Umri Pooph Pratappur (Upp) Tollways Pvt. Ltd. v. M.P. Road Development Corporation and Another
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 907; [2025] 7 S.C.R. 1768
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice J.B. Pardiwala, Justice R Mahadevan
- Decided
- 30 Jul 2025
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 9920/2025
- Sections
- 7, 2(1), 4, 23, 12, 2, 7(5), 19, 115, 34, 16, 7(1)
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:19 am. Original source ↗
Preview: first 50% of the document.
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1768 : 2025 INSC 907 Umri Pooph Pratappur (UPP) Tollways Pvt. Ltd.
v.
M.P. Road Development Corporation and Another (Civil Appeal No. 9920 of 2025)
30 July 2025 [J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan,* JJ.] Issue for Consideration The core issue in the present matter revolves around determining the appropriate forum for the adjudication of disputes arising out of the Concession Agreement dated 05.01.2012 entered into between the appellant and respondent no.1.
Headnotes† Madhya Pradesh Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983 – s.7 – Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – The appellant and respondent no.1-Madhya Pradesh Road Development Corporation entered into a Concession Agreement for the augmentation of the road – Disputes arose between the parties – The appellant raised claims before the Independent Engineer for amicable resolution and compensation, which were mostly rejected – With no resolution forthcoming, appellant initiated proceedings before the Madhya Pradesh Arbitration Tribunal – Thereafter, the appellant invoked Cl.44.3.1 of the Concession Agreement and approached the International Centre for Alternative Dispute Resolutionrespondent no.2 – Respondent no. 1 raised objections – ICADR by order dated 02.06.2022 appointed arbitrators – On the other side, the Arbitral Tribunal issued notice for preliminary hearing, by order dated 07.06.2022 – Subsequently, the appellant filed an application before Madhya Pradesh Arbitration Tribunal for seeking withdrawal, which was allowed – Aggrieved by the orders dated 02.06.2022 and 07.06.2022 of the ICADR and the Arbitral Tribunal, respondent no.1 filed writ petition which was allowed and orders dated 02.06.2022 and 07.06.2022 were quashed:
* Author [2025] 7 S.C.R. 1769Umri Pooph Pratappur (UPP) Tollways Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. v. M.P. Road Development Corporation and Another Held: The present Concession Agreement pertains to the construction of a State Highway situated entirely within the State and was awarded by respondent no.1, a State-controlled entity, the agreement clearly qualifies as a “works contract” u/s.2(1)(i) of the 1983 Act – Consequently, the dispute arising therefrom falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Madhya Pradesh Arbitration Tribunal – The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 stands excluded by operation of law in such matters – The private arbitration proceedings initiated by the appellant are therefore, non est in law, and the proper forum for adjudication is the Madhya Pradesh Arbitration Tribunal established under the 1983 Act – It is not in dispute that the appellant had initiated Reference Case before the Madhya Pradesh Arbitration Tribunal and had obtained issuance of notice – While the said reference was pending, the appellant simultaneously invoked arbitration under Clause 44.3.1 of the Concession Agreement and initiated private arbitration proceedings before the ICADR (Respondent No. 2) under the 1996 Act – This parallel invocation of remedies is impermissible in law and squarely hit by the doctrine of election and estoppel – A party cannot pursue two mutually inconsistent remedies under different legal regimes arising from the same cause of action – Clause 44.3.1 of the Concession Agreement to the extent it purports to permit private arbitration, cannot override the statutory mandate of the 1983 Act – Accordingly, the attempt of the appellant to invoke Clause 44.3.1 of the Concession Agreement and re-agitate the issue of private arbitration-already settled in Viva Highways and affirmed by this Court-is barred by the doctrine of constructive res judicata and amounts to an abuse of the process of law – Additionally, the appellant’s conduct in withdrawing the reference petition before the Madhya Pradesh Arbitration Tribunal, without seeking liberty to re-agitate the claims, and simultaneously initiating proceedings under the 1996 Act, constitutes forum shopping – This conduct, aimed at circumventing the statutory mechanism and reviving abandoned claims, is tainted with mala fides – In terms of the statutory mandate under Rule 53(3)(b) of 1985 Regulations, once a reference is withdrawn without obtaining liberty to re-agitate the same, the appellant stands precluded from initiating a fresh reference on the same subject matter – This substantive bar also applies to any attempt to pursue the same claims before alternative fora – Nonetheless, considering 1770 [2025] 7 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports the nature of the dispute and in the interests of justice, appellant directed to seek revival of Reference Petition before the Madhya Pradesh Arbitration Tribunal. [Paras 11.9, 11.10, 12, 12.1, 13.1, 14, 16, 17, 17.1] Case Law Cited Federal Bank Ltd. v. Sagar Thomas [2003] Supp. 4 SCR 121 : (2003) 10 SCC 733; Binny Ltd v. Sadasivan [2005] Supp. 2 SCR 421 : (2005) 6 SCC 657; Gangotri Enterprises Ltd v. Madhya Pradesh Road Development Corporation [2018] 4 SCR 260 : (2018) 16 SCC 296; Madhya Pradesh Rural Road Development Corporation Ltd v. L.G. Chaudhary Engineers and Contracts [2012] 2 SCR 162 : (2018) 10 SCC 826; Gayathri Project Ltd v. M.P. Road Development Corporation Ltd. [2018] 4 SCR 260 : 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1136; Booz Allen and Hamilton Inc v. SBI Home Finance Ltd. [2011] 7 SCR 310 : (2011) 5 SCC 532 – relied on.
S.Shobha v. Muthoot Finance Ltd. [2025] 1 SCR 1147 : SLP(C) Nos. 2625-2627 of 2025; Jagmittar Sain Bhagat v. Director, Health Services, Haryana and Others [2013] 8 SCR 77 : (2013) 10 SCC 136; Kanwar Singh Saini v. High Court of Delhi [2011] 15 SCR 972 : (2012) 4 SCC 307; State of Chhattisgarh v. M/s. KMC Construction [2018] 4 SCR 270 : (2018) 10 SCC 839; ARSS Damoh - Hirapur Tolls (P) Ltd. v. M.P. Road Development Corporation, 2018 SCC OnLine SC 3899; Madhya Pradesh Rural Road Development Authority v. Backbone Enterprises Limited [2018] 4 SCR 255 : (2018) 15 SCC 660; Deep Industries Ltd v. Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. [2019] 17 SCR 995 : (2020) 15 SCC 706 – referred to.
Viva Highways Ltd v. Madhya Pradesh Road Development Corporation Ltd., 2017 SCC OnLine MP 1448 – referred to. List of Acts Madhya Pradesh Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983; Constitution of India; Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Civil Procedure Code, 1908; Madhya Pradesh Highways Act, 2004; Arbitration Act, 1940; Limitation Act, 1963; Madhya Pradesh Madhyastham Adhikaran Regulations, 1985.
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1771Umri Pooph Pratappur (UPP) Tollways Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. v. M.P. Road Development Corporation and Another List of Keywords Concession Agreement; Determining the appropriate forum for the adjudication of disputes; Independent Engineer; Amicable resolution and compensation; Withdrawal; State-controlled entity; Works contract; Exclusive jurisdiction; Private arbitration proceedings; Doctrine of election and estoppels; Mutually inconsistent remedies; Same cause of action; Private arbitration; Doctrine of constructive res judicata; Abuse of the process of law; Forum shopping; Liberty to re-agitate; Fresh reference on the same subject matter; Proper forum for adjudication.
Case Arising From CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 9920 of 2025 From the Judgment and Order dated 09.09.2024 of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh Principal Seat at Jabalpur in WP No. 14569 of 2022 Appearances for Parties Advs. for the Appellant:
Siddharth Dave, Sr. Adv., Ms. Sadapurna Mukherjee, Saurabh Kumar, Manvi Sharma, Rajat Mittal.
Advs. for the Respondents:
Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General, Siddharth Sharma, Bhuvan Kapoor, Ms. Rajeshwari Shankar, Ms. Ishika Chauhan. Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment R. Mahadevan, J.
Leave granted.
2. This appeal has been preferred against the final judgment and order dated 09.09.2024 passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur 1 in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 14569 of 2022 1 Hereinafter referred to as “the High Court”
1772 [2025] 7 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports filed by Respondent No. 1 – Madhya Pradesh Road Development Corporation. By the impugned judgment, the High Court allowed the writ petition and quashed the orders dated 02.06.2022 and 07.06.2022 passed by the International Centre for Alternative Dispute Resolution 2 – Respondent No.2 and the Arbitral Tribunal, respectively. For ease of reference, the orders impugned in the writ petition, are extracted below:
Order dated 02.06.2022 passed by the ICADR “… The ICADR has made thorough examination of all the points of the Claimant and Respondent including the aforesaid nine attachments with email dated 24.05.2022 and due deliberation and consideration of all the points raised by both the Claimant and Respondent particularly Arbitration Agreement, the judgement in Writ Petition no. 11783/2021 dt.03.09.2021 and Orders sheets of Madhyastham Adhikaran at Bhopal and it has come to the following conclusions:
1. ICADR is the proper forum for the arbitration of disputes arising out of execution of Concession Agreement dated 05.01.2012 between M/s. Umri Pooph Pratappur Tollway Private Limited and Madhya Pradesh Road Development Corporation Ltd. and the same can be ascertained from Arbitration Agreement incorporated in Article 44.3.1 and 44.3.2.
2. The Judgement in Writ Petition nо. 11783/2021 dt.03.09.2021 gives clear finding that ICADR is the proper forum for Arbitration of dispute arising from the Concession agreement dated 05.01.2012.
3. In view of and from the orders sheets of Madhyastham Adhikaran at Bhopal, it is ascertained that the Madhyastham Adhikaran at Bhopal has not entered upon reference of the 2 For short, “ICADR”
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1773Umri Pooph Pratappur (UPP) Tollways Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. v. M.P. Road Development Corporation and Another arbitration and therefore not in seisin of the aforementioned arbitrable disputes.
Therefore, in view of Rule 5(2) of the ICADR Arbitration Rules, 1996, inter alia, provides that where a party fails to appoint an arbitrator within 30 days from the receipt of a request to do so from the other party, the appointment shall be made upon request of the party, by ICADR. However, in view of Reply of MPRDCL vide letter No. 2941/83/BOT/MPRDC Bhopal dated 13.05.2022 to Arbitration Notice dated 06.05.2022 of the Claimant whereby the Respondent has declined to nominate their Arbitrator, hence, ICADR need not wait for expiry of 30 days.
Since the Respondent has failed to appoint their arbitrator in terms of clause 44.3.1 of the Agreement, now, therefore, I, R.K. Rathore, Secretary General of the International Centre for Alternative Dispute Resolution (ICADR), in exercise of the powers vested in me under Rule 5(2) read with Rule 35(3) of ICADR Arbitration Rules, 1996, do hereby appoint the following arbitrator on the behalf of Respondent:
Shri Jagdish Prasad Shukla, IRSE (Retd.)
Former Principal Engineer/Northern Railway Chief Managing Director/ Rail Vikas Nigam Ltd. & Member Administration/Central Administrative Tribunal Add: 501, Ridgewood, Omaxe Forest Sector-92, Noida.
Cell No. 9958998686 E-mail: jpshukla46@gmail.com The two appointed arbitrators will select the third Arbitrator, i.e. Presiding Arbitrator, as provided in clause 44.3.2 of the above mentioned Agreement.”
1774 [2025] 7 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Order dated 07.06.2022 passed by the Arbitral Tribunal “… Notice for preliminary hearing 1) The Concessionaire/ Claimant has appointed Shri Kamlesh Kumar as Arbitrator on their behalf. The ICADR on behalf of Madhya Pradesh Road Development Corporation Limited has nominated Shri J. P. Shukla as Arbitrator for MPRDC Ltd.
2) The above said nominee Arbitrators of the parties by mutual consent have appointed me the Presiding Arbitrator to adjudicate the matter in dispute relating to the abovementioned subject vide email date 05.06.2022. I have accepted to act as Presiding Arbitrator in the above referred dispute on 05.06.2022 and the same was communicated to all concerned by email.
3) In pursuance there off, the parties to the dispute are hereby notified that Preliminary hearing of the Arbitral Tribunal will be held on 18.06.2022 (11.00 AM) through video conferencing Wherein timeline for submission of the Statement of Claims (SOC) and Statement of Defense (SOD) and the procedure for conducting the Arbitration will be discussed and decided. The claimant shall arrange to send meeting link to all concerned for the video conferencing well in advance.
4) The Parties to dispute may kindly note that I have received the proposal of my appointment as Presiding Arbitrator on 05.06.2022 and on same day i.e., on 05.06.2022 accepted to act as Presiding Arbitrator. Therefore, the period of 6 months for filing the statement of claims (SOC) and statement of defense (SOD) as specified in Sub Section 4 of Section 23 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Amendment 2019) shall be reckoned from 05.06.2022 and such period end on 04.12.2022.
5) In the meantime, the Respondent is directed to file a certified copy of Agreement between the Respondent [2025] 7 S.C.R. 1775Umri Pooph Pratappur (UPP) Tollways Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. v. M.P. Road Development Corporation and Another and Claimant to all the Tribunal Members with a copy to the Claimant.
6) My Disclosure under section 12(1 b) as schedule VI of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 (Amendment 2019) is enclosed for reference of parties to the dispute. ….”
3. The brief facts necessary for adjudication of the present appeal are as follows:
3.1. The appellant and Respondent No.1 entered into a Concession Agreement dated 05.01.2012 for the development of the Umari – Pooph – Pratappur Road on a Build, Operate and Transfer (BOT – Toll + Annuity) basis. The total cost of the project was Rs. 73.68 crores for the augmentation of the existing road from T-Junction of SH-45 at Umari Village to 43.775 km on the Umri – Pooph – Pratappur section of Major District Road (MDR) in the State of Madhya Pradesh, as stipulated in Clause 48.1 of the Concession Agreement. The implementation period was fixed at 24 months from the appointed date.
3.2. In accordance with Article 9.1.1 and Schedule F of the Concession Agreement, the appellant furnished a performance security of Rs. 3.68 crores in the form of an irrevocable and unconditional bank guarantee, vide Bank Guarantee No. 00494121PG000028 dated 03.07.2012 issued by Allahabad Bank. An Escrow Agreement was also executed on 20.06.2012 among the appellant, Respondent No.1 and Allahabad Bank.
3.3. M/s. S&P Infrastructure Developers Private Limited and M/s. BLA Infrastructure Private Limited, by Deeds of Guarantee dated 20.06.2012 and 15.05.2012 respectively, guaranteed the performance of the appellant under the Common Loan Agreement. The appellant alleged that Respondent No.1 arbitrarily fixed the appointed date as 20.06.2012. Thereafter, the appellant submitted the project completion schedule, work programme, and designs and drawings for review by the Divisional Manager, who had been temporarily appointed as the Independent Engineer. Upon acceptance, the appellant 1776 [2025] 7 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports mobilized men, materials, and machinery at the site and commenced work.
3.4. Vide Letter No. VO/TL/2012/Gen/02 dated 27.06.2012, the appellant was informed that M/s. Vaidya Organisation had been appointed as the Independent Engineer with effect from 01.06.2012. The Independent Engineer did not approve the designs and drawings earlier submitted and directed the appellant not to proceed with construction until the already executed work was reviewed and approved. The appellant was further directed to submit revised designs and drawings. Despite objections, revised submissions were made by the appellant on 11.07.2012, which were eventually approved. Consequently, the appellant was compelled to dismantle and re-execute substantial portions of the work, resulting in an escalation of the total project cost to Rs. 99.80 crores.
3.5. Subsequent delays and disruptions allegedly occurred due to breaches of contractual obligations by Respondent No.
1. Consequently, the appellant raised 19 claims before the Independent Engineer invoking Article 44.2 of the Concession Agreement for amicable resolution and compensation. These claims were also submitted to the Secretary, PWD. While some claims were accepted during conciliation proceedings, most were rejected, and no payments were released to the appellant.
3.6. With no resolution forthcoming, the appellant initiated proceedings before the Madhya Pradesh Arbitration Tribunal by filing Reference Case No. 61 of 2018. Notice in the said reference was issued on 13.08.2018.
3.7. Thereafter, the appellant invoked Clause 44.3.1 of the Concession Agreement and approached the ICADR.
Respondent No. 1 raised objections under Section 7 of the Madhya Pradesh Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983 3 . Nevertheless, the ICADR, by order dated 02.06.2022, proceeded to appoint arbitrators to adjudicate the disputes. The Arbitral Tribunal issued a notice for preliminary hearing, by order dated 07.06.2022.
3 For short, “the 1983 Act”
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1777Umri Pooph Pratappur (UPP) Tollways Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. v. M.P. Road Development Corporation and Another
3.8. Subsequently, on 24.06.2022, the appellant filed an application before the Madhya Pradesh Arbitration Tribunal, seeking withdrawal of Reference Case No.61 of 2018.
3.9. Aggrieved by the orders dated 02.06.2022 and 07.06.2022 passed by the ICADR and the Arbitral Tribunal, respectively, Respondent No.1 filed Writ Petition No.14569 of 2022 before the High Court. During the pendency of the writ petition, the Madhya Pradesh Arbitration Tribunal allowed the appellant’s withdrawal application by order dated 08.02.2023.
3.10. Ultimately, by judgment dated 09.09.2024, the High Court allowed the writ petition and quashed the orders dated 02.06.2022 and 07.06.2022. Aggrieved thereby, the appellant has preferred the present appeal before this Court.
4. The learned Senior Counsel for the appellant submitted that the writ petition filed by Respondent No. 1 before the High Court was not maintainable as the appellant is a private company and does not function as an instrumentality of the State. Reliance was placed on the judgment of this Court in S.Shobha v. Muthoot Finance Ltd 4, wherein it was held that a writ petition is maintainable only against a body that qualifies as ‘State’ under Article 12 of the Constitution. Therefore, the High Court erred in entertaining the writ petition and passing the impugned order against the appellant.
4.1. Reference was also made to the decisions of this Court in Jagmittar Sain Bhagat v. Director, Health Services, Haryana and others5 and Kanwar Singh Saini v. High Court of Delhi6 , to submit that the issue of maintainability of a writ petition can be raised at any stage of the proceedings, and must be determined at the threshold.
4.2. The learned Senior Counsel submitted that the arbitration proceedings were initiated by the appellant under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 7 , strictly in accordance with 4 SPL(C) Nos. 2625-2627 of 2025
5 (2013) 10 SCC 136
6 (2012) 4 SCC 307
7 For short, “the 1996 Act”
1778 [2025] 7 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Clause 44.3.1 of the Concession Agreement dated 05.01.2012, and not as an alternative or secondary remedy. Both parties, being fully aware of the existence of the Madhya Pradesh Arbitration Tribunal constituted under the 1983 Act, had mutually agreed to resolve disputes through arbitration governed by the 1996 Act and the ICADR Rules. Accordingly, the invocation of the 1996 Act was not barred by the 1983 Act.
4.3. It was further emphasized that if the parties had intended to refer disputes to the Tribunal under the 1983 Act, the agreement would have specifically provided for such reference. Whereas, Clause 44.3.1 of the Concession Agreement mandates arbitration under the aegis of ICADR, New Delhi. Therefore, the jurisdiction of the Madhya Pradesh Arbitration Tribunal cannot override this binding contractual mechanism.
4.4. The learned Senior Counsel placed reliance on paragraph 79 of the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Viva Highways Ltd v. Madhya Pradesh Road Development Corporation Ltd 8, which held that the Madhya Pradesh Arbitration Tribunal under the 1983 Act has jurisdiction only over “ascertained” claims. It also acknowledged that “ascertained” claims have a specific connotation. In the present case, the appellant’s claims are, at best, “ascertainable”, and therefore, outside the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. Even assuming, without conceding, that the claims could be considered “ascertained”, it was incumbent upon the High Court or Tribunal to undertake an inquiry to classify the nature of the claims. However, no such determination was carried out in the present case.
4.5. It was contended that the Doctrine of Election has no application to the present case. Firstly, the appellant invoked arbitration proceedings under the Concession Agreement and did not approach the Madhya Pradesh Arbitration Tribunal under the 1983 Act on its own volition. Secondly, arbitration was not resorted to as an alternative, but as a binding and mutually agreed remedy under the contract.
8 2017 SCC OnLine MP 1448 [2025] 7 S.C.R. 1779Umri Pooph Pratappur (UPP) Tollways Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. v. M.P. Road Development Corporation and Another
4.6. It was further submitted that the 1996 Act is a self-contained and exhaustive code, based on the UNCITRAL Model Law, enacted with the objective of promoting speed, efficiency, and uniformity in arbitral proceedings. Therefore, allowing statutory tribunals such as the one under the 1983 Act to override the framework of the 1996 Act would defeat the legislative intent and undermines India’s aspiration to be country that can provide early dispute settlement mechanism for commercial disputes through promotion of arbitration.
4.7. It was also submitted that the Madhya Pradesh Arbitration Tribunal constituted under the 1983 Act functions more akin to a civil Court than an Arbitral Tribunal. Section 2(d) restricts its jurisdiction to “ascertained” claims. Section 7(5) permits summary dismissal, similar to Order 37 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 9 . Section 19 limits the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court to narrow grounds under Section 115 of the CPC, thereby excluding recourse under Section 34 of the 1996 Act. Section 16 mandates delivery of an award within four months of notice. However, in the present case, even after three and a half years, no effective progress has been made, highlighting the Tribunal’s inefficacy.
4.8. Additionally, it was submitted that although the appellant had initially invoked the jurisdiction of the Tribunal under the 1983 Act, it was compelled to withdraw the reference due to an inordinate delay of over four years, and because the claims were only “ascertainable” and not “ascertained”. Therefore, the ratio in Madhya Pradesh Rural Road Development Corporation Ltd v. L.G. Chaudhary Engineers and Contracts10 is not applicable to the present case.
4.9. Finally, it was submitted that the appellant’s claims, aggregating to Rs.280.1566 crores pertain to expenses incurred, damages under Clauses 4.2 and 10.3.4 of the Concession Agreement, and other project related costs. The quashing of the arbitration 9 For short, “the CPC”
10 (2018) 10 SCC 826
1780 [2025] 7 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports proceedings by the High Court without directing adjudication either under the 1996 Act or the 1983 Act, has left the appellant without any effective legal remedy.
4.10. In light of the above submissions and case laws, the learned Senior Counsel prayed that this appeal be allowed and the impugned order be set aside.
5. Per contra, the learned Solicitor General of India appearing for Respondent No.1 submitted that there is no dispute between the parties regarding the nature of the Concession Agreement dated 05.01.2012 – it constitutes a works contract. The Government of Madhya Pradesh enacted the Madhya Pradesh Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983, which provides for the establishment of the Madhya Pradesh Arbitration Tribunal to adjudicate disputes arising out of ‘works contracts’, where the State Government or a State Public Undertaking is a party. Section 2(1)(d) of the 1983 Act defines a “dispute” as a claim for ascertained or ascertainable money valued at Rs. 50,000 or more relating to differences arising from the execution or non-execution of a works contract.
5.1. It was further submitted that Respondent No.1 is a wholly owned entity of the State of Madhya Pradesh, and that any Concession Agreement executed by it falls within the ambit of a ‘works contract’ under Section 2(1)(i) of the 1983 Act. Section 7(1) provides for mandatory reference of such disputes to the Madhya Pradesh Arbitration Tribunal, notwithstanding any arbitration clause in the agreement. Section 20 bars the jurisdiction of civil Courts in such matters, thereby establishing the Tribunal as the exclusive forum. Furthermore, Section 2(4) of the 1996 Act, preserves the operation of special statutory forums like the Madhya Pradesh Arbitration Tribunal, reinforcing this exclusivity.
5.2. Reliance was placed on the judgment of a three-judge bench of this Court in Madhya Pradesh Rural Road Development Authority v. L. G. Chaudhary Engineers and Contractors (supra), which upheld the exclusive jurisdiction of the Madhya Pradesh Arbitration Tribunal for disputes arising out of works contracts. Similarly, in Viva Highways Ltd. (supra), a Full Bench [2025] 7 S.C.R. 1781Umri Pooph Pratappur (UPP) Tollways Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. v. M.P. Road Development Corporation and Another of the Madhya Pradesh High Court confirmed the Tribunal’s exclusive jurisdiction, and the Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.17070/2017 filed against the same was dismissed by this Court on 18.04.2018.
5.3. The learned Solicitor General also referred to the decisions in State of Chhattisgarh v. M/s. KMC Construction11 , ARSS Damoh - Hirapur Tolls (P) Ltd. v. M.P. Road Development Corporation12 , and Madhya Pradesh Rural Road Development Authority v. Backbone Enterprises Limited13 , where this Court reiterated that disputes arising out of a works contract, must be adjudicated exclusively by the Madhya Pradesh Arbitration Tribunal.
5.4. Accordingly, the learned Solicitor General contended that since the Concession Agreement is a “works contract” and Respondent No. 1 is a State-owned corporation, any dispute arising therefrom falls squarely within the Tribunal’s exclusive jurisdiction. The appointment of a private arbitral tribunal under the aegis of ICADR is in direct contravention of the statutory framework, and the High Court rightly intervened to quash the arbitration proceedings under the 1996 Act.
5.5. It was further submitted that the appellant had raised inflated claims amounting to Rs.280.1566 crores before the Madhya Pradesh Arbitration Tribunal in Reference Case No. 61 of 2018, including claims for loss of profits and damages. These claims were ex facie time-barred under Section 7-B the 1983 Act, which requires claims to be filed within one year from the date of communication of the decision of the final authority. The appellant, having failed to comply with the limitation, sought to circumvent the statutory bar by initiating private arbitration under the 1996 Act, reflecting forum shopping and lack of bona fides.
5.6. The learned Solicitor General pointed out that Reference Case No. 61 of 2018 was admitted on 06.09.2021, and Respondent
11 (2018) 10 SCC 839
12 2018 SCC OnLine SC 3899
13 (2018) 15 SCC 660
1782 [2025] 7 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports No.1 filed its written statement on 05.11.2021, raising limitation as a preliminary objection. Thereafter, the appellant invoked Clause 44.3.1 of the Concession Agreement and issued a notice under Section 21 of the 1996 Act. Simultaneously, the appellant filed an application to withdraw the reference before the Tribunal on 24.06.2022, which was allowed on 08.02.2023.
5.7. According to the learned Solicitor General, as per Rule 53(3)(b) of the Madhya Pradesh Madhyastham Adhikaran Regulations, 1985, a party that withdraws a reference without the permission contemplated under Rule 53(2) is barred from instituting a fresh reference on the same subject matter. Since the appellant withdrew its claim without such leave, it is now barred from re-agitating the same claims before any forum, including private arbitration. The conduct of the appellant, therefore, amounts to an impermissible attempt to sidestep statutory restrictions.
5.8. Reference was made to Deep Industries Ltd v. Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd14 , where this Court upheld the High Court’s power to exercise writ jurisdiction and quash arbitration proceedings coram non judice.
5.9. It was argued that contractual terms cannot override statutory mandates. If a statute designates a specific forum for adjudication, parties cannot, by mutual agreement, confer jurisdiction on an alternate forum. Clause 44.3.1 of the Concession Agreement, to the extent that it provides for private arbitration, is void ab initio in the context of a works contract governed by the 1983 Act. In support, reliance was placed on Booz Allen and Hamilton Inc v. SBI Home Finance Ltd15 .
5.10. It was further submitted that the term ‘ascertained money’ under Section 2(1)(d) includes consequential reliefs. Moreover, the amendment to the 1983 Act post – Viva Highways, includes unascertained money claims within the definition of “dispute”.
14 (2020) 15 SCC 706
15 (2011) 5 SCC 532
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1783Umri Pooph Pratappur (UPP) Tollways Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. v. M.P. Road Development Corporation and Another Thus, the Tribunal has jurisdiction even over claims where quantification may occur during adjudication.
5.11. The learned Solicitor General also submitted that the appellant’s claims totalling Rs. 280.1566 crores were clearly quantified and sought money relief alone. No declaratory or indeterminate relief was prayed for. The appellant’s conduct in attempting to re-agitate these very claims before the ICADR Tribunal – despite having withdrawn the earlier reference under Rule 53(3)(b) – reveals its intent to circumvent the statutory bar. Accordingly, the Madhya Pradesh Arbitration Tribunal under the 1983 Act remained the appropriate and exclusive forum, and the High Court rightly quashed the arbitration proceedings initiated under the 1996 Act.
5.12. It was further submitted that by withdrawing the reference without seeking liberty under Rule 53(2), the appellant has irrevocably abandoned its claims. The consequence under Rule 53(3)(b) is substantive and bars re-litigation of the same subject matter. This bar applies irrespective of whether arbitration is under the 1983 Act or under the 1996 Act. Furthermore, even dehors the special limitation under the 1983 Act, the appellant’s claims are now time-barred under the general law of limitation, as per Section 43 of the 1996 Act. The disputes arose between 2013 and 2015, and the invocation of arbitration in 2022 and thereafter in 2025 is clearly beyond the prescribed three-year limitation.
5.13. However, it was submitted that Respondent No.1 would have no objection, if the appellant were to file an application for recall of the withdrawal order and seek restoration of the Reference Petition before the Madhya Pradesh Arbitration Tribunal, which may be directed to be considered in accordance with law.
6. We have heard the learned Senior Counsel appearing for both sides and also perused the materials available on record.
7. The core issue in the present matter revolves around determining the appropriate forum for the adjudication of disputes arising out of the Concession Agreement dated 05.01.2012 entered into between the appellant and Respondent No.1.
1784 [2025] 7 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
8. At the outset, the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant submitted that the writ petition filed by Respondent No.1 was not maintainable against the appellant as it was directed against a private party. It is well settled that the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution is not confined to individuals seeking enforcement of fundamental rights. Even juristic persons, including State Corporations, are entitled to invoke the writ jurisdiction for enforcement of legal rights. However, when a State Corporation seeks relief against a private party, the maintainability of the writ petition must satisfy certain threshold requirements, namely, that the dispute involves a public law element rather than being confined to the realm of private contractual obligations, and that the private party is performing a public duty or is subject to a statutory obligation in relation to the State entity.
8.1. In the present case, Respondent No.1 is a State - owned entity and the project in question pertains to the development of Umri – Pooph – Pratappur Road under a Concession Agreement on a BOT (Toll + Annuity) basis. Although the dispute emanates from a works contract governed by the said agreement, the writ petition was not filed for enforcement of any contractual obligation. Rather, it was filed to challenge the invocation of arbitration by the appellant under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, despite the existence of a statutory remedy before the Madhya Pradesh Arbitration Tribunal constituted under the Madhya Pradesh Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983. The issue, therefore, pertained to the availability and exclusivity of a statutory dispute resolution mechanism, and not merely to the adjudication of a claim on merits arising out of a private contractual dispute.
8.2. In this context, reference was made to the decision in Federal Bank Ltd. v. Sagar Thomas 16, wherein, this Court provided a classification of entities against whom a writ petition may be maintainable. The following paragraph is pertinent: “18. From the decisions referred to above, the position that emerges is that a writ petition under Article 226
16 (2003) 10 SCC 733
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1785Umri Pooph Pratappur (UPP) Tollways Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. v. M.P. Road Development Corporation and Another of the Constitution of India may be maintainable against (i)the State (Government); (ii)an authority; (iii) a statutory body; (iv)an instrumentality or agency of the State; (v)a company which is financed and owned by the State; (vi)a private body run substantially on State funding; (vii)a private body discharging public duty or positive obligation of public nature; and (viii)a person or a body under liability to discharge any function under any statute, to compel it to perform such a statutory function.”
8.3. This Court in Binny Ltd v. Sadasivan17, noted the distinction between public and private functions; and clarified the scope of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 in the context of private contractual disputes involving entities that may be performing public functions. The relevant paragraphs are extracted below for ready reference:
“11……. It is difficult to draw a line between public functions and private functions when they are being discharged by a purely private authority. A body is performing a “public function” when it seeks to achieve some collective benefit for the public or a section of the public and is accepted by the public or that section of the public as having authority to do so. Bodies therefore exercise public functions when they intervene or participate in social or economic affairs in the public interest.”
“29. Thus, it can be seen that a writ of mandamus or the remedy under Article 226 is pre-eminently a public law remedy and is not generally available as a remedy against private wrongs. It is used for enforcement of various rights of the public or to compel the public/statutory authorities to discharge their duties and to act within their bounds. It may be used to do justice when there is
17 (2005) 6 SCC 657
1786 [2025] 7 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports wrongful exercise of power or a refusal to perform duties. This writ is admirably equipped to serve as a judicial control over administrative actions.
This writ could also be issued against any private body or person, especially in view of the words used in Article 226 of the Constitution. However, the scope of mandamus is limited to enforcement of public duty. The scope of mandamus is determined by the nature of the duty to be enforced, rather than the identity of the authority against whom it is sought. If the private body is discharging a public function and the denial of any right is in connection with the public duty imposed on such body, the public law remedy can be enforced.
The duty cast on the public body may be either statutory or otherwise and the source of such power is immaterial, but, nevertheless, there must be the public law element in such action.
Sometimes, it is difficult to distinguish between public law and private law remedies. According to Halsbury’s Laws of England, 3rd Edn., Vol. 30, p.682, “1317. A public authority is a body, not necessarily a county council, municipal corporation or other local authority which has public statutory duties to perform and which perform the duties and carries out its transactions for the benefit of the public and not for private profit.”
There cannot be any general definition of public authority or public action. The facts of each case decide the point.”
…..
Applying these principles, it can very well be said that a writ of mandamus can be issued against a private body which is not a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution and such body is amenable to the jurisdiction under Article of the [2025] 7 S.C.R. 1787Umri Pooph Pratappur (UPP) Tollways Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. v. M.P. Road Development Corporation and Another Constitution and the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution can exercise judicial review of the action challenged by a party. But there must be a public law element and it cannot be exercised to enforce purely private contracts entered into between the parties.”
Continue reading
Sign in and become a member to continue reading this judgment and every other document in the library.
Members read the full text, download where permitted, and keep notes and bookmarks.