favour. When plaintiff No.2 claimed title on the basis of the PoA executed by the original owner and thereafter executed the sale deed in favour of plaintiff No.1 as PoA of the original owner, the conditions provided under Section 33(1)(c) of the Registration Act are required to be strictly complied with. [Para 6][158-G-H; 159-A] 1.2 As per Section 32 of the Registration Act, every document to be registered under the Registration Act shall be presented at the proper registration office by some person executing or claiming under the same, or, by the agent of such a person, representative or assign, duly authorised by PoA executed and authenticated in the manner mentioned in Section 33(1)(c) of the Registration Act. Section 33 of the Registration Act provides that for the purposes of Section 32, only those power of attorneys shall be recognised as are mentioned in Section 33(1). As per Section 33(1)(c) of the Act, if the principal at the time of execution of the PoA does not reside in India, a PoA executed before and authenticated by a Notary Public, or any Court, Judge, Magistrate, Indian Consul or Vice-Consul, or representative of the Central Government shall be valid. In the instant case, the requirement of Section 33(1)(c) of the Act has not been satisfied at all. Section 32 of the Act is to be read along with Section 33(1)(c) of the Registration Act. Only in a case where the execution of the PoA is as per Section 32 read with Section 33(1)(c) of the Act, there shall be statutory presumption under Section 60 and/or under the provisions of the Registration Act. Therefore, the High Court committed a grave error in drawing the statutory presumption in favour of the plaintiffs and more particularly with respect to alleged PoA alleged to have been executed by the original owner in favour of plaintiff No.2. As such, there were concurrent findings recorded by both the courts below on non-compliance and/or non-fulfilling the conditions mentioned in Section 33(1)(c) of the Registration Act. By drawing the statutory presumption and without properly appreciating and/or considering the fact that there is a non-compliance of Section 33(1)(c) of the Registration Act there cannot be any statutory MANIK MAJUMDER AND OTHERS v. DIPAK KUMAR SAHA
(DEAD) THROUGH LRS. & OTHERS
A B C D E F G H 142 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 4 S.C.R.
presumption, the High Court has set aside the concurrent findings recorded by both the courts below, in exercise of powers under Section 100 CPC. [Para 7][160-F-H; 161-A-D] 1.3 Even the conduct on the part of the plaintiffs, more particularly on the part of plaintiff No.2, executing the second sale deed in favour of plaintiff No.1-his own wife as a PoA of original land owner deserves serious consideration. Even according to the plaintiffs, on the basis of the PoA alleged to have been executed by the original land owner, plaintiff No.2 executed the registered sale deed in his own favour dated 3.9.1968. If that be so, in that case, there was no reason for him to execute the subsequent sale deed in favour of plaintiff No.1-his own wife as a PoA of the original land owner. Once he became the owner on the basis of a registered sale deed dated 3.9.1968, which was executed by him in his own name as a PoA of the original owner, he could have executed the sale deed in favour of plaintiff No.1 as the owner and not as a PoA of the original owner. [Para 8][161- E-G] 1.4 Another conduct on the part of the plaintiffs submitting the application to amend the plaint under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC submitted before the first appellate court also creates doubts about the genuinity of the PoA. It was never the case on behalf of the plaintiffs before the trial court and in the suit that the PoA was handed over by the plaintiffs to original defendant No.1 and that despite his demands he never returned the same. Having found and realised that the non-production of the PoA had gone against them, subsequently, before the first appellate court, the plaintiffs sought to make out a case that the PoA was handed over by plaintiff No.2 to original defendant No.1 and that despite his demands, never returned the same. The amendment sought under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC was rightly refused by the first appellate court. The plaintiffs tried to make out altogether a new case which was not even the case of the plaintiffs earlier. This conduct on the part of the plaintiffs also deserves serious consideration and it creates serious doubts on the genuinity of the PoA. In that view of the matter, the High Court committed a serious error in drawing a statutory presumption as to the A B C D E F G H authenticity of the sale deeds. There may be a statutory presumption as per Section 60 of the Registration Act where all other requirements of execution of the sale deed, required to be complied with under the Registration Act and the genuineness of the PoA on the basis of which the sale deed was executed is not doubted. [Para 9][161-G-H; 162-A-D] 1.5 As the PoA is not produced on record; the executant of the PoA in favour of plaintiff No.2 has not stepped into the witness box; there is a non-compliance of Section 33(1)(c) of the Registration Act; and the plaintiff no.2 is claiming title on the basis of the PoA alleged to have been executed by the original owner which is not forthcoming and that plaintiff no.1 is claiming the title on the basis of the sale deed dated 29.09.1968 executed by plaintiff No.2 as a PoA holder of the original owner which is not forthcoming, the trial court was justified and right in dismissing the suit and refusing to pass a decree for a declaration of title in favour of the plaintiffs. The same was rightly confirmed by the first appellate court. The High Court committed a serious error in decreeing the suit. The impugned judgment and order of the High Court is unsustainable both, on law as well as on facts. The impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court decreeing the suit is hereby quashed and set aside and the judgment and decree passed by the trial court, confirmed by the first appellate Court, is restored. [Paras 10, 11][162-D-H] Prem Singh and others v. Birbal and others, (2006) 5 SCC 353 : [2006] 1 Suppl. SCR 692; H. Siddiqui v. A.
Ramalingam (2011) 4 SCC 240 : [2011] 5 SCR 587;
Anil Rishi v. Gurbaksh Singh (2006) 5 SCC 558 : [2006] 1 Suppl. SCR 659; Sebastio Luis Fernandes v. K.V.P.
Shastri (2013) 15 SCC 161 : [2013] 11 SCR 1076; J.
