Cox and Kings Ltd. v. Sap India Pvt. Ltd. & Anr.
- Citation
- 2023 INSC 1051; [2023] 15 S.C.R. 621
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 5 Judges: Justice D.Y. Chandrachud, Justice Hrishikesh Roy, Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, Justice J.B. Pardiwala, Justice 1996. Earlier, Justice Where A Three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court Had Read the Said Doctrine
- Decided
- 6 Dec 2023
- Case number
- ARBITRATION PETITION No. 38/2020
- Sections
- 45, 7, 2(1), 9, 8, 11, 7(4), 11(6), 11(12), 7(5), 13, 44
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:27 am. Original source ↗
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[2023] 15 S.C.R. 621 : 2023 INSC 1051
COX AND KINGS LTD.
v.
SAP INDIA PVT. LTD. & ANR.
(Arbitration Petition (Civil) No. 38 of 2020)
DECEMBER 06, 2023
[DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, CJI,
HRISHIKESH ROY, PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA,
J B PARDIWALA AND MANOJ MISRA, JJ.]
HEADNOTES
Issues for consideration:
The primary issue for consideration of the present Constitution Bench of Five Judges was determination of the validity of the ‘Group of companies doctrine’ in Indian arbitration jurisprudence and its applicability to proceedings under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Earlier, the Group of Companies doctrine had been adopted and applied in Indian arbitration jurisprudence in Chloro Controls case, where a three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court had read the said doctrine into the phrase “claiming through or under” in Section 45 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The ‘Group of companies doctrine’ provides that an arbitration agreement which is entered into by a company within a group of companies may bind non-signatory affiliates, if the circumstances are such as to demonstrate the mutual intention of the parties to bind both signatories and non-signatories. This doctrine was called into question purportedly on the ground that it interfered with the established legal principles such as party autonomy, privity of contract, and separate legal personality. Also, there were ancillary issues such as: (i) whether the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 allows joinder of a non-signatory as a party to an arbitration agreement; (ii) whether Section 7 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 allows for determination of an intention to arbitrate on the basis of the conduct of the parties; and (iii) interpretation of the phrase “claiming through or under” appearing under Sections 8, 35 and 45 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
Ed. Note: Hon’ble Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, CJI pronounced judgment on behalf of his Lordship, Hon’ble Mr. Justice Hrishikesh Roy, Hon’ble Mr. Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Manoj Misra. Hon’ble Mr. Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha pronounced a separate concurring judgment.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.622 Arbitration – Arbitration agreement – Consent as the basis for arbitration:
Held (per Dr. Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI) (for himself, Hrishikesh Roy, J B Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ.): Consensus ad idem between the parties forms the essential basis to constitute a valid arbitration agreement – Since consent forms the cornerstone of arbitration, a nonsignatory cannot be forcibly made a “party” to an arbitration agreement as doing so would violate the sacrosanct principles of privity of contract and party autonomy. [Paras 60, 63] Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – s.2(1)(h) r/w s.7 – Definition of “parties”:
Held (per Dr. Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI) (for himself, Hrishikesh Roy, J B Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ.): The definition of “parties” under Section 2(1)(h) read with Section 7 of the Arbitration Act includes both the signatory as well as non-signatory parties. [Para 165] Arbitration – Parties to an arbitration Agreement – Method to figure out:
Held (per Dr. Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI) (for himself, Hrishikesh Roy, J B Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ.): The signature of a party on the agreement is the most profound expression of the consent of a person or entity to submit to the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal – However, the corollary that persons or entities who have not signed the agreement are not bound by it may not always be correct – The issue of who is a “party” to an arbitration agreement is primarily an issue of consent. [Para 66] Words and Phrases – Arbitration agreement – Term “nonsignatories” – Meaning of:
Held (per Dr. Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI) (for himself, Hrishikesh Roy, J B Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ.): The term “nonsignatories”, instead of the traditional “third parties”, seems the most suitable to describe situations where consent to arbitration is expressed through means other than signature – A non-signatory is a person or entity that is implicated in a dispute which is the subject matter of an arbitration, although it has not formally entered into an arbitration agreement – Nonsignatories, by virtue of their relationship with the signatory parties and active involvement in the performance of commercial obligations which are intricately linked to the subject matter, are not actually strangers to the dispute between the signatory parties. [Paras 66, 127] Arbitration – Group of companies doctrine in Indian arbitration jurisprudence – Relevance –Doctrines / Principles:
Held (per Dr. Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI) (for himself, Hrishikesh Roy, J B Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ.): The group of companies doctrine is a consent-based doctrine which has been applied, for identifying the real intention of the parties to bind a non-signatory to an arbitration agreement – The group of companies doctrine should be retained in the Indian arbitration jurisprudence considering its utility in determining the intention of the parties in the context of complex transactions involving multiple parties and multiple agreements. [Paras 81, 165] Corporate Law – Principle of corporate separateness – Separate legal personality:
Held (per Dr. Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI) (for himself, Hrishikesh Roy, J B Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ.): The entities within a corporate group have separate legal personality, which cannot be ignored save in exceptional circumstances such as fraud – The distinction between a parent company and its subsidiary is fundamental, and cannot be easily abridged by taking recourse to economic convenience – Legally, the rights and liabilities of a parent company cannot be transferred to the subsidiary company, and vice versa, unless, there is a strong legal basis for doing so – The underlying basis for the application of the group of companies doctrine rests on maintaining the corporate separateness of the group companies while determining the common intention of the parties to bind the non-signatory party to the arbitration agreement. [Paras 89, 165] Arbitration – Group of companies doctrine – Adopting a pragmatic approach to consent:
Held (per Dr. Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI) (for himself, Hrishikesh Roy, J B Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ.): Corporate structures may take the form of groups based on equity, joint ventures, and informal alliances – In the context of arbitration law, the challenge arises when COX AND KINGS LTD. v. SAP INDIA PVT. LTD. & ANR.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.624 only one member of the group signs the arbitration agreement, to the exclusion of other members – Should the non-signatories be excluded from the arbitration proceedings, even though they were implicated in the dispute which forms the subject matter of arbitration? – As a response to this challenge, arbitration law has developed and adopted the group of companies doctrine, to allow or compel a non-signatory party to be bound by an arbitration agreement – The group of companies doctrine is applied to ascertain the intentions of the parties by analysing the factual circumstances surrounding the contractual arrangements. [Paras 96 and 97] Arbitration – Group of companies doctrine – International perspectives – Precedents on applicability of the doctrine in France, England, Switzerland, Singapore and the USA – Discussed:
Held (per Dr. Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI) (for himself, Hrishikesh Roy, J B Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ.): The international jurisdictions, in some form or the other, have moved beyond the formalistic requirement of consent to bind a non-signatory to an arbitration agreement – The issue of binding a non-signatory to an arbitration agreement is more of a fact-specific aspect – In jurisdictions such as France and Switzerland, there is a broad consensus that consent or subjective intention of a non-signatory to arbitrate may be proved by conduct – Such subjective intention could be derived from the objective evidence in the form of participation of the nonsignatory in the negotiation, performance, or termination of the underlying contract containing the arbitration agreement – However, the group of companies doctrine has not been universally accepted by all jurisdictions – In jurisdictions such as France where the doctrine has gained acceptance, group of companies is one of the several factors that a court or tribunal considers to determine the mutual intention of all the parties to join the nonsignatory to the arbitration agreement. [Para 58] Arbitration – Group of companies doctrine, a fact based doctrine:
Held (per Dr. Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI) (for himself, Hrishikesh Roy, J B Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ.): The existence of a group of companies is a factual element that the court or tribunal has to consider when analysing the consent of the parties – It inevitably adds an extra layer of criteria to an exercise which at its core is preponderant on determining the consent of the parties in case of complex transactions involving multiple parties and agreements. [Para 102] Arbitration – Group of companies doctrine – Mutual intention of all the parties to bind the non-signatory to the arbitration agreement – The determination of mutual intention:
Held (per Dr. Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI) (for himself, Hrishikesh Roy, J B Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ.): The primary test to apply the group of companies doctrine is by determining the intention of the parties on the basis of the underlying factual circumstances – The application of the group of companies doctrine will serve to stymie satellite litigation by non-signatory members of the corporate group, thereby ensuring the efficacy of the agreement between the parties – Avoiding multiplicity of proceedings and fragmentation of disputes is certainly in the interests of justice –However, it can never be the sole consideration to invoke the group of companies doctrine. [Para 109] Arbitration – Group of companies doctrine – Applicability – Threshold standard of evidence:
Held (per Dr. Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI) (for himself, Hrishikesh Roy, J B Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ.): In Discovery Enterprises case, the Supreme Court refined and clarified the cumulative factors that the courts and tribunals should consider in deciding whether a company within a group of companies is bound by the arbitration agreement – All the cumulative factors laid down in Discovery Enterprises case must be considered while determining the applicability of the group of companies doctrine – However, the application of the above factors has to be fact-specific, and onecannot tie the hands of the courts or tribunals by laying down how much weightage they ought to give to the above factors – The principle of single economic unit cannot be the sole basis for invoking the group of companies doctrine. [Paras 110, 128 and 165] Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – ss.8 and 45 – Phrase “claiming through or under” as appearing under ss.8 and 45 of the Arbitration Act – Party to arbitration agreement and Persons COX AND KINGS LTD. v. SAP INDIA PVT. LTD. & ANR.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.626 “claiming through or under” a party to the arbitration agreement are different:
Held (per Dr. Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI) (for himself, Hrishikesh Roy, J B Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ.): A person “claiming through or under” is asserting their legal demand or cause of action in an intermediate or derivative capacity – A person “claiming through or under” has inferior or subordinate rights in comparison to the party from which it is deriving its claim or right – Therefore, a person “claiming through or under” cannot be a “party” to an arbitration agreement on its own terms because it only stands in the shoes of the original signatory party – Under the Arbitration Act, the concept of a “party” is distinct and different from the concept of “persons claiming through or under” a party to the arbitration agreement – The persons “claiming through or under” can only assert a right in a derivative capacity. [Paras 137, 165] Words and Phrases – “Claiming through or under”; “claim”;
“through” and “claiming under”. [Para 137] Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – s.9 – Power of the Courts to issue directions u/s.9:
Held (per Dr. Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI) (for himself, Hrishikesh Roy, J B Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ.): The group of companies doctrine is based on determining the mutual intention to join the non-signatory as a “veritable” party to the arbitration agreement – Once a tribunal comes to the determination that a non-signatory is a party to the arbitration agreement, such non-signatory party can apply for interim measures under s.9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. [Para 153] Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – ss.8 and 11 – Standard of determination at the referral stage – Stage of applicability of the group of companies doctrine under the Arbitration Act:
Held (per Dr. Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI) (for himself, Hrishikesh Roy, J B Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ.): When a nonsignatory person or entity is arrayed as a party at Section 8 or Section 11 stage, the referral court should prima facie determine the validity or existence of the arbitration agreement, as the case may be, and leave it for the arbitral tribunal to decide whether the non-signatory is bound by the arbitration agreement – At the referral stage, the referral court should leave it for the arbitral tribunal to decide whether the non-signatory is bound by the arbitration agreement. [Paras 163, 165] Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – s.7 – Requirement of a written arbitration agreement u/s.7 – Effect:
Held (per Dr. Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI) (for himself, Hrishikesh Roy, J B Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ.): The requirement of a written arbitration agreement u/s.7 does not exclude the possibility of binding non-signatory parties. [Para 165] Arbitration – Group of companies doctrine – Whether the principle of alter ego or piercing the corporate veil can be the basis for application of the group of companies doctrine:
Held (per Dr. Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI) (for himself, Hrishikesh Roy, J B Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ.): The principle of alter ego disregards the corporate separateness and the intentions of the parties in view of the overriding considerations of equity and good faith – In contrast, the group of companies doctrine facilitates the identification of the intention of the parties to determine the true parties to the arbitration agreement without disturbing the legal personality of the entity in question – The principle of alter ego or piercing the corporate veil cannot be the basis for the application of the group of companies doctrine. [Paras 104, 165] Arbitration – Group of companies doctrine – Factors to be considered for application of the doctrine – Conduct of the nonsignatory parties – Relevance:
Held (per Dr. Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI) (for himself, Hrishikesh Roy, J B Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ.): The participation of the non-signatory in the performance of the underlying contract is the most important factor to be considered by the courts and tribunals – The intention of the parties to be bound by an arbitration agreement can be gauged from the circumstances that surround the participation of the non-signatory party in the negotiation, performance, and termination of the underlying contract containing such agreement – The non-signatory’s participation in the negotiation, performance, or termination of the contract can give rise to the implied consent of it being bound by the contract – Conduct of the COX AND KINGS LTD. v. SAP INDIA PVT. LTD. & ANR.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.628 non-signatory parties could be an indicator of their consent to be bound by the arbitration agreement. [Paras 118, 125 and 165] Arbitration – Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – s.2(1)(h) and s.7 – Group of companies doctrine – Has independent existence: Held (per Dr. Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI) (for himself, Hrishikesh Roy, J B Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ.): The group of companies doctrine has an independent existence as a principle of law which stems from a harmonious reading of s.2(1)(h) along with s.7 of the Arbitration Act. [Para 165] Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Group of Companies doctrine – In Chloro Controls case, a three Judge Bench of Supreme Court read the said doctrine into the phrase “claiming through or under” in s.45 of the Arbitration Act – Challenge to.
Held (per Dr. Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI) (for himself, Hrishikesh Roy, J B Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ.): The approach of the Supreme Court in Chloro Controls case to the extent that it traced the group of companies doctrine to the phrase “claiming through or under” is erroneous and against the well-established principles of contract law and corporate law. [Para 165] Arbitration – Group of companies doctrine – Applicability – Non-signatory, if party to arbitration agreement – Determination – Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – s.7(4)(b).
Held (per Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, J.) (Concurring with Dr. Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI): An agreement to refer disputes to arbitration must be in a written form, as against an oral agreement, but need not be signed by the parties – Under s.7(4)(b), a court or arbitral tribunal will determine whether a non-signatory is a party to an arbitration agreement by interpreting the express language employed by the parties in the record of agreement, coupled with surrounding circumstances of the formation, performance, and discharge of the contract – While interpreting and constructing the contract, courts or tribunals may adopt well-established principles, which aid and assist proper adjudication and determination – The Group of Companies doctrine is one such principle. [Para 56] Arbitration – Group of companies doctrine – Arbitration agreement – Ascertaining the intention of the non-signatory.
Held (per Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, J.) (Concurring with Dr. Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI): The Group of Companies doctrine is also premised on ascertaining the intention of the non-signatory to be party to an arbitration agreement – The doctrine requires the intention to be gathered from additional factors such as direct relationship with the signatory parties, commonality of subject-matter, composite nature of the transaction, and performance of the contract. [Para 56] Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – s.7(4)(b) – Inquiry by a court or arbitral tribunal under s.7(4)(b) and Group of companies doctrine.
