Ameena Begum v. The State of Telangana & Ors.
- Citation
- 2023 INSC 788; [2023] 11 S.C.R. 958
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Surya Kant, Justice Dacoits, Justice Drug-Off Enders, Justice Goondas, Justice Immoral
- Decided
- 4 Sept 2023
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 2706/2023
- Sections
- 438, 353, 41, 11, 12, 13, 3(2), 2, 10, 9, 3, 7
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CASE DETAILS
AMEENA BEGUM
v.
THE STATE OF TELANGANA & ORS.
(Criminal Appeal No. 2706 of 2023)
SEPTEMBER 04, 2023
[SURYA KANT AND DIPANKAR DATTA, JJ.]
HEADNOTES
Issue for consideration: An order of detention dated 24.03.2023 was passed by the Commissioner of Police against appellant’s husband. Whether the alleged acts of commission for which the Detenu has been kept under detention are prejudicial to ‘public order’ and whether all relevant circumstances were considered or whether extraneous factors weighed in the mind of the detaining authority leading to the conclusion that the Detenu is a habitual offender and for prevention of further crimes by him, he ought to be detained.
Telangana Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug-Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders, Land Grabbers, Spurious Seed Offenders, Insecticide Offenders, Fertiliser Offenders, Food Adulteration Offenders, Fake Document Offenders, Scheduled Commodities Offenders, Forest Offenders, Gaming Offenders, Sexual Offenders, Explosive Substances Offenders, Arms Offenders, Cyber Crime Offenders and White Collar or Financial Offenders Act 1986 – During the years 2022 and 2023, in quick succession, appellant’s husband had committed 9 (nine) more offences and 5 (five) FIRs were registered under various sections 186, 189, 353, 504, 420, 384, 354, 420, 323, 392, 195A of IPC – An order of detention dated 24.03.2023 was passed – Propriety:
Held: The order of detention impugned failed to differentiate between offences which create a “law and order” situation and which prejudicially affect or tend to prejudicially affect “public order” – Even if the offences [2023] 11 S.C.R. 958 : 2023 INSC 788 referred to in the Detention Order, alleged to have been committed by the Detenu have led to the satisfaction being formed, still the same are separate and stray acts affecting private individuals and the repetition of similar such acts would not tend to affect the even flow of public life – The offence in respect of the minor girl did exercise consideration of the Court for some time but it was noted that the Detenu was not arrested because of an order passed by the High Court on an application u/s. 438 of the Cr.PC. – Even otherwise, the gravity of the offences alleged in Arun Ghosh case was higher in degree, yet, the same were not considered as affecting ‘public order’ – The only other offence that could attract the enumerated category of “acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order” and an order of preventive detention, if at all, is the stray incident where the Detenu has been charged u/s. 353, IPC and where the police has not even contemplated an arrest u/s. 41 of the Cr.PC – On an overall consideration of the circumstances, the existing legal framework for maintaining law and order is sufficient to address like offences under consideration, which the Commissioner anticipates could be repeated by the Detenu if not detained – The order of detention is, thus, indefensible. [Paras 29, 39 and 40] Telangana Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug-Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders, Land Grabbers, Spurious Seed Offenders, Insecticide Offenders, Fertiliser Offenders, Food Adulteration Offenders, Fake Document Offenders, Scheduled Commodities Offenders, Forest Offenders, Gaming Offenders, Sexual Offenders, Explosive Substances Offenders, Arms Offenders, Cyber Crime Offenders and White Collar or Financial Offenders Act 1986 – Application of mind in the order of detention dated 24.03.2023 – Proper or not:
Held: The Detenu was earlier preventively detained under the Act vide order of detention dated 04.03.2021, since quashed by the High Court by its order dated 16.08.2021 – The Commissioner stated that the present order of detention is based only on 5 (five) out of these 9 (nine) crimes (years 2022-2023), which are alleged to show that the Detenu’s activities are “prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, apart from disturbing peace and tranquillity in the area” – The Commissioner sought to project that he ordered detention based on the said 5 (five) FIRs, indication of the past offences allegedly committed by the Detenu – However, with the AMEENA BEGUM v. THE STATE OF TELANGANA
& ORS.
960 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S.C.R.
