M/S Iveco Magirus Brandschutztechnik Gmbh v. Nirmal Kishore Bhartiya & Anr
- Citation
- 2023 INSC 880; [2023] 13 S.C.R. 220
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Bela M. Trivedi, Justice Dipankar Datta Headnotes Issue for Consideration: (I) Whether, Justice While Considering A Private Complaint Alleging Defamation, Justice Applying the Exceptions to S.499, Justice Ipc, Justice If At All, Justice To What Extent, Justice Is It Open to the High Courts to Exercise Inherent Power Saved By S.482, Justice Cr. Pc to Quash Proceedings for Defamation By Setting
- Decided
- 5 Oct 2023
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 1959/2012
- Sections
- 499, 482, 200, 202, 204, 34, 188, 500, 397, 251, 201, 203
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:28 am. Original source ↗
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[2023] 13 S.C.R. 220 : 2023 INSC 880
CASE DETAILS
M/S IVECO MAGIRUS BRANDSCHUTZTECHNIK GMBH v.
NIRMAL KISHORE BHARTIYA & ANR.
(Criminal Appeal No. 1959 of 2012)
OCTOBER 05, 2023
[BELA M. TRIVEDI AND DIPANKAR DATTA, JJ.]
HEADNOTES
Issue for consideration: (i) Whether, while considering a private complaint alleging defamation, the Magistrate before summoning the accused ought to confine himself to the allegations forming part of the petition only or he may, applying his judicial mind to the exceptions to s.499, IPC, dismiss the complaint holding that the facts alleged do not make out a case of defamation?
(ii) Whether and, if at all, to what extent, is it open to the High Courts to exercise inherent power saved by s.482, Cr. PC to quash proceedings for defamation by setting aside the summoning order upon extending the benefit of any of the Exceptions to s.499, IPC?
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Issue Process – Complaint of Defamation – Application of judicial mind by the Magistrate: Held: In the context of a complaint of defamation, at the stage the Magistrate proceeds to issue process, he has to form his opinion based on the allegations in the complaint and other material (obtained through the process referred to in section 200/section 202) as to whether ‘sufficient ground for proceeding’ exists as distinguished from ‘sufficient ground for conviction’, which has to be left for determination at the trial and not at the stage when process is issued – Although there is nothing in the law which in express terms mandates the Magistrate to consider whether any of the Exceptions to s. 499, IPC is attracted, there is no bar either – It is not the law that the Magistrate is in any manner precluded from considering if at all any of the Exceptions is attracted in a given case; the Magistrate is under no fetter from so considering, more so because being someone who 221M/S IVECO MAGIRUS BRANDSCHUTZTECHNIK GMBH v.
NIRMAL KISHORE BHARTIYA
is legally trained, it is expected that while issuing process he would have a clear idea of what constitutes defamation – If, in the unlikely event, the contents of the complaint and the supporting statements on oath as well as reports of investigation/inquiry reveal a complete defence under any of the Exceptions to s. 499, IPC, the Magistrate, upon due application of judicial mind, would be justified to dismiss the complaint on such ground and it would not amount to an act in excess of jurisdiction if such dismissal has the support of reasons.[Para 45] Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s. 482 – Power of the High Court to quash proceedings for defamation by setting aside the summoning order upon extending the benefit of any of the Exceptions to s.499, IPC:
Held: The exercise of jurisdiction by the High Courts u/s. 482, Cr.P.C., in a case where the offence of defamation is claimed by the accused to have not been committed based on any of the Exceptions and a prayer for quashing is made, law seems to be well settled that the High Courts can go no further and enlarge the scope of inquiry if the accused seeks to rely on materials which were not there before the Magistrate – This is based on the simple proposition that what the Magistrate could not do, the High Courts may not do – It may not be understood to undermine the High Courts’ powers saved by s.482, Cr.P.C.; such powers are always available to be exercised ex debito justitiae, i.e., to do real and substantial justice for administration of which alone the High Courts exist – The issue of process u/s. 204 r/w. s.200, Cr.P.C. does not ipso facto stand vitiated for non-consideration of the Exceptions to s.499, IPC unless, of course, before the High Court it is convincingly demonstrated that even on the basis of the complaint and the materials that the Magistrate had before him and without there being anything more, the facts alleged do not prima facie make out the offence of defamation and that consequently, the proceedings need to be closed. [Paras 46 and 47] Penal Code, 1860 – s. 499 – Exceptions to s.499 – Trial Court upon considering the complaint u/s. 200 Cr.P.C. returned a prima facie finding in order dated 25.03.2010 that accused no.1, the appellant (accused no.2) and its district manager were responsible for writing, sending, publishing letters containing malicious and defamatory statements and SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.222 consequently summoned the three accused persons u/ss. 500/107/34, IPC – Propriety:
Held: At the stage, when the Trial Court made the summoning order, two aspects were required to be satisfied: (1) whether the uncontroverted allegations as made in the petition of complaint read with the examination of the complainant, prima facie, tend to suggest an offence having been committed, and (2) whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to proceed – Keeping in view the allegations made in the petition of complaint and the evidence placed before the Trial Court by the complainant and on a plain reading of its order dated 25.03.2010 issuing summons to the accused, it does not appear that the finding of a prima facie case having been made out at that stage is so outrageously illogical or in defiance of legal principles and acceptable standards that it would merit interference by this Court – Appellant would be free to appear before the Trial Court and raise whatever defence is available to it in law, not necessarily confined to the Fourth Exception, for due consideration thereof by the Trial Court – Therefore, the Trial Court was not unjustified in issuing summons to the accused based on the materials before it. [Paras 49, 50] Penal Code, 1860 – s.499 – Exceptions to s.499 – Whether a company can be prosecuted for defamation when the alleged defamatory statements are made not by it (the company) but by its authorised agent: Held: It must necessarily depend on the facts of each case, meaning thereby the quality of evidence that is led in course of the trial and the weight to be attached to it – In the instant case, the Power of Attorney is yet not proved by the appellant-company according to law and, therefore, could not have been considered by the Judge and cannot be considered by this Court as well – Even if proved, its effect and import necessarily have to be considered by the Trial Court – However, if from evidence led it is established that the authorised agent had issued defamatory statements with the consent of the principal or that the principal, without giving consent, had due knowledge of such defamatory statements, yet, did not caution/ reprimand the agent for doing so or had not disowned the statements so made, there is no reason why a prosecution for defamation should be nipped in the bud on the specious ground that an authorised agent is supposed to act 223M/S IVECO MAGIRUS BRANDSCHUTZTECHNIK GMBH v.
NIRMAL KISHORE BHARTIYA
lawfully and not unlawfully – As far as the benefit of the fourth exception is concerned, it is for the appellant to demonstrate before the Trial Court that the Fourth Exception is attracted, or plead any other defence, and discharge its burden of proof in respect thereof during the course of the trial. [Paras 54, 55, 56, 57]
LIST OF CITATIONS AND OTHER REFERENCES
Balraj Khanna & Ors. v. Moti Ram (1971) 3 SCC 399 : [1971] Suppl. SCR 447; Sewakram Sobhani v. R.K. Karanjia (1981) 3 SCC 208 : [1981] 3 SCR 627; Shatrughna Prasad Sinha v. Rajabhau Surajmal Rathu (1996) 6 SCC 263 : [1996] 5 Suppl. SCR 771; Subramanian Swamy v. Union of India (2016) 7 SCC 221 : [2016] 3 SCR 865; Rajendra Kumar Sitaram Pande v. Uttam (1999) 3 SCC 134 : [1999] 1 SCR 580; Jawaharlal Darda v. Manoharrao Ganpatrao Kapsikar (1998) 4 SCC 112; Vadilal Panchal v. Dattatraya Dulaji Ghadigaonkar [1961] 1 SCR 1; Ramgopal Ganpatrai Ruia v. State of Bombay [1958] SCR 618; National Bank of Oman v. Barakara Abdul Aziz (2013) 2 SCC 488 : [2012] 11 SCR 500 – relied on. Iridium India Telecom Ltd. v. Motorola Incorporated & Ors. (2011) 1 SCC 74 : [2010] 14 SCR 591; Morgan Tetronics Ltd. v. State & Anr. LPA- 668/2010 dt. 17 th September 2010: Aroon Purie v. State of NCT of Delhi (2022) 15 SCALE 541; Supriya Jain v. State of Haryana (2023) SCC OnLine SC 765; M.N. Damani v. S.K. Sinha (2001) 5 SCC 156 : [2001] 3 SCR 415; M.A. Rumugam v. Kittu Alias Krishnamoorthy (2009) 1 SCC 101 : [2008] 15 SCR 642; Chandra Deo Singh v. Prokash Chandra Bose [1964] 1 SCR 639: Jeffrey J. Diermeier v. State of West Bengal (2010) 6 SCC 243 : [2010] 7 SCR 128; Manoj Kumar Tiwari v. Manish Sisodia 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1434; B.R.K. Aathithan v. Sun Group 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1705; Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan (2005) 2 SCC 42; Jagdish Ram v. State of Rajasthan (2004) 4 SCC 432 : [2004] 2 SCR 846; Chand Dhawan (Smt.) v. Jawaharlal (1992) 3 SCC 317 : [1992] 2 SCR 83 – referred to.
