Priya Indoria v. State of Karnataka and Ors. Etc.
- Citation
- 2023 INSC 1008; [2023] 15 S.C.R. 525
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice B.V. Nagarathna, Justice 1973 – S. 438 –
- Decided
- 20 Nov 2023
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 003549/2023
- Sections
- 438, 177, 498A, 326, 13, 14, 157, 156, 167(2), 7, 2, 9
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:27 am. Original source ↗
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[2023] 15 S.C.R. 525 : 2023 INSC 1008
CASE DETAILS
PRIYA INDORIA
v.
STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ORS. ETC.
(Criminal Appeal No. 003549-003552/2023 of 2023)
NOVEMBER 20, 2023
[B. V. NAGARATHNA AND UJJAL BHUYAN, JJ.]
HEADNOTES
Issue for consideration: Whether the power of the High Court or the Court of Session to grant anticipatory bail u/s 438 CrPC could be exercised with respect to an FIR registered outside the territorial jurisdiction of the said Court; and whether the practice of granting transit anticipatory bail or interim protection to enable an applicant seeking anticipatory bail to make an application u/s 438 CrPC before a Court of competent jurisdiction is consistent with the administration of criminal justice.
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s. 438 – Extra-territorial anticipatory bail – Power of the High Court or the Court of Session to grant u/s 438 CrPC, if could be exercised with respect to an FIR registered outside the territorial jurisdiction of the said Court: Held: An interpretation giving rise to an absolute bar on the jurisdiction of a Court of Session or a High Court to grant interim anticipatory bail for an offence committed outside the territorial confines of a High Court or Court of Session may lead to an anomalous and unjust consequence for bona fide applicants who may be victims of wrongful, mala fide or politically motivated prosecution – In such circumstances, the Courts must balance the interest of the accused in the context of the salutary principle of access to justice which is a facet of Art. 21 of the Constitution as well as a Directive Principle of State Policy-Art. 39(A) as also Art. 14 – Power to grant extra-territorial anticipatory bail should be exercised in exceptional and compelling circumstances only which means where, denying transit anticipatory bail or interim protection to enable the applicant to make an application u/s 438 before a Court of competent jurisdiction would cause irremediable and irreversible prejudice to the applicant – Having regard 526 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.
to the salutary concept of access to justice, the accused can seek limited transit anticipatory bail or limited interim protection from the Court in the State in which he resides but in such an event, a ‘regular’ or full-fledged anticipatory bail could be sought from the competent Court in the State in which the FIR is filed – This may also lead the accused to choose the Court of his choice for seeking anticipatory bail – Thus, in order to avoid the abuse of the process of the Court as well as the law by the accused, it is necessary for the Court before which the plea for anticipatory bail is made, to ascertain the territorial connection or proximity between the accused and the territorial jurisdiction of the Court which is approached for seeking such relief. [Paras 26, 34, 37, 39, 40] Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s. 438 – Direction for grant of bail to person apprehending arrest – Grant of transit anticipatory bail or interim protection to enable an applicant seeking anticipatory bail to make an application u/s 438 CrPC before a Court of competent jurisdiction, if consistent with the administration of criminal justice: Held: Accused cannot seek full-fledged anticipatory bail in a State where he is a resident when the FIR has been registered in a different State – However, he would be entitled to seek a transit anticipatory bail from the Court of Session or High Court in the State where he is a resident which necessarily has to be of a limited duration so as to seek regular anticipatory bail from the Court of competent jurisdiction – Need for such a provision is to secure the liberty of the individual concerned – Since anticipatory bail as well as transit anticipatory bail are intrinsically linked to personal liberty Art. 21 of the Constitution of India and since the concept of access to justice is extended to such a situation and bearing in mind Art 14 thereof it would be necessary to give a constitutional imprimatur to the evolving provision of transit anticipatory bail – Otherwise, in a deserving case, there is likelihood of denial of personal liberty as well as access to justice for, by the time the person concerned approaches the Court of competent jurisdiction to seek anticipatory bail, it may well be too late as he may be arrested – If a rejection of the plea for limited/transitory anticipatory bail is made solely with reference to the concept of territorial jurisdiction it would be adding a restriction to the exercise of powers u/s 438 – This, would result in miscarriage and travesty of justice, aggravating the adversity of the accused who is apprehending arrest and would be against the principles of access to justice. [Para 45, 46] Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – ss. 438, 177 – Ordinary place of inquiry and trial, if would be inclusive of the place where the complainant-wife resides after being separated from her husband: Held: As per s. 177 especially in matrimonial cases alleging cruelty and domestic violence by the wife, if none of the ingredients constituting the offence can be said to have occurred within the local jurisdiction, that jurisdiction cannot be the ordinary place of investigation and trial of a matrimonial offence – Adverse effects on mental health of the wife even while residing in her parental home on account of the acts committed in the matrimonial home would amount to commission of cruelty within the meaning of s. 498A at the parental home – At the place where the wife takes shelter after leaving or being driven away from the matrimonial home on account of acts of cruelty committed by the husband or his relatives, would, also have jurisdiction to entertain a complaint – On facts, the complainantwife claims to have received death threats and harassment over the phone even after her return to her parental home in Chirawa, Rajasthan the ordinary place of trial may be Chirawa – By the impugned orders, the accusedhusband and his family members were granted extra-territorial anticipatory bail without issuing notice to the investigating officer and public prosecutor in Police Station, Rajasthan wherein the complainant had lodged the FIR – Impugned orders set aside – Accused to approach the jurisdictional Court in Chirawa for anticipatory bail. [Paras 48, 49] Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s. 438 – Grant of anticipatory bail – Salient features – Stated. [Para 9.6] Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s. 438 – Grant of anticipatory bail – Expression “the High Court” or “the Court of Session” – Construction:
Held: On a reading of s. 438 it is not found that the expression “the High Court” or “the Court of Session” is restricted vis-à-vis the local limits or any particular territorial jurisdiction – However, this does not mean that if an FIR is lodged in one State then the accused can approach the Court in another State for seeking anticipatory bail – He can do so, if at the time PRIYA INDORIA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ORS.
ETC.
528 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.
