Ch. Joseph v. The Telangana State Road Transport Corporation & Other
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 920; [2025] 8 S.C.R. 320
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice J.K. Maheshwari, Justice Aravind Kumar
- Decided
- 31 Jul 2025
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 9986/2025
- Sections
- 12(3), 12, 47, 2, 18(3)
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:18 am. Original source ↗
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[2025] 8 S.C.R. 320 : 2025 INSC 920 Ch. Joseph v.
The Telangana State Road Transport Corporation & Other (Civil Appeal No. 9986 of 2025)
01 August 2025 [J.K. Maheshwari and Aravind Kumar,* JJ.] Issue for Consideration i) Whether the retirement of the appellant on medical grounds due to colour blindness, without offering alternative employment, is legally sustainable in light of applicable service regulations and binding settlements; ii) whether Clause 14 of the Memorandum of Settlement dated 17.12.1979, executed u/s.12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, remains valid, binding, and enforceable despite the subsequent 1986 settlement and internal administrative circulars; iii) whether the respondents complied with their duty to make a bona fide assessment of alternative employment options for the appellant, as required by law, policy, and principles of natural justice; iv) whether the reliance placed by the High Court on B.S. Reddy was legally tenable in the context of the appellant’s independent rights under a binding industrial settlement. Headnotes† Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 – APSRTC Employees (Service) Regulations, 1964 – Regn. 6A(5)(b) – Appellantdriver was found to be colour blind and was declared unfit to hold the post of driver – The appellant’s representation seeking alternate employment came to be rejected by the respondent-corporation – The corporation passed an order retiring the appellant – Whether the retirement of the appellant on medical grounds due to colour blindness, without offering alternative employment, is legally sustainable in light of applicable service regulations and binding settlements: Held: 1. The appellant’s retirement from service on the ground of colour blindness was effected without any demonstrable effort by the respondent-corporation to identify or assess the feasibility of * Author [2025] 8 S.C.R. 321Ch. Joseph v.
The Telangana State Road Transport Corporation & Other alternative employment, despite the appellant having expressed willingness to be reassigned to a non-driving post – Such inaction violates both statutory obligation and administrative fairness. [Para 10.1]
2. The primary legal flaw lies in the assumption that medical unfitness for a particular post automatically entails incapacity for public service altogether – Colour blindness, though a disqualification for driving, does not render the appellant unfit to serve in any other non-driving role – There is no evidence that he was declared wholly incapacitated or incapable of performing other duties. [Para 13]
3. The MOS dated 17.12.1979 entered into u/s.12 (3) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 between the employer and the union representing the workmen under Clause 14 would indicate that the drivers found with “colour blindness” would be provided an alternate job and all service benefits would stand protected – However, the Corporation has relied upon the subsequent agreement, namely Memorandum of Settlement (MOS) dated 22.12.1986 to stave off the claim for alternate employment raised by the appellant in the instant case – A plea has been raised in the Counter affidavit filed by the Corporation that the MOS dated 17.12.1979 has been superseded by the agreement of 1986 – The said contention is rejected – The agreement dated 22.12.1986 does not refer to the agreement dated 17.12.1979 – In fact, Clause 5 (d) of the settlement agreement 22.12.1986 would indicate, suitable alternate jobs would have to be identified and only in the event of not being possible to identify such job, recourse to payment of additional monetary benefit as per the proposal sent to the government will be given after government’s approval – The Settlement dated 22.12.1986 does not specifically supersede the settlement agreement of 17.12.1979 – It is only by way of a communication dated 10.11.2014, the benefit of alternate employment given to the drivers declared unfit due to “colour blindness” has been sought to be taken away which benefit was extended till that date. [Paras 14, 16, 16.1, 16.2, 16.3]
4. Retirement on medical grounds must be a measure of last resort, only after the employer exhausts all reasonable avenues for redeployment – This principle is inherent in the concept of “reasonable accommodation”, which is now recognised as an aspect of substantive equality under Articles 14 and 21 – The failure to explore alternate employment before resorting to medical 322 [2025] 8 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports retirement is not merely a procedural lapse—it is a substantive illegality that violates the appellant’s right to livelihood and equal treatment. [Para 17] Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 – Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 – s.12(3) – APSRTC Employees (Service) Regulations, 1964 – Regn. 6A(5)(b) – Whether Clause 14 of the Memorandum of Settlement dated 17.12.1979, executed u/s.12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, remains valid, binding, and enforceable despite the subsequent 1986 settlement and internal administrative circulars:
Held: 1. The appellant’s entitlement to re-deployment arises from Clause 14 of the binding Memorandum of Settlement dated 17.12.1979, executed u/s.12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, which specifically provides for alternate employment to drivers declared colour blind, with pay protection and continuity of service – This clause remains valid and enforceable. [Para 10.2]
2. The Memorandum of Settlement dated 17.12.1979, was executed between the Corporation and its recognised union u/s.12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 – The Memorandum of Settlement is not a mere administrative circular—it is a binding statutory contract forged between labour and management. [Para 18]
3. The enforceability of this settlement is not diminished by the subsequent settlement dated 22.12.1986, which the Corporation claims to be governing the field – Clause 5(d) of the 1986 settlement provides that drivers who are medically unfit may, “to the extent possible”, be provided alternative employment, and where not feasible, will be granted Additional Monetary Benefit (AMB) – Crucially, this clause does not contain any express language annulling or modifying Clause 14 of the 1979 agreement – Also, the absence of a termination clause in the 1986 settlement, coupled with the Corporation’s continued adherence to Clause 14 in other cases even after 1986, confirms that the earlier agreement remained operational – Accordingly, this Court finds that 1986 settlement does not explicitly abrogate or nullify Clause 14 of the 1979 settlement. [Para 21] Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 – Industrial Disputes [2025] 8 S.C.R. 323Ch. Joseph v.
The Telangana State Road Transport Corporation & Other Act, 1947 – APSRTC Employees (Service) Regulations, 1964 – Whether the respondents complied with their duty to make a bona fide assessment of alternative employment options for the appellant, as required by law, policy, and principles of natural justice:
Held: 1. From the record, it is evident that the Corporation made no effort whatsoever to assess the feasibility of assigning the appellant to a non-driving post – There is no file noting, committee report, vacancy statement, or suitability assessment relating to the appellant – His representation requesting the post of Shramik remained unanswered – No comparative evaluation was conducted, and no individualized inquiry was held – The only justification offered is that the Corporation’s circulars bar such alternate employment. [Para 24]
2. In the instant case, there is no evidence that the respondents examined even the most basic parameters—availability of vacancies, suitability of tasks, or the appellant’s qualifications – This total failure undermines the Corporation’s claim of compliance with either the 1979 or 1986 framework, and renders the retirement order void for non-consideration of appellant’s claim in proper perspective. [Para 27] Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 – Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 – s.47 – APSRTC Employees (Service) Regulations, 1964 – Whether the reliance placed by the High Court on B.S. Reddy was legally tenable in the context of the appellant’s independent rights under a binding industrial settlement: Held: 1. The Division Bench of the High Court erred in applying the judgment in B.S. Reddy, which dealt with the limited scope of s.47 of the 1995 Act, and did not consider claims arising independently under industrial settlements – The present case stands on an entirely different legal footing. [Para 10.5]
2. The B.S. Reddy judgment did not deal with the enforceability of a clause in an agreement/settlement entered into u/s.12(3) of Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 or the Corporation’s obligations under bilateral agreements with its workers – The High Court overlooked the fundamental distinction between statutory rights under disability law and contractual service conditions enforceable through settlements. [Para 29] 324 [2025] 8 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
3. The Court in Mohamed Ibrahim clarified that employees with conditions like colour blindness, although not falling within the defined categories of the statute, must still be accommodated wherever their functional capacity permits – To do otherwise would result in a regressive interpretation of the law, undermining the very foundation of equal opportunity in public employment. [Para 36]
4. Even though in the present case the appellant had an enforceable right under a statutory industrial settlement—placing his claim on firmer footing—this Court finds it necessary to reaffirm that even in the absence of such contractual rights, employees who acquire disabilities during service must not be abandoned or prematurely retired without being afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity for reassignment. [Para 37] Case Law Cited Kunal Singh v. Union of India and Another [2003] 1 SCR 1059 : (2003) 4 SCC 524; Mohamed Ibrahim v. The Chairman and Managing Director and Others [2023] 13 SCR 924 – relied on. Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation Represented by its Managing Director and Others v. B.S. Reddy (2018) 12 SCC 704; Vikash Kumar v. Union Public Service Commission and Others [2021] 12 SCR 311 : (2021) 5 SCC 370; Ravinder Kumar Dhariwal and Another v. Union of India and Others [2021] 13 SCR 823 – referred to.
