Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. & Ors. v. Adani Power Rajasthan Ltd. & Anr.
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 770; [2025] 5 S.C.R. 2486
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice M.M. Sundresh, Justice Rajesh Bindal
- Decided
- 23 May 2025
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 4336/2025
- Sections
- 86, 111, 127, 125, 100, 3
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:19 am. Original source ↗
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[2025] 5 S.C.R. 2486 : 2025 INSC 770 Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. & Ors.
v.
Adani Power Rajasthan Ltd. & Anr.
(Civil Appeal No. 4336 of 2025)
23 May 2025 [M.M. Sundresh* and Rajesh Bindal, JJ.] Issue for Consideration Issue pertains to whether the notification by the Coal India imposing Evacuation Facility Charges constituted a change in law under the Power Purchase Agreement; and as regards the interpretation of Article 10.2.1 vis-à-vis Article 10.5 of the PPA with specific reference to 10.5.1(ii).
Headnotes† Electricity Act, 2003 – Power Purchase Agreement – Art.10 – Principles for computing impact of Change in Law – Tariff Adjustment Payment on account of Change in Law – Power Purchase Agreement between the appellants-Discoms and respondent No.1-Power Generator for the supply of 1200 MW power – Issuance of Notification by Coal India imposing a levy of Evacuation Facility Charges – Next day, respondent No.1 informed appellants that the Notification constituted a ‘change in law’ event – Respondent no.1 then filed a Petition before the Electricity Regulatory Commission – Some reliefs allowed, and against refusal of some of the claims, the respondent No.1 filed an appeal – Appellate tribunal allowed the delay in filing and re-filing of the appeal – Appellate tribunal held that the Notification would amount to a change in law, and the respondent No.1 would be entitled to the grant of compensation from the date of the Notification along with carrying cost at Late Payment Surcharge rates and remanded the matter to the Commission for computation of the amounts – Challenge to: Held: All such additional charges which are payable on account of orders, directions, notifications, regulations, etc. issued by the instrumentalities of the State, after the cut-off date, will have to * Author [2025] 5 S.C.R. 2487Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. & Ors. v. Adani Power Rajasthan Ltd. & Anr.
be considered to be “change in law” events – Generators would be entitled to compensation on the restitutionary principle on such changes occurring after the cut-off date – Art.10.2.1 in the PPA was incorporated based on the principle of restitution, to compensate the affected party in order to restore it to the same economic position, but for the change in law – This particular provision is a substantive one, which in a normal circumstance, has to be given effect to in letter and spirit – Under Art.10.5.1(i) of the PPA, the adjustment in monthly tariff payment shall become effective from the date notified in the change in law – Art. 10.5.1(ii) of the PPA emerge where there is an adjudication by way of an order/judgment of a competent Court or Tribunal or an Indian Governmental Instrumentality, is not applicable to the facts of the instant case since there is no change in law which has occasioned by way of an interpretation given by a Court or a Tribunal or an Indian Governmental Instrumentality – Thus, no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment – Liability has been fastened upon the appellants under the agreement – Submission that the supplementary bill ought to have been raised earlier and, thus, the payment can only be made thereafter has neither a factual basis nor a legal one. [Paras 18, 21-25, 28] Case Law Cited GMR Warora Energy Ltd. v. CERC [2023] 8 SCR 183 : (2023) 10 SCC 401; Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd. v. Adani Power Ltd. [2019] 4 SCR 487 : (2019) 5 SCC 325; Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd. v. Adani Power (Mundra) Ltd. [2022] 11 SCR 102 : (2023) 2 SCC 624 – relied on.
Prem Cottex v. Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd. [2021] 8 SCR 645 : (2021) 20 SCC 200 – referred to.
List of Acts Electricity Act, 2003; Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. List of Keywords Evacuation Facility Charges; Change in law; Power Purchase Agreement; Principles for computing impact of Change in Law; Tariff Adjustment Payment; Electricity Regulatory Commission; Late Payment Surcharge rates; Additional charges; Compensation; Restitutionary principle; Cut-off date; Principle of restitution; Monthly tariff payment; Supplementary bill.
