The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 481; [2025] 4 S.C.R. 985
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice J.B. Pardiwala, Justice R Mahadevan
- Decided
- 8 Apr 2025
- Case number
- WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) No. 1239/2023
- Sections
- 75, 17A(1), 19(1), 19, 8(3), 12, 15, 4, 3, 57, 7, 27
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[2025] 4 S.C.R. 985 : 2025 INSC 481 The State of Tamil Nadu v.
The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.
(Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1239 of 2023)
08 April 2025 [J.B. Pardiwala* and R. Mahadevan, JJ.] Issue for Consideration a. What courses of action are available to the Governor in exercise of his powers under Article 200 of the Constitution. b. Whether the Governor can reserve a Bill for the consideration of the President when it is presented to him for assent after being reconsidered in accordance with the first proviso to Article 200, more particularly, when he had not reserved it for the consideration of the President in the first instance.
c. Whether there is an express constitutionally prescribed time limit within which the Governor is required to act in the exercise of his powers under Article 200 of the Constitution.
d. Whether the Governor in the exercise of his powers under Article 200 of the Constitution can only act in accordance with the aid and advice tendered to him by the State Council of Ministers or whether he has discretion in discharge of his functions under the provision.
e. Whether the exercise of discretion by the Governor in discharge of his functions under Article 200 of the Constitution could be said to be subject to judicial review? If yes, what are the parameters for such judicial review.
f. What is the manner in which the President under Article 201 of the Constitution is required to act once a Bill has been reserved for his consideration by the Governor under Article 200 of the Constitution.
* Author 986 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Headnotes † Constitution of India – Article 200 – The Governor has three enumerated options when a bill is presented to him under Article 200 – Governor can either assent, withhold or reserve the bill for consideration of the President – Pocket veto is not available to the Governor while exercising powers under Article 200 – The Governor cannot keep the bill with him without deciding on the assent:
Held: There are only three courses of action available to the Governor to choose from when a bill is presented to him for assent under Article 200 – The first proviso is not an independent fourth course of action but intrinsically attached to the option of withholding of assent – In other words, the first proviso is clarificatory and only elaborates the procedure to be followed in case the option of withholding of assent is invoked by the Governor – The use of the expression “shall” in the substantive part of Article 200 read with the expression “as soon as possible” used in the first proviso indicates that there is no pocket veto available to the Governor while he is exercising the powers under Article 200 – Inaction on part of the Governor to take a decision when a bill is presented to him under Article 200 is grossly violative of the constitutional scheme of expediency which permeates the provision – The Governor, in exercise of his powers under Article 200, also does not possess any absolute veto – He is mandated to take a decision from among the three options that are provided in the substantive part of the Article 200 – In case of withholding of assent, the Governor is bound to follow the procedure prescribed under the first proviso and assent to the bill if it is ultimately presented to him for assent after being repassed by the State legislature – The Governor may also reserve certain bills for the consideration of the President – However, in no case has the Governor been conferred with the power to veto a bill which is presented to him – He is envisaged as an intermediary stop in the journey of the bill towards becoming an Act – When a bill comes to the Governor, he may forthwith assent to it, or postpone the grant of assent by exercising the option of withholding of assent but only for so long till the bill comes back to him after reconsideration, or he may forward the bill to the President whereupon the procedure prescribed under Article 201 is to be followed – Thus, in none of these cases can the Governor permanently keep a bill with him without according assent to it, nor can he declare a simpliciter withholding of assent thereby killing the bill. [Paras 194-198] [2025] 4 S.C.R. 987The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr. Constitution of India – Article 200 – The Governor cannot reserve a Bill for the consideration of the President when it is presented to him for assent after being reconsidered in accordance with the first proviso to Article 200:
Held: There is no scope for the Governor to reserve a bill for the consideration of the President once it is presented to him for reconsideration after compliance with the procedure laid down in the first proviso – The first proviso to Article 200 is a complete code in itself as regards the procedure which is to be followed once the Governor withholds assent and the rest of the article has no applicability thereafter – In light of the language of Article 200, and also keeping in mind its interpretation by this Court in State of Punjab v. Principal Secretary to the Governor of Punjab (2024) 1 SCC 384, there was no room for the Governor to declare a simpliciter withholding of assent without taking recourse to the first proviso as that virtually amounts to the exercise of absolute veto by the Governor, a power which is conspicuously absent from our constitutional scheme. [Paras 204-211] Constitution of India – Article 200 – Timelines for the Governor to act under Article 200 – Courts can prescribe time limits for the discharge of certain functions, even in cases where no specific time-limit has been prescribed:
Held: 1. Unlike many countries across the globe wherein a provision for deemed assent upon the expiry of the specified time period has been made, there is no such provision in our Constitution – The only manner in which a temporal imperative has been weaved into the scheme of Article 200 is by the use of the expression “as soon as possible” in the first proviso – The said expression, which also appears in Article 111 of the Constitution, was the subject of some debate in the Constituent Assembly – Governor’s inaction with respect to the bills for an unreasonable and prolonged period of time cannot be held to be permissible within our constitutional scheme. [Paras 217-225]
2. Keisham Meghachandra Singh v. The Hon’ble Speaker Manipur Legislative Assembly & Ors. [2020] 2 SCR 132 discussed in the context of the timeline for the Speaker to decide on the petitions seeking disqualifications under the Schedule X of the Constitution – The view adopted by the Court in Keisham Meghachandra (supra) was that the “reasonable period” for deciding such petitions by the 988 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Speaker largely depends on the facts of each case yet, where there are no exceptional circumstances, the Speaker should arrive at a decision within an outer time-limit of three-months reiterated – Ram Chand and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. (1994) 1 SCC 44 discussed wherein it was held that where for exercise of any power no time-limit has been prescribed, such power has to be exercised within a reasonable period of time – AG Perarivalan v. State, Through Superintendent of Police CBI/SIT/MMDA, Chennai, Tamil Nadu and Anr. (2023) 8 SCC 257 discussed wherein it was held that the inaction of the Governor would be subject to judicial review and in the absence of any cogent reasons for the delay, it would be open to the courts to issue directions for a time-bound decision on a case-to-case basis – Held, what is discernible from a reading of the decisions discussed above is that despite there being no prescribed time-limit for the Governor to take a decision under Article 200, the provision cannot be read in a manner which allows the Governor to not take action upon bills which are presented to him for assent and thereby delay and essentially roadblock the law-making machinery in the State. [Paras 227, 229, 230, 231]
3. Any time limit in the exercise of powers in terms of Article 200 of the Constitution should not be construed as timelines laid within the edifice of the provision, rather should be understood as timelines that would serve as a lodestar for the purpose of exercise of judicial review by the courts, a benchmark tool to aid and enable the courts in ascertaining if any inaction or malfeasance has occasioned in the exercise of such powers – Those timelines no doubt demand the earnest adherence by the Governor, however, these being nothing more than tools upon which scrutiny by judicial review is to be premised, remain as prescriptions within the realm of judicial review alone and do not transgress into the legislative bounds or amount to alteration of the text or authority of Article 200 of the Constitution. [Para 239]
4. Keeping in mind the constitutional significance of Article 200 and the role it plays in the federal polity of the country, the following timelines were prescribed: First, if a bill is either withheld or reserved for the President’s consideration based on the aid and advice of the State Council of Ministers, the Governor is expected to act immediately, and in any case, within a maximum period of one month – Second, if assent is withheld contrary to the advice of the State Council of Ministers, the Governor must return the bill with a message within a maximum of three months – Third, if a bill is [2025] 4 S.C.R. 989The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr. reserved for the President’s consideration contrary to such advice, the Governor must do so within a maximum period of three months – Finally, when a bill is presented again after reconsideration as per the first proviso, the Governor is required to grant assent without delay, and in any event, within one month – Failure to comply with these timelines would make the inaction of the Governors subject to judicial review by the courts. [Paras 250-251] Constitution of India – Article 200 – Governor in the exercise of his powers under Article 200 of the Constitution can only act in accordance with the aid and advice tendered to him by the State Council of Ministers – B.K. Pavitra v. Union of India (2019) 6 SCC 129 held to be per incuriam:
Held: 1. What flows from a study of the Constituent Assembly debates concerning the appointment of the Governor and the scope of his discretionary powers is that the Governor plays a very crucial role in the political structure of the country – He is the bridge between the governments at the Central and State level, the proverbial buckle which ties the States with the Centre. [Para 289]
2. The second proviso to Article 200 is an instance under the Constitution where the Governor has been conferred with the power to act in his discretion and even against the advice of the Council of Ministers – However, the logical sequitur to this is that under Article 200, there is no scope for the Governor acting in his discretion other than the second proviso. [Para 295]
