Mukesh Singh v. The State (Nct of Delhi)
- Citation
- 2023 INSC 765; [2023] 11 S.C.R. 886
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice M.M. Sundresh
- Decided
- 24 Aug 2023
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 1554/2015
- Sections
- 54A, 9, 313, 8, 27, 98, 188, 34, 394, 392, 397, 357
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:28 am. Original source ↗
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[2023] 11 S.C.R. 886 : 2023 INSC 765
CASE DETAILS
MUKESH SINGH
v.
THE STATE (NCT OF DELHI)
(Criminal Appeal No. 1554 of 2015)
AUGUST 24, 2023
[M. M. SUNDRESH AND J. B. PARDIWALA, JJ.]
HEADNOTES
Issues for consideration:
(i) Whether the High Court committed any error in dismissing the appeal filed by the appellant convict and thereby affirming the judgment and order of conviction and sentence passed by the Trial Court for the alleged offences?;
(ii) Whether an accused can decline to participate in the TIP on the ground that he was already shown to the eye witnesses prior to the conduct of the TIP and in such circumstances, the TIP would be nothing short of creating evidence against him?;
(iii) Can an accused decline to participate in the TIP that the investigating officer may propose to hold in the course of investigation on the ground that no person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself? To put it in other words, can an accused decline to subject himself to the TIP on the ground that the same violates his fundamental right under Article 20(3) of the Constitution?;
(iv) To what extent the Court can draw an adverse inference against the accused for having refused to participate in the TIP? Whether by virtue of drawing such adverse inference, is it open for the Court to accept the substantive evidence of identification before the Trial Court without any corroboration to such identification?;
(v) What is the true purport of Section 54A of the CrPC?;
(vi) Whether the Courts below were justified in placing reliance on the discovery of weapon of offence and the currency notes from the residence of the appellant convict as one of the incriminating circumstances against the appellant convict?
Test Identification Parade – Whether an accused can decline to participate in the TIP on the ground that he was already shown to the eye witnesses prior to the conduct of the TIP:
Held: The accused while subjecting himself to the TIP does not produce any evidence or perform any evidentiary act – It may be a positive act and even a volitional act, but only to a limited extent, when the accused is brought to the place where the TIP is to be held – It is certainly not his evidentiary act – The accused concerned may have a legitimate ground to resist facing the TIP saying that the witnesses had a chance to see him either at the police station or in the Court, as the case may be, however, on such ground alone he cannot refuse to face the TIP – It is always open for the accused to raise any legal ground available to him relating to the legitimacy of the TIP or the evidentiary value of the same in the course of the trial – However, the accused cannot decline or refuse to join the TIP. [Para 35] Test Identification Parade – Whether TIP violates the fundamental right of an accused under Article 20(3) of the Constitution. Held: What is prohibited by Article 20(3) of the Constitution is procuring by compulsion of the positive volitional evidentiary acts of an accused – It is true that an accused may be said to be compelled to attend a test identification parade, but this compulsion does not involve any positive volitional evidentiary act – His mere attendance or the exhibition of his body at a test identification parade even though compelled, does not result in any evidentiary act until he is identified by some other agency – The identification of him by a witness is not his act, even though his body is exhibited for the purpose – If the coercion is sought to be imposed in getting from an accused evidence which cannot be procured save through positive volitional act on his part, the constitutional guarantee as enshrined under Article 20(3) of the Constitution will step in to protect him – However, if that evidence can be procured without any positive volitional evidentiary act on the part of the accused, Article 20(3) of the Constitution will have no application. [Paras 26 and 35] MUKESH SINGH v. THE STATE (NCT OF DELHI)
888 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S.C.R.
Test Identification Parade – The test identification parade provides corroboration to the identification of the witness in court: Held: It is well settled that the substantive evidence is the evidence of identification in court and the test identification parade provides corroboration to the identification of the witness in court, if required – However, what weight must be attached to the evidence of identification in court, which is not preceded by a test identification parade, is a matter for the courts of fact to examine. [Para 48] Test Identification Parade – Where an accused himself refused to participate in the TIP:
Held: In a case where an accused himself refused to participate in the TIP, it is not open to him to contend that the statement of the eye witnesses made for the first time in Court, wherein they specifically point towards him as a person who had taken part in the commission of the crime, should not be relied upon – Such a plea is available provided the prosecution is itself responsible for not holding a TIP – However, in a case where the accused himself declines to participate in a TIP, the prosecution has no option but to proceed in a normal manner like all other cases and rely upon the testimony of the witnesses, which is recorded in Court during the course of the trial of the case. [Para 70] Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.54A – Test Identification Parade – Obligation u/s. 54A CrPC:
Held: The introduction of Section 54A in the CrPC, an accused is under an obligation to stand for identification parade – An accused cannot resist subjecting himself to the TIP on the ground that he cannot be forced or coerced for the same – If the coercion is sought to be imposed in getting from an accused evidence which cannot be procured save through positive volitional act on his part, the constitutional guarantee as enshrined under Article 20(3) of the Constitution will step in to protect him – However, if that evidence can be procured without any positive volitional evidentiary act on the part of the accused, Article 20(3) of the Constitution will have no application – The accused while subjecting himself to the TIP does not produce any evidence or perform any evidentiary act. [Para 35] Test Identification Parade – Importance and Evidentiary value of TIP:
Held: Facts which establish the identity of any person or thing whose identity is relevant are, by virtue of Section 9 of the Evidence Act, always relevant – The term ‘identification’ means proving that a person, subject or article before the Court is the very same that he or it is alleged, charged or reputed to be – Identification is almost always a matter of opinion or belief. [Para 37] Test Identification Parade – Object of:
Held: Before the investigating authorities send up a case to Court, they must be satisfied that the persons arrested by them are the persons accused of having committed the crime – If they were known to the witnesses, the witnesses would have given their names and that would have established their identity, but when they were not known, their identity could be established only if the witnesses on seeing them say that they are the offenders – Since it would be very easy for a witness who has little regard for truth, to say that the person arrested on suspicion was the offender, he is confronted with the suspect mixed with innocent men – If he picks him out, that would add to the credibility of his statement that he was the offender – This is the primary object of identification proceeding. [Paras 40 and 41] Penal Code, 1860 – Trial Court convicted appellant-convict u/ ss. 302, 392, 394, 397 and sentenced him imprisonment for life – High Court affirmed the conviction and sentence – Propriety:
Held: Appellant-convict stated that the PW-1 was in a position to identify him for the first time before the Trial Court only because he had the opportunity to see him on 15.09.2008 – In such circumstances, it is argued on behalf of the appellant convict that there is no evidence to hold him guilty for the alleged crime – However, the State stated that is not a sufficient or a good ground to discard the substantive evidence of identification before the Trial Court – Although the appellant convict in his further statement recorded u/s. 313 CrPC stated that he had refused to participate in the TIP as the eye witnesses had already seen him, yet except a bald assertion, no other foundation was laid for offering such an explanation – It is a long settled law that if a witness is trustworthy and reliable, the mere fact that no identification parade could be conducted and the appellant convict was MUKESH SINGH v. THE STATE (NCT OF DELHI)
890 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S.C.R.