quashing of the order of detention dated 04.03.2021 by the High Court and such direction having attained finality, it defies logic why the Commissioner embarked on an elaborate narration of past offences, which are not relevant to the grounds of the present order of detention – Since the aforesaid order of the High Court went unchallenged and is, thus, binding upon the parties, it was not open to the Commissioner to refer to the very same antecedent offences again in the Detention Order under challenge – There was no direct nexus or link with the immediate need to order detention and there were extraneous considerations in the Detention Order. [Paras 43, 46 and 48] Preventive detention – Ordinary criminal law and extraordinary measure of law of preventive detention:
Held: In the instant case, it is neither the case of the respondents that the Detenu had not complied with the terms of the notice issued u/s. 41-A of the Cr. PC, nor has it been alleged that the conditions of bail had been violated by the Detenu – It is pertinent to note that in the three criminal proceedings where the Detenu had been released on bail, no applications for cancellation of bail had been moved by the State – In the light of the same, the provisions of the Act, which is an extraordinary statute, should not have been resorted to when ordinary criminal law provided sufficient means to address the apprehensions leading to the impugned Detention Order – There may have existed sufficient grounds to appeal against the bail orders, but the circumstances did not warrant the circumvention of ordinary criminal procedure to resort to an extraordinary measure of the law of preventive detention. [Para 51] Preventive detention – Guidance for detaining authorities – Order to be in plain and simple language:
Held: There is no requirement in law of orders of detention being expressed in language that would normally be considered elegant or artistic – An order of detention, which is capable of comprehension, has to precisely set forth the grounds of detention without any vagueness – The substance of the order and how it is understood by the detenu determines its nature – An order in plain and simple language providing clarity of how the subjective satisfaction was formed is what a detenu would look for, since the detenu has a right to represent against the order of detention and claim that such order should not have been made at all. [Para 49] Telangana Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug-Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders, Land Grabbers, Spurious Seed Offenders, Insecticide Offenders, Fertiliser Offenders, Food Adulteration Offenders, Fake Document Offenders, Scheduled Commodities Offenders, Forest Offenders, Gaming Offenders, Sexual Offenders, Explosive Substances Offenders, Arms Offenders, Cyber Crime Offenders and White Collar or Financial Offenders Act 1986 – Role of the Advisory Board and the Government in the period of detention:
Held: It is one thing to say that the Advisory Board has expressed an opinion that there is sufficient cause for the detention and, therefore, the detention has been continued; yet, it is quite another thing to say that the detention should continue for the maximum permissible period – In the light of sub-section (2) of section 11 read with sub-section (1) of section 12 of the Act, the period for which the detention should continue is left to be specified by the Government with the stipulation in section 13 thereof that the maximum period shall be 12 (twelve) months from the date of detention – This appears on a plain reading of the relevant statutory provisions – The duration for which a detenu is to be kept in detention is for the detaining authority to decide and not the Advisory Board – The period of detention and the terminal point has, therefore, to be decided by the Government. [Para 58] Telangana Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug-Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders, Land Grabbers, Spurious Seed Offenders, Insecticide Offenders, Fertiliser Offenders, Food Adulteration Offenders, Fake Document Offenders, Scheduled Commodities Offenders, Forest Offenders, Gaming Offenders, Sexual Offenders, Explosive Substances Offenders, Arms Offenders, Cyber Crime Offenders and White Collar or Financial Offenders Act 1986 – The term “maximum period” in s.13 and continuing detention: Held: The very term “maximum period” in section 13 vests the Government with discretion, allowing it to be exercised while considering whether the detention is to be continued for the maximum period of 12 (twelve) months or any lesser period – The period of detention ought to necessarily vary depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case and cannot be uniform in all cases – The objective sought to be fulfilled in AMEENA BEGUM v. THE STATE OF TELANGANA
& ORS.
962 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S.C.R.
each case, whether is sub-served by continuing detention for the maximum period, ought to bear some reflection in the order of detention; or else, the Government could be accused of unreasonableness and unfairness. [Paras 63 and 70] Preventive detention – Judicial reviewability – The Courts to test the legality of orders of preventive detention, when called upon to examine the same :
Held: In the circumstances of a given case, a Constitutional Court when called upon to test the legality of orders of preventive detention would be entitled to examine whether: (i) the order is based on the requisite satisfaction, albeit subjective, of the detaining authority, for, the absence of such satisfaction as to the existence of a matter of fact or law, upon which validity of the exercise of the power is predicated, would be the sine qua non for the exercise of the power not being satisfied; (ii) in reaching such requisite satisfaction, the detaining authority has applied its mind to all relevant circumstances and the same is not based on material extraneous to the scope and purpose of the statute; (iii) power has been exercised for achieving the purpose for which it has been conferred, or exercised for an improper purpose, not authorised by the statute, and is therefore ultra vires; (iv) the detaining authority has acted independently or under the dictation of another body; (v) the detaining authority, by reason of self-created rules of policy or in any other manner not authorized by the governing statute, has disabled itself from applying its mind to the facts of each individual case; (vi) the satisfaction of the detaining authority rests on materials which are of rationally probative value, and the detaining authority has given due regard to the matters as per the statutory mandate;
(vii) the satisfaction has been arrived at bearing in mind existence of a live and proximate link between the past conduct of a person and the imperative need to detain him or is based on material which is stale; (viii) the ground(s) for reaching the requisite satisfaction is/are such which an individual, with some degree of rationality and prudence, would consider as connected with the fact and relevant to the subject-matter of the inquiry in respect whereof the satisfaction is to be reached; (ix) the grounds on which the order of preventive detention rests are not vague but are precise, pertinent and relevant which, with sufficient clarity, inform the detenu the satisfaction for the detention, giving him the opportunity to make a suitable representation; and (x) the timelines, as provided under the law, have been strictly adhered to. [Para 25] Constitution of India – Preventive detention – Reckless invocation of:
Held: It requires no serious debate that preventive detention, conceived as an extraordinary measure by the framers of the Constitution, has been rendered ordinary with its reckless invocation over the years as if it were available for use even in the ordinary course of proceedings – To unchain the shackles of preventive detention, it is important that the safeguards enshrined in the Constitution, particularly under the ‘golden triangle’ formed by Articles 14, 19 and 21, are diligently enforced. [Para 57]
LIST OF CITATIONS AND OTHER REFERENCES
Haradhan Saha vs. State of West Bengal AIR 1974 SC 2154: [1975] 1 SCR 778; Rameshwar Shaw vs. District Magistrate AIR 1964 SC 334: [1964] SCR 921; Sunil Fulchand Shah vs. Union of India (2000) 3 SCC 409: [2000] 1 SCR 945; Ram Manohar Lohia vs. State of Bihar [1966] 1 SCR 709; Kuso Sah vs. The State of Bihar (1974) 1 SCC 195; Fagu Shaw vs. The State of West Bengal (1974) 4 SCC 152: [1974] 2 SCR 832 – followed. Khudiram Das vs. The State of West Bengal (1975) 2 SCC 81: [1975] 2 SCR 832; Icchu Devi Choraria vs. Union of India (1980) 4 SCC 531: [1981] 1 SCR 640; Sama Aruna vs. State of Telangana (2018) 12 SCC 150: [2017] 4 SCR 52; Khaja Bilal Ahmed vs. State of Telangana (2020) 13 SCC 632: [2019] 18 SCR 1174; Rekha vs. State of Tamil Nadu (2011) 5 SCC 244: [2011] 4 SCR 740; Rajesh Gulati vs. Govt. of NCT of Delhi (2002) 7 SCC 129; Vijay Narain Singh vs. State of Bihar (1984) 3 SCC 14: [1984] 3 SCR 435; Banka Sneha Sheela vs. The State of Telangana (2021) 9 SCC 415; Mallada K Sri Ram vs. State of Telangana 2022 SCC OnLine SC 424; A.K. Roy vs. Union of India (1982) 1 SCC 271: [1982] 2 SCR 272 – relied on.