OTHER CASE DETAILS INCLUDING IMPUGNED
ORDER AND APPEARANCES
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.
1959 of 2012.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.224 From the Judgment and Order dated 10.12.2010 of the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in CRLMC No.2845 of 2010.
Appearances:
Ms. Aparna Viswanathan, R. Gopalakrishnan, Advs. for the Appellant. Manoj D. Taneja, Ms. Gauri K. Dass Mohanti, Snehasis Mukherjee, Sunil Fernandes, Ms. Priyansha Sharma, Advs. for the Respondents. JUDGMENT / ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT
JUDGMENT
DIPANKAR DATTA, J.
THE APPEAL
1. This appeal, by special leave, is at the instance of a German company (“the appellant”, hereafter). It assails a short five-line order of a learned Judge of the High Court of Delhi (“learned Judge”, hereafter) dated 10th December 2010. By such order, the learned Judge dismissed a petition1 under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“Cr. PC”, hereafter) presented by the appellant as not maintainable relying on the decision of this Court in Iridium India Telecom Ltd. v. Motorola Incorporated & Ors.2 and a Bench decision of the High Court of Delhi in Morgan Tetronics Ltd. v. State & Anr.3
CHALLENGE BEFORE THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI
2. Appellant had approached the High Court of Delhi taking exception to an order dated 25th March 2010 passed by the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate (SE), New Delhi (“Trial Court”, hereafter) on a complaint4 lodged under section 200, Cr. PC by the respondent (“complainant”, hereafter). The Trial Court upon considering the complaint returned a prima facie finding in the said order that Mr. M.C. Aggarwal (accused no.1), the appellant (accused no. 2) and its District Manager (Asia), Mr. Lorenzo Boninsegna (accused 1 CRL. M.C. 2845/2010
2 (2011) 1 SCC 74
3 LPA-668/2010 dt. 17th September 2010 4 CC No.465/1/09 no.3) were “jointly and severally responsible for writing, sending, publishing the above said letters containing malicious and defamatory statements and imputation against the complainant” and consequently summoned the three accused for offences under sections 500/107/34, Indian Penal Code (“IPC”, hereafter).
FACTS
3. The undisputed and relevant facts leading to the summoning order impugned before the learned Judge is noticed hereunder:
i. Global Tender No. EQ/Global/2007-09/01 was floated by the Airports Authority of India (“AAI”, hereafter) for supply of 40 (forty) Airfield Crash Fire Tenders at various airports across the country. The appellant, a Germany-based manufacturer of fire safety equipment, executed a Power of Attorney in favour of Mr. M.C. Aggarwal, the respondent no. 2 (“Aggarwal”, hereafter), who happened to be the Managing Director of Brijbasi Hi-Tech Udyog Ltd. Aggarwal was appointed to be the local representative of the appellant in India and he was empowered, inter alia, to file suits and take all steps which were deemed expedient in furtherance of the tender process.
ii. The company of the complainant, Bhartiya Vehicles & Engineering Pvt. Ltd, was the Indian associate of one Rosenbauer International AG (“Rosenbauer”, hereafter), another bidder in the aforementioned tender process.
iii. On 21st July 2008, AAI rejected the bid of the appellant and eventually awarded it to Rosenbauer. In the aftermath of the rejection, on various occasions in 2008, Aggarwal issued four letters in the nature of complaints to different authorities including the Minister of Civil Aviation, Government of India, the Chairman of AAI, the Chief Vigilance Officer, AAI, and the Central Vigilance Commissioner, Government of India, inter alia, complaining of favouritism and irregularities in the tender process. These letters allege that the complainant, through illegal and wrongful methods, persuaded AAI to award the tender to Rosenbauer. Enumeration of the contents of such letters is avoided, lest the same prejudices the rights of the parties. M/S IVECO MAGIRUS BRANDSCHUTZTECHNIK GMBH v.
NIRMAL KISHORE BHARTIYA [DIPANKAR DATTA, J.] SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.226 iv. Dissatisfied with the inaction of the aforementioned authorities to look into the letters of complaint, Aggarwal, in his capacity as the local authorised representative of the appellant, invoked the writ jurisdiction of the High Court on or about 12th August 2008 by presenting a writ petition5 against the Union of India and AAI. It is pertinent to note that Bhartiya Vehicles & Engineering Pvt. Ltd., and Rosenbauer were also made parties to the proceedings. The writ petition was finally dismissed on 13th February 2009 vide a detailed order, which was not challenged thereafter.
v. On 30th April 2009, the complainant addressed a legal notice to the appellant and Aggarwal inter alia alleging that the contents of the aforementioned four letters of complaint given to the concerned authorities were defamatory. Pertinently, on 20th May 2009, the appellant responded to the legal notice inter alia stating that it had not authorised Aggarwal to write any such letter, and that the appellant was also not involved in their preparation.
vi. It was in this context that the complainant lodged the complaint before the Trial Court alleging criminal defamation as well as its abetment under sections 107, 499, and 500 read with section 34 of the IPC against the accused.
vii. The Trial Court, after perusing the complaint and examining the witnesses in support thereof, ordered the accused to be summoned as it was of the opinion that a prima facie case was made out against them.
viii. The challenge by the appellant to the summoning order was spurned by the High Court vide the impugned order.