Yashoda v. K. Shobha Rani (2007) 5 SCC 730 : [2007] 5 SCR 367; Rajni Tandon v. Dulal Ranjan Ghosh Dastidar (2009) 14 SCC 782 : [2009] 11 SCR 686;
Amar Nath v. Gian Chand 2022 SCC OnLine SC 102 – referred to.
MANIK MAJUMDER AND OTHERS v. DIPAK KUMAR SAHA
(DEAD) THROUGH LRS. & OTHERS
A B C D E F G H 144 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 4 S.C.R.
Case Law Reference [2006] 1 Suppl. SCR 692 referred to Para 3.3 [2011] 5 SCR 587 referred to Para 3.7 [2006] 1 Suppl. SCR 659 referred to Para 3.9 [2013] 11 SCR 1076 referred to Para 3.9 [2007] 5 SCR 367 referred to Para 3.10 [2009] 11 SCR 686 referred to Para 3.12 Per B.V. NAGARATHNA, J. (Dissenting)
2.1 In the instant case, what is sought to be proved is title by the sale deed and not the power of attorney as it is the sale deed which conveys title and the sale deed has been executed in accordance with the provisions of Registration Act, 1908, and proved in accordance with Section 67 of Evidence Act. It cannot be held that the sale made on behalf of the seller (original owner of the suit land) to the buyer through the power of attorney is vitiated as the power of attorney was not produced before the Court. This is because even in the absence of the production of the power of attorney, the contents of the sale deed and the execution of the power of attorney as well as the sale deed have been established by proving the sale deed in accordance with the law. [Para 18][177-H; 178-A-B] 2.2 On a conjoint reading of the two documents, namely sale deeds, it is established that the initial sale deed dated 03rd September, 1968 by plaintiff No.2 is as a power of attorney holder of the orignal owner, to himself as a buyer. The power of attorney is dated 01st August, 1968, the details of which are referred to in the said sale deed inasmuch as the power of attorney was executed by the original owner before the Magistrate, East Pakistan, which is evident on a reading of both the documents. Thereafter, plaintiff No.2 executed a sale deed dated 29th October, 1968 in favour of the plaintiff No.1 as the absolute owner of the suit schedule property. Therefore, there is compliance of Section 33(1)(c) of the Registration Act, 1908 inasmuch as the power of attorney has been executed before the Magistrate, East Pakistan. [Para 21][180-B-D] A B C D E F G H 2.3 As per Section 18 of the Registration Act, registration of deed of attorney is optional. Further, Section 32 deals with the categories of persons who can present documents for registration. The following three categories of persons are mentioned therein:
(a) by some person executing or claiming under the same, or, in the case of a copy of a decree or order, claiming under the decree or order, or (b) by the representative or assign of such a person, or (c) by the agent of such a person, representative or assign, duly authorised by power-of- attorney executed and authenticated in manner mentioned therein. Therefore, it is evident that plaintiff no. 2, had the authority as per Section 32 (c) to present a document for registration in his capacity as the attorney of the original owner of the suit property. [Para 22][180-E-H] 2.4 Non-production of the power of attorney in the suit is also not fatal to the case of the plaintiffs. Production of the original power of attorney is not an indispensable requirement to establish the validity of execution of a sale deed. It would therefore follow that production of a power of attorney is not a necessary requirement to prove a sale deed before a court of law executed through a power of attorney. [Para 23][181-A; 183-F] 2.5 Section 67 of the Evidence Act deals with proof of documents such as a sale deed as in the instant case. The plaintiff No.1 has proved her right, title and interest in the land in question. There is no contra evidence produced by the defendants so as to defeat the validity of the sale deeds. The said documents speak for themselves. Therefore, there is no substance in the contentions of the appellants arising under the provisions of the Registration Act, 1908. Thus, plaintiff No.1 has acquired title to the land in question. Further, when a sale deed is executed on the strength of deed of power of attorney, the non-production of thedeed of power of attorney in the suit is not fatal to the case of the plaintiff. [Para 24][183-G; 184-B-C] 2.6 The sale deed dated 03rd September, 1968 was executed on the strength of the power of attorney which was executed in conformity with Section 33 (1) (c) of the Registration Act, 1908 because the power of attorney has been duly executed MANIK MAJUMDER AND OTHERS v. DIPAK KUMAR SAHA
(DEAD) THROUGH LRS. & OTHERS
A B C D E F G H 146 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 4 S.C.R.