Vijay Kumar vs. Union of India (1988) 2 SCC 57; Pesala Nookaraju vs. The Government of Andhra Pradesh Crl. Appeal No.2304 of 2023, decided on 16 th August, 2023; – distinguished.
AMEENA BEGUM v. THE STATE OF TELANGANA
& ORS.
964 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S.C.R.
A.K. Gopalan vs. State of Madras AIR 1950 SC 27: [1950] SCR 88; Rustomjee Cawasjee Cooper vs. Union of India AIR 1970 SC 564: [1970] 3 SCR 530; Shibban Lal Saksena vs. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1954 SC 179: [1954] SCR 418; Common Cause vs. Union of India (1999) 6 SCC 667: [1999] 3 SCR 1279; Arun Ghosh vs. State of West Bengal (1970) 1 SCC 98: [1970] 3 SCR 288; Shaik Nazneen vs. The State of Telangana Crl. Appeal No.908 of 2022, dated 22nd June 2023; Dattatraya Moreshwar Pangarkar vs. State of Bombay AIR 1952 SC 181: [1952] SCR 612; Bangalore Medical Trust vs. B.S. Muddappa (1991) 4 SCC 54: [1991] 3 SCR 102; Deepak vs. State of Maharashtra 2022 SCC OnLine SC 99; Cherukari Mani vs. Chief Secretary, Government of Andhra Pradesh (2015) 13 SCC 722: [2014] 6 SCR 750 Susannah Sharp vs. Wakefield & Ors. [1891] A.C. 173, 179 – referred to.
OTHER CASE DETAILS INCLUDING IMPUGNED
ORDER AND APPEARANCES
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
2706 of 2023.
From the Judgment and Order dated 28.06.2023 of the high Court for the State of Telangana at Hyderabad in WP No.9000 of 2023.
Appearances:
Siddharth Luthra, Sr. Adv., Dr. J. P. Dhanda, Ms. Raj Rani Dhanda, Ms. Suchi Nigam, Ms. Jesal Wahi, Advs. for the Appellant.
Siddharth Dave, Sr. Adv., Sriharsha Peechara, Rajiv Kumar Choudhry, Duvvuri Subrahmanya Bhanu, Ms. Pallavi, Ms. Kriti Sinha, Rupraj Banerjee, Advs. for the Respondents.
JUDGMENT / ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT
JUDGMENT
DIPANKAR DATTA, J.
Leave granted.
THE JUDGMENT UNDER CHALLENGE
2. Under assail in this appeal is a judgment and order dated 28th June, 2023 of a Division Bench of the High Court for the State of Telangana (“High Court”, hereafter). Vide the impugned judgment, a writ petition1 instituted by the appellant seeking a writ of habeas corpus was dismissed and the order of detention dated 24th March, 2023 (“Detention Order”, hereafter) of the appellant’s husband (“Detenu”, hereafter), impugned therein, upheld.
THE ORDER OF DETENTION AND FURTHER PROCEEDINGS
3. The Commissioner of Police, Hyderabad City (“Commissioner”, hereafter) passed the Detention Order against the Detenu under the provisions of section 3(2) of the Telangana Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug-Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders, Land Grabbers, Spurious Seed Offenders, Insecticide Offenders, Fertiliser Offenders, Food Adulteration Offenders, Fake Document Offenders, Scheduled Commodities Offenders, Forest Offenders, Gaming Offenders, Sexual Offenders, Explosive Substances Offenders, Arms Offenders, Cyber Crime Offenders and White Collar or Financial Offenders Act 1986 (“the Act”, hereafter). Perusal of the Detention Order reveals that the Detenu earlier suffered an order of detention dated 4th March, 2021 under the category of “White Collar Offender”; however, pursuant to an order of the High Court dated 16th August, 2021in writ proceedings instituted by his father2, the Detenu was released from detention on 17th August, 2021; that even after such release, the Detenu did not mend his habitual nature of committing crimes and in the recent past (during 2022 and 2023), in quick succession, had committed 9 (nine) more offences within the limits of Hyderabad Police Commissionerate, as listed therein; that out of such 9 (nine) offences, 5(five) FIRs3 had been taken into consideration; and that on examination of the material placed before him, the Commissioner was satisfied that the Detenu was “habitually committing the offences including outraging the modesty of women, cheating, extortion, obstructing the public servants from discharging their legitimate duties, robbery and 1 W.P. No.9000 of 2023 2 W.P. No.12321 of 2021 3 (i) FIR No. 227/2022 dated 28.07.2022 for offences under Sections 186, 189, 353, 504, 506, IPC; (ii) FIR No. 262/2022 dated 10.10.2022 for offences under Sections 420, 384, 506 r/w 34, IPC; (iii) FIR No.338/2022 dated 12.10.2022 for offences under Sections 354, 420, 323, 506 r/w 34, IPC; (iv) FIR No. 18/2023 dated 21.01.2023 for offences under Sections 506, 420, 406 r/w 34, IPC; and (v) FIR No. 35/2023 dated 08.02.2023 for offences under Sections 392, 195A, IPC.
