Nagarajan & Anr. v. The State of Tamil Nadu
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 703; [2025] 6 S.C.R. 471
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Dipankar Datta, Justice Manmohan
- Decided
- 14 May 2025
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 1390/2025
- Sections
- 20AA, 97, 6, 2, 7, 16(1), 360, 26, 16, 4, 302, 52
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:19 am. Original source ↗
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[2025] 6 S.C.R. 471 : 2025 INSC 703 Nagarajan & Anr.
v.
The State of Tamil Nadu (Criminal Appeal No. 1390 of 2025)
15 May 2025 [Dipankar Datta* and Manmohan , JJ.] Issue for Consideration Whether the benefit of the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 can be granted to the appellants; if the answer to the aforesaid issue is in the negative, can the reduced sentence that the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 Act envisages be imposed on the appellants instead.
Headnotes† Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 – s.20AA – Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 – s.97 – Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 – Offences under the PoFA Act took place in 2001 and 1985 – Appellants were convicted and sentenced – Mollification of sentence sought by the appellants:
Held: s.20AA, PoFA Act r/w s.97, FSS Act makes it clear that the benefit under the Probation Act is inapplicable to an offence committed under the PoFA Act, if the offence has been committed between introduction of s.20AA in 1976 and its repeal in 2006 by the FSS Act – However, in the facts and circumstances and the discrepancy in the analysis reports of the seized curd, the lead appeal is partly allowed following the decision in C. Mohammed – The connected appeal is also partly allowed in the interest of justice, equity, propriety and judicial comity on the basis of the dictum in A.K. Sarkar & Co. – Sentences imposed converted to fine. [Paras 47, 48] Interpretation of Statutes – Rule of literal construction – Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 – s.97 – Repeal and savings – Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 – s.20AA – Probation of Offenders Act, 1958:
Held: A ‘repeals and savings’ clause in any statute is not mere surplusage that the Courts may ignore in the interpretation of the * Author 472 [2025] 6 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports law – When a ‘repeal and savings’ clause specifically protects a penalty provided for in the old enactment, the intention of the legislature is clear – This Court cannot and should not provide a benefit to the accused that is not permitted in law – Mollification must only be provided in cases where a provision in relation to ‘repeal and savings’ is either not present or where the ‘repeal and savings’ clause envisages such a possibility – This Court cannot offend the express provisions present in any legislative instrument merely to provide a benefit to an offender, not envisaged under the law – General Clauses Act, 1897 – s.6, 26 – Constitution of India – Article 20. [Paras 41, 43] Case Law Cited T. Barai v. Henry Ah Hoe [1983] 1 SCR 905 : (1983) 1 SCC 177; Paramjit Singh v. Municipal Corpn. (1982) 3 SCC 317; Santosh Kumar v. Municipal Corpn. (2000) 9 SCC 151 – held inapplicable. Babu Ram v. State of Haryana (1987) Supp. SCC 12; Basheer v. State of Kerala [2004] 2 SCR 224 : (2004) 3 SCC 609;
C. Mohammed v. State of Kerala (2006) 13 SCC 290 – relied on. A.K. Sarkar & Co. v. State of W.B. [2024] 3 SCR 356 : (2024) 10 SCC 727; Ishar Das v. State of Punjab [1972] 3 SCR 312 : (1973) 2 SCC 65; Jai Narain v. Municipal Corpn. of Delhi [1973] 1 SCR 923 : (1972) 2 SCC 637; Pyarali K. Tejani v. Mahadeo Ramchandra Dange [1974] 2 SCR 154 : (1974) 1 SCC 167; Prem Ballab v. State (Delhi Admn.) [1977] 1 SCR 592 : (1977) 1 SCC 173; Nemi Chand v. State of Rajasthan (2018) 17 SCC 448; Rattan Lal v. State of Punjab [1964] 7 SCR 676 : 1964 SCC OnLine SC 40; Arvind Mohan Sinha v. Amulya Kumar Biswas [1974] 3 SCR 133 : (1974) 4 SCC 222 – referred to.
