Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi v. Vidhi Rawal
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 734; [2025] 6 S.C.R. 545
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Abhay S. Oka, Justice Ujjal Bhuyan
- Decided
- 18 May 2025
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 2688/2025
- Sections
- 482, 528, 12, 12(1), 200, 223, 498A, 2, 26, 61, 3, 125
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[2025] 6 S.C.R. 545 : 2025 INSC 734 Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi v.
Vidhi Rawal (Criminal Appeal No. 2688 of 2025)
19 May 2025 [Abhay S. Oka* and Ujjal Bhuyan, JJ.] Issue for Consideration Whether the High Court can invoke its inherent jurisdiction u/s.482, Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 or s.528, Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 to quash proceedings initiated u/s.12, Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005.
Headnotes† Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 – s.482 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 – s.528 – Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (DV Act) – s.12 – Exercise of power of High Court u/s.482, CrPC (s.528, BNSS) to quash proceedings u/s.12, DV Act – Permissibility:
Held: High Courts can exercise power u/s.482, CrPC (s.528, BNSS) for quashing the proceedings initiated u/s.12(1) of the DV Act, 2005, pending before the Court of the Magistrate – However, considering the object of the DV Act, 2005, the High Courts should exercise caution and circumspection when dealing with an application u/s.12(1) – Normally, interference u/s.482 is warranted only in the case of gross illegality or injustice – View taken in the impugned order of the High Court that a petition u/s.482, CrPC for challenging the proceedings emanating from s.12(1), DV Act, 2005 is not maintainable, is not the correct view – Order passed by High Court quashed – Petitions filed by the appellants u/s.482, CrPC to quash the application u/s.12, DV Act restored to the file of the High Court. [Para 39] Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (DV Act) – ss.12, 28 – Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 – s.200 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 – s.223 – Scheme of s.12 vis-a-vis s.200, CrPC or s.223, BNSS. [Paras 18, 21] * Author 546 [2025] 6 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (DV Act) – s.12 – Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 – s.482 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 – s.528 – Nature of proceedings u/s.12 – Quashing of proceedings u/s.12:
Held: Notwithstanding the penal provisions in the form of ss.31 and 33 of Chapter V, the proceedings before the Magistrate under the DV Act are predominantly of a civil nature – Decisions of the High Courts taking a view that the jurisdiction u/s.482, CrPC is not available to quash proceedings of an application u/s.12(1), DV Ac are primarily based on the premise that proceedings u/s.12(1) are predominantly of a civil nature – Said view is not correct. [Paras 28.1, 37] Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 – s.482 – Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (DV Act) – s.12 – Two parts of s.482 – Which part is applicable to proceedings u/s.12, DV Act – Discussed. [Paras 31, 32] Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (DV Act) – Object of – Discussed. [Para 12] Case Law Cited Kunapareddy alias Nookala Shanka Balaji v. Kunapareddy Swarna Kumari and Another [2016] 2 SCR 608 : (2016) 11 SCC 774; Prabha Tyagi v. Kamlesh Devi [2022] 5 SCR 970 : (2022) 8 SCC 90 – referred to.
Devendra Agarwal and 3 Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another; Nandkishor Pralhad Vyawahare v. Mangala, Application u/s 482 NO. -18994 OF 2024; Ram Lotan Vishwakarma and Ors. v. State of U.P and Anr. 2025 AHC-LKO 7572 – referred to. List of Acts Criminal Procedure Code, 1973; Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023; Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. List of Keywords Inherent jurisdiction of High Court under Section 482, Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 or Section 528, Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023; Quashing of proceedings initiated under Section 12, Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (DV Act, 2005); Object of the DV Act, 2005.
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 547Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi v. Vidhi Rawal Case Arising From CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
2688 of 2025 From the Judgment and Order dated 09.05.2024 of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Indore in MCRC No. 52308 of 2022 With Criminal Appeal No. 2689 of 2025 Appearances for Parties Advs. for the Appellant:
Vinay Navare, Sr. Adv., Kuldeep Rai, Sandeep Chawla, Ranjan Nikhil Dharnidhar, Karan Kapoor, Manik Kapoor, Ms. Srishti Singla, Shrey Kapoor.