2488 [2025] 5 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Case Arising From CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 4336 of 2025 From the Judgment and Order dated 18.04.2024 of the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity at New Delhi in AN No. 237 of 2023 Appearances for Parties Advs. for the Appellants:
Shyam Divan, Sr. Adv., Kartik Seth, Ms. Shriya Gilhotra, Raghav Sharma, Saurabh Chaturvedi, Chiranjeev Sharma, M/S. Chambers of Kartik Seth.
Advs. for the Respondents:
Dr. A.M. Singhvi, Sr. Adv., Mahesh Agarwal, Amit Kapur, Ms. Poonam Sengupta, Arshit Anand, Shashwat Singh, Saunak Rajguru, Subham Bhut, Siddharth Seem, E. C. Agrawala. Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment M.M. Sundresh, J.
1. Admit.
2. We have heard the learned Senior Counsel, Mr. Shyam Divan and learned Counsel, Mr. Karthik Seth appearing for the appellants and the learned Senior Counsel, Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi appearing for the respondent No. 1, at length. All the relevant documents, including the written submissions of the parties, have been perused.
3. In pursuance of the Letter of Intent issued to Adani Power Rajasthan Ltd. (respondent No.1-Power Generator), on 17.12.2009, a Power Purchase Agreement (hereinafter referred to as the “PPA”) dated 28.01.2010 was entered into between appellant Nos.1, 2 and 3, who are the Rajasthan Discoms engaged in the distribution and supply of electricity, on one side and respondent No.1 on the other, for the supply of 1200 MW Aggregate Contracted Capacity at a levelized tariff of Rs.3.238 per unit. The same was duly approved by respondent No.2.
4. While the agreement was in operation, a Notification came to be issued at the instance of M/s. Coal India Limited (hereinafter referred [2025] 5 S.C.R. 2489Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. & Ors. v. Adani Power Rajasthan Ltd. & Anr.
to as “CIL”), dated 19.12.2017, imposing a levy of Evacuation Facility Charges (hereinafter referred to as the “EFC”) with effect from 20.12.2017. Immediately, on the very next day i.e. 20.12.2017, respondent No.1 informed appellant No. 4 that the Notification dated 19.12.2017 constituted a ‘change in law’ event. The Notification dated 19.12.2017 is extracted below:
“COAL INDIA LIMITED A Maharatna Company (A Govt. of India Enterprise)
COAL BHAWAN
Sales & Marketing Division Ground & Floor, Premises No, 04 MAR, Plot No. AF-III, Action Area -1A Rajarhat, New Town, Kolkata - 700156 Phone: 033-71104143, Fax: 033-23244229, Website:
………………………………
CIN: L23 L09WB1973GO1028844
PRICE NOTIFICATION: CIL:S&M: GM(F)Pricing 2017/ 1005 dated 19th Dec. 2017 Charge of Rs. 50 (Fifty) per tonne shall be levied as ‘Evacuation Facility Charges’ on all despatches except despatch through rapid loading arrangement. This is effective from 00:00 hour of 20” Dec. 2017. This issues with the approval of the competent authority.
General Manager (M&S)
Marketing & Sales”
5. On its failure in eliciting a suitable reply, respondent No.1 filed a Petition bearing No.1373/2018 before the Rajasthan Electricity Regulatory Commission (hereinafter referred to as the “RERC”), invoking Section 86 of the Electricity Act, 2003 (hereinafter referred to as the “2003 Act”) read with Article 10 of the PPA. While rejecting some of the reliefs, the RERC did allow some of the other prayers 2490 [2025] 5 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports sought for by respondent No.1. Against the refusal of some of the claims, the respondent No. 1 filed an appeal before the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity (hereinafter referred to as the “APTEL”).
6. The appeal under Section 111 of the 2003 Act was so made along with an application seeking condonation of delay of 332 days in filing. Another application was filed seeking to condone the delay of 236 days in re-filing the appeal. Upon hearing both sides, the aforesaid applications were allowed and, thereafter, the appeal was decided on merits. It is pertinent to note that the common order by the APTEL, dated 23.01.2023, condoning the delay on both counts, has attained finality for want of further challenge.