Held (per Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, J.) (Concurring with Dr. Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI): Since the purpose of inquiry by a court or arbitral tribunal u/s.7(4)(b) and the Group of Companies doctrine is the same, the doctrine can be subsumed within s.7(4)(b) to enable a court or arbitral tribunal to determine the true intention and consent of the nonsignatory parties to refer the matter to arbitration – The doctrine is subsumed within the statutory regime of s.7(4)(b) for the purpose of certainty and systematic development of law. [Para 56] Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – ss.2(1)(h), 7, 8 and 45 – Expression “claiming through or under” in ss.8 and 45 – Difference from expression ‘party’ in s.2(1)(h) and 7.
Held (per Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, J.) (Concurring with Dr. Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI): The expression “claiming through or under” in ss.8 and 45 is intended to provide a derivative right; and it does not enable a non-signatory to become a party to the arbitration agreement – The decision in Chloro Controls tracing the Group of Companies doctrine through the phrase “claiming through or under” in ss.8 and 45 is erroneous – The expression ‘party’ in s.2(1)
(h) and s.7 is distinct from “persons claiming through or under them”. [Para 56] COX AND KINGS LTD. v. SAP INDIA PVT. LTD. & ANR.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.630
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Cheran Properties Ltd v. Kasturi and Sons Ltd. (2018) 16 SCC 413 : [2018] 4 SCR 1063; Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd. v. Canara Bank (2020) 12 SCC 767 : [2019] 11 SCR 660; Sukanya Holdings (P) Ltd v. Jayesh H Pandya (2003) 5 SCC 531 : [2003] 3 SCR 558; Indowind Energy Ltd v. Wescare (I) Ltd. (2010) 5 SCC 306 : [2010] 5 SCR 284; Bhaven Construction v. Executive Engineer, Sardar Sarovar Narmada Nigam Ltd. (2022) 1 SCC 75; Sumitomo Corporation v. CDC Financial Services (Mauritius) Ltd, (2008) 4 SCC 91 : [2008] 3 SCR 309; S N Prasad v. Monnet Finance Ltd. (2011) 1 SCC 320 : [2010] 13 SCR 207; Ameet Lalchand Shah v. Rishabh Enterprises, (2018) 15 SCC 678 : [2018] 6 SCR 1001; Reckitt Benckiser (India) Private Limited v. Reynders Label Printing India Private Limited, (2019) 7 SCC 62 : [2019] 8 SCR 966; Bharat Aluminium Company v Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services, (2016) 4 SCC 126 : [2016] 1 SCR 364; Satish Kumar v. Surinder Kumar [1969] 2 SCR 244; Bihar State Mineral Development Corporation v. Encon Builders (I) Pvt. Ltd. (2003) 7 SCC 418 : [2003] 2 Suppl. SCR 81; Dhulabhai v. State of Madhya Pradesh [1968] 3 SCR 662; Vidya Drolia v. Durga Trading Corporation, (2021) 2 SCC 1 : [2020] 11 SCR 1001; M C Chacko v. State Bank of Travancore (1969) 2 SCC 343 : [1970] 1 SCR 658; Haji Mohammed Ishaq v. Mohamad Iqbal (1978) 2 SCC 493 : [1978] 3 SCR 571; Shakti Bhog Foods Limited v. Kola Shipping Ltd. (2009) 2 SCC 134 : [2008] 13 SCR 925; Trimex International FZE Ltd v. Vedanta [2022] 4 SCR 926; Aluminium Ltd. (2010) 3 SCC 1 : [2010] 1 SCR 820; Great Offshore Ltd. v. Iranian Offshore Engineering and Construction Company, (2008) 14 SCC 240 : [2008] 12 SCR 515; S N Prasad v. Monnet Finance Limited (2011) 1 SCC 320 : [2010] 13 SCR 207; Govind Rubber Ltd v. M/s Louis Dreyfus Commodities, (2015) 13 SCC 477 : [2014] 12 SCR 488; Sundaram Finance Ltd v. NEPC India Ltd. (1999) 2 SCC 479 : [1999] 1 SCR 89; P Manohar Reddy and Bros v. Maharashtra Krishna Valley Development Corporation, (2009) 2 SCC 494 : [2008] 17 SCR 1217; Tata Engineering and Locomotive Co Ltd. v. State of Bihar [1964] 6 SCR 885; LIC v. Escorts Ltd. (1986) 1 SCC 264 : [1985] 3 Suppl. SCR 909; Delhi Development Authority v. Skipper Construction Co. (P) Ltd. (1996) 4 SCC 662 : [1996] 2 Suppl. SCR 295; Kapila Hingorani v. State of Bihar (2003) 6 SCC 1 : [2003] 1 Suppl. SCR 175; Balwant Rai Saluja v. Air India (2014) 9 SCC 407 : [2014] 14 SCR 1512; Vodafone International Holding BV v. Union of India (2012) 6 SCC 613 : [2012] 1 SCR 573; Kamla Devi v. Takhatmal Land, AIR 1964 SC 859 : [1964 ] 2 SCR 152; Bangalore Electricity Supply Co Ltd v. E S Solar Power (P) Ltd. (2021) 6 SCC 718 : [2021] 1 SCR 453; Bank of India v. K Mohandas (2009) 5 SCC 313 : [2009] 1 SCR 1045; M Dayanand Reddy v. A P Industrial Infrastructure Corporation Ltd. (1993) 3 SCC 137 : [1993] 2 SCR 629; A Ayyasamy v. A Paramsivam, (2016) 10 SCC 386 : [2016] 11 SCR 521; Union of India v. D N Revri, (1976) 4 SCC 147 : [1977] 1 SCR 483; Roop Kumar v. Mohan Thedani, (2003) 6 SCC 595 : [2003] 3 SCR 292; Olympus Superstructures (P) Ltd v. Meena Vijay Khetan, (1999) 5 SCC 651 : [1999] 3 SCR 490; Reliance Industries Ltd v. Union of India, (2014) 7 SCC 603 : [2014] 6 SCR 456; Enercon (India) Ltd v. Enercon Gmbh, (2014) 5 SCC 1: [2014] 2 SCR 855; Agri Gold Exims Ltd v. Sri Lakshmi Knits & Wovens, (2007) 3 SCC 686 : [2007] 1 SCR 1161; SBP & Co v. Patel Engineering Ltd. (2005) 8 SCC 618 : [2005] 4 Suppl. SCR 688; Uttarakhand Purv Sainik Kalyan Nigam Ltd. v. Northern Coal Field, (2020) 2 SCC 455; Pravin Electricals Pvt Ltd v. Galaxy Infra and Engineering Pvt Ltd. (2021) 5 SCC 671: [2021] 1 SCR 1162; Shin-Etsu Chemical Co Ltd. v. Aksh Optifibre Ltd. (2005) 7 SCC 234 : [2005] 2 Suppl. SCR 699 and Deutsche Post Bank Home Finance Ltd. v. Taduri Sridhar (2011) 11 SCC 375 : [2011] 5 SCR 674 – referred to. Dow Chemical v. Isover Saint Gobain, Interim Award, ICC Case No. 4131, 23 September 1982; Paris Court of Appeal, 7 December 1994, V 2000 (formerly Jaguar France) v. Project XS, Rev. Arb. (1996) 67; A, B, C v. D and State of Libya, 4 A 636/2018; 5 Saudi Butec Ltd et Al Fouzan Trading v. Saudi Arabian Saipem Ltd, unpublished ICC Interim Award of 25 October 1994, confirmed by DFT on 29 January 1996, ASA Bulletin (1996) Vol 3 p 496;X v. Y Engineering S.p.A. and Y S.p.A., 4A_450/2013, ASA Bull., 160 (2015); Peterson Farms INC v. C & M Farming Limited, [2004] EWHC 121; Roussel-Uclaf v. G D Searle and Co Ltd. [1978] 1 Lloyd’s Rep; The COX AND KINGS LTD. v. SAP INDIA PVT. LTD. & ANR.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.632 Mayoralty and Commonalty & Citizens of the City of London v. Ashok Sancheti, [2008] EWCA Civ 1283; Blackpool and Fylde Aero Club Ltd. v. Blackpool Borough Council, [1990] 1 WLR 1195; Dallah Real Estate and Tourism Holding Company v. The Ministry of Religious Affairs, Government of Pakistan [2010] UKSC 46; Manuchar Steel Hong Kong Limited v. Star Pacific Line Pte Ltd. [2014] SGHC 181; G E Energy Power Conversion France SAS v. Outokumpu Stainless, 140 S. Ct. 1637 (2020); American Fuel Corp v. Utah Energy Development Co, Inc, 122 F.3d 130, 134 (2d Cir 1997); American Bureau, Shipping v. Tencara Shipyard, 170 F.3d 349, 353 (2d Cir 1999); Sunkist Soft Drinks, Inc v. Sunkist Growers, Inc, 10 F.3d 753, 757 (11th Cir 1993) and Grigson v. Creative Artists Agency, LLC, 210 F.3d 524 (2000); United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation, (1960) 363 US 574, 582; Fiona Trust and Holding Company v. Privalov [2007] UKHL 40; Salomon v. Salomon [1897] AC 22; D H N Food Distributors Ltd v. Tower Hamlets London Borough Council [1976] 1 WLR 852; Bank of Tokyo v. Karoon, (1986) 3 All ER 468; Schiffahrts– gesellschaft Detlev von Appen v Voest Alpine Intertrading, [1997] EWCA Civ 1420; Through Transport Mutual Insurance Association (Eurasia) Ltd v. New India Assurance Co Ltd. [2005] EWHC 455 (Comm); West Tankers Inc. v. Allianz Spa, [2012] EWCA Civ 27; Tanning Research Laboratories Inc v. O’Brien, [1990] HCA 8; Rinehart v. Hancock Prospecting Pty Ltd. [2019] HCA 13 – referred to.
Law Commission of India, ‘Amendments to the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996’, Report No. 246 (August 2014); Bernard Hanotiau and Leonardo Ohlrogge, ‘40th Year Anniversary of the Dow Chemical Award’ 40(2) ASA Bulletin 300-308; Yves Derains, ‘Is there a Group of Companies Doctrine?’ in Bernard Hanotiau and Eric Schwartz (eds) in Dossier of the ICC Institute of World Business Law, Volume 7, 131-145;Audley William Sheppard, ‘Third Party Non-Signatories in English Arbitration Law’ in Stavros Brekoulakis, Julian Lew, et al (eds) The Evolution and Future of International Arbitration (Kluwer Law International, 2016) 183-198; Chitty on Contracts, Hugh Beale (ed), (32nd edn, Sweet and Maxwell, 2015) para 2-169 and para 1-104; Andrijana Misovic, ‘Binding non-signatories to arbitrate: the United States approach’ (2021) 37(3) Arbitration International 749-768; Bernard Hanotiau, ‘May an Arbitration Clause be Extended to Non-signatories: Individuals, States or Other Companies of the Group?’ in Complex Arbitrations: Multi-party, multi-contract, Multi-issue – A comparative study’ Bernard Hanotiau (eds) (2nd edn, 2020) 95, 194; Gary Born, International Arbitration Law and Practice (3rd ed, 2021);Pollock and Mulla, The Indian Contract and Specific Reliefs Act (14th edn, 2016) 235; Stavros Brekoulakis, ‘Rethinking Consent in International Commercial Arbitration: A General Theory for Non-signatories’ (2017) 8 Journal of International Dispute Settlement 610, 621; UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, Recommendation regarding the interpretation of article II, paragraph 2, and article VII, paragraph 1, of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, done in New York, 10 June 1958, (adopted by the UNCITRAL on 7 July 2006) 39; Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration (7th edn, Oxford University Press, 2023) para 2.23; Jayati Sarkar, ‘Business Groups in India’ in Asli Coplan, Takashi Hikino, and James Lincoln (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Business Groups (2010) 299; Bernard Hanotiau, ‘Consent to Arbitration: Do We Share a Common Vision?’ (2011) 27(4) Arbitration International 539, 554; Stavros Brekoulakis, ‘Parties in International Arbitration: Consent v. Commercial Reality’ in Stavros Brekoulakis, Julian DM Lew, et al (eds) in ‘The Evolution and Future of International Arbitration’ (2016) 119, 120; UNCITRAL, ‘Settlement of Commercial Disputes: Possible uniform rules on certain issues concerning settlement of commercial disputes: conciliation, interim measures of protection, written form of arbitration agreement: Report of the Secretary General’ A/CN.9/ WG.II/WP.108/Add.1 (26 January 2000); Stavros Brekoulakis, ‘Parties in International Arbitration: Consent v. Commercial Reality’ in Stavros Brekoulakis, Julian DM Lew, et al (eds) ‘The Evolution and Future of International Arbitration’ (2016) 119, 137, 148; UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts, 2016, Article 4.3; Stavros Brekoulakis, ‘Rethinking Consent in International Commercial Arbitration: A General Theory for Non-signatories’ (2017) 8 Journal of International Dispute Settlement 610, 621; Karim Youssef, ‘The Limits of Consent: The Right or Obligation to Arbitrate of Non-Signatories in Group of Companies’ in Multiparty Arbitration: Dossiers of the ICC Institute of Worlds Business Law, Volume 7 (2010) 71, 79; Russel on Arbitration (23rd edn, 2007) 99 para 3-018; Vicky Priskich, ‘Binding non-signatories to arbitration agreements – who are person ‘claiming through or under’ a party?’ (2019) 35(3) COX AND KINGS LTD. v. SAP INDIA PVT. LTD. & ANR.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.634 Arbitration International 375-386; Black’s Law Dictionary (5th edn, 1979) 224; P Ramanatha Aiyar’s, The Law Lexicon (1997) 330, 331; Black’s Law Dictionary (5th edn, 1979) 1328; Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Belknap Press, Harvard University Press 1986) 229 – referred to.
In the judgment of Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, J.
Chloro Controls India (P) Ltd. v. Severn Trent Water Purification Inc., (2013) 1 SCC 641:[2013] 1 SCR 698 – held erroneous.