Advs. for the Respondent:
Anurag Tandon, Pankaj Thakkar, Manan Shah, Ms. Baani Khanna, Robin Singh, Kapil Balwani, Ms. Tejal Nagauri, Ranjeet Singh Chauhan, Yogesh Yadav, Ritesh Patil, Surya Pratap Deva. Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment Abhay S. Oka, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The main question involved in the appeals is whether the High Court can invoke its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (for short, ‘the CrPC’) or Section 528 of the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for short, ‘the BNSS’) to quash proceedings initiated under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (for short ‘the DV Act, 2005’).
FACTUAL ASPECTS
3. The two connected appeals involve a challenge to the common order passed by the High Court rejecting the appellants’ prayer to quash proceedings initiated under Section 12(1) of the DV Act, 2005. The 548 [2025] 6 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports appellant in the Criminal Appeal arising out of SLP(Crl) 9493 of 2024, Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi, is the respondent’s brother-in-law whereas the appellants in the Criminal Appeal arising out of SLP(Crl) 13896 of 2024, Prateek Tripathi, Vivekanand Tiwari and Mira Tiwari, are the respondent’s husband, father-in-law and mother-in-law respectively. Prateek Tripathi married the Respondent, Vidhi Rawal, on 12 th December 2019 as per Hindu rites and rituals at Dewas. After two years of marriage, on 8th December 2021, the respondent made a complaint to the Station House Officer at the Police Station Women Consultancy Centre, Dewas, against Prateek Tripathi, and Vivekanand Tiwari alleging that dowry was demanded by them. On 7 th January 2022, the respondent lodged FIR No.3 of 2022 at P.S Mahila Thana, Dewas under Section 498A, 504, 506 and 34 of the IPC against the appellants alleging mental and physical harassment on account of non-payment of dowry. The respondent claimed that on her return from work in Johannesburg, South Africa, the appellants tortured her, demanding a sum of Rs. 20 Lakh cash and a top model SUV car.
4. Aggrieved by the threats, the respondent on 2 nd March 2022 filed an application against the appellants bearing MJCR No. 215/2022, before the District and Sessions Judge, Dewas, Madhya Pradesh, under Section 12 of the DV Act, 2005. She claimed that Prateek Tripathi would beat her and throw her out of the house while they were abroad. The respondent prayed for reliefs provided under Sections 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23 of the DV Act, 2005. The appellants filed two separate petitions under Section 482 of the CrPC to quash the application under Section 12 of the DV Act, 2005. By the impugned judgment and order, the High Court dismissed the quashing of the petitions on the ground that the proceedings under Section 12 of the DV Act, 2005, being of a civil nature, cannot be quashed.
SUBMISSIONS
Appellants
5. The learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that the learned Magistrate has been conferred jurisdiction to entertain proceedings under Sections 12, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23 of the DV Act, 2005. The term Magistrate is defined under Section 2(i) of the DV Act, 2005 to mean a Judicial Magistrate of first class or, as [2025] 6 S.C.R. 549Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi v. Vidhi Rawal the case may be, a Metropolitan Magistrate exercising jurisdiction under the CrPC. Therefore, the Court of a Judicial or Metropolitan Magistrate is a Criminal Court constituted under the provisions of the CrPC.
6. The learned senior counsel further contended that, although remedies under Sections 18, 19, 20, 21, and 22 can be availed of in a Civil Court or Family Court as per Section 26, Section 26 cannot be read to understand the scheme of the DV Act, 2005.