of lodging of the FIR in any State, he is residing or is present there for a legitimate purpose in any other State – It does not emerge that the expression “the High Court” or “the Court of Session” must have reference only to the place or territorial jurisdiction within which the FIR is lodged – If that was the implication, the same would have been expressly evident in the Section itself or by a necessary implication – Use of the word “the” before “High Court” and “Court of Session” also does not mean that only the High Court or the Court of Session, as the case may be, within whose jurisdiction the FIR is filed, is competent to exercise jurisdiction for the grant of transit anticipatory bail. [Para 44] Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s. 438 – Expression ‘transit anticipatory bail’ – Need and necessity for:
Held: Need and necessity for transit anticipatory bail has occasioned because the police has been conferred power under the CrPC to pursue an accused in other jurisdictions – Police is obligated to secure a transit remand of the accused for taking him from the place where he is arrested to the place where the crime is registered, for production before the competent magistrate in terms of the requirement of Art. 22 – Primary purpose of transit remand is to enable the police to shift the person in custody from the place of arrest to the place where the matter can be investigated – It appears that from the requirement of transit remand, the necessity of ‘transit anticipatory bail’ has arisen, for affected person cannot be without a remedy. [Para 35] Bail – Anticipatory Bail – Evolution of the safeguard – Stated. [Para 10] Bail – Pre-arrest bail – Position of law in United States of India, United Kingdom, Kenya and India – Comparative legal study – Stated. [Paras 19, 20] Bail – Limited anticipatory bail – Grant of, by the High Court or the Court of Session u/s 438 CrPC with respect to FIR registered outside the territorial jurisdiction of the said Court – Conditions to be fulfilled – Stated. [Para 36] Constitution of India – Art. 21 – Right to life and liberty under – Access to justice :
Held: Art. 39A which deals with equal justice and free legal aid can be construed to be a specie of Art 21 – Citizen must be provided a just adjudicatory forum to agitate his grievance and seek adjudication of what he may perceive as a breach of his right to the level of a fundamental right – Adjudicatory forum supposed to be effective in its functioning and just, fair and objective in its approach, but it also must be conveniently approachable and affordable – Access to justice would, thus, be a constitutional value of any significance and utility only if the delivery of justice to the citizen is speedy. [Para 20, 22, 23] Interpretation of statutes – Penal statutes – Rule of statutory interpretation:
Held: Penal statutes are to be construed strictly – When acts are to be made penal and are to be visited with loss or impairment of life, liberty, or property, the personal liberty requires clear and exact definition of the offence – Appropriate care must be taken to adopt an interpretation which makes the textual interpretation match the contextual – Fundamental right to personal liberty and access to justice, which are constitutionally recognised and statutorily preserved, would be undermined through a restrictive interpretation – While construing a statute, constitutional Courts are obliged to render a contextually sensitive construction that preserves and furthers core constitutional values – Criminal statutes such as the CrPC are interpreted with rational regard to the aim and intention of the legislature – Interpretation of all statutes should be favorable to personal liberty subject to fair and effective administration of criminal justice. [Paras 25, 27, 30] Words and phrases – Word ‘transit’ – Meaning of – Stated. [Para 35.1]
LIST OF CITATIONS AND OTHER REFERENCES
State of Assam vs. Brojen Gogol (Dr), (1998) 1 SCC 397; Amar Nath Neogi vs. State of Jharkhand (2018) 11 SCC 797; Nathu Singh vs. State of U.P., (2021) 6 SCC 64; Navinchandra Majithia vs. State of Maharashtra [2000] 3 Suppl. SCR 82: (2000) 7 SCC 640; Raghubans Dubey vs. State of Bihar (1967) 2 SCR 423; Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod vs. State of Maharashtra [2014] 11 SCR 921: (2014) 9 SCC 129; Balchand Jain vs. PRIYA INDORIA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ORS.
ETC.
530 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.
State of M.P. [1977] 2 SCR 52: (1976) 4 SCC 572; Sushila Aggarwal vs. NCT of Delhi [2020] 2 SCR 1: (2020) 5 SCC 1; Shri Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia vs. State of Punjab [1980] 3 SCR 383: (1980) 2 SCC 565; Jamini Mullick vs. Emperor (1909) ILR 36 Cal 174, Hidayat Ullah Khan vs. The Crown, AIR 1949 Lah 77; Gurbaksh Singh Sibia vs. State of Punjab, 1977 SCC OnLine P&H 157; Teesta Atul Setalvad vs. State of Maharashtra Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 1770 of 2014; Joginder Kumar vs. State of U.P., [1994] 3 SCR 661: (1994) 4 SCC 260; Anita Kushwaha vs. Pushap Sudan [2016] 9 SCR 560: (2016) 8 SCC 509; Central Inland Water Transport Corporation vs. Brojo Nath Ganguly [1986] 2 SCR 278: (1986) 3 SCC 156; State of Bihar vs. Deokaran Nenshi [1973] 1 SCR 1004: (1972) 2 SCC 890; Sujata Mukherjee (Smt.) vs. Prashant Kumar Mukherjee [1997] 3 SCR 1127: (1997) 5 SCC 30; Y. Abraham Ajith vs. Inspector of Police, Chennai [2004] 3 Suppl. SCR 604: (2004) 8 SCC 100; Ramesh vs. State of T.N. [2005] 2 SCR 493: (2005) 3 SCC 507: ; Manish Ratan vs. State of M.P., [2006] 8 Suppl. SCR 226: (2007) 1 SCC 262; Rupali Devi vs. State of U.P., [2019] 6 SCR 577: (2019) 5 SCC 384; Re: Benod Ranjan Sinha 1981 SCC Online Cal 102; L.R. Naidu (Dr.) vs. State of Karnataka, 1983 SCC OnLine Kar 206; N.K. Nayar vs. State of Maharashtra, 1985 Cri LJ 1887 – referred to. In re: Sturman, 1984.604 F. Supp. 278. (F. E. Devine (1990); Regina vs. Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex Parte LeecH, (1994) Q.B. 198; Coroline Kuthie Karanja vs. Director Public Prosecutions (2021) eKLR – referred to.
Anticipatory Bail: An Indian Civil Liberties Innovation, International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice, 14:1-2, 107-114; Maxwell, Treatise on Interpretation of Statutes (10 edn.), p 284; Concise Oxford English Dictionary, 10 th Edition, Revised, Black’s Law Dictionary, 11 th Edition – referred to.
OTHER CASE DETAILS INCLUDING IMPUGNED
ORDER AND APPEARANCES
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal Nos.3549-3552 of 2023.
From the Judgment and Order dated 07.07.2022 of the Court of LXXI Addl. City Civil & Sessions Judge, Bengaluru City (CCH-72) in CRLM Nos.3941, 3943, 3944 and 3945 of 2022.
Appearances:
Vikramjit Banerjee, ASG, Tathagat Sharma, Siddhartha Sinha, Nring Chamwidbo Zeliang, Shivam Singhania, Saransh Kumar, Prashant Rawat, Advs. for the Amicus Curiae.
Kaustav Paul, Sr. Adv., Rishi Matoliya, H. D. Thanvi, Nikhil Kumar Singh, Achal Singh Bule, Kshitij Bikaramia, Mahendra Singh Inda, Ms. Sumati Sharma, Advs. for the Appellant.
Dr. Manish Singhvi, Sr. Adv., V. N. Raghupathy, M Bangaraswamy, S Shashank Reddy, Ms. Shubhangi Agarwal, Apurv S., Sourav Roy, Sandeep Kumar Jha, Vasudev Singh, Kaushal Sharma, Attarva Kotwal, Ms. Anjana Sharma, Sukumar, Deepak Goel, Kumar Kartikay, Advs. for the Respondents.
JUDGMENT / ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT
JUDGMENT
NAGARATHNA, J.
Leave granted.
Bird’s Eye View of the Controversy:
2. We begin this Judgment by an illustration:
A person allegedly under intoxication beats another person with an iron rod in the State of Goa. The victim of the attack is injured. The alleged assailant travels to Rourkela, Odisha, where he is working in a factory. Meanwhile, the family of the injured registered a First Information Report (FIR) for the offence of causing grievous hurt under Section 326 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) at the Bicholim Police Station, Goa. On coming to know about the same and apprehending his arrest, the alleged assailant files an application for anticipatory bail before the District and Sessions Judge, Sundargarh, Odisha, having jurisdiction over Rourkela. Whether the alleged assailant’s application is maintainable or not? Such a question has come for consideration before this Court in the present appeal. PRIYA INDORIA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ORS.
ETC.
532 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.
