Amandeep Singh Saran v. State of Chhattisgarh
- Citation
- 2023 INSC 1028; [2023] 16 S.C.R. 435
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice C.T. Ravikumar, Justice Penal Code, Justice 1860; Exercise of Powers Under Cr.Pc, Justice 1973 – Ss.26, Justice After Commencement of Inquiry Or Trial, Justice Ipc Punishable With Imprisonment for Life Or
- Decided
- 29 Nov 2023
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 2625/2023
- Sections
- 409, 26, 12, 323, 29, 31, 29(1), 34, 300(1), 300, 138, 2
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:27 am. Original source ↗
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[2023] 16 S.C.R. 435 : 2023 INSC 1028
CASE DETAILS
AMANDEEP SINGH SARAN
v.
STATE OF CHHATTISGARH
(Criminal Appeal No. 2625 of 2023)
NOVEMBER 29, 2023
[C.T. RAVIKUMAR AND SUDHANSHU DHULIA, JJ.]
HEADNOTES
Issue for consideration: Conduct of the trial for offence under Section 409, Penal Code, 1860; exercise of powers under Cr.PC, for committal of cases to the Court of competent jurisdiction.
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – ss.26, 29, 12, 323; First Schedule to CrPC – Penal Code, 1860 – s.409 – Courts by which offences are triable – Procedure when, after commencement of inquiry or trial, Magistrate finds case should be committed– Appellant charged for commission of various offences including u/s.409, IPC punishable with imprisonment for life or imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to 10 years and fine and under two other enactments – Facing trial before the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, not competent to impose a corporeal sentence of imprisonment beyond 7 years – Appellant had already undergone incarceration for more than 8 years – Parties ad idem that the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate is not competent to try the offence u/s.409, IPC:
Held: True that going by the First Schedule to Cr.PC an offence u/s.409, IPC is triable by a ‘Court of the Magistrate of the First Class’ – Nonetheless, it is the indubitable position revealed from the very text of s.26 itself that the said Section and the First Schedule to Cr. PC enumerating the Courts by which different off ences could be tried, are controlled by the other provisions of Cr.PC, as the Section itself opens with the phrase, “subject to the other provisions of this Code” – The First Schedule to Cr.PC, when lies in conflict with the other specific provisions under the Cr.PC must give way to such other provisions 436 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 16 S.C.R.
under the Cr.PC – ‘Magistrate of the First Class’ and ‘Any Magistrate’ used in the explanatory note No. (2) in the First Schedule not only takes in ‘Metropolitan Magistrates’ but also takes in ‘Chief Judicial Magistrates’ as explicit from s.12, Cr.PC – The trial of the appellant is to be conducted before a Court of Session having jurisdiction over the area in question – As relates to an offence u/s.409 IPC, going by the First Schedule to Cr.PC, it is triable by Court of a Magistrate of the First Class and since that expression takes in the Court of a Chief Judicial Magistrate – A scanning of the provisions u/s.323, CrPC would show that in any inquiry or trial before a Magistrate, “which expression would take in the Chief Judicial Magistrate as well”, it appears to him at any stage of the proceedings before signing the judgment that the case is one which ought to be tried by the Court of Session, it should commit to that Court before signing the judgment, the power u/s.323, CrPC is available to be exercised – Under normal circumstances, it was desirable to direct the Court of the Magistrate concerned to exercise the power after due consideration – However, in view of the peculiar circumstances of this case, that the maximum penalty imposable by the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate is imprisonment not exceeding 7 years, taking into account the fact that the appellant had already undergone incarceration for more than 8 years, order passed for his release on bail and the fact that only 10 out of 86 witnesses on the side of the prosecution have been examined, Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Raipur to commit the case under trial against the appellant to the Court of Session to which he is subordinate, to enable that Court to conduct the trial in the said case – Court of Session concerned shall proceed with the trial of the case in accordance with law under Chapter XVIII, Cr. PC – Constitution of India – Article 21 – Prize Chits and Money Circulation Schemes (Banning) Act, 1978 – Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. [Paras 11, 12, 26, 27] Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973– Explanatory Note No. (2) in the First schedule to Cr.PC; ss.3(1)(c), 12:
Held: Expressions ‘Magistrate of the First Class’ and ‘Any Magistrate’ used in the First schedule to Cr.PC, include ‘Chief Judicial Magistrates’ as well – Any contra-construction would lead to a situation denuding the status of ‘trial Court’ to a Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate and in other words, any such contra-construction would tantamount to a declaration that as per the First Schedule to Cr. PC no offence is triable by a Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate. [Paras 15, 16] Criminal Law – Object of Penology – Discussed.