7. The learned senior counsel invited our attention to various provisions under the CrPC where the nature of relief which can be granted by the Courts is, in essence, a relief which can be granted by a Civil Court. Similarly, certain provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the CPC’), were pointed out by him, where the relief granted by a Civil Court can also be granted in criminal proceedings. Therefore, the answer to the question which arises for consideration is not dependent upon the nature of the proceedings or the nature of the relief that can be granted in those proceedings.
8. The learned senior counsel relied upon a decision of the High Court of Allahabad in the case of Devendra Agarwal and 3 Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another1 and a decision of the High Court of Bombay in the case of Nandkishor Pralhad Vyawahare v. Mangala 2. In these cases, the High Courts held that an application under Section 482 CrPC is maintainable against orders passed under the DV Act, 2005 to prevent abuse of the process of Court and to secure the ends of justice. It is relevant to point out that the case of Devendra Agarwal and 3 Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another 1 has been referred to a larger bench of the High Court of Allahabad in the case of Ram Lotan Vishwakarma and Ors v. State of U.P and Anr3 .
9. The learned senior counsel submitted that because an application under Section 12 of the DV Act, 2005, is maintainable before a Criminal Court under the CrPC, it is amenable to the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the CrPC.
1 Application u/s 482 NO. - 18994 OF 2024 2 2018 SCC OnLine Bom 923
3 2025 AHC-LKO 7572
550 [2025] 6 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Respondent
10. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent submits that proceedings under Section 12 of the DV Act, 2005, cannot be quashed under Section 482 of the CrPC. He contended that the High Court rightly held that the proceedings under the DV Act, 2005, are civil in nature. He relied upon the objects and reasons of the DV Act, 2005, to submit that the Legislature intended the proceedings thereunder to be civil in nature. The learned counsel relied upon the decision of this Court in the case of Kunapareddy alias Nookala Shanka Balaji v. Kunapareddy Swarna Kumari and Another 4 , which held that proceedings under the DV Act, 2005 are predominantly civil in nature.
11. The learned counsel argued that an application under section 12 of the DV Act, 2005, is not a “complaint” under section 2(d) of the CrPC. Further, he argued that Sections 200 to 204 of the CrPC do not apply to proceedings under the DV Act, 2005 and a Magistrate cannot treat an application under the DV Act, 2005 as a complaint under Section 200 of the CrPC. The notice issued to the respondent on an application under Section 12 of the DV Act, 2005 is not a summons under Section 61 of the CrPC but is a notice set out in Form VII of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Rules, 2006 (for short, ‘the DV Rules 2006’). He supported the view taken by the High Court.
CONSIDERATIONS
The provision of the DV Act, 2005
12. The DV Act, 2005 was enacted with the object of providing more effective protection to the rights of women guaranteed under the Constitution who are the victims of violence of any kind occurring within the family. The DV Act, 2005, has been enacted to tackle the menace of domestic violence faced by women in our society. A very wide meaning has been assigned to the term ‘domestic violence’ in the DV Act, 2005. Section 3 of the DV Act, 2005 reads thus: “3. Definition of domestic violence.—For the purposes of this Act, any act, omission or commission or conduct of the respondent shall constitute domestic violence in case it—
4 (2016) 11 SCC 774
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 551Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi v. Vidhi Rawal
(a) harms or injures or endangers the health, safety, life, limb or well-being, whether mental or physical, of the aggrieved person or tends to do so and includes causing physical abuse, sexual abuse, verbal and emotional abuse and economic abuse; or
(b) harasses, harms, injures or endangers the aggrieved person with a view to coerce her or any other person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any dowry or other property or valuable security; or
(c) has the effect of threatening the aggrieved person or any person related to her by any conduct mentioned in clause (a) or clause (b); or
(d) otherwise injures or causes harm, whether physical or mental, to the aggrieved person.