3. This Court in B.K. Pavitra v. Union of India (2019) 6 SCC 129 took the view that the Constitution has entrusted the Governor with the discretion of reserving a bill, presented to him for assent, for the consideration of the President – It also held that the exercise of the power of reservation of bills for the consideration of the President could be done by the Governor contrary to the aid and advice tendered by the Council of Ministers – The Court observed that such an important responsibility having been conferred upon a constitutional functionary, its discharge was expected to be undertaken upon careful reflection and with statesmanship, and in a manner that does not thwart democratic federalism – On the nature of bills which may be reserved for the consideration of the President, the Court held that it was impossible to lay down with certainty all the situations wherein such a reference may be warranted – This view held per incuriam since the removal of the expression “in his discretion” from Section 75 of the Government of India Act, 1935 when it was being adapted as Article 200 990 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports of the Constitution, clearly indicates that any discretion which was available to the Governor under the Government of India Act, 1935 in respect of reservation of bills became unavailable with the commencement of the Constitution – Held, the views expressed by the members of the Constituent Assembly, which are recorded in the debates that took place on Article 175 of the Draft Constitution, also indicate the same – The same is also in alignment with the fundamental tenets of responsible government in a parliamentary democracy – The only exception to the general principle of the Governor adhering to the aid and advice tendered by the Council of Ministers can be traced to Article 163(1) and the second proviso to Article 200 – Held, B.K Pavitra (supra) failed to take into consideration the larger Bench decisions in Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab (1974) 2 SCC 831 and M.P. Special Police Establishment v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. (2004) 8 SCC
788. [Paras 303-306]
4. While construing the role of the Governor in the context of Article 200, it must be kept in mind that such a role has been envisaged not to supplant the opinion of the Council of Ministers, but to infuse it with his wisdom – However, once the bill is passed by the State legislature, and presented to the Governor for assent, he must act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers as a general rule and only in exceptional situations should he reserve it for the consideration of the President. [Paras 307-308]
5. The option of withholding of assent, as believed by the framers, would be invoked in very rare circumstances where the Council of Ministers discover some error in the legislation or desire to incorporate certain changes to it so as to meet with the popular opinion outside the House – The framers did not expect that the Governor would, as a matter of routine, declare the withholding of assent to bills casually – The deletion of the expression “in his discretion” from the first proviso is also an unmistakable indication of the intent of the framers in vesting no discretion in the Governor as regards the withholding of assent and returning of the bill along with suggestions for the introduction of amendments. [Paras 310, 315, 316]
6. The Governor does not possess any discretion in the exercise of his functions under Article 200 and has to mandatorily abide by the advice tendered to him by the Council of Ministers – The only exceptions to this general rule are: (a) Where the bill is of a description as provided under the second proviso to Article 200,
(b) Where the bill is of a nature covered by Articles 31A, 31C, [2025] 4 S.C.R. 991The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr. 254(2), 288(2), 360(4)(a)(ii) etc. wherein assent of the President is a condition precedent before the bill can take effect as law or is necessary for the purpose of securing immunity against the operation of some constitutional provision, and (c) Where the bill is of a nature that, if allowed to take effect, then it would undermine the Constitution by placing the fundamental principles of a representative democracy in peril as described in M.P. Special Police (supra). [Paras 318-319] Constitution of India – Article 200 and Article 201– Actions of the Governor and the President – Amenable to judicial review: Held: 1. The Governor, by choosing to act in his discretion under Article 200, has the power to thwart the entire legislative machinery of the State by reserving a bill for the consideration of the President – He also has the power to significantly delay the grant of assent to a bill by withholding assent and returning the same to the State legislature under the first proviso to Article 200 of the Constitution – The discharge of functions by the President or the Governor as constitutional and formal heads is undoubtedly subject to judicial review by virtue of it being an exercise of their constitutional powers – Decision taken by the Governor under Article 200 would not be shielded from scrutiny of the courts by virtue of the immunity accorded under Article 361 of the Constitution – Held, the power of judicial review of the courts would be available in respect of exercise of all powers by any authority under the Constitution unless expressly excluded. [Paras 333, 335, 338]
2. The grant of assent to a bill is an exercise which generally takes place on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, and assenting to the bill is the only practically possible course of action available to the constitutional heads in most of the common law jurisdictions – The grant of assent may not be justiciable because, there exists an unavailability of any material upon which the courts may be able to undertake a judicial scrutiny – However, the same would not be the case as regards the withholding of assent or reservation of the bill for the consideration of the President, which can only be exercised upon furnishing of detailed reasons for the same. [Para 358]
3. Where the Governor reserves a bill for the consideration of the President in his own discretion and contrary to the aid and advice tendered to him by the State Council of Ministers, it shall be open to the State Government to assail such an action before 992 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports the appropriate High Court or this Court – Such a challenge can be made on the following grounds:
(i) Where the reservation is on the ground that the bill is of a description falling under the Second Proviso to Article 200 of the Constitution, it may be assailed on the ground that the bill or any provision thereof does not so derogate from the powers of the High Court so as to endanger the position which that court is designed by the Constitution to fill – The Governor while reserving a bill on this count shall be expected to provide clear reasons and also point to the specific provision(s) of the bill which, in his opinion, attract the Second Proviso – This question being purely of a legal nature would be completely justiciable and the competent court would be, after a proper adjudication, fully authorized to approve or disapprove of such reservation by the Governor – If such a challenge finds favour with the competent court, then, subject to any other considerations, it would be a fit case for the issuance of a writ in the nature of mandamus to the Governor for appropriate action – If, however, the challenge should fail then the mechanism envisaged under Article 201 of the Constitution will spring into action.
(ii) Where the reservation is on account of the bill attracting any provision of the Constitution wherein the assent of the President is a condition precedent for the proper enactment and enforceability of such a bill as a law or for the purpose of securing any immunity (such as under Article 31A) or overcoming any repugnancy that may exist qua a Central Legislation (under Article 254(2)), then the Governor is expected to make a specific and clear reference to the President properly indicating the reasons for such reservation and inviting his attention as described in Kaiser-I-Hind Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. v. National Textile Corporation (Maharashtra North) Ltd. and Ors. reported in (2002) 8 SCC 182 – Such a reservation can be assailed by the State Government, if the reference made by the Governor either fails to indicate the reasons for such reservation as discussed above or that the reasons indicated are wholly irrelevant, mala-fide, arbitrary, unnecessary or motivated by extraneous considerations – Then such a reservation would be liable to be set aside – This question being purely of a legal nature would be completely justiciable and the competent court would be after a proper adjudication fully authorized to approve or disapprove of such reservation by the Governor – If such a challenge finds favour with the competent court, then, subject to any other considerations, it would be fit case for issuance of a writ in the nature of mandamus to the Governor for appropriate action – If however, the challenge [2025] 4 S.C.R. 993The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr. should fail then the mechanism envisaged under Article 201 of the Constitution will spring into action.
(iii) Where the reservation of a bill by the Governor for the consideration of the President is on the grounds of peril to democracy or democratic principles or on other exceptional grounds as mentioned in M.P. Special Police (supra) and Nabam Rebia & Bamang Felix v. Dy. Speaker, Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly reported in (2016) 8 SCC 1 then the Governor would be expected to make a specific and clear reference to the President properly indicating the reasons for entertaining such a belief by pinpointing the specific provisions in this regard and the consequent effect that may ensue if such a bill were to be allowed to become a law – The Governor while making such a reference should also indicate his subjective satisfaction as to why the aforesaid consequences that may ensue cannot be possibly curtailed or contained by taking recourse to the constitutional courts of the country – It shall be open to the State Government to challenge such a reservation on the ground of failure on part of the Governor to furnish the necessary reasons as discussed aforesaid or that the reasons indicated are wholly irrelevant, mala-fide, arbitrary, unnecessary or motivated by extraneous considerations – This being a question completely capable of being determined by the constitutional courts, would be fully justiciable.
(iv) Reservation of a bill on grounds other than the ones mentioned above, such as personal dissatisfaction of the Governor, political expediency or any other extraneous or irrelevant considerations is strictly impermissible by the Constitution and would be liable to be set-aside forthwith on that ground alone – This will also encompass reservation of a bill by the Governor after having already exercised the option of withholding of assent in terms of Article 200 except in such exceptional circumstance as mentioned in paragraph 204 of this judgment.
(v) Where the Governor exhibits inaction in making a decision when a bill is presented to him for assent under Article 200 and such inaction exceeds the time-limit as has been prescribed by us in paragraph 250 of this judgment then it shall be open to the State Government to seek a writ of mandamus from a competent court against the Governor directing expeditious decision on the concerned bill as is the mandate of the Constitution, however, it is clarified that the Governor may successfully resist such a challenge on providing sufficient explanation for the delay caused. [Para 367] 994 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
4. Where the Governor reserves a bill for the consideration of the President and the President in turn withholds assent thereto then, it shall be open to the State Government to assail such an action before this Court – Such a challenge can broadly be made on the following grounds:
(i) Where a State bill has been reserved by the Governor for the consideration of the President on the ground that assent of the President is required for the purpose of making the bill enforceable or securing some immunity therefore, then in such cases the withholding of assent by the President would be justiciable to the limited extent of exercise of such power in an arbitrary or mala fide manner – Owing to the political nature of the assent of the President in these categories of bills, the courts would impose a self-restraint.
(ii) Where a State bill has been reserved by the Governor, in his discretion, for the consideration of the President on the ground that the bill appears to be patently unconstitutional for placing the principles of representative democracy in peril, the withholding of assent by the President would, in ordinary circumstances, involve purely legal and constitutional questions and therefore be justiciable without any impediments imposed by the doctrine of political thicket – In such cases, it would be prudent for the President to obtain the advisory opinion of this Court by way of a reference under Article 143 and act in accordance with the same to dispel any apprehensions of bias, arbitrariness or mala fides.