CONTENTIONS OF THE APPELLANT
4. On behalf of the appellant, learned counsel Ms. Viswanathan argued that the High Court committed grave miscarriage of justice in 5 WP (C) No.6155/2008 dismissing the petition by a cryptic order. She contended that several important questions of law were raised in the petition by the appellant. Although the objection as to whether a company is capable of being prosecuted on the ground that it is incapable of possessing necessary mens rea stood answered by the decisions relied on by the learned Judge, yet, according to her, the learned Judge should have considered the other objections raised by the appellant. Not having so considered, it was urged that the impugned order is indefensible.
5. Ms. Viswanathan, in support of the appeal, raised the following specific contentions:
i. The impugned order of the learned Judge omitted to consider that the complaint did not disclose any oral or written words, spoken or written by the appellant, or sign or visible representation made by it; and, in the absence of disclosure of any imputation made by the appellant, the key ingredient of the offence of defamation did not exist. The impugned order of the learned Judge failed to appreciate that issuance of a Power of Attorney cannot by law constitute an ingredient of an offence under section 499, IPC since agents, under section 188 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, are authorised to do only lawful acts; and, as a corollary, execution of such power of attorney did not amount to authorisation or consent given to Aggarwal to commit any alleged act of defamation.
ii. The learned Judge erred in not considering that a writ petition instituted on behalf of the appellant cannot constitute an ingredient of an offence under section 499, IPC, since documents filed in civil cases are protected by an “absolute privilege” and are also covered under the Fourth Exception to section 499, IPC.
iii. There has been a gross failure of justice in that the learned Judge ought to have corrected the manifest error committed by the Trial Court in issuing process against the accused without the Trial Court considering whether any of the exceptions to section 499, IPC was applicable on facts and in the circumstances of the present case.
M/S IVECO MAGIRUS BRANDSCHUTZTECHNIK GMBH v.
NIRMAL KISHORE BHARTIYA [DIPANKAR DATTA, J.] SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.228 iv. The impugned order of the learned Judge fails to explain why the decision of this Court in Rajendra Kumar Sitaram Pande v. Uttam6 was not followed, whereby law has been settled that issuance of process by a Magistrate without applying the exceptions to section 499, IPC is unreasonable, excessive and palpably wrong resulting in failure of justice.
v. The decision in Aroon Purie v. State of NCT of Delhi7 was also cited for the proposition that there is no rigid principle that the benefit of exception can only be afforded at the stage of trial.
6. Resting on the aforesaid contentions, Ms. Viswanathan prayed that the proceedings emanating from the complaint be quashed.
CONTENTIONS OF THE FIRST RESPONDENT
7. Mr. Taneja, learned counsel representing the complainant invited our attention to various documents forming part of his counter affidavit to the special leave petition. According to him, the appellant withheld relevant materials from this Court and obtained an ex parte interim order on 29th April 2011 as a sequel whereto the entire proceedings before the Trial Court have been brought to a grinding halt.
8. Our notice was first invited to the fact that Aggarwal had independently challenged the summoning order before the High Court of Delhi by presenting a petition8 under section 482, Cr. PC. By a detailed order dated 10th December 2010, the same learned Judge (who dismissed the petition of the appellant) noted that Aggarwal was taking defence under exceptions to section 499 IPC and that “the Court cannot take the defence of the petitioner into account to quash the summoning order or to quash the complaint”. Based on such finding, the learned Judge rejected the challenge.
9. Mr. Taneja contended that the learned Judge on 10th December 2010 had considered the petitions of Aggarwal and the appellant, one after
6 (1999) 3 SCC 134
7 2022 (15) SCALE 541
8 CRL. M.C. 3350/2010 the other; and, although it is true that the learned Judge while dismissing the petition of the appellant dealt with the point that a company could be proceeded against in view of Iridium India Telecom Ltd. (supra) and Morgan Tetronics Ltd. (supra) and did not assign separate reasons for spurning the appellant’s challenge to the impugned order on the other grounds raised therein, the appellant was duly represented by its learned advocate when Aggarwal’s petition was considered and in his presence, the order of dismissal was dictated. What Mr. Taneja hinted at was that the learned Judge having passed a reasoned order rejecting Aggarwal’s challenge to the summoning order, the learned Judge may not have considered it necessary to repeat the reasons twice over while dismissing the petition of the appellant.
