Smriti Debbarma (Dead) Through Legal Representative v. Prabha Ranjan Debbarma and Others
- Citation
- 2023 INSC 8; [2023] 1 S.C.R. 355
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Sanjiv Khanna
- Decided
- 4 Jan 2023
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 878/2009
- Sections
- 101, 102, 144, 906, 90, 81, 1011, 1021
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:27 am. Original source ↗
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A B C D E F G H 355[2023] 1 S.C.R. 355
SMRITI DEBBARMA (DEAD) THROUGH LEGAL
REPRESENTATIVE
v.
PRABHA RANJAN DEBBARMA AND OTHERS
(Civil Appeal No. 878 of 2009)
JANAURY 04, 2023
[SANJIV KHANNA AND J. K. MAHESHWARI, JJ.] Suit – Suit for declaration of title – Burden of proof – Trial court decreed the suit holding that the plaintiff had right, title and interest in the subject property and was entitled to khas possession of the property after evicting all the defendants – High Court reversed the judgment of trial court holding that plaintiff on basis of evidence and documents placed on record had not been able to discharge the burden of proof to establish legal ownership and title to the subject property – Held: High Court rightly set aside the judgment and decree of the trial court – The plaintiff took contradictory stands – On the date of filing of the suit, the plaintiff was not in constructive or actual physical possession of the property – The defendants could not be dispossessed unless the plaintiff established a better title and rights over the property – The burden of proof to establish a title in the present case lay upon the plaintiff –s.101 of the Evidence Act states that burden on proving the fact rests with party who substantially asserts in the affirmative and not on the party which is denying it – In terms of s.102 of the Evidence Act, if both parties fail to adduce evidence, the suit must fail – Onus of proof, no doubt shifts and the shifting is a continuous process in the evaluation of evidence, but this happens when in a suit for title and possession, the plaintiff has been able to create a high degree of probability to shift the onus on the defendant – The weakness of the defence cannot be a justification to decree the suit – The plaintiff A B C D E F G H 356 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 1 S.C.R.
could have succeeded in respect of the property if she had discharged the burden to prove the title to the property which squarely fell on her – This would be the true effect of ss.101 and 102 of the Evidence Act – Suit in question liable to be dismissed – Evidence Act – ss. 101 and 102.
Evidence – “Burden of proof” and “Onus of proof” – Discussed.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court HELD:1. For the plaintiff to succeed, she has to establish that she has a legal title to the Schedule ‘A’ property, and consequently, is entitled to a decree of possession. The defendants cannot be dispossessed unless the plaintiff has established a better title and rights over the Schedule ‘A’ property. A person in possession of land in the assumed character as the owner, and exercising peaceably the ordinary rights of ownership, has a legal right against the entire world except the rightful owner. A decree of possession cannot be passed in favour of the plaintiff on the ground that defendant nos. 1 to 12 have not been able to fully establish their right, title and interest in the Schedule ‘A’ property. The defendants, being in possession, would be entitled to protect and save their possession, unless the person who seeks to dispossess them has a better legal right in the form of ownership or entitlement to possession [Para 30][372- H; 373-A-C]
2. The burden of proof to establish a title in the present case lies upon the plaintiff as this burden lies on the party who asserts the existence of a particular state of things on the basis of which she claims relief. This is mandated in terms of Section 101 of the Evidence Act, which states that burden on proving the fact rests with party who substantially asserts in the affirmative A B C D E F G H and not on the party which is denying it. This rule may not be universal and has exceptions, but in the factual background of the present case, the general principle is applicable. In terms of Section 102 of the Evidence Act, if both parties fail to adduce evidence, the suit must fail. Onus of proof, no doubt shifts and the shifting is a continuous process in the evaluation of evidence, but this happens when in a suit for title and possession, the plaintiff has been able to create a high degree of probability to shift the onus on the defendant. In the absence of such evidence, the burden of proof lies on the plaintiff and can be discharged only when he is able to prove title. The weakness of the defence cannot be a justification to decree the suit. The plaintiff could have succeeded in respect of the Schedule ‘A’ property if she had discharged the burden to prove the title to the Schedule ‘A’ property which squarely falls on her. This would be the true effect of Sections 101 and 102 of the Evidence Act. Therefore, it follows that the plaintiff should have satisfied and discharged the burden under the provisions of the Evidence Act, failing which the suit would be liable to be dismissed. [Para 31][373-C-E; 374-A-C] Poona Ram v. Moti Ram (Dead) through Legal Representatives and Others (2019) 11 SCC 309 : [2019] 1 SCR 671; Nair Service Society Limited v. Rev. Father K.C. Alexander and Others, AIR 1968 SC 1165 : [1968] 3 SCR 163; Anil Rishi v. Gurbaksh Singh, (2006) 5 SCC 558 : [2006] 1 Suppl. SCR 659;
R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami & V.P. Temple and Another (2003) 8 SCC 752 : [2003] 4 Suppl. SCR 450; Union of India and Others v. Vasavi Cooperative Housing Society Limited and Others (2014) 2 SCC 269 : [2014] 1 SCR
SMRITI DEBBARMA (DEAD) THROUGH LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE
v. PRABHA RANJAN DEBBARMA A B C D E F G H 358 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 1 S.C.R.
