Satheesh V.K. v. The Federal Bank Ltd.
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 1140; [2025] 9 S.C.R. 1255
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Dipankar Datta, Justice K.V. Viswanathan
- Decided
- 23 Sept 2025
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 11752/2025
- Sections
- 13(4), 2, 9, 114
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:18 am. Original source ↗
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[2025] 9 S.C.R. 1255 : 2025 INSC 1140 Satheesh V.K.
v.
The Federal Bank Ltd.
(Civil Appeal No(s). 11752-11753 of 2025)
23 September 2025 [Dipankar Datta* and K.V. Viswanathan, JJ.] Issue for Consideration Issue arose as regards the maintainability of the second SLP challenging the same order where the first SLP was withdrawn without leave to re-approach.
Headnotes† Constitution of India – Art.136 – Maintainability of the second Special Leave Petition, when the first was withdrawn without liberty – Appellant defaulted in his obligation to repay loan to the respondent-Bank – Respondent classified the loan account as ‘Non-Performing Asset’ and initiated measures u/s.13(4) of the SARFAESI Act – Appellant filed writ petition, which was disposed of by the High Court requiring the appellant to pay Rs.2 crores by a stipulated date and the remaining amount in instalments – Appellant challenged this order in SLP before this Court and the SLP was dismissed as withdrawn – Appellant then filed a review petition in the High Court seeking review of the order passed by the High Court and the same was dismissed – Consequent thereupon, the appellant filed two civil appeals against the original High Court order and the order dismissing the review petition – Maintainability:
Held: It is not a permissible practice to challenge the same order over again after withdrawing the special leave petition without obtaining permission of the court for withdrawing it with liberty to move for special leave again subsequently – Nature of power exercisable by this Court u/Art.136, would apply in the first round when a judgment and order is challenged and not when the challenge to the same judgment and order is withdrawn * Author 1256 [2025] 9 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports in the first round and a second chance is attempted without having obtained the permission of the Court to re-approach it – Entertaining a special leave petition in a case of the present nature would be contrary to public policy and can even tantamount to sitting in appeal over the previous order of this Court which has attained finality – Maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium (it is for the public good that there be an end to litigation) would apply in all fours when it is found that proceedings challenging an order were not carried forward by withdrawing the special leave petition and the litigant has returned to the same court after some time mounting a challenge to the self-same order which was earlier under challenge and such challenge had not been pursued – This is a course of action which cannot be justified either in principle or precept – Preliminary objections to the maintainability of the appeals upheld – Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 – s.13(4) – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Ord.XLVII r.7(1). [Paras 26, 35] Case Law Cited Upadhyay & Co. v. State of U.P. and Others [1998] Supp. 3 SCR 234 : (1999) 1 SCC 81 – relied on.
S. Narahari and Others v. S.R. Kumar and Others [2023] 10 SCR 1010 : (2023) 7 SCC 740 – distinguished.
N.F. Railway Vending and Catering Contractors Association Lumding Division v. Union of India & Ors., Special Leave Petition (C) No(s). 17501-17502/2024; Dhakeswari Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal [1955] 1 SCR 941 : AIR 1955 SC 65; Kunhayammed and Others v. State of Kerala & Another [2000] Supp. 1 SCR 538 : (2000) 6 SCC 359; Khoday Distilleries Limited (Now Known as Khoday India Limited) and Others v. Sri Mahadeshwara Sahakara Sakkare Karkhane Limited, Kollegal (Under Liquidation) Represented by the Liquidator [2019] 3 SCR 411 : (2019) 4 SCC 376; Vasantalata Kom Vimalanand Mirjankar Rep. by G.P.A. Holder v. Deepa Mavinkurve & Ors., Special Leave Petition (C) Diary No. 36933/2025 – held inapplicable.