7. The APTEL, inter alia, held by its judgment dated 18.04.2024, after elaborately considering the submissions made by both sides, that the Notification dated 19.12.2017 would amount to a change in law, and the respondent No. 1 would be entitled to the grant of compensation from the date of the Notification, by taking note of the decision rendered by this Court in GMR Warora Energy Ltd. v. CERC (2023) 10 SCC 401 (hereinafter referred to as “GMR Warora”) which, in turn, also placed reliance upon the earlier decisions of this Court. While doing so, it also took into consideration, the fair submission made on behalf of the appellants that the principal issue of levy of EFC, and consequently, the date from which the respondent No. 1 would be entitled to the grant of compensation, is covered by the aforementioned judgement. Further reliance was placed on the said decision by the APTEL, for the purpose of granting carrying cost at the rate of Late Payment Surcharge (hereinafter referred to as “LPS”), on a compounding basis, which is to be reckoned from the date of the Notification. The submission made by the appellants before the APTEL that a supplementary bill is mandatory before seeking relief for the LPS was also considered and rejected. Once again, the impact of delay was argued and considered with specific reference to carrying cost. Accordingly, the following conclusion was arrived at: “X.CONCLUSION:
The Appellant shall, in terms of what has been indicated hereinabove, be entitled for the benefit of the change in law event on account of evacuation facility charges from the date on which the notification, issued by Coal India Limited, was made applicable to them. The sum representing this [2025] 5 S.C.R. 2491Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. & Ors. v. Adani Power Rajasthan Ltd. & Anr.
benefit shall be paid by Respondents 2 to 5 to the appellant along with carrying cost at LPS rates. While the Appellant shall not be entitled for carrying cost (much less at LPS rates), for the delay of 332 days in filing the Appeal, they shall be given credit for the sum of Rs.5 lakhs paid by them earlier as a condition for condoning the delay in filing the Appeal, since they are now being denied carrying cost for the said period of delay. The matter is remanded to the Respondent-Commission to compute the amounts which the Appellant is entitled to in terms of this Judgment. The Appeal is disposed of accordingly.”
8. When the appeal was filed before this Court, it was entertained, limiting its scope only to the interpretation of Article 10.2.1 vis-à-vis 10.5 of the PPA, with specific reference to 10.5.1 (ii). The following is the order passed by this Court on 09.09.2024:
“We have heard learned senior counsel for the parties at length.
Most of the issues raised in the present matter are covered by earlier decisions of this Court in ‘GMR Warora Energy Ltd. v. CERC & Ors.’, (2023) 10 SCC 401, ‘UHBVNL v. Adani Power (Mundra) Limited’, (2023) 2 SCC 624, ‘UHBVNL v. Adani Power Limited’, (2019) 5 SCC 325 and ‘MSEDCL v. MERC & Ors.’, (2022) 4 SCC 657. We may note that the delay in refiling has been duly considered earlier by the APTEL while condoning it. The said order has attained finality.
The only issue which might arise for consideration in this appeal pertains to the interpretation of Article 10.2.1 vis-à-vis Article 10.5 of the PPA with specific reference to 10.5.1 (ii).
Learned senior counsel for the respondents seeks and is granted two weeks’ time to file a counter affidavit. Rejoinder affidavit shall be filed within a period of two weeks thereafter.
List on 26.11.2024.”
(emphasis supplied)
2492 [2025] 5 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANTS
9. Notwithstanding the aforesaid order passed on 09.09.2024, the learned Senior Counsel and learned Counsel appearing for the appellants, made elaborate submissions on the other issues as well. It is submitted that the delay has occasioned only due to the fault of respondent No.1 through the litigation process and, therefore, what is to be applied is Article 10.5.1 (ii). The APTEL was wrong in condoning the delay by allowing the applications filed by respondent No.1. There is no basis for awarding carrying cost at the rate of LPS, and the APTEL ought not to have awarded the same as the LPS is granted only when there is a delay in the payment of a supplementary bill. The learned Senior Counsel placed substantial reliance on the PPA to contend that it is respondent No.1 who did not raise the supplementary bill at the earliest point of time, as mandated under Article 8 of the PPA. The decision rendered by this Court in GMR Warora (supra) does not apply to the case of respondent No.1, considering that in the said case, a supplementary bill was indeed raised. Unless a demand is raised, there is no question of payment that would arise, as there is a clear distinction between the liability to pay, as against an obligation to pay. In support of his contention, the learned Senior Counsel has also placed reliance upon the decision of this Court in Prem Cottex v. Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd., (2021) 20 SCC 200.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS
10. The learned Senior Counsel Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi appearing for the respondent No. 1, submits that there exists a preliminary objection as arguments have been made by the appellants beyond the scope of not only the present appeal but also the order, dated 09.09.2024, of this Court. The issues sought to be raised by the appellants have already been settled by this Court in not only GMR Warora (supra) but also in two other decisions of this Court in Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd. v. Adani Power Ltd., (2019) 5 SCC 325 (hereinafter referred to as “UHBVNL 2019”) and Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd. v. Adani Power (Mundra) Ltd., (2023) 2 SCC 624 (hereinafter referred to as “UHBVNL 2023”).