before the Magistrate, East Pakistan as noted from the two sale deeds. There is no contra evidence produced by defendants in that regard. Since the requirements of execution of a sale deed are duly complied with, and there is no reason to doubt the recitals of the sale deed which has been proved in accordance with law, it would follow that the statutory presumption under Section 60 of the Registration Act could be invoked in the instant case. [Para 25][184-D-F] 2.7 It is trite that registration of a document is a solemn act of parties and the recitals of a registered document are presumed to be valid unless such a presumption is rebutted by strong evidence to the contrary. This is because, the document speaks for itself. [Para 26][184-F-G] 2.8 A registered document carries with it, by virtue of it being registered, the presumption as to the authority of the person executing it. In the present case, the trial court and the First Appellate Court failed to treat the endorsement made by the District Sub-Registrar on the body of the sale deed, as evidence in respect of the authority of Plaintiff No. 2 to execute the sale deed. This is to be considered in light of the fact that at no point of time did the original owner dispute the execution of power of attorney in favour of Plaintiff No. 2. [Para 28][185-G-H] 2.9 Prima-facie, the endorsement made on the sale deed dated 03rd September, 1968, could be considered as determinative evidence of the conveyance of title to the suit property by its original owner, especially where the defendants have not set up a case to establish any independent title over the suit property. When such a presumption arises, the onus would be on a person who challenges such presumption, to successfully rebut it. As regards, the issue whether, the defendants have rebutted the presumption of validity of the sale deed dated 03rd September, 1968, the trial court and first appellate court have concurrently found that the defendants do not have any title over the suit land and against such finding the defendants have not preferred an appeal. They have thus accepted this finding which has attained finality. The original owner has not initiated any A B C D E F G H proceeding to dispute the execution of power of attorney in favour of plaintiff No. 2. The order of the Munsiff records that by way of a sale deed dated 03rd September, 1968, plaintiff No. 2 had purchased the suit property and was paying municipal taxes as the owner of the premises which finding is binding on the parties herein as the same has not been upset by any Court of law. Original defendant No. 1 in the present suit, was the plaintiff therein. Notwithstanding the fact that the original defendant had become aware of the sale deed dated 03rd September, 1968 and of the power of attorney that formed the basis of such sale deed, no steps were taken by the defendant to challenge plaintiff No. 2’s title over the suit property. It was only in the written statement filed in the present suit that it was vaguely claimed that original defendant no.1 was the title holder of the suit property and plaintiff No. 2 was a tenant therein. This, without there being any legal basis or evidence. In light of the said facts, it can be stated that the defendant has not rebutted the presumption of validity of the sale deed dated 03rd September, 1968. [Para 29][186-A-H; 187- A] 2.10 There is no reason to disbelieve the recitals contained in the registered sale deed dated 03rd September, 1968 merely on the ground that the document conferring power of attorney in favour of plaintiff no. 2 was not produced before the trial court. In the instant case, the High Court was therefore right in holding that when a document has been duly registered, there is a presumption of correctness and it can be rebutted only by strong evidence to the contrary. But the defendants have not led any evidence in order to rebut the presumption as might be drawn on the basis of the said endorsement on the body of the sale deed dated 03.09.1968 accepting original plaintiff no.2 as the attorney of the original owner. The same is a vital piece of evidence which has been ignored by the trial court as well as the first appellate court. The High Court is further right in holding that original plaintiff no.2 was duly nominated and constituted as the attorney of original owner of the suit land and on the strength of the said power of attorney, plaintiff No.2 transferred land in favour of himself. As the absolute owner, plaintiff No.2 sold the said land to plaintiff No.1. Thus, plaintiff no.1 had every right to recover the said suit land, description of which has been provided in the MANIK MAJUMDER AND OTHERS v. DIPAK KUMAR SAHA
(DEAD) THROUGH LRS. & OTHERS
A B C D E F G H 148 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 4 S.C.R.
Schedule (C) of the plaint by removing and demolishing all obstructions fromthe defendants. The High Court was therefore right in decreeing the suit. [Para 30][187-B-E] Amar Nath vs. Gian Chand and Anr. 2022 SCC OnLine SC 102; Rattan Singh and Ors. vs. Nirmal Gill and Ors.
AIR 2021 SC 899 – relied on.
Suraj Lamp and Industries vs. State of Haryana (2012)
1 SCC 656 : [2011] 11 SCR 848; Atal Chakrajvarty vs. Sudhi Gopal Pandey (1969) 73 CWN 947; Ishwar Dass Jain vs. Sohan Lal (2000) 1 SCC 434 : [1999] 5 Suppl. SCR 24; Chottey Lal vs. The Collector of Moradabad A.I.R. 1922 PC 279; Prem Singh and Ors.
vs. Birbal and Ors. (2006) 5 SCC 353 : [2006] 1 Suppl.
SCR 692 – referred to.
Case Law Reference [2011] 11 SCR 848 referred to Para 18 A.I.R. 1922 PC 279 referred to Para 18 (i), 26 [1999] 5 Suppl. SCR 24 referred to Para 26 AIR 2021 SC 899 relied on Para 27 [2006] 1 Suppl. SCR 692 referred to Para 29 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2965 of 2022.
From the Judgment and Order dated 05.04.2018 of the High Court of Tripura, Agartala in R.S.A. No. 01 of 2005.
Rana Mukherjee, Sr. Adv., Pijush K. Roy, Mrs. Kakali Roy, Rajan K. Chourasia, Advs. for the Appellants.
Hrishikesh Baruah, Ms. Radhika Gupta, Advs. for the Respondents.
The Judgments of the Court were delivered by
M. R. SHAH, J.
1. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment and order dated 05.04.2018 passed by the High Court of Tripura at A B C D E F G H Agartala in Regular Second Appeal No. 01/2005, by which the High Court has allowed the said appeal preferred by the original plaintiffs and has decreed the suit by quashing and setting aside the concurrent findings recorded by both the courts below, the original defendants have preferred the present appeal.
2. The facts leading to the present appeal in a nutshell are as under:
That one Braja Mohan Dey was the owner and in possession of ‘Schedule A’ property. He was alleged to have taken a loan of Rs. 10,000/ - from his tenant, namely, Dhirendra Chandra Saha, original plaintiff No.2. The original owner, Braja Mohan Dey went to East Pakistan. It was alleged that he had executed a Power of Attorney (PoA) in East Pakistan, ostensibly in favour of original plaintiff No.2 to enable repayment of the alleged loan amount by sale of the subject land to himself (original plaintiff No.2) as his PoA holder. That original plaintiff No.2, on the basis of the alleged loan amount and PoA alleged to have been executed by the original owner, executed in his favour sale deed dated 3.9.1968 as PoA holder of the original owner. Thereafter original plaintiff No.2, by virtue of the said PoA, transferred ‘Schedule A’ property to his wife Gita Rani Saha (original plaintiff No.1) (now deceased) vide sale deed dated 29.09.1968, allegedly for repayment of a sum of Rs. 20,000/- taken by him from his wife, out of which a sum of Rs. 10,000/ - was alleged to have been handed over to the original owner Braja Mohan Dey.
