In Re: Right to Privacy of Adolescents v.
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 778; [2025] 7 S.C.R. 216
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- Justice Abhay S. Oka, Justice Ujjal Bhuyan
- Decided
- 22 May 2025
- Case number
- No. 3/2023
- Sections
- 6, 376, 482, 2, 9, 19, 19(6), 46, 432, 473
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:19 am. Original source ↗
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[2025] 7 S.C.R. 216 : 2025 INSC 778 In Re: Right To Privacy of Adolescents (Suo Motu Writ Petition (C) No. 3 of 2023)
23 May 2025 [Abhay S. Oka* and Ujjal Bhuyan, JJ.] Issue for Consideration Issue arose as regards sentencing the accused; about the rehabilitation of the victim and her child; and about adopting measures for adolescent well being and child protection. Headnotes† Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 – s.6 – Penal Code, 1860 – ss.363 and 366 – Sentencing of the accused – Rehabilitation of the victim and her child – Measures for adolescent well being and child protection – On facts, girl aged fourteen years victim under the POCSO Act – Victim married the accused and had a child with him – Acquittal of the accused for the offences punishable under the 2012 Act and IPC by the High Court, since the victim and the accused wanted to continue their cohabitation – In appeal thereagainst, this Court set aside the judgment of the High Court and restored the conviction of the accused for the offences punishable u/ ss.376(2)(n) and 376(3) IPC and s.6 of the POCSO Act – Issue as regards sentencing the accused and the suo motu writ petition as regards objectionable observations made in the impugned judgment:
Held: Final report of the Committee concludes that though the incident was seen as a crime in law, the victim did not treat it as one – In law, no option but to sentence the accused and send him to jail for undergoing the minimum punishment prescribed by the Statute – However, the society, the family of the victim and the legal system have done enough injustice to the victim, she has been subjected to enough trauma and agony and would add to the injustice by sending her husband to jail to undergo imprisonment – There has been failure to provide both social and economic justice to the victim, failure of the concept of welfare state, complete failure of the society and the legal system – However, * Author [2025] 7 S.C.R. 217In Re: Right To Privacy of A dolescents as compared to the situation when the incident took place, victim is better placed today and is comfortable with her small family – Earlier she did not get any opportunity to make informed choice, and now, she is desperate to save her husband and is emotionally committed to him and has become very possessive of her small family – To remedy the situation, the Court to ensure that the accused is not separated from the victim, and the State and the society to ensure that the family is rehabilitated – Exercising the jurisdiction u/Art.142, though the accused stands convicted, he will not undergo sentence – State to act as a true guardian of the victim and her child; to provide a better shelter to the victim and her family; to bear the expenditure of the education of the victim till Xth standard, the degree course, if she desires to pursue, and can offer her free vocational training after her Xth standard; to bear the entire expenditure of the education of the child up to Xth standard and ensure that she is educated in a very good school; and to take the assistance of NGOs for securing debts incurred by victim – State to file compliance report regarding implementation of the said directions – Secretary, Ministry of Women and Child Development to appoint Committee of experts to deal with the suggestions of amici curiae, and thereafter submit detailed report. [Paras 23-31] Case Law Cited Shilpa Sailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan [2023] 5 SCR 165 : (2023) 14 SCC 231; K. Dhandapani v. State, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1056; Sankar v. State of Tamil Nadu, Curative Petition (Criminal) 3/2023; Elumalai v. Inspector of Police, Crl. Appeal No. 674 of 2018; Gian Singh v. State of Punjab [2012] 8 SCR 753 : (2012) 10 SCC 303 – referred to.
Ajay Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2022 SCC OnLine Del 3705; Vijayalakshmi v. State, 2021 SCC OnLine Mad 317; Ranjit Rajbanshi v. State of West Bengal, 2021 SCC OnLine Cal 2470 – referred to.
List of Acts Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012; Penal Code, 1860; Constitution of India; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015. 218 [2025] 7 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports List of Keywords Sentencing; Rehabilitation of victim and her child; Adopting measures for adolescent well being and child protection; Suo motu writ petition; Final report of the Committee; Minimum punishment; Family of the victim; Imprisonment; Social and economic justice; Concept of welfare state; Failure of society and legal system; Make informed choice; Jurisdiction u/Art.142; Guardian of victim and her child; Better shelter to victim and her family; Expenditure of education of the victim; Degree course; Free vocational training; Assistance of NGOs; Public-spirited citizens; Debts incurred by victim; Secretary, Ministry of Women and Child Development; Suggestions of amici curiae.