Cox and Kings Ltd v. SAP India Pvt Ltd. (2022) 8 SCC 1; Vidya Drolia v. Durga Trading Corporation, (2021) 2 SCC 1 : [2020] 11 SCR 1001; Gemini Bay Transcription Pvt Ltd v. Integrated Sales Service Ltd. (2022) 1 SCC 753; Jugal Kishore Rameshwardas v. Goolbai Hormusji [1955] 2 SCR 857; Caravel Shipping Services (P) Ltd v. Premier Sea Foods Exim (P) Ltd. (2019) 11 SCC 461 : [2018] 14 SCR 289; Rickmers Verwaltung Gmbh v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. (1999) 1 SCC 1 : [1998] 3 Suppl. SCR 42; MTNL v. Canara Bank, (2020) 12 SCC 767 : [2019] 11 SCR 660; Babanrao Rajaram Pund v. Samarth Builders and Developers, (2022) 9 SCC 691; KK Modi v. KN Modi, (1998) 3 SCC 573 : [1998] 1 SCR 601; Bihar State Mineral Development Corporation v. Encon Builders (I) Pvt Ltd. (2003) 7 SCC 418 : [2003] 2 Suppl. SCR 812; Shakti Bhog Foods v. Kola Shipping Ltd. (2009) 2 SCC 134 : [2008] 13 SCR 925; Smita Conductors v. Euro Alloys, (2001) 7 SCC 728 : [2001] 2 Suppl. SCR 477; Unissi (India) Pvt Ltd v. Post Graduate Institute of Medical Education and Research (2009) 1 SCC 107 : [2008] 14 SCR 108; Powertech World Wide Ltd v. Delvin international General Trading LLC (2012) 1 SCC 361 : [2011] 13 SCR 122; Govind Rubber v. Louids Dreyfus Commodities Asia Pvt Ltd. (2015) 13 SCC 477: [2014] 12 SCR 488; Nimet Resources Inc v. Essar Steels Ltd, (2000) 7 SCC 497; Bangalore Electricity Supply Company Ltd (BESCOM) v. E.S. Solar Power Pvt Ltd. (2021) 6 SCC 718; Food Corporation of India v. Abhijit Paul 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1605; Bank of India v. K. Mohandas (2009) 5 SCC 313 : [2009] 5 SCR 118; Godhra Electricity Co Ltd v. State of Gujarat (1975) 1 SCC 199 : [1975] 2 SCR 42; McDermott International Inc v. Burn Standard Co Ltd. (2006) 11 SCC 181 : [2006] 2 Suppl. SCR 409; ONGC v. Saw Pipes Ltd. (2003) 5 SCC 705 : [2003] 3 SCR 691; Roop Kumar v. Mohan Thedani (2003) 6 SCC 595 : [2003] 3 SCR 292; Sukanya Holdings v. Jayesh H Pandya (2003) 5 SCC 531 : [2003] 3 SCR 558; Indowind Energy Ltd v. Wescare (India) Ltd. (2010) 5 SCC 306 : [2010] 5 SCR 284; Duro Felguera, S.A. v. Gangavaram Port Ltd. (2017) 9 SCC 729 : [2017] 10 SCR 285; Cheran Properties Ltd v. Kasturi and Sons Ltd. (2018) 16 SCC 413 : [2018] 4 SCR 1063; Ameet Lalchand Shah v. Rishabh Enterprises (2018) 15 SCC 678 : [2018] 6 SCR 1001; ONGC v. Discovery Enterprises Pvt Ltd. (2022) 8 SCC 42; Reckitt Benckiser (India) Pvt Ltd v. Reynders Label Printing India Pvt Ltd. (2019) 7 SCC 62 : [2019] 8 SCR 966; MTNL v. Canara Bank (2020) 12 SCC 767: [2019] 11 SCR 660 – referred to.
Dow Chemical v. Isover Saint Gobain. ICC Case No. 4131, 23 September 1982; Dallah Real Estate and Tourism Holding Co. v. Ministry of Religious Affairs, Government of Pakistan Case No. 9-28533, dated 17 February 2011 (Paris Cour d’Appel), [2010] UKSC 46; Malakoff Corporation Berhad and TLEMCEN Desalination Investment Company v. Algerian Energy Company SA and Hyflux Limited, Case No. 21-07296, dated 13 June 2023 (Paris Cour d’Appel); Peterson Farms Inc v. C&M Farming Ltd. [2004] EWHC 121 (Comm); Mayor and Commonalty & Citizens of the City of London v. Ashok Sancheti, [2008] EWCA Civ 1283; Bank of Tokyo Ltd v. Karoon, [1987] AC 45; Kabab-Ji SAL (Lebanon) v. Kout Food Group (Kuwait), [2021] UKSC 48; Manuchar Steel Hong Kong Ltd v. Star Pacific Line Pte Ltd. [2014] SGHC 181; GE Energy Power Conversion France SAS Corp., FKA Converteam SAS v. Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC, et al., Case No. 18-1048 (1 June 2020); McBro Planning & Dev. Co. v. Triangle Elec. Constr. Co. Inc., 741 F.2d 342 (11th Cir. 1984); Nauru Phosphate Royalties, Inc. v. Drago Daic Interests, Inc. 138 F.3d 160 (5th Cir. 1998); Sarhank Group v. Oracle Corp, 404 F. 3d 657 (2nd Cir. 2005) – referred to.
Lewison, The Interpretation of Contracts (6th edn, Sweet and Maxwell 2016) para 2.01, 27; Gary Born, International Commercial Arbitration, vol 1 (3rd edn, Kluwer Law International 2021) 1531; Bernard Hanotiau, ‘Chapter 14: Group of Companies in International Arbitration’ in Loukas A. Mistelis and Julian D.M. Lew (ed), Pervasive Problems in International Arbitration, vol 15 (Kluwer Law International 2006), 286; Bernard Hanotiau, ‘Consent to Arbitration: Do We Share a Common Vision?’ (2011) 27(4) Arbitration International 539 – referred to. COX AND KINGS LTD. v. SAP INDIA PVT. LTD. & ANR.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.636
OTHER CASE DETAILS INCLUDING IMPUGNED
ORDER AND APPEARANCES
CIVIL ORIGINAL/APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Arbitration Petition (Civil) No. 38 of 2020.
Petition for Appointment of the Arbitral Tribunal under Section 11(6), Section 11(12)(a) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. With SLP (C) Nos. 8607 and 5833 of 2022.
Appearances:
Nakul Dewan, Sanjoy Ghose, Sr. Advs., Hiroo Advani, Divyakant Lahoti, Ms. Madhur Jhavar, Ms. Vindhya Mehra, Parikshit Ahuja, Ms. Praveena Bisht, Kartik Lahoti, Ms. Garima Verma, Rahul Maheshwari, Ms. Shivangi Malhotra, Navdeep Dahiya, Ms. Sanjana Khatri, Ms. Ria Garg, Manav Nagpal, Karandeep Dahiya, Jeevan Ballav Panda, Ms. Shalini Sati Prasad, Satish Padhi, Ms. Meher Tandon, Gaurav Sharma, Ms. Dhriti Mehta, Rohan Naik, Ms. Nooreen Sarna, Neil Chatterjee, Ms. Tansi Fotedar, Sathvik Chandrashekhar, Rohan Mandal, M/s. Khaitan & Co., Nagarkatti Kartik Uday, Advs. for the Petitioner.
Tushar Mehta, SG, Darius J. Khambata, Ritin Rai, Ms. Meenakshi Arora, Sr. Advs., Rajat Nair, Kartikey Agarwal, Parantap Singh, Rohit, Rohan Batra, Ms. Sonali Malik, Harsh Vardhan Arora, Tushar Hathiramani, Rishabh Bhargava, Dhruv Sethi, Ms. Vidhi Shah, Farhad Sorabjee, Dheeraj Nair, Manish Jha, Kumar Kislay, Pratik Pawar, Siddhesh Pradhan, Ms. Shanaya Cyrus Irani, Ms. Aishna Jain, Yashvardhan, Ms. Smita Kant, Apoorv Shukla, Puneet Chahar, Ms. Prabhleen A. Shukla, Ms. Ishita Farsaiya, Ms. Kritika Nagpal, Chandratanay Chaube, Tushar Arora, Anirudh Krishnan, Balaji Srinivasan, Shiva Krishnamurti, Ms. Gauri Pasricha, Devamshu Behl, Rohan Dewan, Advs. for the Respondents.
Kapil Sibal, Dr. A.M. Singhvi, A.N. Haksar, Sr. Advs., Ajay Bhargava, Mrs. Vanita Bhargava, Aseem Chaturvedi, Ms. Trishala Trivedi, Milind Sharma, Ms. Manisha Singh, M/s. Khaitan & Co., Ujjwal A. Rana, Himanshu Mehta for M/s. Gagrat and Co, Pallav Mongia, Debesh Panda, Pratyush Miglani, Omar Ahmad, Pranav Mago, Udbhav Gady, Ms.
Chandrika Sharma, Sri Aditya Kumar, Kanishk Aggarwal, Vas Dev Verma, George Pothan Poothicote, Ms. Manisha Singh, Ms. Jyoti Singh, Ashu Pathak, Arunava Mukherjee, Advs. for the Intervenors.
JUDGMENT / ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT
JUDGMENT
DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, CJI
Table of Contents* A. The reference .............................................................................4 B. Submissions ...............................................................................7 C. Legal background ....................................................................16 i. India......................................................................................16 a. Chloro Controls.................................................................20 b. Development of Law after Chloro Controls .....................24 ii. France – The Dow Chemicals case .....................................29 iii. Switzerland .........................................................................33 iv. England ..............................................................................34 v. Singapore .............................................................................37 vi. United States of America ....................................................38 D. Arbitration Agreement .............................................................41 i. Consent as the basis for arbitration ......................................41 ii. Parties to Arbitration Agreement .........................................45 E. Group of Companies Doctrine .................................................56 i. Separate legal personality .....................................................56 ii. Adopting a pragmatic approach to consent .........................61 iii. Group of companies doctrine – a fact based doctrine ........66 *Ed. Note: The pagination as per the original Judgment.
COX AND KINGS LTD. v. SAP INDIA PVT. LTD. & ANR.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.638 iv. The determination of mutual intention ...............................70 v. Threshold standard ...............................................................80 F. The group of companies doctrine has independent existence ..............................................................................85 i. Party and Persons “claiming through or under” are different ..............................................................................88 ii. The approach adopted by this Court in Chloro Controls is Incorrect ................................................................92 iii. Power of the Courts to issue directions under Section....... ..............................................................................97 G. The standard of determination at the referral stage – Sections 8 and 11 .....................................................................98 H. Conclusions ...........................................................................104 A. The reference
1. More than a century ago, James Joyce published Ulysses. Joyce experimented with the narrative technique by extensively using a stream of consciousness. In its modernist narrative technique, Ulysses is feted by literary critics and novelists as a literary masterpiece. Novelists such as Vladimir Nabokov and T S Elliot eulogized it as a divine work of art. However, others such as Virginia Woolf and Aldous Huxley criticized the novel for being technical and boring. Despite the varied criticism, the legacy of Ulysses endures particularly because its experimental narrative technique challenged the conventional literary style. Similar is the case of the group of companies doctrine – a modern theory which challenges the conventional notions of arbitration law. It is celebrated by some, reviled by many others. Yet, its legacy continues.
2. Five judges of this Court are called upon to determine the validity of the ‘Group of Companies’ doctrine in the jurisprudence of Indian arbitration. *Ed. Note: The pagination as per the original Judgment.
The doctrine provides that an arbitration agreement which is entered into by a company within a group of companies may bind non-signatory affiliates, if the circumstances are such as to demonstrate the mutual intention of the parties to bind both signatories and non-signatories. This doctrine is called into question purportedly on the ground that it interferes with the established legal principles such as party autonomy, privity of contract, and separate legal personality. The challenge before this Court is to figure out whether there can be a reconciliation between the group of companies doctrine and well settled legal principles of corporate law and contract law.
3. A Bench of three Judges of this Court, while considering an application under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration Act and Conciliation 19961, sought to reexamine the validity of the group of companies doctrine in the Indian context on the ground that it is premised more on economic efficiency rather than law. The Bench of three judges (speaking through the majority opinion authored by Chief Justice N. V. Ramana (as he was then), and the concurring opinion by Justice Surya Kant) doubted the correctness of the application of the doctrine by the Indian courts.
4. Chief Justice Ramana criticised the approach of a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Chloro Controls India (P) Ltd v. Severn Trent Water Purification Inc2 of relying upon the phrase “claiming through or under” in Section 45 of the Arbitration Act to adopt the group of companies doctrine. He noted that the subsequent decisions of this Court established the doctrine in Sections 8 and 35 without adequately examining the interpretation of the phrase “claiming through or under” appearing in those provisions. These decisions include: Cheran Properties Ltd v. Kasturi and Sons Ltd3, Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd. v. Canara Bank4, and Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd v. Discovery Enterprises Pvt. Ltd.5 He also observed that economic concepts such as tight group structure and single economic unit alone cannot be utilized to bind a non-signatory to an arbitration agreement in the absence of an express consent. Consequently, he 1 “Arbitration Act”
2 (2013) 1 SCC 641
3 (2018) 16 SCC 413
4 (2020) 12 SCC 767
5 (2022) 8 SCC 42
COX AND KINGS LTD. v. SAP INDIA PVT. LTD. & ANR.
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, CJI] SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.640 referred the matter to the larger Bench to seek clarity on the interpretation of the phrase “claiming through or under” appearing under Sections 8, 35, and 45 of the Arbitration Act by formulating the following two questions: a. Whether the phrase ‘claiming through or under’ in Sections 8 and 116 could be interpreted to include the ‘Group of Companies’ doctrine; and b. Whether the ‘Group of Companies’ doctrine as expounded by Chloro Controls Case (supra) and subsequent judgments is valid in law.
5. In a concurring opinion, Justice Surya Kant observed that the decisions of this Court before Chloro Controls (supra), rendered in Sukanya Holdings (P) Ltd v. Jayesh H Pandya7 and Indowind Energy Ltd v. Wescare (I) Ltd,8 adopted a “rigid” and “restrictive” approach by placing undue emphasis on formal consent. Justice Surya Kant traced the evolution of the group of companies doctrine to observe it had gained a firm footing in Indian jurisprudence. However, he opined that that this Court adopted inconsistent approaches while applying the doctrine in India, which needed to be clarified by a larger Bench. Accordingly, he highlighted the following questions of law for determination by the larger Bench: a. Whether the Group of Companies Doctrine should be read into Section 8 of the Act or whether it can exist in Indian jurisprudence independent of any statutory provision;
b. Whether the Group of Companies Doctrine should continue to be invoked on the basis of the principle of ‘single economic reality’; c. Whether the Group of Companies Doctrine should be construed as a means of interpreting implied consent or intent to arbitrate between the parties; and 6 The reference to Section 11 seems inadvertent as the phrase “claiming through or under” is not found in the said provision. Rather, Section 11 ought to be read as Section 45 where the phrase “claiming through or under” appears.
7 (2003) 5 SCC 531
8 (2010) 5 SCC 306
d. Whether the principles of alter ego and/or piercing the corporate veil can alone justify pressing the Group of Companies Doctrine into operation even in the absence of implied consent.
6. We are not reproducing the factual matrix of the case, as we have been called upon to settle the broader legal issues raised in the reference. In the process, we will answer the above legal issues, as well as other ancillary issues that have been raised before us by counsel.
B. Submissions
7. Mr Hiroo Advani, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in Arbitration Petition No. 38 of 2020, made the following submissions: a. The basis for the application of the group of companies doctrine is the tacit or implied consent by the non-signatory to be bound by the arbitration agreement;
b. The definition of “party” under Section 2(1)(h) of the Arbitration Act cannot be restricted to the signatories to an arbitration agreement. The definition should be read expansively to also include nonsignatories depending upon the facts and circumstances;
c. Section 7 of the Arbitration Act provides that the defined legal relationship between the parties may be non-contractual as well. Moreover, Section 7(4)(b) indicates that a non-signatory could be bound by an arbitration agreement if in the course of a written communication, it has demonstrated an intention to be bound by the agreement; and d. The group of companies doctrine should ideally be applied by the arbitral tribunal. At the stage of referral, the court should merely take a prima facie view and leave it for the arbitral tribunal to determine the necessity of joining the non-signatories to the arbitration agreement.