11. There is no question of raising a supplementary bill earlier, in view of the definite stand taken by the appellants on the notification [2025] 5 S.C.R. 2493Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. & Ors. v. Adani Power Rajasthan Ltd. & Anr.
made by respondent No.1 on 20.12.2017. It is nobody’s case that the appellants were going to honour the bill if raised at the earliest point of time, as contended by them. The APTEL itself has held that respondent No.1 is not entitled to carrying cost for the period of delay in filing the appeal. The orders passed on that count have attained finality. The appellants are making a futile attempt at reopening the issues which are closed. Thus, it is a fit case where the appeal has to be dismissed with costs, particularly when appropriate orders have been passed by the RERC in pursuance of the order of remand made by the APTEL.
12. Before we deal with the submissions made by the parties, we deem it appropriate to discuss and elaborate on the scope of appeals under the 2003 Act.
SCOPE OF APPEALS UNDER THE ELECTRICITY ACT, 2003
13. Whenever a statute provides for an appeal, a Court is expected to restrain itself to the contours of the powers conferred under it. The nature and status of the Court loses its significance as it only draws its powers from the statute alone, and not beyond. After all, judicial restraint and sobriety, when consciously restricted by the Legislature, forms an integral part of the duties and functions of the Court. Section 111 of the 2003 Act “111. Appeal to Appellate Tribunal.— (1) Any person aggrieved by an order made by an adjudicating officer under this Act (except under Section 127) or an order made by the Appropriate Commission under this Act may prefer an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity: Provided that any person appealing against the order of the adjudicating officer levying any penalty shall, while filing the appeal, deposit the amount of such penalty:
Provided further that where in any particular case, the Appellate Tribunal is of the opinion that the deposit of such penalty would cause undue hardship to such person, it may dispense with such deposit subject to such conditions as it may deem fit to impose so as to safeguard the realisation of penalty.
2494 [2025] 5 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
(2) Every appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed within a period of forty-five days from the date on which a copy of the order made by the adjudicating officer or the Appropriate Commission is received by the aggrieved person and it shall be in such form, verified in such manner and be accompanied by such fee as may be prescribed: Provided that the Appellate Tribunal may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of forty-five days if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing it within that period.
(3) On receipt of an appeal under sub-section (1), the Appellate Tribunal may, after giving the parties to the appeal an opportunity of being heard, pass such orders thereon as it thinks fit, confirming, modifying or setting aside the order appealed against.
(4) The Appellate Tribunal shall send a copy of every order made by it to the parties to the appeal and to the concerned adjudicating officer or the Appropriate Commission, as the case may be.
(5) The appeal filed before the Appellate Tribunal under sub-section (1) shall be dealt with by it as expeditiously as possible and endeavour shall be made by it to dispose of the appeal finally within one hundred and eighty days from the date of receipt of the appeal:
Provided that where any appeal could not be disposed of within the said period of one hundred and eighty days, the Appellate Tribunal shall record its reasons in writing for not disposing of the appeal within the said period.
(6) The Appellate Tribunal may, for the purpose of examining the legality, propriety or correctness of any order made by the adjudicating officer or the Appropriate Commission under this Act, as the case may be, in relation to any proceeding, on its own motion or otherwise, call for the records of such proceedings and make such order in the case as it thinks fit.”