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – ss.3(1)(c), 29, 31:
Held: In the Cr.PC, there is no provision to empower a Court of a Chief Judicial Magistrate or Court of a Magistrate of the first class to pass any sentence not authorized u/s.29 (1) or 29 (2), Cr.PC, as the case may be – s.31, Cr. PC deals with sentence in cases on conviction of several offences at one trial and needless to say that this provision would not cloth power on a Magistrate to bypass the provision u/s.29(1) or 29(2), Cr.PC in respect of imposing sentence in any given offence upon conviction of the offender and, therefore, it is different from s.34 of the old Code, 1898. [Para 18] Constitution of India – Article 21 – Speedy trial, a facet of fair trial – Necessity of – Discussed.
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.300(1):
Held: In the light of the provision u/s.300 (1), Cr. PC, an accused is having a right to claim to be tried (if he were to be tried) before a Court of competent jurisdiction because acquittal or conviction by a Court lacking competence would not be a bar for a second trial – Maxims - ‘Nemo Debet Bis Vexari’.[Para 20] Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – First Schedule to CrPC, surveyed – Court of competence in the hierarchy of Courts empowered to try a particular offence where imprisonment for life or imprisonment for 10 years and fine is prescribed:
Held : Barring very few offences including s.409, IPC, in all cases, where the offence concerned is punishable with imprisonment for life or imprisonment for 10 years and fine, the First Schedule to Cr. PC provides the Court competent to try such offences as “Court of Session” – Barring some exceptions, it is essentially the severity of the punishment imposable and severe nature of the offence that acts as the decisive factor in the matter of fixing the forum in the hierarchy of Courts, for trying the different offences. [Paras 21, 24] AMANDEEP SINGH SARAN v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH 438 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 16 S.C.R.
LIST OF CITATIONS AND OTHER REFERENCES
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR (1978) SC 597: [1978] 2 SCR 621; Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, AIR (1992) SC 1701: [1991] 3 Suppl. SCR 325; Budhan Choudhry v. State of Bihar, AIR (1955) SC 191: [1955] 1 SCR 1045 – followed.
Hussainara Khatoon and Ors. v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, (1980) 1 SCC 81: [1979] 3 SCR 169; Nirmal Singh Kahlon v. State of Punjab and Ors., (2009) 1 SCC 441: [2008] 14 SCR 1049 – referred to.
OTHER CASE DETAILS INCLUDING IMPUGNED
ORDER AND APPEARANCES
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.2625 of 2023.
From the Judgment and Order dated 18.04.2019 of the High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur in MCRC No.1730 of 2019.
Appearances:
Varinder Kumar Sharma, Adv. for the Appellant.
Sourbh Roy, Ld. AAG, Sumeer Sodhi, Prabudh Singh, Yash Gupta, Advs. for the Respondent.