10. Next, our attention was drawn by Mr. Taneja to the letters of complaint issued by Aggarwal before the various public authorities. It was contended that while acting on behalf of the appellant and also under its instructions, Aggarwal had made reckless and frivolous allegations against the complainant amounting to defamation and, in the process, lowered his reputation and fame in the eyes of the public. He further contended that the appellant cannot feign ignorance of the letters of complaint issued by Aggarwal. Referring to the writ petition of the appellant presented before the High Court of Delhi, he pointed out that the self-same letters of complaint issued by Aggarwal were made part of such petition while challenging the appellant’s disqualification in course of the tender process; and, if indeed, such letters were issued without knowledge and consent of the appellant, it defies logic as to why they were made part of the writ petition in the first place where the appellant was arrayed as the writ petitioner.
11. Relying on the decision of this Court in Supriya Jain v. State of Haryana9, it was argued by Mr. Taneja that it is not open to the Courts to quash a complaint based on additional material placed by the accused which is not part of the record of proceedings before the court below. According to him, the Power of Attorney is not a piece of evidence that has been admitted or accepted by the complainant and, thus, it requires 9 (2023) SCC OnLine SC 765 M/S IVECO MAGIRUS BRANDSCHUTZTECHNIK GMBH v.
NIRMAL KISHORE BHARTIYA [DIPANKAR DATTA, J.] SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.230 proof by the appellant. Since the same is yet not proved by the appellant according to law, therefore, the same cannot be considered at this stage by this Court. Also, it is for the appellant to respond to the summons and to raise whatever defence is available to it by appearing before the Trial Court.
12. Reliance was also placed on several decisions by Mr. Taneja, some of which we propose to refer to a little later, to buttress his contention that the petition of the appellant was rightly dismissed and that the appeal deserves dismissal with costs.
THE QUESTIONS
13. Having heard learned counsel appearing for the appellant and the complainant and on consideration of the materials on record, we are of the view that the following questions of law emerge for an answer: i. Whether, while considering a private complaint alleging defamation, the Magistrate before summoning the accused ought to confine himself to the allegations forming part of the petition only or he may, applying his judicial mind to the exceptions to section 499, IPC, dismiss the complaint holding that the facts alleged do not make out a case of defamation?
AND
ii. Whether and, if at all, to what extent, is it open to the High Courts to exercise inherent power saved by section 482, Cr. PC to quash proceedings for defamation by setting aside the summoning order upon extending the benefit of any of the Exceptions to section 499, IPC?
14. After answering the aforesaid questions, we wish to answer the following questions emerging from the facts and circumstances of the appeal: a. Whether the appellant has made out any case for interference with the judicial orders of the Magistrate and the learned Judge under challenge?
b. Whether a company can be prosecuted for defamation when the alleged defamatory statements are made not by it (the company) but by its authorised agent?
c. Depending on the answers to the above, whether the benefit of the Fourth Exception to section 499, IPC, as claimed, should be accorded to the appellant?
ANALYSIS
15. A survey of the decisions of this Court which were cited and those mentioned in the cited decisions as well as some other decisions, which we had the occasion to read and consider while preparing this judgment, would provide guidance and pave the way for us to decide the fate of this appeal.
16. We would first consider the decisions cited by the parties and those decisions, though not cited by them, are traceable in such decisions, by maintaining the sequence of their origin.
17. In Balraj Khanna & Ors. v. Moti Ram10, the respondent lodged a complaint against the first appellant and 6 (six) others under section 500, IPC, alleging that they had levelled allegations against him which were defamatory in character. On 2 (two) grounds, the Magistrate dismissed the complaint. The respondent unsuccessfully applied for revision of the order of dismissal before the Additional Sessions Judge, whereafter he approached the High Court of Delhi with success. The High Court, while setting aside the orders impugned, directed further inquiry. After considering various foreign decisions as well as decisions of the High Courts of Orissa, Nagpur, Allahabad and Mysore that were cited, this Court in paragraph 29 held as follows:
“29. Before concluding the discussion, it is to be stated that the trial Magistrate has given an additional reason for dismissing the complaint. That reason is that the resolution passed by the Standing Committee on December 11, 1964 and the discussion preceding it by the members of the Standing Committee including the appellants, is covered by the Exceptions to Section 499 IPC. Unfortunately, the High Court also has touched upon this aspect and made certain observations. In our opinion, the question of the application of the Exceptions to Section 499 IPC, does not arise at this stage. Rejection of the complaint by the Magistrate on the second ground
10 (1971) 3 SCC 399
M/S IVECO MAGIRUS BRANDSCHUTZTECHNIK GMBH v.