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 2495Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. & Ors. v. Adani Power Rajasthan Ltd. & Anr.
Section 125 of the 2003 Act “125. Appeal to Supreme Court.—Any person aggrieved by any decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal, may, file an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days from the date of communication of the decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal, to him, on any one or more of the grounds specified in Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908):
Provided that the Supreme Court may, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within the said period, allow it to be filed within a further period not exceeding sixty days.”
Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 “100. Second appeal.— (1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from every decree passed in appeal by any Court subordinate to the High Court, if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law.
(2) An appeal may lie under this section from an appellate decree passed ex- parte.
(3) In an appeal under this section, the memorandum of appeal shall precisely state the substantial question of law involved in the appeal.
(4) Where the High Court is satisfied that a substantial question of law is involved in any case, it shall formulate that question.
(5) The appeal shall be heard on the question so formulated and the respondent shall, at the hearing of the appeal, be allowed to argue that the case does not involve such question:
Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall be deemed to take away or abridge the power of the Court to hear, for reasons to be recorded, the appeal on any other substantial 2496 [2025] 5 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports question of law, not formulated by it, if it is satisfied that the case involves such question.”
14. Under Section 111 of the 2003 Act, the APTEL is vested with all the powers that can possibly be exercised by the Regulatory Commission. In other words, it is the final Court of fact and law.
15. However, under Section 125 of the 2003 Act, the powers expected to be exercised by this Court is circumscribed and controlled by the pari materia provision contained under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as “the CPC”). Thus, it is axiomatic that an appellant has to raise a substantial question of law, which if the Court finds to be in existence, shall accordingly frame it in whatever manner it deems fit and proper, and put it to the other side to respond. It is for this Court to ultimately consider the existence of a substantial question of law and if it does so, answer it accordingly. We will only clarify that there is no bar for this Court to add any number of substantial questions of law even after framing one earlier, in which case the respondents will have to be given due notice of the same.
16. Section 100 of the CPC, after its amendment in the year 1978, consciously concerns itself with a question of law which shall be substantial in nature. Therefore, a mere question of law would not be sufficient enough to entertain an appeal under Section 125 of the 2003 Act. Added to that, it should be such that the substantial question of law, if answered in the affirmative in favour of the appellant, shall have the effect of reversing the decision of the APTEL. While deciding a substantial question of law, this Court shall do so, based upon the findings of fact rendered by the APTEL, unless by way of an exception, a perversity is found thereunder. In a case where a finding is rendered contrary to the records, without assigning any reason, and/or on a total misconception of the fact seen apparently on the face of the record, may in a given case, give rise to a substantial question of law. Suffice it is to state that a substantial question of law has to be framed by this Court in exercise of the power under Section 125 of the 2003 Act and, thereafter, to be answered accordingly.
17. In the facts of the instant case, we have indeed framed only one substantial question of law vide order dated 09.09.2024, as aforementioned. Though we did permit the appellants to raise all the other issues and considered them as not feasible, the fact remains that they do not constitute substantial questions of law. [2025] 5 S.C.R. 2497Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. & Ors. v. Adani Power Rajasthan Ltd. & Anr.
DISCUSSION
18. The issue with respect to change in law over a notification issued by a public authority and the resultant date to be reckoned has indeed attained finality pursuant to the judgments delivered by this Court in GMR Warora Energy Ltd. (supra), UHBVNL 2019 (supra) and UHBVNL 2023 (supra).
GMR Warora Energy Ltd. v. CERC (2023) 10 SCC 401 “95. For appreciating the rival submissions, we will have to construe the term “Law”, which has been defined in the PPAs, which reads thus:
“ “Law” means, in relation to this Agreement, all laws including Electricity laws in force in India and any statute, ordinance, regulation, notification or code, rule, or any interpretation of any of them by an Indian Governmental Instrumentality and having force of law and shall further include all applicable rules, regulations, orders, notifications by an Indian Governmental Instrumentality pursuant to or under any of them and shall include all rules, regulations, decisions and orders of CERC and MERC.”