Vinod Kapoor v. State of Goa (2012) 12 SCC 383; Patel Narshi Thakershi and Ors. v. Shri Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji (1971) 3 SCC 844; S. Nagaraj and Others v. State of Karnataka and [2025] 9 S.C.R. 1257Satheesh V.K. v. The Federal Bank Ltd. Another [1993] Supp. 2 SCR 1 : (1993) Supp. 4 SCC 595; Lily Thomas and Others v. Union of India & Ors. [2000] 3 SCR 1081 : (2000) 6 SCC 224; Ramnik Vallabhdas Madhvani and Others v. Taraben Pravinlal Madhvani [2003] Supp. 5 SCR 230 : (2004) 1 SCC 497; Union of India v. Amrit Lal Manchanda and Another [2004] 2 SCR 422 : (2004) 3 SCC 75; M/s Pro Knits v. The Board of Directors of Canara Bank & Ors. [2024] 8 SCR 140 : (2024) 10 SCC 292; Shri Shri Swami Samarth Construction & Finance Solution and Another v. Board of Directors of NKGST Co-op. Bank Ltd and Others, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1566; Sandhya Educational Society v. Union of India (2014) 7 SCC 701 – referred to. List of Acts Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002; Constitution of India; Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
List of Keywords Maintainability; Second SLP; First SLP withdrawn without leave to re-approach; Non-Performing Asset; Twelve equal monthly instalments; Review petition; Public policy; Maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium-it is for the public good that there be an end to litigation; Preliminary objections.
Case Arising From CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No(s). 11752- 11753 of 2025 From the Judgment and Order dated 01.10.2024 and 05.12.2024 of the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam in WP (C) No. 33280 and RP No. 1294 of 2024, respectively.
Appearances for Parties Advs. for the Appellant:
M. K. S. Menon, Ms. Usha Nandini V., Shashank Menon, John Thomas Arakal.
Advs. for the Respondent:
Aljo K. Joseph, Saket Jee, Santhosh Kumar Kolkundra, Rajesh Kumar, Vinay Kumar Puvvala, Ms. Ankita Kutthi.
1258 [2025] 9 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment Dipankar Datta, J.
1. Appellant, Satheesh V.K., is a borrower within the meaning of section 2(f) of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 1 . Undisputedly, the appellant obtained financial assistance from the respondent-Federal Bank, a secured creditor within the meaning of section 2(zd) of the SARFAESI Act, by creating equitable mortgage over properties situated in Kozhikode. However, the appellant having defaulted in his obligation to repay the loan, the respondent classified the loan account as ‘Non-Performing Asset’ (NPA) and initiated measures under section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act.
2. Aggrieved by the action taken by the respondent, the appellant invoked the jurisdiction of the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam under Article 226 of the Constitution by presenting a writ petition 2 . According to the respondent, the total outstanding amount was Rs.7,77,41,321/-. The order dated 1 st October, 2024 passed by the High Court disposing of the writ petition required the appellant to pay Rs.2,00,00,000/- on or before 30 th October, 2024 and the remaining amount along with future interest in 12 (twelve) equal monthly instalments. The first instalment was to be paid on or before 15 th November, 2024 and the remaining eleven (11) instalments were to be paid on or before 15 th day of each succeeding month. The impugned order further directed that in case of failure to make payment of Rs.2,00,00,000/- or any of the subsequent instalments, as directed, the respondent would be free to proceed against the appellant under the SARFAESI Act for realisation of the dues in accordance with law. Appellant was also granted liberty to approach the respondent for one time settlement after making payment of the initial sum of Rs.2,00,00,000/- on or before 30th October, 2024.
3. The order dated 1 st October, 2024 was challenged by the appellant in a special leave petition 3 before this Court. Order dated 28 th November, 1 SARFAESI Act 2 Writ Petition (C) No. 33280 of 2024 3 Special Leave Petition (C) No. 28259/2024 [2025] 9 S.C.R. 1259Satheesh V.K. v. The Federal Bank Ltd. 2024 recorded on the said special leave petition by a co-ordinate Bench reads as follows:
ORDER
1. After arguing for some time and on our expressing reservation in entertaining the present petition, the learned senior counsel for the petitioner seeks permission to withdraw the present petition.
2. Permission to withdraw is granted.
3. The Special Leave Petition is dismissed as withdrawn.
4. Having been permitted to withdraw the special leave petition, the appellant next approached the High Court with a petition 4 seeking review of the order dated 1st October, 2024. Such petition came to be dismissed vide order dated 5 th December, 2024.