identified for the first time before the Trial Court, would not be a reason to discard the evidence of the witness – Further, in a case where the accused himself declines to participate in a TIP, the prosecution has no option but to proceed in a normal manner like all other cases and rely upon the testimony of the witnesses, which is recorded in Court during the course of the trial of the case – In the instant case, the PW-1 in his first statement had categorically stated that he can identify assailants, if brought before him and while giving statements he had identified all four assailants in the Court and their roles in the crime – Besides that, when the appellant was arrested, he is said to have made a disclosure statement – The statement was one relating to the weapon of offence i.e. ice pick which was ultimately discovered from his house – The evidence of the circumstance, simpliciter, that the accused pointed out to the police officer, the place where he had concealed the weapon of offence i.e. ice pick, would be admissible as conduct u/s. 8 irrespective of the fact whether the statement made by the appellant convict contemporaneously with or antecedent to such conduct falls within the purview of s.27 of the Evidence Act or not – There was no infirmity in the line of reasoning adopted by the Trial Court as well as by the High Court in holding the appellant convict guilty of the alleged crime. [Paras 69, 70, 76 and 78]
LIST OF CITATIONS AND OTHER REFERENCES
Rajesh v. State of Haryana (2021) 1 SCC 118; Munshi Singh Gautam (D) & Ors. v. State of M.P. (2005) 9 SCC 631 : [2004] 5 Suppl. SCR 1092; Ramanbhai Naranbhai Patel v. State of Gujarat (2000) 1 SCC 358 : [1999] 5 Suppl. SCR 41; Malkhansingh v. State of M.P. (2003) 5 SCC 746 : [2003] 1 Suppl. SCR 443; Munna v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2003) 10 SCC 599 : [2003] 2 Suppl. SCR 1048 – relied on.
M.P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra AIR 1954 SC 300 : [1954] SCR 1077; K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1 : [2017] 10 SCR 569; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Rajju AIR 1971 SC 708; Shri Ram v. State of U.P. (1975) 3 SCC 495 : [1975] 2 SCR 622; Prem Singh v. State of Haryana (2011) 9 SCC 689 : [2011] 13 SCR 949; Prem Singh v. State of Haryana (2013) 14 SCC 88 : [2013] 10 SCR 51; Kanan & Ors. v. State of Kerala AIR 1979 SC 1127; Sidhartha Vashisht @ Manu Sharma v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2010) 6 SCC 1 : [2010] 4 SCR 103 – referred to.
Peare Lal Show v. The State AIR 1961 Cal 531; Ravindra Laxman Mahadik v. State of Maharashtra 1997 CriLJ 3833 – referred to. Rex v. Christie, (1914) A. C. 545 (551); John R. Manson, Commissioner of Correction of Connecticut v. Nowell A. Brathwaite 432 u.s. 98 (1977); William S. NEIL, Warden v. Archie Nathaniel Biggers 409 u.s. 188 (1972) – referred to.
OTHER CASE DETAILS INCLUDING IMPUGNED
ORDER AND APPEARANCES
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
1554 of 2015.
From the Judgment and Order dated 28.02.2014 of the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in CRLA No. 1246 of 2011.
Appearances:
Jayesh Gaurav, Ms. Nandini Rai, Ms. Diksha Ojha, Farrukh Rasheed, Advs. for the Appellant.
K. M. Nataraj, ASG, Alabhaya Dhamija, Sharath Nambiar, Shailesh Madiyal, Dr. N. Visakamurthy, Shreekant Neelappa Terdal, Advs. for the Respondent.
JUDGMENT / ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT
JUDGMENT
J. B. PARDIWALA, J. :
1. This appeal, by special leave, is at the instance of a convict accused and is directed against the judgment and order dated 28.02.2014 passed by the High Court of Delhi in Criminal Appeal No. 1246 of 2011 by which the High Court dismissed the appeal and thereby affirmed the judgment and order of conviction dated 08.04.2011 and the order on sentence of life imprisonment dated 27.04.2011 resply passed by the Additional Sessions Judge-II (North West), Rohini, Delhi in the Sessions Case No. 998 of 2009 holding the appellant convict herein guilty for the offences punishable under Sections 302, 392, 394 and 397 resply read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (for short, ‘IPC’).
MUKESH SINGH v. THE STATE (NCT OF DELHI)
892 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S.C.R.