8. Mr Darius J Khambata, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents in SLP (C) No. 8607 of 2022, made the following submissions: a. The applicability of the group of companies doctrine must be examined from the touchstone of whether a non-signatory could be COX AND KINGS LTD. v. SAP INDIA PVT. LTD. & ANR.
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, CJI] SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.642 made a party to the arbitration agreement. The expression “claiming through or under” a party cannot be the basis to apply the doctrine; b. The doctrine is a consensual theory premised on the existence of a dispute arising from a defined legal relationship and mutual intention of the parties to be bound by the arbitration agreement. The intention of the non-signatory has to be ascertained from the cumulative factors laid down in Chloro Controls (supra);
c. The following requirements must be met for the application of the group of companies doctrine to bind the non-signatory as a “veritable” party to the arbitration agreement:
i. mutual intention of all the parties, both signatories and nonsignatories, to be bound by the arbitration agreement;
ii. absolute and unqualified acceptance by the non-signatory party to the arbitration agreement; and iii. such acceptance must either be expressed or implied. In the context of a non-signatory, such acceptance will be implied and manifested in the negotiation, performance, or termination of the contract;
d. Mutual consent of the parties to refer disputes arising out of their defined legal relationship to arbitration is the essential ingredient of an arbitration agreement. It would be against the concept of party autonomy to bind a non-signatory to an arbitration agreement without ascertaining their consent;
e. The concept of “party” to an arbitration agreement is distinct from the concept of “person claiming through or under” a party. The latter expression conveys the notion of a derivative cause of action where the non-signatory steps into the shoes of the party rather than claiming an independent right under the agreement. The typical scenarios where a person claims through or under a party are assignment, subrogation, and novation; and f. Concepts such as ‘tight group structure’ and ‘single economic unit’ cannot be the sole basis to invoke the group of companies doctrine. This doctrine cannot be applied to bind a non-signatory merely on account of it being under the ownership, control, or supervision of the signatory party;
9. Dr A M Singhvi, learned senior counsel appearing for the interveners in IA No. 92757 of 2022, made the following submissions: a. The group of companies doctrine constitutes a true and genuine effectuation of the real intent of the parties to subject both the signatory and non-signatory parties to the arbitration agreement;
b. The doctrine is a reasonable and natural extension of the principle of piercing the corporate veil. The application of the doctrine is also justified in affixing responsibility when the requisite and sufficient degree of common ownership and control exists;
c. The intention of the parties cannot be the only basis to join a nonsignatory party to an arbitration agreement. The court can also consider non-consensual doctrines such as piercing the corporate veil, alter ego, or tight group structure; and d. The Arbitration Act does not prohibit or inhibit the adoption of the group of companies doctrine in Indian arbitration jurisprudence. On the contrary, Section 7 of the Arbitration Act provides an expansive concept of an arbitration agreement. Moreover, the legislature specifically amended Section 8 of the Arbitration Act by inserting the words “any person claiming through or under” to recognize and codify the reality of non-signatories acting through or under the signatory parties.
10. Mr Kapil Sibal, learned senior counsel appearing for the intervener in IA No. 56615 of 2023, made the following submissions:
a. A non-signatory can be impleaded in an arbitration proceeding provided: (i) there is a defined legal relationship between the nonsignatory and the parties to the arbitration agreement; and (ii) the nonsignatory consented to be bound by the arbitration agreement in terms of Section 7 of the Arbitration Act;
b. The onus to prove the intention of the non-signatory to be bound by the arbitration agreement lies on the party seeking to implead the nonsignatory;
COX AND KINGS LTD. v. SAP INDIA PVT. LTD. & ANR.
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, CJI] SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.644 c. In view of the requirement under Section 7 of the Arbitration Act, an arbitration agreement has to be in writing and there cannot be an oral agreement to arbitrate. Regardless, the intention of the non-signatory to be bound by the arbitration agreement can be gathered from conduct; d. Arbitration is in the realm of private law, and a matter of choice and intent of the parties. Therefore, factors such as economic convenience, justice, or equity cannot be grounds for binding non-signatories to an arbitration agreement; and e. The cumulative factors laid down by this Court in Discovery Enterprises (supra) cannot be considered in isolation, and must be applied holistically to determine the applicability of the group of companies doctrine in a given factual matrix.
11. Mr Nakul Dewan, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent in SLP (C) No. 8607 of 2022, made the following submissions: a. The group of companies doctrine and single economic entity doctrine are purely economic concepts without any basis in either contract law or company law. Therefore, they cannot be applied to determine the intention of non-signatories to be bound by an arbitration agreement;
b. The decision of a party to not sign the arbitration agreement may form the basis to demonstrate an intent not to be bound by it; c. The mere factum of multiple agreements or that the non-signatory was involved in the negotiation of the contract cannot form the basis to bind it to the arbitration agreement;
d. The phrase “claiming through or under” which finds mention under Sections 8 and 45 of the Arbitration Act cannot be the basis for the application of the group of companies doctrine; and e. The determination of the intention of parties to a contract should relate only to the intention held at the time of entering into the contract, which can be gathered objectively from the text of the contract. However, Chloro Controls (supra) which considers consequential or subsequent agreements to determine the mutual intention of the parties is incorrect.
12. Mr Ritin Rai, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent in Arbitration Petition No. 38 of 2020, made the following submissions: a. Section 7 of the Arbitration Act requires the arbitration agreement to be in writing. Therefore, an arbitration agreement cannot be created on the basis of implied consent of the non-signatory;
b. Complex multi-party contracts are outcomes of detailed negotiations entered into after parties have fully applied their mind. To impute intention to parties in contradiction to the express terms of the agreement would defeat the purpose of the parties’ memorializing their understanding in a negotiated, written document;
c. An arbitration agreement which sets out the executing parties and the arbitral procedure agreed among them cannot be read to expand its reach to third parties;
d. The group of companies doctrine cannot be traced to the phrase “claiming through or under” as provided under Sections 8 and 45 of the Arbitration Act; and e. Chloro Controls (supra) erroneously failed to consider whether an implied consent derived from the conduct of a non-signatory satisfied the requirement of a clear intention to arbitrate. Moreover, Chloro Controls (supra) wrongly held that the courts have the discretion to refer non-signatory parties to arbitration under Sections 8 or 45 of the Arbitration Act in exceptional cases. The introduction of such a discretion brings in uncertainty in the arbitration practice in India.
13. Mr Tushar Mehta, learned Solicitor General appearing on behalf of the Union of India, made the following submissions:
a. Since India follows the UNCITRAL Model Law, concepts of ‘commercial element’ and ‘business prudence’ have to be considered while interpreting the provisions of the Arbitration Act;
b. The group of companies doctrine is inbuilt in the overall scheme of the Arbitration Act. Section 7 uses the broad phrase “defined relationship whether contractual or otherwise” to convey that an arbitration agreement is not restricted to a conventional agreement; COX AND KINGS LTD. v. SAP INDIA PVT. LTD. & ANR.
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, CJI] SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.646 c. The insertion of the words “claiming through or under” in Section 8 of the Arbitration Act is merely in furtherance of the legislative intent to confer locus on yet another category of persons to insist that the judicial authority must refer the dispute before it to arbitration; and d. If the referral court under Sections 8 and 11 cannot prima facie determine the issue of joinder of a non-signatory to the arbitration agreement on the basis of the group of companies doctrine, it can refer the issue to be decided by the arbitral tribunal.
14. Mr Sanjoy Ghose, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner in SLP (C) No. 8607 of 2022, made the following submissions: a. Section 2(1)(h) uses the term “party” and not “signatory” to account for situations where a non-signatory enters the shoes of a signatory party either by succession, operation of law, assignment, or death; and b. The group of companies doctrine contravenes the provisions of corporate law by fixing liability on an entity that is not a party to an arbitration agreement. Mere participation in the negotiation or performance of the contract cannot bind a non-signatory to the arbitration agreement in the absence of express consent.
15. Mr Pallav Mongia, learned advocate on behalf of the interveners in IA No. 58168 of 2023, submitted that Section 2(1)(h) of the Arbitration Act does not restrict the definition of parties to “signatories”. Rather, the definition has to be inferred from Section 7. Section 7(4) expands the definition of parties to non-signatories.
16. Ms Meenakshi Arora, learned senior counsel on behalf of the respondent in SLP (C) No. 8607 of 2022, argued for de-tagging of SLP (C) No. 8607 of 2022 from the lead matter, that is Arbitration Petition No. 38 of 2020, as the former deals with power of the courts to issue directions under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act against third parties. Further, the learned senior counsel submitted that the courts can take aid of the group of companies doctrine to issue interim directions against non-signatories to the arbitration agreement.
17. The arguments advanced by advocates on both sides of the aisle indicate that this Constitution Bench has been primarily called upon to determine the validity of the group of companies doctrine in Indian arbitration jurisprudence. However, there are other broad ancillary issues which have been raised by the learned counsel. These include: (i) whether the Arbitration Act allows joinder of a non-signatory as a party to an arbitration agreement; and, (ii) whether Section 7 of the Arbitration Act allows for determination of an intention to arbitrate on the basis of the conduct of the parties. This Bench will address the issues arising out of the order of reference as well as the above-mentioned ancillary issues in due course. C. Legal background i. India
18. Before the enactment of the Arbitration Act, the law on arbitration was substantially contained in the Arbitration Act of 1940,9 the Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act of 1937, and the Foreign Awards (Recognition and Enforcement) Act of 1961. In 1978, the Law Commission of India suggested substantive amendments to the 1940 Act. Moreover, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law10 adopted the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration in 1985.11 The General Assembly of the United Nations recommended all the Member States to adopt the UNCITRAL Model Law in their domestic legislation with a view to uniformize the law of arbitral procedures.12 The Arbitration Act was enacted to consolidate and amend the law relating to arbitration. It brought the law relating to domestic and international commercial arbitration in consonance with the UNCITRAL Model Law, the New York Convention, and the Geneva Convention.
19. Section 2(1)(h) of the Arbitration Act defines a “party” to mean “a party to an arbitration agreement.” An “arbitration agreement” is defined 9 “1940 Act”
10 “UNCITRAL”
11 “UNCITRAL Model Law”
12 UN General Assembly, Fortieth Session, ‘Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law’ 40/72 (1985)
COX AND KINGS LTD. v. SAP INDIA PVT. LTD. & ANR.
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, CJI] SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.648 under Section 2(1)(b) to mean “an agreement referred to in Section 7.” Section 7 lays down the essential elements of a valid and binding arbitration agreement. It defines an arbitration agreement as an agreement by the parties to submit to arbitration all or certain disputes which have arisen or which may arise between them in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not. The provision also mandates that an arbitration agreement shall be in writing. An arbitration agreement is in writing if it is contained in:
(a) a document signed by the parties;
(b) an exchange of letters, telexes, telegrams, or other means of telecommunication including communication through electronic means which provide a record of the agreement; or
(c) an exchange of statements of claim and defense in which the existence of the agreement in alleged by one party and not denied by the other.
Section 7(5) further stipulates that the reference in a contract to a document containing an arbitration clause constitutes an arbitration agreement if two conditions are satisfied. These conditions are first, that the contract is in writing; and second, that the reference is such as to make the arbitration clause part of the contract.
20. An arbitration agreement, being a creature of contract,13 is based on the consent of parties to submit their disputes to an alternate dispute resolution mechanism. Generally, a party to an arbitration agreement is determined on the basis of persons or entities who are signatories to the arbitration agreement or the underlying contract containing the arbitration agreement. However, over the past two decades the law on joinder of nonsignatory parties has evolved substantially. The evolution could roughly be classified into two stages: before Chloro Controls (supra) and after Chloro Controls (supra).
21. In the pre Chloro Controls (supra) era, this Court construed “parties” by limiting it only to the signatories to the arbitration agreement. In Sukanya Holdings (supra) the applicant filed an application under Section 13 Bhaven Construction v. Executive Engineer, Sardar Sarovar Narmada Nigam Ltd,
(2022) 1 SCC 75
8 of the Arbitration Act before the High Court and sought to enforce the arbitration agreement against both the signatories and non-signatories to the agreement. The High Court rejected the application on the ground that the non-signatories were not parties to the arbitration agreement. In appeal, this Court upheld the decision of the High Court by observing that there is no provision under the Arbitration Act stipulating what is required to be done where some parties to the suit are not parties to the arbitration agreement. In Sumitomo Corporation v. CDC Financial Services (Mauritius) Ltd,14 this Court, while dealing with an international commercial arbitration held that a “party” to an arbitration agreement means a party to the judicial proceedings. This was expressly held to be erroneous in Chloro Controls (supra), where it was held that “party” has to be construed in view of Section 2(1)(h) to mean a party to an arbitration agreement.
22. The interpretation of the expression “party” as defined under Section 2(1)(h) came up for the consideration of this Court in Indowind Energy Ltd (supra). In that case, an agreement of sale was entered into by the first and second respondents. The agreement described the second respondent as the ‘buyer’ and promoter of Indowind, the non-signatory. After a dispute arose, the first respondent instituted an application under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration Act against the second respondent and Indowind. Indowind resisted the impleadment on the ground that it was not a party to the underlying sale agreement and, therefore, had not consented to be bound by the arbitration clause. The issue before this Court was whether the arbitration agreement contained in the sale agreement was binding on Indowind. This Court refused to join Indowind to the arbitration agreement on the ground that (i) Indowind was not a signatory to the sale agreement;
(ii) Indowind and the promoter company were two independent companies with a separate and distinct legal existence; and (iii) the fact that Indowind did not sign the sale agreement indicated that it was the mutual intention of all the parties to not make it a party to the arbitration agreement.
23. The pre Chloro Controls (supra) position was characterized by three underlying precepts: (i) arbitration could be invoked at the instance of a signatory to the arbitration agreement only in respect to disputes with
14 (2008) 4 SCC 91
COX AND KINGS LTD. v. SAP INDIA PVT. LTD. & ANR.