(iii) Where the President exhibits inaction in making a decision when a bill is presented to him for assent under Article 201 and such inaction exceeds the time-limit as has been prescribed by us in paragraph 391 of this judgment then it shall be open to the State Government to seek a writ of mandamus from this Court. [Para 367]
5. Summary of Court’s findings on the judicial review of the exercise of power by the President under Article 201 in withholding assent to a bill: (a) where the bill which is under consideration is pertaining to a provision of the Constitution where primacy has been given to the Union government in taking a decision keeping in consideration the desirability of having certain uniform standards of national policy, then the limited grounds of judicial review would be based on arbitrariness, mala fides, etc. and (b) where the bill which is under consideration pertains to a subject matter or domain within which State legislature has been accorded primacy, and the reservation of the bill is by the Governor contrary to the aid and [2025] 4 S.C.R. 995The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr. advice of the State Council of Ministers, then in exercise of judicial review the courts would be competent to look into the reasons for withholding of assent and whether they are legally tenable or not, besides the grounds of mala fides and arbitrariness, etc. [Para 368] Constitution of India – Article 200 – Timelines for the President under Article 201 to decide on the Bill reserved for his consideration by the Governor under Article 200:
Held: 1. The Court deems it appropriate to adopt the timeline prescribed by the Ministry of Home Affairs in the Office Memorandum dated 04.02.2016 issued by the Ministry of Home, Government of India, and prescribe that the President is required to take a decision on the bills reserved for his consideration by the Governor within a period of three months from the date on which such reference is received – In case of any delay beyond this period, appropriate reasons would have to be recorded and conveyed to the concerned State – The States are also required to be collaborative and extend co-operation by furnishing answers to the queries which may be raised and consider the suggestions made by the Central government expeditiously. [Paras 385-391]
2. After due consultation with the State government, the President may either declare assent to the bill or he may declare that he withholds assent thereto – It would not be appropriate for the President to declare withholding of assent without first seeking clarifications from the State government as is mentioned in the guidelines featuring in the Office Memorandums – If, in the course of discussions, the State government expresses willingness to make such changes to the bill as may be suggested by the Central government, then it would be open to the President to seek reconsideration of the bill by invoking the proviso, and upon the bill being re-considered and passed with such changes, the President may grant assent thereto. [Para 401]
3. After the bill is sent with a message to State legislature by the President and they repass it, with or without amendments, the President would be empowered to take a final call on the giving or withholding of assent on the bill concerned – If he chooses to assent to the bill, it would become law – There is no gainsaying to the fact that the President under Article 201 is conferred with the power to withhold a bill during the second round, without activating any other procedure, effectively bringing the legislative process vis-à-vis that same bill to an end, in contrast to the scheme of Article 200 996 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports wherein the Governor must mandatorily accord his assent to a Bill which is presented to him for the second time. [Para 404]
4. However, if he chooses to withhold his assent, the bill will not take birth as law – It must, however, be noted that even during the withholding of assent of a bill received on the second round, the President would be required to assign clear and sufficiently detailed reasons for arriving at such a decision – Even in the second round, he has no power whatsoever to exercise absolute veto, as the Constitution does not provide anywhere that withholding of assent can be done simpliciter. [Para 405] Constitution of India – Article 200 – Governor cannot reserve a reconsidered bill for consideration of the President – Article 142 exercised to grant deemed assent:
Held: 1. The Governor first withheld the ten bills under question and later despite the said Bills being repassed by the State legislature and presented before him again under the first proviso to Article 200, still reserved them for the consideration of the President – The clear language in which the first proviso is couched, there would never arise, except in extraordinary situations, any occasion for the Governor to reserve a reconsidered bill for the consideration of the President – The said bills, in the absence of any message given by the Governor under the first proviso, were taken up for reconsideration by the State Assembly and passed in their original form, and presented to the Governor for his assent – Thus, it was not open to the Governor to reserve the bills for the consideration of the President and he ought to have granted assent – Considerable time has elapsed since these ten Bills were originally passed and presented to the Governor for assent – Two out of the ten Bills even date back to 2020 – It is important to keep in mind that the tenure of the State legislature is of five years and the representatives are accountable to their electorate as regards the enactment of legislations addressing the issues faced by the electorate – At the end of every five years, the elected representatives have to go back to their electorate and provide a report card, based upon which the people, in whom the ultimate sovereignty rests, cast their votes – Bills, if kept pending for long despite their passage by the State legislature, militate against this very fundamental, essential to the sustenance of a representative democracy based on direct elections. [Paras 430-431]
2. The conduct exhibited on part of the Governor, as it clearly appears from the events that have transpired even during the [2025] 4 S.C.R. 997The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr. course of the present litigation, has been lacking in bona fides – There have been clear instances where the Governor has failed in showing due deference and respect to the judgments and directions of this Court – In such a situation, it is difficult to repose our trust and remand the matter to the Governor with a direction to dispose of the bills in accordance with the observations made by the Court in this judgment – Article 142 empowers the Court to do complete justice and in the facts of the present case, more particularly, in light of the fact that the option of granting assent to the repassed bills was the only constitutionally permissible option available with the Governor, it is deemed absolutely necessary and appropriate to grant that very relief by exercising our extraordinary powers – No meaningful purpose would be served by keeping the bills, some of which have already been pending for incredulously long periods, pending for more time – The ten Bills deemed to have assented on the date when they presented to the Governor after being reconsidered by the State legislature. [Para 432] Case Law Cited S.R. Bommai v. Union of India [1994] 2 SCR 644 : (1994) 3 SCC 1; Rameshwar Prasad v. Union of India [2006] 1 SCR 562 : (2006) 2 SCC 1; Kihoto Holohan v. Zachillhu [1992] 1 SCR 686 : (1992) Supp. 2 SCC 651; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Jogendra Singh [1964] 2 SCR 197 : AIR 1963 SC 1618; The State of Telangana v. Secretary to Her Excellency the Hon’ble Governor for the State of Telangana & Anr. (2024) 1 SCC 405; Ram Chand and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. [1993] Supp. 2 SCR 558 : (1994) 1 SCC 44; Keisham Meghachandra Singh v. Speaker, Manipur Legislative Assembly and Ors. [2020] 2 SCR 132 : (2021) 16 SCC 503; M/s North Eastern Chemicals Industries (P) Ltd. & Anr. v. M/s Ashok Mills, CA No. 2669 of 2023; Secunderabad Club v. Commissioner of Income-Tax [2023] 12 SCR 979 : (2023) SCC OnLine SC 1004; Purushothaman Nambudiri v. State of Kerala [1962] Supp. 1 SCR 753 : 1961 SCC OnLine SC 361; State of Bihar v. Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga [1952] 1 SCR 889 : (1952) 1 SCC 528; Durga Pada Ghosh v. State of West Bengal (1972) 2 SCC 656; Periyammal (Dead) thr. LRs & Ors. v. Rajamani & Anr. Etc., 2025 INSC 329 : [2025] 3 SCR 540; B.P. Singhal v. Union of India [2010] 6 SCR 589 : (2010) 6 SCC 331; Maru Ram v. Union of India [1981] 1 SCR 1196 : (1981) 1 SCC 107; State of Gujarat v. R.A. Mehta [2013] 1 SCR 1 : (2013) 3 SCC 1; Indra Sawhney v. Union of India [1992] Supp. 2 SCR 454 : (1992) Supp. 998 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports 3 SCC 217; State of Rajasthan v. Union of India [1978] 1 SCR 1 : (1977) 3 SCC 592; Minerva Mills v. Union of India [1981] 1 SCR 206 : (1980) 3 SCC 625; A.K. Kaul v. Union of India [1995] 3 SCR 469 : (1995) 4 SCC 73; Epuru Sudhakar v. Govt. of A.P. [2006] Supp. 7 SCR 81 : (2006) 8 SCC 161; Bharat Sevashram Sangh v. State of Gujarat [1986] 3 SCR 602 : (1986) 4 SCC 51; In Re: The Special Courts Bill, 1978 [1979] 2 SCR 476 : (1979) 1 SCC 380 – referred to.
State of Punjab v. Principal Secretary to the Governor of Punjab [2023] 15 SCR 777 : (2024) 1 SCC 384; Nabam Rebia & Bamang Felix v. Dy. Speaker, Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly [2016] 6 SCR 1 : (2016) 8 SCC 1; Kaiser-I-Hind Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. v. National Textile Corporation (Maharashtra North) Ltd. and Ors. [2002] Supp. 2 SCR 555 : (2002) 8 SCC 182; Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab [1975] 1 SCR 814 : (1974) 2 SCC 831; AG Perarivalan v. State, Through Superintendent of Police CBI/ SIT/MMDA, Chennai, Tamil Nadu and Anr. [2022] 7 SCR 1048 : (2023) 8 SCC 257 – relied upon.
B.K. Pavitra v. Union of India [2017] 1 SCR 631 : (2017) 4 SCC 620 – held per incuriam.
S. Ramakrishnan v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2020 SCC OnLine Mad 5207 – referred to.
Reference Re Amendment of the Constitution of Canada, 1981 SCC OnLine Can SC 77; Galati v. Governor-General of Canada [2015] FC 91; Gallant v. The King [1949] 2 DLR 425; Eastgate v. Rozzoli (1990) 20 NSWLR 188; Regina (Miller) v. Prime Minister (Lord Advocate and others intervening) [2019] 3 WLR 589; Baker v. Carr, 1962 SCC OnLine US SC 40; Re Constitutional Reference No 1 of 2008 [2009] 1 LRC 453; Republic of Vanuatu v Carcasses [2010] 2 LRC 264 – referred to.
Books and Periodicals Cited 8, Constituent Assemb. Deb., (May 30, 1949); 8, Constituent Assemb. Deb, (Jun. 1, 1949); 9, Constituent Assemb. Deb., (Aug. 1, 1949); 10, Constituent Assemb. Deb., (Oct. 17, 1949); Jessica J. Richardson, Modernisation of Royal Assent in Canada, 27 Can. Parliam. Rev.2, 32 (2004), http://www.revparl.ca/27/2/27n2_04e_ Richardson.pdf; Nicholas Barber, Can Royal Assent Be Refused on the Advice of the Prime Minister?, UK Constitutional Law [2025] 4 S.C.R. 999The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr. Association (Apr. 7, 2025, 9:45 PM), https://ukconstitutionallaw. org/2013/09/25/nick-barber-can-royal-assent-be-refused-on-theadvice-of-the-prime-minster/; David Torrance, Royal Assent, House Of Commons Library (Feb. 26, 2024), https://researchbriefings.files. parliament.uk/documents/cbp-9466/cbp-9466.pdf; Dept. of Prime Minister & Cabinet, Austl. Govt., Legislation Handbook (2017); 5, Durga Das Basu, Commentary on the Constitution of India 6318 (LexisNexis 2009); K.C. Markandan, Centre State Relations The Perspective 120 (ABS Publications 1986) – reffered to.
List of Acts Constitution of India; Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; Representation of the People Act, 1951; Government of India Act, 1935; Government of India Act, 1919; Aundh State Constitution Act, 1939; Government of Mysore Act, 1940; Government of India Act, 1858; United Kingdom: Judicial Committee Act, 1833; Canada: Royal Assent Act, 2002; Constitution Act, 1867; Strengthening Canadian Citizenship Act, 2014; United States of America: Constitution of the United States; New Zealand: Constitution Act, 1852; Australia: Constitution Act, 1889; Ireland: Constitution of the Ireland; Singapore: Constitution of Singapore; Sri Lanka: Constitution of Sri Lanka; Republic of Kiribati: Constitution of Kiribati; Fiji: Constitution of Fiji, 2013; Fiji Independence Order, 1970; Solomon Islands & Antigua and Barbuda: Constitution of the Soloman Islands; Constitution of Antigua and Barbuda; Pakistan: Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan; Germany: Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany; Constitution of Berlin; Italy: Constitution of the Italian Republic; France: Constitution of October 4, 1958.
List of Keywords Constitution of India; Governor; President; Deemed Assent; Withholding of assent; Pocket veto; Absolute veto; Federalism; Centre-State Relations; Sarkaria Commission; Puncchi Commission; Tamil Nadu; Bills; Article 200; Article 201; Article 142; Inherent power of the Supreme Court; Discretion of the Governor and the President.
Case Arising From CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1239 of 2023 Under Article 32 of The Constitution of India 1000 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Appearances for Parties Advs. for the Petitioner:
Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, Mukul Rohatgi, Rakesh Dwivedi, P.wilson, Sr. Advs., Ms. Preetika Dwivedi, Mohd. Yasir, Ms. Jahnavi Taneja, Sabarish Subramanian, Poornachandiran R, Siddarth Seema, Vishnu Unnikrishnan, Apoorv Malhotra, Lokesh Krishna, Danish Saifi, Aravind A, Saran Raghunadhan S.
Advs. for the Respondents:
R Venkatramani, Attorney General for India, Vikramjit Banerjee, ASG, Ms. Madhavi Goradia Divan, Nl Rajah, Sr. Advs., Prashant Rawat, Ms. Rashi Mangal, Kartik Dey, Abhishek Goel, Kanu Agarwal, Padmesh Mishra, Arkaj Kumar, Chitvan Singhal, Raman Yadav, Abhishek Kumar Pandey, Kartikay Aggarwal, Ms. Ameya Vikrama Thanvi, Ms. Sonali Jain, Arvind Kumar Sharma, Manoj Ranjan Sinha, Mrigank Prabhakar, Vishal Agrawal, Siddharth Sahu, S. Santanam Swaminadhan, Ms. Abhilasha Shrawat, T. Bhaskar Gowtham, D. Bharat Kumar, Mrs. Aarthi Rajan.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment J.B. Pardiwala, J.