Facts of the case:
2.1. The present appeals have been filed by the complainant-wife, against the orders dated 07.07.2022 passed by the learned Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge Bengaluru City in Criminal Misc. No. 3941/2022, 3943/2022, 3944/2022 and 3945/2022. By the said orders, the learned Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge Bengaluru City has granted anticipatory bail to the accused-husband and his family namely, accused Nos. 2,3 & 4 in FIR No. 43/2022 which alleged commission of offences under Sections 498A, 406 and 323 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC’, for short), registered by the complainant-wife at Chirawa Police Station, District Jhunjhunu, Rajasthan.
2.2. In view of the above, we take note of the social reality of criminal complaints relating to dowry harassment, cruelty and domestic violence arising out of unsuccessful matrimonial relationships. With the increasing migration of young people for marital and career prospects, supplemented by the forces of economic liberalization, a significant number of couples hail from two different States, with the corollary being that the matrimonial home of a complainant-wife is located in a different State from where her parental home is located.
3. According to the complainant-wife (appellant herein), the facts giving rise to the present appeal, in a nutshell as gathered from the material on record are:
3.1. The complainant-wife got married to the accused-husband on 11.12.2020 and started living in Bengaluru.
3.2. On 09.11.2021, the accused-husband filed a divorce petition M.C. No. 5786/2021 under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 before the Principal Judge, Family Court, Bengaluru, Karnataka. Notice was issued in the divorce petition on 15.11.2021.
3.3. On 07.03.2022, the complainant-wife filed Transfer Petition No.590/22 before this Court to transfer the case from the Principal Judge, Family Court, Bengaluru to Court of Additional District Judge, Chirawa, Jhunjhunu, Rajasthan.
3.4. The complainant-wife registered a First Information Report (‘FIR’, for short) being FIR No. 43/2022 for offences under Sections 498A, 406 and 323 of the IPC, at Chirawa Police Station, District Jhunjhunu, Rajasthan, on 25.01.2022 at 06.07 pm.
3.5. At the time of marriage, two younger siblings of the complainantwife were still unmarried. The father of the complainant-wife, despite being a heart patient who had undergone Angioplasty, spent about Rs. 46,00,000/- on the wedding and had met the dowry demands made by the accused-husband and his family members being his father, mother and younger brother, i.e., accused Nos.2, 3 & 4.
3.6. That the complainant-wife was a victim of harassment, torture and assault for the demand of dowry. The accused-husband and his family claimed that they had been cheated because the complainant-wife’s father had promised to spend one crore rupees for the marriage. The harassment and torture continued from 11.12.2020 until 06.07.2021. For less than a year of marriage that the couple spent together, the accused-husband perpetrated cruelty upon her by frequently threatening to divorce her and get married for the second time.
3.7. The accused-husband started threatening and abusing the complainant-wife and stated that the complainant-wife was mentally and physically incapable of intimate relationships. Additionally, he slapped the complainant-wife about a month after the marriage and said that he was not inclined for marriage and preferred to live a free life. He threatened the complainant-wife that if she wanted to stay together, she would have to fulfil the dowry demand.
3.8. The complainant-wife informed her in-laws, being accused Nos. 2, 3 and 4, about the refusal of the accused-husband to consummate the marriage and the physical assault committed on her. Allegedly, her in-laws dismissed her by saying that it was not necessary to have a relationship with the husband and as such, being a husband, he had the right to beat her.
3.9. Deeply agonized by this experience, a demand regarding purchase of a scooter for the accused-husband was met. Rs.1,01,326/- was to be paid online from complainant-wife’s mother’s bank account on 12.02.2021. PRIYA INDORIA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ORS.
ETC. [B. V. NAGARATHNA, J.] 534 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.
3.10. Thereafter, the accused-husband started demanding a car, but the demand could not be fulfilled. The complainant-wife was harassed even when she was COVID-19 positive, and eventually, she was driven out of the matrimonial house on 02.06.2021. The complainant-wife’s father begged the accused-husband to take back his daughter, but the accusedhusband refused.
3.11. Thereafter, on 11.06.2021, the complainant-wife’s father was forced to bring the complainant-wife back to Chirawa.
3.12. It was averred that goods and valuables worth Rs. 30,00,000/were still in possession of the accused-husband and his family. The complainant-wife was continuously threatened with death by the accusedhusband and his family even when she was in her paternal home in Chirawa. When the complainant-wife came to Chirawa, the accused-husband through internet call and video, threatened to kill her if she came to Bengaluru and kept saying all the time that if she came to Bengaluru, he would get her killed by goons and her dead body would also not be known.
3.13. The complainant-wife refused to undergo a medical test and noted that at the time she was thrown out of the accused-husband’s house, she had shown light blue marks near the neck and shoulder to her parents but being hopeful of a change in the attitude of the husband, and affected by social stigma, she did not file any report.
3.14. The Sub-Inspector, Chirawa Police Station, Rajasthan made a note that from the victim’s report, the offences under Sections 498A, 406 and 323 of the IPC were made out and the investigation was initiated. We reiterate that the aforesaid details are as narrated by the complainant and are not our inferences of facts of the case.
Impugned Orders:
The accused-husband and his family members, accused Nos. 2, 3 and 4, sought the relief of anticipatory bail under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (‘CrPC’, for short) by filing CRL. MISC. No. 3941/2022, CRL.MISC. No. 3943/2022, CRL. MISC. No. 3944/2022 and CRL. MISC. No. 3945/2022 before the Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru City.
4. The Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru City, on 07.07.2022, allowed the applications of anticipatory bail made by the accused-husband and his family members, accused Nos. 2, 3 & 4.
4.1. It is clear from a reading of the impugned orders that both Bagalkunte Police Station, Bengaluru and Chirawa Police Station, Rajasthan, were Respondents in the Bail Application. Both police stations were represented by the same Public Prosecutor before the Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru City.
4.2. The learned Judge noted that the Investigating Officer had commenced the investigation, conducted mahazar, recorded the statement of witnesses and completed a major part of the investigation. It was reasoned that the involvement of the accused-husband and his family members, being accused Nos. 2, 3 and 4, was yet to be proved. The learned Judge further reasoned that since the alleged offences were not punishable with death or imprisonment for life and are to be tried before the Magistrate, there was absolutely no reason to deny the benefit of anticipatory bail.
4.3. When the police of Chirawa called upon the accused-husband and his family members, accused Nos. 2, 3 & 4, it was realised that the learned Sessions Judge, Bengaluru, had granted them anticipatory bail. This was confirmed by the complainant-wife when she checked the Court’s website.
4.4. On 09.12.2022, this Court allowed complainant-wife’s Transfer Petition No.590/22 and transferred the M.C. No. 5786/2021 from the Principal Judge, Family Court, Bengaluru, to the Court of Additional District Judge, Chirawa, Jhunjhunu, Rajasthan.
5. Being aggrieved by the grant of anticipatory bail to the accusedhusband and accused Nos. 2, 3 and 4, the complainant-wife filed W.P. No.48/2023 before this Court, which came to be dismissed as withdrawn on 17.02.2023 with liberty to pursue her legal remedies.
6. Thereafter, the present Special Leave to Appeal came to be filed and notice was issued by this Court on 17.03.2023. On 07.07.2023, this Court requested learned Additional Solicitor General Sri Vikramjit Banerjee to assist the Court as an amicus curiae, having regard to the ramifications that would arise in the context of Section 438 of CrPC and the jurisdiction of the concerned Sessions Court or High Court to grant pre-arrest bail, when PRIYA INDORIA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ORS.