2.1 That original plaintiff No.2 allegedly constructed a godown at the rear end of the grocery shop in another part of ‘Schedule A’ property (‘Schedule C’ property). It was the case on behalf of the plaintiffs that one Sarat Chandra Majumdar (original defendant No.1) tried to dispossess the plaintiffs from the said ‘Schedule C’ property. However, on the other hand, it was the case on behalf of the defendants that their predecessorin-interest held out that Sarat Chandra Majumdar was in possession of the suit land for more than thirty years and was running a business from the said property, while denying that the plaintiffs had acquired any right, title or interest as claimed over the suit land. The original defendants also claimed to be in peaceful possession of the property for over forty years and it was their case that they were paying the municipal taxes and land revenue and other statutory dues. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had started a pucca construction on ‘Schedule C’ property MANIK MAJUMDER AND OTHERS v. DIPAK KUMAR SAHA (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. & OTHERS [M. R. SHAH, J.] A B C D E F G H 150 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 4 S.C.R.
and forcibly dispossessed them from the said property. Therefore, the plaintiffs filed a Civil Suit being T.S. No. 201/1985 before the learned trial Court for a declaration of title over the suit land and recovery of khas possession from the defendants (appellants herein).
2.2 The said suit was resisted by the defendants by filing a written statement denying all the allegations as well as their right of possession in respect of the disputed suit property. At this stage, it is required to be noted that though the original plaintiff No.2 claimed the ownership on the basis of the sale deed dated 3.9.1968 executed by plaintiff No.1 in his own favour on the basis of the alleged PoA executed by the original owner, however, the same was not produced before the learned trial Court and in the suit.
2.3 The learned trial Court vide its judgment and decree dated 11.09.1995 dismissed the suit and held that the plaintiffs were not entitled to relief sought as no right, title or interest was established in favour of plaintiff No.2, inter alia, for want of PoA for proper execution of the sale deed in his favour. At this stage, it is required to be noted that issue No.6 was, “have the plaintiffs proved their alleged right, title and interest in the suit land?”. The learned trial Court also held that the sale deeds in favour of plaintiff No.2 and plaintiff No.1 respectively did not have the endorsements of the Sub-Registrar that it was executed by the PoA of Braja Mohan Dey (original owner) and further that even in an earlier suit between plaintiff No.2 and Sarat Chandra Majumdar, the said PoA was not produced. The learned trial Judge also came to the conclusion that the provisions of Section 33(1)(c) of the Registration Act, 1908 have not been complied with, when according to the plaintiffs the alleged PoA was executed at Kumilla, East Pakistan, now Bangladesh, which is a foreign country.
2.4 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court dismissing the suit, the original plaintiffs preferred an appeal before the first appellate Court. In the appeal before the first appellate Court, the plaintiffs filed an application under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC for amendment of the plaint in T.S. No. 201/1985. The amendment sought for was to the effect that the missing PoA, i.e., the fulcrum of the case was allegedly handed over by the plaintiffs to original defendant No.1 and that despite demands, he never returned the same. Vide order dated 31.01.1998, the first appellate Court rejected the prayer for amendment of the plaint by observing that allowing the amendment A B C D E F G H at that stage would mean a remand of the suit for fresh trial. That after framing the points for consideration, the first appellate Court dismissed the appeal and confirmed the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court dismissing the suit. The first appellate Court also found that though plaintiff No.2 had acquired title over the suit land on the basis of the sale deed executed by him in his favour on the basis of the PoA alleged to have been executed by its true owner Braja Mohan Dey, but failed to produce the same before the Court and as such in the absence of PoA, genuinity of the sale deed dated 3.9.1968 cannot be presumed to be correct and on the basis of that sale deed, subsequent sale deed dated 29.09.1968 in favour of plaintiff No.1 by plaintiff No.2 also cannot be treated as genuine.
2.5 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment and order passed by the first appellate Court dismissing the appeal and confirming the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court dismissing the suit, the plaintiffs preferred the second appeal before the High Court under Section 100 CPC.
2.6 In the Second Appeal, the High Court, while admitting the appeal, framed the following substantial question of law: “Whether a sale deed executed by the attorney of the vendor can be challenged by a third party only on the ground that the attorney executive in the deed was not duly authorised by a power of attorney.”
Subsequently, the High Court reframed the following substantial questions of law:
“1) Whether the endorsement made on the sale deed No.1-10394 dated 3.9.1968 [Exbt.11] in respect of the power of attorney is substantive evidence in respect of the power of attorney authorising the plaintiff No.2 to sell the said land as demised in the sale deed dated 3.9.1968?
2. Whether the defendants had fundamental onus to discharge in respect that the power of attorney was not in existence or forged and as such, the sale deed dated 3.9.68 cannot be treated as the instrument of a valid transfer?”
2.7 By the impugned judgment and order, the High Court has allowed the second appeal No. 01/2005 by setting aside the concurrent MANIK MAJUMDER AND OTHERS v. DIPAK KUMAR SAHA (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. & OTHERS [M. R. SHAH, J.] A B C D E F G H 152 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 4 S.C.R.
findings recorded by the courts below by drawing a statutory presumption in respect of existence of PoA by virtue of endorsement. While holding so, the High Court has considered Section 33(1)(c) of the Registration Act. Consequently, the High Court has decreed the suit and has directed the appellants – original defendants to handover the vacant possession of the suit land to the original plaintiffs.