NIRMAL KISHORE BHARTIYA [DIPANKAR DATTA, J.] SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.232 mentioned above cannot be sustained. It was also unnecessary for the High Court to have considered this aspect and differed from the trial Magistrate. It is needless to state that the question of applicability of the Exceptions to Section 499 IPC, as well as all other defences that may be available to the appellants will have to be gone into during the trial of the complaint.”
(underlining ours, for emphasis)
18. The next decision is Sewakram Sobhani v. R.K. Karanjia11, rendered by a Bench of 3 (three) Hon’ble Judges. The appeal was directed against an order passed by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in exercise of jurisdiction under section 397, Cr. PC, alternatively under section 482 thereof. The respondent was the Chief Editor, Blitz. An article was published therein which was per se defamatory. Prosecution for an offence under section 500, IPC which was launched stood quashed by the impugned order on the ground that the case “clearly falls within the ambit of Exception 9 of Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860”. The appeal was allowed by the majority and the order under challenge quashed. This is what the Court, speaking through Hon’ble A.P. Sen, J., said:
“6. The order recorded by the High Court quashing the prosecution under Section 482 of the Code is wholly perverse and has resulted in manifest miscarriage of justice. The High Court has prejudged the whole issue without a trial of the accused persons. The matter was at the stage of recording the plea of the accused persons under Section 251 of the Code. The requirements of Section 251 are still to be complied with. The learned Magistrate had to ascertain whether the respondent pleads guilty to the charge or demands to be tried. The circumstances brought out clearly show that the respondent was prima facie guilty of defamation punishable under Section 500 of the Code unless he pleads one of the exceptions to Section 499 of the Code. *** It is for the respondent to plead that he was protected under Ninth Exception to Section 499 of the Penal Code. The burden, such as it is, to prove that his case would come within that exception is on him. ***
11 (1981) 3 SCC 208
7. We are completely at a loss to understand the reasons which impelled the High Court to quash the proceedings. ***”
Hon’ble O. Chinnappa Reddy, J., in a concurring judgment, made an illuminating discussion which would also be relevant for answering one of the questions formulated by us touching upon the facts of this appeal. We quote the concluding paragraph of His Lordship’s judgment, reading thus: “18. Several questions arise for consideration if the Ninth Exception is to be applied to the facts of the present case. Was the article published after exercising due care and attention? Did the author of the article satisfy himself that there were reasonable grounds to believe that the imputations made by him were true? Did he act with reasonable care and a sense of responsibility and propriety? Was the article based entirely on the report of the Deputy Secretary or was there any other material before the author? What steps did the author take to satisfy himself about the authenticity of the report and its contents? Were the imputations made rashly without any attempt at verification? Was the imputation the result of any personal ill will or malice which the author bore towards the complainant? Was it the result of any ill will or malice which the author bore towards the political group to which the complainant belonged? Was the article merely intended to malign and scandalise the complainant or the party to which he belonged? Was the article intended to expose the rottenness of a jail administration which permitted free sexual approaches between male and female detenus? Was the article intended to expose the despicable character of persons who were passing off as saintly leaders? Was the article merely intended to provide salacious reading material for readers who had a peculiar taste for scandals? These and several other questions may arise for consideration, depending on the stand taken by the accused at the trial and how the complainant proposes to demolish the defence. Surely the stage for deciding these questions has not arrived yet. Answers to these questions at this stage, even before the plea of the accused is recorded can only be a priori conclusions. ‘Good faith’ and ‘public good’ are, as we said, questions of fact and matters for evidence. So, the trial must go on.”
(underlining ours, for emphasis)
M/S IVECO MAGIRUS BRANDSCHUTZTECHNIK GMBH v.