AMEENA BEGUM v. THE STATE OF TELANGANA & ORS. [DIPANKAR DATTA, J.] 966 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S.C.R.
criminal intimidation along with his associates in an organized manner in the limits of … and he is a ‘Goonda’ as defined in clause (g) of Section 2”of the Act (bold in original). The Commissioner, with a view to prevent the Detenu from acting in a manner prejudicial to maintenance of public order, recorded not only his satisfaction for invoking the provisions of the Act but also recorded a satisfaction that “the ordinary law under which he was booked is not sufficient to deal with the illegal activities of such an offender who has no regard for the society. Hence, unless he is detained under the detention laws, his unlawful activities cannot be curbed”. After referring to the bail petitions filed by the Detenu in Cr.No.18/2023 of Golconda PS and Cr.No.35/2023 of Falaknuma PS and bail having been granted despite suitable counters filed by the prosecution resulting in the Detenu’s release from jail, the Commissioner observed as follows:
“As seen from his past criminal history, background and antecedents and also his habitual nature of committing crimes one after the other and his efforts to come out of the prison, I strongly believe that if such a habitual criminal is set free, his activities would not be safe to the society and there is an imminent possibility of his committing similar offences by violating the bail conditions in one of the cases which would be detrimental to public order, unless he is preventively detained from doing so by anappropriate order of detention.” This was followed by the order detaining the Detenu, treated as a ‘Goonda’, from the date of service of the same with a direction to lodge him in Central Prison, Chanchalguda, Hyderabad.
4. Upon her husband being detained, the appellant submitted a representation dated 29th March, 2023 in terms of section 10 of the Act raising several grounds and seeking revocation of the Detention Order. Such representation was placed before the Advisory Board constituted under section 9 of the Act. The Advisory Board vide a report dated 29th April, 2023opined that “there is sufficient cause for the detention of the detenu …”, whereupon the Government issued an order dated 20th May, 2023 under sub-section (1) of section 12 read with section 13 of the Act confirming the Detention Order and directing that the detention be continued for a period of 12 months from the date of detention, i.e., 27th January, 2023 (sic, 27th March, 2023). By a further order of even date, the appellant was informed by the Government of absence of any valid grounds/reasons to set aside/ revoke the Detention Order leading to rejection of her representation.
5. The appellant then invoked the writ jurisdiction of the High Court whereupon the parties were heard and the impugned judgment delivered containing reasons for dismissing the writ petition.
CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES
6. In course of hearing of the appeal, Mr. Luthra, learned senior counsel for the appellant invited our attention to several paragraphs of the impugned judgment to demonstrate the errors from which the same suffered, both factual as well as legal. He also placed on record written notes containing submissions on factual as well as legal aspects. Relying on the authorities referred to therein, he prayed for interference by this Court to facilitate release of the Detenu from illegal detention.
7. Per contra, Mr. Dave, learned senior counsel for the respondents urged that notwithstanding Mr. Luthra’s attempt to prick holes in the impugned judgment of the High Court, what is to be seen and read is the order of detention passed under section 3 and once read, it becomes clear that the ultimate conclusion recorded in the impugned judgment is defensible based on the grounds for detention as assigned by the Commissioner in his order dated 24th March, 2023 and the order dated 20th May, 2023 of the Government. Other contentions raised by Mr. Dave need not be enumerated here, for, we intend to deal with the same while proceeding further. However, to put it concisely, the argument of Mr. Dave has been that the satisfaction of the detaining authority cannot be subjected to objective tests and that the courts are not supposed to exercise appellate powers over such authorities; and that an order, proper on its face, passed by a competent authority in good faith is a complete answer to negative a claim such as the one raised by Mr. Luthra. Several authoritative decisions on preventive detention cases having high precedential value was cited by him and he contended that the appeal deserves nothing but dismissal.
GENERAL DISCUSSIONSON PREVENTIVE DETENTION
AND JUDICIAL REVIEWABILITY
8. Prior to venturing to decide the contentious issue as to whether the Detention Order is legal or not, we consider it necessary to remind ourselves AMEENA BEGUM v. THE STATE OF TELANGANA & ORS. [DIPANKAR DATTA, J.] 968 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S.C.R.
of the purpose for which preventive detentionin a particular case could be ordered, the requisites of a valid detention order and the scope of judicial reviewability of such order.
9. Clauses (1) and (2) of Article 22 of the Constitution guaranteeing protection to a person against arbitrary arrest, effected otherwise than under a warrant issued by a court of law, are regarded as vital and fundamental for safeguarding personal liberty. Nonetheless, the protection so guaranteed is subject to clause (3) of Article 22 which operates as an exception to clauses
(1) and (2) and ordains that nothing therein shall apply to, inter alia, any person who is arrested or detained under any law providing for preventive detention. The purpose of preventive detention, as said by Hon’ble A.N. Ray, CJ. in Haradhan Saha vs. State of West Bengal4 is to prevent the greater evil of elements imperiling the security and safety of a State, and the welfare of the Nation. Preventive detention, though a draconian and dreaded measure, is permitted by the Constitution itself but subject to the safeguards that are part of the relevant article and those carved out by the Constitutional Courts through judicial decisions of high authority which have stood the test of time.