2.8 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court allowing the second appeal and quashing and setting aside the judgments and orders of the courts below dismissing the suit and consequently decreeing the suit in favour of the original plaintiffs, the original defendants have preferred the present appeal.
3. Shri Rana Mukherjee, learned Senior Advocate has appeared on behalf of the appellants – original defendants and Shri Hrishikesh Baruah, learned Advocate has appeared on behalf of the original plaintiffs. 3.1 Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants – original defendants has vehemently submitted that the High Court has committed a serious error in law by setting aside the concurrent findings of the courts below in the second appeal. This is particularly when both the courts below concurrently found that plaintiff No.2 is alleged to have acquired title over the suit land on the basis of the sale deed dated 3.9.1968 executed by him in his own favour on the basis of the PoA executed by its true owner Braja Mohan Dey, but failed to produce the same before the Court and as such in the absence of PoA, genuinity of the sale deed dated 3.9.1968 cannot be presumed to be correct. Further, on the basis of the sale deed dated 3.9.1968, subsequent sale deed dated 29.09.1968 in favour of plaintiff No.1 by plaintiff No.2 also cannot be treated as genuine. Therefore, the very execution of the sale deed dated 3.9.1968 is doubtful and it cannot be said that the same has been executed validly. 3.2 It is further submitted that the High Court, while drawing a statutory presumption, has failed to consider that when execution of the sale deed is doubtful and the cloud over the execution has not been cleared, no statutory presumption could be drawn in respect of existence or regularity of the PoA by virtue of an endorsement, when the PoA which was allegedly executed in a foreign country could not be produced and execution of the PoA has been done contrary to Section 33(1)(c) of the Registration Act.
A B C D E F G H 3.3 It is submitted that the High Court has erroneously relied on the judgment of this Court in the case of Prem Singh and others v. Birbal and others, (2006) 5 SCC 353. Relying upon the aforesaid decision, the High Court has seriously erred in holding that there is a presumption that “a registered document is validly executed”. 3.4 It is further submitted that despite the original plaintiffs having sale deeds in their favour, plaintiff No.1 sought a declaration of the title. It is submitted that assuming that the plaintiffs were dispossessed from ‘Schedule C’ property of which relief was claimed, then an application/ proceeding under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act could have also been filed, which was not done because the plaintiffs in the suit knew that there was a cloud in their title to the suit land.
3.5 It is urged that even the original owner of the land, Braja Mohan Dey, who was alleged to have executed the missing PoA, was never made a party to the suit. He was neither a party to the suit nor was examined as one of the witnesses by the trial Court in support of the case of the plaintiffs. It is submitted that even the sale deeds executed by virtue of the said PoA were not proved by examining the registering authorities or by production of documents registering such sale. 3.6 Now so far as the effect of Section 33(1)(c) of the Registration Act, it is submitted that insofar as the PoA was concerned, no evidence was led to the effect that the same was in compliance of the provisions of Section 33(1)(c) of the Registration Act. It is urged that as such the trial Court has observed that the plaintiffs had not produced the PoA before the Court and there was no explanation/averment made in the plaint for such non-production. It is submitted that even the subsequent conduct/attempt on the part of the plaintiffs seeking amendment of the plaint before the first appellate Court deserves consideration. It is submitted that having found that non-production of the PoA by the plaintiffs would come in their way, and in fact had gone against them, the plaintiffs tried to make out altogether a new case by averring that the copy of the PoA was handed over to original defendant No.1 and despite several requests, he never returned the same. It is submitted that the same was never the case of the plaintiffs when the suit was filed and there was no such amendment prayed in the plaint. 3.7 Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants has heavily relied upon the decision of this Court in the case of H. Siddiqui MANIK MAJUMDER AND OTHERS v. DIPAK KUMAR SAHA (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. & OTHERS [M. R. SHAH, J.] A B C D E F G H 154 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 4 S.C.R.
v. A. Ramalingam (2011) 4 SCC 240 (paras 13 & 15) in support of his submission that once the issue of alleged PoA was raised, the High Court ought not to have decided the second issue framed by it in that case without deciding on the first issue, i.e., that of impact of nonproduction of the PoA and its existence thereof. It is submitted that in the present case, the High Court ought to have decided the issue of nonproduction of PoA by the plaintiffs in the first instance and then would have drawn the statutory presumption.
3.8 It is further submitted that in the present case, the learned trial Court also specifically observed that no endorsement was made by the Sub-Registrar on the documents in compliance with Section 26 and Section 58 of the Registration Act. It is contended that it was neither stated in the deed that the plaintiff has the PoA by which he was empowered to execute the deed in his favour nor was an averment made in the plaint to that effect. It is submitted that the evidence produced by the plaintiffs, i.e., two sale deeds dated 3.9.1968 and 29.9.1968 based on the purported PoA, has not been proved by production of official records or through the Registrar being examined as a witness. It is urged that the PoA is the fulcrum of the case on which the plaintiffs were claiming their rights, the plaintiffs never produced in any form. It is further urged that it was incumbent on the part of the plaintiffs to produce PoA as the plaintiffs in the suit were having their rights, title or interest through the PoA which is the basic document.
3.9 Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants has further submitted that Sections 101 to 103 of the Indian Evidence Act provides that a party who avers the title must prove the title and that such a party is not relieved of the onus. It is submitted that in the present case even the plaintiffs had not discharged their initial burden of proving the title. Reliance is placed upon the decision of this Court in the cases of Anil Rishi v. Gurbaksh Singh (2006) 5 SCC 558; and Sebastio Luis Fernandes v. K.V.P. Shastri (2013) 15 SCC 161.