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, CJI] SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.650 another signatory party;15 (ii) the court would adopt a strict interpretation of the provisions of the Arbitration Act, particularly the unamended Section 8 which only allowed reference of “parties” to an arbitration agreement; and (iii) there was an emphasis on formal consent of the parties, thereby excluding any scope for implied consent of the non-signatories to be bound by an arbitration agreement. This position of law underwent a significant change when a Bench of three Judges of this Court in Chloro Controls (supra) allowed joinder of non-signatory parties to the arbitration agreement on the basis of the group of companies doctrine.
a. Chloro Controls
24. In Chloro Controls (supra) this Court was called upon to determine an arbitral reference in case of multi-party agreements where performance of the ancillary agreements was substantially dependent upon effective execution of the principal agreement. In that case, a foreign entity and an Indian entity incorporated a joint venture company to market and distribute chlorination equipment. With respect to the joint venture, the related companies of both the Indian and foreign entity were also involved. Consequently, the parties concluded several ancillary agreements such as a Shareholders’ Agreement which contained an arbitration clause. All the contracting parties were not signatories to all the agreements, including the Shareholders’ Agreement. When disputes arose between the parties, the foreign entities sought to terminate the joint venture. The Indian entity filed an application before the High Court seeking a declaration to restrain the foreign entities from repudiating their obligations under the agreements. In response, the foreign entities applied for referring the disputes to arbitration in view of the fact that the agreements were binding on the non-signatories because of the composite nature of the transaction. A Single Judge of the High Court granted the application of the Indian entity, which was set aside by the Division Bench of the High Court. The primary issue before this Court pertained to the ambit and scope of Section 45 of the Arbitration Act. This Court framed the issue in the following terms:
“1.3. Whether in a case where multiple agreements are signed between different parties and where some contain an arbitration clause and 15 S N Prasad v. Monnet Finance Ltd, (2011) 1 SCC 320 others do not and further the parties are not identically common in proceedings before the court (in a suit) and the arbitration agreement, a reference of disputes as a whole or in part can be made to the Arbitral Tribunal, more particularly, where the parties to an action are claiming under or through a party to the arbitration agreement”
25. Section 45 of the Arbitration Act in its unamended form read as follows:
“45. Power of judicial authority to refer parties to arbitration.— Notwithstanding anything contained in Part I or in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), a judicial authority, when seized of an action in a matter in respect of which the parties have made an agreement referred to in Section 44, shall, at the request of one of the parties or any person claiming through or under him, refer the parties to arbitration, that the said agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.”
(emphasis supplied)
In view of the language of Section 45, this Court held that the expression “any person” reflects a legislative intent of enlarging the scope beyond “parties” who are signatories to the arbitration agreement to include non-signatories. However, the court noted that such non-signatory parties are required to claim “through or under the signatory party.” Thus, this Court accepted that arbitration is possible between a signatory to an arbitration agreement and a third party or non-signatory claiming through a party.
26. The next issue before this Court was to determine whether there was any legal relationship between the signatory and the non-signatory for the latter to “claim through or under” the former. The court noted that the group of companies doctrine has been developed by courts and tribunals in the international context to bind a non-signatory affiliate or sister concern within the same corporate group as the signatory party, to an arbitration agreement provided there was a mutual intention of all the parties. This court emphasized that the “intention of the parties” is the underlying principle for the application of the group of companies doctrine. It observed: “72. This evolves the principle that a non-signatory party could be subjected to arbitration provided these transactions were with group of COX AND KINGS LTD. v. SAP INDIA PVT. LTD. & ANR.
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, CJI] SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.652 companies and there was a clear intention of the parties to bind both, the signatory as well as the non-signatory parties. In other words, “intention of the parties” is a very significant feature which must be established before the scope of arbitration can be said to include the signatory as well as the non-signatory parties.”
(emphasis supplied)
27. The court held that a non-signatory could be subjected to arbitration “without their prior consent” in “exceptional cases” on the basis of four determinative factors:
(i) A direct relationship to the party which is a signatory to the arbitration agreement;
(ii) A direct commonality of the subject-matter and the agreement between the parties being a composite transaction;
(iii) The transaction being of a composite nature where performance of the mother agreement may not be feasible without the aid, execution, and performance of supplementary or ancillary agreements for achieving the common object and collectively have a bearing on the dispute; and
(iv) A composite reference of such parties will serve the ends of justice.
28. In Chloro Controls (supra), this Court acknowledged that cases of composite transactions involving multi-party agreement give rise to peculiar challenges where non-signatories may be implicated in the dispute because of their legal relationship and involvement in the performance of contractual obligations. To remedy such situations, it was held that the group of companies doctrine could be applied to systematically evaluate the facts and circumstances to determine “a clear intention of the parties to bind both, the signatory as well as the non-signatory parties” to the arbitration agreement.
29. Chloro Controls (supra) was dealing with a situation where the success of the joint venture agreement was dependent upon the fulfilment of all the ancillary agreements. In this context, this Court observed that all the ancillary agreements were relatable to the parent agreement and the ancillary agreements were intrinsically linked with each other, to the extent that they could not be severed. This in the view of the court indicated the intention of the parties to refer all disputes arising out of the parent agreement and ancillary agreements to the arbitral tribunal.
30. Furthermore, this Court explained the phrase “legal relationship” to mean the relationship of the signatory party with the person claiming under or through them. It observed that all the agreements were signed by “some parties or their holding companies or the companies into which the signatory company had merged.” Although these companies did not put pen to paper for all the agreements, they were descendants in interest or subsidiaries of the signatory parties and therefore would be covered under the expression “claiming through or under” the parties to the agreement. In this context the Court observed that being part of the same corporate group, the interests of the non-signatory companies were not adverse to the interest of the principal company and the joint venture company. Therefore, the group of companies doctrine formed the basis for a non-signatory to claim through or under the signatory. Chloro Controls (supra) laid down the ratio that a non-signatory person or entity could be made a party to an arbitration agreement, as “claiming through or under” a signatory party, if the circumstances demonstrate the mutual intention of the parties on the basis of the composite nature of the transaction, direct commonality of subjectmatter, and direct relationship of the non-signatory to the signatory parties. b. Development of Law after Chloro Controls
31. In the aftermath of Chloro Controls (supra), the Law Commission of India published a Report in 2014 recommending amendments to the Arbitration Act. The Commission observed that the phrase “claiming through or under” as used and understood in Section 45 is absent in the corresponding provision of Section 8. To cure this anomaly, it was suggested that the definition of “party” under Section 2(1)(h) be amended to also include the expression “a person claiming through or under such party.”16 In 2016, the legislature amended Section 8 to bring it in line with Section 45 of the Arbitration Act. The unamended Section 8(1) provided that a party to an arbitration agreement could make an application seeking a reference to arbitration. The amended Section 8(1) provided that “a party to an arbitration 16 Law Commission of India, ‘Amendments to the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996’, Report No. 246 (August 2014)
COX AND KINGS LTD. v. SAP INDIA PVT. LTD. & ANR.
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, CJI] SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.654 agreement or any person claiming through or under him” could seek a reference to arbitration. However, the legislature did not bring about any change in the language of Section 2(1)(h) or Section 7 of the Arbitration Act. Since Chloro Controls (supra) and the amendment to Section 8, subsequent decisions of this Court have referred to the group of companies doctrine to join non-signatories persons or entities to arbitration agreements.
32. In Cheran Properties (supra), the issue before this Court was whether the arbitral award could be enforced under Section 35 of the Arbitration Act against a non-signatory, who was a nominee of one of the signatories to the arbitration agreement and a direct beneficiary of the underlying contract between the signatories. Section 35 of the Arbitration Act postulates that an arbitral award “shall be final and binding on the parties and persons claiming under them respectively.” This Court observed that the expression “persons claiming under them” refers to every person whose capacity or position is derived from and is same as a party to the proceedings. It held that the non-signatory, being a nominee of one of the signatory parties, was bound by the arbitral award as it was claiming under the signatory.
33. This Court in Cheran Properties (supra) interpreted the group of companies doctrine to hold that its true purport is to enforce the common intention of the parties where the circumstances indicate that both the signatories and non-signatories were intended to be bound. One of us (D Y Chandrachud J) explained the evolution of the group of companies doctrine in the Indian context in the following terms:
“23. As the law has evolved, it has recognised that modern business transactions are often effectuated through multiple layers and agreements. There may be transactions within a group of companies. The circumstances in which they have entered into them may reflect an intention to bind both signatory and non-signatory entities within the same group. In holding a non-signatory bound by an arbitration agreement, the court approaches the matter by attributing to the transactions a meaning consistent with the business sense which was intended to be ascribed to them. Therefore, factors such as the relationship of a non-signatory to a party which is a signatory to the agreement, the commonality of subject-matter and the composite nature of the transaction weigh in the balance. The group of companies doctrine is essentially intended to facilitate the fulfilment of a mutually held intent between the parties, where the circumstances indicate that the intent was to bind both signatories and non-signatories. The effort is to find the true essence of the business arrangement and to unravel from a layered structure of commercial arrangements, an intent to bind someone who is not formally a signatory but has assumed the obligation to be bound by the actions of a signatory.”
(emphasis supplied)
34. The decision in Cheran Properties (supra) holds that the group of companies doctrine is applied to bind a non-signatory party upon a construction of the arbitration agreement, circumstances which exist at the time of entering into the contract, and the performance of the underlying contract. Nevertheless, it must be noted that Cheran Properties (supra) did not apply the group of companies doctrine to make the non-signatory a party to the arbitration agreement. Rather, this Court made the arbitral award binding on a non-signatory under Section 35 on the ground that it was claiming under a party which was a signatory to the arbitration agreement.
35. In Ameet Lalchand Shah v. Rishabh Enterprises,17 a two-Judge Bench of this Court was dealing with an arbitral dispute arising out of four interconnected agreements executed towards a single commercial project. The issue was whether the four agreements were interconnected to refer all the parties to arbitration. In that case, all the parties were not signatories to the main agreement containing the arbitration clause. This Court relied on Chloro Controls (supra) to hold that a non-signatory, which is a party to an interconnected agreement, would be bound by the arbitration clause in the principal agreement. It observed that in view of the composite nature of the transaction, the disputes between the parties to various agreements could be resolved effectively by referring all of them to arbitration.
36. Over time, this Court has identified certain additional factors for the invocation of the group of companies doctrine. In Reckitt Benckiser
17 (2018) 15 SCC 678
COX AND KINGS LTD. v. SAP INDIA PVT. LTD. & ANR.
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, CJI] SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.656 (India) Private Limited v. Reynders Label Printing India Private Limited,18 a two-Judge Bench of this Court was dealing with an application under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration Act seeking the appointment of an arbitrator. This Court prima facie observed that the parties belonged to the same group of companies. Subsequently, the issue before this Court was whether there was a clear intention of the parties to bind both the signatory and non-signatory parties based on their participation in the negotiation of the underlying contract. The court held that the non-signatory party, even though a constituent part of the corporate group, did not have “any causal connection with the process of negotiations preceding the agreement or the execution thereof, whatsoever.” Thus, the participation of the non-signatory party in the negotiation and performance of the underlying contract was held to be the key determinant of the intention of the parties to be bound by an arbitration agreement.
37. In Canara Bank (supra), this Court emphasized that the group of companies doctrine could be invoked on the basis of the principle of “single economic unit”. In that case, the facts were that Canbank Financial Services Ltd19, a wholly owned subsidiary of Canara Bank, subscribed to the bonds floated by MTNL. CANFINA subsequently transferred the bonds to Canara Bank. Eventually, MTNL cancelled the bonds which gave rise to the dispute between the parties. Canara Bank filed a writ petition before the Delhi High Court challenging the cancellation of bonds by MTNL. The High Court referred the parties to arbitration, but Canara Bank challenged the impleadment of CANFINA. This Court dismissed Canara Bank’s objection on the ground that CANFINA was a necessary and proper party to the arbitral proceedings, being the original purchaser to the bonds. While dealing with the contours of the group of companies doctrine, this Court noted that the doctrine could also be invoked “in cases where there is a tight group structure with strong organizational and financial links, so as to constitute a single economic unit, or a single economic reality.”
38. The last in the series of decisions dealing with the group of companies doctrine is a three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in Discovery Enterprises
18 (2019) 7 SCC 62
19 “CANFINA”
(supra). In that case, ONGC entered into a contract with Discovery Enterprises for operating a shipping vessel. After a dispute arose between the parties, ONGC invoked the arbitration clause in the contract against Discovery Enterprises and Jindal Drilling and Industries Ltd., a sister company of Discovery Enterprises. The arbitral tribunal refused to proceed with the claim against Jindal Drilling and Industries Ltd. on the ground that it was not a signatory to the arbitration agreement. In an appeal filed by ONGC under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act, the High Court upheld the decision of the tribunal. The High Court’s decision was challenged before this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. This Court cited Chloro Controls (supra) and the subsequent decisions with approval to emphasize that the group of companies doctrine can be applied to bind a company within a group which is not a signatory to the arbitration agreement. The Court held that in addition to the cumulative factors laid down in Chloro Controls (supra), the performance of the contract was also an essential factor to be considered by the courts and tribunals to bind a non-signatory to the arbitration agreement. Ultimately, this Court set aside the decision of the arbitral tribunal on the ground that it failed to address the plea raised by ONGC, and remanded the matter back to the tribunal to decide afresh.
ii. France – The Dow Chemicals case
39. The application of the group of companies doctrine in arbitration law mainly originated from the decisions rendered by international arbitral tribunals. Before proceeding to analyze the contours of the doctrine, it is necessary to understand its origin and development in the international context. Such an analysis is particularly relevant because any authoritative determination by this Court with regard to the group of companies doctrine ought to be in tune with the internationally accepted principles on the vexed issue of joining non-signatories to arbitration agreements.
40. The origin of the doctrine is primarily attributed to a number of arbitration awards rendered mainly in France. The most prominent among them remains an interim award delivered more than four decades ago by an ICC tribunal in Case No. 4131,20 more popularly known as the Dow Chemicals case. In that case, Dow Chemical (Venezuela) entered 20 Dow Chemical v. Isover Saint Gobain, Interim Award, ICC Case No. 4131, 23 September 1982 COX AND KINGS LTD. v. SAP INDIA PVT. LTD. & ANR.
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, CJI] SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.658 into a contract with a French company, which later assigned the rights to Isover Saint Gobain, for distribution of thermal isolation products in France. Dow Chemical (Venezuela) subsequently assigned the contract to Dow Chemical AG, which was a subsidiary of Dow Chemical Company – the holding company. Thereafter, Dow Chemical Europe, a subsidiary of Dow Chemical AG, entered into a similar contract with three companies, which subsequently assigned the contract to Isover Saint Gobain. Both contracts provided that the deliveries of products to the distributors will be made by Dow Chemical France, or any other subsidiary of Dow Chemical Company. Several suits were instituted against the companies of the Dow Chemical group before the French courts. In response, the four companies of the Dow Chemical group (the two formal parties to the contract – Dow Chemical AG and Dow Chemical Europe, and the two non-signatories – Dow Chemical Company and Dow Chemical France) instituted arbitral proceedings against Isover Saint Gobain before the ICC tribunal.
41. The primary issue before the ICC tribunal was to determine its own jurisdiction over the non-signatory parties. The tribunal sought to determine whether there existed a common intention of the parties to be bound by the arbitration agreement. The tribunal established the common intention of the parties by analyzing the factual circumstances underpinning the negotiation, performance, and termination of the contracts. The tribunal held that Dow Chemical France “was a party” to the two contracts, and consequently to the arbitration agreements contained in them, because it played a preponderant role in the negotiation, performance, and termination of the contract. As for Dow Chemical Company, the tribunal held that the holding company had ownership of the trademarks under which the products were marketed in France and had absolute control over its subsidiaries who were involved in the negotiation, performance, and termination of the two contracts. The tribunal also relied on the fact that Isover Saint Gobain applied for the joinder of the holding company into the court proceedings in France before the Court of Appeal of Paris.