For the convenience of the exposition, this judgment is divided in the following parts:
INDEX* A. FACTUAL MATRIX ..................................................................... 5 i. Factual background with respect to assent to bills. ............. 5 ii. Factual background with respect to accord of sanction for investigation into cases of corruption against public servants. ................................................................................. 17 iii. Factual background with respect to the files pertaining to premature release of prisoners. ............................................ 19 iv. Factual background with respect to the appointments to the Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission (TNPSC). .............. 20 * Ed. Note: Pagination as per the original Judgment.
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1001The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr. v. Factual background with respect to dismissal of ministers and allocation of ministries. ................................................... 22 B. SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES ............................................. 25 i. Submissions on behalf of the Petitioner ............................... 25 ii. Submissions on behalf of the Respondents ......................... 54 C. ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION ................................................ 61
D. ASSENT TO BILLS – HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ............... 65
i. Concept of assent to bills as envisaged by certain historical documents drafted during the freedom struggle. .................. 79 ii. Debates of the Constituent Assembly on Article 200 of the Constitution ............................................................................ 91
E. ARTICLE 200 OF THE CONSTITUTION - DEVELOPMENTS
POST THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION. ........ 99
i. First Administrative Reforms Commission, 1966................... 100 ii. Rajamannar Commission, 1971............................................. 102 iii. Sarkaria Commission............................................................. 105 iv. Punchhi Commission.............................................................. 121
F. INTERNATIONAL JURISPRUDENCE ON ASSENT TO
BILLS............................................................................................ 128 G. ANALYSIS .................................................................................... 145 i. What courses of action are available to the Governor in exercise of his powers under Article 200 of the Constitution? .......................................................................... 145 ii. Whether the Governor can reserve a Bill for the consideration of the President when it is presented to him for assent after being reconsidered in accordance with the first proviso to Article 200, more particularly, when he had not reserved it for the consideration of the President in the first instance? ........................................................................ 168 iii. Whether there is an express constitutionally prescribed time-limit within which the Governor is required to act in the exercise of his powers under Article 200 of the Constitution? ................................................................... 174 1002 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports iv. Whether the Governor in the exercise of his powers under Article 200 can only act in accordance with the aid and advice tendered to him by the State Council of Ministers?............... 213 a. The Office of the Governor.............................................. 216 b. Constituent Assembly Debates on the mode of Selection of the Governor............................................................... 218 c. Constituent Assembly Debates on the Exercise of Discretion by the Governor............................................. 227 d. The decision of this Court in B.K. Pavitra (supra) is per incuriam........................................................................... 263 v. Whether the exercise of discretion by the Governor in discharge of his functions under Article 200 could be said to be subject to judicial review? If yes, what are the parameters for such judicial review?........................................................ 280 vi. What is the manner in which the President under Article 201 of the Constitution is required to act once a Bill has been reserved for his consideration by the Governor under Article 200 of the Constitution?......................................................... 340 vii. On Exercise of Article 142. ................................................... 382 H. CONCLUSION ............................................................................. 387
1. While the framers of the Constitution set out with a vision that the Governor would be a “constitutional head, a sagacious counselor and adviser to the Ministry”1 , someone who can “pour oil over troubled waters”, what has unfolded before us in the instant litigation has been quite the opposite, as this Court has been called upon to calm the troubled waters stirred by the ensuing long-drawn battle of a high constitutional order between the petitioner and the respondent. 1 8, Constituent A ssemb. Deb ., (May 30, 1949) 431.
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1003The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.
2. The State of Tamil Nadu, being aggrieved by the action of the Governor on few issues of prime public importance, has invoked the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution seeking appropriate reliefs as prayed for in the writ petition. The petitioner is aggrieved by the action, or rather inaction, on part of the Governor of Tamil Nadu in discharge of the following functions:
(i) Withholding of assent to and reserving for consideration of the President, by the Governor of 10 Bills enacted by the Legislature for the State of Tamil Nadu.
(ii) Inaction on files submitted to the Governor for according sanction to prosecute public servants and investigate various crimes of corruption involving moral turpitude.
(iii) Pendency of a number of files submitted to the Governor for premature release of prisoners.
(iv) Pendency of proposals submitted to the Governor for appointment of members to the Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission under Article 316 of the Constitution.
A. FACTUAL MATRIX
i. Factual background with respect to assent to bills.
3. The Legislature for the State of Tamil Nadu, between 13.01.2020 and 28.04.2023, enacted and forwarded 12 Bills to the Governor for grant of assent as per Article 200 of the Constitution. Even though the present Governor took charge of the office with effect from 18.11.2021, yet he did not take the necessary action on any of the said Bills forwarded to his office till October 2023. The petitioner, being aggrieved by the inaction on part of the Governor, had to ultimately file the present writ petition before this Court. The same was filed on 31.10.2023.
4. This Court issued notice to the respondents on 10.11.2023. The Governor, forthwith, took a decision on the 12 Bills on 13.11.2023 by withholding assent simpliciter to 10 bills i.e., he did not convey any message to the State Legislature for reconsideration of the said Bills as prescribed under the first proviso to Article 200, and by reserving two Bills for the consideration of the President. The 1004 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports 10 bills for which assent was withheld were returned to the State Legislature by the Governor.
5. The State Legislature, on 18.11.2023, convened a special session and repassed the 10 bills which were returned by the Governor after withholding of assent. The bills were passed without any material change and were forwarded to the Governor’s Secretariat on the same day for his assent in accordance with the first proviso to Article
200. This Court, in its order dated 20.11.2023, noted that since the repassed 10 bills were pending with the Governor, the hearing of the writ petition be adjourned to 01.12.2023 and issued directions that this Court shall be apprised of the progress in the matter.
6. On 28.11.2023, the Governor, without the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers of the State, in exercise of his discretion, reserved the said repassed Bills for the consideration of the President. The letter of the Governor to the Union Government referring the said Bills for the consideration of the President mentioned that the Bills were reconsidered and passed again by the State Legislature. Interestingly, although the Governor noted that the Bills were intra-vires the competence of the State Legislature having been legislated under Entry 66 of List I, Entry 32 of List II and Entry 25 of List III, yet he reserved the said Bills for the consideration of the President in the second round on the ground that the Bills suffered from repugnancy on account of being contrary to Entry 66 of the Union List i.e., List I. These grounds have been taken by the Governor to reserve the 10 Bills for consideration of the President. For reference, we have extracted the relevant portion of the letter pertaining to the Tamil Nadu Fisheries University (Amendment) Bill, 2023 which reads thus: “I am directed to state that the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly has passed the Tamil Nadu Fisheries University (Amendment) Bill, 2023 (LA Bill No.15 of 2023) on 21.4.2023 and sent to the Hon’ble Governor for assent.
Hon’ble Governor has returned the Bill with the following remarks – “I withhold assent”.
2. The State Government have reconsidered the said Bill and again passed in the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly on 18.11.2023 and sent to Hon’ble Governor for assent.
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1005The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.
3. In this regard, I am directed to inform that a Background Note on Reserving the Bills for the consideration of Hon’ble President regarding University Bills which has been approved by the Hon’ble Governor is enclosed, since, co-ordination. and determination of standards in institutions of higher education or research and scientific and technical institutions Is in Entry No.66 of the Union List of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, the Bills suffer from repugnancy. Hence, the Hon’ble Governor has reserved the Bill viz. Tamil Nadu Fisheries University (Amendment) BIii, 2023 (LA Bill No.15 of 2023) for the consideration of the Hon’ble President.
4. The Bill falls, mainly, within the scope of the following entries of the Union, State and Concurrent. Lists In the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, namely-
UNION LIST
Entry 66·- Co-ordination and determination of standards in institutions for higher education or research and scientific and technical institutions.
STATE LIST
Entry 32 -- Incorporation, regulation and winding up of corporations, other than those specified in List-I and Universities;
CONCURRENT LIST
Entry 25 -- Education, including technical education, medical education and universities and is intra-vires the State Legislature.
5. I am, therefore, directed. to request to take appropriate action for the Bill to have consideration of the Hon’ble President.”
7. The Governor, on 04.12.2023, also sought to clarify that the 10 Bills to which he had withheld assent simpliciter were not returned to the Legislature for reconsideration as stipulated in the first proviso of Article 200. Despite that, the State Government had placed the Bills before the legislative assembly again. After the Bills were repassed by the legislative assembly, the State Government sent the same 1006 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports back to the Governor for assent. The Governor clarified that since the Bills suffered from repugnancy, he was reserving the said Bills for the consideration of the President. These clarifications were sent for all the 10 Bills. For reference, we have extracted the relevant portion of the letter pertaining to the Tamil Nadu Fisheries University (Amendment) Bill, 2023 which reads thus:
“Kindly refer our letter dated 28.11.2023.
2. I am now directed to elaborate further on the circumstances under which the Bill was requested to be placed before the Hon’ble President for consideration. When the, The Tamil Nadu Fisheries University (Amendment) Bill, 2020 (LA Bill No. 2 of 2020) passed by the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly on 09.01.2020 was sent to the Hon’ble Governor for his essent, the Hon’ble Governor has exercised his substantive powers under Article 200 of the Constitution and took decision of withholding his assent to the Bill and the file was returned to the Law Department of the State Government, conveying the decision of the Governor “I Withhold assent”. It is clarified that the Bills was not returned for re-consideration as stipulated in the proviso to Article 200 of the Constitution.
3. While withholding his assent, the Hon’ble Governor has relied on the position held by the five member bench (Constitution Bench) of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India and others Vs. Valluri Basavalah Chowdhary and others and Maharao Sahit Shri Bhim Singhi Vs. Union of India and others. (Civil Appeal No’s 1896 of 1976, 265- 300 of 1977, 29-38 of 1977 and 5 of 1977 and W.P. No.
350 of 1977, decided on May 1, 1979) where it has been stated In Para 19:
“The Governor is, however, made a component part of the legislature of a State under Article 168, because every Bill passed by the State Legislature has to be reserved for the assent under Article 200. Under that article, the Governor can adopt one of the three courses, namely (i) he may give his assent to it, in which case the Bill becomes a law; or (ii) he may, except In the case of a ‘Money Bill’, withhold his assent therefrom, In which case the Bill [2025] 4 S.C.R. 1007The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr. falls through unless the procedure indicated in the first proviso is followed, I.e. return the Bill to the Assembly for reconsideration with a message, or (iii) he may (subject to Ministerial advice) reserve the Bill for the consideration of the President, in which case the President will adopt the procedure laid down In Article 201”.
4. However, State Government placed the Bill again in the Legislative Assembly and after getting Assembly’s endorsement, sent them again to the Hon’ble Governor on 18.11.2023.
5. The Hon’ble Governor had not returned the Bills under the proviso to Article 200 for re-consideration, however, State Government has sent them back. Since the Bill suffers from repugnancy, Hon’ble Governor has reserved the same for the consideration of the Hon’ble President.”