Case Arising From ORIGINAL /APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Suo Motu Writ Petition (Civil) No. 3 of 2023 (Under Article 32 of The Constitution of India)
With Criminal Appeal No. 1451 of 2024 Appearances for Parties By Courts Motion.
Ms. Madhavi Divan, Ms. Liz Mathew, Sr. Advs./Amicus Curiae, Ms. Nidhi Khanna, Ms. Aishani Narain, Sameer Choudhary, Ms. Aandrita Deb, Ms. Bagavathy Vennimalai, Ms. Mallika Agarwal. Advs. for the Appellants:
Huzefa Ahmadi, Sr. Adv., Kunal Mimani, Abhinav Rana.
Adv. for the Respondents:
Abhijit Sengupta.
Advs. for the Intervenors:
Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, A.S.G., Shiv Mangal Sharma, A.A.G., Chinmayee Chandra, Ms. Archana Surve Shinde, Dr. N.
Visakamurthy, Anuj Bhandari, Ms. Astha Sharma, Ms. Nidhi Khanna, Anuj Bhandari, Ms. Nidhi Jaswal, Ms. Ankita Sharma, Arjun D Singh, Kunal Mimani, Aravindh S.
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 219In Re: Right To Privacy of A dolescents Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment Abhay S. Oka, J.
FACTUAL ASPECTS
1. Criminal Appeal No.1451 of 2024 has been preferred by the State of West Bengal, being aggrieved by the judgment and order dated 18th October 2023, passed by a Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta. In Suo Motu Writ Petition (C) No.3 of 2023, this Court’s attention was drawn to certain objectionable observations made in the aforesaid judgement. While dealing with the same, this court took note of the systemic failure of the State to protect the victim, resulting in her fate and wellbeing being ultimately tied up with that of the accused. Accordingly, in this judgement, we are dealing with the issue of sentencing of the accused arising out of the criminal appeal and the Suo Motu Writ Petition. We are also dealing with the issue of rehabilitation of the victim and her child.
2. The learned Special Judge appointed under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (for short, ‘the POCSO Act’) convicted the accused for the offences punishable under Section 6 of the POCSO Act and Sections 363 and 366 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, ‘the IPC’). For the offence punishable under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, the accused was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for twenty years and pay a fine of Rs.10,000/-. For the offences punishable under Sections 363 and 366 of the IPC, the accused was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for four years and five years respectively and was also ordered to pay a fine of Rs. 2,000/-and Rs. 5,000/- respectively. Though the learned Special Judge under the POCSO Act came to the conclusion that the accused was guilty of the offences punishable under clause (n) of sub-section (2) and sub-section (3) of Section 376 of the IPC, in view of the sentence imposed for the offence punishable under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, no separate punishment was imposed. The accused preferred Criminal Appeal (DB) 14 of 2023 before the Calcutta High Court against the conviction. The High Court by the Impugned Judgement dated 18th October 2023 purported to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India 220 [2025] 7 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports read with Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, “the CrPC”) to set aside the conviction of the accused for the aforesaid offences.
3. This Court by a detailed judgement dated 20 thAugust 2024, set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and restored the verdict of the learned Special Court to the extent of the conviction of the accused for the offences punishable under clause (n) of sub-section 2 and sub-section (3) of Section 376 of the IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act. This Court confirmed the acquittal of the accused for the offences punishable under Sections 363 and 366 of the IPC. However, the sentencing was postponed for the reasons recorded in the judgment. In paragraph 2 of the said judgment, the basic facts of the case have been mentioned and in paragraph 3, the findings recorded by the High Court have been mentioned. Paragraphs 2 to 5 of the judgment are relevant which read thus:
“2. The victim girl was fourteen years old at the time of the incident. The victim’s mother lodged a First Information Report (FIR) on 29th May 2018. The victim’s mother stated in her complaint that the victim, who was her minor daughter, escaped from her home at 5:30 p.m. on 20 th May 2018 without informing anyone. On inquiry, it was found that the accused enticed her to leave her house. The accused did so with the help of his two sisters. The victim’s mother repeatedly visited the house of the accused and requested him to facilitate the return of her daughter. However, the victim did not come back. A female child was born to the victim. Admittedly, the accused is the biological father of the child. There was a gross delay in the investigation, and the accused was arrested on 19th December 2021.
The chargesheet was filed on 27 th January 2022 against the accused for the offences for which he was convicted. In addition, the accused was charged with the offence punishable under Section 9 of the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006. The prosecution examined seven witnesses. We may note here that as the learned Special Judge under the POCSO Act found that there was no evidence of marriage between the victim and the accused, the charge under Section 9 of the 2006 Act was held as not substantiated.