5. Consequent upon such dismissal, these two civil appeals were presented by the appellant before this Court on 12 th December, 2024. The appeal 5 registered prior in point of time is directed against the order dated 1 st October, 2024 of disposal of the appellant’s writ petition, whereas the one6 subsequently registered is directed against the dismissal of the review petition.
6. The alacrity with which the appellant moved from court to court between 1 st October, 2024 (date of disposal of his writ petition) and 12 th December, 2024 (date of presenting the special leave petitions before this Court giving rise to these appeals) without showing semblance of an inclination to repay the dues of the respondent and to buy time by resorting to technicalities are certainly factors which we propose to bear in mind while deciding these appeals.
7. Mr. Aljo K. Joseph, learned counsel appearing for the respondent, has vehemently objected to maintainability of the appeals. He has referred to the aforesaid order dated 28 th November, 2024 passed on the appellant’s previous special leave petition and contended that no liberty having been sought and/or granted by this Court to present a fresh special leave petition to lay a challenge to the order 4 RP No. 1294 of 2024 5 Civil Appeal No. 11752/2025 6 Civil Appeal No. 11753/2025 1260 [2025] 9 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports dated 1 st October, 2024, the appellant has no right in law to approach this Court once again after withdrawing the initial challenge. Also, in view of Order XLVII Rule 7 (1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 7 , there can be no appeal against an order refusing review.
8. The objection to the maintainability of the appeal against the order dated 1 st October, 2024 was sought to be countered by Mr. Menon, learned counsel for the appellant, by citing the decision of a coordinate Bench of this Court in S. Narahari and Others v. S.R. Kumar and Others8 . It was pointed out that a reference was made for constitution of a larger Bench to deliberate and adjudicate the issue as to whether a second special leave petition would be maintainable against an order which was previously challenged in a special leave petition but the challenge had either been withdrawn or spurned. Our attention was further drawn by Mr. Menon to orders dated 29 th July, 2024 and 13 th August, 2024 passed by another co-ordinate Bench of this Court [of which one of us (Dipankar Datta) was a member] in N.F. Railway Vending and Catering Contractors Association Lumding Division vs. Union of India & Ors.9 where, noticing S. Narahari (supra), the special leave petitions were adjourned till such time the reference is decided.
9. Apart from referring to the aforesaid decisions, Mr. Menon relied on a compilation of precedents starting from Dhakeswari Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal10 . Reliance was placed on paragraph 8 of Dhakeswari Cotton Mills Ltd. (supra) on the extent of powers conferred by Article 136 of the Constitution, reading as follows:
“8. … It is not possible to define with any precision the limitations on the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in this Court by the constitutional provision made in Article 136. The limitations, whatever they be, are implicit in the nature and character of the power itself. It being an exceptional and overriding power, naturally it has to be exercised sparingly and with caution and only in special and extraordinary situations. Beyond that it is not possible
7 CPC
8 (2023) 7 SCC 740
9 Special Leave Petition (C) No(s). 17501-17502/2024
10 AIR 1955 SC 65
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 1261Satheesh V.K. v. The Federal Bank Ltd. to fetter the exercise of this power by any set formula or rule. All that can be said is that the Constitution having trusted the wisdom and good sense of the Judges of this Court in this matter, that itself is a sufficient safeguard and guarantee that that power will only be used to advance the cause of justice, and that its exercise will be governed by well-established principles which govern the exercise of overriding constitutional powers. It is, however, plain that when the Court reaches the conclusion that a person has been dealt with arbitrarily or that a court or tribunal within the territory of India has not given a fair deal to a litigant, then no technical hurdles of any kind like the finality of finding of facts or otherwise can stand in the way of the exercise of this power because the whole intent and purpose of this Article is that it is the duty of this Court to see that injustice is not perpetuated or perpetrated by decisions of courts and tribunals because certain laws have made the decisions of these courts or tribunals final and conclusive. …”
10. According to Mr. Menon, the power conferred by Article 136 of the Constitution of India is an extra-ordinary power and such power must be exercised to advance the cause of justice and not to thwart it.