96. Perusal of the definition of the term “Law” itself would clearly show that the term “Law” would mean all laws including Electricity laws in force in India and any statute, ordinance, regulation, notification or code, rule, or any interpretation of any of them by an Indian governmental instrumentality and having force of law. It would further reveal that the term “Law” shall also include all applicable rules, regulations, orders, notifications by an Indian governmental instrumentality and shall also include all rules, regulations, decisions and orders of CERC and MERC.
97. In any case, the issue as to what would amount to “Law” is no more res integra. This Court, in Energy Watchdog [Energy Watchdog v. CERC, (2017) 14 SCC 2498 [2025] 5 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports 80 : (2018) 1 SCC (Civ) 133] , has observed thus : (SCC p. 131, para 57)
“57. Both the letter dated 31-7-2013 and the revised Tariff Policy are statutory documents being issued under Section 3 of the Act and have the force of law. This being so, it is clear that so far as the procurement of Indian coal is concerned, to the extent that the supply from Coal India and other Indian sources is cut down, the PPA read with these documents provides in Clause 13.2 that while determining the consequences of change in law, parties shall have due regard to the principle that the purpose of compensating the party affected by such change in law is to restore, through monthly tariff payments, the affected party to the economic position as if such change in law has not occurred. Further, for the operation period of the PPA, compensation for any increase/decrease in cost to the seller shall be determined and be effective from such date as decided by the Central Electricity Regulation Commission. This being the case, we are of the view that though change in Indonesian law would not qualify as a change in law under the guidelines read with the PPA, change in Indian law certainly would.”
98. The aforesaid view of this Court taken in Energy Watchdog [Energy Watchdog v. CERC, (2017) 14 SCC 80 : (2018) 1 SCC (Civ) 133] has been approved by a Bench of three learned Judges of this Court in Adani Rajasthan case [Jaipur Vidyut Vitaran Nigam Ltd. v. Adani Power Rajasthan Ltd., (2021) 18 SCC 478] and also followed by this Court when the two linked matters out of this batch of appeals were decided by this Court in Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Co. Ltd. v. Adani Power Maharashtra Ltd. [(2023) 7 SCC 401] It cannot be denied that CIL is an instrumentality of the Government of India and its orders, insofar as price of fuel is concerned, are binding on all its subsidiaries.
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 2499Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. & Ors. v. Adani Power Rajasthan Ltd. & Anr.
***
100. As discussed hereinabove, the term “Law”
would also include all applicable rules, regulations, orders, notifications issued by an Indian governmental instrumentality.
101. It would thus be clear that all such additional charges which are payable on account of orders, directions, notifications, regulations, etc. issued by the instrumentalities of the State, after the cut-off date, will have to be considered to be “change in law” events. The generators would be entitled to compensation on the restitutionary principle on such changes occurring after the cut-off date.
***
111. Undisputedly, EFC was imposed by CIL vide its Circular dated 19-12-2017.
112. As already discussed hereinabove, CIL is an instrumentality of the State. It is thus clear that, on the cut-off date, there was no requirement of EFC, which has been brought into effect only on 19-12-2017. As such, the circular of CIL dated 19-12-2017 would also amount to “change in law”.
***
117. For considering the rival submissions, it will be apposite to refer to the following articles, which are almost common in most of the PPAs:
“11. Billing and payment.— ***
11.3. Payment of monthly bills.— *** 11.3.4. In the event of delay in payment of a monthly bill by any procurer beyond its due date, a late payment surcharge shall be payable by the procurer to the seller at the rate of two 2500 [2025] 5 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
(2) per cent in excess of the applicable SBAR per annum, on the amount of outstanding payment, calculated on a day-to-day basis (and compounded with monthly rest), for each day of the delay.
***
11.8. Payment of supplementary bill.— 11.8.1. Either party may raise a bill on the other party (“supplementary bill”) for payment on account of:
(i) Adjustments required by the Regional Energy Account (if applicable);
(ii) Tariff payment for change in parameters, pursuant to provisions in Schedule 5; or
(iii) Change in law as provided in Article 13 and such bill shall be paid by the other party.
*** 11.8.3. In the event of delay in payment of a supplementary bill by either party beyond one month from the date of billing, a late payment surcharge shall be payable at same terms applicable to the monthly bill in Article 11.3.4.”
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