8. In view of the reservation of the 10 Bills for the consideration of the President, the petitioner filed the I.A. No. 259020 of 2023 on 11.12.2023, seeking amendment of the prayers of the present writ petition and prayed for insertion of the following prayer: “Pass any writ/order or direction to declare that the action of the Governor of Tamil Nadu/ first Respondent of reserving the following Bills 1. Bill No 2/2020 namely “A Bill further to amend the Tamil Nadu Fisheries University Act, 2012”, 2. Bill No 12/2020 namely “A Bill further to amend the Tamil Nadu Veterinary and Animal Sciences University Act, 1989”, 3. Bill No 24/2022 namely “The bill to amend the Universities laws. The Vice-Chancellors of all Universities (except University of Madras)”, 4. Bill No 29/2022 namely “A Bill further to amend the Tamil Nadu Dr. Ambedkar Law University Act, 1996”, 5. Bill No 39/2022 namely “A Bill further to amend the Tamil Nadu Dr. M.G.R. Medical University, Chennai, Act, 1987”, 6. Bill No 40/2022 namely “A Bill further to amend the Tamil Nadu Agricultural University Act, 1971”, 7. Bill No 48/2022 namely “A bill further to amend the Tamil Nadu Universities Laws”, 8.
Bill No 55/2022 namely “A Bill further to amend the Tamil University Act, 1982”, 9. Bill No 15/2023 namely “A Bill further to amend the Tamil Fisheries University Act, 2012”, 1008 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
10. Bill No 18/2023 namely “A Bill further to amend the Tamil Nadu Veterinary and Animal Sciences University Act, 1989” for the consideration of the President qua the Bills passed and forwarded by the Tamil Nadu State Legislature to him as unconstitutional, illegal, arbitrary, unreasonable besides malafide exercise of power and/or to quash the being ultra- vires Articles 14, 19 and 21 read with Article 200 of the Constitution and direct the Respondent-1 to declare assent to the same.”
9. Thus, what was sought to be conveyed by the aforesaid I.A. was that the 10 Bills were reconsidered and passed again by the State Legislature and were thereafter forwarded to the Governor for his assent in terms of the first proviso to Article 200. However, the Governor reserved the said Bills for the consideration of the President. It was alleged that such action on the part of the Governor was violative of Article 200 and was done with a mala fide intention only with a view to circumvent the jurisdiction of this Court.
10. Upon the suggestion made by this Court, the Governor, on 12.12.2023 wrote to the Chief Minister for the State of Tamil Nadu inviting him to a meeting in an attempt to resolve the deadlock. The Governor and the Chief Minister met on 30.12.2023, pursuant to which the Chief Minister submitted a representation summarising the following issues: a. The Bills could not have been reserved for the consideration of the President after the decision of this Court in State of Punjab v. Principal Secretary to the Governor of Punjab reported in (2024) 1 SCC 384, wherein it was held that once the Governor decides to exercise the power of withholding assent to a bill, the operation of the first proviso to Article 200 has to necessarily follow.
b. Article 200 does not confer any power upon the Governor to exercise the option of reserving a bill for Presidential consideration after a bill has been reconsidered and repassed by the State Legislature. Since, the 10 Bills in the present case were reconsidered and passed again by the State legislature, the only constitutionally permissible option for the Governor was to grant assent.
c. The Governor also acted in contravention of the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers that “the Bill repassed by [2025] 4 S.C.R. 1009The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr. the Legislative Assembly should be assented to by the Hon’ble Governor without withholding assent”, which is ultra vires of the Constitution.
11. In light of the above representation, the Chief Minister requested the Governor to:
(i) Recall the 10 Bills reserved for the consideration of the President and grant assent expeditiously;
(ii) In future, grant assent to Bills passed by the State Legislature within 30 days and avoid unnecessary reservation of the bills for the consideration of the President;
(iii) Act in accordance with the aid and advice tendered by the Council of Ministers.
12. Out of the 10 Bills reserved for her consideration, the President withheld assent to seven Bills, granted assent to one Bill and is yet to consider the remaining two Bills.
13. The status of the Bills is summarized below:
S.
No.
Bill Details Forwarded to the Governor by the State Legislature Action by the Governor Reenacted by the State Legislature Action by the Governor Action by the President
1. Bill No. 2/2020 namely “A Bill further to amend the Tamil Nadu Fisheries University Act, 2012.
13.01.2020 Assent withheld on 13.11.2023.
18.11.2023 Reserved for consideration of the President on 28.11.2023.
Assent withheld on 26.02.2024.
2. Bill No 12/2020 namely “A Bill further to amend the Tamil Nadu Veterinary and Animal Sciences University Act, 1989”
18.10.2020 Assent withheld on 13.11.2023.
18.11.2023 Reserved for consideration of the President on 28.11.2023.
Assent is awaited since 28.11.2023.
1010 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
3. Bill No 24/2022 namely “The bill to amend the Universities laws. The Vice Chancellors of all Universities (except University of Madras) to be appointed by the Government instead of Governor.”
28.04.2022 Assent withheld on 13.11.2023.
18.11.2023 Reserved for consideration of the President on 28.11.2023.
Assent withheld on 26.02.2024.
4. Bill No. 25/2022 namely “A bill to further amend the Chennai University Act.”
28.04.2022 Reserved for consideration of the President on 13.11.2023.
- - Status not on record.
5. Bill No. 26/2022 namely “A Bill to provide for the Establishment and Incorporation of a University for Siddha Ayurveda, Unani, Yoga & Naturopathy and Homeopathy in the State.”
05.05.2022 Reserved for consideration of the President on 13.11.2023.
- - Status not on record.
6. Bill No 29/2022 namely “A Bill further to amend the Tamil Nadu Dr. Ambedkar Law University Act, 1996”.
16.05.2022 Assent withheld on 13.11.2023.
18.11.2023 Reserved for consideration of the President on 28.11.2023.
Assent withheld on 15.02.2024.
7. Bill No 39/2022 namely “A Bill further to amend the Tamil Nadu Dr.
M.G.R. Medical University, Chennai, Act, 1987”.
16.05.2022 Assent withheld on 13.11.2023.
18.11.2023 Reserved for consideration of the President on 28.11.2023.
Assent withheld on 16.02.2024.
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1011The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.
8. Bill No 40/2022 namely “A Bill further to amend the Tamil Nadu Agricultural University Act, 1971”.
16.05.2022 Assent withheld on 13.11.2023.
18.11.2023 Reserved for consideration of the President on 28.11.2023.
Assent withheld on 18.02.2024.
9. Bill No 48/2022 namely “A bill further to amend the Tamil Nadu Universities Laws.”
27.10.2022 Assent withheld on 13.11.2023.
18.11.2023 Reserved for consideration of the President on 28.11.2023.
Assent granted on 18.02.2024.
10. Bill No 55/2022 namely “A Bill further to amend the Tamil University Act, 1982.”
27.10.2022 Assent withheld on 13.11.2023.
18.11.2023 Reserved for consideration of the President on 28.11.2023.
Assent withheld on 18.03.2024.
11. Bill No 15/2023 namely “A Bill further to amend the Tamil Nadu Fisheries University Act, 2012.”
28.04.2023 Assent withheld on 13.11.2023.
18.11.2023 Reserved for consideration of the President on 28.11.2023.
Assent withheld on 26.02.2024.
12. Bill No 18/2023 namely “A Bill further to amend the Tamil Nadu Veterinary and Animal Sciences University Act, 1989”.
28.04.2023 Assent withheld on 13.11.2023.
18.11.2023 Reserved for consideration of the President on 28.11.2023.
Assent is awaited since 28.11.2023.
ii. Factual background with respect to accord of sanction for investigation into cases of corruption against public servants.
14. Between 10.04.2022 and 15.05.2023, the Government of Tamil Nadu submitted to the Governor, four files relating to the prosecution of public servants involved in crimes of moral turpitude under the 1012 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, which at the time of filing of the writ petition remained pending with the Governor.
15. It is only upon the present writ petition being filed and issuance of notice that the Governor’s office started acting upon the files. The Governor, on 01.12.2023, submitted the factual position regarding the bills, files and other cases pending with his office detailing the actions taken thereupon. The details of the files requesting for sanction to investigate and prosecute and the Governor’s actions thereupon are summarised below:
S.
No.
Department Subject Request sent by the State to the Governor Status of the Files
1. Tamil Development and Information Department Request to accord sanction by the Hon’ble Governor/ Chancellor for initiating preliminary enquiry under Section 17A(1)(b) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 against Thiru G. Bhaskaran, Former Vice- Chancellor, Tanjavur University.
11.05.2022 Sanction accorded on 18.11.2023.
2. Public (S.C.)
Department Request to accord sanction by the Hon’ble Governor u/s 19(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 to prosecute Thiru K.C.
Veeramani, former Minister.
12.09.2022 • A duly authenticated investigation report was sought from the Government on 07.07.2023.
• The Government sent a reply dated 11.07.2023 stating that authenticated investigation report has been submitted.
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1013The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr. • The Governor sent back the file to the Government on 15.11.2023 with the observation that there was no duly authenticated investigation report in the file.
• The Government re-submitted the file on 18.11.2023.
3. Public (S.C.)
Department Request to accord sanction by the Hon’ble Governor for initiating prosecution u/s 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 against Thiru B.V.
Ramana @ B.
Venkataramana, former Minister for Commercial Taxes and Dr.
C. Vijayabaskar, former Minister for Health & Family Welfare.
12.12.2022 Sanction accorded on 13.11.2023.
4. Public (S.C.)
Department Request to accord necessary sanction by the Hon’ble Governor for initiating prosecution u/s 19(1)(b) of
PC ACT, 1988
against Thiru M.R.
Vijayabhaskar, former Minister.
15.05.2023 Under consideration since May 2023.
1014 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports iii. Factual background with respect to the files pertaining to premature release of prisoners.
16. The petitioner forwarded 53 files pertaining to the premature release of prisoners to the Governor between June and August 2023 requesting approval thereof.
17. In response to the allegation of delay and pendency on the said files, the office of the Governor represented before this Court that since September 2021, i.e., from the date the present Governor assumed office, 580 proposals regarding premature release of prisoners were received out of which 362 files were approved, 165 files were rejected and 53 were under consideration.
18. The Governor informed in the backdrop of the factual position prevailing on 01.12.2023 that the 53 files that remained pending were recent proposals sent by the petitioner only between June and August 2023. This Court has not been apprised of the status of these files after 01.12.2023 by any of the parties.
iv. Factual background with respect to the appointments to the Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission (TNPSC).
19. It is the case of the petitioner that it was represented before the Governor by way of various representations that as per Regulation 3 of the Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission Regulations, 1954, the Commission shall consist of a Chairman and 14 Members. However, no heed was paid to such representations. The functioning strength of TNPSC was of four members on the date of filing of the present petition.