List of Acts Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954; Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006; Probation of Offenders Act, 1958; Constitution of India; Criminal Procedure Code, 1973; General Clauses Act, 1897. List of Keywords Food adulteration; Mollification of sentence; Benefit of probation; Repeals and savings clause; Release of offenders on probation; Samples of curd; Spice; Chilli powder, Flour; Cooking oil; Salt; Food Inspector; Rule of beneficial construction; Rule of statutory [2025] 6 S.C.R. 473Nagarajan & Anr. v. The State of Tamil Nadu interpretation; Rule of literal construction; Food adulteration; Crime against public health; Safety of consumers; Safety standards of food; Preventing adulterated food; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966; Discrepancy in the analysis reports; Seized curd; Interest of justice; Equity; Propriety; Judicial comity. Case Arising From CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
1390 of 2025 From the Judgment and Order dated 04.06.2019 of the High Court of Judicature at Madras at Madurai in CRLRC (MD) No. 111 of 2010 With Criminal Appeal No. 2054 of 2025 Appearances for Parties Advs. for the Appellants:
S. Nandakumar, Sr. Adv., R. Satish Kumar, Ms. V. Susheatha, Ms. Deepika Nandakumar, Aakash Elango, Ms. Sandhya Dutt, Mohit Kumar Gupta, P.V. Yogeswaran.
Adv. for the Respondent:
Sabarish Subramanian.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment Dipankar Datta, J.
The A ppeAls
1. The two criminal appeals before us, arising from different incidents of crime, question the correctness of two decisions of the respective High Courts involving the same question of law. We, therefore, propose to decide the said two appeals by this common judgment and order.
2. In the lead appeal, the appellants - Nagarajan and Selvaraj - have assailed the judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Madras 1 1 Madras High Court 474 [2025] 6 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports dated 04 th June, 2019 dismissing the criminal revision 2 filed by them on the grounds assigned therein.
3. In the connected appeal, the appellant - Naresh Chandra - has assailed the judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad 3 dated 04th July, 2019. The criminal revision 4 filed by the appellant was dismissed thereby on similar grounds.
FAcTuAl MATrix
4. The case of the prosecution in the lead appeal is that a sample of curd was taken from the shop of the appellants on 26th June, 2001 at about 14:30 hours and sent for analysis. The analysis revealed that the standard, prescribed under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 5 and the relevant rules, was not fulfilled. A complaint came to be registered followed by trial. Upon perusal of the evidence, vide judgment and order dated 18 th June, 2006, the Trial Court convicted Nagarajan and Selvaraj under Sections 7(1) and 16(1)(a)(i) r/w Section 2(ia)(a)(m) of the PoFA Act and sentenced them to undergo simple imprisonment for 6 (six) months each and to pay a fine of Rs. 3000/- each, in default to undergo simple imprisonment for 2 (two) months each.
5. Aggrieved, Nagarajan and Selvaraj filed an appeal 6 before the concerned Appellate Court, which confirmed the conviction and the sentence of the Trial Court vide judgment and order dated 18th December, 2009.
6. Still aggrieved, Nagarajan and Selvaraj invoked the revisional jurisdiction of the Madras High Court unsuccessfully.
7. The case of the prosecution in the connected appeal is that at about 10:45 hours on 20th March, 1985, in the area of Karkala Bazaar, the concerned Food Inspector found Naresh Chandra selling spice, chilli powder, flour, cooking oil, salt and other stuff. Upon suspicion, the Food Inspector presented Form VI to Naresh Chandra who refused to accept and sign it. The Food Inspector then called on witnesses 2 CRLRC (MD) No. 111/2010 3 Allahabad High Court 4 CRLR No. 1660/1998 5 PoFA Act 6 CA No. 183 of 2004 [2025] 6 S.C.R. 475Nagarajan & Anr. v. The State of Tamil Nadu present there; however, no one agreed to take part except one Radhey Lal (PW2). Thereupon, an attempt was made by the Food Inspector to take a sample on his own. Naresh Chandra intimidated the Food Inspector and refused to allow him to take a sample. The complaint lodged by the Food Inspector eventually led to a trial. The Trial Court vide order dated 25 th August, 1987 convicted Naresh Chandra u/s Section 7/10(1) r/w Section 16(1)(c)(d) of the PoFA Act and sentenced him to undergo simple imprisonment for 6 (six) months and fine of Rs. 1000/-, in default to undergo simple imprisonment for 2 (two) more months.
8. The conviction and sentence had been carried in appeal 7 by Naresh Chandra whereupon, the Appellate Court upheld the same and dismissed the appeal vide order dated 16 th November, 1988.
9. The appellate judgment and order having been subjected to challenge before the Allahabad High Court in its revisional jurisdiction, vide the impugned judgment, the court refused to interfere and dismissed the revision.
conTenTions
10. Mollification of sentence is sought on behalf of the two sets of appellants by learned counsel appearing on their behalf on the common following grounds:
a. That Section 20AA of the PoFA Act effectively denies the benefit of probation for first-time offenders, thereby violating Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
b. That Section 20AA of the PoFA Act violates Article 21 of the Constitution as denial of probation impacts the liberty of individuals without due consideration of their circumstances considering that the Probation of Offenders Act, 19588 is to rehabilitate offenders and reduce the burden on the prison system.
c. That Section 20AA of the PoFA Act contradicts the reformative justice approach enshrined in Section 360 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 9 which encourages rehabilitation of offenders.