List of Acts Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995; Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. List of Keywords Service Law; Retirement; Medical grounds; Retirement on medical grounds; Colour blind; Post of driver; Alternative employment; Service regulations; Binding settlements; Internal administrative circulars; Principles of Natural Justice; Statutory obligation; Administrative fairness; Incapacity for public service; Additional monetary benefit; Concept of reasonable accommodation;
Termination clause; Right to livelihood; Equal treatment; Article 14 of Constitution; Article 21 of Constitution; Statutory rights under disability law; Reasonable opportunity for reassignment. [2025] 8 S.C.R. 325Ch. Joseph v.
The Telangana State Road Transport Corporation & Other Case Arising From CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 9986 of 2025 From the Judgment and Order dated 21.08.2017 of the High Court Of Judicature at Hyderabad for The State of Telangana and The State of Andhra Pradesh in WA No. 1343 of 2017 Appearances for Parties Advs. for the Appellant:
C. Mohan Rao, Sr. Adv., R. Santhana Krishnan, Lokesh Kumar Sharma, Dharmendra Kumar Sinha.
Advs. for the Respondents:
Satyam Reddy Sarasani, Sr. Adv. Ms. Sri Ruma Sarasani, Shishir Pinaki.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment Aravind Kumar, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. Appellant herein is aggrieved by the judgment passed by the High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad for the State of Telangana and the State of Andhra Pradesh (hereinafter referred to as High Court) in Writ Appeal No. 1343 of 2017 dated 21.08.2017, whereunder the writ appeal filed by Telangana State Road Transport Corporation [hereinafter referred to as “TSRTC”] i.e., Respondent No. 1, came to be allowed and the judgment of the single Judge dated 10.03.2016 passed in Writ Petition No. 5164 of 2016 directing the Respondent No.1 to provide the appellant an alternate employment came to be setaside and permitted the appellant to make a detailed representation to the respondent-corporation to seek alternate employment.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND:
3. Appellant herein was selected and appointed as a ‘driver’ in the Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation (“APSRTC” –i.e., the predecessor-in-title of the respondent-corporation) on 01.05.2014, after fulfilling the eligibility criteria fixed for the post. On a periodical 326 [2025] 8 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports medical examination conducted by the medical officer of the dispensary belonging to the respondent-corporation, it was found that the appellant was ‘colour blind’ and was declared unfit to hold the post of ‘driver’. The appellant preferred an appeal challenging the observation regarding his fitness for the post of ‘driver’, alternatively, the appellant also sought for alternate employment in the event, he was declared ‘medically unfit’. The appellate authority dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant, upon which appellant made a representation to the Medical Board, to consider his case by the hospital belonging to the corporation. The Medical Board after considering the case of the appellant, reiterated the findings of the medical officer and the Appellate Authority.
4. The appellant’s representation seeking alternate employment came to be rejected by the corporation on the ground that extant rules do not provide for granting alternate employment to colour blind drivers. The corporation, vide order dated 27.01.2016, passed an order retiring the appellant w.e.f. 06.01.2016 and directed him to avail the additional monetary benefits provided under the policy governing the same.
5. The appellant approached the High Court by filing a Writ Petition No. 5164/2016, impugning the order dated 27.01.2016 and sought for a direction to the corporation to provide him alternate employment contending his disability falls under the category of disablement under the provisions of the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) and therefore he cannot be discriminated; it was also contended that such discrimination would be in violation of Section 47 of the Act and Article 14 and Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The appellant also relied on a Memorandum of Settlement (hereinafter referred to as “MOS”) dated 17.12.1979 entered between the respondent-corporation and the recognized union, which had a provision, namely, Clause 14 of the MOS, which stated that the ‘drivers’ would be provided with an alternate employment.
6. The Single Judge vide order dated 10.03.2016, allowed the Writ Petition. No. 25577/2014 wherein it was held that the category of ‘colour also falls within the category of disablement within the provisions of the Act. Aggrieved by the direction of the Single Judge, the corporation filed an appeal and the Division Bench relying on the [2025] 8 S.C.R. 327Ch. Joseph v.