180 and Sebastiao Luis Fernandes (DEAD) Through LRs.
And Others v. K.V.P. Shastri (DEAD) Through LRs. and Others (2013) 15 SCC 161 : [2013] 11 SCR 1076 – relied on.
Addagada Raghavamma and Another v. Addagada Chenchamma and Another AIR 1964 SC 136 : [1964] 2 SCR 933 – referred to.
Case Law Reference [2019] 1 SCR 671 relied on Para 30 [1968] 3 SCR 163 relied on Para 30 [2006] 1 Suppl. SCR 659 relied on Para 31 [1964] 2 SCR 933 referred to Para 31 [2003] 4 Suppl. SCR 450 relied on Para 31 [2014] 1 SCR 180 relied on Para 31 [2013] 11 SCR 1076 relied on Para 31 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 878 of 2009.
From the Judgment and Order dated 17.05.2006 of the High Court of Gauhati (Agartala Bench) in F.A. No.40 of 1997.
Rauf Rahim, Ali Asghar Rahim, Advs. for the Appellant.
Kedar Nath Tripathy, Dr. P. V. Saravanaraja, P. Veerappan, Anand Kumar V., Advs. for the Respondents.
A B C D E F G H The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SANJIV KHANNA, J.
On 19.06.1986, Smriti Debbarma, as an attorney and on behalf of Maharani Chandratara Devi, had filed Title Suit No. 66 of 1986, inter alia praying for declaration that Maharani Chandratara Devi is the owner of the property known as ‘Khosh Mahal’, described in Schedule ‘A’ to the original plaint, as under:
“ S C H E D U L E - A.
Old Dar Tashkishi Taluk No. 178 (now Agartala Town Sheet No. 3), Khatian No. 4882, Dag Nos. 13142, 13144, 13176/26261 and 13144/51733, commonly known as “Khosh Mahal”, within this land measuring One Kani five Gandas two karas, three kranta and ten dhurs only.”
Other reliefs included a declaration that any transfer/conveyance for and on behalf of the plaintiff made by late Bikramendra Kishore Debbarma1 and his legal representatives, impleaded as defendant nos. 1 to 7 to the civil suit, should be declared illegal and void, and that the defendants and their agents should be restrained from entering, selling or alienating the Schedule ‘A’ property. In addition, the plaintiff had prayed that she has right, title and interest in Schedule ‘B’ property, namely the shares and business of M/s. Hotel Khosh Mahal Limited, Agartala.
2. Post recording of the statement of witnesses, and the report of the Court Surveyor dated 20.01.1995, marked as Exhibit-I, the plaint was amended, and the land mentioned in Schedule ‘A’ was substituted and increased to 2 Kanis 8 Gandas 3 Karas and 8½ Dhurs. Paragraphs 26(A) to 26(D) and paragraphs 27(A) to 27(C) to the plaint were added. The prayer clause was amended to include a direction to the Survey and Settlement authority to delete/expunge the record of rights standing in the name of defendant nos. 8 to 12 as void and inoperative. Prayer for direction to the Director of Settlement and Land Records to issue a record of rights in the name of the plaintiff for the Schedule ‘A’ property, and to confirm the possession of the plaintiff of the Schedule ‘A’ property was made.
3. Earlier, defendant nos. 8 to 12 were impleaded as defendants in the Title Suit vide order dated 15.09.1989. These defendants had 1 Alias “Bidurkarta”.