20. In regard to the aforesaid, the petitioner forwarded representations to the Governor’s office seeking approval of the proposed names for the position of members in TNPSC and carrying out their appointments. The petitioner also sent reminders to the Principal Secretary to the Governor for acting on the files sent to the Governor’s office in this respect.
21. The Governor, on 27.09.2023, returned the said files with a note raising some queries regarding transparency in the selection process, tenure of the members to be appointed and credentials of the proposed candidates. The Governor clarified that as the queries raised by his office were not addressed by the petitioner, the proposal [2025] 4 S.C.R. 1015The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr. for appointment of the recommended candidates was being returned and the same was no longer pending before him. This happened on 26.10.2023.
22. The petitioner, on the other hand, has averred in its writ petition that such queries were against the established practices to the selection of constitutional posts and that the availability of the chairman and members in the TNPSC was essential to monitor and expedite various recruitment processes as well as promotions. Delays in appointments to the TNPSC resulted in non-availability of sufficient members, which detrimentally affected the functioning of the Executive.
23. The petitioner explained this position and also addressed the queries raised by the Governor in its clarification note dated 07.10.2023. The files for approval of appointments were accordingly re-submitted on 10.10.2023, however, the same were returned by the Governor on 27.10.2023 without assigning any reasons.
v. Factual background with respect to dismissal of ministers and allocation of ministries.
24. On 29.06.2023, the Governor suo moto and contrary to the aid and advice of the State Council of Ministers recommended the dismissal and divestment of portfolio of Senthil Balaji, a minister in the Tamil Nadu Cabinet on the ground that he was arrested by the Enforcement Directorate and was in judicial custody. However, the Governor addressed another letter to the Chief Minister on the very same day informing that he had kept the dismissal of Senthil Balaji in abeyance till further communication in light of the advice of the Union Minister of Home Affairs that it would be prudent to seek the opinion of the Attorney General on the matter.
25. In a similar case, Dr. K. Ponmudy, a minister in the Government of Tamil Nadu was convicted and sentenced by the Madras High Court against which, he filed an appeal before this Court. This Court, vide order dated 11.03.2024, suspended the conviction of Dr. K. Ponmudy from its operation keeping in view Section 8(3) of the Representation of People’s Act, 1951 and more particularly for the reason that he should not suffer disqualification from the office of Member of Legislative Assembly.
26. Accordingly, on 13.03.2024, the Speaker of the State Legislative Assembly declared that the disqualification ceased to operate with 1016 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports effect from 19.12.2023. The Election Commission also withdrew the notification of vacancy for his constituency.
27. The Chief Minister wrote to the Governor on 13.03.2024 to swear in Dr. K. Ponmudy as a Minister and allot to him the portfolio of Higher Education. However, the Governor vide the letter dated 17.03.2024, declined the request stating that the conviction order was suspended from its operation by way of ‘interim relief’ granted by this Court which meant that the conviction against Dr. Ponmudy, though existent, had been made non-operative and not set aside. The Governor also stated that the re-introduction of Dr. K. Ponmudy in the Cabinet would be against “constitutional morality”.
28. Consequently, the petitioner was constrained to file I.A. No. 69967 of 2024 on 18.03.2024 to amend its prayer in the present writ petition for including the relief of staying the operation of the Governor’s letter dated 17.03.2024 and directing him to administer the oath of office and secrecy to Dr. K. Ponmudy. The amendment sought to be made reads thus:
“It is therefore, most respectfully prayed that this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to:
a) Grant permission to amend the prayer in the above W.P. No. 1239 of 2023 and add the following prayer:
“f. Call for the records of the 1st Respondent pertaining to Letter No. 007/RBTN/ 2024 dated 17.03.2024 and quash the same and direct the 1st Respondent to act in accordance with the letter of the Hon’ble Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu in D.O. Letter No. 952/CMO/2024 dated 13.03.2024 and consequently to appoint Thiru K. Ponmudi, Member of Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly as a Minister of the Government of Tamil Nadu by administering oath of office and secrecy with the portfolios specified in the letter of the Hon’ble Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu in D.O. Letter No. 952/CMO/2024 dated 13.03.2024 and consequently to change the portfolios among Hon’ble Ministers”
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1017The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr. b) Pass such other or further order as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the present case.”
29. This Court heard the application on 22.03.2024 and expressed its displeasure at the reluctance of the Governor to accept the order of this Court dated 11.03.2024 suspending the sentence of Dr. K. Ponmudy. This prompted the Governor to swear in Dr. K. Ponmudy as Minister in the State Cabinet and the I.A. was disposed of accordingly recording the same.
30. In the aforesaid factual matrix, the petitioner have prayed for a declaration that the reservation of the bills by the Governor for the consideration of the President after they were repassed by the State Legislature and presented before him as illegal. Further, as a sequitur, the petitioner have prayed that the act of withholding of assent by the President be declared as void ab-initio. The petitioner have also prayed for a declaration that the simpliciter withholding of assent by the Governor without following the procedure prescribed in the first proviso to Article 200, be also declared to be illegal for being in contravention to the position of law as laid down in State of Punjab (supra). The petitioner have also prayed for a direction to the Governor to accord sanction for prosecution, take prompt decision on the pending files pertaining to grant of remission and to clear the proposal for appointment of members to the TNPSC.
B. SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES
i. Submissions on behalf of the Petitioner
31. Mr. Rakesh Dwivedi, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner, made elaborate submissions on the following aspects: a) Apparent Constitutional errors committed by the Governor. i) Pocket veto is not available under the Indian constitutional scheme. The Governor could not have kept the Bills submitted to him between the years 2020 and 2023 in a cold storage without taking any decision on them. The fact that he entered no discussion with the State Government or the Chief Minister in relation to the Bills submitted to him further indicates that the Governor exercised pocket 1018 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports veto in relation to the said Bills, thereby bringing the constitutional machinery to a standstill. He submitted that the substantive part of Article 200 uses the expression “shall declare” which indicates that the function of the Governor is mandatory. The underlying objective of Article 200 is to make a Bill operative as an Act. Therefore, the scheme of Article 200 negates the possibility of engaging in inordinate delay or pocket veto.
ii) The Governor failed to take note of the decision of this Court in State of Punjab (supra). Although the said decision held that the first proviso to Article 200 attaches to the option of withholding assent, yet the Governor recorded a simpliciter finding of withholding assent without conveying any message to the State Legislature, as provided under the first proviso. He submitted that simpliciter withholding of assent by the Governor is also violative of Article 14 which mandates that the exercise of Constitutional powers should be based on reason and transparency. The State Legislature must be told why the assent has been withheld so as to enable it to reconsider the Bill. He further submitted that in the absence of any message, it would be open to the State Legislature to understand that the Governor wishes the entire Bill to be reconsidered.
iii) On the facts of the present case, Mr. Dwivedi submitted that having recorded that the Bills submitted to him were intra vires of the State Legislature, it was not open to the Governor to reserve the Bills for the consideration of the President upon being repassed and presented again before him. He submitted that once the reservation of the Bills for the consideration of the President is found to be erroneous in law, any subsequent withholding of assent by the President would also be legally vitiated.
iv) He submitted that even the withholding of assent by the President under Article 201 was by way of a non-speaking order and thus does not comply with the first proviso to the Article. Similar to Article 200, the withholding of assent under Article 201 must necessarily result in a message under the first proviso. He summarised his arguments on this [2025] 4 S.C.R. 1019The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr. aspect by submitting that the acts of simpliciter withholding, reserving for the consideration of the President, delay by Governor, as well as simpliciter withholding of assent by the President are all unconstitutional, and hence null and void. b) Justiciability and Judicial Review.
i) Mr. Dwivedi submitted that no constitutional power vested in any authority, howsoever high, is beyond the powers of judicial review of the constitutional courts. The scope of judicial review may vary, but no power is beyond the purview of the courts. The Courts may exercise restraint, but that is not to say that if the power has been exercised unconstitutionally, manifestly arbitrarily, in breach of fundamental rights enshrined in Part III or any other provision of the Constitution, or in a mala fide manner, the courts would be prohibited from striking down the exercise of such power.
ii) In furtherance of the aforesaid submission, he drew our attention to the decision in S.R. Bommai v. Union of India reported in (1994) 3 SCC 1 wherein the justiciability of a proclamation under Article 356 was propounded. He also relied upon the decisions of this Court in Rameshwar Prasad v. Union of India reported in (2006) 2 SCC 1 and Kihoto Holohan v. Zachillhu reported in 1992 Supp (2)
SCC 651 wherein the exercise of power of the Governor to invite the leader of the majority party to form government and the power of the Speaker under the 10th Schedule to the Constitution were respectively held to be justiciable by this Court.
iii) In light of the aforesaid, he submitted that the position of law as on date, as explained by several Constitutional Bench decisions, is clear that no exercise of Constitutional power is outside the ambit of judicial review. No power is absolute and non-justiciable. Hence, the power exercised under Article 200 can also be examined by this court to discern any unconstitutionality.
c) Governor is required to act upon the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers.
1020 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports i) Mr. Dwivedi submitted that the various provisions of the Constitution stand in harmony and are interdependent.
They are not isolated silos. They share the ultimate objective of harmonious Parliamentary governance, seek welfare of the people and implement Parliamentary form of democracy within a federal system. Therefore, interpretation of a Constitutional provision should accord with these fundamental principles and the basic structure of the Constitution.
ii) He submitted that this Court has been consistent in its approach while interpreting the constitutional provisions, more particularly those that pertain to the Governor or the President, in light of the fundamental principles of Parliamentary democracy and federalism. He placed reliance on the decisions of this Court in Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab reported in (1974) 2 SCC 831, S.R. Bommai (supra), Nabam Rebia & Bamang Felix v. Dy. Speaker, Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly reported in (2016) 8 SCC 1 in support of the aforesaid submission.
iii) He further submitted that the discretion of the Governor under the Indian Constitution is governed solely by Article 163(1) and the interpretation adopted by this Court has been such which does not make the Governor dominant over the Chief Minister, who is an elected representative of the people.
iv) Article 200 embodies an aspect of legislative procedure so as to make a Bill operative as an Act. Seen thus, it is imperative that the Governor acts upon the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers when exercising his power under Article 200.
v) Taking us through the historical background in which Article 200 came to be drafted, Mr. Dwivedi submitted that Section 75 was the provision corresponding to Article 200 in the Government of India Act, 1935. However, in Section 75 the expressions “Governor in his discretion” and “Governor may, in his discretion” were deployed in the substantive part and the proviso respectively. Later on, when the draft of the Constitution was prepared by [2025] 4 S.C.R. 1021The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr. the constitutional advisor, the expression “Governor in his discretion” was dropped from the substantive part of Article 147 (predecessor of draft Article 175), but the expression “Governor may, in his discretion” was retained in the proviso. The same position continued in Article 175 of the Draft Constitution, 1948 (hereinafter, “the Draft Constitution”) (predecessor of Article 200) presented before the Constituent Assembly. However, ultimately, the expression conferring discretion was dropped and Article 200 came to be adopted in its present form. He submitted that the reason for this was explained by Dr. Ambedkar who said that there can be no room for the Governor to act on his discretion in a responsible form of government. Further, it was explained by Mr. T.T. Krishnamachari that the returning of the Bill to the Legislature will only be upon the advice of the Council of Ministers and not on the personal discretion of the Governor.
vi) Mr. Dwivedi submitted that issues of repugnance of State legislation with a Central enactment are not of easy determination and the only method of discourse between the Governor and the State Legislature is provided in the first proviso to Article 200. Hence, simpliciter withholding of assent without taking recourse to the first proviso ought to be rejected by the Courts and compliance with the first proviso ought to be mandated in every case of withholding of assent. Furthermore, issues of repugnance should be left for the constitutional courts to decide.
vii) The interpretation of Article 200 must be done in line with the intent of the framers of the Constitution which is evident from the Constituent Assembly Debates. The only instance where this Court adopted an approach contrary to the one suggested by the Constituent Assembly pertained to the appointment of Judges to the High Court and this Court and that approach was adopted to preserve the independence of the judiciary, which is part of the basic structure. However, in the present case, there is no compelling need to diverge from the view adopted by the Constituent Assembly as that view supports the fundamental principles of federalism.