JUDGMENT / ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT
JUDGMENT
C. T. RAVIKUMAR, J.
1. This appeal by special leave directed against the order dated 18.04.2019 passed by the High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur in MCRC No.1730/2019, owing to various circumstances including the inordinate delay occasioned in the matter of trial, now, poses a legal conundrum. The appellant is facing trial before the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Raipur in criminal case arising from FIR No.22/2015 of Police Station, New Rajendra Nagar, Raipur in the State of Chhattisgarh, registered under Sections 420, 409/34 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred for short ‘IPC’) and Sections 3 and 4 of the Prize Chits and Money Circulation Schemes (Banning) Act, 1978 (for short ‘the Banning Act’) and Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. In terms of Section 29(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short ‘Cr.PC’) the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Raipur where the case is now pending can only impose, in case found him guilty, a maximum corporeal punishment of a term up to 7 years even if it is of the view that the appellant deserves more severe punishment. We may hasten to clarify here that we shall not be understood to have expressed an opinion that the appellant deserves to be convicted and handed down such a sentence. Even the question whether he should be convicted or acquitted is a matter of evidence and to be decided by the trial Court, on appreciation of evidence, at the appropriate stage of trial. But then, by now the appellant had already undergone incarceration for a term of more than eight years. We do not think it just or appropriate to treat this situation as a mere happenstance and leave it there for the appellant to get resolved or remedied later. Taking note of the scope of the SLP this Court, normally, would be loath to permit the parties to submit beyond the question whether to grant or not to grant bail, but the very peculiar circumstances involved and also evolved tends us to think that disinclination to go into the legal conundrum emerging in this case may result in great miscarriage of justice in all probabilities. It is also to be noted that both sides submit and pray that appropriate orders be passed to ensure a fair trial by a court of competent jurisdiction. In such circumstances, the parties were heard in extenso.
2. We have heard Mr. Varinder Kumar Sharma, learned counsel for the appellant, Mr. Sourbh Roy, learned Additional Advocate General and Mr. Sumeer Sodhi, learned counsel for the respondent State.
3. We have already noted that the appellant herein has been charged for commission of various offences under the IPC including indictment under Section 409, IPC punishable with imprisonment for life or imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to 10 years and fine and under the stated provisions of the two enactments mentioned hereinbefore. Essentially, taking into account the fact that the appellant had already undergone incarceration for more than 8 years as per order dated 02.08.2023, this Court called for an affidavit from the respondent-State as to the steps taken to apprehend the other absconding accused and also indicating the stage of trial proceedings as on date.
AMANDEEP SINGH SARAN v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH [C. T. RAVIKUMAR, J.] 440 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 16 S.C.R.
4. In compliance with the directions in the order dated 02.08.2023, the respondent-State filed an additional affidavit. It is stated therein that with respect to the illegal Collective Investment Scheme (CIS), being run by M/s HBN Dairies and Allied Limited, the appellant and other Directors indulged in collection of huge sums of money from around 97,707 investors under false assurances and then failed to return the amount upon maturity. Two First Information Reports, including the present one being FIR No.22 of 2015 were registered. As relates the appellant herein, it is stated therein that after registration of the FIR he was absconding and was arrested by the Bureau of Immigration on 02.02.2015 from the Indira Gandhi International Airport, New Delhi. It is further stated therein that chargesheet was filed in the case on 15.10.2015 and currently the matter is at the stage of prosecution evidence where 10 witnesses had been examined and 76 more witnesses are yet to be examined. Thus, it is evident that though the chargesheet was laid on 15.10.2015 by now only 10 out of the 86 prosecution witnesses alone were examined and the appellant had already undergone incarceration for more than 8 years. There can be no doubt with respect to the object of penology that is to protect the society against the criminals and in other words, for imposition of appropriate, adequate, just and proportionate sentence commensurate with the nature and gravity of the crime and the manner of its commission, in case of conviction. Having said this, we cannot be oblivious of the rights of the accused as well. In the circumstances expatiated above, the question is how long the appellant-accused should carry the tag of “accused”? But, certainly, taking into account the legal and factual circumstances the appellant has to stand the trial.
5. Puzzling legal issues arise for consideration in the instant case in view of the attending circumstances as also the various provisions under the IPC, Cr.PC and also in view of various relevant decisions of this Court. Before delving into those aspects, we think it only appropriate to refer to the necessity of speedy trial which is a facet of fair trial, taking into account the fact that in the case on hand by now the appellant had already undergone incarceration for more than 8 years whereas the Court before which his matter is now facing trial is not competent to impose a corporeal sentence of imprisonment beyond 7 years. The requirement of a speedy trial assumes a new gloss with the verdict in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India1. Thereafter, this Court issued guidelines in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak2 for the speedy trial of cases. It was held therein that fair, just and reasonable procedure implicit in Article 21 of the Constitution of India creates a right in the accused to be tried speedily. The concern underlying the right to speedy trial from the point of view of the accused was also highlighted therein and one of the aspects of concern is as under:- “The period of remand and pre-conviction detention should be as short as possible. The accused should not be subjected to unnecessary or unduly long incarceration prior to his conviction.”