42. After concluding that the non-signatories were also a party to the arbitration agreement, the tribunal proceeded to analyze the factual circumstances of the signatory and non-signatory belonging to the same group of companies. At the outset, the tribunal observed that a group of companies constitutes one and the same economic reality. However, the tribunal emphasized that a non-signatory may be bound by the arbitration agreement entered into by another entity of the same group if the non-signatory appears to be a veritable party to the contracts on the basis of their involvement in the negotiation, performance, and termination of the contracts. The relevant observation is extracted below:
“Considering, in particular, that the arbitration clause expressly accepted by certain of the companies of the group should bind the other companies which, by virtue of their role in their conclusion, performance, or termination of the contracts containing said clause, and in accordance with the mutual intention of all parties to the proceedings, appear to have been veritable parties to these contracts or to have been principally concerned by them and the disputes to which they may give rise.”
43. In Dow Chemical (supra), the arbitral tribunal did not base its decision to extend the arbitration agreement to non-signatories solely on the fact that both the signatory and non-signatory parties were members of the same group. The tribunal emphasized the importance of determining the true parties to the arbitration agreement on the basis of their participation in the negotiation, performance, and termination of the agreement. The Dow Chemical case has been regarded as being instrumental in the transition from a restrictive interpretation of consent focusing only on its express manifestation to a more flexible approach attaching necessary relevance to implied consent to be bound by the arbitration agreement.21
44. In a series of subsequent rulings, the Court of Appeal of Paris acknowledged the extension of an arbitration agreement to non-signatories provided there was common intention of all the parties. According to the Court of Appeal, the common intention may be ascertained from the active role played by the non-signatories in the performance of the contract containing 21 Bernard Hanotiau and Leonardo Ohlrogge, ‘40th Year Anniversary of the Dow Chemical Award’ 40(2) ASA Bulletin 300-308.
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[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, CJI] SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.660 the arbitration agreement, which gives rise to the presumption that the nonsignatory had knowledge of the arbitration agreement.22
45. The French law has been succinctly summarized in an unpublished ICC award in case No. 11405 of 2001 in the following terms:
“[t]here is no general rule, in French international arbitration law, that would provide that non-signatory parties members of a same group of companies would be bound by an arbitration clause, whether always or in determined circumstances. What is relevant is whether all parties intended non-signatory parties to be bound by the arbitration clause. Not only the signatory parties, but also the non-signatory parties should have intended (or led the other parties to reasonably believe that they intended) to be bound by the arbitration clause.”23 Hence our understanding of the position in French law is that an arbitration agreement can be extended to non-signatory parties if all the parties to the arbitration agreement had a common intention to be bound by the agreement. The subjective intention of the parties is to be inferred on the basis of their objective conduct during the negotiation, performance, and termination of the underlying contract containing the arbitration agreement. iii. Switzerland
46. Section 178(1) of the Swiss Private International Law Act 1987 states that an “arbitration agreement must be made in writing or any other means of communication allowing it to be evidenced by text.” In 2003, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court held that once there is a valid arbitration clause according to Section 178(1) of the Swiss Act, the issue whether it also extends to non-signatories may be decided by the courts or the arbitral tribunals. As a matter of general rule, the Swiss courts have extended an arbitration agreement to non-signatories typically in cases of assignment of a claim, assumption of debt or delegation of a contract.24 22 Paris Court of Appeal, 7 December 1994, V 2000 (formerly Jaguar France) v. Project XS, Rev. Arb. (1996) 67.
23 Yves Derains, ‘Is there a Group of Companies Doctrine?’ in Bernard Hanotiau and Eric Schwartz (eds) in Dossier of the ICC Institute of World Business Law, Volume 7, 131-145.
24 A, B, C v. D and State of Libya, 4A_636/2018
47. In a decision rendered in 1996, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court held that the fact that a non-signatory party belonged to the same group of companies as the signatory party to the arbitration agreement was not a sufficient justification for binding the non-signatory to the arbitration agreement.25 However, the Swiss Courts are not averse to extending an arbitration agreement to non-signatory parties if there is an independent and formally valid manifestation of consent of the non-signatory party to the arbitration agreement.
48. In Swiss law, the consent of the parties to be bound by an arbitration agreement may be express or implied by conduct. In a 2008 decision, the Swiss Federal Court held that certain behavior or conduct may substitute compliance with a formal requirement of an arbitration agreement.26 To determine the implied consent, it was held that the courts or tribunals may take into consideration the fact whether the non-signatory party was involved in the negotiation and performance of the contract, and thereby expressed its willingness to be bound by the arbitration agreement.27 Thus, the subjective element of willingness to be bound by an arbitration agreement ought to be expressed through an objective element in the form of negotiation or performance of the contract.
iv. England
49. The English courts have generally taken a conservative approach to binding non-signatory parties to arbitration agreements. Section 82(2) of the English Arbitration Act 1996 defines a “party to arbitration agreement” to include “any person claiming under or through a party to the agreement.” The English law envisages that even non-signatory parties may be bound by an arbitration agreement but only if they are claiming under or through the original party to the agreement. The English courts have adopted an approach which favors a strict adherence to the doctrine of privity. Under English law, an arbitration agreement is extended to non-signatory parties on the basis of traditional contractual principles and doctrines such as agency, novation, 25 Saudi Butec Ltd et Al Fouzan Trading v. Saudi Arabian Saipem Ltd, unpublished ICC Interim Award of 25 October 1994, confirmed by DFT on 29 January 1996, ASA Bulletin (1996) Vol 3 p 496.
26 Decision 4A_376/2008 of 5 December 2008.
27 X v. Y Engineering S.p.A. and Y S.p.A., 4A_450/2013, ASA Bull., 160 (2015). COX AND KINGS LTD. v. SAP INDIA PVT. LTD. & ANR.
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, CJI] SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.662 assignment, operation of law, and merger and succession.28 However, the English law has explicitly rejected other doctrines such as piercing the corporate veil, equitable estoppel, and group of companies as a basis for extending an arbitration agreement to non-signatory parties.
50. In Peterson Farms INC v. C & M Farming Limited,29 a claim for damages was brought against Peterson Farms by the respondent C & M Farming for damages suffered by several C & M group entities, some of them being non-signatories to the arbitration agreement. The arbitral tribunal applied the group of companies doctrine to hold that C & M Farming contracted on behalf of the entire C & M group entities, and therefore was entitled to claim all the damages suffered by the C & M group entities arising out of the contractual relationship with Peterson. In appeal, the Commercial Court held that the chosen proper law of the Agreement - Arkansas law – is similar to the English law which excludes the application of the group of companies doctrine. Thus, the English law does not favor the application of the group of companies doctrine for extending an arbitration agreement to non-signatory parties.
51. The English precedents have also dealt with the meaning of the phrase “claiming through or under”, which was referred to by this Court in Chloro Controls (supra). In Roussel-Uclaf v. G D Searle and Co Ltd30, the issue before the Court of Chancery Division was whether a wholly owned subsidiary company could claim to be a party to an arbitration agreement between the parent company and a third party. The Court was called upon to interpret Section 1 of the Arbitration Act of 1975 which allowed any party to an arbitration agreement “or any person claiming through or under him” to apply to a court to stay proceedings where an arbitration agreement existed. It was held that the subsidiary can claim the benefit of the arbitration agreement because the parent company and the subsidiary were “so closely related” that it could be said that the subsidiary was “claiming through or 28 Audley William Sheppard, ‘Third Party Non-Signatories in English Arbitration Law’ in Stavros Brekoulakis, Julian Lew, et al (eds) The Evolution and Future of International Arbitration (Kluwer Law International, 2016) 183-198.
29 [2004] EWHC 121 (Comm)
30 [1978] 1 Lloyd’s Rep under” the parent company. In City of London v. Sancheti,31 the Court of Appeal overturned Roussel-Uclaf (supra) on the ground that an entity cannot be considered to be claiming through or under merely because there is a “legal or commercial connection” between them.
52. Section 5 of the English Arbitration Act, 1996 requires an arbitration agreement to be in writing. Further, Section 5(2)(a) provides that it is not necessary for the parties to sign the arbitration agreement. In such situations, the critical question that arises before the English courts is whether a non-signatory party is bound by an arbitration agreement. The English law position is that “contracts are not to be lightly implied” and the court “must be able to conclude with confidence both that the parties intended to create contractual relations and that the agreement was to the effect contended for.”32 However, in limited situations, a contract is implied if the parties conducted themselves in a manner as if they have formally entered into a contract.33
53. In Dallah Real Estate and Tourism Holding Company v. The Ministry of Religious Affairs, Government of Pakistan34, the Government of Pakistan entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with Dallah Real Estate and Tourism Holding Company35 for construction of housing facilities in Mecca, Saudi Arabia. Subsequently, an agreement was executed between Dallah and the Awami Hajj Trust, which was established by the Government through an Ordinance. However, the trust ceased to exist as a legal entity because the Ordinance was not laid before Parliament and no further ordinance was promulgated. Dallah commenced arbitral proceedings against the Government. The UK Supreme Court had to determine whether there was a common intention on behalf of the Government and Dallah to make the former a party to the agreement. The Court observed that the “common intention of the parties means their subjective intention derived 31 The Mayoralty and Commonalty & Citizens of the City of London v. Ashok Sancheti, [2008] EWCA Civ 1283 32 Blackpool and Fylde Aero Club Ltd. v. Blackpool Borough Council, [1990] 1 WLR 33 Chitty on Contracts, Hugh Beale (ed), (32nd edn, Sweet and Maxwell, 2015) para 2-169.
34 [2010] UKSC 46 35 “Dallah”
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[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, CJI] SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.664 from the objective evidence.” It was held that there was no evidence to conclude that the Government’s behavior showed that it always considered itself to be a true party to the agreement.
v. Singapore
54. In Manuchar Steel Hong Kong Limited v. Star Pacific Line Pte Ltd,36 the Singapore High Court expressly rejected the group of companies doctrine to bind non-signatories to arbitration agreement. The High Court reasoned that the group of companies doctrine was: first, anathema to the logic of consensual basis of an agreement to arbitrate; and second, ordering of companies within a broader group did not mean one could dispense with separate legal entity. The Singapore High Court relied on position of law taken in Peterson Farms INC (supra) to observe that enforceable obligations cannot be imposed on “strangers” to an arbitration agreement.
vi. United States of America
55. The Federal Arbitration Act is silent on the aspect of the joinder of non-signatory parties to the arbitration agreement. Nevertheless, the US courts have often used the general principles of contract law such as incorporation by reference, assumption, agency, veil piercing or alter ego, and estoppel for binding non-signatories to arbitration agreements.37 Although the United States follow a pro-arbitration policy, an important issue that often comes up for deliberation is whether the domestic doctrines could be applied for binding non-signatories in cases of international arbitration.
56. In G E Energy Power Conversion France SAS v. Outokumpu Stainless,38 the issue before the United States Supreme Court was whether the New York Convention precludes a non-signatory to an international arbitration agreement from compelling arbitration by invoking domestic doctrines such as equitable estoppel. In that case, the Eleventh Circuit Court refused to apply the domestic doctrine of equitable estoppel on the ground that it conflicts with the signature requirements under the New York 36 [2014] SGHC 181 37 Andrijana Misovic, ‘Binding non-signatories to arbitrate: the United States approach’ (2021) 37(3) Arbitration International 749-768.
38 140 S. Ct. 1637 (2020)
Convention. The Circuit Court observed that Article II of the New York Convention contains a strict requirement that the parties “actually sign” the arbitration agreement in order to compel the parties to arbitration. The US Supreme Court held that the Article II of the New York Convention does not restrict the contracting states from applying domestic law to refer parties to arbitration agreements. Moreover, it was observed that “the provisions of Article II contemplate the use of domestic doctrines to fill gaps in the Convention.” Thus, it was held that the New York Convention does not set out a comprehensive regime to preclude the use of domestic law to enforce arbitration agreements.
57. Unlike the English courts, the US Courts have used non-consensual doctrines to extend arbitration agreements to non-signatory parties. For instance, the US Courts have pierced the corporate veil and held the alter ego liable in exceptional circumstances where the parent company exercised complete control over the subsidiary with respect to the transaction at issue.39 Similarly, the doctrine of arbitral estoppel has been developed by the US Courts to bind non-signatory parties to an arbitration agreement. The doctrine of arbitral estoppel suggests that a party is estopped from denying its obligation to arbitrate when it received a ‘direct benefit’ from a contract containing an arbitration agreement.40 The second type of arbitral estoppel developed by the US courts places emphasis on the substantial interdependent relationship between the signatory and non-signatory party.41 In a situation where claims of concerted misconduct were raised against both the signatory and non-signatory to the contract, the courts have resorted to the doctrine of equitable estoppel to further the policy of pro-arbitration.42
58. The above discussion shows that international jurisdictions, in some form or the other, have moved beyond the formalistic requirement of consent to bind a non-signatory to an arbitration agreement. The primary conclusion is that the issue of binding a non-signatory to an arbitration 39 American Fuel Corp v. Utah Energy Development Co, Inc, 122 F.3d 130, 134 (2d Cir 1997)
40 American Bureau, Shipping v. Tencara Shipyard, 170 F.3d 349, 353 (2d Cir 1999) 41 Sunkist Soft Drinks, Inc v. Sunkist Growers, Inc, 10 F.3d 753, 757 (11th Cir 1993) 42 Grigson v. Creative Artists Agency, LLC, 210 F.3d 524 (2000) COX AND KINGS LTD. v. SAP INDIA PVT. LTD. & ANR.
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, CJI] SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.666 agreement is more of a fact-specific aspect.43 In jurisdictions such as France and Switzerland, there is a broad consensus that consent or subjective intention of a non-signatory to arbitrate may be proved by conduct. Such subjective intention could be derived from the objective evidence in the form of participation of the non-signatory in the negotiation, performance, or termination of the underlying contract containing the arbitration agreement. However, the group of companies doctrine has not been universally accepted by all jurisdictions.
In jurisdictions such as France where the doctrine has gained acceptance, group of companies is one of the several factors that a court or tribunal considers to determine the mutual intention of all the parties to join the non-signatory to the arbitration agreement. Keeping in mind the above background, we now move on to analyze the applicability of the group of companies doctrine in the Indian context.
Arbitration Agreement i. Consent as the basis for arbitration
59. Arbitration is an alternative dispute resolution mechanism where parties consensually decide to submit a dispute between them to an arbitral tribunal to the exclusion of domestic courts.44 Arbitration provides a neutral, efficient, and expert process for dispute resolution at a single forum whose decision is final and binding on the parties. The principle of party autonomy underpins the arbitration process as it allows the parties to dispense with technical formalities and agree upon substantive and procedural laws and rules applicable to the merits of the dispute.45 Party autonomy allows the parties to choose the seat of arbitration, number of arbitrators, procedure for appointment of arbitrators, rules governing the arbitral procedure, and the institution which will administer the arbitration. An arbitration proceeding is broadly divided into two stages: The first 43 Bernard Hanotiau, ‘May an Arbitration Clause be Extended to Non-signatories: Individuals, States or Other Companies of the Group?’ in Complex Arbitrations: Multiparty, multi-contract, Multi-issue – A comparative study’ Bernard Hanotiau (eds) (2nd edn, 2020) 95, 194.