1022 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports d) Option of withholding of assent is attached to the first proviso to Article 200.
i) He submitted that the exercise of power to withhold assent by the Governor is coupled with the duty of the Governor to comply with the procedure prescribed in the first proviso to Article 200 and the same has been recognised in the decision in State of Punjab (supra).
ii) On the use of the expression “shall declare” in the substantive part of Article 200, he submitted that this expression in the main part of Article 200 would, by necessary implication, require the Governor to mention the reasons for withholding the assent.
iii) He submitted that the expression “shall not withhold assent therefrom” in the first proviso to Article 200 takes away the option of reserving the Bill for the consideration of the President from the Governor when the Bill is repassed by the State Legislature and presented before him for assent. In support of his submission, he argued that the use of a negative expression renders the course of action prescribed as mandatory in nature. He further submitted that the phraseology of the first proviso to Article 200 is different from the proviso to Article 201 inasmuch as the latter does not oblige the President to mandatorily assent to the Bill after it has been repassed by the State Legislature and is presented before him again. Whereas, in contrast, the first proviso to Article 200 is couched in a negative language and thus prohibits the Governor from taking any other recourse than granting assent.
e) Reservation of bills for the consideration of the President. i) Mr. Dwivedi submitted that the power to reserve the Bill for the consideration of the President is not open ended. If specific provision of the Constitution does not require Presidential assent to the Bill passed by State Legislature, then such a Bill cannot be reserved for the consideration of the President.
ii) He submitted that a further limitation on the power to reserve a Bill is that it can only be reserved on the aid and [2025] 4 S.C.R. 1023The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr. advice of the Council of Ministers and the Governor has no personal discretion in this matter. Articles 31A, 31C, 213, 254, 288, 304(b), 360 and 6 th Schedule are the only provisions which expressly require assent of President. It is only when these articles are attracted that the Governor can reserve the Bills for consideration of the President. In the exclusive domain of Legislation under the State List or List-II of the 7th Schedule of the Constitution, no assent of President is needed.
iii) On the aspect of repugnancy, he submitted that the letter of the Governor informing that the Bills were being reserved for the consideration of the President fails to specify the Central law with which States Bills are repugnant. This indicates non-application of mind. He submitted that in Kaiser-I-Hind Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. v. National Textile Corporation (Maharashtra North) Ltd. and Ors. reported in (2002) 8 SCC 182, a Constitution Bench of this Court held that the Central law with which repugnance exists must be pointed out by the proposal of State government specifically. Even the nature of repugnance should be stated so as to enable the President to consider the nature, extent, feasibility, practicality and desirability of assenting. iv) On the aspect of reading in a time limit within the scheme of Article 200, he submitted that an outer limit of 2 to 3 months needs to be stipulated by this court to obviate exercise of pocket-veto by the Governors. Delays of over 3 months needs to be curbed.
32. Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner, made detailed submissions broadly on the following aspects:
a) The Governor in exercise of his functions under Article 200 is required to act on the aid and advice tendered by the Council of Ministers.
i) The Governor is merely a titular or de jure head of the State and the task of governing the State is entrusted to the Chief Minister and his Council of Ministers who can be said to be the head of the 1024 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports State de facto. The powers vested in the Governor under the Constitution must be exercised on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers headed by the Chief Minister.
ii) The Constituent Assembly Debates indicate that the framers of our Constitution envisaged the position of the Governor as that of a guide, philosopher and a friend of the Government and the people in general.
iii) The Constituent Assembly, in its wisdom and in consonance with the position of the Governor in the parliamentary form of Government, removed the phrase “in his discretion” from the substantive part and the first proviso to Section 75 of the Government of India Act upon which Article 200 was modelled.
iv) The Constitutional Scheme does not envisage that the Governor would have the power to veto Bills duly passed by the State Legislature and would be capable of supplanting the policies of the Government with his own discretion. The Governor cannot sit over the Bills enacted by the Legislature indefinitely as that would be against the interest of the people who elect the Government with the aspiration that the Government would legislate in their interest.
Gubernatorial procrastination is a new phenomenon and requires judicial intervention for finding a new solution for it within the Constitutional framework.
v) Placing reliance on the Constitution Bench decision in Samsher Singh (supra), he submitted that although the executive power of the State is vested in the Governor yet it is actually carried on by the Ministers under the Rules of Business made under Article 166(3). Further, the President or the Governor act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers with the Prime Minister as the head in the case of the Union and the Chief Minister as the head in the case of States, in all matters which vest in the Executive, irrespective of whether those functions are executive or legislative in character.
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1025The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr. vi) Referring to the observations made by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Nabam Rebia (supra), it was submitted that the Governor cannot be entrusted with such powers and functions as would assign to him a dominating position over the State Executive and the State Legislature. The Governor cannot be accepted as an all-pervading super-constitutional authority. It was submitted that an examination of the executive and legislative functions of the Governor in the context of the constitutional scheme clearly brings out that the Governor has not been assigned any substantive role either in the executive or the legislative functioning of the State.
vii) It was argued that this Court in Nabam Rabia (supra) has gone further to say that any exercise of discretionary powers of the Governor is limited to situations where a constitutional provision expressly provides that the Governor should act in his own discretion. Additionally, a Governor may exercise his functions in his own discretion in situations where the constitutional provision concerned cannot be construed otherwise and in situations where the clear intent underlying a constitutional provision so requires i.e., where the exercise of such power on the aid and advice, would run contrary to the constitutional scheme, or would be contradictory in terms.
viii) In response to our specific question as regards the observations made by this Court in B.K. Pavitra v.
Union of India reported in (2019) 6 SCC 129, that the eventuality in Article 254(2) does not exhaust the ambit of the power entrusted to the Governor under Article 200 to reserve a Bill for the consideration of the President, he submitted that the Governor may legitimately refer a bill for consideration at the end of the President upon entertaining a legitimate doubt about the validity of law. However, such reference of a bill can only be done with the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers and not upon the individual discretion of the Governor.
1026 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports ix) He further submitted that the said observations in B.K. Pavitra (supra) should be interpreted to mean that even though the power under Article 200 is entrusted to the Governor, yet such exercise of power can only be done with the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers of the State. The Governor has no independent discretion under the substantive part of Article 200 for referring the bill for the consideration of the President. As is crystal clear from the Constituent Assembly Debates, there is no independent discretion vested in the Governor in exercise of his functions under Article 200 of the Constitution. Although the power of reserving Bills for the consideration of the President is a necessary channel for references under Article 254(2) to save the competence of the State Legislatures from being unduly restricted by the operation of the rule of repugnancy embodied in Clause (1) of the Article 254, yet such power is also subject to the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers.
b) The Governor cannot reserve a bill for the consideration of the President when it is repassed by the State Legislature, with or without amendments, under the first proviso to Article 200?
i) Mr. Singhvi submitted that the relevant consideration at the end of the Governor when a bill is presented before him for assent broadly should be as follows:
1. The first step is to ascertain whether the Bill is a Money Bill – In cases of Money Bills, the Governor has to grant assent.
2. Thereafter, the Governor must ascertain whether the second proviso to Article 200 is attracted, that is, whether the Bill, if it became law, would derogate from the powers of the High Court - If the answer is yes, then the Governor must reserve the Bill for the consideration of the President.
3. In all other cases, the Governor has three options to choose from when the bill is presented before him for [2025] 4 S.C.R. 1027The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr. the first time – to either assent, or withhold assent, or reserve the Bill for the consideration of the President. ii) He submitted that after the Governor has withheld assent to a bill and returned the same to the Legislative Assembly, it is not open to the Governor to reserve the said bill for the consideration of the President once the Legislative Assembly re-passes it with or without amendment. If the Governor wants to reserve any bill for the consideration of the President, he must do so in the first instance when the bill is presented to him for assent. The Governor can choose any one of the three options at the first instance but if he exercises the option to withhold assent, then the option of reserving the bill for the consideration of the President ceases to exist because the next step in such a case is to follow the procedure prescribed under first proviso to Article 200.
iii) Explaining the reason for the aforesaid, he submitted that upon exercising the second option, the third option no longer remains for the Governor as the first proviso to Article 200 comes into operation. Article 200 does not provide any scope to the Governor for the reservation of the bill once the second option has already been exercised. The decision of the Governor to go down the path of sending the bill back to the Legislature precludes him from reversing his constitutional election subsequently, by referring it to the President after the Bill is returned to him consequent to repassing by the Legislature.
c) The first proviso to Article 200 is attached to the option of withholding of assent provided in the substantive part of the article.
i) The concluding part of the first proviso stipulates that if the Bill is passed again by the Legislature either with or without amendments, the Governor shall not withhold assent therefrom upon presentation. The expression “shall not withhold assent therefrom” is a clear indicator that the exercise of the power under the first proviso is relatable to the withholding of the assent by the Governor to the bill in the first instance. This phrase constitutes a clear 1028 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports and unequivocal constitutional prohibition against the Governor. The role which is ascribed by the first proviso to the Governor is recommendatory in nature and it does not bind the State Legislature.
ii) The first proviso to Article 200 expands upon the second option to ensure that the object of the Article is not rendered otiose as without the first proviso, Article 200 would allow the Governor to indiscriminately veto bills by repetitively and sequentially withholding the assent and cripple an elected Government for political reasons.
iii) On the use of the expression “may” in the first proviso to Article 200, placing reliance on the decision of this Court in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Jogendra Singh reported in AIR 1963 SC 1618 the counsel submitted that in the said decision while adjudicating the duty of the Governor to refer the cases relating to Government servants to the Administrative Tribunal under Rules 4(2) of the Civil Service Rules which also used the expression “may” this Court had held that the word “may” is capable of meaning “must” or “shall” in the light of the context. He further submitted that where a discretion is conferred upon a public authority coupled with an obligation, the word “may” which denotes discretion should be construed to mean a command. Sometimes, the legislature uses the word “may” out of deference to the high status of the authority on whom the power and the obligation are intended to be conferred and imposed.
iv) The first part of the first proviso is mandatory in nature. It authorises the Governor to, as soon as possible, after the presentation for Bill for assent, return the Bill together with a message requesting the House to reconsider the Bill with the desirability of introducing any such amendments as he may recommend in his message. He submitted that this interpretation was also followed by this Court in the decision in State of Punjab (supra) by stating that Governor must mandatorily follow the course of action indicated in the first proviso of communicating to the State Legislature “as soon as possible” a message warranting reconsideration of the Bill.