The Telangana State Road Transport Corporation & Other judgment of this Court in Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation Represented by its Managing Director and Others v. B.S. Reddy1 and connected matters set-aside the order of the Single Judge and directed the appellant to make a representation to the corporation seeking the benefit as prescribed under the regulations and the scheme governing the corporation.
SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES:
7. Mr. C. Mohan Rao, learned Senior Advocate representing the Appellant contends as follows:
7.1. The Memorandum of Settlement (MOS) entered between the APSRTC and the recognized unions u/s 12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act,1947 dated 17.12.1979 is binding on the respondent-corporation and according to the same, the appellant herein being the ‘driver’ of the corporation is entitled for an alternate employment and therefore, the appellant has the right to seek alternate employment.
7.2. The High Court ought to have considered the case of the appellant positively and has failed to appreciate that the case of the Appellant falls within the category of people who have acquired the disability during service and thus appellant would be entitled for alternate employment.
7.3. The High Court failed to appreciate the principles enunciated in the case of Kunal Singh v. Union of India and Another2 by this Court wherein this Court differentiated between the disability of a person and acquired disability while in service and contended that appellant having acquired disability while in service is entitled to alternate employment.
7.4. The High Court ought to have considered that the Appellant herein is entitled to the benefit of Section 47 of the Act and therefore has the right to alternate employment.
7.5. The appellant also relied on the judgment of this Court in Mohamed Ibrahim v. The Chairman and Managing Director and Others in Civil Appeal No. 6785 of 2023, wherein this court
1 (2018) 12 SCC 704
2 (2003) 4 SCC 524
328 [2025] 8 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports directed Respondent-Corporation therein to give the appellant, who was colour blind, an alternate employment.
8. Mr. Satyam Reddy Sarasani, Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent-corporation, supporting the impugned order, has contended:
8.1. That MOS dated 17.12.1979 was replaced by the Memorandum of Settlement dated 22.12.1986, and the previous clause relating to alternate employment to the drivers came to be replaced by Clause 5(d) under the MOS dated 22.12.1986, which state as follows:
“5(d) Medically unfit driver- it is agreed that to the extent possible suitable alternative job will be identified. In case it is not possible to identify suitable jobs, additional monetary benefit as per the proposals sent to the Government will be given after Government’s approval”
8.2. As the appellant being an illiterate person and being a person without qualification, does not fall in the category of persons who can be given alternate employment as per clause 5(d) of the MOS dated 22.12.1986 and therefore, as there is no suitable post available in the corporation to accommodate the appellant, the decision of the corporation to terminate the services of the appellant is correct. The corporation also relied on the regulations governing the workmen of the corporation to demonstrate that, no provision is available in the regulation which imposes an obligation on the corporation to appoint the appellant by providing an alternate employment.
8.3. The term ‘colour blindness’ does not fall under the category of ‘disability’ as defined under Section 2(i) of the Act and therefore Section 47 of the Act does not apply. It is further contended that, the judgment passed in Civil Appeal No. 3529 of 2017, relied on by the High Court is correct and therefore supported the impugned order passed by the High Court.
8.4. On the bare reading of the definition given in Section 2(i) it can be seen that, persons who have more than 40% of disability will fall into the category of ‘persons with disability’, and appellant’s case therefore does not fall in the category of ‘persons with disability’. [2025] 8 S.C.R. 329Ch. Joseph v.
The Telangana State Road Transport Corporation & Other
8.5. That the corporation has also introduced a scheme for providing employment to one of the family members of the medically invalidated workers of the Corporation, therefore appellant should opt for the same.
9. Upon hearing the learned counsels appearing for the parties and perusing the material available on record the following questions arise for our consideration.
I. Whether the retirement of the Appellant on medical grounds due to colour blindness, without offering alternative employment, is legally sustainable in light of applicable service regulations and binding settlements?
II. Whether Clause 14 of the Memorandum of Settlement dated 17.12.1979, executed under Section 12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, remains valid, binding, and enforceable despite the subsequent 1986 settlement and internal administrative circulars?
III. Whether the Respondents complied with their duty to make a bona fide assessment of alternative employment options for the Appellant , as required by law, policy, and principles of natural justice?
IV. Whether the reliance placed by the High Court on B.S. Reddy (supra) was legally tenable in the context of the Appellant’s independent rights under a binding industrial settlement?