ETC. [B. V. NAGARATHNA, J.] 536 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.
the FIR is not registered within the territorial jurisdiction of a particular district or State but in a different State.
Submissions:
7. We have heard Sri Vikramjeet Banerjee, Additional Solicitor General and learned amicus, Sri Kaustav Paul, learned senior counsel for the complainant-wife, Dr. Manish Singhvi, learned Additional Advocate General for the State of Rajasthan, Sri V.N. Raghupathy, learned counsel for the State of Karnataka and Smt. Anjana Sharma, learned counsel for the accused-husband. We have also perused the material on record.
7.1. Learned senior counsel Sri Banerjee, while assisting this Court as an amicus, submitted as under:
i. Section 438 of CrPC has only used the term ‘High Court or the Court of Session’, as the case may be’ but has not specified whether such a ‘High Court or the Court of Session’ has to be the same Court which can take cognizance of the matter or can be any ‘High Court or Court of Session’ across the country.
Therefore, there exists limited legislative guidance about the power of a Court to grant anticipatory bail for an offence that is registered outside its territorial jurisdiction, in other words, whether ‘extra-territorial anticipatory bail’ can be granted by a High Court or Court of Session to a person apprehending arrest. ii. Elaborating on the divergent approaches of various High Courts in the country regarding the grant of ‘extra-territorial anticipatory bail’, learned amicus submitted that the Courts have evolved the ‘transit anticipatory bail’ approach to provide an equitable and interim relief enabling an accused travelling a residing in a different State to seek anticipatory bail. Learned amicus clarified that anticipatory bail and ‘transit anticipatory bail’ are different, as the former may or may not be restricted to a time period, whereas the latter is always granted for a specific time period, until an applicant can make an application for anticipatory bail before a Court that can take ‘cognizance’ of the offence. It was further submitted that this Court had adopted the ‘transit anticipatory bail’ approach in State of Assam vs. Brojen Gogol (Dr), (1998) 1 SCC 397 (Brojen Gogol) and Amar Nath Neogi vs. State of Jharkhand, (2018) 11 SCC 797.
iii. Learned amicus further submitted that this Court in Nathu Singh vs. State of U.P., (2021) 6 SCC 64 (Nathu Singh) had emphasized a liberal approach to the grant of anticipatory bail in view of the serious impact that the unfair denial of the same can have on the right to life and liberty under Article 21.
iv. Referring to the judgement of this Court in Navinchandra Majithia vs. State of Maharashtra, (2000) 7 SCC 640, learned amicus apprised this Court of an alternative approach that is based on the ‘cause of action’ theory in criminal law. In view of the facts of the present case, it was submitted that the cause of action essentially arose in the matrimonial home of the parties in Bengaluru, Karnataka and continued in the complainant-wife’s paternal home in Chirawa, Rajasthan. Therefore, Courts at either of these places may exercise their jurisdiction.
7.2. Learned senior counsel Sri Paul appearing for the complainantwife/appellant herein submitted as follows:
i. The right to fair and impartial investigation and trial of an offence is a fundamental right not only of the accused but also of the complainant.
ii. Grant of bail by the Court at Bengaluru in an F.I.R which was not lodged within its territorial Jurisdiction, had left the complainantwife without an opportunity to oppose the same.
iii. The complainant-wife could not oppose the bail petition and the jurisdictional prosecutor from Chirawa, Rajasthan was also absent during the hearing. That only the Public Prosecutor of Bengaluru was present at the time of the hearing of the bail petition seeking anticipatory bail. The said prosecutor neither had the case diary of the investigation with him nor any assistance from the area police station where the F.I.R had been lodged. Hence, the impugned orders may be set aside.
PRIYA INDORIA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ORS.
ETC. [B. V. NAGARATHNA, J.] 538 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.
7.3. Learned senior counsel for the State of Rajasthan Dr. Manish Singhvi submitted as under:
i. The existence of territorial jurisdiction is the undergrid of the institution of any case before a Court of law. The concept of territorial jurisdiction is of cardinal significance to the administration of justice. More specifically, both Chapter XIII of the CrPC and the existing/general criminal jurisprudence recognize that cognizance of an offence and not the offender is taken. That this Court in Raghubans Dubey vs. State of Bihar (1967) 2 SCR 423 (Raghubans Dubey) held that the Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence and not the offender. That territorial jurisdiction assumes paramount importance as the offender, unlike the defendant in a civil suit instituted as per the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, has no role to play as far as the conferment of jurisdiction of a Court is concerned. That, in Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod vs. State of Maharashtra, (2014) 9 SCC 129, it was observed that Section 177 of the CrPC postulated that every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed.
ii. Elaborating on the scheme of the CrPC, Dr. Singhvi submitted that Chapter II of the CrPC distributes adjudicatory duties amongst Magistrates and Courts as per territorial jurisdiction. Section 14 of the CrPC specifically determines the jurisdiction of local Magistrate(s). The provisions granting power to take cognizance (Section 157) or power to investigate (Section 156), are in accordance with the concept of ‘ordinary place of inquiry and trial,’ as stated in Chapter XIII of the CrPC.
iii. Therefore, the Court under whose territorial jurisdiction the offence was committed becomes the Court of competent jurisdiction to pass all orders, including bail and anticipatory bail. That the language of Section 167(2) mandating a judicial order for the detention of an accused beyond 24 hours, mentions ‘nearest Magistrate’ and not Magistrate of competent jurisdiction. The nearest Magistrate, while possessing the power to extend custody up to 15 days, does not have the power to grant bail as the same power is reserved only for the Magistrate who is competent to commit the case for trial. In this regard, learned senior counsel submitted that the power of ‘the High Court or the Court of Session’ to grant pre-arrest anticipatory bail under Section 438 of CrPC cannot be invoked by a Court which does not have territorial jurisdiction. It was further contended that a proper construction of the word ‘the’ prefixed to both High Court and Sessions Court in the text of Section 438 of CrPC would mean the High Court or the Sessions Court having the competent jurisdiction. It was contended that the word ‘the’ cannot be given so liberal a construction that it becomes indistinguishable from ‘any.’ iv. Learned senior counsel apprised this Court that even after the introduction of the provision of anticipatory bail in the CrPC in 1973, many States, such as Uttar Pradesh, did not have the said provision for decades altogether. It was further pointed out that practical difficulties such as forum shopping may arise from the treatment of anticipatory bail as analogous to a fundamental right. The difficulty would arise if a High Court would grant pre-arrest bail for an offence committed in a State where the provision for anticipatory bail does not exist. This may lead to a situation where the High Court or the Court of Session would not have the advantage of the stance of the investigating agency or the assistance of the public prosecutor while adjudicating applications for grant of anticipatory bail. In view thereof, it was submitted that the High Court judgements, InRe: Benod Ranjan Sinha, 1981 SCC Online Cal 102 (InRe: Benod Ranjan Sinha), L.R. Naidu (Dr.) vs. State of Karnataka, 1983 SCC OnLine Kar 206 (L.R. Naidu) and N.K. Nayar vs. State of Maharashtra, 1985 Cri LJ 1887 (N.K. Nayar), permitting the grant of anticipatory bail for an offence committed outside their jurisdiction, should be set aside. To buttress his contention, learned senior counsel submitted that the Justice V.S. Malimath Committee Report on Reforms in Criminal Justice System, in section 7.33, page 121, had proposed that the provision regarding anticipatory bail may PRIYA INDORIA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ORS.