NIRMAL KISHORE BHARTIYA [DIPANKAR DATTA, J.] SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.234
19. The decision of another Bench of 3 (three) Hon’ble Judges in Shatrughna Prasad Sinha v. Rajabhau Surajmal Rathu12 outlined the contours for exercise of jurisdiction to quash a complaint for defamation. Paragraph 13 being relevant is set out below:
“13. As regards the allegations made against the appellant in the complaint filed in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, Ist Class, at Nasik, on a reading of the complaint we do not think that we will be justified at this stage to quash that complaint. It is not the province of this Court to appreciate at this stage the evidence or scope of and meaning of the statement. Certain allegations came to be made but whether these allegations do constitute defamation of the Marwari community as a business class and whether the appellant had intention to cite as an instance of general feeling among the community and whether the context in which the said statement came to be made, as is sought to be argued by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, are all matters to be considered by the learned Magistrate at a later stage. At this stage, we cannot embark upon weighing the evidence and come to any conclusion to hold, whether or not the allegations made in the complaint constitute an offence punishable under Section 500. It is the settled legal position that a court has to read the complaint as a whole and find out whether allegations disclosed constitute an offence under Section 499 triable by the Magistrate. The Magistrate prima facie came to the conclusion that the allegations might come within the definition of ‘defamation’ under Section 499 IPC and could be taken cognizance of. But these are the facts to be established at the trial. The case set up by the appellant are either defences open to be taken or other steps of framing a charge at the trial at whatever stage known to law. Prima facie we think that at this stage it is not a case warranting quashing of the complaint filed in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, Ist Class at Nasik. To that extent, the High Court was right in refusing to quash the complaint under Section 500 IPC.”
(underlining ours, for emphasis)
12 (1996) 6 SCC 263
20. Then followed M.N. Damani v. S.K. Sinha13 where this Court, after applying the law laid down in Sewakram Sobhani (supra) and Shatrughna Prasad Sinha (supra), set aside the order of the Karnataka High Court and restored the order of the Magistrate issuing summons to the accused for offence under section 500, IPC.
21. In M.A. Rumugam v. Kittu Alias Krishnamoorthy14, the respondent filed a private complaint against the appellant for commission of the offence of defamation under section 500, IPC. Taking cognizance of the said complaint, the Magistrate issued summons to the appellant. Aggrieved thereby, he filed a petition before the High Court of Judicature at Madras praying to call for the records pertaining to the complaint petition filed by the respondent and to quash the same. Before the High Court, a contention was raised that the backdrop of events and the manner in which the complaint petition had to be filed by the appellant would clearly establish that the action on his part was not in good faith. The said contention was negatived by the High Court. This Court had the occasion to consider the applicability of the provisions of section 482, Cr. PC for quashing of a complaint petition filed by the respondent against the appellant under section 500, IPC. While dismissing the appeal, the Court went on to apply the well-settled principle of law that those who plead exception must prove it and, therefore, the burden of proof that his action was bona fide would, thus, be on the appellant alone.
22. In Subramanian Swamy v. Union of India15, this Court considered the issue from a different angle. We can do no better than reproduce the contention and how the same was unhesitatingly repelled in the following words:
“209. We will be failing in our duty if we do not take note of the submission of Mr. Bhambhani, learned Senior Counsel. It is submitted by the learned Senior Counsel that Exceptions to Section 499 are required to be considered at the time of summoning of the accused but as the same is not conceived in the provision, it is unconstitutional. It is settled position of law that those who plead Exception must prove it. It
13 (2001) 5 SCC 156
14 (2009) 1 SCC 101
15 (2016) 7 SCC 221
M/S IVECO MAGIRUS BRANDSCHUTZTECHNIK GMBH v.
NIRMAL KISHORE BHARTIYA [DIPANKAR DATTA, J.] SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.236 has been laid down in M.A. Rumugam that for the purpose of bringing any case within the purview of the Eighth and the Ninth Exceptions appended to Section 499 IPC, it would be necessary for the person who pleads the Exception to prove it. He has to prove good faith for the purpose of protection of the interests of the person making it or any other person or for the public good. The said proposition would definitely apply to any Exception who wants to have the benefit of the same. Therefore, the argument that if the said Exception should be taken into consideration at the time of issuing summons it would be contrary to established criminal jurisprudence and, therefore, the stand that it cannot be taken into consideration makes the provision unreasonable, is absolutely an unsustainable one and in a way, a mercurial one. And we unhesitatingly repel the same.”