3.10 It is further submitted that Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act provides for circumstances under which secondary evidence may be given without filing primary evidence. It is submitted that in the present case the plaintiffs have failed to prove the primary evidence, i.e., PoA on the basis of which the secondary evidence, i.e., the sale deeds were executed. Reliance is placed on the decision of this Court in the case of J. Yashoda v. K. Shobha Rani (2007) 5 SCC 730. It is submitted that A B C D E F G H therefore in the absence of the principal evidence (PoA), the significance of the two sale deeds, produced by the plaintiffs is diluted. 3.11 It is further contended that in the impugned judgment and order, the High Court while holding against the appellants and upsetting the concurrent findings of the courts below, inter alia, has held that there was a statutory presumption in favour of the plaintiffs insofar as the PoA is concerned. It is submitted that the said finding is erroneous inasmuch as the statutory presumption would not be available to the plaintiffs and the documents in question since the document (PoA) itself has not been produced before the courts below to ascertain whether the document was in order or in compliance of Section 33(1)(c) of the Registration Act.
3.12 Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants has also relied upon the decisions of this Court in the case of Rajni Tandon v. Dulal Ranjan Ghosh Dastidar (2009) 14 SCC 782; and recent decision of this Court in the case of Amar Nath v. Gian Chand 2022 SCC OnLine SC 102, in support of his submission on Section 33 (1)(c) of the Registration Act.
3.13 Making the above submissions and relying upon the aforesaid decisions, it is vehemently submitted that the High Court has erred in allowing the second appeal and quashing and setting aside the concurrent findings of the courts below and thereby decreeing the suit while exercising the power under Section 100 CPC. Therefore, it is prayed to allow the present appeal and set aside the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court and restore the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court.
4. The present appeal is opposed by Shri Hrishikesh Baruah, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents – original plaintiffs.
4.1 It is vehemently submitted that the land which is in possession of defendant No.1 is founded on the title of plaintiff No.1 based on the sale deed dated 3.9.1968 which has been executed on the basis of the PoA in favour of plaintiff No.2. It is submitted that therefore the defendants are not entitled in law as well as in equity to raise a dispute about the existence of the same.
4.2 It is submitted that as such the original defendants tried to take forceful possession of ‘Schedule C’ property by breaking the godown MANIK MAJUMDER AND OTHERS v. DIPAK KUMAR SAHA (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. & OTHERS [M. R. SHAH, J.] A B C D E F G H 156 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 4 S.C.R.
and taking away the goods. Plaintiff No.2 informed the concerned police station and thereafter made a prayer before the Court of the SDM, Sardar for drawing up proceedings under Section 144 Cr.P.C. On a police enquiry report, proceedings under Section 144 Cr.P.C. were started. During the proceedings, a prohibitory order was passed. The defendants entered the possession of ’Schedule C’ property. It is submitted that, in fact, the learned Executive Magistrate directed the defendants to vacate the ‘Schedule C’ property/land and handover the same to the plaintiffs. However, in the revision petition filed by the defendants, the learned revisional Court set aside the same on technical grounds. The plaintiffs approached the High Court by way of revision petition. The High Court disposed of the case by directing that the plaintiffs can initiate a fresh case under Section 145 Cr.P.C. regarding the ‘Schedule C’ property. It is submitted that thereafter the plaintiffs filed a petition under Section 145 Cr.P.C. However, on 27.09.1985, as the defendants started construction of a pucca structure on ‘Schedule C’ property, the plaintiffs were constrained to file the suit.
4.3 It is submitted that as such the High Court has rightly drawn the statutory presumption in favour of the plaintiffs. It is submitted that as observed and held by the High Court, the defendants have not led any evidence to rebut the presumption. It is submitted that as there was an endorsement in the sale deed and that it is a vital piece of evidence, the High Court has not committed any error in drawing the statutory presumption.
4.4 It is further submitted that Part VI of the Registration Act deals with presenting documents for registration. Section 32 contemplates that only those persons mentioned in clause (c) are entitled to present documents for registration. In case the PoA holder himself executes the sale deed, then for the purpose of registration he is considered to be a person falling under Section 32(a) of the Registration Act. He is not even required to produce the PoA (although in the present case the PoA was produced and the requisite endorsement was made). It is submitted that sub-clause (c) contemplates presentation of a document for registration by a PoA holder. It is submitted that Section 33 further provides as to which PoA holders will be recognised for the purpose of Section 32. Sub-clause (c) provides for a case where the principal is not residing in India. It is submitted that in that case, the PoA executed has to be authenticated by the concerned persons mentioned therein. Further, A B C D E F G H the plaintiffs have proved execution of the PoA by the original owner by examining PW1. It is contended therefore there is no dispute that the steps mentioned in Section 33(1)(c) of the Registration Act were complied with.
4.5 It is further submitted that Section 34 of the Registration Act contemplates an enquiry which relates to various aspects mentioned in sub-clause (3) including (i) enquiring into the fact as to whether such document was executed by the persons by whom it purports to have been executed; (ii) satisfying himself as to the identity of the persons appearing before him; and (iii) in case of any person appearing as a representative assign or agent satisfying himself as to the right of such person so to appear. That on completion of enquiry as contemplated under the Registration Act, the registering authority may direct registration and issuance of a certificate in terms of Section 60(1) and 60(2) of the Act. Therefore by virtue of Section 60(2) of the Registration Act, there is a statutory presumption which arises to the effect that the document has been registered in the manner provided by the Act, which means that it has been registered after due compliance of the enquiry contemplated under Section 33(1) (c) and 36 of the Registration Act. 4.6 It is submitted that in the present case plaintiff No.2 had executed the first sale deed dated 3.9.1968 which is a registered document. That on the foundation of the said sale deed, the second sale deed dated 29.09.1968 had been executed in favour of plaintiff No.1 and therefore the owner of the property is plaintiff No.1. It is contended that on the foundation of the aforesaid registered document, the title has to flow. Otherwise, it would lead to a situation wherein a registered document will have no effect. That in the present case there is no challenge to the sale deeds. Therefore, the legal effect of the execution of the sale deeds has been proved.