CASE OF THE PROSECUTION
2. The appellant convict along with three other co-accused was put to trial in the Court of the Additional Sessions Judge-II (North West), Rohini, Delhi for the offences punishable under Sections 392, 394, 397, 307, 302, 411 read with Section 34 of the IPC. On 16.08.2008 at about 3.30 in the early morning the PW-1, namely, Sushil Kumar (original first informant and injured eye witness) along with his friend Pappu (deceased) and his brother Pradeep Kumar, PW-4 were at the Azadpur Subzimandi. They were at the Azadpur Subzimandi for the purpose of purchasing vegetables. After purchasing vegetables from the D Block corner of the Azadpur Subzimandi, they proceeded towards the main gate. When the PW 1 and his friend Pappu reached near the STD PCO at the D Block corner, they were cornered by the four accused persons who were put to trial. These four accused persons, according to the case of the prosecution, included the appellant herein also. Two of the accused persons snatched away Rs. 14,800/- from the pocket of the PW 1. The two accused persons who snatched away the money from the pocket of the PW 1 were Sharwan Kumar and Pawan Kumar respectively. When the PW 1 resisted, the other two accused persons armed with ice picks attacked him and his friend Pappu. The appellant convict and co-accused Vijay alias Kalia are alleged to have caused injuries with their respective ice picks on the body of the PW 1 as well as his friend Pappu (deceased). After robbing and in the process of causing injuries, all the four accused ran away from the place of occurrence. When the traffic of trucks at the market got eased, the PW-1 saw Pappu (deceased) lying in an injured condition. Both received help from the PCR officials and were taken to the BJRM hospital. Pappu ultimately succumbed to the injuries he suffered and died at the hospital. The PW 1 was also admitted in the hospital.
3. The PW 1 lodged the First Information Report (FIR) No. 186 of 2008 on 16.08.2008 in connection with the incident as narrated above. The FIR No. 186 of 2008 dated 16.08.2008 reads thus:- “F.I.R. N0.186/2008, DATED 16.08.08 Statement of Sushil Kumar S/o Shri Ram Das R/o H. No.190, Mukesh Nagar, Shahadara Gali No.3, near Badi Ramleela Ground, Delhi aged 42 years.
Stated that I reside at the above mentioned address with family and I am a retail vegetable seller at nearby place of Metro Station. Today, on 16/8/08, I arrived for purchasing vrgetables at Azadpur Sabzimandi along with my friend Pappu S/o Shri Shokaran Singh R/o H.No.199, Bholanath Nagar, Near Railway Line, Sabzimandi Shahdara, Delhi. We purchased some vegetables from D Block and we both were going towards main gate from D Block Azadpur Mandi. Then, at around 3-30 a.m., when, we both reached at D Block Corner main road Azadpur Mandi, then, four boys, surrounded us and out of them, two boys, took out amount of Rs.14,800/- placed in my pocket. I and my friend Pappu opposed it. The four boys began to fight with us and out of them, two boys, by taking out some sharp weapon, attacked on the chest of Pappu and on my left hand and on my chest and on our screaming, the four boys, snatched the amount from us and ran away from the spot. The police personnel of PCR Van admitted us in BJRM Hospital. The four boys, having common intention, have looted the amount from me and on raising objection by us, with intention to kill us, while attacking by sharp object, have injured us. I will identify if four boys may come in front of me. You have recorded my statement as per my saying. Read over and affirmed to be correct. Hence, it is requested that legal action may kindly be taken against them.”
[Emphasis supplied]
4. Upon the FIR being registered as referred to above, the investigation started. On 17.08.2008 pursuant to the secret information, the three coaccused, namely, Vijay alias Kalia, Pawan Kumar and Sharwan Kumar were arrested from the DDA park, South Azadpur, Delhi. The appellant convict herein came to be arrested on 20.08.2008.
5. In the course of the investigation, the investigating officer decided to hold the Test Identification Parade (TIP) of the accused persons. However, it is the case of the prosecution that the appellant convict herein declined to participate in the TIP on the ground that he was already shown to the witnesses in the police station.
6. It is also the case of the prosecution that after the arrest of the appellant convict, he made a statement that he would be in a position to show the weapon of offence i.e. the ice pick which he had placed in one MUKESH SINGH v. THE STATE (NCT OF DELHI)
[J. B. PARDIWALA, J.] 894 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S.C.R.
corner of his house. The investigating officer is said to have discovered the weapon of offence i.e. the ice pick at the instance of the appellant convict herein.
7. Upon conclusion of the investigation, the charge sheet was filed for the offences enumerated above. The case was committed to the Court of Sessions as the offences were exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions. The appellant convict herein and the co-accused pleaded not guilty to the charge framed by the trial court and claimed to be tried.
8. In the course of trial, the prosecution led the following oral evidence:- Sr. No. Name of the witness Details of deposition PUBLIC WITNESSES/EYE WITNESSES
1. Sushil Kumar (PW1)
He is the eye witness to the incident and had also received injuries during the incident. He has deposed on the following aspects:
1. That on 16.08.2008 he along with his friend namely Pappu came to Azadpur Subzi Mandi to purchase vegetables.
2. That they had purchased some vegetable from the D Block of Azadpur Subzi Mandi and were going towards the IN Gate/ Main gate and at about 3.30 AM when they were near the STD PCO on the D Block corner, they were encircled by four persons.
3. That two of the accused persons snatched Rs.14,800/from his pocket. He has identified the accused Sharwan Kumar and Pawan to be the persons who had snatched money from him.
4. That when he resisted, two of the other accused persons who were armed with Ice pricks started attacking him and Pappu. He has identified the accused Vijay @ Kalia to be the person, who stabbed him and has also identified accused Mukesh as the person who was armed with ice prick.
5. That the accused persons Vijay and Mukesh caused injuries with the aid of ice picks on the person of Pappu and also to him on the left side of chest and abdomen in three places and also on his right hand.
6. That after snatching money the accused persons ran away.
7. That he had been gheroed by the accused persons, when he entrapped in the traffic of trucks and when he moved out of the traffic he saw that his companion Pappu was also lying in an injured condition on the road on which he called up PCR from his mobile phone bearing number 9210415252 and requested the public to take them to hospital.