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 221In Re: Right To Privacy of A dolescents
3. By the impugned judgment, the High Court held that the offences punishable under Sections 363 and 366 of the IPC were not made out, and therefore, the High Court acquitted the accused for the said two offences. Considering the factual scenario that the High Court noticed, it purported to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India read with Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, ‘the Cr. PC’) to set aside the conviction of the accused for the offences punishable under Section 6 of the POCSO Act and sub-sections 2(n) and (3) of Section 376 of the IPC. The High Court noted that the mother of the victim had disowned her and therefore, the victim was continuously residing with the accused along with their minor child.
4. The Suo Motu writ petition was initiated based on the directions issued by the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India for challenging the impugned judgment. The State Government has preferred the criminal appeal to challenge the order of acquittal.
5. Considering the nature of the observations made by the High Court and the findings recorded by it, this Court appointed Ms. Madhavi Divan and Ms. Liz Mathew, the learned senior counsel, as amicus curiae to assist the Court. Both of them have rendered valuable assistance to the Court. Along with them, Ms. Nidhi Khanna, Advocateon-Record, has also assisted the Court. We have heard Mr.Huzefa Ahmadi, the learned senior counsel appearing for the State Government and the learned counsel representing the accused and the victim. The learned senior counsel for the State Government has taken a fair stand. The accused and the victim are on the same page and want to continue their cohabitation.”
4. In paragraphs 15 and 15.1, this Court has dealt with the objectionable portions of the impugned judgment of the High Court. Thereafter, this Court also dealt with the exercise of plenary powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the CrPC to quash the order of conviction. In paragraphs 23 and 23.1, this Court held thus:
222 [2025] 7 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports “23. There are various decisions of this Court holding that the High Court can exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.PC to quash a prosecution on the grounds of settlement or by consent. One such judgment is in the case of Gian Singh v. State of Punjab & Anr., (2012) 10 SCC 303. Paragraph 58 of the said decision reads thus: “58. Where the High Court quashes a criminal proceeding having regard to the fact that the dispute between the offender and the victim has been settled although the offences are not compoundable, it does so as in its opinion, continuation of criminal proceedings will be an exercise in futility and justice in the case demands that the dispute between the parties is put to an end and peace is restored; securing the ends of justice being the ultimate guiding factor. No doubt, crimes are acts which have harmful effect on the public and consist in wrongdoing that seriously endangers and threatens the well-being of the society and it is not safe to leave the crime-doer only because he and the victim have settled the dispute amicably or that the victim has been paid compensation, yet certain crimes have been made compoundable in law, with or without the permission of the court. In respect of serious offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc., or other offences of mental depravity under IPC or offences of moral turpitude under special statutes, like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, the settlement between the offender and the victim can have no legal sanction at all. However, certain offences which overwhelmingly and predominantly bear civil flavour having arisen out of civil, mercantile, commercial, financial, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony, particularly relating to dowry, etc. or the family dispute, where the wrong is basically to the victim and the offender and the victim have settled all disputes between them amicably, irrespective of the fact that such [2025] 7 S.C.R. 223In Re: Right To Privacy of A dolescents offences have not been made compoundable, the High Court may within the framework of its inherent power, quash the criminal proceeding or criminal complaint or FIR if it is satisfied that on the face of such settlement, there is hardly any likelihood of the offender being convicted and by not quashing the criminal proceedings, justice shall be casualty and ends of justice shall be defeated. The above list is illustrative and not exhaustive. Each case will depend on its own facts and no hard-and-fast category can be prescribed.”
(emphasis added)
23.1 Therefore, in view of the settled position of law, in the facts of the case, even if the accused and the victim (who has now attained majority) were to come out with a settlement, the High Court could not have quashed the prosecution.”
4.1 In paragraphs 24 and 25, this Court highlighted the helpless position in which the victim of the offences under the POCSO Act was placed. Paragraphs 24 and 25 read thus:
“24. The situation in which the victim was placed after the commission of the offence needs a bit of elaboration. As noted earlier, the victim left her house on 20th May 2018, and her mother filed a complaint on 29th May 2018. On 1st June 2018, PW-5 (ASI Gopal Chandra Saha) brought the victim from the house of the accused to the police station.
After her medical examination was conducted, she was sent for safe custody at Alor Disha Child Line at Champahati. PW-2, mother of the victim, without giving any particulars stated that she got her daughter back from Narendrapur Sanlaap home. She claimed in the cross-examination that the victim remained in her house for one year and, later on, went back to the house of the accused. She admitted that she never went to the home of the accused, not even to see her grandchild. The victim’s parents completely abandoned her, at least from the year 2019.
224 [2025] 7 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
25. Ms Madhavi Divan, the learned amicus curiae, rightly emphasized that no opportunity was made available to a girl of fourteen or fifteen years of age to make an informed choice to decide whether to stay with the accused. She did not get any support from her parents and the State machinery when she required it the most. As held by us hereafter, the State machinery failed to act according to the law to take care of the victim. The situation in which she was placed at that time was such that she had no opportunity to make an informed choice about her future. She had no option but to seek shelter where it was provided to her i.e. in the house of the accused. In any event, it is doubtful whether she could have made an informed choice at the age of fourteen or fifteen.”
5. From paragraphs 26 to 36, this Court has elaborately dealt with the failure of the State to perform its obligation to take care of the victim of the offence under the POCSO Act who was only fourteen years old. This Court referred to the constitutional obligation of the State. This Court also held that the existing statutes have enough provisions to address this kind of situation. Though, under the existing law, the State could have taken adequate care of the poor victim, it was not done. Therefore, very elaborate conclusions were recorded by referring to specific provisions of the POCSO Act and the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (for short, ‘the JJ Act’). Ultimately, in paragraphs 37 and 38, this Court has noted the effect of the failure of the State, its machinery as well as the collective failure of society at large. Paragraphs 37 and 38 read thus:
“37. It is the responsibility of the State to take care of helpless victims of such heinous offences. Time and again, we have held that the right to live a dignified life is an integral part of the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Article 21 encompasses the right to lead a healthy life. The minor child, who is the victim of the offences under the POCSO Act, is also deprived of the fundamental right to live a dignified and healthy life. The same is the case of the child born to the victim as a result of the offence. All the provisions of the JJ Act [2025] 7 S.C.R. 225In Re: Right To Privacy of A dolescents regarding taking care of such children and rehabilitating them are consistent with Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, immediately after the knowledge of the commission of a heinous offence under the POCSO Act, the State, its agencies and instrumentalities must step in and render all possible aid to the victim children, which will enable them to lead a dignified life. The failure to do so will amount to a violation of the fundamental rights guaranteed to the victim children under Article 21. The police must strictly implement sub-section (6) of Section 19 of the POCSO Act. If that is not done, the victim children are deprived of the benefits of the welfare measures under the JJ Act. Compliance with Section 19(6) is of vital importance. Non-compliance thereof will lead to a violation of Article 21.
38. Unfortunately, in our society, due to whatever reasons, we find that there are cases and cases where the parents of the victims of the offences under the POSCO Act abandon the victims. In such a case, it is the duty of the State to provide shelter, food, clothing, education opportunities, etc., to the victim of the offences as provided in law. Even the child born to such a victim needs to be taken care of in a similar manner by the State. After the victim attains the majority, the State will have to ensure that the victim of the offence can stand on his/her legs and, at least, think of leading a dignified life. That is precisely what Section 46 of the JJ Act provides. Sadly, in the present case, there is a complete failure of the State machinery. Nobody came to rescue the victim of the offence, and thus, for her survival, no option was left to her but to seek shelter with the accused.”
6. Paragraph 40, 40.1 and 41 discuss the issue of rehabilitation of the victim and her child. The operative portion of the judgment in paragraph 44 is relevant, which reads thus:
“44. Hence, we pass the following order:
(a) The impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside and the judgment of the Special Court is restored to the extent of the conviction of the accused for the offences 226 [2025] 7 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports punishable under sub-sections (2)(n) and (3) of Section 376 of the IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act. Accordingly, the accused stands convicted. The acquittal of the accused for the offences punishable under Sections 363 and 366 of the IPC is confirmed. The appeal is partly allowed. The issue regarding sentencing will be considered after receiving the report of the committee in terms of clause
(h) below.