Explanation I—For the purposes of this section,—
(i) “physical abuse” means any act or conduct which is of such a nature as to cause bodily pain, harm, or danger to life, limb, or health or impair the health or development of the aggrieved person and includes assault, criminal intimidation and criminal force;
(ii) “sexual abuse” includes any conduct of a sexual nature that abuses, humiliates, degrades or otherwise violates the dignity of woman;
(iii) “verbal and emotional abuse” includes—
(a) insults, ridicule, humiliation, name calling and insults or ridicule specially with regard to not having a child or a male child; and
(b) repeated threats to cause physical pain to any person in whom the aggrieved person is interested.
(iv) “economic abuse” includes— 552 [2025] 6 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
(a) deprivation of all or any economic or financial resources to which the aggrieved person is entitled under any law or custom whether payable under an order of a court or otherwise or which the aggrieved person requires out of necessity including, but not limited to, household necessities for the aggrieved person and her children, if any, stridhan, property, jointly or separately owned by the aggrieved person, payment of rental related to the shared household and maintenance;
(b) disposal of household effects, any alienation of assets whether movable or immovable, valuables, shares, securities, bonds and the like or other property in which the aggrieved person has an interest or is entitled to use by virtue of the domestic relationship or which may be reasonably required by the aggrieved person or her children or her stridhan or any other property jointly or separately held by the aggrieved person; and
(c) prohibition or restriction to continued access to resources or facilities which the aggrieved person is entitled to use or enjoy by virtue of the domestic relationship including access to the shared household.
Explanation II—For the purpose of determining whether any act, omission, commission or conduct of the respondent constitutes “domestic violence” under this section, the overall facts and circumstances of the case shall be taken into consideration.”
13. Even ‘domestic relationship’ has been defined widely under clause (f) of Section 2 of the DV Act, 2005, which reads thus:
“(f) “domestic relationship” means a relationship between two persons who live or have, at any point of time, lived together in a shared household, when they are related by consanguinity, marriage or through a relationship in the [2025] 6 S.C.R. 553Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi v. Vidhi Rawal nature of marriage, adoption or are family members living together as a joint family”
13.1 An aggrieved person has been defined in clause (a) of Section 2, which reads thus:
“(a) aggrieved person” means any woman who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship with the respondent and who alleges to have been subjected to any act of domestic violence by the respondent”
14. Chapter IV of the DV Act, 2005, lays down what kind of reliefs can be granted to a person aggrieved who has been subjected to any act of domestic violence. There are different categories of reliefs which can be granted under the DV Act, 2005. These reliefs can be sought either by making an application under Section 12 of the DV Act, 2005 or by making an application in pending legal proceedings affecting aggrieved person before a Civil Court, Family Court or a Criminal Court. The reliefs are provided in Sections 17 to 22, which read thus:
“17. Right to reside in a shared household.—(1)
Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, every woman in a domestic relationship shall have the right to reside in the shared household, whether or not she has any right, title or beneficial interest in the same.
(2) The aggrieved person shall not be evicted or excluded from the shared household or any part of it by the respondent save in accordance with the procedure established by law.
18. Protection orders.—The Magistrate may, after giving the aggrieved person and the respondent an opportunity of being heard and on being prima facie satisfied that domestic violence has taken place or is likely to take place, pass a protection order in favour of the aggrieved person and prohibit the respondent from—
(a) committing any act of domestic violence;
(b) aiding or abetting in the commission of acts of domestic violence;
554 [2025] 6 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
(c) entering the place of employment of the aggrieved person or, if the person aggrieved is a child, its school or any other place frequented by the aggrieved person;
(d) attempting to communicate in any form, whatsoever, with the aggrieved person, including personal, oral or written or electronic or telephonic contact;
(e) alienating any assets, operating bank lockers or bank accounts used or held or enjoyed by both the parties, jointly by the aggrieved person and the respondent or singly by the respondent, including her stridhan or any other property held either jointly by the parties or separately by them without the leave of the Magistrate;
(f) causing violence to the dependants, other relatives or any person who give the aggrieved person assistance from domestic violence;
(g) committing any other act as specified in the protection order.
