Neeraj Dutta v. State (Govt. of N.C.T. of Delhi)
- Citation
- 2023 INSC 245; [2023] 2 S.C.R. 997
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Abhay S. Oka, Justice Rajesh Bindal Prevention of Corruption Act, Justice 1988 : Ss. 7, Justice 13(1)(D), Justice Held : Apart From the Evidence of Pw-5-Shadow Witness, Justice There Is No Other Evidence
- Decided
- 17 Mar 2023
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 1669/2009
- Sections
- 7, 13(1), 313, 13(2), 12, 13, 2, 20
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:26 am. Original source ↗
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A B C D E F G H
NEERAJ DUTTA
v.
STATE (GOVT. OF N.C.T. OF DELHI)
(Criminal Appeal No. 1669 of 2009)
MARCH 17, 2023
[ABHAY S. OKA AND RAJESH BINDAL, JJ.] Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 : ss. 7, 13(1)(d), 13(2) – Proof of demand of illegal gratification – Prosecution case that a trap was laid and the appellant-Electricity Inspector came with the co-accused and demanded the documents and bribe of which was paid by the complainant – Special Court holding that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence on record to prove the guilt of the appellant, convicted her for the offence punishable u/ ss. 7 and 13(i)(d)(i) and (ii) rw 13(2) – High Court upheld the same – On appeal, held : Apart from the evidence of PW-5-shadow witness, there is no other evidence that is pressed into service by the prosecution for proving the demand by the appellant – Even taking the statements of PW-5 in the examination-in-chief as correct, it is impossible to even infer that the demand of Rs.10,000/- was made by the appellant by way of gratification – Every demand made for payment of money is not a demand for gratification – It has to be something more than mere demand for money – On facts, no circumstances brought on record which would prove the demand for gratification – Thus, the ingredients of the offence u/s. 7 not established and consequently, the offence u/s. 13(1)(d) not attracted – Judgment passed by the courts below set aside.
ss. 7, 13(1)(d), 13(2) – Illegal gratification – Demand and acceptance of – Modes of proof – Held: In the absence of direct evidence, the demand and/or acceptance can always be proved by other evidence such as circumstantial evidence.
Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1.1 The proof of demand within the meaning of Section 7 cannot be a simpliciter demand for money but it has to be a demand of gratification other than legal remuneration. All that PW-5 says is when the appellant visited the shop of the [2023] 2 S.C.R. 997 A B C D E F G H 998 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 2 S.C.R.
complainant, she asked the complainant to give papers regarding the electricity meter and Rs.10,000/- to her by telling him that she was in a hurry. This is not a case where a specific demand of gratification for providing electricity meter was made by the appellant to the complainant in the presence of the shadow witness. PW-5 has not stated that there was any discussion in his presence between the appellant and the complainant on the basis of which an inference could have been drawn that there was a demand made for gratification by the appellant. The witness had no knowledge about what transpired between the complainant and the appellant earlier. PW-5 had admittedly no personal knowledge about the purpose for which the cash was allegedly handed over by the complainant to the appellant. [Para 16][1011- C-F]
1.2. As per the version of the appellant in her statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, on 17th April 2000, she was working as an LDC in DVB office. On that day, she was busy with her official duty in a collection drive organized by the department to collect dues from the consumers. Her explanation is that the complainant was her neighbour and he wanted her assistance to deposit electricity charges. She stated that earlier, she had a transaction of sale and purchase of a car through the complainant. She has also stated that the complainant was a history-sheeter and there were three First Information Reports (FIRs) registered against him. In this context, PW-5 was questioned in the cross-examination. PW-5 did not confirm the correctness of the suggestion but stated that he was not in a position to deny the same. In fact, PW-7, the investigation officer, deposed that cash of Rs.71,900/– was found in the appellant’s car. This lends support to the defence that there was a recovery drive conducted