8. That they were taken to a private nursing home but the guard at the Nursing Home did not let them enter the same on the pretext of police case and in the meantime, PCR officials reached there and took them to BJRM Hospital.
9. He has proved having given his statement to the police in BJRM Hospital which is Ex.PW1/A.
10.That the denomination of currency note was Ten currency notes of Rs.1000/-, Nine currency notes of Rs.500/- and Three currency notes of Rs.100/- each.
11.That he had identified the accused persons on 15.09.2008 in the Rohini court Complex when the accused persons had produced in the some court.
12.That his blood stained clothes were seized at the hospital which he identified in the court i.e. a white shirt with cuts on the left chest side which is Ex.P1 and a vest bearing a cut corresponding to the cut in the shirt which is Ex.P2.
13.That within a month of the occurrence he was again called at the hospital when his blood sample was taken by the doctor.
2. Pradeep Kumar (PW4)
He is the brother of deceased Pappu and also the alleged eye witness to the incident. He has deposed on the following lines:
1. That on 16.08.2008 he along with his brother Pappu and one Sushil came to Azadpur Subzi Mandi for purchasing vegetable at around 3.00 a.m. and Pappu and Sushil went towards D Block for purchasing vegetables whereas he went towards onion shed.
2. That at around 3.30 AM he saw that four boys had surrounded his brother Pappu and friend Sushil and one of them had taken out the purse of his brother MUKESH SINGH v. THE STATE (NCT OF DELHI)
[J. B. PARDIWALA, J.] 896 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S.C.R.
from his pocket and when his brother objected then the accused Mukesh and Vijay (whom the witness has correctly identified in the court by pointing out towards them but not by name), gave ice prick blow on various parts of his body and the other two accused who had surrounded his brother and Sushil had taken out the money.
3. He has identified the accused Pawan and Sarwan correctly by pointing out towards them in the court.
4. That accused gave ice prick blow to Sushil and Pappu on which he raised alarm and thereafter all the four accused ran away towards D Block on which somebody informed the police on No.100 and police came there and took his brother and Sushil to BJRM Hospital.
5. That he went to his house to inform about the incident and later on he came back at the spot when he came to know that his brother has already expired.
6. That deceased Pappu was having black colour purse and used to keep one small diary and some telephone diary, voter I card etc.
7. That after postmortem examination dead body of his brother was received vide receipt which is Ex.PW4/A.
8. That later on he identified the accused Pawan and Vijay in the judicial test Identification Parade in Rohini jail. He has proved his statement recorded during the Test identification Parade of accused Pawan and Vijay which are Ex.PW4/B and Ex.PW4/C respectively.
9. That subsequently he was again called in Tihar jail for the test Identification Parade of other two accused but they refused to participate in the same and thereafter he had not identified them anywhere before the police.
10. Some leading questions were put to the witness Pradeep by the Ld. Addl. PP for the State wherein he has admitted that on 15.09.2008 he had come to court complex Rohini and outside the court of Ld. MM Shri Prashant Kumar he had identified accused Sharvan and Mukesh also besides accused Pawan and Vijay to the investigating officer being the said four persons who were involved in the incident.
11.That in the incident accused Sharvan had blocked the way of his brother and Sushil and Mukesh had attacked them with ice prick.
MEDICAL EVIDENCE/WITNESSES
3. Dr. Gopal (PW3) This witness has proved that on 16.08.2008 one patient Sushil S/o Ramdass aged 42 years, male was brought to the BJRM hospital with the alleged history of physical assault and was examined by Dr. Nadeem Sr. Resident under his supervision. He has proved the MLC of injured Sushil which is Ex.PW3/A.
He has also proved that on the same day one patient Pappu S/o Sobran Singh, aged 45 years male was also brought to hospital with the alleged history of physical assault and was also examined by Dr. Nadeem under his supervision vide MLC which is Ex.PW3/C.
4. Dr. R.P. Singh (PW12)
This witness has proved having conducted the postmortem examination on the dead body of deceased Pappu on 16.8.2008 which report is Ex.PW12/A. He has also proved that the cause of death in this case was shock due to cardiac temponade as a result of injuries to great vessels produced by pointed stabbing object and the Injury no.2 is ante-mortem and sufficient to cause death in ordinary course of nature and time since death is about eight hours.
He has also proved that on 22.10.2008 on an application moved before him by Inspector Ram Chander, he gave his opinion that the injuries mentioned in the postmortem report no. 822/08 dated 16.8.2008 on the body of Pappu S/o Shobha Ram are possible by the weapons produced before him or by similar such type of weapons, which opinion is Ex.PW12/B. He has proved that the sketch prepared by him which are Ex.PW12/C & PW12/D.
He has correctly identified the ice pricks examined by him which are Ex.P-4 and Ex.P-5.
5. Dr. Rohit Kumar (PW15)
This witness has proved the death certificate of Pappu issued by BJRM hospital which is Ex.PW15/A and Death Summary which is Ex.PW15/B POLICE/OFFICIAL WITNESSES (Proving Investigations)
6. HC Raghubir Singh (PW2)
He is a formal witness being the Duty Officer who has proved having received the rukka on the intervening night of 15/16.08.2008 at around 6 AM which was brought by ASI Surender and sent by SI Arvind Pratap Singh, on the basis of which rukka he got an FIR MUKESH SINGH v. THE STATE (NCT OF DELHI)
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no.186/08, under Section 394/ 397/307/34 IPC registered by dictating it to the computer operator, print out of which FIR is Ex.PW2/A. He has also proved having made an endorsement on the rukka which is Ex.PW2/B and having recorded the DD No.31A copy of which is Ex.PW2/C.
7. HC Mahender (PW5)
He is also a formal witness being the photographer who has proved having taken seven photographs of the place of incident on the direction of the investigating officer the negatives of which are Ex.PW5/A (1 to 7) and the corresponding positive photographs are Ex.PW5/B (1 to 7).