7 Criminal Appeal No. 138 of 1987 8 Probation Act 9 Cr. PC 476 [2025] 6 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports d. That the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006,10 which repealed the PoFA Act, does not include a provision equivalent to Section 20AA evincing the legislative intent to move towards a reformatory framework.
11. However, learned counsel for the respondent in the lead appeal - State of Tamil Nadu - has placed great reliance on the express words in Section 20AA of the PoFA Act, prescribing a categorical and complete exclusion of the applicability of the Probation Act and Section 360 of the Cr. PC. Therefore, according to the State, the legislative intent is clear that food adulteration is a crime against public health and the perpetrators of such crimes must face consequences for their acts of crimes. Furthermore, emphasis was laid on incorporation of Section 20AA in the PoFA Act by way of amendment and reliance was placed on the Statement of Object and Reasons for such amendment highlighting the growing concern over the prevalence of food adulteration and the inadequacy of existing provincial laws to address the issue uniformly.
12. The State of Uttar Pradesh has not pressed any arguments before us. The legislATive FrAMework
13. Section 20AA was introduced in the PoFA Act though an amendment in 1976. It reads thus:
20AA. Application of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 and section 360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.—Nothing contained in the Probation of offenders Act, 1958 (20 of 1958) or section 360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) shall apply to a person convicted of an offence under this Act unless that person is under eighteen years of age.
14. The PoFA Act was repealed by the FSS Act. We may also refer to Section 97 of the FSS Act, which deals with ‘repeal and savings’. The proviso to Section 97 specifically saves certain aspects of the PoFA Act. The relevant part is reproduced below:
10 FSS Act [2025] 6 S.C.R. 477Nagarajan & Anr. v. The State of Tamil Nadu
97. Repeal and savings.– … Provided that such repeal shall not affect:—
(i) the previous operations of the enactment and Orders under repeal or anything duly done or suffered there under; or
(ii) any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any of the enactment or Orders under repeal; or
(iii) any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offences committed against the enactment and Orders under repeal; or
(iv) any investigation or remedy in respect of any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment, and any such investigation, legal proceedings or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed, as if this Act had not been passed.
15. The appellants have largely based their arguments on the basis of Article 20(1) of the Constitution, which is as follows:
20. Protection in respect of conviction for offences.—
(1) No person shall be convicted of any offence except for violation of a law in force at the time of the commission of the Act charged as an offence, nor be subjected to a penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted under the law in force at the time of the commission of the offence.
16. Article 15(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966, which was ratified by India in 1979, includes a provision similar to Article 20(1) of the Constitution. It says:
Article 15. 1. No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier 478 [2025] 6 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time when the criminal offence was committed. If, subsequent to the commission of the offence, provision is made by law for the imposition of a lighter penalty, the offender shall benefit thereby.
17. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 189711 notes the effect of a repeal of any enactment:
6. Effect of repeal.—Where this Act, or any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not—
(a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect; or
(b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder; or
(c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed; or
(d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed against any enactment so repealed; or
(e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid; and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the repealing Act or Regulation had not been passed.
18. Section 26 of the GC Act positing a situation of an offence being punishable under two or more enactments, ordains that the offender shall be liable to punishment only under one of those enactments and not under both [quite falling in line with Article 20(2) of the Constitution]. It reads thus:
11 GC Act, hereafter [2025] 6 S.C.R. 479Nagarajan & Anr. v. The State of Tamil Nadu
26. Provision as to offences punishable under two or more enactments.—Where an act or omission constitutes an offence under two or more enactments, then the offender shall be liable to be prosecuted and punished under either or any of those enactments, but shall not be liable to be punished twice for the same offence
19. The relevant part of Section 16 of the PoFA Act stipulating penalties reads as follows:
16. Penalties.—(1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (1A) if any person—
(a) Whether by himself or by any other person on his behalf, imports into India or manufacturers for sale or stores, sells or distributes any article of food—
(i) which is adulterated within the meaning of sub-clause (m) of clause (ia) of section 2 or misbranded within the meaning of clause (ix)
of that section or the sale of which is prohibited under any provision of this Act or any rule made thereunder or by an order of the Food (Health)
Authority;
(ii) Other than an article of food referred to in sub-clause (I), in contravention of any of the provision of this Act or of any rule made thereunder, or …
(c) prevents a food inspector from taking a sample as authorised by this Act; or
(d) prevents a food inspector from exercising any other power conferred on him by or under this Act;
… he shall, in addition to the penalty to which he may be liable under the provisions of section 6, be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months but which may extend to three years, and with fine which shall not be less than one thousand rupees: … 480 [2025] 6 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports QuesTions
20. Special Leave Petitions having been presented before this Court by the two sets of appellants, separate coordinate Benches issued notice, limited to the question of sentence.