44 Gary Born, International Arbitration Law and Practice (3rd ed, 2021) 2. 45 Bharat Aluminium Company v Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services, (2016) 4 SCC stage commences with an arbitration agreement and ends with the making of an arbitral award. The second stage pertains to the enforcement of the arbitral award.46
60. Consent forms the cornerstone of arbitration. An arbitration agreement records the consent of the parties to submit their disputes to arbitration. A two-Judge Bench of this Court in Bihar State Mineral Development Corporation v. Encon Builders (I) Pvt. Ltd.47 laid down four essential elements of an arbitration agreement:
(i) There must be a present or a future difference in connection with some contemplated affair
(ii) The parties must intend to settle such difference by a private tribunal
(iii) The parties must agree in writing to be bound by the decision of such tribunal.
(iv) The parties must be ad idem.
61. An arbitration agreement is a contractual undertaking by two or more parties to resolve their disputes by the process of arbitration, even if the disputes themselves are not based on contractual obligations. An arbitration agreement is a conclusive proof that the parties have consented to submit their dispute to an arbitral tribunal to the exclusion of domestic courts. The basis for an arbitration agreement is generally traced to the contractual freedom of parties to codify their intention to consensually submit their disputes to an alternative dispute resolution process.
62. According to Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1908, the courts have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature except suits whose cognizance is expressly or impliedly barred. The said provision gives a right to any person to file a civil suit before a court of competent jurisdiction. Moreover, Section 28 of the Indian Contract Act of 187248 provides that any agreement restraining a party from enforcing their rights under a contract 46 Satish Kumar v. Surinder Kumar, (1969) 2 SCR 244
47 (2003) 7 SCC 418
48 “Contract Act”
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[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, CJI] SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.668 before courts or tribunals is void to that extent. However, the provision specifically saves a contract by which two or more persons agree that any dispute, which may arise between them, in respect of any subject or class of subjects shall be referred to arbitration. Thus, arbitration agreements are granted a statutory exception under Section 28 of the Contract Act. In Dhulabhai v. State of Madhya Pradesh a Constitution Bench of this Court held that the jurisdiction of civil courts may be excluded by an express provision of law or by clear intendment arising from such law.49 In Chloro Controls (supra), this Court observed that Section 45 of the Arbitration Act shall prevail over the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in case of a valid arbitration agreement. Considering the fact that an arbitration agreement excludes the jurisdiction of civil courts, such an agreement ought to be valid and enforceable.
63. An arbitration agreement must satisfy the principles of contract law laid down under the Contract Act, in addition to satisfying other requirements stipulated under Section 7 of the Arbitration Act, to qualify as a valid agreement.50 Section 2(e) of the Contract Act defines an agreement as every promise and every set of promises forming the consideration for each other. An agreement enforceable by law is a contract. An agreement should satisfy the mandate of Section 10 of the Contract Act to be enforceable by law. Section 10 provides that all agreements are contracts if they are made by the free consent of parties competent to contract, for a lawful consideration and with a lawful object. According to Section 13, two or more persons are said to consent when they agree upon the same thing in the same sense. Thus, consensus ad idem between the parties forms the essential basis to constitute a valid arbitration agreement.
64. Being a creature of a contract, an arbitration agreement is also bound by the general principles of contract law, including the doctrine of privity. The doctrine of privity means that a contract cannot confer rights or impose liabilities on any person except the parties to the contract. This doctrine has two aspects: first, only the parties to the contract are entitled under it or bound by it; and second, the parties to the contract cannot impose a
49 (1968) 3 SCR 662
50 Vidya Drolia v. Durga Trading Corporation, (2021) 2 SCC 1 liability on a third party. As a corollary, a third party cannot acquire rights and entitlements under a contract. In M C Chacko v. State Bank of Travancore, this Court held it as a settled principle of law that a person who is not party to a contract cannot enforce the terms of the contract, subject to certain wellrecognised exceptions such as trust, family arrangement, and assignment.51 The principle that only the parties to an arbitration agreement are either bound or benefited by such an agreement is fundamental to arbitration.52 This principle is uniformly reflected in international arbitration conventions as well as the Arbitration Act. For instance, Section 7 of the UNCITRAL Model Law defines an arbitration agreement as “an agreement by the parties to submit to arbitration all or certain disputes which have arisen or which may arise between them in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not.” (emphasis supplied)
65. It is a generally accepted legal proposition that arbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which they have not agreed so to submit.53 Since consent forms the cornerstone of arbitration, a non-signatory cannot be forcibly made a “party” to an arbitration agreement as doing so would violate the sacrosanct principles of privity of contract and party autonomy. However, In case of multi-party contracts, the courts and tribunals are often called upon to determine the parties to an arbitration agreement.
ii. Parties to Arbitration Agreement
66. The general method to figure out the parties to an arbitration agreement is to look for the entities who are named in the recitals and have signed the agreement. The signature of a party on the agreement is the most profound expression of the consent of a person or entity to submit to the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal. However, the corollary that persons or entities who have not signed the agreement are not bound by it may not always be correct. A written contract does not necessarily require that parties put their signatures to the document embodying the terms of the
51 (1969) 2 SCC 343
52 Gary Born (n 44) 1518.
53 United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation, (1960) 363 US 574, COX AND KINGS LTD. v. SAP INDIA PVT. LTD. & ANR.
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, CJI] SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.670 agreement.54 Therefore, the term “non-signatories”, instead of the traditional “third parties”, seems the most suitable to describe situations where consent to arbitration is expressed through means other than signature. A nonsignatory is a person or entity that is implicated in a dispute which is the subject matter of an arbitration, although it has not formally entered into an arbitration agreement.55 The important determination is whether such a non-signatory intended to effect legal relations with the signatory parties and be bound by the arbitration agreement. There may arise situations where persons or entities who have not formally signed the arbitration agreement or the underlying contract containing the arbitration agreement may intend to be bound by the terms of the agreement. In other words, the issue of who is a “party” to an arbitration agreement is primarily an issue of consent.
67. Section 2 of the Contract Act provides that when a person signifies their willingness to do or to abstain from doing anything, with a view to obtaining the assent of that other to such act or abstinence, is said to make a proposal. The proposal is said to be accepted when the person to whom the proposal is made signifies their assent. A proposal becomes promise upon acceptance. Every promise and every set of promises, forming the consideration for each other, is an agreement. Importantly, Section 9 provides that a promise is said to be express if the proposal or acceptance of any promise is made in words, while a promise is said to be implied if such proposal or acceptance is “made otherwise than in words.” Thus, a contract may either be express or implied.
68. Chitty on Contracts explains the difference between express and implied contracts as follows:
“Contracts may either be express or implied. The difference is not one of legal effect but simply of the way in which the consent of the parties is manifested. Contracts are express when their terms are stated in words by the parties. They are often said to be implied when their terms are not so stated, as, for example, when a passenger 54 Pollock and Mulla, The Indian Contract and Specific Reliefs Act (14th edn, 2016) 235. 55 Stavros Brekoulakis, ‘Rethinking Consent in International Commercial Arbitration: A General Theory for Non-signatories’ (2017) 8 Journal of International Dispute Settlement 610.
is permitted to board a bus: from the conduct of the parties the law implies a promise by the passenger to pay the fare, and a promise by the operator of the bus to carry him safely to his destination.[…] Express and implied contracts are both contracts in the true sense of the term, for they both arise from the agreement of the parties, though in one case the agreement is manifested in words and in the other case by conduct. Since, as we have seen, agreement is not a mental state but an act, an inference from conduct, and since many of the terms of an express contract are often implied, it follows that the distinction between express and implied contracts has little importance.”56
69. The above exposition gives rise to the inference that in case of an implied contract, the question revolves around the determination of the consent of the parties to be bound by the terms of the contract. Such determination is manifested through the acts or conduct. The theory of implied contract by conduct has also been accepted by this Court. In Haji Mohammed Ishaq v. Mohamad Iqbal,57 the plaintiff supplied tobacco to the defendant. Although there was no express agreement between the parties, the defendant accepted the goods, but allegedly failed to clear the outstanding dues despite repeated demands raised by the plaintiff. A Bench of three Judges of this Court observed that the conduct of the defendants in accepting the goods and not repudiating any of the demand letters raised by the plaintiff “clearly showed that a direct contract which in law is called an implied contract by conduct was brough about between them.” Under the Indian contract law, it is posited that actions or conduct can be an indicator of consent of a party to be bound by a contract. This also applies to an arbitration agreement considering the fact that it is a creature of contract. However, an arbitration agreement also has to meet the requirements laid down under the Arbitration Act to be valid and enforceable.
70. Section 2(h) of the Arbitration Act defines a “party” to mean a party to an arbitration agreement. Section 7 defines an arbitration agreement to mean an agreement by the parties to submit to arbitration all or certain 56 Chitty on Contracts, Hugh Beale (ed) (32nd edn, Sweet and Maxwell, 2015) para 1-104.
57 (1978) 2 SCC 493
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[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, CJI] SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.672 disputes which have arisen or which may arise between them in respect of a “defined legal relationship.” Section 7 requires that an arbitration agreement has to be in writing. Section 7 indicates the circumstances in which it is regarded as an agreement in writing. Such an agreement may be embodied in a document, an exchange of communications, including in the electronic form, or in a statement of claim which is not traversed in the defence. In Vidya Drolia v. Durga Trading Corporation,58 this Court observed that a legal relationship means a relationship which gives rise to legal obligations and duties, and confers a right. Such a right may be contractual or noncontractual. In case of a non-contractual legal relationship, the cause of action arises in tort, restitution, breach of statutory duty, or some other noncontractual cause of action. Thus, the legislative intent underlying Section 7 suggests that any legal relationship, including relationships where there is no contract between the persons or entities, but whose actions or conduct has given rise to a relationship, could form a subject matter of an arbitration agreement under Section 7. This approach is in line with the observations of Lord Hoffman in Fiona Trust and Holding Company v. Privalov where it was observed that “the construction of an arbitration clause should start from the assumption that the parties, as rational businessmen, are likely to have intended any dispute arising out of the relationship into which they have entered or purported to enter to be decided by the same tribunal.”59 (emphasis supplied)
71. Section 7(3) requires an arbitration agreement to be in writing. Section 7(4) lays down three circumstances to elaborate when an arbitration agreement can be said to be in writing. According to the first circumstance laid down under Section 7(4)(a), an arbitration agreement is in writing if it is signed by the parties. This circumstance refers to a situation where the parties have formally executed and expressly assumed the status of parties by attesting their signatures to the arbitration agreement or the underlying contract containing the arbitration agreement. In such situations, the courts or tribunals only need to refer to the signature page or the recitals to figure out the parties to the arbitration agreement.
58 (2021) 2 SCC 1
59 [2007] UKHL 40
72. Section 7(4)(b) provides the second circumstance, according to which an arbitration agreement is in writing if it is contained in an exchange of letters, telex, telegrams or other means of telecommunication including communication through electronic means which provide a record of the agreement. According to this provision, the existence of an arbitration agreement can be inferred from various documents duly approved by the parties.60 Section 7(4)(b) dispenses with the conventional sense of an agreement as a document with signatories. Rather, it emphasizes on the manifestation of the consent of persons or entities through their actions of exchanging documents. However, the important aspect of the said provision lies in the fact that the parties should be able to record their agreement through a documentary record of evidence. In Great Offshore Ltd. v. Iranian Offshore Engineering and Construction Company, this Court observed that Section 7(4)(b) requires the court to ask whether a record of agreement is found in the exchange of letters, telex, telegrams, or other means of telecommunication.61 Thus, the act of agreeing by the persons or entities has to be inferred or derived by the courts or tribunals from the relevant documents and communication, neither of which can be equated with a conventional contract.
73. The third circumstance is provided under Section 7(4)(c), according to which an arbitration agreement is in writing if it is contained in an exchange of statements of claim and defence in which the existence of the agreement is alleged by one party and not denied by the other. A two-Judge Bench of this Court clarified in S N Prasad v. Monnet Finance Limited62 that there will be an “exchange of statements of claim and defence” for the purposes of Section 7(4)(c) if there is an assertion of the existence of an arbitration agreement in any suit, petition or application filed before any court or tribunal, and if there is no denial of it in the defence, counter, or written statement. Thus, in the third circumstance the court proceeds on the assumption that the conduct of the person or entity in not denying the existence of an arbitration agreement leads to the conclusive proof of its 60 Shakti Bhog Foods Limited v. Kola Shipping Ltd, (2009) 2 SCC 134; Trimex International FZE Ltd v. Vedanta Aluminium Ltd, (2010) 3 SCC 1
61 (2008) 14 SCC 240
62 (2011) 1 SCC 320
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[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, CJI] SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.674 existence. All the three circumstances contained in Section 7(4) are geared towards determining the mutual intention of the parties to be bound by the arbitration agreement.
74. Section 7 of the Arbitration Act contains two aspects: a substantive aspect and a formal aspect. The substantive aspect is contained is Section 7(1) which allows parties to submit disputes arising between them in respect of a defined legal relationship to arbitration. The legal relationships between and among parties could either be contractual or non-contractual. For legal relations to be contractual in nature, they ought to meet the requirements of the Indian contract law as contained in the Contract Act. It has been shown in the preceding paragraphs that a contract can either be express or implied, which is inferred on the basis of action or conduct of the parties. Thus, it is not necessary for the persons or entities to be signatories to a contract to enter into a legal relationship – the only important aspect to be determined is whether they intended or consented to enter into the legal relationship by the dint of their action or conduct.
75. The second aspect is contained in Section 7(3) which stipulates the requirement of a written arbitration agreement. A written arbitration agreement need not be signed by the parties if there is a record of agreement.63 The mandatory requirement of a written arbitration agreement is merely to ensure that there is a clearly established record of the consent of the parties to refer their disputes to arbitration to the exclusion of the domestic courts.
76. Section 2(h) read with Section 7 does not expressly require the “party” to be a signatory to an arbitration agreement or the underlying contract containing the arbitration agreement. This interpretation is in line with the general trend in national and international legislations that a signature is not necessary for an arbitration agreement. The UNCITRAL Model Law as amended in 2006 lays down the writing requirement for an arbitration agreement under Article 7 in the following terms:
“(3) An arbitration agreement is in writing if its content is recorded in any form, whether or not the arbitration agreement or contract has been concluded orally, by conduct, or by other means.”
63 Govind Rubber Ltd v. M/s Louis Dreyfus Commodities, (2015) 13 SCC 477 The above provision states that an arbitration agreement may be entered into in any form, for example orally or tacitly, as long as the content of the agreement is recorded. It eliminates the requirement of the signature of parties or an exchange of messages between the parties.