8. SI Satpal Singh (PW6)
This witness is the Crime Team Incharge who has proved having inspected the spot of incident on 16.08.2008 and having prepared his report which is Ex.PW16/A which he handed over to the Investigating Officer.
9. HC Prahlad Singh (PW7)
He is the formal witness being the MHCM who has proved having received the various case properties from the Investigating Officer and later on sent same to FSL. He has placed on record the photocopies of the various entries in Register No. 19 and the RC which are Ex.PW7/A to Ex.PW7/J. He has proved that the sealed pullanda remained intact during his custody and he did not interfere with the same nor allowed anyone to interfere with it.
10. SI Manohar Lal (PW8)
He is the Draftsman who has proved having prepared the scaled site plan of the spot of incident which site plan is Ex.PW8/A.
11. Ct. Rakesh (PW9) He is a formal witness who has proved that on 27.10.2008 he took six sealed pullandas and four sample seals along with FSL Form for depositing in FSL Rohini vide RC No.83/21/08. He has proved that the sealed pullanda remained intact during his custody and he did not interfere with the same nor allowed anyone to interfere with it.
12. SI Arvind Pratap Singh (PW10)
He is the initial investigating officer who has proved the following documents:
Ex.PW10/A DD No. 29A Ex.PW10/B Rukka prepared by him Ex.PW10/C Seizure of pullanda containing the clothes of injured Sushil.
Ex.PW10/D Arrest memo of accused Vijay @ Kalia Ex.PW10/E Arrest memo of accused Pawan Ex.PW10/F Arrest memo of accused Sharwan Ex.PW10/G Personal search memo of accused Vijay Ex.PW10/H Personal search memo of accused Pawan Ex.PW10/J Personal search memo of accused Sharwan Ex.PW10/K Disclosure statement of accused Vijay Ex.PW10/L Disclosure statement of accused Pawan Ex.PW10/M Disclosure statement of accused Sharwan Ex.PW10/N Pointing out memo Ex.PW10/O Seizure of Purse along with its belonging got recovered by the accused Vijay @ Kalia Ex.PW10/P Sketch of the ice prick got recovered by the accused Vijay @ Kalia Ex.PW10/Q Seizure of the ice prick Ex.PW10/R Arrest memo of accused Mukesh Ex.PW10/S Personal search memo of accused Mukesh Ex.PW10/T Disclosure statement of accused Mukesh Ex.PW10/U Pointing out memo Ex.PW10/V Seizure of currency notes recovered by the accused Mukesh Ex.PW10/W Sketch of the ice prick got recovered by the accused Mukesh Ex.PW10/X Seizure of ice prick got recovered by the accused Mukesh
13. SI Kishan Lal (PW11)
This witness has proved having got conducted the Test Identification Parade of the accused persons during which they have refused to participate. He has also proved having got the witness Sushil Kumar medically examined in BJRM Hospital and the seizure of blood samples of the accused vide memo Ex.PW11/A.
MUKESH SINGH v. THE STATE (NCT OF DELHI)
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14. Inspector R.C.
Sangwan (PW13)
He is the subsequent investigating officer who has proved the various investigation proceedings conducted by him. Apart from the document proved by SI Arvind Pratap he has proved the following documents:
Ex.PW13/A-1 to A-7 Photographs of the spot Ex.PW13/B Site plan Ex.PW13/C Brief Facts Ex.PW13/D Form 25.35 Ex.PW13/E & Ex.PW13/F Dead body identification statement of Pradeep and Bhagwati Ex.PW13/G Request for postmortem Ex.PW13/H Seizure of pullanda containing clothes of the deceased Ex.PW13/J Application for seeking subsequent opinion Ex.PX FSL result (not disputed by the Ld. counsels for the accused persons)
15. HC Kanwarpal (PW14)
He was the PCR van Incharge and has deposed that:
1. In the intervening night of 15/16.8.2008 at about 3:50 am they received the information that two persons have been stabbed at gate no.2 Azadpur Mandi.
2. Thereafter he along with staff reached gate no.2 Azadpur Mandi from where he came to know that the incident had taken place at D-Block Corner near STD booth and thereafter, they reached there and found two persons namely Sushil Kumar and Pappu in injured conditions.
3. They took the injured to BJRM Hospital and got them admitted there for treatment.
16. Sh. Raj esh Kum ar Goel, Ld. ACMM This witness has proved having conducted the Test, Ld.
ACMM Identification Parade proceedings of accused persons namely Sharwan Kumar, Vijay @ Kalia and Pawan Kumar and Mukesh. He has proved the following documents:
Ex.PW8/A Test Identification Parade of accused Mukesh Ex.PW8/B Test Identification Parade of accused Vijay @ Kalia Ex.PW8/C Test Identification Parade of accused Pawan Ex.PW16/A Application of the investigating officer for obtaining copies of the proceedings Ex.PW8/E Test Identification parade of accused Sharwan Ex.PW16/B Application of the investigating officer for obtaining the copies of the proceedings Ex.PW16/C & Ex.PW16/D Env el ope s containing t he Te s t Identification Parade proceedings Ex.PW16/E & PW16/F Application moved by the investigating officer for conducting Test Identification Parade
9. Upon conclusion of the recording of evidence, the further statement of the appellant convict under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) was recorded in which the appellant convict stated that he had refused for the TIP as he was already shown to the witnesses by the police. He further stated that he was innocent and had been falsely implicated in the case. He was picked up from the house of his in-laws and was detained in the police station for three days. He stated that he had no idea about the case.
10. Upon appreciation of the oral as well as documentary evidence on record, the Trial Court came to the conclusion that the appellant convict herein and the co-accused, namely, Vijay alias Kalia were guilty of the offences punishable under Sections 302, 392, 394 and 397 resply read with Section 34 of the IPC, whereas the other two co-accused, namely, Pawan Kumar and Sharwan Kumar were held guilty of the offence punishable under Section 392 read with Section 34 of the IPC.