21. Based on the rival contentions, two short but interesting interconnected questions of law arise for decision in the present appeals:
(i) whether the benefit of the provisions of the Probation Act can be granted to the respective appellants? (ii) should the answer to the above question be in the negative, can the reduced sentence that the FSS Act envisages be imposed on the appellants instead? A nAlysis
22. We now proceed with our analysis. The task ought to commence with a study of judicial precedents.
precedenTs
23. The parties before us have referred to a catena of decisions of this Court in support of their contentions. A study of such decisions along with a few other decisions would provide guidance for the ultimate disposal of these appeals.
24. Prior to 1976, i.e., before Section 20AA was included in the PoFA Act, there was no doubt that the Probation Act applied to the offences committed under the PoFA Act. A profitable reference may be made to the decision in Ishar Das v. State of Punjab,12 wherein Hon’ble H.R. Khanna, J. (as His Lordship then was) speaking for the Bench observed:
“9. The provisions of Probation of Offenders Act, in our opinion, point to the conclusion that their operation is not excluded in the case of persons found guilty of offences under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. Assuming that there was reasonable doubt or ambiguity, the principle to be applied in construing a penal act is that such doubt or ambiguity should be resolved in favour of the person who would be liable to the penalty (see Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, p. 239, 12th Edn). It has also to be borne in mind
12 (1973) 2 SCC 65
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 481Nagarajan & Anr. v. The State of Tamil Nadu that the Probation of Offenders Act was enacted in 1958 subsequent to the enactment in 1954 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. As the legislature enacted the Probation of Offenders Act despite the existence on the statute book of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, the operation of the provisions of Probation of Offenders Art cannot be whittled down or circumscribed because of the provisions of the earlier enactment viz. Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. Indeed, as mentioned earlier, the non obstante clause in Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act is a clear manifestation of the intention of the legislature that the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act would have effect notwithstanding any other law for the time being in force...”
However, Their Lordships rightly cautioned against resorting to the provisions in the Probation Act in normal circumstances and instead advocated adoption thereof on a case-to-case approach such that the Court is convinced about the application of the Probation Act: “10. Adulteration of food is a menace to public health. The Prevention of Food Adulteration Act has been enacted with the aim of eradicating that anti-social evil and for ensuring purity in the articles of food. In view of the above object of the Act and the intention of the legislature as revealed by the fact that a minimum sentence of imprisonment for a period of six months and a fine of rupees one thousand has been prescribed. The courts should not lightly resort to the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act in the case of persons above 21 years of age found guilty of offences under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act...” (emphasis supplied)
25. Thereafter, a three-Judge Bench of this Court dealing with an offence under the PoFA Act in Jai Narain v. Municipal Corpn. of Delhi,13 while upholding the view expressed in Ishar Das (supra), held that the conduct of the appellant therein being anti-social did not merit the application of the Probation Act.
13 (1972) 2 SCC 637
482 [2025] 6 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
26. Yet again, in the case of Pyarali K. Tejani v. Mahadeo Ramchandra Dange,14 this Court, through Hon’ble V.R. Krishna Iyer, J., upheld the view in Ishar Das (supra) and observed that the offence under the PoFA Act is an economic offence and would therefore, not be easily susceptible to the probationary process. We quote His Lordship hereunder:
“28. The kindly application of the probation principles is negatived by the imperatives of social defence and the improbabilities of moral proselyti-sation. No chances can be taken by society with a man whose anti-social operations, disguised as a respectable trade, imperil numerous innocents. He is a security risk. Secondly, these economic offences committed by white-collar criminals are unlikely to be dissuaded by the gentle probationary process. Neither casual provocation nor motive against particular persons but planned profit-making from numbers of consumers furnishes the incentive — not easily humanised by the therapeutic probationary measure. It is not without significance that the recent report (47th report) of the Law Commission of India has recommended the exclusion of the Act to social and economic offences by suitable amendments. It observed:
‘We appreciate that the suggested amendment would be in apparent conflict with current trends in sentencing. But ultimately, the justification of all sentencing is the protection of society. There are occasions when an offender is so anti-social that his immediate and sometimes prolonged confinement is the best assurance of society’s protection. The consideration of rehabilitation has to give way, because of the paramount need for the protection of society. We are, therefore, recommending suitable amendment in all the Acts, to exclude probation in the above cases’.”