by the appellant. Apart from the evidence of PW-5, there is no other evidence that is pressed into service by the prosecution for proving the demand by the appellant. Even taking the statements of PW-5 in the examination-in-chief as correct, it is impossible to even infer that the demand of Rs.10,000/- was made by the appellant by way of gratification. Every demand made for payment of money is not a demand for gratification. It has to be something more than mere demand for money. [Para 17][1011-F-H; 1012-A, D-E] A B C D E F G H 1.3 In the complaint filed by the deceased complainant on 17th April 2000, in the form of his statement recorded by the Anti- Corruption Bureau, he has stated that pursuant to the application dated 6th May 1996, a meter was installed in his shop and after a few months, he found that the meter was removed. However, the Special Court has observed in paragraph 19 of the impugned judgment that a complaint regarding a stolen electricity meter was registered at the instance of the complainant on 25th April 2000. Thus, the grievance regarding stolen meter was made by the complainant 8 days after the alleged demand for bribe. In fact, PW-7 admitted that the complainant did not produce a copy of the application made by him for providing electricity meter. PW-7 further stated that the complainant did not clearly tell him that he had given such application. In absence of proof of making such application, the prosecution’s case regarding demand of bribe for installing new electricity meter becomes doubtful. Moreover, till 24th April 2000, the complainant did not register a complaint regarding commission of offence. This makes the prosecution’s case regarding the demand of gratification on 17th April 2000 for installing a new electricity meter extremely doubtful. [Para 18][1012-F-H; 1013-A-B] 1.4 There are no circumstances brought on record which would prove the demand for gratification. Therefore, the ingredients of the offence under Section 7 of the PC Act were not established and consequently, the offence under Section 13(1)(d) will not be attracted. The impugned judgment and the judgment of the Special Court is set aside as also the conviction and sentence of the appellant. [Paras 19, 20][1013-B-C] Neeraj Dutta v State (Govt of NCT of Delhi) 2022 SCCOnline SC 1724 – followed.
B. Jayaraj v. State of Andhra Pradesh (2014) 13 SCC 55 : [2014] 4 SCR 554; P. Satyanarayana Murthy v.
District Inspector of Police, State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr. (2015) 10 SCC 152; M. Narsinga Rao v. State of A.P. (2001) 1 SCC 691 : [2000] 5 Suppl. SCR 584;
N. Vijayakumar v. State of Tamil Nadu (2021) 3 SCC 687 – referred to.
NEERAJ DUTTA v. STATE (GOVT. OF N.C.T. OF DELHI)
A B C D E F G H 1000 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 2 S.C.R.
Case Law Reference [2014] 4 SCR 554 referred to Para 4 (2015) 10 SCC 152 referred to Para 4 [2000] 5 Suppl. SCR 584 referred to Para 4 (2021) 3 SCC 687 referred to Para 11 CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
1669 of 2009.
From the Judgment and Order dated 02.04.2009 of he High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in CRLA No. 04 of 2007.
S. Nagamuthu, Sr.Adv., Mr. Satinder S. Gulati, Raj Kishor Choudhary, Advs. for the Appellant.
Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, Jayant K. Sud, A.S.Gs., Shreekant Neelappa Terdal, Ms. Snidha Mehra, Ms. Rukhmini Bobde, Sanjay Kr. Tyagi, Adit Khorana, Shubranshu Padhi, Udai Khanna, Ms. Poornima Singh, Ms. Manisha Chava, Ms. B.L.N.Shivani, Ms. Shivika Mehra, Advs. for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
ABHAY S. OKA, J.
FACTUAL ASPECTS
1. The appellant was convicted by the Special Judge, Delhi for the offences punishable under Section 7 and clauses (i) and (ii) of Section13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short, ‘the PC Act’). The co-accused, Mr. Yogesh Kumar, was convicted by the Special Judge for the offence punishable under Section 12 of the PC Act. The co-accused was acquitted by the High Court. The appellant was sentenced to undergo a rigorous imprisonment for a period of three years and to pay a fine of Rs.15,000/- for the offence punishable under sub-section (2) of Section 13 of the PC Act. For the offence punishable under Section 7, she was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years and to pay a fine of Rs.5,000/-. Sentences in default of payment of fine were also imposed. The conviction of the appellant has been upheld by the High Court by the impugned judgment.