ETC. [B. V. NAGARATHNA, J.] 540 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.
be retained subject to two conditions: that the Court would hear the Public Prosecutor; and that the petition for anticipatory bail should be heard only by the Court of competent jurisdiction. v. As an alternative form of relief to persons resident in a particular State but apprehending arrest by the police in another State, learned senior counsel relied upon judgements of this Court in Balchand Jain vs. State of M.P., (1976) 4 SCC 572 (Balchand Jain) and Sushila Aggarwal vs. NCT of Delhi, (2020) 5 SCC 1 (Sushila Aggarwal), which enunciated the approach of ‘transit anticipatory bail’ and ‘interim protection’ that balanced the right to life and personal liberty enshrined in Article 21 and the right to freedom of movement under Article 19(1)(d) with the fundamental scheme of administration of criminal justice, as prescribed in the CrPC. It was submitted that in an age where the movement of a citizen is frequent and fast, an offender may apprehend arrest even with respect to a statement made in a place of residence in one State, but the offended person may be residing in another State.
vi. Learned senior counsel further contended that in order to prevent the abuse of the process of law, this Court may hold that interim protection for a limited period could be granted by the Court nearest to the residence of the accused apprehending arrest. However, in order to prevent forum shopping, certain safeguards were also suggested for availing grant of interim protection as follows:
a. The person must show some residence proof to establish that he/she had been residing in the area in which the interim protection is sought;
b. If the person is seeking interim protection apart from his/ her normal place of residence, he/she must state the reasons for doing so and also disclose the nature of apprehension of arrest in the area wherein he/she does not reside;
c. The interim protection should not exceed a period of fourteen days under normal circumstances;
d. The concerned public prosecutor of the Court wherein interim application is moved may be informed in advance about the filing of the interim protection application. The public prosecutor after looking at the nature of the interim protection application, may contact the concerned police station and seek information about the stage and nature of the investigation of the crime committed;
e. The limited duration of the interim protection to secure the liberty of the individual from arrest in an alleged frivolous case would also ensure that the regular anticipatory bail is only granted by a Court of competent jurisdiction; and f. Interim protection should not be granted unless the requirements enumerated under Section 438 of CrPC are satisfied.
7.4. Learned counsel for the State of Karnataka submitted that having regard to the relevant judicial precedents on Section 438 of CrPC, an appropriate order may be made in this case.
7.5. Smt. Anjana Sharma, learned counsel for the accused-husband submitted as under:
i. The complainant-wife had filed a frivolous FIR against him and his family members based on false allegations and accusations. It is alleged that the sole objective of complainant-wife is to extort money as the accused-husband had refused to pay an amount of Rs. 50,00,000/-.
ii. That the anticipatory bail applications had been filed for securing protection from immediate arrest as the liberty of the petitioner was at stake and instant protection was necessary to protect his fundamental rights.
iii. That the apprehension of arrest was during the subsistence of the COVID-19 pandemic and he was under continuous pressure and threat of being arrested. The accused-husband being the only earning member having a younger brother and an elderly ailing father, was compelled to seek protection of his life and PRIYA INDORIA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ORS.
ETC. [B. V. NAGARATHNA, J.] 542 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.
limb because the complainant-wife’s father had influential local contacts in the place where the FIR was registered, i.e., Chirawa, Rajasthan. There was a reasonable apprehension of his arrest, which was the guiding factor in filing the application before the Bengaluru Court.
iv. Learned counsel of the accused-husband also questioned the bona fides of the complainant-wife by relying upon the delay in filing the present petition. It was further contended that the FIR was filed in Chirawa Police Station with the sole objective of causing harassment to accused-husband and his family as the alleged offences were committed in Bengaluru. That the complainantwife is familiar with Bengaluru as even earlier, she was working with a Mumbai-based company in Bengaluru.
Points for Consideration:
8. Having heard learned amicus and senior counsel and counsel for the respective parties and on perusal of the material on record, the following points would emerge for our consideration:
i. Whether the power of the High Court or the Court of Session to grant anticipatory bail under Section 438 of the CrPC could be exercised with respect to an FIR registered outside the territorial jurisdiction of the said Court?
ii. Whether the practice of granting transit anticipatory bail or interim protection to enable an applicant seeking anticipatory bail to make an application under Section 438 of the CrPC before a Court of competent jurisdiction is consistent with the administration of criminal justice?
iii. What order?
The aforesaid questions shall be considered together as they are intertwined.
Legal Framework:
9. Before discussing the points for consideration in the present appeal, the relevant provisions of the CrPC are exposited as under:
9.1. Section 2(e) of the CrPC defines “High Court” to mean ‘the High Court for that State,’ in relation to any State. In relation to the Union Territory, it is defined as that High Court for a State to which the Union Territory’s jurisdiction has been extended. In case of any other Union territory, it means the highest Court of criminal appeal for that territory other than the Supreme Court of India.
9.2. Section 2(j) defines “local jurisdiction”, in relation to a Court or Magistrate to mean the local area within which the Court or Magistrate may exercise its powers under the CrPC. Section 14 of the CrPC states that the local jurisdiction of a magistrate shall be confined to the limits defined by the Chief Judicial Magistrate. Section 9 of the CrPC mandates that the State Government shall establish a Court of Session to be presided over by a judge appointed by the High Court.
9.3. A Court of competent jurisdiction is referred to in Section 41A of the CrPC wherein a police officer is empowered to arrest a person who fails to comply with a notice for arrest subject to the orders of such Court. This is a Court that is competent to try the case. Section 167(2) empowers the nearest Magistrate to authorize the custody of an accused for a period not exceeding 15 days, once he is produced before him, whether it is a Court of competent jurisdiction to try the case or not. If the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to try the case or commit it for trial, and considers further detention unnecessary, he may order the accused to be forwarded to a Magistrate having such jurisdiction. Section 156 further postulates that any officer in-charge of a police station may investigate any cognizable case which a Court having jurisdiction over the local area within the limits of such station would have power to inquire into or try under the provisions of Chapter XIII.
9.4. Section 177 in Chapter XIII of the CrPC mandates that every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed. In case of uncertainty or ambiguity regarding the local areas where an offence is committed, Section 178 postulates that it may be inquired into or tried by a Court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas where the offence, or part thereof, may have been committed. Section 179 states that when the consequence of the offending act ensues, it may be inquired into or tried by a Court within PRIYA INDORIA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ORS.
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whose local jurisdiction such thing has been done or such consequence has ensued.
9.5. Having regard of the aforesaid statutory framework, it would be apposite to distillate the core aspects of Section 438 of CrPC pertaining to grant of anticipatory bail which reads as under:
“438. Direction for grant of bail to person apprehending arrest.-
(1) Where any person has reason to believe that he may be arrested on accusation of having committed a non-bailable offence, he may apply to the High Court or the Court of Session for a direction under this section that in the event of such arrest he shall be released on bail; and that Court may, after taking into consideration, inter-alia, the following factors, namely:—
(i) the nature and gravity of the accusation;
(ii) the antecedents of the applicant including the fact as to whether he has previously undergone imprisonment on conviction by a Court in respect of any cognizable offence;
(iii) the possibility of the applicant to flee from justice; and
(iv) where the accusation has been made with the object of injuring or humiliating the applicant by having him so arrested, either reject the application forthwith or issue an interim order for the grant of anticipatory bail;
Provided that, where the High Court or, as the case may be, the Court of Session, has not passed any interim order under this subsection or has rejected the application for grant of anticipatory bail, it shall be open to an officer in-charge of a police station to arrest, without warrant the applicant on the basis of the accusation apprehended in such application.