77. Article II paragraph 2 of the New York Convention defines “agreement in writing” to include an arbitral clause in a contract or an arbitration agreement, signed by the parties or contained in an exchange of letters or telegrams. Article 7 of the UNCITRAL Model Law establishes a more favourable requirement for a written arbitration agreement. In 2006, UNCITRAL recommended that the circumstances described in Article II paragraph 2 of the New York Convention “be applied recognizing that the circumstances described therein are not exhaustive.”64 Additionally, it also recommended that Article 7 paragraph 1 of the UNCITRAL Model Law should be applied “to allow any interested party to avail itself of rights it may have, under the law or treaties of the country where an arbitration agreement is sought to be relied upon, to seek recognition of the validity of such an arbitration agreement.” The Arbitration Act is largely based on the UNCITRAL Model Law. Therefore, the UNCITRAL Model Law could be referred to while construing the provisions of the Arbitration Act.65 Although the amended Section 7 of the UNCITRAL Model Law has not been adopted in the Indian law, it reflects the modern commercial reality where substance is given precedence over technical legal formalities.66
78. Reading Section 7 of the Arbitration Act in view of the above discussion gives rise to the following conclusions: first, arbitration agreements arise out of a legal relationship between or among persons or entities which may be contractual or otherwise; second, in situations where the legal relationship is contractual in nature, the nature of relationship can 64 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, Recommendation regarding the interpretation of article II, paragraph 2, and article VII, paragraph 1, of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, done in New York, 10 June 1958, (adopted by the UNCITRAL on 7 July 2006) 39. 65 Sundaram Finance Ltd v. NEPC India Ltd, (1999) 2 SCC 479, para 9; P Manohar Reddy and Bros v. Maharashtra Krishna Valley Development Corporation, (2009) 2 SCC 494, para 27.
66 Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration (7th edn, Oxford University Press, 2023) para 2.23.
COX AND KINGS LTD. v. SAP INDIA PVT. LTD. & ANR.
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, CJI] SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.676 be determined on the basis of general contract law principles; third, it is not necessary for the persons or entities to be signatories to the arbitration agreement to be bound by it; fourth, in case of non-signatory parties, the important determination for the courts is whether the persons or entities intended or consented to be bound by the arbitration agreement or the underlying contract containing the arbitration agreement through their acts or conduct; fifth, the requirement of a written arbitration agreement has to be adhered to strictly, but the form in which such agreement is recorded is irrelevant; sixth, the requirement of a written arbitration agreement does not exclude the possibility of binding non-signatory parties if there is a defined legal relationship between the signatory and non-signatory parties; and seventh, once the validity of an arbitration agreement is established, the court or tribunal can determine the issue of which parties are bound by such agreement.
79. It is presumed that the formal signatories to an arbitration agreement are parties who will be bound by it. However, in exceptional cases persons or entities who have not signed or formally assented to a written arbitration agreement or the underlying contract containing the arbitration agreement may be held to be bound by such agreement. As mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, the doctrine of privity limits the imposition of rights and liabilities on third parties to a contract. Generally, only the parties to an arbitration agreement can be subject to the full effects of the agreement in terms of the reliefs and remedies because they consented to be bound by the arbitration agreement. Therefore, the decisive question before the courts or tribunals is whether a non-signatory consented to be bound by the arbitration agreement. To determine whether a non-signatory is bound by an arbitration agreement, the courts and tribunals apply typical principles of contract law and corporate law. The legal doctrines provide a framework for evaluating the specific contractual language and the factual settings to determine the intentions of the parties to be bound by the arbitration agreement.67
80. Gary Born suggests that the legal theories and doctrines provide a basis for determining the real intent of parties to be bound by an arbitration agreement. Therefore, it is incorrect to use terminologies such as ‘extension’ of an arbitration agreement to non-signatories or ‘third parties’: 67 Gary Born (n 44) 1531.
“Judicial case law and commentary on international arbitration sometimes make reference to the “extension” of an arbitration agreement to non-signatories, or to “third parties” on the basis of one or more of the foregoing theories. These expression are inaccurate, in that they imply that an entity which is not a party to an arbitration agreement is nonetheless subject to that agreement’s effects, by virtue of something other than the parties’ consent. Contrary to the references to “extension” or “third parties”, most of the theories […] provide a basis for concluding that an entity is in reality a party to the arbitration agreement – which therefore does not need to be “extended” to a “third party” – because that party’s actions constitute consent to the agreement, or otherwise bind it to the agreement, notwithstanding the lack of its formal execution of the agreement. The arbitration agreement is therefore not ordinarily “extended”, but rather the true parties that have consented to the arbitration agreement are identified.”
81. Courts and tribunals across the world have been applying traditional contractual and commercial doctrines to determine the consent of the nonsignatory parties to be bound by the arbitration agreement. Generally, consent based theories such as agency, novation, assignment, operation of law, merger and succession, and third party beneficiaries have been applied in different jurisdictions. In exceptional circumstances, non-consensual theories such as piercing the corporate veil or alter ego and estoppel have also been applied to bind to bind a non-signatory party to an arbitration agreement. The group of companies doctrine is one such consent-based doctrine which has been applied, albeit controversially, for identifying the real intention of the parties to bind a non-signatory to an arbitration agreement. Group of Companies Doctrine i. Separate legal personality
82. The phenomenon of group companies is the modern reality of economic life and business organisation. Group companies are a set of separate firms linked together in formal or informal structures under the control of a parent company. The group companies can be defined in the Indian context as “an agglomeration of privately held and publicly traded firms operating in different lines of business, each of which is incorporated as a separate legal entity, but which are collectively under the entrepreneurial, COX AND KINGS LTD. v. SAP INDIA PVT. LTD. & ANR.
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, CJI] SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.678 financial, and strategic control of a common authority, typically a family, and are linked by trust-based relationships forged around a similar persona, ethnicity, or community.”68 A group company involving the parent and subsidiary companies are created for myriad purposes such as limiting the liability of the parent corporation, facilitating international trade, entering into business ventures with investors, establishing domestic corporate residence, and avoiding tax liability.
83. The principle of separate legal personality has been the cornerstone of corporate law. In Salomon v. Salomon,69 the House of Lords famously observed that a company is at law a different person altogether from the promoters, directors, shareholders, and employees. The principle of separate legal personality equally applies to corporate groups. A parent company is not generally held to be liable for the actions of the subsidiary company of which it is a direct or indirect shareholder. The Companies Act, 201370 has statutorily recognized a subsidiary company as a separate legal entity.71 Section 2(46) of the 2013 Act defines a holding company as a company of which one or more other companies are subsidiary companies. Section 2(87) defines “subsidiary company” to mean a company in which the holding company exercises control over the composition of the Board of Directors and has a controlling interest of at least 50 percent over the voting rights. Although a holding company owns a controlling interest in the subsidiary company, they are considered as separate legal entities. Group companies’ structures allow multinational corporations to structure their businesses at both the national and international level to leverage better returns for the investors and ensure business growth of the corporation.
84. A Bench of three Judges of this Court in Vodafone International Holding BV v. Union of India72 emphasized the principles of corporate separateness in the following terms:
68 Jayati Sarkar, ‘Business Groups in India’ in Asli Coplan, Takashi Hikino, and James Lincoln (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Business Groups (2010) 299 69 [1897] AC 22 70 “2013 Act”
71 Balwant Rai Saluja v. Air India, (2014) 9 SCC 407
72 (2012) 6 SCC 613
101. A company is a separate legal persona and the fact that all its shares are owned by one person or by the parent has nothing to do with its separate legal existence. If the owned company is wound up, the liquidator, and its parent company, would get hold of the assets of the subsidiary. In none of the authorities have the assets of the subsidiary been held to be those of the parent unless it is acting as an agent. Thus, even though a subsidiary may normally comply with the request of a parent company it is not just a puppet of the parent company. The difference is between having power or having a persuasive position. Though it may be advantageous for parent and subsidiary companies to work as a group, each subsidiary will look to see whether there are separate commercial interests which should be gained.”
85. The separateness of corporate personality will be ignored by courts in exceptional situations where a company is used as a means by the members and shareholders to carry out fraud or evade tax liabilities. If the court, on the basis of factual evidence, determines that the company was acting as an agent of the members or shareholders, it will ignore the separate personality of the company to attribute liability to the individuals. In Tata Engineering and Locomotive Co Ltd v. State of Bihar73, the issue before a Constitution Bench of this Court was whether a company could be treated as a citizen for the purposes of maintaining a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution. The company urged that the corporate veil should be lifted to treat the petition as one filed by the shareholders. This Court held that the veil of a corporation can be lifted where fraud is intended to be prevented or trading with an enemy is sought to be defeated.
86. In case of group companies, there may arise situations where a holding company completely dominates the affairs of the subsidiary company, to the extent of misusing its control, to avoid or conceal liability. In such situations, the courts apply the doctrine of “alter ego” or piercing the corporate veil to disregard the corporate separateness between the two companies and treat them as a single entity.74 In LIC v. Escorts Ltd,75 a Constitution Bench of this Court
73 (1964) 6 SCR 885
74 Gary Born (n 44) 1545.
75 (1986) 1 SCC 264
COX AND KINGS LTD. v. SAP INDIA PVT. LTD. & ANR.
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, CJI] SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.680 noted that the principle of distinct legal personality may be ignored where the associate companies are inextricably connected as to be, in reality, part of one concern. Speaking for the Bench, Justice O Chinnappa Reddy observed: “90. […] Generally and broadly speaking, we may say that the corporate veil may be lifted where a statute itself contemplates lifting the veil, or fraud, or improper conduct is intended to be prevented, or a taxing statute or a beneficent statute is sought to be evaded or where associated companies are inextricable connected as to be, in reality, part of one concern. It is neither necessary nor desirable to enumerate the classes of cases where lifting the veil is permissible, since that must necessarily depend on the relevant statutory or other provisions, the object sought to be achieved, the impugned conduct, the involvement of the element of the public interest, the effect on parties who may be affected, etc.”
87. The application of the doctrine of lifting the corporate veil rests on the overriding considerations of justice and equity.76 Often, the courts pierce the corporate veil when maintaining the separateness of corporate personality is found opposed to justice, convenience, and public interests.77 In Balwant Rai Saluja v. Air India,78 this Court cautioned that the principle of piercing the corporate veil should be applied in a restrictive manner and only in scenarios where it is evident that the subsidiary company was a mere camouflage deliberately created by the holding company for the purpose of avoiding liability. It was further observed that the intent of piercing the corporate veil must be such that would seek to remedy a wrong done by the holding company. In the context of arbitration, the principle of piercing the corporate veil has been sparingly used because it disregards the intention of the parties by emphasizing on the overriding considerations of good faith and equity to bind the non-signatories to an arbitration agreement.
88. Moreover, since the companies in a group have separate legal personality, the presence of common shareholders or directors cannot lead to 76 Delhi Development Authority v. Skipper Construction Co. (P) Ltd., (1996) 4 SCC 77 Kapila Hingorani v. State of Bihar, (2003) 6 SCC 1
78 (2014) 9 SCC 407
the conclusion that the subsidiary company will be bound by the acts of the holding company. The statements or representations made by promoters or directors in their personal capacity would not bind a company. Similarly, the mere fact that the two companies have common shareholders or a common Board of Directors will not constitute a sufficient ground to conclude that they are a single economic entity. The single economic entity or the single economic unit theory imposes general enterprise liability on the corporate group. In D H N Food Distributors Ltd v. Tower Hamlets London Borough Council79, Lord Denning held that a group of three companies should be treated as a single economic entity on the basis of two factors: first, the parent company owned all the shares of the subsidiary companies to the extent that it controlled every movement of the given subsidiary companies; and second, all the three companies in the group virtually acted as partners and could not be treated separately. Thus, the determination of whether two or more companies constitute a single economic entity depends upon the concerted efforts of the companies to act in pursuance of a common endeavour or enterprise.
89. From the above discussion, we can infer that entities within a corporate group have separate legal personality, which cannot be ignored save in exceptional circumstances such as fraud. The distinction between a parent company and its subsidiary is fundamental, and cannot be easily abridged by taking recourse to economic convenience.80 Legally, the rights and liabilities of a parent company cannot be transferred to the subsidiary company, and vice versa, unless, there is a strong legal basis for doing so. ii. Adopting a pragmatic approach to consent
90. In the context of arbitration law, the intention of the parties has to be derived from the words used in the arbitration agreement. While construing the arbitration agreement, it is the duty of the court to not delve deep into the intricacies of the human mind, but only consider the expressed intentions of the parties.81 The words used in the contract reflect the commercial 79 [1976] 1 WLR 852 (2)
80 Bank of Tokyo v. Karoon, (1986) 3 All ER 468 81 Kamla Devi v. Takhatmal Land, AIR 1964 SC 859; Bangalore Electricity Supply Co Ltd v. E S Solar Power (P) Ltd, (2021) 6 SCC 718 COX AND KINGS LTD. v. SAP INDIA PVT. LTD. & ANR.
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, CJI] SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.682 understanding between the parties. The intention of the parties has to be ascertained from the words used in the contract, considered in light of the surrounding circumstances and the object of such contract.82
91. An arbitration agreement encapsulates the commercial understanding of business entities as regards to the mode and manner of settlement of disputes that may arise between them in respect of their legal relationship. In most situations, the language of the contract is only suggestive of the intention of the signatories to such contract and not the non-signatories. However, there may arise situations where a person or entity may not sign an arbitration agreement, yet give the appearance of being a veritable party to such arbitration agreement due to their legal relationship with the signatory parties and involvement in the performance of the underlying contract. Especially in cases involving complex transactions involving multiple parties and contracts, a non-signatory may be substantially involved in the negotiation or performance of the contractual obligations without formally consenting to be bound by the ensuing burdens, including arbitration.
92. Modern commercial reality suggests that there often arise situations where a company which has signed the contract containing the arbitration clause is not always the one to negotiate or perform the underlying contractual obligations. In such situations, emphasis on formal consent will lead to the exclusion of such non-signatories from the ambit of the arbitration agreement, leading to multiplicity of proceedings and fragmentation of disputes. In A Ayyasamy v. A Paramsivam,83 this Court observed that it is the duty of the courts “to impart to that commercial understanding a sense of business efficacy.” The courts must interpret contracts in a manner that would give them a sense of efficacy rather than invalidating the commercial interests of the parties. The meaning of the contract must be gathered by adopting a common sense approach, which should “not be allowed to be thwarted by a narrow, pedantic and legalistic interpretation.”84 Therefore, there is a need to adopt a modern approach to consent, which takes into 82 Bank of India v. K Mohandas, (2009) 5 SCC 313; M Dayanand Reddy v. A P Industrial Infrastructure Corporation Ltd, (1993) 3 SCC 137
83 (2016) 10 SCC 386
84 Union of India v. D N Revri, (1976) 4 SCC 147 consideration the circumstances, apparent conduct, and commercial facets of business transactions.
93. As Professor Hanotiau suggests, there is a need to adopt a modern and pragmatic approach to consent:
“I would suggest that it is more accurate to refer to a modern approach to consent; an approach that is more pragmatic, more focussed on an analysis of facts, which places an emphasis on commercial practice, economic reality, trade usages, and the complex and multifaceted dimensions of large projects involving group of companies and connected agreements in multiparty multi-contract scenarios; an approach that is no longer restricted to express consent but that takes into consideration all its various expressions and tends to give much more importance than before to the conduct of the individuals or companies concerned.”85
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