M/S Rimjhim Ispat Limited and Others v. Union of India & Another
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 901; [2025] 7 S.C.R. 1744
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Bhushan Ramkrishna Gavai, Justice Cji and Augustine George Masih, Justice * J.]
- Decided
- 24 Jul 2025
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 268/2017
- Sections
- 9, 11AC, 482, 245(2), 245(1), 8
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[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1744 : 2025 INSC 901 M/s Rimjhim Ispat Limited and Others v.
Union of India & Another (Criminal Appeal No. 268 of 2017)
24 July 2025 [B.R. Gavai, CJI and Augustine George Masih,* J.] Issue for Consideration Matter pertains to the legality of having parallel and continuation of adjudication proceedings and criminal proceedings against the appellants.
Headnotes† Central Excise Act, 1944 – ss.9, 9AA – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – ss.245(2), 482 – Continuation of parallel adjudication proceedings and criminal proceedings – Legality – Criminal proceedings initiated against the appellants u/ss.9 and 9AA of the 1944 Act – Discharge application by the appellants on the ground that quashing of the departmental proceedings initiated by the respondentdepartment against the appellant by the High Court in the Writ, on the similar grounds, the criminal proceedings are not sustainable against the appellants – Dismissed by the trial court holding that adjudication and prosecution were independent processes and that the appellants had not yet been absolved of the underlying liabilities in the departmental proceedings – Revision thereagainst dismissed by the High Court – Interference with:
Held: No bar on parallel proceedings, with one being by the Department and the other being criminal in nature, under the 1944 Act – Direction for de novo proceedings on technical or procedural grounds cannot be assumed to be in equivalence to having been set-aside on merits, when it was specifically mentioned that the merits have not been considered – Plea of the appellant that nonexistent Order dated 31.03.2011 was set aside, even assuming it to be so, it is clear from the materials on record that investigation * Author [2025] 7 S.C.R. 1745M/s Rimjhim Ispat Limited and Others v. Union of India & Another and the complaint are still in sustenance against the appellants – Contents of the complaint reveal that no reliance placed on the now-set aside Order dated 31.03.2011 rather it was only referred as an addendum – Irregularities which came to light on search and the contents of the investigation report, are sufficient to observe and opine prima facie on the existence of allegations against the appellants, at the time of the consideration made by the trial court justifying the passing of the summoning order – Even the contention on the conditional stay of the subsequent Order passed by the Commissioner of Central Excise, by the High Court does not come to the assistance of the appellants – Furthermore, it cannot be said that the allegations for the purpose of criminal complaint, were rendered “groundless” – Proceedings by the respondent-Department were passed on merits and not on technical foundation – Contentions raised by the appellants on jurisprudence of discharge misconceived and outside the scope of adjudication – Contents of the complaint prima facie makes out an offence under the statute for which it had been preferred – Having perused the alleged conduct and the orders passed by the concerned authorities and the courts below, the authorities relied upon by the appellants are unable to substantiate their claim – Impugned judgment passed by the High Court does not call for interference. [Paras 28-36] Case Law Cited Radheshyam Kejriwal v. State of West Bengal and Another [2011] 4 SCR 889 : (2011) 3 SCC 581; Air Customs Officer IGI, New Delhi v. Pramod Kumar Dhamija [2016] 2 SCR 561 : (2016) 4 SCC 153 – relied on.
Ajoy Kumar Ghose v. State of Jharkhand and Another [2009] 4 SCR 515 : (2009) 14 SCC 115; State of Tamil Nadu v. R. Soundirarasu and Others [2022] 7 SCR 630 : (2023) 6 SCC 768; Ram Prakash Chadha v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2024) 10 SCC 651; A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak and Another [1988] Supp. 1 SCR 1 : (1988) 2 SCC 602; Videocon Industries Limited and Another v. State of Maharashtra and Others [2016] 2 SCR 741 : (2016) 12 SCC 315; Vishnu Kumar Shukla and Another v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another [2023] 13 SCR 1071 : (2023) 15 SCC 502; State of Tamil Nadu v. N. Suresh Rajan and Others [2014] 1 SCR 135 : (2014) 11 SCC 709 – referred to.
1746 [2025] 7 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports List of Acts Central Excise Act, 1944; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Foreign Exchange Regulations Act, 1973.
List of Keywords Continuation of parallel adjudication proceedings and criminal proceedings; Discharge application; Quashing of the departmental proceedings; Absolved of the liabilities in the departmental proceedings; Bar on parallel proceedings; De novo proceedings on technical or procedural grounds; Irregularities; Investigation report; Conditional stay of the subsequent Order.
Case Arising From CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
268 of 2017 From the Judgment and Order dated 05.02.2016 of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in CRLR No. 4581 of 2015 Appearances for Parties Advs. for the Appellants:
Jaideep Gupta, Sr.Adv., Syed Shahid Hussain Rizvi, Zeeshan Rizvi. Advs. for the Respondents:
S. Dwarakanath, A.S.G., Rupesh Kumar, Sr. Adv., Gurmeet Singh Makker, Adwaitya Awasthi, Suyash Pandey, Ms. Prerna Dhal, Rajat Vaishnw, Prabhakar Yadav, S. Vijaya Adithya, Ankit Goel, Vikas Bansal.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment Augustine George Masih, J.
1. The present Criminal Appeal is moved against concurrent findings of dismissal of discharge application by the Special Chief Judicial Magistrate at Kanpur Nagar, Uttar Pradesh (hereinafter, “Trial Court”) and the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad (hereinafter, “High Court”) as moved by M/s Rimjhim Ispat Limited, M/s Juhi [2025] 7 S.C.R. 1747M/s Rimjhim Ispat Limited and Others v. Union of India & Another Alloys Limited, and Shri Yogesh Aggarwal (hereinafter, “Appellants”) in the criminal proceedings that were initiated against it under Section 9 and 9AA of the Central Excise Act, 1944 (hereinafter, “CEA 1944”).
2. Against the Judgment dated 05.02.2016 passed by the High Court (hereinafter, “Impugned Judgment”), the strength of the argument for discharge application, as raised by the Appellants has primarily been the quashing of departmental proceedings initiated by the Respondent No.2 herein (hereinafter, “Respondent-Department”) against the Appellant by the High Court in Writ Tax No.771 of 2015 on similar grounds, the criminal proceedings are, not sustainable against the Appellants.
3. The factual matrix, as selectively presented by the Appellants, reveals that on 22.11.2007, a search was conducted at the premises, offices and factories, of Appellant No.1, unearthing serious irregularities that culminated in the initiation of proceedings via two separate Show Cause Notices (hereinafter, “SCNs”). The first, dated 16.05.2008 (hereinafter, “First SCN”), alleged clandestine manufacture and illicit removal of excisable goods. The second, dated 06.03.2009 (hereinafter, “Second SCN”), attributed direct and vicarious liability to the Director(s) of Appellant No.1 (specifically, Appellant No.3) and M/s Juhi Alloys Limited, being Appellant No.2 herein, for such unlawful removal of excisable goods during the Financial Year 2006-07, along with evasion of excise duty, interest, and penal consequences.
4. While the proceedings under the First SCN were dropped by the Additional Commissioner of Central Excise at Kanpur, the seized goods were released vide Order dated 14.07.2009. The said decision was subsequently affirmed by the Commissioner (Appeals) on 18.01.2010, and this outcome appears to have emboldened the Appellants, who overlooked the serious and distinct liabilities arising under the Second SCN.
5. In relation to the Second SCN, the Commissioner of Central Excise at Kanpur, vide Order dated 31.03.2011, upheld a substantial demand amounting to INR 6,68,94,028/- (Rupees Six Crores Sixty- Eight Lakhs Ninety-Four Thousand and Twenty-Eight only) along with interest against Appellants No.1 and 2, and further imposed a 1748 [2025] 7 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports penalty of INR 25,00,000/- (Rupees Twenty-Five Lakhs only) upon Appellant No. 03 under Section 11AC of the CEA 1944, indicative of the gravity of their violations.
6. The Appellants sought relief before the Customs Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal at New Delhi (hereinafter, “CESTAT”), which, while setting aside the said order on procedural grounds vide Order dated 25.02.2013, rather than addressing the merits of the findings, remanded the matter for de novo consideration, inter alia, observing that joint confirmation of duty against separate legal entities was impermissible, and liability was required to be assessed individually.
7. Exploiting the CESTAT’s procedural indulgence, the Appellants then proceeded to contest the initiation of criminal proceedings by the Respondent-Department. These proceedings stemmed from the Sanction Order dated 03.05.2013 by Directorate General of Central Intelligence (hereinafter, “DGCEI”) for prosecuting the Appellants under Sections 9 and 9AA of the CEA 1944, a sanction that was said to be based on the Commissioner’s findings dated 31.03.2011, which the Appellants allege was relied upon through suppression of the CESTAT’s remand order by the very same Commissioner.
8. An inquiry letter dated 07.10.2013 was issued by the concerned Assistant Commissioner seeking clarification regarding the validity of the Sanction Order dated 03.05.2013, particularly given that it was premised on a now-set-aside adjudication order. Nevertheless, the Commissioner reiterated his direction to proceed with prosecution, persisting in his stand despite the procedural setback.
9. Consequently, Complaint Case No. 841 of 2014 was instituted before the Trial Court under Sections 9 and 9AA of the CEA 1944 (hereinafter, “Complaint”), and summons were issued against the Appellants on 02.05.2014, signalling the commencement of criminal proceedings based on the evidence then available.
10. In response, the Appellants sought to stall the criminal trial by invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter, “CrPC 1973”), through Criminal Misc. 482 Application No. 31300 of 2014. The High Court, while granting interim protection, refused to quash the proceedings [2025] 7 S.C.R. 1749M/s Rimjhim Ispat Limited and Others v. Union of India & Another outright and directed the Appellants to avail the remedy of discharge before the Trial Court vide Order dated 21.08.2014.
11. Following this direction, the Appellants moved a discharge application under Section 245(2) of CrPC 1973 before the Trial Court. The matter was heard on 24.08.2015 and listed for orders on 01.09.2015, with the Appellants attempting to shield themselves from prosecution based on technicalities.
12. Meanwhile, the re-adjudication pursuant to the Order dated 25.02.2013 of the CESTAT, culminated in a fresh Order dated 28.08.2015 by the Commissioner of Central Excise at Kanpur, again recording adverse findings against the Appellants, including reimposition of demands and penalties. This order was duly submitted as an addendum in the pending Complaint.
13. A writ petition being Writ Tax No. 771 of 2015 was thereafter filed by the Appellants challenging this second adjudication. It was only after the Trial Court rejected the discharge applications, the High Court vide Judgment dated 17.11.2015 intervened in the writ, not due to any exoneration on the merits of the claim put forth on the part of the Appellants, but primarily due to procedural lapses and conduct attributable to the Commissioner of Central Excise at Kanpur. The High Court set aside the Order dated 28.08.2015 and directed the matter to be re-adjudicated afresh this time by the Commissioner at Lucknow, instead of Kanpur.
14. During the pendency of the above writ petition, as stated above, the Trial Court dismissed the discharge application of the Appellants vide Order dated 09.10.2015, holding that adjudication and prosecution were independent processes and that the Appellants had not yet been absolved of the underlying liabilities in the departmental proceedings.
15. Dissatisfied with the rejection of their discharge plea, the Appellants preferred Criminal Revision No. 4581 of 2015 before the High Court, seeking to overturn the Order dated 09.10.2015 of the Trial Court. This approach to the High Court again reflected the Appellants’ repeated attempts to evade prosecution without securing a clean slate on merits from the Respondent-Department.
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