SMRITI DEBBARMA (DEAD) THROUGH LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE
v. PRABHA RANJAN DEBBARMA A B C D E F G H 360 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 1 S.C.R.
purchased portions of land vide the sale deeds executed by the Managing Director of M/s. Hotel Khosh Mahal Limited. The sale deed in favour of the defendant no.8, marked as Exhibit-E, dated 17.07.1985, is prior to the institution of the suit in question, which was filed on 19.06.1986.
4. Maharani Chandratara Devi was the sixth wife of the late Maharaja Birendra Kishore Debbarma. She was not survived by her children who had predeceased her. Maharani Chandratara Devi did not enter the witness box and depose as a witness. Maharani Chandratara Devi had expired soon after filing of the suit on 27.12.1988.
5. Smriti Debbarma was substituted as the plaintiff, as the legal representative of Maharani Chandratara Devi, who had inherited the Schedule ‘A’ property and other properties in terms of the Will, marked as Exhibit-4, dated 15.10.1985 of Maharani Chandratara Devi. The Will has not been probated, and was disputed by the defendants before the trial court2. Smriti Debbarma, had expired during the pendency of the present appeal and is now represented by her legal representatives.
6. By judgment dated 23.11.1996, the suit was decreed holding that the plaintiff had right, title and interest in the Schedule ‘A’ property, as amended, and the plaintiff was entitled to khas possession of the Schedule ‘A’ property after evicting all the defendants and was entitled to remove all obstructions. Further, any transfer and/or conveyance of any portion of the Schedule ‘A’ property made by late Bidurkarta and defendant nos. 1 to 7 was illegal and void. Directions were issued to make correction in the records of the office of the Sub-Registrar, Municipal Holdings etc. by deleting the names of M/s. Hotel Khosh Mahal Limited and/or defendant nos. 8 to 12, and that the name of the plaintiff should be recorded in all records relating to the Schedule ‘A’ property. The defendants, their agents etc. were restrained from entering into the Schedule ‘A’ property and creating any sort of disturbance in the peaceful possession of the plaintiff over the same. The Survey Report (Exhibit-I) was directed to form part of the decree.
7. However, the trial court did not grant and therefore, is deemed to have rejected the prayer of the plaintiff for a decree in respect of the Schedule ‘B’ property. The plaintiff did not challenge the decree of the 2The trial court accepted the genuineness of the will propounded by Smriti Debbarma. It appears this finding was challenged in the first appeal filed before the High Court of Gauhati and the appeal was allowed, albeit the question of the genuineness of the will has not been examined.
A B C D E F G H trial court dismissing her suit in respect of the Schedule ‘B’ property. Decree of the trial court to this extent has attained finality.
8. The defendants preferred appeals against the decree in respect of the Schedule ‘A’ property before the Gauhati High Court, which have been allowed by the impugned judgment dated 17.05.2006. This judgment of reversal inter alia holds that the plaintiff on the basis of evidence and documents placed on record has not been able to discharge the burden of proof to establish legal ownership and title to the Schedule ‘A’ property. We will elaborate on the evidence and reasons recorded by the High Court subsequently. The judgment also refers to the Tripura Land Revenue and Land Reforms Act which came into force in 1960, and observes that certain rights may have accrued to the state government in respect of the Schedule ‘A’ property. Albeit the High Court clarified that the question pertaining to the right, title and interest of the defendants remains to be adverted, and the defendants could approach the appropriate forum.
9. We would now proceed to examine the averments made in the pleadings, including the plaint, and the evidence led by the parties.
10. The plaint and the claim made by Smriti Debbarma, who had deposed as PW-1, is predicated on the Deed of Patta, marked as Exhibit- 12, executed by Maharaja Durjoy Kishore Debbarma, son of Maharaja Birendra Kishore Debbarma in favour of Bidurkarta on 31.10.1951. Subsequently, Bidurkarta on 25.06.1952 had executed an Ekrarnama, marked as Exhibit-5, acknowledging that the rights granted to him under the Deed of Patta (Exhibit-12) actually belong to Maharani Chandratara Devi. To this extent, there is no dispute.