11. Other decisions relied on by Mr. Menon are Patel Narshi Thakershi and Ors. v. Shri Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji11 , S. Nagaraj and Others v. State of Karnataka and Another12 , Lily Thomas and Others v. Union of India & Ors.13 , Kunhayammed and Others v. State of Kerala & Another14 , Ramnik Vallabhdas Madhvani and Others v. Taraben Pravinlal Madhvani15 , Union of India v. Amrit Lal Manchanda and Another16 , and Khoday Distilleries Limited (Now Known as Khoday India Limited) and Others v. Sri Mahadeshwara Sahakara Sakkare Karkhane Limited, Kollegal (Under Liquidation) Represented by the Liquidator17 .
11 (1971) 3 SCC 844
12 (1993) Supp. 4 SCC 595
13 (2000) 6 SCC 224
14 (2000) 6 SCC 359
15 (2004) 1 SCC 497
16 (2004) 3 SCC 75
17 (2019) 4 SCC 376
1262 [2025] 9 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
12. Of these decisions, Kunhayammed (supra) and Khoday Distilleries Limited (supra) have relevance and, therefore, we propose to consider the same in some detail for deciding the question arising before us at a later part of this judgment. The other decisions not being directly related to the point under consideration are not separately considered. Suffice to record, these decisions lay down general principles of law, inter alia, of what is a review, that power to review is not an inherent power and has to be statutorily conferred, whether res judicata is applicable in a case where there is inherent lack of jurisdiction, how to read precedents, and that law has to bend before justice in given circumstances.
13. On merits, Mr. Menon referred to the decision in M/s Pro Knits v. The Board of Directors of Canara Bank & Ors.18 and Shri Shri Swami Samarth Construction & Finance Solution and Another v. Board of Directors of NKGST Co-op. Bank Ltd and Others19 to contend that the appellant’s company being an unit which is an MSME, it is entitled to the benefits flowing from Notification dated 29 th May, 2015 issued by the Central Government in terms of Section 9 of the Micro Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 and that the respondent had acted illegally in not extending the benefit of such notification to the appellant.
14. Since the question of examining the merits of the appellant’s claim would arise if the objection to the maintainability were overcome, we proceed to examine the maintainability aspect first.
15. In course of hearing, we had invited Mr. Menon’s attention to the order of recent origin dated 1 st September, 2025 of another co-ordinate Bench in Vasantalata Kom Vimalanand Mirjankar Rep. by G.P.A. Holder vs. Deepa Mavinkurve & Ors.20 . Mr. Menon sought to distinguish Vasantalata (supra) by referring to the opening sentence of paragraph 7. It was submitted that this Court in Vasantalata (supra) had dealt with a case where a special leave petition was dismissed and not withdrawn, as in the present case; therefore, Vasantalata (supra) has no application here.
18 (2024) 10 SCC 292
19 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1566 20 Special Leave Petition (C) Diary No. 36933/2025 [2025] 9 S.C.R. 1263Satheesh V.K. v. The Federal Bank Ltd.
16. The question we are tasked to decide, though of frequent occurrence now-a-days, is not res integra. It is, whether a special leave petition (second in the series) would be maintainable against a judgment and order which was earlier challenged before this Court but such challenge turned out to be abortive because the special leave petition before this Court is either (i) withdrawn unconditionally, or
(ii) dismissed on merits by a brief order not containing reasons, or
(iii) withdrawn with liberty to apply for review but without the liberty to approach this Court once again, should the review too fail.
17. No doubt, the co-ordinate Bench in S. Narahari (supra) has referred the issue to a larger Bench for consideration. The facts therein may be noted now. The coordinate Bench in S. Narahari (supra) was seized of the question as to whether, upon dismissal of a special leave petition against the parent order as withdrawn with liberty to file a review before the high court but without liberty to approach this Court again against the parent order should the review fail, a fresh special leave petition filed against both the parent order and the review rejection order would be maintainable. The Bench pondered whether liberty granted by this Court to approach the high court in review automatically places the said matter in the “escalation matrix”, and makes the remedy of a special leave petition available again. The Bench traced the first line of cases, Vinod Kapoor v. State of Goa21 and Sandhya Educational Society v. Union of India22 which ruled that when no liberty has been granted to approach the Supreme Court once again, a subsequent special leave petition is not maintainable. This was contrasted with the decision rendered in Khoday Distilleries (supra) wherein after placing reliance on Kunhayammed (supra), a three-Judge Bench came to the conclusion that even after dismissal of a special leave petition, a review before the high court is maintainable.
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