A B C D E F G H
2. The complainant – Mr. Ravijit Singh died before the trial commenced. In fact, PW-7, the Investigation Officer, deposed that the complainant was murdered. In his complaint, the complainant stated that he was doing business of sale and purchase of cars in a shop situated at Vikas Puri, New Delhi. His case is that there was no electricity meter installed in his shop and therefore, on 6th May 1996 he applied for an electricity meter. In the complaint filed by him on 17th April 2000, in the form of his statement recorded by the Anti- Corruption Bureau, he stated that pursuant to the application dated 6th May 1996, a meter was installed in his shop and after a few months, he found that the meter was removed. As the shopkeepers in the area had got the electricity meters installed through the appellant, he met her. On 17th April 2000, he received a telephone call at 7:30 a.m. from the appellant who was working as an Inspector in the D.V.B./electricity department in the local area. She called him at her residence to discuss the issue of the electricity meter. At 8:00 a.m., when the complainant met her, she demanded a sum of Rs.15,000/- for getting the meter installed and ultimately after negotiations, she settled the demand at Rs.10,000/-. According to the complainant, the appellant stated that she would come to his shop between 3:00 and 4:00 p.m. when the complainant should hand over the papers for the electricity meter and Rs.10,000/- as a bribe. The complainant stated that he had no option but to accept her demand for a bribe.
3. The prosecution’s case is that on the basis of the aforesaid complaint, a trap was laid. PW-5, Mr. S. K. Awasthi, was the shadow witness. When he along with the complainant as well as members of the raiding party visited the complainant’s shop at 3:50 p.m., the appellant was not present there. At about 4:40 p.m., a telephone call was received by the complainant that the appellant would come at around 5:30/6:00 p.m. At 5:20 p.m., the appellant came with the co-accused and demanded the documents and bribe of Rs.10,000/-, which was paid by the complainant. The Special Court held that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence on record to prove the guilt of the appellant. In fact, a finding was recorded on the basis of circumstantial evidence that the demand and acceptance were proved. The order of conviction of the learned Special Court as regards the appellant has been confirmed by the High Court in the impugned judgment.
4. While hearing this appeal, a bench of two Hon’ble Judges of this Court came to a conclusion that the decisions of this Court of the NEERAJ DUTTA v. STATE (GOVT. OF N.C.T. OF DELHI)
[ABHAY S. OKA, J.] A B C D E F G H 1002 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 2 S.C.R.
benches of three Hon’ble Judges in the cases of B. Jayaraj v. State of Andhra Pradesh1 and P. Satyanarayana Murthy v. District Inspector of Police, State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr.2 were in conflict with an earlier three-Judge bench’s decision in the case of M. Narsinga Rao v. State of A.P.3 Accordingly, the following question was referred to the larger bench:
“The question whether in the absence of evidence of complainant/ direct or primary evidence of demand of illegal gratification, is it not permissible to draw inferential deduction of culpability/guilt of a public servant under Section 7 and Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 based on other evidence adduced by the prosecution.”
5. The above-mentioned question was referred for decision to a Constitution Bench, which disposed of the reference by the judgment dated 15th December 20224. Broadly, the Constitution Bench held that in absence of the complaint’s testimony in a prosecution for offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(2) of the PC Act, the prosecution can rely upon even circumstantial evidence to prove the demand of gratification. In paragraph 74 of the said decision, the Constitution Bench has summarized its conclusions.
RIVAL SUBMISSIONS
6. Shri S. Nagamuthu, the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that this is a case where there is no evidence of demand of illegal gratification by the appellant. The learned senior counsel submitted that proof of demand of gratification by a public servant is a sine qua non for the offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) of the PC Act. He submitted that the findings of the Courts are based on surmises and conjectures.
7. Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, the learned Additional Solicitor General appearing for the prosecution supported the impugned judgments. She submitted that PW-5 has proved the demand. Moreover, on the basis of the circumstantial evidence, the demand and acceptance were proved. She also submitted that once the demand and acceptance are established,
1 2014 (13) SCC 55
2 2015 (10) SCC 152
3 2001 (1) SCC 691
4 2022 SCCOnline SC 1724 A B C D E F G H there is a presumption that the acceptance of gratification proves the existence of motive or reward. The learned ASG submitted that no interference is called for with the impugned judgments.
LEGAL POSITION
8. Before we analyze the evidence, we must note that we are dealing with Sections 7 and 13 of the PC Act as they stood prior to the amendment made by the Act 16 of 2018 with effect from 26th July 2018. We are referring to Sections 7 and 13 as they stood on the date of commission of the offence. Section 7, as existed at the relevant time, reads thus:
“7. Public servant taking gratification other than legal remuneration in respect of an official act.— Whoever, being, or expecting to be a public servant, accepts or obtains or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain from any person, for himself or for any other person, any gratification whatever, other than legal remuneration, as a motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do any official act or for showing or forbearing to show, in the exercise of his official functions, favour or disfavour to any person or for rendering or attempting to render any service or disservice to any person, with the Central Government or any State Government or Parliament or the Legislature of any State or with any local authority, corporation or Government company referred to in clause (c) of section 2, or with any public servant, whether named or otherwise, shall be punishable with imprisonment which shall be not less than three years but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine. Explanations.-
(a) “Expecting to be a public servant”- If a person not expecting to be in office obtains a gratification by deceiving others into a belief that he is about to be in office, and that he will then serve them, he may be guilty of cheating, but he is not guilty of the offence defined in this section.
(b) “Gratification”. The word “gratification” is not restricted to pecuniary gratifications or to gratifications estimable in money.
(c) “Legal remuneration”- The words “legal remuneration” are not restricted to remuneration which a public servant can lawfully NEERAJ DUTTA v. STATE (GOVT. OF N.C.T. OF DELHI)
[ABHAY S. OKA, J.] A B C D E F G H 1004 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 2 S.C.R.
demand, but include all remuneration which he is permitted by the Government or the organisation, which he serves, to accept.
(d) “A motive or reward for doing”. A person who receives a gratification as a motive or reward for doing what he does not intend or is not in a position to do, or has not done, comes within this expression.
(e) Where a public servant induces a person erroneously to believe that his influence with the Government has obtained a title for that person and thus induces that person to give the public servant, money or any other gratification as a reward for this service, the public servant has committed an offence under this section.”
9. Section 13(1)(d), as existed at the relevant time, reads thus: “13.Criminal misconduct by a public servant.—
(1) A public servantis said to commit the offence of criminal misconduct,-
(a) ………………………………
(b) ……………………………...
(c) ………………………………
(d) if he,-
(i) by corrupt or illegal means, obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage; or
(ii) by abusing his position as a public servant, obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage; or
(iii) while holding office as a public servant, obtains for any person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage without any public interest; or
(e) ..................................................”
The demand for gratification and the acceptance thereof are sine qua non for the offence punishable under Section 7 of the PC Act.
10. The Constitution Bench4 was called upon to decide the question which we have quoted earlier. In paragraph 74, the conclusions of the Constitution have been summarised, which read thus:
A B C D E F G H “74. What emerges from the aforesaid discussion is summarised as under:
(a) Proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by a public servant as a fact in issue by the prosecution is a sine qua non in order to establish the guilt of the accused public servant under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act.
(b) In order to bring home the guilt of the accused, the prosecution has to first prove the demand of illegal gratification and the subsequent acceptance as a matter of fact. This fact in issue can be proved either by direct evidence which can be in the nature of oral evidence or documentary evidence.
(c) Further, the fact in issue, namely, the proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification can also be proved by circumstantial evidence in the absence of direct oral and documentary evidence.
(d) In order to prove the fact in issue, namely, the demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by the public servant, the following aspects have to be borne in mind:
(i) if there is an offer to pay by the bribe giver without there being any demand from the public servant and the latter simply accepts the offer and receives the illegal gratification, it is a case of acceptance as per Section 7 of the Act. In such a case, there need not be a prior demand by the public servant.
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