11. The order of sentence as awarded to the appellant convict herein by the Trial Court is reproduced as under:- “The convict Mukesh Singh is sentenced to Rigorous Imprisonment for life and fine for a sum of Rs.25,000/- for the offence under Section 397 read with 302 Indian Penal Code. In default of payment of fine the convict shall further undergo Simple Imprisonment for a period of MUKESH SINGH v. THE STATE (NCT OF DELHI)
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three months. The total fine of Rs.25,000/-, if recovered, shall be given to the family of the deceased Pappu as compensation under Section 357 Cr.P.C. Further the convict is sentenced to Rigorous Imprisonment for a period of Five years and fine of Rs. 2,000/- for the offence under Section 392 read with Section 394 Indian Penal Code. In default of payment of fine the convict shall further undergo Simple Imprisonment for a period of one week.”
12. The appellant convict being aggrieved by the judgment of conviction and order on sentence passed by the Trial Court went in appeal before the High Court of Delhi. The High Court upon re-appreciation of the entire evidence on record, dismissed the appeal and thereby affirmed the judgment of conviction and order on sentence passed by the Trial Court.
13. In such circumstances referred to above, the appellant is here before this Court with the present appeal.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT
14. Mr. Jayesh Gaurav, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant convict vehemently submitted that the Courts below committed a serious error in holding that the prosecution was successful in establishing its case against the appellant convict beyond reasonable doubt. He submitted that the conviction of the appellant convict is essentially based on the evidence of the PW 1 – Sushil Kumar. According to the learned counsel, there is no other evidence on record to connect the appellant convict with the alleged crime.
15. The learned counsel laid much stress on the fact that the case of the prosecution is one of robbery and murder. The time of the alleged incident is early in the morning at 3.30. He argued that although the incident occurred at a vegetable market, yet there were no sufficient lights in that area to enable the assailants to easily identify or to put it in other words, the PW 1 as an injured eye witness must not have had the occasion to even have a bare glimpse of the appellant.
16. It was argued that the investigating officer had arranged a TIP but the appellant convict had declined to participate in the same as he had already been shown to the witnesses in the police station. He further submitted that the PW 4, namely, Pradeep Kumar also claims to be an eye witness to the incident. However, both the Trial Court and the High Court disbelieved his oral evidence as his presence at the place of occurrence was found to be doubtful. Therefore, according to the learned counsel, the entire case hinges on the evidence of a solitary eye witness i.e. PW 1 Sushil Kumar. He argued that PW 1 Sushil Kumar identified the appellant convict herein and other three co-accused for the first time before the Trial Court. This identification for the first time before the Trial Court could not have been relied upon being a weak piece of evidence to hold the appellant convict guilty of the offences charged with.
17. The learned counsel vehemently submitted that the Courts below ought not to have drawn any adverse inference against the appellant convict for not having participated in the TIP. According to the learned counsel, the TIP is a part of the police investigation and the accused cannot be compelled to submit himself to the TIP, more particularly if the case of the accused is that he was already shown to the witness before the TIP could be undertaken. In other words, the submission of the learned counsel is that if the identification of the appellant convict for the first time before the Trial Court is eschewed from consideration, then there is no other evidence to connect him with the alleged act. The learned counsel submitted that the prosecution seeks to rely upon the discovery of the weapon of offence i.e. the ice pick and an amount of Rs. 7,000/- of the denomination of one thousand from the house of the appellant convict, but it is not a discovery in the eye of law as the same is not in conformity with Section 27 of the Evidence Act, 1872 (for short, ‘the Evidence Act’).
18. In such circumstances referred to above, the learned counsel prayed that there being merit in his appeal, the same may be allowed and the appellant convict be acquitted of all the charges.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE STATE (NCT OF DELHI)
19. On the other hand, this appeal was vehemently opposed by Mr. K.M. Nataraj, the learned Additional Solicitor General appearing for the State (NCT of Delhi). He submitted that no error, not to speak of any error of law, could be said to have been committed by the Courts below in holding the appellant convict guilty of the offences he was charged with. The learned ASG submitted that the Courts below were justified in drawing adverse inference against the appellant convict for having declined to participate in MUKESH SINGH v. THE STATE (NCT OF DELHI)
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the TIP. It was argued that once having declined to participate in the TIP, the accused thereafter cannot object or say anything against as regards the evidentiary value of the identification by the eye witnesses of the accused persons before the Trial Court. He further argued that the identification of the accused by the eye witnesses before the Trial Court constitutes substantive evidence and, if TIP is carried out in the course of the investigation, then the proceedings of such TIP would corroborate the substantive evidence of identification before the Court. The learned ASG submitted that the Courts below have believed and found the identification of the accused appellant for the first time before the Trial Court, absolutely reliable and trustworthy. This being a question of fact, the same may not be disturbed by this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution.
20. The learned ASG further submitted that over and above the evidence of identification, there is evidence of discovery of the currency notes of Rs. 7,000/- of the denomination of one thousand as well as the weapon of offence i.e. the ice pick from the house of the appellant convict. This, according to the learned Additional Solicitor General, is one additional incriminating circumstance against the appellant convict pointing towards his guilt.
21. In such circumstances referred to above, the learned ASG prayed that there being no merit in this appeal, the same may be dismissed.
ANALYSIS
22. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having gone through the materials on record, the following questions fall for our consideration:-
(i) Whether the High Court committed any error in dismissing the appeal filed by the appellant convict and thereby affirming the judgment and order of conviction and sentence passed by the Trial Court for the alleged offences?
(ii) Whether an accused can decline to participate in the TIP on the ground that he was already shown to the eye witnesses prior to the conduct of the TIP and in such circumstances, the TIP would be nothing short of creating evidence against him?
(iii) Can an accused decline to participate in the TIP that the investigating officer may propose to hold in the course of investigation on the ground that no person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself? To put it in other words, can an accused decline to subject himself to the TIP on the ground that the same violates his fundamental right under Article 20(3) of the Constitution?