11. The plaint refers to and accepts that a charter executed by Maharaja Bir Bikram Kishore Debbarma, incorporated a private limited company, on 24.01.1351 Tripura Era3 or 1941 A.D. , namely, M/s. Hotel Khosh Mahal Limited. Further, M/s. Hotel Khosh Mahal Limited, after its incorporation, had acquired huge properties in Agartala town. The plaintiff claims that she is one of the major shareholders of this company. However, there is no evidence or material on record to show the shareholding of Maharani Chandratara Devi in M/s. Hotel Khosh Mahal Limited. As noted above, the plaintiff’s prayer for a decree in respect of shares and business of M/s. Hotel Khosh Mahal Limited was declined 3 For short, “T. E.”.
SMRITI DEBBARMA (DEAD) THROUGH LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE
v. PRABHA RANJAN DEBBARMA [SANJIV KHANNA, J.] A B C D E F G H 362 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 1 S.C.R.
by the trial court, which decree remains unchallenged by the plaintiff and has been accepted. Paragraph 7 of the plaint states that M/s. Hotel Khosh Mahal Limited was established after taking the land and building of Schedule ‘A’ property, which was given on lease by Maharani Chandratara Devi. The lease had expired long back. Date of execution and the term of the lease is not indicated. No lease deed or surrender document was placed on record and proved. Nevertheless, we would record that the plaint accepts that M/s. Hotel Khosh Mahal Limited was in possession of the Schedule ‘A’ property.
12. Maharani Chandratara Devi had appointed Bidurkarta as her attorney vide registered power of attorney executed by her on 29.10.1969 because of her ill-health, old age and religious mentality, and as she used to primarily reside at Varanasi, Haridwar and/or Dehradun. Later on, she cancelled this power of attorney on 06.03.1970 and instituted a civil suit T.S. No. 95/72 in 1972 for cancellation of the registered gift deed executed on 12.01.1970 by Bidurkarta transferring her 1/3rd share of the ‘Rupchaya’ Cinema Hall business to Karnakishore Debbarma and Sahadeb Kishore Debbarma. The suit was decreed on 17.06.1983, and the gift deed was cancelled. The facts stated in this paragraph have been established and proved by the plaintiff.
13. The plaint states that the hotel business of M/s. Hotel Khosh Mahal Limited had closed down due to heavy losses and mismanagement. Thereupon, the land and building were given to M/s. Indian Airlines Corporation Limited. Bidurkarta used to send rent received from the tenant to Maharani Chadratara Devi. However, with the passage of time, the remittances became far and few, and they eventually stopped. Bidurkarta had, in collusion with the defendants, transferred Schedule ‘A’ property and Schedule ‘B’ business to his wife defendant no.1- Jyoti Debbarma. Defendant no.2- Prabha Ranjan Debbarma, son of Bidurkarta, an I.A.S. Officer and a central government employee, would collect monthly rent from M/s. Indian Airlines Corporation Limited, though he had no connection with the Schedule ‘A’ property.
14. The plaint, post the amendment, had claimed that M/s. Indian Airlines Corporation Limited had vacated the property on 30.06.1986. Thereafter, the plaintiff through her workmen and agents had taken possession of the Schedule ‘A’ property and started a guest house under the name and style of ‘M/s. Star Guest House’. However, as the suit A B C D E F G H was dismissed in default4, the defendants took advantage, dispossessed the plaintiff and took possession of the Schedule ‘A’ property. The plaintiff had initiated proceedings under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, in the court of Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Agartala vide Miscellaneous No. 75/86, whereby the defendants were restrained from disturbing the possession of the plaintiff. However, vide order dated 26.08.1986 passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Agartala, a police officer was appointed as a receiver. This action of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Agartala, it is contended, illegal and improper as the plaintiff had already instituted the suit in question.