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1029The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr. v) The Governor can only return the bill when he has withheld the assent. The Governor cannot be expected to keep the bill in his custody after withholding the assent as it would amount to a “pocket veto” or veto which is contrary to the intention of the makers of the Constitution. Any acceptance of such “suspended animation” doctrine of a Bill, supposedly kept indefinitely pending by a Governor, would be grossly violative of the Constitutional text, spirit and intent. vi) The counsel while highlighting the facts of the case at hand, submitted that the Governor had returned the Bills with the remarks “I withhold assent” which amounts to a clear withholding as per the second option of the substantive part of Article 200. When these Bills were returned to the Legislative Assembly, the Bills only contained a signed endorsement by the Governor with the remarks “I withhold assent” and there was no message for reconsideration. In such a situation of simpliciter withholding of assent, the State Legislative Assembly cannot be precluded from reconsidering the Bill and re-passing the Bill as the exercise of the option of withholding of assent brings into operation the first proviso whereby such Bills have to be returned to the State Legislative Assembly.
vii) Once the first proviso comes into operation, the State Legislature is bound to mandatorily reconsider the Bills and pass them with or without any amendments as indicated by the expression “House or Houses shall reconsider the Bill accordingly” in the second part of the first proviso to Article 200.
d) A time-limit must be read into the expression “as soon as possible” appearing in the first proviso to Article 200 to curtail the prevalent practice of gubernatorial procrastination.
i) He submitted that the expression “as soon as possible” provided in first proviso to Article 200 does not provide any strict time limit to be followed by the Governor to decide upon the Bills presented for assent, but that should not and cannot mean that the Governor can keep a Bill duly passed by the State Legislative Assembly “pending” for 1030 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports indeterminate periods. This course of action is inconsistent with the phrase “as soon as possible”.
ii) The counsel placed reliance on the following decisions of this Court in support of his submission:
• The State of Telangana v. Secretary to Her Excellency the Hon’ble Governor for the State of Telangana & Anr. reported in (2024) 1 SCC 405 has emphasized that the phrase “as soon as possible”
has significant Constitutional content, and must be borne in mind by Constitutional functionaries.
• Ram Chand and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.
reported in (1994) 1 SCC 44 held that where for exercise of power no time-limit is fixed, it has to be exercised within a time which can be held to be reasonable.
• Keisham Meghachandra Singh v. Speaker, Manipur Legislative Assembly and Ors. reported in (2021) 16 SCC 503 had postulated a “three months outer limit” for deciding disqualification petitions filed before the Speaker.
• M/s North Eastern Chemicals Industries (P) Ltd. & Anr. v. M/s Ashok Mills - CA No. 2669 of 2023 has held that where there is no time period prescribed by the statute, the Court must undertake a holistic assessment of the facts and circumstances, conduct of the parties, and the nature of the proceedings to examine the possibility of delay causing prejudice to a party.
• AG Perarivalan v. State, Through Superintendent of Police CBI/SIT/MMDA, Chennai, Tamil Nadu and Anr. reported in (2023) 8 SCC 257 wherein while dealing with the delay caused by the Governor in deciding remission matters, this Court exercised its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution directing that the prisoner was deemed to have served the sentence.
iii) Mr. Singhvi referred to Chapter V of the report of the Sarkaria Commission on Centre-State Administrative [2025] 4 S.C.R. 1031The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr. Relations wherein it was suggested that the Governor should make a declaration under Article 200 within one month from the date on which the Bill is presented. He also referred to the Punchhi Committee Report on Centre- State Relations which recommended “maximum period of six months after Bill is presented” to be the time limit to be followed by the Governor under Article 200.
e) The observations made by this Court in its decision in Valluri Basavaiah Chowdhary are not applicable to the present case i) Mr. Singhvi submitted that this Court in Valluri Basavaiah Chowdhary (supra) had no occasion to adjudicate upon the interpretation of the constitutional powers of the Governor under Article 200 of the Constitution. Therefore, the observations of the Court in Para 19 cannot be construed to be its ratio decidendi. At most, these observations could be considered as obiter dicta. Indeed, they may not even constitute obiter but are mere observations, totally unconnected to and unnecessary for that case.
ii) He relied upon the decision of this Court in Secunderabad Club v. Commissioner of Income-Tax reported in (2023)
SCC OnLine SC 1004 to submit that in terms of Article 141 of the Constitution, only the ratio decidendi of a judgment, that is, the reason assigned in support of the conclusion, is binding. He submitted that this Court has held that what is binding, therefore, is the principle underlying a decision which must be discerned in the context of the question(s) involved in that case from which the decision takes its colour. In a subsequent case, a decision cannot be relied upon in support of a proposition that it did not decide. Therefore, the context or the question, while considering which, a judgment has been rendered assumes significance.
iii) He submitted that the obiter dictum of the Supreme Court is binding under Article 141 to the extent of the observations on points raised and decided by the court in a case. Although the obiter dictum of the Supreme Court is binding on all courts yet it only has persuasive authority as far as the Supreme Court itself is concerned.
1032 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports iv) He further submitted that a decision is not an authority for what can be read into it by implication or by assigning an assumed intention of the judges and inferring from it a proposition of law which the judges have not specifically or expressly laid down in the pronouncement.
v) Lastly, he submitted that even if the decision in Valluri Basavaiah Chowdhary (supra) is interpreted as a binding precedent, still such interpretation of the Article 200 would fall foul of the intention envisaged by the Constituent Assembly.
f) Role of the President under Article 201.
i) On the aspect of the position of the President under Article 201, he submitted that the President is not required to mandatorily assent to the bill that is presented to him for his consideration after being repassed by the State Legislature, once such bill has been sent back by the President under the proviso to Article 201 in the first instance.
ii) It was submitted that Article 201 does not contain the expression “shall not withhold assent therefrom” in the proviso unlike the first proviso to Article 200. He further submitted that this Court in Kaiser-I-Hind (supra) had held that the assent of the President envisaged under Articles 31-A, 31-C, 254(2) and 304(b) of the Constitution respectively constitutes a distinct class and category of its own and is different from the assent envisaged under Articles 111 of the President or Article 200 of the Governor. A bare perusal of Article 201 indicates that even when the Houses of the State Legislature re-pass the Bill and present it for consideration in terms of the proviso to Article 201, there is no compulsion on the President to accord assent. iii) Just as the Governor, the President is also bound by the aid and advice of his Council of Ministers under Article 201 of the Constitution. Such absence of compulsion of the President to grant assent to the Bill re-considered and repassed by the State Legislative Assembly is also subject to the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. Whether the President should grant assent or not would be subject [2025] 4 S.C.R. 1033The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr. to the aid and advice by the Council of Ministers. There is no individual discretion vested in the President in granting or not granting the assent under Article 201.
g) Malice in law and malice in fact i) He submitted that the Governor could be said to have committed violence to the constitutional framework by not adhering to the mandate under Article 200 of the Constitution and has also attempted to render the present Writ Petition infructuous during its pendency.
ii) It was submitted that when the Petitioner had approached this Court initially, the Governor had kept 12 Bills pending. Thereafter, the captioned Writ Petitions were heard by this Court on 10.11.2023 wherein it was observed that the present Writ Petition raised a matter of serious concern and issued notice to the Union of India represented by the Secretary to the Government in the Ministry of Home Affairs. In light of the aforesaid, the Governor hastily on 13.11.2023 referred two Bills for the consideration of the President and withheld assent simpliciter to the remaining 10 Bills. On 18.11.2023, a special session of Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly was held and the 10 Bills were reconsidered and passed in the Assembly. These Bills were sent to the Governor for consideration on the same day itself. However, the Governor, with a view to render the present petition infructuous, reserved the 10 Bills for the consideration of the President.
iii) In the last, the learned counsel submitted that the action of the Governor has been contrary to what was laid down by this Court in S.R. Bommai (supra) wherein it was stated that the Governor is a very high Constitutional functionary and he is supposed to act fairly and honestly, in a manner consistent with his oath. It is for this reason that Article 356 places such implicit faith on his report. If, however, in a given case his report is vitiated by legal mala fides, it is bound to vitiate the President’s action as well.
33. Mr. P. Wilson, the learned Senior Counsel, made extensive submissions on behalf of the petitioner. For the sake of brevity, 1034 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports we are recording only those submissions which are in addition to the points already canvassed by Mr. Dwivedi and Mr. Singhvi respectively:
i) The Constituent Assembly after long and detailed debates decided to have a nominated Governor in place of an elected Governor and consciously deleted all expressions from the Draft Constitution which conferred individual discretion on the Governor. He referred to certain portions of the report of the Sarkaria Commission in support of his arguments.
ii) Article 91 of the Draft Constitution, 1948 which enumerated the assent to bills by the President, had postulated a time limit of six weeks for the President to provide his assent to the bills presented to him by the Houses of Parliament.
iii) Relying on the speech of Mr. T.T. Krishnamachari in the Constituent Assembly, he submitted that Article 200, as finally enacted, does not vest any discretion in the Governor to withhold a bill passed by the Legislature except on the express aid and advice of the Council of Ministers.
iv) He submitted that the Sarkaria Commission in its Report in Chapter V had observed that the Governor may reserve a bill for the consideration of President when it clearly violates Fundamental Rights or transgresses other Constitutional limitations. The power to reserve Bills could be used only in rare circumstances. In all other circumstances, the Governor needs to abide by the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. Therefore, Article 200 does not confer general discretion on the Governor but mandates him to act in accordance with aid and advice of the Council of Ministers.
v) He submitted that the fear anticipated by Shri H.V. Kamath as regards the difficulties that may arise due to the use of the phrase “as soon as possible” during the discussion on draft Article 91 is exactly what has been happening in the States of Telangana, Punjab, