Kasireddy Upender Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors.
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 768; [2025] 7 S.C.R. 105
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- Justice J.B. Pardiwala, Justice R Mahadevan
- Decided
- 22 May 2025
- Case number
- No. 2808/2025
- Sections
- 41(1), 120, 61(2), 187, 47, 179, 409, 420, 48, 17A, 57, 56
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:19 am. Original source ↗
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[2025] 7 S.C.R. 105 : 2025 INSC 768 Kasireddy Upender Reddy v.
State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors.
(Criminal Appeal No. 2808 of 2025)
23 May 2025 [J.B. Pardiwala* and R. Mahadevan, JJ.] Issue for Consideration Whether the arrest of the appellant’s son was per se illegal for want of supply of appropriate and meaningful grounds of arrest, as alleged. Headnotes† Constitution of India – Art.22 – When not violated – Appellant filed writ petition before High Court seeking a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that his son was illegally arrested by CID as appropriate grounds for arrest were not furnished at the time of arrest and thus, the arrest was violative of Art.22 – Writ petition dismissed – Sustainability:
Held: If a person is arrested on a warrant, the grounds for reasons for the arrest is the warrant itself; if the warrant is read over to him, that is sufficient compliance with the requirement that he should be informed of the grounds for his arrest – If he is arrested without a warrant, he must be told why he has been arrested – If he is arrested for committing an offence, he must be told that he has committed a certain offence for which he would be placed on trial – In order to inform him that he has committed a certain offence, he must be told of the acts done by him which amounts to the offence – He must be informed of the precise acts done by him for which he would be tried; informing him merely of the law applicable to such acts would not be enough – The information of the grounds of arrest must be provided to the arrested person in a manner that sufficient knowledge of the basic facts constituting the grounds is imparted and communicated to the arrested person effectively in the language which he understands – The mode and method of communication must be such that the object of the constitutional safeguard is achieved – Appellant’s son was arrested for specific offences as mentioned in the grounds of arrest – The grounds of arrest show that the requirement in terms of para 21(b) as laid * Author 106 [2025] 7 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports down in Vihaan Kumar’s case is fulfilled – No merit in this appeal – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 – ss.47, 48, 35 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.41(1). [Paras 25, 36] Constitution of India – Art. 22 – Judgment of Supreme Court in Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana and another – Constitutional protections against arbitrary arrest and detention – Rights of individuals upon arrest – Principles of law explained in Vihaan Kumar, enumerated. [Paras 15, 18] Case Law Cited Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana and another, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 269; State of Bombay v. Atma Ram [1951] 1 SCR 167 : (1951) SCC 43 : AIR 1951 SC 157 (C) – relied on.
Magan Lal Jivabhai, in re, AIR 1951 Bom 33(D); Vimal Kishore Mehrotra v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1956 All 56 – referred to. Hooper v. Lane (1857) 6 HLC 443 : 10 ER 1368 (G); Christie v. Leachinsky (1947) AC 573; McNabb v. United States of America (1943) 318 US 332 (H); United States v. Cruikshank (1876) 92 US 542 – referred to.
List of Acts Constitution of India; Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
List of Keywords Article 22 of the Constitution of India; Grounds of arrest; Arrested on a warrant; Arrested without a warrant; Appropriate and meaningful grounds of arrest; At the time of arrest; Writ of habeas corpus; Vihaan Kumar case; Information of the grounds of arrest; Sufficient knowledge of the basic facts; Arrest by CID.
Case Arising From CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 2808 of 2025 From the Judgment and Order dated 08.05.2025 of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Amravati in WP No. 10858 of 2025 With SLP (CRL.) No. 5691 of 2025 [2025] 7 S.C.R. 107Kasireddy Upender Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. Appearances for Parties Advs. for the Appellant:
Mahesh Jethmalani, Navin Pahwa, Ponnavolu Sudhakar Reddy, Sr. Advs., Ramesh Allanki, Ms. Aruna Gupta, Shriharsha Peechara, Syed Ahmad Naqvi, Alabhya Dhamija, Shreevardhan Dhoot, M. Bala Krishna, T. Vijaybhaskar Reddy, Yash Gupta, Krishna Kumar Singh, Ms. Serena Jethmalani, Ajay Awasthi, Ms. Mugdha Pande, Vaibhav Thaledi, Yashaswi SK Chocksey, Krishna Kumar Singh. Advs. for the Respondents:
Sidharth Luthra, Siddharth Aggarwal, Sr. Advs., Guntur Pramod Kumar, Ms. Prerna Singh, Samarth Krishan Luthra, Ms. Rajni Gupta. Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment J.B. Pardiwala, J.
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2808 OF 2025
(@ SLP (CRIMINAL) No. 7746 OF 2025)
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal arises from the judgment and order passed by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Amaravati dated 8.05.2025 in W.P. No. 10858 of 2025 by which the writ petition filed by the appellant herein seeking a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that his son viz. Kessireddy Raja Shekhar Reddy came to be illegally arrested by the CID and is in unlawful detention, came to be dismissed.
3. The facts giving rise to this appeal may be summarised as under: a. The son of the appellant herein, namely, Kessireddy Raja Shekhar Reddy came to be arrested on 21.04.2025 in connection with Crime No. 21 of 2024 dated 23.09.2025 registered with CID Police Station, Mangalagiri for the offence punishable under Sections 420, 409 read with Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code respectively (for short, the “IPC”) (Now Sections 318, 316(5) read with Section 61(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 respectively (for short, the “BNS”)).
108 [2025] 7 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports b. It appears from the materials on record that on 19.04.2025 the son of the appellant herein was arrayed as accused no. 1 by way of an entry in the case diary.
c. The son of the appellant was arrested at around 6 P.M. from the Hyderabad Airport. At the time of arrest, the grounds of arrest were supplied to him and later were also served on his father i.e. the appellant herein.
d. Pursuant to the arrest, the son of the appellant was brought to Vijayawada and was produced before the jurisdictional magistrate i.e. the Special Judge for SPE and ACB cases, Vijayawada at 5.15 P.M. on 22.04.2025 i.e. within 24 hours of the arrest. d. It appears that police remand was prayed for and the same came to be granted vide order dated 22.04.2025 passed by the Special Judge for SPE and ACB cases.
e. The operative part of the remand order reads thus: “12. Remand report further reveals that, police have to examine several witnesses and has to apprehend several Government and non Government officials and investigation is only at preliminary stage and police requires time to conduct thorough investigation in this case. Therefore, request for remand of Al is accepted, hence, Al is remanded to judicial custody under Section 187 of BNSS till 6.5.025, for the offences under Sections 420, 409, 120 B IPC and Sections 7, 7A and 8, 13(1)(b) , 13 (2) of P.C.Act, Al is hereby ordered to be kept in District Jail, Vijayawada under proper escort.
Sd/-P.Bhaskara Rao
SPL. JUDGE FOR SPE AND ACB
CASES-CUM-III ADJ. VIJAYAWADA”
f. The appellant preferred a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution before the High Court and prayed for a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that the arrest of his son was per se illegal and therefore, his continued detention in jail could be said to be unlawful and thereby, violative of Article 21 of the Constitution.
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 109Kasireddy Upender Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. g. The writ of habeas corpus was prayed for essentially on the ground that although the grounds of arrest were served upon the appellant’s son at the time of his arrest, yet such grounds were not meaningful and were just an eyewash. The grounds of arrest lacked in material particulars.
h. It was argued before the High Court that if appropriate grounds for arrest are not furnished at the time of arrest then the arrest would be violative of Article 22 of the Constitution read with Sections 47 and 48 respectively of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 respectively (for short, the “BNSS”). i. The High Court adjudicated the writ petition filed by the appellant herein and ultimately vide the impugned judgment and order dismissed the same holding as under:
“11. In the present case, both the provisions of law as well as the grounds for arrest, can be made out, on a conjoint reading of the notice under Section 47, the grounds of arrest, 48 of BNSS and the remand report which were all served on the detenue prior to the hearing of his remand application. The learned Special Judge, had specifically recorded that even the remand report had been served on the detenue prior to the commencement of the hearing before the Special Judge. The copy of the remand report, filed by the respondents, show that the detenue had signed a copy of the remand report as service of the said grounds of arrest on him. In view of the earlier judgment of this Court, it must be held that the requirements of Article 22 of the Constitution of India as well as the provisions of BNSS have been complied.
xxx xxx xxx
13. In Vihaan Kumar vs. State of Haryana and Another’s case, neither the detenue nor his relatives or family members had been served with any document.
In such circumstances, as can be seen from the same passage, the Hon’ble Supreme Court had held that in the absence of service of the remand report, mere inclusion of grounds of arrest in the 110 [2025] 7 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports remand report would not be sufficient compliance of Article 22 of the Constitution of India or Section 47 of BNSS. In the present case, the Special Judge had recorded that the remand report had been served on the detenue and the copy of the remand report, containing the signature of the detenue, produced by the respondents would also fortify this position. Sri P. Sudhakar Reddy contends that papers were served on the detenu after the hearing in the remand application and as such, there is no compliance of Article 22 of the Constitution of India. This contention does not appear to be correct inasmuch as the Special Judge had recorded, in the remand order, that the remand report had been served on the detenue. In these circumstances, this Court does not find any reason to interfere with the order of remand.
14. Accordingly, this Writ Petition is dismissed.
However, this would not preclude the detenue from availing of his remedies under law for being set at liberty. There shall be no order as to costs.”
4. In such circumstances referred to above, the appellant is here before this Court with the present appeal.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT
5. Mr. Mahesh Jethmalani, the learned Senior Counsel, made oral submissions and has also filed his written submissions. The written submissions read thus:
“A) That since 25.03.2025, the Respondent State has issued notices under Section 179 of the BNSS to appear before them. The accused has challenged these notices and the said challenge is a subject matter of Petition tagged along with the instant case. On 21.04.2025 at 5 PM, the Petitioner sent a WhatsApp message to the Investigating Officer that he would appear before him on 22.04.2025 at 10 AM. Pursuant to the said Section 179 notices, the accused travelled from Goa to Hyderabad, Telangana en route to Vijayawada, Andhra Pradesh and reached Hyderabad Airport at 6 PM. On his disembarking the accused was [2025] 7 S.C.R. 111Kasireddy Upender Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. arrested and taken to Vijayawada, Andhra Pradesh. The Petitioner’s son was never cited as an Accused in the FIR, was in the eyes of the Respondent State a witness as disclosed by the Section 179 Notices sent to him and was always of the impression that he was wanted as a witness to which he even acceded on 21.04.2025. The Petitioner’s son was not an accused person at the time of his arrest on 21.04.2025 and there was no evidence of his complicity in any crime. The Respondent’s case (see para 6 of the Impugned Judgment of the High Court) is that the Petitioner’s son was made an accused on 19.04.2025 by way of an entry in the Case Diary. The Case Diary is not a public document like an FIR and so there was no public document disclosing that the Petitioner’s son was an accused person in the case. Admittedly, in the same Paragraph 6 of the Impugned Order, the intimation of such inclusion as filed with a Special Judge for SPE and ACB Cases, Vijayawada, Andhra Pradesh on 22.04.2025, i.e., after his arrest on the previous day. The Petitioner’s son’s arrest was without any basis and illegal.
B) Further, events post the arrest of the Petitioner’s son clearly discloses the groundless basis of his arrest as also the mala fide intent behind it. In the course of his investigation post his arrest, the Petitioner’s son was informed that he should make a Statement implicating the then Chief Minister of the State of Andhra Pradesh – Shri Y. S. Jagan Mohan Reddy, for alleged illegalities in the liquor excise policy that was being investigated. Shockingly, present during his investigation were 2 ‘mediators’. The case of the Respondent has disclosed in the Remand Application of the next day (Second paragraph @ Page 88 of the SLP) was that the accused refused to sign on an alleged confession. It is clear from the said averments in the Remand Application that the ‘mediators’ were introduced to pressurize the Petitioner’s son into making a ‘confession’ implicating the Former Chief Minister of the State of Andhra Pradesh – Shri Y. S. Jagan Mohan Reddy. The entire conspectus of facts that transpired during interrogation discloses glaring illegalities, including the 112 [2025] 7 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports presence of the ‘mediators’. The fact that the Petitioner’s son refused to sign the alleged ‘confession’ is clear proof that he was being forced to make a confession, which he refused. In sum, the events that transpired from the evening of 21.04.2025 till 22.04.2025, establishes that the Petitioner was not an accused until the time he refused to comply with the pressure of the ‘mediators’ and the police. It is reiterated that the arrest of the Petitioner’s son as an Accused was baseless and mala fide.
“During the course of interrogation, the above noted accused admitted the facts and his guilt about the commission of offences. The entire confession got drafted in the presence of mediators Chavalam Gopala Krishna S/o Narasimha Rao, 40 Years, VRO 2, Nunna and Mohd Sirajuddin, S/o Kutubiddin, 40 Yrs, VRO-1, Kundavari Kandrika under a cover of mahazar and seized a mobile phone 14 Funtouch OS vivo Y18t having IMEI number 869933078319375 (Slot 1), 869933078319367 (Slot 2) and SIM card of number +917559260506 and for investigation purpose duly signed by the mediators. However, the accused refused to sign on the above confessional statement. The mediators endorsed the same.”
C) That the grounds of arrest served on the Petitioner on 21.04.2025 were in total non compliance of Article 22 of the Constitution of India and Section 47 of the BNSS for the following reasons:
i. It has been laid down in a number of decisions of this Hon’ble Court that the grounds of arrest are not an empty formality. This principle has been enunciated with greater rigour in recent judgments (see: Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2024) 8 SCC 254 and Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana & Anr., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 269 : SLP(Crl) 13320 of 2024) that the whole rational behind communicating the grounds of arrest is to enable the Petitioner’s son’s counsel to meet the Police case in remand proceedings and for bail. In the grounds of arrest served on the Petitioner on 21.04.2025, the substantive [2025] 7 S.C.R. 113Kasireddy Upender Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. offences were Sections 409 and 420 IPC. While the Section numbers were mentioned, the ingredients of the offence find no mention in the furnished grounds. Thus, in so far as Section 409 IPC is concerned, there is not a whisper about the ingredient of entrustment, the property entrusted and the manner of misappropriation or conversion to the accused’s use. Similarly, as far as Section 420 IPC is concerned, the ingredients of deception, fraudulent or dishonest inducement and the property delivered pursuant to such inducement are all significantly absent. The grounds of arrest therefore did not even remotely disclose how the offences alleged were made out. It is submitted that this was the case because there was no ground to arrest the Petitioner’s son and his arrest was illegal and mala fide. ii. Article 22 of the Constitution requires that the grounds of arrest shall be informed to the person arrested “as soon as may be”. In Paragraph 5 of the Impugned Judgment of the High Court, it is recorded that, “The learned Advocate General would submit that the grounds of arrest as well as the provisions of the law were made known to the detenue, in writing, by virtue of service of the notice of arrest under Section 47, the grounds of arrest under Section 48 and the remand report.” It is submitted that a remand report cannot in law be grounds of arrest contemplated under Article 22 or Section 47 of the BNSS, save perhaps when the Accused is produced in Court for remand and furnished with a Remand Application immediately on his production. Else a remand report can never comply with the requirement of the obligation to furnish grounds as soon as may be in Article 22 or ‘forthwith’ communication of such grounds prescribed by Section 47 BNSS. In admitting that the remand report was part of the grounds of arrest and that it was served on the accused on 22.04.2025, the Respondent State has violated the mandate of “as soon as may be” in Article 22 and ‘forthwith’ in Section 47 BNSS. It is important to emphasize that Article 22 mandates that “no person who is arrested shall be detained in custody without being informed as soon as may be of the grounds of such arrest…”. The Constitutional mandate was thus 114 [2025] 7 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports violated because the Petitioner’s son was detained in custody post arrest without being informed “as soon as may be” of the complete grounds for arrest. Further, what he was provided with at the time of his arrest was grounds of arrest which did not spell out the particulars of the offences alleged.
iii. In addition, Section 47 of the BNSS mandates that what should be ‘forthwith’ communicated to an arrested person is the full particulars of the offence. Fully cognizant of the fact that the grounds of arrest served on the Petitioner’s son on 21.04.2025 did not disclose the offence under Section 409 and 420 IPC, the remand report of 22.04.2025 added the substantive offences of Sections 7, 7A, 8 and 13(1)(b) read with 13(2) Prevention Corruption Act, 1988. Thus the ‘full particulars of the offence’ for which the Petitioner’s son was arrested was not furnished to him ‘forthwith’. iv. That the invocation of offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 in the remand report as grounds for arrest of the Petitioner’s son is vitiated by patent illegality. The Petitioner could not have been arrested for offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, in view of the provisions of Section 17A of the said Act It is the Respondent State’s case that they could only invoke the offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act on 22.04.2025 as they had not received the requisite sanction under Section 17A at the time of the Petitioner’s son’s arrest. The sanction order under Section 17A (Pages 66 – 67 of the SLP) is dated 21.04.2025. Moreover, the sanction sought and granted on 21.04.2025 was only in respect of a public servant by the name Shri Dodda Venkat Satya Prasad. There was no sanction granted for investigation for the offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act for the Petitioner’s son. Granting of Sanction is not akin to taking of cognizance by a Court where cognizance is taken of offences and not of offenders. Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act prohibits any enquiry, inquiry or investigation into any offence alleged to have been committed by a public servant under this act where [2025] 7 S.C.R. 115Kasireddy Upender Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. the alleged offence is relatable to any recommendation made or decision taken by such public servant in discharge of his official functions or duty. Thus under Section 17A, the sanctioning authority has to examine the case of every public servant separately to determine whether the provisions of that Section apply to him so that sanction may be granted or refused. The Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and pensions (Department of Personnel and training) has on 17.09.2021 issued SOPs for the processing of cases under Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (Annexure P – 10 @ Page 5 in Vol 2). Clause 4.6 of the SOP mandates as under:
“4.6. Separate proposals shall be made in respect of each public servant, where a composite offence is alleged against more than one public servant.”
Thus, where a composite offence is alleged against more than one public servants, a separate proposal shall be made in respect of each public servant. There is neither a sanction proposal nor grant of such sanction in respect of the Petitioner’s son. The invocation of offences under the PC Act against him and the contention that the remand report which contains these offences constituted the grounds of arrest within the meaning of Article 22 of the Constitution and Section 47 of the BNSS is manifestly untenable. In invoking offences against the Prevention of Corruption Act as part of the grounds of arrest, the Respondent State has committed a manifest illegality, as in the absence of the requisite sanction, under Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, read with Clause 4.6 of the SOP of the Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and pensions (Department of Personnel and training) dated 03.09.2021, the grounds of arrest were untenable and consequently the arrest and detention in custody of the Petitioner’s son was patently illegal.”
6. In such circumstances referred to above, the learned counsel prayed that there being merit in his appeal, the same may be allowed and the arrest of the accused may be declared as illegal thereby, rendering his continued detention unlawful.
116 [2025] 7 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE STATE
7. Mr. Siddharth Luthra, the learned Senior Counsel made oral submissions on behalf of the State while opposing this appeal and has also filed his written submissions. The written submissions read thus: “1. Crime No. 21 of 2024 dated 23.09.2025 was registered in CID P.S., Mangalagiri under Sections 420,409 r/w 120- B I.P.C. (FIR@Pg39-49 of SLP). On 19.04.2025,the son of the present Petitioner being Kessireddy Raja Shekhar Reddy(hereinafter referred to as A1) was arrayed as Accused A1 by way of an entry in the Case Diary Refer-Para 6 of the impugned order & Para 9 of the Counter Affidavit filed by the State before the High Court (Ann P13 @ Pg 23, relevant at Pg 26 of IA No.128534/2025 for Addl. Documents).
2. On 21.04.2025 at 6 PM, Accused No 1 was arrested from the Hyderabad Airport. At the time of arrest, Grounds of Arrest were supplied to him and served on his father as well (Grounds of Arrest @ Pg13-14 of IA No.128534/2025 for Addl. Documents). A perusal of the said Grounds of Arrest would show complete compliance with the directions in Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana; 2025 SCCOnLine SC 269 @ Para21, wherein this Hon’ble Court directed that information of grounds of arrest must be provided “in such a manner that sufficient knowledge of the basic facts constituting the grounds is imparted and communicated to the arrested person…”
3. Pursuant to arrest, A1 was brought to Vijayawada and produced before the jurisdictional magistrate i.e. the Ld. Special Judge for SPE & ACB Cases Vijayawada at 5.15 PM on 22.04.2025 i.e. within 24 hours of arrest, thereby complying with all requirements as well as Article 22(2) of the Constitution. In the Remand Order dated …, the Ld. Magistrate inter alia noted in para 2, that A1 stated that he had not been ill-treated in custody and that he had received the Remand Report with enclosures (Pg 106 of SLP). After considering all aspects, including the nature of the allegations, the Ld. Magistrate ordered for A1 to be remanded (Remand Order @ Pg106-113 of SLP), and [2025] 7 S.C.R. 117Kasireddy Upender Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. the same was upheld by way of the impugned order. It is humbly submitted that the arrest and remand of A1 do not suffer from any infirmity.
4. In pursuance of Article 22(2), the procedural aspects are set out in the BNSS/Cr.P.C. Section 57 & 58 of the BNSS (formerly Section 56 and 57, Cr.P.C.) deals with the procedure to be followed upon arrest. Section 187 BNSS (Section167, Cr.P.C.) provides the procedure when investigation can’t be completed in 24hours. S. 57 These provisions i.e. S. 57/58/187 BNSS have to be read together &the requirement of law is to produce the arrestee before the jurisdictional magistrate within 24 hours. If the period of 24 hours is expiring and the detenu cannot be produced before the jurisdictional Magistrate, then he/she must be produced before the nearest Magistrate. Indisputably the detenu was produced before the jurisdictional Magistrate within 24 hours.
5. This exposition of law has been time and again reinforced by this Hon’ble Court; notably in State of U.P. v. Abdul Samad; AIR 1962 SC 1506 @ Para 14, Chaganti Satyarayana v. State of A.P. (1986) 3 SCC 141 @ Para12 and more recently reiterated in Gautam Navlakha v. NIA; (2022) 13 SCC 542 @ Para 102.
6. The Calcutta High Court in In Re: Nagendranath Chakravarti; 1923 ILR Vol. LI 402, interpreting S. 61 & 167 CrPC 1898 (equivalent to S. 58 BNSS) observed that, “…the intention of the Legislature, having regard to sections 61 and 167 and to the requirements of justice generally, is that an accused person should be brought before a Magistrate competent to try, or commit with as little delay as possible….”
7. In this regard, any reliance on Priya Indoria v. State of Karnataka; (2024) 8 SCC254 by the Petitioner is entirely misplaced. That case dealt with issues relating to anticipatory bail, and observations in this regard was in the passing and are obiter. That judgment doesn’t consider the law laid down by earlier judgments of this Hon’ble Court including in Re: Nagendranath Chakravarti supra 118 [2025] 7 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports and Gautam Navlakha supra (2JJ), and is therefore per incuriam in this regard.
Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act
8. On 21.04.2025, in Vijayawada, the IO had made a request for the addition of sections 7, 7A, 8, 13(1)(b) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and made a request for approval under sec 17A of the Act with respect to co-accused D.Venkata Satya Prasad. Approval under Section 17-A was granted on 21.04.2025 in Vijayawada. Upon reaching Vijayawada, on 22.04.2025, A1 was served with the Arrest Memo containing the above mentioned sections of the Prevention of Corruption Act and the same was received by A1 and is in case diary.
9. A1 was only an “IT Advisor” to the Government of Andhra Pradesh who was running his business in Hyderabad at the relevant time. The scope of the Petitioner’s duties as an “IT Advisor” had no relation at all to the excise/liquor policy, as has been repeatedly averred by the Petitioner himself (Pg G & Pg 123of SLP). Earlier, in his Reply to a Notice u/sec 179 BNSS, A1 himself clearly stated that “..based on publicly available information, I understand that the case pertains to an excise-related matter in Andhra Pradesh. However, I am unable to ascertain any direct or indirect link in the case from my end…”
10. It is submitted that the approval under Section 17A is person-specific (as admitted by the Petitioner himself, Ground F @ Pg123 of the SLP), required when the alleged offence is “relatable to any recommendation made or decision taken by such public servant in discharge of his official functions or duties.” In the present case, the allegations against A1 with respect to the perpetration of the liquor scam are in no way relatable to his function as an IT Advisor, therefore there is no requirement for approval under Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act.”
ANALYSIS
8. Since the entire case revolves around the question whether the arrest of the appellant’s son could be said to be per se illegal for want of [2025] 7 S.C.R. 119Kasireddy Upender Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. supply of appropriate and meaningful grounds of arrest, we should look into few provisions of the Constitution as well as the BNSS.
9. Article 21 of the Constitution reads thus:
“21. Protection of life and personal liberty- No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.”
10. Article 22 of the Constitution reads thus:
“22. Protection against arrest and detention in certain cases. -(1) No person who is arrested shall be detained in custody without being informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds for such arrest nor shall he be denied the right to consult, and to be defended by, a legal practitioner of his choice.
(2) Every person who is arrested and detained in custody shall be produced before the nearest magistrate within a period of twenty-four hours of such arrest excluding the time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to the court of the magistrate and no such person shall be detained in custody beyond the said period without the authority of a magistrate.
(3) Nothing in clauses (1) and (2) shall apply— (a) to any person who for the time being is an enemy alien; or (b) to any person who is arrested or detained under any law providing for preventive detention.
**(4) No law providing for preventive detention shall authorise the detention of a person for a longer period than three months unless— (a) an Advisory Board consisting of persons who are, or have been, or are qualified to be appointed as, Judges of a High Court has reported before the expiration of the said period of three months that there is in its opinion sufficient cause for such detention:
Provided that nothing in this sub-clause shall authorise the detention of any person beyond the maximum period prescribed by any law made by Parliament under subclause (b) of clause (7); or (b) such person is detained 120 [2025] 7 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports in accordance with the provisions of any law made by Parliament under subclauses (a) and (b) of clause (7).
(5) When any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any law providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, communicate to such person the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order.
(6) Nothing in clause (5) shall require the authority making any such order as is referred to in that clause to disclose facts which such authority considers to be against the public interest to disclose.
(7) Parliament may by law prescribe— *(a) the circumstances under which, and the class or classes of cases in which, a person may be detained for a period longer than three months under any law providing for preventive detention without obtaining the opinion of an Advisory Board in accordance with the provisions of sub-clause (a) of clause (4);
**(b) the maximum period for which any person may in any class or classes of cases be detained under any law providing for preventive detention; and
(c) the procedure to be followed by an Advisory Board in an inquiry under ***[sub-clause (a) of clause (4)].”
11. Sub-section (1) of Section 41 of Code of Criminal Procedure (for short the “Cr.P.C.”) lists cases where the police may arrest a person without a warrant. The corresponding provision in the BNSS is Section
35. Section 41 of the Cr.P.C. reads thus:
“41. When police may arrest without warrant.—(1) Any police officer may without an order from a Magistrate and without a warrant, arrest any person—
(a) who commits, in the presence of a police officer, a cognizable offence;
(b) against whom a reasonable complaint has been made, or credible information has been received, or a reasonable [2025] 7 S.C.R. 121Kasireddy Upender Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. suspicion exists that he has committed a cognizable offence punishable with imprisonment for a term which may be less than seven years or which may extend to seven years whether with or without fine, if the following conditions are satisfied, namely:—
(i) the police officer has reason to believe on the basis of such complaint, information, or suspicion that such person has committed the said offence;
(ii) the police office is satisfied that such arrest is necessary—
(a) to prevent such person from committing any further offence; or
(b) for proper investigation of the offence; or
(c) to prevent such person from causing the evidence of the offence to disappear or tampering with such evidence in any manner; or
(d) to prevent such person from making any inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the Court or to the police officer; or
(e) as unless such person is arrested, his presence in the Court whenever required cannot be ensured, and the police officer shall record while making such arrest, his reasons in writing.
Provided that a police officer shall, in all cases where the arrest of a person is not required under the provisions of this subsection, record the reasons in writing for not making the arrest.
(ba) against whom credible information has been received that he has committed a cognizable offence punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to more than seven years whether with or without fine or with death sentence and the police officer has reason to believe on the basis of that information that such person has committed the said offence;
122 [2025] 7 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
(c) who has been proclaimed as an offender either under this Code or by order of the State Government; or
(d) in whose possession anything is found which may reasonably be suspected to be stolen property and who may reasonably be suspected of having committed an offence with reference to such thing; or
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