15. Defendant nos. 1 to 7 in their written statement had relied upon the Deed of Patta, marked as Exhibit-A, executed by Maharaja Durjoy Kishore Debbarma on 11.10.1358 T.E. or 1948 A.D. in favour of M/s. Hotel Khosh Mahal Limited, by which the land admeasuring 3 Kani 8 Gandas 3 Karas and 16½ Dhurs was given on lease for a period of twenty years from 1349 T.E. to 1369 T.E. or 1939 A.D. to 1959 A.D. We shall subsequently refer to the Deed of Patta (Exhibit-A) and also examine the challenge to the genuineness of this document by the plaintiff before this Court. Relying on this document, the written statement pleads that Schedule ‘A’ Property is owned by M/s. Hotel Khosh Mahal Limited. By an agreement dated 25.03.1953, Bidurkarta, as the Managing Director of M/s. Hotel Khosh Mahal Limited, had leased out the business/property to Maharani Chandratara Devi. This lease was terminated in August 1968 and thereafter by a fresh agreement, the business was leased to defendant no. 2 - Prabha Ranjan Debbarma, son of Bidurkarta. M/s. Indian Airlines Corporation Limited had started paying rent to defendant no. 2. These lease deeds, including board resolutions, etc. are not placed on record and proven. The fact that from 1968 onwards rent was paid by M/s Indian Airlines Corporation Limited to defendant no. 2 is accepted by the plaintiff-appellant.
16. Thus, as per defendant nos. 1 to 7, the property in possession and occupation of M/s. Hotel Khosh Mahal Limited is different and distinct from the land, which is the subject matter of the Deed of Patta (Exhibit-12), and which as per the Ekrarnama (Exhibit-5) is owned by Maharani Chandratara Devi.
4The Title Suit No. 66 of 1986 was dismissed in default vide order dated 28.04.1988. A restoration petition in Misc. Case No. 69 of 88 for the Title Suit No. 66 of 1986 was filed by the plaintiff and the Title Suit No. 66 of 1986 was restored vide order dated 13.07.1989, which also disposed of Misc. Case No. 69 of 88.
SMRITI DEBBARMA (DEAD) THROUGH LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE
v. PRABHA RANJAN DEBBARMA [SANJIV KHANNA, J.] A B C D E F G H 364 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 1 S.C.R.
17. Defendant no. 8 had filed a separate written statement and had accepted that he had acquired the land vide registered sale deed dated 17.07.1985, (Exhibit-E), from the Managing Director of M/s. Hotel Khosh Mahal Limited. Defendant no. 8 had thereupon constructed a building to the notice and knowledge of the plaintiff. The plaintiff had at that time neither raised an objection nor claimed right, title or interest over the purchased land. Defendant no. 8 had got his name mutated in the Survey and Settlement office vide Khatian No. 30912, marked as Exhibit-F, dated 16.05.1989. Defendant no. 8 has been in possession of the purchased property.
18. Defendants no. 9 to 11 had similarly submitted that the plaintiff had no right, title, and interest over the Schedule ‘A’ property. They had acquired the right, title and interest over the portions of the Schedule ‘A’ property on the strength of the purchased/sale deed executed by the Managing Director of M/s. Hotel Khosh Mahal Limited. Further, they had got published the record of rights of the land in their favour from the government. Defendant no.11 in his additional written statement had claimed that he was not in possession or owner by way of purchase of any land included in Schedule ‘A’ of the plaint, or the schedule mentioned in the Will (Exhibit-4). Defendant no. 11’s wife had purchased a small piece of land from defendant no. 1, but this land does not fall within any plots mentioned in Schedule ‘A’ of the plaint or the Will (Exhibit-4). Defendants nos. 9 to 11 had questioned the genuineness of the Will (Exhibit-4).
19. The aforesaid narration reveals that there are essentially two interconnected issues which arise for consideration. The first aspect relates to the demarcation of land given on lease vide the Deed of Patta (Exhibit-12) and the Ekrarnama (Exhibit-5), on the basis of which the title suit was filed by Smriti Debbarma as the attorney and on behalf of Maharani Chandratara Devi. The second issue relates to the burden of proof and whether the plaintiff has succeeded in discharging the burden by establishing her title for a declaratory decree of ownership and her right to possession of the Schedule ‘A’ property.
20. The impugned judgment in our opinion has rightly examined the aspect of demarcation and identification of Schedule ‘A’ property viz. the identity of the land mentioned in the Deed of Patta (Exhibit- 12) and the Ekrarnama (Exhibit-5), and upon consideration of the evidence and material on record held that the plaintiff has not been able to establish A B C D E F G H her title and ownership over the Schedule ‘A’ property. We would refer to the reasoning given by the High Court in this regard and add some reasons of our own.
21. First, the Deed of Patta (Exhibit-12) dated 31.10.1951 and the Ekrarnama (Exhibit-5) dated 25.06.1952, demarcate and refer to the property as under:
“ Deed of Patta xx xx xx (Schedule boundaries)
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