(1A) Where the Court grants an interim order under sub-section (1), it shall forthwith cause a notice being not less than seven days notice, together with a copy of such order to be served on the Public Prosecutor and the Superintendent of Police, with a view to give the Public Prosecutor a reasonable opportunity of being heard when the application shall be finally heard by the Court.
(1B) The presence of the applicant seeking anticipatory bail shall be obligatory at the time of final hearing of the application and passing of final order by the Court, if on an application made to it by the Public Prosecutor, the Court considers such presence necessary in the interest of justice.
(2) When the High Court or the Court of Session makes a direction under sub-section (1), it may include such conditions in such directions in the light of the facts of the particular case, as it may thinks fit, including—
(i) a condition that the person shall make himself available for interrogation by a police officer as and when required;
(ii) a condition that the person shall not, directly or indirectly, make any inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the Court or to any police officer;
(iii) a condition that the person shall not leave India without the previous permission of the Court;
(iv) such other condition as may be imposed under sub-section
(3) of section 437, as if the bail were granted under that section.
(3) If such person is thereafter arrested without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station on such accusation, and is prepared either at the time of arrest or at any time while in the custody of such officer to give bail, he shall be released on bail, and if a Magistrate taking cognizance of such offence decides that a warrant should issue in the first instance against that person, he shall issue a bailable warrant in conformity with the direction of the Court under Sub-Section (1).
(4) Nothing in this section shall apply to any case involving the arrest of any person on accusation of having committed an offence under sub-section (3) of section 376 or section 376AB or section 376DA or section 376DB of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).”
PRIYA INDORIA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ORS.
ETC. [B. V. NAGARATHNA, J.] 546 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.
9.6 The salient features of Section 438 of CrPC can be culled out as under:
i. It confers a statutory right upon any person who has a reason to believe that he may be arrested in relation to the commission of a non-bailable offence.
ii. The statutory right consists of the right to apply before the High Court or the Court of Session for a direction that in the event of such arrest, he shall be released on bail.
iii. The Parliament has provided ample legislative guidance on the factors that may guide the High Court or the Court of Session while considering the application for grant of an anticipatory bail.
iv. The substantive factors consist of the nature and gravity of the accusation, the criminal antecedents of the applicant, the risk of the applicant absconding from justice or not cooperating with the criminal justice administration and the possibility of an accusation made in bad faith with the aim of injuring or humiliating the applicant.
v. In addition to the aforementioned substantive factors guiding the exercise of judicial discretion, Section 438 of CrPC engrafts certain procedural requirements. The High Court or the Court of Session may grant an interim order under Section 438(1) of CrPC in case the facts and averments in the application satisfy the factors laid down. However, the proviso to Section 438(1) of CrPC provides that if such an interim order is denied, the officer in-charge of a police station is at liberty to arrest the applicant without warrant. Even if the interim order is made in favour of the applicant, the High Court or the Court of Session is mandated under Section 438 (1A) of CrPC to cause a notice of not less than seven days along with a copy of the interim order to be served on the Public Prosecutor and the Superintendent of Police, with a view to give the Public Prosecutor a reasonable opportunity of being heard when the application is finally heard by the Court. The Court is also empowered under Section 438 (1B) of CrPC to allow the Public Prosecutor’s application to make the presence of the applicant seeking anticipatory bail obligatory at the time of final hearing, if the Court deems such presence necessary in the interest of justice.
vi. The High Court or the Court of Session, under Section 438(2) of CrPC, is further empowered to pass any such conditions in light of the facts of a particular case, including a) A condition that the person shall make himself available for interrogation by a police officer as and when required;
b) a condition that the person shall not, directly or indirectly, make any inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the Court or to any police officer;
c) a condition that the person shall not leave India without the previous permission of the Court;
d) such other condition as may be imposed under Sub-Section
(3) of section 437, as if the bail is being granted under that Section.
vii. Section 438(3) states that if such a person is thereafter arrested without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station on an accusation, and is prepared either at the time of arrest or at any time while in the custody of such officer to give bail, he is entitled to be released on bail. If a Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence decides that a warrant should be issued in the first instance against that person, he is empowered to issue a bailable warrant in conformity with the direction of the Court under Section 438(1).
viii. The Parliament has inserted clause (4) to Section 438 of CrPC vide the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2018, thereby stipulating that the remedy under Section 438 of CrPC cannot be resorted to by any person accused of having committed an offence under Sections 376(3), 376-AB, 376-DA or 376-DB of the IPC.
PRIYA INDORIA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ORS.
ETC. [B. V. NAGARATHNA, J.] 548 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.
ix. The State Legislatures of Maharashtra, Odisha, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal have enacted State amendments to Section 438 of CrPC.
Evolution of the Safeguard of Anticipatory Bail:
10. In Shri Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia vs. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565 (Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia), a Constitution Bench of this Court speaking through Chandrachud, C.J., observed that society has a vital stake in preserving personal liberty as well as investigational powers of the police and their relative importance at any given time depends upon the complexion and restraints of political conditions. How best to balance these interests while determining the scope of Section 438 of CrPC was the focus of the said case while dealing with the historical background of the said provision.
10.1. The question of the grant of pre-arrest or anticipatory bail fell for consideration in the era when the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 was in vogue and the grant of such bail was governed by Sections 497 and 498 of the erstwhile Criminal Procedure Code. In Jamini Mullick vs. Emperor, (1909) ILR 36 Cal 174, the Calcutta High Court considered a case where the Presidency Magistrate had issued warrants for the arrest of certain persons as suspects in a murder case. The deceased had been found lying dead at night on the footpath and while at the inquest certain unknown persons were suspected, the Magistrate issued warrants when evidence casting suspicion on four individuals was produced. Therefore, the suspected individuals petitioned the Calcutta High Court for grant of bail. The Division Bench of Justices Mitra and Coxe granted pre-arrest bail to the suspected individuals. The judgment was prefaced by remarking that ordinarily the Court did not grant bail in cases of that kind, but emphasised on Section 498 of the erstwhile Criminal Procedure Code to hold that the High Court could exercise revisionary jurisdiction and grant bail to any person. It was noted that the yardstick for the grant of relief of bail was whether there existed reasonable grounds to believe that the accused were guilty of the offence. It was underlined that it was within the Magistrate’s jurisdiction to release the accused persons on bail but since the Magistrate did not consider the inconsistencies in the evidence produced to implicate four different accused for the same crime, the High Court could correct the Magistrate’s failure to exercise his jurisdiction.
10.2. The decision of the Calcutta High Court was followed by the Full Bench of the Lahore High Court in Hidayat Ullah Khan vs. The Crown, AIR 1949 Lah 77 wherein the petitioners being apprehensive of institution of criminal proceedings had outlined reasons for the apprehension and sought pre-arrest bail till the disposal of the trial. The petitioners had averred that such arrest would amount to victimization, and would be a cause of disgrace and dishonour to them. Justice Cornelius underlined that the proposed prosecution was not in good faith and that one of the petitioners was suffering from certain illnesses. The Crown had challenged the competence of the High Court to grant bail in anticipation of arrest, and that had occasioned the reference of the question from the Single Judge to the Full Bench. The Full Bench framed the question as under:
“Whether the High Court can grant any relief, and if so what, to a person seeking an order for bail, in anticipation of his arrest for an offence?”