4.7 It is submitted that the defendants are asking for production of a PoA which was used by the predecessor-in-interest of plaintiff No.1 to execute the sale deed in his favour. This burden to provide the PoA on the foundation of which the first sale deed was executed is an onerous burden and not contemplated in law. That as such the defendants are nothing but rank tress-passers. They have never set up their title in the property. They have never asserted that they have obtained possessory right from a person with title. Therefore, they have no right to challenge the title of plaintiff No.1.
MANIK MAJUMDER AND OTHERS v. DIPAK KUMAR SAHA (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. & OTHERS [M. R. SHAH, J.] A B C D E F G H 158 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 4 S.C.R.
4.8 Relying upon the recent decision of this Court in the case of Amar Nath (supra), it is submitted that as observed and held by this Court that when a PoA holder executes the sale deed, he executes in terms of Section 32(a) of the Registration Act and therefore he does not need to produce the PoA. Only when the PoA holder executes a further PoA, then only the second PoA holder will have to produce the PoA between him and the first PoA and not otherwise.
4.9 Making the above submissions and relying upon the above decision, it is prayed to dismiss the present appeal.
5. I have heard learned counsel for the respective parties at length. At the outset, it is required to be noted that in the present case, the plaintiffs instituted the suit for declaration of title, to which they were laying claim by virtue of the two sale deeds, one dated 3.9.1968 (executed by plaintiff No.2 in his favour on the basis of the alleged PoA alleged to have been executed by the original land owner – Braja Mohan Dey) and the second sale deed dated 29.09.1968 (executed by plaintiff No.2 in favour of plaintiff No.1 as a PoA holder of the original owner). Both, the learned trial Court as well as the first appellate Court held that the plaintiffs have failed to prove their title as the PoA on the basis of which plaintiff No.2 claimed the right/title is not forthcoming and/or not produced before the Court. Therefore, both, the learned trial Court as well as the first appellate Court held that the requirement of Section 33(1)(c) of the Registration Act has not been satisfied. However, by drawing the statutory presumption under Section 60 of the Registration Act, the High Court has believed the sale deeds dated 3.9.1968 and 29.09.1968 and has held that the plaintiffs have proved their title. But, by the impugned judgment and order and drawing the statutory presumption, the High Court while exercising the powers under Section 100 CPC, has set aside the concurrent findings recorded by the courts below.
6. When the plaintiffs claimed title on the basis of the aforesaid two sale deeds dated 2.9.1968 and 29.09.1968, it was for the plaintiffs to prove even the execution of the sale deeds. The defendants were not required to challenge the sale deeds in the suit filed by the plaintiffs, who prayed for a decree for a declaration of title in their favour. When plaintiff No.2 claimed title on the basis of the PoA executed by the original owner and thereafter executed the sale deed in favour of plaintiff No.1 as PoA of the original owner, the conditions provided under Section 33(1)(c) of A B C D E F G H the Registration Act are required to be strictly complied with. Sections 32 and 33 of the Registration Act, which are relevant for our purpose, read as under:
“32. Persons to present documents for registration.—Except in the cases mentioned in 33[Sections 31, 88 and 89], every document to be registered under this Act, whether such registration be compulsory or optional, shall be presented at the proper registration office,—
(a) by some person executing or claiming under the same, or in the case of a copy of a decree or order, claiming under the decree or order, or
(b) by the representative or assign of such person, or
(c) by the agent of such person, representative or assign, duly authorized by power-of-attorney executed and authenticated in manner hereinafter mentioned.
33. Power-of-attorney recognizable for purposes of Section 32.—(1) For the purposes of Section 32, the following powersof-attorney shall alone be recognized, namely—
(a) if the principal at the time of executing the power-of-attorney resides in any part of 35[India] in which this Act is for the time being in force, a power-of-attorney executed before and authenticated by the Registrar or Sub-Registrar within whose district or sub-district the principal resides;
(b) if the principal at the time aforesaid resides in any part of India in which this Act is not in force, a power-of-attorney executed before and authenticated by any Magistrate;
(c) if the principal at the time aforesaid does not reside in 37[India], a power-of attorney executed before and authenticated by a Notary Public, or any Court, Judge, Magistrate, Indian Consul or Vice-Consul, or representative of the Central Government:
Provided that the following persons shall not be required to attend at any registration-office or Court for the purpose of executing any such power-of-attorney as is mentioned in clauses (a) and
(b) of this Section, namely— MANIK MAJUMDER AND OTHERS v. DIPAK KUMAR SAHA (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. & OTHERS [M. R. SHAH, J.] A B C D E F G H 160 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 4 S.C.R.
(i) persons who by reason of bodily infirmity are unable without risk or serious inconvenience so to attend:
(ii) persons who are in jail under civil or criminal process; and
(iii) persons exempt by law from personal appearance in the Court.
[Explanation.—In this sub-section, “India” means India, as defined in clause (28) of Section 3 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897)].
(2) In the case of every such person the Registrar or Sub-Registrar or Magistrate, as the case may be, if satisfied that the power-ofattorney has been voluntarily executed by the person purporting to be the principal, may attest the same without requiring his personal attendance at the office or Court aforesaid.