(iv) To what extent the Court can draw an adverse inference against the accused for having refused to participate in the TIP? Whether by virtue of drawing such adverse inference, is it open for the Court to accept the substantive evidence of identification before the Trial Court without any corroboration to such identification?
(v) What is the true purport of Section 54A of the CrPC?
(vi) Whether the Courts below were justified in placing reliance on the discovery of weapon of offence and the currency notes from the residence of the appellant convict as one of the incriminating circumstances against the appellant convict?
Whether TIP violates the fundamental right of an accused under Article 20(3) of the Constitution
23. Article 20(3) of the Constitution reads thus:- “Article 20(3):-No person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.”
24. The true purport of clause (3) of Article 20 of the Constitution referred to above was laid down by this Court in the case of M.P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra, AIR 1954 SC 300. Jagannadhadas J., delivering the judgment of the Court, observed:- “Indeed, every positive volitional act, which furnishes evidence is testimony, and testimonial compulsion connotes coercion which procures the positive volitional evidentiary acts of the person, as opposed to the negative attitude of silence or submission on his part.”
25. We are conscious of the fact that M.P. Sharma (supra) referred to above came to be overruled in K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1, to the extent that it had observed that privacy is not a MUKESH SINGH v. THE STATE (NCT OF DELHI)
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right guaranteed by the Indian Constitution. It was held in M.P. Sharma (supra) that in absence of a provision like the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, a right to privacy could not be read into the Indian Constitution. In the case on hand, we are not concerned with the right of privacy of an accused when it comes to putting him to TIP. What has been ruled in K.S. Puttaswamy (supra) in context of Article 21, is that an invasion of privacy must be fulfilled on the basis of a law which stipulates a procedure which is fair, just and reasonable.
26. What is prohibited by Article 20(3) of the Constitution is procuring by compulsion of the positive volitional evidentiary acts of an accused. It is true that an accused may be said to be compelled to attend a test identification parade, but this compulsion does not involve any positive volitional evidentiary act. His mere attendance or the exhibition of his body at a test identification parade even though compelled, does not result in any evidentiary act until he is identified by some other agency. The identification of him by a witness is not his act, even though his body is exhibited for the purpose. His compelled attendance at a test identification parade is comparatively remote to the final evidence and cannot be said by itself to furnish any positive volitional evidentiary act. [See : Peare Lal Show v. The State, AIR 1961 Cal 531]
27. In Peare Lal Show (supra), Mitter, J. of the Calcutta High Court in his separate judgment observed thus:- “5. True, we are to construe Article 20(3), but the language of Article 20(3) is as to the material part tolidem verbis the 5th Amendment of the American Constitution. Dealing with the point, Holmes, J. in Holt v. United States, (1910) 218 US 245, observed:
“A question arose as to whether a blouse belonged to the prisoner. A witness testified that the prisoner put it on and it fitted him. It is objected that he did this under the same duress that made his statements inadmissible, and that it should be excluded for the same reasons. But the prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material. The objection in principle would forbid a jury to look at a prisoner and compare his features with a photograph in proof. Moreover, we need not consider how far a court would go in compelling a man to exhibit himself. For when he is exhibited, whether voluntarily or by order, and even if the order goes too far, the evidence, if material, is competent”.
6. In the same strain are to be found comments in Wigmore on Evidence, Volume VIII (3rd Edition), Section 2263 at page 363. The emphasis is upon the testimonial status of the accused and not upon any compulsion which might be a step in obtaining the final evidence against the man. Dealing with, this topic, Wigmore observed:
“Such, finally, is the practical requirement that follows from the necessity of recognizing other unquestioned methods of procuring evidence: for if the privilege extended beyond these limits, and protected an accused otherwise than in his strictly testimonial status, — if, in other words, it created inviolability not only for his physical control of his own vocal utterances, but also for his physical control in whatever form exercised then it would be possible for a guilty person to shut himself up in his house, with all the tools and indicia of his crime, and defy the authority of the law to employ in evidence anything that might be obtained by forcibly overthrowing his possession and compelling the surrender of the evidential articles, a clear “reductio ad absurdum”.”
7. The foregoing principles were embodied in the judgement of the Supreme Court in M.P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra, AIR 1954 SC 300, and the statement of the law set out earlier in this judgment furnishes, to my mind, the real test for determining whether any particular accused is compelled to be a witness against himself. As I have pointed out, the identification of an accused at a test identification parade by someone is not the accused’s own act. His mere attendance or the exhibition of his body cannot be regarded as furnishing any positive volitional evidentiary act. That being the position, the impugned order cannot be regarded as violative of Article 20(3) of the Constitution.” [Emphasis supplied] MUKESH SINGH v. THE STATE (NCT OF DELHI)
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28. Bhattacharya, J. by his separate but concurring judgment observed thus:- “10. InM.P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra, AIR 1954 SC 300, it is pointed out that the guarantee under Article 20(3) of the Constitution is available to the person against whom a first information report has been recorded. As was observed in Collector of Customs v. Calcutta Motor and Cycle Co., AIR 1958 Cal 682, no formal complaint is necessary and even if a person has been named as one who committed an offence, particularly by officers who are competent to launch a prosecution against him, he has been accused of an offence within the meaning of Article 20(3) and he can claim protection under that provision of law and, therefore, the extortion of any evidentiary material even at the stage of investigation, as in the present case, which may aid in the making out of a case against him may be within the meaning of condemnation of the Article. After the decision of the Supreme Court in Sharma’s case, referred to above, it cannot be said that the guarantee in Article 20(3) is confined to the oral evidence of the accused. Their Lordships pointedly observed:
“We can see no reason to confine the contents of the constitutional guarantee to this barely literal import. So to limit it would be to rob guarantee of its substantial purpose and to miss the substance for the sum as stated in certain decisions. A person can be a witness not merely by giving oral evidence but also by producing documents or making intelligible gestures as in the case of a dumb witness or the like. To be a witness is nothing more than to furnish evidence and such evidence can be furnished through the lips or by production of a thing or of a document or any other means”.