10. It is common knowledge that recourse to preventive detention can be taken by the executive merely on suspicion and as a precaution to prevent activities by the person, sought to be detained, prejudicial to certain specified objects traceable in a validly enacted law. Since an order of preventive detention has the effect of invading one’s personal liberty merely on suspicion and is not viewed as punitive, and the facts on which the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority is based for ordering preventive detention is not justiciable, meaning thereby that it is not open to the Constitutional Courts to enquire whether the detaining authority has erroneously or correctly reached a satisfaction on every question of fact and/or has passed an order of detention which is not justified on facts, resulting in narrowing down of the jurisdiction to grant relief, it is only just and proper that such drastic power is not only invoked in appropriate cases but is also exercised responsibly, rationally and reasonably. Having regard to the circumstance of loss of liberty by reason of an order of
4 AIR 1974 SC 2154
preventive detention being enforced without the detenu being extended any opportunity to place his case, the Constitutional Courts being the protectors of Fundamental Rights have, however, never hesitated to interdict orders of detention suffering from any of the vices on the existence whereof such limited jurisdiction of judicial reviewability is available to be exercised.
11. At this stage, a survey of certain authorities outlining the contours of judicial reviewability of an order of preventive detention may not be inapt.
12. Reading of paragraph 2 of the judgment authored by Hon’ble H.J. Kania, CJ., reveals that A.K. Gopalan vs. State of Madras5 was the first case where the different articles on Fundamental Rights came up for discussion before the Supreme Court. Detention was ordered under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 (“the Detention Act”, hereafter). The petitioner therein challenged the vires of the enactment as well as the detention order. The decision of the Supreme Court by its full complement of 6 (six) Hon’ble Judges rendered within 4 (four) months of India becoming a Republic, revealed an approach of circumscribing Article 21 by a literal interpretation. Since then, this Court in Rustomjee Cawasjee Cooper vs. Union of India6 has held that “the assumption in A.K. Gopalan case that certain articles in the Constitution exclusively deal with specific matters and in determining whether there is infringement of the individual’s guaranteed rights, the object and the form of the State action alone need be considered, and effect of the laws on fundamental rights of the individuals in general will be ignored cannot be accepted as correct”, and it being settled law that the new needs of a person for liberty in the different spheres of life can now be claimed as a part of personal liberty under Article 21 and these personal liberties cannot be restricted either by legislation or law not satisfying Articles 14 and 19, we need not at all be guided by the view expressed in A.K. Gopalan (supra). Suffice it to observe that A.K. Gopalan (supra) was decided by this Court at the dawn of the Constitution, keeping in mind the then social realities, when the true and correct interpretation of the Constitution was yet to take shape and also without the benefit of any precedent on the point, which permits understanding of various points of view of Hon’ble Judges
5 AIR 1950 SC 27
6 AIR 1970 SC 564
AMEENA BEGUM v. THE STATE OF TELANGANA & ORS. [DIPANKAR DATTA, J.] 970 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S.C.R.
and thereby makes it easy for successors to evolve the dynamic facets of the Fundamental Rights enshrined in the Constitution.
13. This Court in Shibban Lal Saksena vs. State of Uttar Pradesh7 speaking through Hon’ble B.K. Mukherjea, J. (as the Chief Justice then was) quashed an order of preventive detention under the Detention Act reasoning that if one of the two grounds for ordering detention was illegal, the order of detention could not survive on the other ground. Law was laid down in the following words:
“8. The first contention raised by the learned counsel raises, however, a somewhat important point which requires careful consideration. It has been repeatedly held by this Court that the power to issue a detention order under Section 3 of the Preventive Detention Act depends entirely upon the satisfaction of the appropriate authority specified in that section. The sufficiency of the grounds upon which such satisfaction purports to be based, provided they have a rational probative value and are not extraneous to the scope or purpose of the legislative provision cannot be challenged in a court of law, except on the ground of malafides. A court of law is not even competent to enquire into the truth or otherwise of the facts which are mentioned as grounds of detention in the communication to the detenue under Section 7 of the Act. What has happened, however, in this case is somewhat peculiar. The Government itself in its communication dated 13-3-1953, has plainly admitted that one of the grounds upon which the original order of detention was passed is unsubstantial or nonexistent and cannot be made a ground of detention. The question is, whether in such circumstances the original order made under Section 3(1)(a) of the Act can be allowed to stand. The answer, in our opinion, can only be in the negative. The detaining authority gave here two grounds for detaining the petitioner. We can neither decide whether these grounds are good or bad, nor can we attempt to assess in what manner and to what extent each of these grounds operated on the mind of the appropriate authority and contributed to the creation of the satisfaction on the basis of which the detention order was made.
7 AIR 1954 SC 179
To say that the other ground, which still remains, is quite sufficient to sustain the order, would be to substitute an objective judicial test for the subjective decision of the executive authority which is against the legislative policy underlying the statute. In such cases, we think, the position would be the same as if one of these two grounds was irrelevant for the purpose of the Act or was wholly illusory and this would vitiate the detention order as a whole. ***”
14. In Rameshwar Shaw vs. District Magistrate8, a Constitution Bench speaking through Hon’ble P.B. Gajendragadkar, J. (as the Chief Justice then was) in course of interdicting an order of detention passed under section 3 of the Detention Act held as follows:
“7. There is also no doubt that if any of the grounds furnished to the detenu are found to be irrelevant while considering the application of clauses (i) to (iii) of Section 3(1)(a) and in that sense are foreign to the Act, the satisfaction of the detaining authority on which the order of detention is based is open to challenge and the detention order liable to be quashed. Similarly, if some of the grounds supplied to the detenu are so vague that they would virtually deprive the detenu of his statutory right of making a representation that again may introduce a serious infirmity in the order of his detention. If, however, the grounds on which the order of detention proceeds are relevant and germane to the matters which fall to be considered under Section 3(1)(a), it would not be open to the detenu to challenge the order of detention by arguing that the satisfaction of the detaining authority is not reasonably based on any of the said grounds.