(3) To obtain evidence as to the voluntary nature of the execution, the Registrar or Sub-Registrar or Magistrate may either himself go to the house of the person purporting to be the principal, or to the jail in which he is confined, and examine him, or issue a commission for his examination.
(4) Any power-of-attorney mentioned in this section may be proved by the production of it without further proof when it purports on the face of it to have been executed before and authenticated by the person or Court hereinbefore mentioned in that behalf.”
7. According to the plaintiffs and it is not in dispute that the original owner was residing in East Pakistan. According to the plaintiffs, the original land owner executed the PoA in favour of plaintiff No.2 at Kumilla, Bangladesh. The original PoA is not produced on record. As per Section 32 of the Registration Act, every document to be registered under the Registration Act shall be presented at the proper registration office by some person executing or claiming under the same, or, by the agent of such a person, representative or assign, duly authorised by PoA executed and authenticated in the manner mentioned in Section 33(1)(c) of the Registration Act. Section 33 of the Registration Act provides that for the purposes of Section 32, only those power of attorneys shall be recognised as are mentioned in Section 33(1). As per Section 33(1)(c) of the Act, if the principal at the time of execution of the PoA does not reside in India, a PoA executed before and authenticated by a Notary Public, or any A B C D E F G H Court, Judge, Magistrate, Indian Consul or Vice-Consul, or representative of the Central Government shall be valid. In the present case, as such, the requirement of Section 33(1)(c) of the Act has not been satisfied at all. Section 32 of the Act is to be read along with Section 33(1)(c) of the Registration Act. Only in a case where the execution of the PoA is as per Section 32 read with Section 33(1)(c) of the Act, there shall be statutory presumption under Section 60 and/or under the provisions of the Registration Act. Therefore, the High Court has committed a grave error in drawing the statutory presumption in favour of the plaintiffs and more particularly with respect to alleged PoA alleged to have been executed by the original owner in favour of plaintiff No.2. As such, there were concurrent findings recorded by both the courts below on non-compliance and/or non-fulfilling the conditions mentioned in Section 33(1)(c) of the Registration Act. By drawing the statutory presumption and without properly appreciating and/or considering the fact that there is a non-compliance of Section 33(1)(c) of the Registration Act there cannot be any statutory presumption, the High Court has set aside the concurrent findings recorded by both the courts below, in exercise of powers under Section 100 CPC.
8. Even the conduct on the part of the plaintiffs, more particularly on the part of plaintiff No.2, executing the second sale deed in favour of plaintiff No.1 – his own wife as a PoA of original land owner deserves serious consideration. It is required to be noted and even according to the plaintiffs, on the basis of the PoA alleged to have been executed by the original land owner – Braja Mohan Dey, plaintiff No.2 executed the registered sale deed in his own favour dated 3.9.1968. If that be so, in that case, there was no reason for him to execute the subsequent sale deed in favour of plaintiff No.1 – his own wife as a PoA of the original land owner. Once he became the owner on the basis of a registered sale deed dated 3.9.1968, which was executed by him in his own name as a PoA of the original owner, he could have executed the sale deed in favour of plaintiff No.1 as the owner and not as a PoA of the original owner.
9. Even another conduct on the part of the plaintiffs submitting the application to amend the plaint under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC submitted before the first appellate Court also creates doubts about the genuinity of the PoA. It was never the case on behalf of the plaintiffs before the trial Court and in the suit that the PoA was handed over by the plaintiffs MANIK MAJUMDER AND OTHERS v. DIPAK KUMAR SAHA (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. & OTHERS [M. R. SHAH, J.] A B C D E F G H 162 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 4 S.C.R.
to original defendant No.1 and that despite his demands he never returned the same. Having found and realised that the non-production of the PoA had gone against them, subsequently, before the first appellate Court, the plaintiffs sought to make out a case that the PoA was handed over by plaintiff No.2 to original defendant No.1 and that despite his demands, never returned the same. The amendment sought under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC was rightly refused by the first appellate Court. The plaintiffs tried to make out altogether a new case which was not even the case of the plaintiffs earlier. This conduct on the part of the plaintiffs also deserves serious consideration and it creates serious doubts on the genuinity of the PoA. In that view of the matter, the High Court has committed a serious error in drawing a statutory presumption as to the authenticity of the sale deeds. There may be a statutory presumption as per Section 60 of the Registration Act where all other requirements of execution of the sale deed, required to be complied with under the Registration Act are complied with and the genuineness of the PoA on the basis of which the sale deed was executed is not doubted.
10. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above and as the PoA is not produced on record; the executant of the PoA in favour of plaintiff No.2 has not stepped into the witness box; there is a noncompliance of Section 33(1)(c) of the Registration Act; and the plaintiff no.2 is claiming title on the basis of the PoA alleged to have been executed by the original owner which is not forthcoming and that plaintiff no.1 is claiming the title on the basis of the sale deed dated 29.09.1968 executed by plaintiff No.2 as a PoA holder of the original owner which is not forthcoming, I am of the opinion that the learned trial Court was justified and right in dismissing the suit and refusing to pass a decree for a declaration of title in favour of the plaintiffs. The same was rightly confirmed by the first appellate Court. The High Court has committed a serious error in decreeing the suit. The impugned judgment and order of the High Court is unsustainable both, on law as well as on facts.
11. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the present Appeal Succeeds and is Allowed. The impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court decreeing the suit is hereby quashed and set aside and the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court, confirmed by the first appellate Court, is hereby restored. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
A B C D E F G H
NAGARATHNA, J.
I have had the advantage of reading the judgment proposed by His Lordship M.R. Shah, J. However, I am unable to agree with the reasoning as well as the result arrived at by His Lordship. Hence, my separate judgment.
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