27. Shortly after the amendment in 1976, this Court speaking through Hon’ble P.N. Bhagwati, J. (as His Lordship then was) in Prem Ballab v.
14 (1974) 1 SCC 167
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 483Nagarajan & Anr. v. The State of Tamil Nadu State (Delhi Admn.),15 while deciding on a similar issue arising from the unamended statute, observed that:
“7. …The imperatives of social defence must discourage the applicability of the probation principle. No chances can be taken by society with a man whose anti-social activities, in the guise of a respectable trade, jeopardise the health and well-being of numerous innocent consumers. The adulterator is a social risk. It might be dangerous to leave him free to carry on his nefarious activities by applying the probation principle to him. Moreover, it must be remembered that adulteration is an economic offence prompted by profit motive and it is not likely to lend itself easily to therapeutic treatment by the probationary measure. It may be pointed out that the Law Commission also in its Forty-seventh Report recommended the exclusion of applicability of the probationary process in case of social and economic offences and presumably in response to this recommendation, the legislature has recently amended the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 by introducing Section 20AA providing that nothing contained in the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 or Section 360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 shall apply to a person convicted of an offence under the Act unless that person is under eighteen years of age. This amendment of course would not apply in the present case but it shows the legislative trend which it would not be right for the court to ignore. We cannot, therefore, give the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 to the appellants and release them on probation.”
(emphasis supplied)
28. However, another three-Judge Bench of this Court in T. Barai v. Henry Ah Hoe,16 was called upon to decide various issues including the issue whether a convict is entitled to the mollified sentence on account of the fact that the new Central enactment provided for a
15 (1977) 1 SCC 173
16 (1983) 1 SCC 177
484 [2025] 6 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports lesser punishment for the same offence as compared with an older State enactment under which the appellant was convicted. Hon’ble A.P. Sen, J. (as His Lordship then was) speaking for the Bench ruled that:
“11. It was not long before Parliament stepped in to meet the growing menace of the anti-social offence of adulteration of articles of food meant for human consumption which was a threat to the national well-being and it was felt that such offences must be ruthlessly dealt with. It was also felt that there should be a summary trial of these offences. The Prevention of Food Adulteration (Amendment) Act, 1976 was accordingly brought into force with effect from April 1, 1976. It not only created new offences but also enhanced the punishment provided. But at the same time it also provided for graded punishment for various types of offences. Incidentally, it mollified the rigour of the law by providing for a reduced punishment for an offence punishable under Section 16(1)(a). We are however not concerned with other types of offences except the one punishable under Section 16(1)(a) and for this the maximum punishment provided was for a term of three years instead of six years… …
22. It is only retroactive criminal legislation that is prohibited under Article 20(1). The prohibition contained in Article 20(1) is that no person shall be convicted of any offence except for violation of a law in force at the time of the commission of the act charged as an offence prohibits nor shall he be subjected to a penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted under the law in force at the time of the commission of the offence. It is quite clear that insofar as the Central Amendment Act creates new offences or enhances punishment for a particular type of offence no person can be convicted by such ex post facto law nor can the enhanced punishment prescribed by the amendment be applicable. But insofar as the Central Amendment Act reduces the punishment for an offence punishable under Section 16(1)(a) of the Act, there is no [2025] 6 S.C.R. 485Nagarajan & Anr. v. The State of Tamil Nadu reason why the accused should not have the benefit of such reduced punishment. The rule of beneficial construction requires that even ex post facto law of such a type should be applied to mitigate the rigour of the law. The principle is based both on sound reason and common sense.
23. To illustrate, if Parliament were to reenact Section 302 of the Penal Code, 1860 and provide that the punishment for an offence of murder shall be sentence for imprisonment for life instead of the present sentence of death or imprisonment for life, then it cannot be that the courts would still award a sentence of death even in pending cases.
25. It is settled both on authority and principle that when a later statute again describes an offence created by an earlier statute and imposes a different punishment, or varies the procedure, the earlier statute is repealed by implication…The rule is however subject to the limitation contained in Article 20(1) against ex post facto law providing for a greater punishment and has also no application where the offence described in the later Act is not the same as in the earlier Act i.e. when the essential ingredients of the two offences are different.
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