FINDINGS:
10. Before we proceed to elaborate on the detailed analysis of the issues arising in the present case, we deem it appropriate to set out in brief the principal grounds which compel us to set aside the impugned order passed by the High Court and to allow the present petition. We do so for the following reasons:
10.1. Firstly, the Appellant’s retirement from service on the ground of colour blindness was effected without any demonstrable effort by the Respondent–Corporation to identify or assess the feasibility of alternative employment, despite the Appellant having expressed willingness to be reassigned to a nondriving post. Such inaction violates both statutory obligation and administrative fairness.
330 [2025] 8 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
10.2. Secondly, the Appellant’s entitlement to redeployment arises from Clause 14 of the binding Memorandum of Settlement dated 17.12.1979, executed under Section 12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, which specifically provides for alternate employment to drivers declared colour blind, with pay protection and continuity of service. This clause remains valid and enforceable.
10.3. Thirdly, the subsequent settlement dated 22.12.1986 neither expressly overrides nor impliedly nullifies the 1979 settlement. Both settlements operate harmoniously, with the latter being general in scope and the former addressing a specific category of disability. Hence, the Respondents’ reliance on the 1986 settlement to deny relief is misplaced.
10.4. Fourthly, internal circulars issued by the Corporation in 2014 and 2015, which purport to deny alternate employment to colour-blind drivers, are administrative instructions that cannot override binding service conditions created by a statutory settlement under the Industrial Disputes Act.
10.5. Fifthly, the Division Bench of the High Court erred in applying the judgment in B.S. Reddy (supra), which dealt with the limited scope of Section 47 of the Act, and did not consider claims arising independently under industrial settlements. The present case stands on an entirely different legal footing.
11. We now proceed to examine each of these issues in detail.
RE: ISSUE – I
12. The undisputed factual position is that the Appellant was appointed as a driver with the Telangana State Road Transport Corporation (TSRTC), was medically examined and declared fit at the time of entry and discharged his duties until he was found colour blind during a routine medical check-up. Pursuant to the medical report declaring him unfit for driving duties, he was retired from service under Regulation 6A(5)(b) of the APSRTC Employees (Service) Regulations, 1964. The Respondents have sought to justify this action by referring to internal circulars dated 10.11.2014 and 14.05.2015, which stipulate that employees found medically unfit due to colour blindness shall not be offered alternate employment, and shall be retired with the grant of “Additional Monetary Benefit” (AMB).
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 331Ch. Joseph v.
The Telangana State Road Transport Corporation & Other
13. The primary legal flaw in this approach lies in the assumption that medical unfitness for a particular post automatically entails incapacity for public service altogether. Colour blindness, though a disqualification for driving, does not render the Appellant unfit to serve in any other non-driving role. There is no evidence that he was declared wholly incapacitated or incapable of performing other duties. This Court in Kunal Singh (supra), held that when an employee acquires a disability in the course of service, the employer must retain the employee by providing suitable alternate employment, unless no such post exists. In the present case, the Appellant had requested reassignment to the post of Shramik, which, by its nature, does not demand normal colour vision. No effort was made by the Corporation to assess his suitability or to examine the availability of such posts.
14. Further, it can be seen that, Rule 6A (5) (b) only provides for the extent of terminal benefits which an employee may be entitled to, in the case of retirement of a driver on medical grounds. The MOS dated 17.12.1979 entered into under Section 12 (3) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 between the employer and the union representing the workmen under Clause 14 would indicate that the drivers found with “colour blindness” would be provided an alternate job and all service benefits would stand protected.
15. For immediate reference Clause 14 of the said MOS dated 17.12.1979 is extracted below:
“14. Colour Blind Drivers a) The long pending issue has been decided and it was agreed to give alternate job to the Drivers found colour blind during the periodical examination. While giving the alternate job, the time scale and pay drawn by the Driver at the time of disqualification would be protected. Circular instructions would be issued in this regard incorporating the cases arising after the issue of circular No. P1/210(1)/76- PD, dt. 16-8-1976.
b) Having given the alternative job, the seniority of Drivers will, however, be continued in the Drivers cadre, and they shall take their further promotions at appropriate time as per Cadre & Recruitment Regulations.
332 [2025] 8 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports c) Drivers who are found Colour Blind during periodical Medical Examination would be given day duties subject to availability of such duties in the Depots.
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