(underlining ours, for emphasis)
23. Now, we take up for consideration the first decision cited by Ms. Viswanathan, i.e., Rajendra Kumar Sitaram Pande (supra). The facts, the relevant issue and the finding – all are captured in paragraph 7, which we reproduce hereunder:
“The next question that arises for consideration is whether reading the complaint and the report of the Treasury Officer which was obtained pursuant to the Order of the Magistrate under sub-section (1) of Section 201, can it be said that a prima facie case exists for trial or Exception 8 to Section 499 clearly applies and consequently in such a case, calling upon the accused to face trial would be a travesty of justice. The gravamen of the allegations in the complaint petition is that the accused persons made a complaint to the Treasury Officer, Amravati, containing false imputations to the effect that the complainant had come to the office in a drunken state and abused the Treasury Officer, Additional Treasury Officer and the Collector and circulated in the office using filthy language and such imputations had been made with the intention to cause damage to the reputation and services of the complainant. In order to decide the correctness of this averment, the Magistrate instead of issuing process had called upon the Treasury Officer to hold an enquiry and submit a report and the said Treasury Officer did submit a report to the Magistrate. The question for consideration is whether the allegations in the complaint read with the report of the Magistrate make out the offence under Section 500 or not. Section 499 of the Penal Code, 1860 defines the offence of defamation and Section 500 provides the punishment for such offence. Exception 8 to Section 499 clearly indicates that it is not a defamation to prefer in good faith an accusation against any person to any of those who have lawful authority over that person with regard to the subject-matter of accusation. The report of the Treasury Officer clearly indicates that pursuant to the report made by the accused persons against the complainant, a departmental enquiry had been initiated and the complainant was found to be guilty. Under such circumstances the fact that the accused persons had made a report to the superior officer of the complainant alleging that he had abused the Treasury Officer in a drunken state which is the gravamen of the present complaint and nothing more, would be covered by Exception 8 to Section 499 of the Penal Code, 1860. By perusing the allegations made in the complaint petition, we are also satisfied that no case of defamation has been made out. In this view of the matter, requiring the accused persons to face trial or even to approach the Magistrate afresh for reconsideration of the question of issuance of process would not be in the interest of justice. On the other hand, in our considered opinion, this is a fit case for quashing the order of issuance of process and the proceedings itself. We, therefore, set aside the impugned order of the High Court and confirm the order of the learned Sessions Judge and quash the criminal proceeding itself. This appeal is allowed.” (underlining ours, for emphasis)
24. The aforesaid determination makes it clear that on perusal of the allegations levelled in the petition of complaint, the Court was satisfied that no case of defamation had been made out therein and this precisely seems to be the reason why the Court felt that it would not be in the interest of justice to require the accused persons to face trial or even to approach the Magistrate afresh for reconsideration of the question of issuance of process. We do not read any law having been laid down by this Court in Rajendra Kumar Sitaram Pande (supra) that wherever a challenge to a summoning order passed on a complaint for defamation is laid before the High Courts in a petition under section 482, Cr. PC or such challenge travels to this Court, M/S IVECO MAGIRUS BRANDSCHUTZTECHNIK GMBH v.
NIRMAL KISHORE BHARTIYA [DIPANKAR DATTA, J.] SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.238 an endeavour must necessarily be made whether any of the exceptions is attracted so that the proceedings may be closed without subjecting the accused to long drawn proceedings. At best, we read the decision as one where, in the given facts and circumstances, the Court felt that requiring the appellants to undergo a trial would be a travesty of justice; hence, the decision must be held to be confined to the facts of the case.
25. Now, it is time to consider the other decision relied on by Ms. Viswanathan, i.e., Aroon Purie (supra). In such decision, the decision in Jawaharlal Darda v. Manoharrao Ganpatrao Kapsikar16 was considered. Before we look into Aroon Purie (supra), we propose to ascertain whether Jawaharlal Darda (supra) lays down a law having the force of a binding precedent.
26. The decision in Jawaharlal Darda (supra) reveals that the respondent 1 had filed a complaint on 2nd February, 1987 in the court of the relevant Magistrate alleging that by publishing a news item in its newspaper ‘Daily Lokmat’, on 4th February, 1984, the appellant being the then Chief Editor of that daily and 4 (four) others associated with the newspaper in one capacity or the other, had committed offences punishable under sections 499, 500, 501 and 502 read with section, 34 IPC. Process was issued against all the accused by the Magistrate. Upon a challenge being laid to such order, the relevant Sessions Court quashed it being of the opinion that by publishing that news item, none of the accused had committed any offence. That order was challenged by the complainant by filing a petition in the High Court under section 482, Cr. PC. The High Court was of the opinion that the Sessions Court misinterpreted the publication. It was also of the view that when the Magistrate had found prima facie case against the accused and thought it fit to issue process, it was not proper for the Sessions Court to set aside that order by exercising revisional power. This Court restored the order of the Sessions Court holding as follows:
“4. As we have stated earlier, the news item was published on 4-2- 1984. The complaint in that behalf was filed by the complainant on 2-2-1987. The news item merely disclosed what happened during the debate which took place in the Assembly on 13-12-1983. It stated
16 (1998) 4 SCC 112
that when a question regarding misappropriation of government funds meant for Majalgaon and Jaikwadi was put to the Minister concerned, he had replied that a preliminary enquiry was made by the Government and it disclosed that some misappropriation had taken place. When questioned further about the names of persons involved, he had stated the names of five persons, including that of the complainant. The said proceedings came to be published by the accused in its Daily on 4-2- 1984. Because the name of the complainant was mentioned as one of the persons involved and likely to be suspended he filed a complaint before the learned CJM alleging that as a result of publication of the said report he had been defamed.
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