6. The factual narration made hereinbefore regarding the period of incarceration underwent by the appellant and the punitive jurisdictional limit of the Court where the case of the appellant is under trial at present, would reveal the non-adherence, rather, the failure to follow the guidelines issued by this Court for the speedy trial of an accused. In view of certain relevant provisions under the Cr.PC and IPC, to be referred to hereafter, and the factual scenario of the case on hand, a formative analysis capable of formulating clues/guidelines to avoid recurrence of similar situations, is required.
7. A reference to Section 300 (1) Cr. PC, which lays down that a person once convicted or acquitted cannot be tried for the same offence, will not be inappropriate in the matter of such a formative analysis, as mentioned above. This law based on the maxim ‘Nemo Debet Bis Vexari’ is founded on the condition that the initial trial must be by a Court of competent jurisdiction for the offences concerned. We are afraid, in the scenario now obtained if this Court is not passing appropriate directions, the appellant accused may have to face fresh trial or prolonged proceedings even after the conclusion of proceedings before the Court where the matter is presently pending. To know the raison d’etre for our remark, one may have to refer to various provisions of law, including the provisions referred infra:
8. Chapter III, Cr. PC deals with 3 topics idest.,
1 AIR 1978 SC 597
2 AIR 1992 SC 1701
AMANDEEP SINGH SARAN v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH [C. T. RAVIKUMAR, J.] 442 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 16 S.C.R.
(i) Courts by which offences are triable;
(ii) The sentences which these courts can pass including passing of sentence in case of conviction of several offences at one trial; and
(iii) Modes of conferring of powers on and withdrawal of powers from the persons or officials by the High Court and the State Government.
9. Section 26, Cr.PC, in so far as it is relevant reads thus:- “26. Courts by which offences are triable.—Subject to the other provisions of this Code,—
(a) any offence under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) may be tried by−
(i) the High Court, or
(ii) the Court of Session, or
(iii) any other Court by which such offence is shown in the First Schedule to be triable;…”
(underline supplied)
10. Thus, going by the First Schedule to Cr. PC, an offence under Section 409, IPC is triable by “Magistrate of the first class”. It is in this context that the phrase ‘subject to the other provisions of this code’ appearing in Section 26 of Cr.PC, and its impact on the ‘First Schedule to Cr.PC’ invites serious discourse. As noted above, offence under Section 409, IPC is punishable with imprisonment for life or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to 10 years and also with fine. However, sub-section (1) of Section 29, Cr.PC, limits the power of punishment of the Court of a Chief Judicial Magistrate and it empowers the Court to pass any sentence short of a sentence of death or imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term exceeding 7 years. Sub-section 2 thereof provides that Court of a Magistrate of the First Class may pass a sentence of imprisonment for a term not exceeding 3 years or of fine exceeding 10,000/- Rupees or of both. Evidently, in this case, after completion of the investigation a report under Section 173 (2), Cr. PC was filed before the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, not merely by taking note of the accusation of having committed offence under Section 409 IPC, but owing to Section 9 of the Banning Act. Though the chargesheet was filed on 15.10.2015 the trial has progressed only upto the stage of examination of only a very few prosecution witnesses and in the meanwhile, the appellant had to remain in custody as an undertrial prisoner for more than 8 years which period is indisputably in excess of the maximum term of imprisonment imposable by a Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate. The disturbing fact is that even then the stage of prosecution evidence has reached only up to the examination of 10 out of 86 witnesses of the prosecution. The trial if permitted to continue in the Court where the appellant is presently under trial, may, in all the aforesaid circumstances, lead to a situation enabling either of the parties to contend that it was not a fair trial. On acquittal or conviction, either of the parties may call in question the verdict on the ground that it was conducted before a Court lacking competence to try the offence under Section 409, IPC as both the parties are ad idem on the point that