8. It is, however, necessary to emphasise in this connection that though the satisfaction of the detaining authority contemplated by Section 3(1)
(a) is the subjective satisfaction of the said authority, cases may arise where the detenu may challenge the validity of his detention on the ground of mala fides and in support of the said plea urge that along with other facts which show mala fides the Court may also consider his grievance that the grounds served on him cannot possibly or rationally support the conclusion drawn against him by the detaining
8 AIR 1964 SC 334
AMEENA BEGUM v. THE STATE OF TELANGANA & ORS. [DIPANKAR DATTA, J.] 972 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S.C.R.
authority. It is only in this incidental manner and in support of the plea of mala fides that this question can become justiciable; otherwise the reasonableness or propriety of the said satisfaction contemplated by Section 3(1)(a) cannot be questioned before the Courts.”
15. In his Counter Affidavit (at pgs. 10 and 11) to the special leave petition, the Commissioner referred to, and extracted a passage from paragraph 8 of the decision of this Court in Khudiram Das vs. The State of West Bengal9, wherein a Bench of 4 (four) Hon’ble Judges of this Court was examining a challenge to an order of detention passed under section 3 of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971 (“MISA”, hereafter) by a district magistrate. We consider it appropriate to notice not only paragraph 8 of the decision rendered by Hon’ble P.N. Bhagwati, J. (as His Lordship then was) in its entirety but also paragraph 9, reading as follows: “8. Now it is clear on a plain reading of the language of sub-sections
(1) and (2) of Section 3 that the exercise of the power of detention is made dependent on the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority that with a view to preventing a person from acting in a prejudicial manner, as set out in sub-clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) of clause
(a) of sub-section (1), it is necessary to detain such person. The words used in sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 3 are ‘if satisfied’ and they clearly import subjective satisfaction on the part of the detaining authority before an order of detention can be made. And it is so provided for a valid reason which becomes apparent if we consider the nature of the power of detention and the conditions on which it can be exercised. The power of detention is clearly a preventive measure. It does not partake in any manner of the nature of punishment. It is taken by way of precaution to prevent mischief to the community. Since every preventive measure is based on the principle that a person should be prevented from doing something which, if left free and unfettered, it is reasonably probable he would do, it must necessarily proceed in all cases, to some extent, on suspicion or anticipation as distinct from proof. Patanjali Sastri, C.J. pointed out in State of Madras v. V.G. Row [(1952) 1 SCC 410 : AIR 1952 SC 196 : 1952
9 (1975) 2 SCC 81
SCR 597] that preventive detention is ‘largely precautionary and based on suspicion’ and to these observations may be added the following words uttered by the learned Chief Justice in that case with reference to the observations of Lord Finlay in Rex v. Halliday [1917 AC 260] namely, that ‘the court was the least appropriate tribunal to investigate into circumstances of suspicion on which such anticipatory action must be largely based’. This being the nature of the proceeding, it is impossible to conceive how it can possibly be regarded as capable of objective assessment. The matters which have to be considered by the detaining authority are whether the person concerned, having regard to his past conduct judged in the light of the surrounding circumstances and other relevant material, would be likely to act in a prejudicial manner as contemplated in any of sub-clauses (i), (ii) and
(iii) of clause (1) of sub-section (1) of Section 3, and if so, whether it is necessary to detain him with a view to preventing him from so acting. These are not matters susceptible of objective determination and they could not be intended to be judged by objective standards. They are essentially matters which have to be administratively determined for the purpose of taking administrative action. Their determination is, therefore, deliberately and advisedly left by the Legislature to the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority which by reason of its special position, experience and expertise would be best fitted to decide them. It must in the circumstances be held that the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority as regards these matters constitutes the foundation for the exercise of the power of detention and the Court cannot be invited to consider the propriety or sufficiency of the grounds on which the satisfaction of the detaining authority is based. The Court cannot, on a review of the grounds, substitute its own opinion for that of the authority, for what is made a condition precedent to the exercise of the power of detention is not an objective determination of the necessity of detention for a specified purpose but the subjective opinion of the detaining authority, and if a subjective opinion is formed by the detaining authority as regards the necessity of detention for a specified purpose, the condition of exercise of the power of detention would be fulfilled. This would clearly show that the power of detention is not a quasi-judicial power.
AMEENA BEGUM v. THE STATE OF TELANGANA & ORS. [DIPANKAR DATTA, J.] 974 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S.C.R.