10.3. The Full Bench held that the High Court had power under Section 498 of the erstwhile Code of Criminal Procedure Code to make an order that a person who is suspected of an offence for which he may he arrested by a police-officer or a Court, shall be admitted to bail. The Full Bench laid emphasis on the distinction between the jurisdiction of the police officer or Magistrate under Section 497 of the erstwhile Criminal Procedure Code ‘to release on bail’ and that of the High Court under Section 498 of the erstwhile Criminal Procedure Code, to ‘direct that any person be admitted to bail.’ The Full Bench reasoned that the distinct use of a wide expression signified that the High Court’s power includes not merely a power to revise the exercise of discretion by police-officers and Courts of first instance where bail has been refused, but also include clearly a power in the High Court to grant bail to persons to whom the police and the Courts of first instance are not permitted by S. 497 to grant bail, including those persons who are not in custody. The Full Bench struck a cautious note that ‘such cases would necessarily be extremely rare, and by its very nature, the power to interfere with the discretion of an official such as a police-officer exercising statutory powers perhaps at some remote place, at the very earliest stages of an investigation, would require to be exercised with the very greatest care.’ The Full Bench held that the Court PRIYA INDORIA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ORS.
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needs to be satisfied that if it stayed its hands until the police-officer had himself exercised his discretion in the matter and refused, upon arrest, to grant bail, a grave or irreparable wrong or injustice might result, while at the same time preserving the interest of justice in so far as they related to the charge against such an accused person.
10.4. It is observed that the CrPC, 1898 did not contain any specific provision corresponding to the present Section 438 of CrPC. Under the old Code, there was a sharp difference of opinion amongst the various High Courts on the question of whether Courts had the inherent power to pass an order of bail in anticipation of arrest, the preponderance of view being that it did not have such power.
10.5. The concept of ‘anticipatory bail’ was clearly explicated vide the 41st Law Commission Report in the year 1969, whereby the Law Commission observed as such:
“39.9. The suggestion for directing the release of a person on bail prior to his arrest (commonly known as ‘anticipatory bail’) was carefully considered by us. Though there is a conflict of judicial opinion about the power of a Court to grant anticipatory bail, the majority view is that there is no such power under the existing provisions of the Code. The necessity for granting anticipatory bail arises mainly because sometimes influential persons try to implicate their rivals in false causes for the purpose of disgracing them or for other purposes by getting them detained in jail for some days. In recent times, with the accentuation of political rivalry, this tendency is showing signs of steady increase. Apart from false cases, where there are reasonable grounds for holding that a person accused of an offence is not likely to abscond, or otherwise misuse his liberty while on bail, there seems no justification to require him first to submit to custody, remain in prison for some days and then apply for bail.
We recommend the acceptance of this suggestion. We are further of the view that this special power should be conferred only on the High Court and the Court of Session, and that the order should take effect at the time of arrest or thereafter.”
(emphasis added by us)
10.6. Thereafter, the 48th Law Commission of India Report, 1972 titled ‘Some questions under the Code of Criminal Procedure Bill, 1970’ discussed the legislative proposal for inclusion of a provision for the grant of anticipatory bail. The Law Commission termed the same to be a ‘useful addition’ while adding a caveat that it ought to be exercised only in very exceptional cases. The Commission opined that the initial order should only be an interim order. That reasons for grant of the relief must be recorded and the Court ought to be satisfied that the direction is necessary in the interest of justice. The Law Commission also expressed a view that it was imperative that the final order of grant of anticipatory bail should only be made after notice to the Public Prosecutor so as to prevent the abuse of the process of law at the ‘instance of unscrupulous petitioners.’
10.7. Observing that the crimes, the criminals and even the complainants can occasionally possess extraordinary features, in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia, it was stated that “when the even flow of life becomes turbid, the police can be called upon to inquire into charges arising out of political antagonism”. The powerful processes of criminal law can then be perverted for achieving extraneous ends. Attendant upon such investigations, when the police are not free agents within their sphere of duty, is a great amount of inconvenience, harassment and humiliation that can even take the form of the parading of a respectable person in handcuffs, apparently on way to a Court of justice. The foul deed is done when an adversary is exposed to social ridicule and obloquy, no matter when and whether a conviction is secured or is at all possible. It is in order to meet such situations, though not limited to these contingencies, that the power to grant anticipatory bail was introduced into the Code of 1973.
10.8. Despite the inclusion of the provision for anticipatory bail in the CrPC after the acceptance of the aforesaid recommendation, the expression “anticipatory bail” remained undefined in the CrPC. This Court in Balchand Jain observed that “anticipatory bail” means “bail in anticipation of arrest.” This Court has exposited that an application for anticipatory bail could be made by the accused either at a stage before an FIR is filed or at a stage when an FIR is registered but the charge sheet has not been filed, and the investigation is underway. Alternatively, it can be moved after the completion of investigation. The stage of investigation PRIYA INDORIA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ORS.
ETC. [B. V. NAGARATHNA, J.] 552 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.
has a bearing on the conditions to be imposed while granting the relief of anticipatory bail.
10.9. A crucial difference between the pre-arrest bail order under Section 438 of CrPC and the bail order under Sections 437 and 439 of CrPC is the stages at which the bail order is passed.
11. Greater clarity on the contours of judicial discretion in the grant of pre-arrest bail emerged out of the judgement of the Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Gurbaksh Singh Sibia vs. State of Punjab, 1977 SCC OnLine P&H 157. The Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court had rejected the application for bail while furnishing the reasons that the power under Section 438 of CrPC is of an extraordinary character and must be exercised sparingly in exceptional cases. The said judgment was carried in appeal before this Court. Thereafter, the law on anticipatory bail was further crystallized by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia, where it disagreed with the reasoning of the Full Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court.
11.1. It was observed that since the denial of bail amounts to deprivation of personal liberty, the Court should lean against the imposition of unnecessary restrictions on the scope of Section 438 of CrPC, especially when not imposed by the legislature in terms of the Section. It was observed that Section 438 of CrPC is a procedural provision which is concerned with the personal liberty of the individual, who is entitled to the benefit of the presumption of innocence since he is not, on the date of his application for anticipatory bail, convicted of the offence in respect of which he seeks bail. An over-generous infusion of constraints and conditions which are not to be found in Section 438 of CrPC can make its provisions constitutionally vulnerable since the right to personal freedom cannot be made to depend on compliance with unreasonable restrictions. The beneficent provision contained in Section 438 of CrPC must be saved, not jettisoned. The considerations for grant of anticipatory bail were discussed in paragraph 31 of the said judgment which reads as under:
“31. In regard to anticipatory bail, if the proposed accusation appears to stem not from motives of furthering the ends of justice but from some ulterior motive, the object being to injure and humiliate the applicant by having him arrested, a direction for the release of the applicant on bail in the event of his arrest would generally be made. On the other hand, if it appears likely, considering the antecedents of the applicant, that taking advantage of the order of anticipatory bail he will flee from justice, such an order would not be made. But the converse of these propositions is not necessarily true. That is to say, it cannot be laid down as an inexorable rule that anticipatory bail cannot be granted unless the proposed accusation appears to be actuated by mala fides; and, equally, that anticipatory bail must be granted if there is no fear that the applicant will abscond. There are several other considerations, too numerous to enumerate, the combined effect of which must weigh with the Court while granting or rejecting anticipatory bail. The nature and seriousness of the proposed charges, the context of the events likely to lead to the making of the charges, a reasonable possibility of the applicant’s presence not being secured at the trial, a reasonable apprehension that witnesses will be tampered with and “the larger interests of the public or the State” are some of the considerations which the Court has to keep in mind while deciding an application for anticipatory bail.”