11. The Magistrate has directed the production of the petitioner in a test identification parade. The petitioner has objected to this procedure. Consequently, there is an element of coercion and therefore no question of acquiescence arises. This kind of objection may be raised, in my opinion, by an accused person not only at the time of passing of such an order by a Magistrate orally or in writing, personally or through his lawyer, but also at the time of actual collection of his evidence which, according to the accused, may be self-incriminatory in character. The objection of the petitioner is in time. There is, therefore, no technical bar.
14. Apart from the question of coercion as opposed to acquiescence the fundamental idea stressed is ‘positive volitional evidentiary act’. This is distinct from ‘negative attitude of silence or submission’. It is clear that the Supreme Court did not lay down only the negative principle of silence or acquiescence. What stands out prominently in the judgment is ‘a positive volitional evidentiary act’. If coercion is sought to be imposed in getting from an accused evidence which cannot be procured save through positive volitional act on his part, the Constitutional guarantee will step in to protect him. This was the view of this Court in the case of Farid Ahmed v. The State, AIR 1960 Cal 32, in connection with a case in which the Magistrate allowed an investigating officer to take specimen writing and signatures of the accused. But if that evidence can be procured without any positive volitional evidentiary act on the part of the accused, Article 20(3) of the Constitution will have no application. In so far as the above ratio decidendi laid down by the Supreme Court was not kept in view fully in Bhaluka Behara v. The State, AIR 1957 Orissa 172; Brij Bhusan v. The State, AIR 1957 Madh Pra 106; Nazir Singh v. The State, AIR 1959 Madh Pra 411, or Sailendra Nath v. The State, AIR 1955 Cal 247, or Ram Swarup v. The State, AIR 1958 Cal 119, we would with due deference dissent from the views in these decisions. In Bhaluka Behara v. The State, the Orissa High Court seems to have been of the opinion that any direction asking the accused to give his thumb impression would amount to asking him to furnish evidence which is prohibited under Article 20(3). In this case, however, there was no element of coercion or compulsion and no objection had been raised by the accused persons at the time of taking the thumb impression. In Brij Bhusan v. The State, the Madhya Pradesh High Court held that Section 5 of the Madhya Bharat Identification of Prisoners Act, in so far as it conferred powers on the Magistrate to direct an accused person to give his thumb impression, specimen writing and signature for comparison to be used against him in a trial, was repugnant to Article 20(3) of the Constitution and was, therefore, void. In Sailendra Nath v. The State MUKESH SINGH v. THE STATE (NCT OF DELHI)
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and Ram Swarup v. The State it was pointed out that taking specimen writing did not offend Article 20(3) of the Constitution, — a view that was dissented from in Farid Ahmed v. The State.
18. It will appear from People v. Swallow, 165 New York Supp. 915, that the rule against self-incrimination is not violated when the accused is compelled to exhibit himself or part of his body to the court or to allow a record of his finger prints to be taken. In State v. Ah Chuey, (1879) 33 Am Re 530, the Court held that an order directing the accused to exhibit certain tattoo marks On his person would not amount to an infringement of the rule against self-incrimination.
19. Negativing the contention that taking of finger prints is a violation of the privilege against self-incrimination, Willis in Constitutional Law of the United States (1936 Edition, page 522) observed inter alia: “The accused does not exercise a volition or give oral testimony. He is passive. He is not giving testimony about his body, but is giving his body”. Speaking of inspection of bodily features by the Tribunal or by witnesses, Wigmore in Evidence, Vol. VIII, page 375, Section 2265 comments that what is obtained from the accused by such action is not testimony about his body but his body itself. This aspect, I cannot help repeating, was also stressed by Holmes, J. in the case of (1910) 218 US 245 by observing: “But the prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be witness against himself is a prohibition of use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material”.
20. If, as we find, taking of thumb impression is not violative of Article 20(3), with greater force the reasons set out above mutatis mutandis will be applicable to a case directing the production of the accused in a test identification parade, apart from such consideration as interposition of a magisterial order. It is not the accused who is called upon to testify against himself but somebody else on seeing him and others now in the parade may have something to say later on. The accused does not produce any evidence or perform any evidentiary act. It may be a positive act and even a volitional act, but only to a limited extent, when he walks to the place where the test identification parade is to be held, as has been urged by Mr. Dutt, but certainly it is not his evidentiary act. The view that we take in the instant case is in full accord with the test of positive volitional evidentiary act laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of M.P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra, AIR 1954 SC 300.”
[Emphasis supplied]
SECTION 54A OF THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE,
29. In the aforesaid context, we shall now look into Section 54A of the CrPC. Section 54A reads thus:- “Section 54A. Identification of person arrested.- Where a person is arrested on a charge of committing an offence and his identification by any other person or persons is considered necessary for the purpose of investigation of such offence, the Court, having jurisdiction may, on the request of the officer in charge of a police station, direct the person so arrested to subject himself to identification by any person or persons in such manner as the Court may deem fit.
Provided that, if the person identifying the person arrested is mentally or physically disabled, such process of identification shall take place under the supervision of a Judicial Magistrate who shall take appropriate steps to ensure that such person identifies the person arrested using methods that person is comfortable with:
Provided further that if the person identifying the person arrested is mentally or physically disabled, the identification process shall be videographed.”
30. The newly inserted Section 54A provides for the identification of the arrested person where it is considered necessary for the purpose of investigation by the officer-in-charge of a police station. The said Section empowers the court, on the request of the officer-in-charge of a police station, to direct for placing the accused at test identification parade for identification by any person or persons in such manner as the court may deem fit. It is provided in the “objects and reasons”:- MUKESH SINGH v. THE STATE (NCT OF DELHI)
[J. B. PARDIWALA, J.] 912 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S.C.R.
“This clause seeks to insert a new section 54A to empower the Court to direct specifically the holding of the identification of the arrested person at the request of the prosecution.”
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