the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate is not competent to try the offence under Section 409, IPC. If ultimately, for any reason it is found that the trial was not before a Court of competent jurisdiction the appellant may again have to face fresh trial in view of the position obtained under Section 300(1), Cr.P.C. It is taking into account all the aforesaid circumstances that we made the initial remark. At this juncture, we may have to make a mention about the decision of this Court in Hussainara Khatoon and Ors. v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar3 where this Court, not only held that an accused got a right to fair trial but also that he got a fundamental right for speedy trial of his case because a speedy trial is an integral and essential part of fundamental right to life and liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. It is equally relevant to refer to the decision of this Court in Nirmal Singh Kahlon v. State of Punjab and Ors.4. In the said decision this Court held that both the accused and victim of a crime have right to fair trial and that fair investigation and fair trial are concomitant to preservation of the fundamental right of an accused under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. In short, in the case on hand, in order to have a fair trial, fair to both sides,
3 (1980) 1 SCC 81
4 (2009) 1 SCC 441
AMANDEEP SINGH SARAN v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH [C. T. RAVIKUMAR, J.] 444 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 16 S.C.R.
and to do complete justice between the parties, we think it only appropriate to proceed with consideration of the joint submission of the parties that the case pending before the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Raipur is liable to be committed to the Court of Session having jurisdiction over the area in question.
11. Now, we will proceed to consider how to resolve these peculiar and puzzling circumstances so as to make a fair trial possible. We have already referred to Section 26, Cr.PC. Sub- clause (ii) of clause (a) thereof would reveal that a Court of Session has the power to try any offence under the IPC subject to the rider specified and sub-clause (iii) thereof would reveal that any other Court inferior in rank to a Court of Session can try only offences shown in the First schedule to the Cr.PC as triable by it. True that going by the First Schedule to Cr.PC an offence under Section 409, IPC is triable by a ‘Court of the Magistrate of the First Class’. Nonetheless, it is the indubitable position revealed from the very text of Section 26 itself that the said Section and the First Schedule to Cr. PC enumerating the Courts by which different offences could be tried, are controlled by the other provisions of Cr.PC. We say so because the very Section itself opens with the phrase, “subject to the other provisions of this Code.” Our view will get support from the decision of a Seven Judge Bench of this Court in Budhan Choudhry v. State of Bihar5, where taking note of the fact that Section 28 under the old Code, 1898 (corresponding to Section 26, Cr.PC) begins with the clause ‘subject to the other provisions of the code’ it was held that it would mean that the Section and the Second Schedule of the Code (old Code, 1898) are controlled by the other provisions of the Code. It was held therein thus:- “6….
*** *** *** *** *** It will be noticed that Section 28 begins with the clause “subject to the other provisions of this Code”. This means that the Section and the Second Schedule referred to therein are controlled by the other provisions of the Code including the provisions of Section 30. Further, the text of Section 30 itself quite clearly says that its provisions will
5 AIR 1955 SC 191
operate “notwithstanding anything contained in Section 28 or Section 29”. Therefore, the provisions of Section 28 and the Second Schedule must give way to the provisions of Section 30.
*** *** *** *** ***”
12. Following the same analogy, despite the absence of a provision under Section 30 of the old Code in ‘Cr.PC’, it can safely be said that the First Schedule to Cr.PC, when lies in conflict with the other specific provisions under the Cr.PC must give way to such other provisions under the Cr.PC.
13. Now, we will refer to the other relevant provisions. Section 3(1) (c), Cr.PC, reads thus:- “Section 3 (1). In this code, -
(a) …………………………………………
(i) ……………………………..
(ii) ………………………………
(b) ………………………………………….
(c) Any reference to a Magistrate of the first class shall,-
(i) In relation to a metropolitan area, be construed as a reference to a Metropolitan Magistrate exercising jurisdiction in that area;
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