19. Residence orders.—(1) While disposing of an application under sub-section (1) of Section 12, the Magistrate may, on being satisfied that domestic violence has taken place, pass a residence order—
(a) restraining the respondent from dispossessing or in any other manner disturbing the possession of the aggrieved person from the shared household, whether or not the respondent has a legal or equitable interest in the shared household;
(b) directing the respondent to remove himself from the shared household;
(c) restraining the respondent or any of his relatives from entering any portion of the shared household in which the aggrieved person resides;
(d) restraining the respondent from alienating or disposing off the shared household or encumbering the same;
(e) restraining the respondent from renouncing his rights in the shared household except with the leave of the Magistrate; or [2025] 6 S.C.R. 555Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi v. Vidhi Rawal
(f) directing the respondent to secure same level of alternate accommodation for the aggrieved person as enjoyed by her in the shared household or to pay rent for the same, if the circumstances so require:
Provided that no order under clause (b) shall be passed against any person who is a woman.
(2) The Magistrate may impose any additional conditions or pass any other direction which he may deem reasonably necessary to protect or to provide for the safety of the aggrieved person or any child of such aggrieved person.
(3) The Magistrate may require from the respondent to execute a bond, with or without sureties, for preventing the commission of domestic violence.
(4) An order under sub-section (3) shall be deemed to be an order under Chapter VIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) and shall be dealt with accordingly.
(5) While passing an order under sub-section (1), subsection (2) or sub-section (3), the court may also pass an order directing the officer in-charge of the nearest police station to give protection to the aggrieved person or to assist her or the person making an application on her behalf in the implementation of the order.
(6) While making an order under sub-section (1), the Magistrate may impose on the respondent obligations relating to the discharge of rent and other payments, having regard to the financial needs and resources of the parties.
(7) The Magistrate may direct the officer in-charge of the police station in whose jurisdiction the Magistrate has been approached to assist in the implementation of the protection order.
(8) The Magistrate may direct the respondent to return to the possession of the aggrieved person her stridhan or any other property or valuable security to which she is entitled to.
20. Monetary reliefs.—(1) While disposing of an application under sub-section (1) of Section 12, the Magistrate may 556 [2025] 6 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports direct the respondent to pay monetary relief to meet the expenses incurred and losses suffered by the aggrieved person and any child of the aggrieved person as a result of the domestic violence and such relief may include, but is not limited to,—
(a) the loss of earnings;
(b) the medical expenses;
(c) the loss caused due to the destruction, damage or removal of any property from the control of the aggrieved person; and
(d) the maintenance for the aggrieved person as well as her children, if any, including an order under or in addition to an order of maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or any other law for the time being in force.
(2) The monetary relief granted under this section shall be adequate, fair and reasonable and consistent with the standard of living to which the aggrieved person is accustomed.
(3) The Magistrate shall have the power to order an appropriate lump sum payment or monthly payments of maintenance, as the nature and circumstances of the case may require.
(4) The Magistrate shall send a copy of the order for monetary relief made under sub-section (1) to the parties to the application and to the in-charge of the police station within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the respondent resides.
(5) The respondent shall pay the monetary relief granted to the aggrieved person within the period specified in the order under sub-section (1).
(6) Upon the failure on the part of the respondent to make payment in terms of the order under sub-section (1), the Magistrate may direct the employer or a debtor of the respondent, to directly pay to the aggrieved person or to deposit with the court a portion of the wages or salaries [2025] 6 S.C.R. 557Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi v. Vidhi Rawal or debt due to or accrued to the credit of the respondent, which amount may be adjusted towards the monetary relief payable by the respondent.
21. Custody orders.—Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the Magistrate may, at any stage of hearing of the application for protection order or for any other relief under this Act grant temporary custody of any child or children to the aggrieved person or the person making an application on her behalf and specify, if necessary, the arrangements for visit of such child or children by the respondent:
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