9. But that does not mean that the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority is wholly immune from judicial reviewability. The courts have by judicial decisions carved out an area, limited though it be, within which the validity of the subjective satisfaction can yet be subjected to judicial scrutiny. The basic postulate on which the courts have proceeded is that the subjective satisfaction being a condition precedent for the exercise of the power conferred on the Executive, the Court can always examine whether the requisite satisfaction is arrived at by the authority : if it is not, the condition precedent to the exercise of the power would not be fulfilled and the exercise of the power would be bad. There are several grounds evolved by judicial decisions for saying that no subjective satisfaction is arrived at by the authority as required under the statute. The simplest case is whether the authority has not applied its mind at all; in such a case the authority could not possibly be satisfied as regards the fact in respect of which it is required to be satisfied. Emperor v. Shibnath Bannerji [AIR 1943 FC 75 : 1944 FCR 1 : 45 Cri LJ 341] is a case in point. Then there may be a case where the power is exercised dishonestly or for an improper purpose : such a case would also negative the existence of satisfaction on the part of the authority. The existence of ‘improper purpose’, that is, a purpose not contemplated by the statute, has been recognised as an independent ground of control in several decided cases. The satisfaction, moreover, must be a satisfaction of the authority itself, and therefore, if, in exercising the power, the authority has acted under the dictation of another body as the Commissioner of Police did in Commissioner of Police v. Gordhandas Bhanji [1951 SCC 1088 : AIR 1952 SC 16 : 1952 SCR 135] and the officer of the Ministry of Labour and National Service did in Simms Motor Units Ltd. v. Minister of Labour and National Service [(1946) 2 All ER 201] the exercise of the power would be bad and so also would the exercise of the power be vitiated where the authority has disabled itself from applying its mind to the facts of each individual case by self-created rules of policy or in any other manner. The satisfaction said to have been arrived at by the authority would also be bad where it is based on the application of a wrong test or the misconstruction of a statute. Where this happens, the satisfaction of the authority would not be in respect of the thing in regard to which it is required to be satisfied. Then again the satisfaction must be grounded ‘on materials which are of rationally probative value’. Machindar v. King [AIR 1950 FC 129 : 51 Cri LJ 1480 : 1949 FCR 827]. The grounds on which the satisfaction is based must be such as a rational human being can consider connected with the fact in respect of which the satisfaction is to be reached. They must be relevant to the subject-matter of the inquiry and must not be extraneous to the scope and purpose of the statute. If the authority has taken into account, it may even be with the best of intention, as a relevant factor something which it could not properly take into account in deciding whether or not to exercise the power or the manner or extent to which it should be exercised, the exercise of the power would be bad. Pratap Singh v. State of Punjab [AIR 1964 SC 72 : (1964) 4 SCR 733]. If there are to be found in the statute expressly or by implication matters which the authority ought to have regard to, then, in exercising the power, the authority must have regard to those matters. The authority must call its attention to the matters which it is bound to consider.” (underlining ours, for emphasis)
16. In Icchu Devi Choraria vs. Union of India10, the judicial commitment to strike down illegal detention,even when the petition on which Rule was issued did not have the requisite pleadings, was highlighted in the following words:
“5.*** Where large masses of people are poor, illiterate and ignorant and access to the courts is not easy on account of lack of financial resources, it would be most unreasonable to insist that the petitioner should set out clearly and specifi cally the grounds on which he challenges the order of detention and make out a prima facie case in support of those grounds before a rule is issued or to hold that the detaining authority should not be liable to do any thing more than just meet the specific grounds of challenge put forward by the petitioner in the petition. The burden of showing that the detention is in accordance with the procedure established by law has always been placed by this Court on the detaining authority because Article
10 (1980) 4 SCC 531
AMEENA BEGUM v. THE STATE OF TELANGANA & ORS. [DIPANKAR DATTA, J.] 976 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S.C.R.
21 of the Constitution provides in clear and explicit terms that no one shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except in accordance with procedure established by law. This constitutional right of life and personal liberty is placed on such a high pedestal by this Court that it has always insisted that whenever there is any deprivation of life or personal liberty, the authority responsible for such deprivation must satisfy the court that it has acted in accordance with the law. This is an area where the court has been most strict and scrupulous in ensuring observance with the requirements of the law, and even where a requirement of the law is breached in the slightest measure, the court has not hesitated to strike down the order of detention or to direct the release of the detenu even though the detention may have been valid till the breach occurred. The court has always regarded personal liberty as the most precious possession of mankind and refused to tolerate illegal detention, regardless of the social cost involved in the release of a possible renegade.”
(underlining ours, for emphasis)
17. In a different context, we may take note of the decision in Sama Aruna vs. State of Telangana11 where, S.A. Bobde, J. (as the Chief Justice then was) while construing the provisions of the Act, held:
“16. There is little doubt that the conduct or activities of the detenu in the past must be taken into account for coming to the conclusion that he is going to engage in or make preparations for engaging in such activities, for many such persons follow a pattern of criminal activities. But the question is how far back? There is no doubt that only activities so far back can be considered as furnish a cause for preventive detention in the present. That is, only those activities so far back in the past which lead to the conclusion that he is likely to engage in or prepare to engage in such activities in the immediate future can be taken into account.”
In holding that the order of detention therein was grounded on stale grounds, the Court held that:
11 (2018) 12 SCC 150
“The detention order must be based on a reasonable prognosis of the future behaviour of a person based on his past conduct in light of the surrounding circumstances. The live and proximate link that must exist between the past conduct of a person and the imperative need to detain him must be taken to have been snapped in this case. A detention order which is founded on stale incidents, must be regarded as an order of punishment for a crime, passed without a trial, though purporting to be an order of preventive detention. The essential concept of preventive detention is that the detention of a person is not to punish him for something he has done but to prevent him from doing it.”
(underlining ours, for emphasis)
18. This was further affirmed by this Court in Khaja Bilal Ahmed vs. State of Telangana12, where the detention order dated 2nd November, 2018 issued under the Act had delved into the history of cases involving the appellant-detenu from the years 2007 - 2016, despite the subjective satisfaction of the Officer not being based on such cases. In quashing such an order, Hon’ble Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J. (as the Chief Justice then was) observed:
“23. *** If the pending cases were not considered for passing the order of detention, it defies logic as to why they were referred to in the first place in the order of detention. The purpose of the Telangana Offenders Act 1986 is to prevent any person from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. For this purpose, Section 3 prescribes that the detaining authority must be satisfied that the person to be detained is likely to indulge in illegal activities in the future and act in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The satisfaction to be arrived at by the detaining authority must not be based on irrelevant or invalid grounds. It must be arrived at on the basis of relevant material; material which is not stale and has a live link with the satisfaction of the detaining authority. The order of detention may refer to the previous criminal antecedents only if they have a direct nexus or link with the immediate need to detain an individual. If the previous criminal activities of the Appellant could
12 (2020) 13 SCC 632
AMEENA BEGUM v. THE STATE OF TELANGANA & ORS. [DIPANKAR DATTA, J.] 978 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S.C.R.
indicate his tendency or inclination to act in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, then it may have a bearing on the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. However, in the absence of a clear indication of a causal connection, a mere reference to the pending criminal cases cannot account for the requirements of Section 3.It is not open to the detaining authority to simply refer to stale incidents and hold them as the basis of an order of detention. Such stale material will have no bearing on the probability of the detenu engaging in prejudicial activities in the future.”