(b) We direct the Government of West Bengal to constitute a committee of three experts, including a clinical psychologist and a social scientist. The State Government may take the assistance of NIMHANS or TISS for constituting the committee. A child welfare officer shall be appointed to assist the committee as its coordinator and secretary;
(c) The committee shall be formed within three weeks from today;
(d) Within one week from the date of formation of the committee, the State Government shall provide all the material particulars/details of the benefits which it is willing to extend to the victim as stated in paragraph 5 of the note submitted on 9th May 2024 by the learned senior counsel appearing for the State;
(e) Thereafter, the committee shall meet the victim of the offences at such a place as it desires to communicate what the State Government is offering to her. The Committee must also inform the victim about the availability of the benefits of the scheme of the Government of India. The duty of the committee shall be to help the victim to make an informed choice whether she wants to continue to remain in the company of the accused and his family or wants to avail of the benefits offered by the State Government. This exercise will naturally require meetings with the victim on multiple occasions. In what manner this task should be performed is left to the committee to decide;
(f) The committee members must perform their duties very carefully and sensitively while ensuring that the victim does not develop a feeling of insecurity. While doing the exercise, [2025] 7 S.C.R. 227In Re: Right To Privacy of A dolescents the committee will endeavour to carefully ascertain the kind of support, if any, the victim and her child are getting from the accused and his family members;
(g) The State Government and its officials shall render all possible facilities and help to the committee members;
(h) The coordinator of the committee shall submit a report in a sealed cover to this Court by 18th October 2024 through the Advocate-on-Record for the State Government. The report can be a preliminary report or a final report. The report should contain the details of the interactions with the victim and the opinion and recommendations of the committee. The committee is free to give its opinion on the action which would be in the best interest of the victim and her child; and
(i) We direct the Registry to forward copies of this judgment to the Secretaries of Law and/or Justice Departments of all the States and Union Territories. The Secretaries shall convene meetings of the Secretaries of the concerned departments and other senior officials. The object of holding such meetings is to ensure that appropriate directions are issued to all concerned to strictly implement the provisions of Section 19(6) of the POCSO Act and the relevant provisions of the JJ Act, which we have elaborated above. The State/Union Territories must create machinery to do so. The State/Union Territories shall also assist the victims in getting the benefits under the scheme of the Government of India and the scheme of NALSA, which we have referred to above. In the meetings, the issue of framing Rules by the States to give effect to the provisions of Section 46 of the JJ Act, shall also be considered. The Secretaries shall forward the compliance reports to the Secretary of the Ministry of Women and Child Development, Government of India, within a period of two months from today. The Secretary of the Ministry of Women and Child Development shall compile the reports and submit an exhaustive report before this Court within three months from today. A copy of this judgment shall also be forwarded to the Secretary to the Ministry of Women and Child Development, Government of India.”
228 [2025] 7 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
7. Broadly, there are three issues which we are considering. The first issue is of sentencing the accused. The second issue is about the rehabilitation of the victim and her child. The third issue is a wider issue about adopting measures for adolescent wellbeing and child protection which goes to the root cause of the problem in our changing society.
8. As far as sentencing is concerned, we cannot deal with the issue without understanding the reports of the Committee appointed by this Court. There are two reports of the Committee: preliminary report and final report. This Court interacted with the members of the Committee and the victim on 3 rd April 2025. The order of this Court dated 3 rd April 2025 reads thus:
“We have interacted with the following members of the Committee of Experts:
(1) Dr. Pekham Basu, Assistant Professor, Centre for Equity and Justice for Children and Families, School of Social Work, Tata Institute of Social Science, Mumbai – Expert Member,
(2) Smt. Jayita Saha, Clinical Psychologist, Pavlov Hospital & COE, CNMCH, Kolkata, Health and Family Welfare Department, Government of West Bengal – Expert Member and
(3) Mr. Sanjeeb Rakshit, District Social Welfare Officer, South 24 Parganas – Member Secretary.
At the outset, we must compliment the role played by the three experts and the assistance they have rendered to the Court and to the learned senior counsel appointed as amicus curiae.
We have heard the victim.
We are not recording in detail what actually transpired, but we are of the view that the victim needs a financial help. After the victim completes her 10th Board Examination, we will have to explore the possibility of whether any vocational training can be given to her or whether parttime employment can be extended to her.
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 229In Re: Right To Privacy of A dolescents On this aspect, we will need the help of the West Bengal State Legal Services Authority. We, therefore, issue notice to the Member Secretary of the West Bengal State Legal Services Authority, returnable on 1st May, 2025. To be listed at 2.00 p.m.
We also request the Member Secretary to interact with the learned senior counsel appointed as amicus curiae and also the learned counsel for the State of West Bengal so that the Member Secretary can be made aware about the nature of help and assistance required from the State Legal Services Authority.
The Registry is directed to forward a copy of this order directly to the Member Secretary of the West Bengal Legal Services Authority.
We request the Member Secretary to remain present before the Court on the returnable date through video conference. The learned senior counsel appearing for the State of West Bengal was present today. We request him to take instructions from the officers of the State in what manner the State can extend the helping hand to the victim.
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