11.2. On the question of evaluation of the consideration as to whether the applicant is likely to abscond, it was observed that there can be no presumption that the wealthy and the mighty will submit themselves to trial and the humble and the poor will run away from the course of justice, any more than there can be a presumption that the former are not likely to commit a crime and the latter are more likely to commit it. Ultimately, the Constitution Bench clarified the following points in paragraphs 35 to 39 which are extracted as under:
“35. Section 438(1) of the Code lays down a condition which has to be satisfied before anticipatory bail can be granted. The applicant must show that he has “reason to believe” that he may be arrested for a non-bailable offence. The use of the expression “reason to believe” shows that the belief that the applicant may be so arrested must be founded on reasonable grounds. Mere ‘fear’ is not ‘belief”, for which reason it is not enough for the applicant to show that he has some sort of a vague apprehension that some one is going to make an accusation against him, in pursuance of which he may be arrested. The grounds PRIYA INDORIA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ORS.
ETC. [B. V. NAGARATHNA, J.] 554 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.
on which the belief of the applicant is based that he may be arrested for a non-bailable offence, must be capable of being examined by the Court objectively, because it is then alone that the Court can determine whether the applicant has reason to believe that he may be so arrested. Section 438(1), therefore, cannot be invoked on the basis of vague and general allegations, as if to arm oneself in perpetuity against a possible arrest. Otherwise, the number of applications for anticipatory bail will be as large as, at any rate, the adult populace. Anticipatory bail is a device to secure the individuals liberty; it is neither a passport to the commission of crimes nor a shield against any and all kinds of accusations, likely or unlikely.
36. Secondly, if an application for anticipatory bail is made to the High Court or the Court of Session it must apply its own mind to the question and decide whether a case has been made out for granting such relief. It cannot leave the question for the decision of the Magistrate concerned under Section 437 of the Code, as and when an occasion arises. Such a course will defeat the very object of Section 438.
37. Thirdly, the filing of a first information report is not a condition precedent to the exercise of the power under Section 438. The imminence of a likely arrest founded on a reasonable belief can be shown to exist even if an FIR is not yet filed.
38. Fourthly, anticipatory bail can be granted even after an FIR is filed, so long as the applicant has not been arrested.
39. Fifthly, the provisions of Section 438 cannot be invoked after the arrest of the accused. The grant of “anticipatory bail” to an accused who is under arrest involves a contradiction in terms, insofar as the offence or offences for which he is arrested, are concerned. After arrest, the accused must seek his remedy under Section 437 or Section 439 of the Code, if he wants to be released on bail in respect of the offence or offences for which he is arrested.”
11.3. Cautioning the Courts against granting blanket order of anticipatory bail so as to cover or protect any and every kind of allegedly unlawful activity, or eventuality, it was observed that there must be a genuine apprehension of arrest by the applicant and there must be something tangible to go by on the basis of which it can be said that the applicant’s apprehension of arrest is genuine. Otherwise, a blanket order of anticipatory bail is bound to cause serious interference with both the right and the duty of the police in the matter of investigation because regardless of what kind of offence is alleged to have been committed by the applicant, when an order of bail comprehends allegedly unlawful activity of any description whatsoever, this will prevent the police from arresting the applicant even if he commits, say, a murder in the presence of the public. Therefore, the Court which grants anticipatory bail must take care to specify the offence or offences in respect of which alone the order will be effective. The power should not be exercised in a vacuum.
12. While adjudicating on a question as to whether the protection granted under Section 438 of CrPC should be limited to a fixed period so as to enable the person to surrender before the trial Court or not, a Constitution Bench of this Court in Sushila Aggarwal took note of later doctrinal developments as well as reports of the Law Commission of India. In this case, two questions were considered by the Constitutional Bench:
1. Whether the protection granted to a person under Section 438 of CrPC should be limited to a fixed period so as to enable the person to surrender before the trial Court and seek regular bail?
2. Whether the life of an anticipatory bail order should end at the time and stage when the accused is summoned by the Court?
12.1. Regarding the first question, this Court held that the protection granted to a person under Section 438 of CrPC should not invariably be limited to a fixed period; it should enure in favour of the accused without any restriction on time. Normal conditions under Section 437(3) read with Section 438(2) of CrPC should be imposed. If there are specific facts or features in regard to any offence, it is open for the Court to impose any appropriate condition (including fixed nature of relief, or its being tied to an event), etc.
12.2. As regards the second question referred to this Court, it was held that the life or duration of an anticipatory bail order does not end normally at the time and stage when the accused is summoned by the Court, or when charges are framed, but can continue till the end of the trial. Again, if there PRIYA INDORIA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ORS.
ETC. [B. V. NAGARATHNA, J.] 556 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.
are any special or peculiar features necessitating the Court to limit the tenure of anticipatory bail, it is open for it to do so.
12.3 The following clarifications were also issued which are to be borne in mind while dealing with an application under Section 438 of CrPC: “a) When an application is made seeking anticipatory bail, it should be based on concrete facts (and not vague or general allegations) relatable to one or other specific offence. The application should contain bare essential facts relating to the offence, and why the applicant reasonably apprehends arrest, as well as his side of the story. This is necessary in order to evaluate the threat or apprehension, its gravity or seriousness and the appropriateness of any condition that may have to be imposed. An application should be moved prior to the filing of an FIR, so long as the facts are clear and there is reasonable basis for apprehending arrest.
b) It is advisable for the Court, to issue notice to the Public Prosecutor and obtain facts, even while granting limited interim anticipatory bail.
c) Nothing in Section 438 CrPC, compels or obliges Courts to impose conditions limiting relief in terms of time, or upon filing of FIR, or recording of statement of any witness, by the police, during investigation or inquiry, etc. The Court has to consider the nature of the offence, the role of the person, the likelihood of his influencing the course of investigation, or tampering with evidence (including intimidating witnesses), likelihood of fleeing justice (such as leaving the country), etc. By virtue of Section 438(2), the Courts would be justified and ought to impose conditions spelt out in Section 437(3). Conditions which limit the grant of anticipatory bail may be imposed, depending on the facts of the case but not be invariably imposed.
d) Courts ought to be generally guided by considerations such as the nature and gravity of the offences, the role attributed to the applicant, and the facts of the case. Whether to grant or not is a matter of discretion and similarly if bail is to be granted, the kind of conditions to be imposed or not to be imposed depends upon the facts of each case and subject to the discretion of the Court.
e) Anticipatory bail granted can, depending on the conduct and behaviour of the accused, continue after filing of the charge-sheet till the end of trial.
f) An order of anticipatory bail should not be blanket in the sense that it should not enable the accused to commit further offences and claim relief of indefinite protection from arrest. It must be confined to the particular offence or offences relatable to an incident, for which apprehension of arrest is sought. It cannot operate in respect of a future incident that involves commission of an offence.
g) The grant of an anticipatory bail does not in any manner limit or restrict the rights or duties of the police or investigating agency, to investigate into the charges against the person who seeks and is granted pre-arrest bail.
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