(boldin original)
(underlining ours, for emphasis)
19. We may also refer to the decision of a Constitution Bench of this Court in Sunil Fulchand Shah vs. Union of India13 wherein the need to strictly adhere to the timelines, provided as procedural safeguards, was stressed upon. It was held thus:
“11. *** The safeguards available to a person against whom an order of detention has been passed are limited and, therefore, the courts have always held that all the procedural safeguards provided by the law should be strictly complied with. Any default in maintaining the time-limit has been regarded as having the effect of rendering the detention order or the continued detention, as the case may be, illegal. The justification for preventive detention being necessity a person can be detained only so long as it is found necessary to detain him. If his detention is found unnecessary, even during the maximum period permissible under the law then he has to be released from detention forthwith. It is really in this context that Section 10 and particularly the words ‘may be detained’ shall have to be interpreted.”
20. On a conspectus of the decisions referred to above and other decisions on preventive detention, we may observe here that the argument commonly advanced on behalf of detaining authorities in the early days of the Constitution was that the Court’s enquiry ought to be confined to whether there is an order of detention or not and the moment such an order, good on its face, is produced, all enquiry into good faith, sufficiency of the reasons
13 (2000) 3 SCC 409
or the legality or illegality of the action comes to an end. However, with passage of time, and expansion and development of law, it is no longer the law that a preventive detention action, howsoever lawful it might appear on its face, cannot be invalidated by the Constitutional Courts. This is so, as at present, there is no administrative order affecting rights of the subjects that can legitimately claim to be impregnably guarded by a protective shield, which judicial scrutiny cannot penetrate.
21. Apart from the aforesaid decisions, multiple decisions have been rendered by this Court over the years which provide suitable guidance to us to complete the present exercise; however, we wish to conclude this discussion by referring to one decision of this Court delivered little in excess of a decade back by a Bench of 3-Judges.
22. In Rekha vs. State of Tamil Nadu14, this Court observed that: “21. It is all very well to say that preventive detention is preventive not punitive. The truth of the matter, though, is that in substance a detention order of one year (or any other period) is a punishment of one year’s imprisonment. What difference is it to the detenu whether his imprisonment is called preventive or punitive?
(italics in original)
***
29. Preventive detention is, by nature, repugnant to democratic ideas and an anathema to the Rule of law. No such law exists in the USA and in England (except during war time). Since, however, Article 22(3)(b) of the Constitution of India permits preventive detention, we cannot hold it illegal but we must confine the power of preventive detention within very narrow limits, otherwise we will be taking away the great right to liberty guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution of India which was won after long, arduous and historic struggles. It follows, therefore, that if the ordinary law of the land (the Penal Code and other penal statutes) can deal with a situation, recourse to a preventive detention law will be illegal.”
14 (2011) 5 SCC 244
AMEENA BEGUM v. THE STATE OF TELANGANA & ORS. [DIPANKAR DATTA, J.] 980 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S.C.R.
23. There could be little doubt with the thought process that although the executive would pass an order under the preventive detention laws as a preventive or a precautionary measure, its effect viewed strictly from the stand point of the detenuis simply and plainly punitive. Significantly, an order of detention is not relatable to an alleged commission of offence which a court is seized of and, thus, the conduct of the accused complained of is yet to be found blameworthy; on the contrary, since it relates to an anticipated offence based on past conduct, the detenu could well feel that he is at the receiving end of a subjective satisfaction of the executive despite he not being proved to be on the wrong side of the law on any previous occasion. If someone loses his liberty and lands up in prison not having a semblance of a chance to resist or protest, the very circumstance of being put behind bars for such period as specified in the order of detention based on an anticipation that an offence is likely to be committed by him seems to be an aspect which does not sync with the norms and ethos of our very own Constitution and the decisions of this Court in which the concept of ‘LIFE’ has been explained in such a manner that ‘LIFE’ has been infused in the letters of Article 21 (see Common Cause vs. Union of India15). Nonetheless, so long clause (3) of Article 22 of the Constitution itself authorises detention as a preventive measure, there can be no two opinions that none can take exception to such a measure being adopted and it is only a limited judicial review by the Constitutional Courts that can be urged by an aggrieved detenu where for too, in examining challenges to orders of preventive detention, the Courts would be loath to interfere with or substitute their own reasoning for the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority. Since the object of a preventive detention law is not punitive but preventive and precautionary, ordinarily it is best left to the discretion of the detaining authority.
24. We, however, hasten to observe here that though the decision in Rekha (supra) reflects on an important aspect of loss of liberty without trial by taking recourse to preventive detention laws, the decision of the Constitution Bench in Haradhan Saha (supra) still holds the field and to the extent the learned Judges in Rekha (supra) sound a note discordant with
15 (1999) 6 SCC 667
the law laid down in Haradhan Saha (supra) ought not to be construed as acceptance by us as the correct exposition of law.
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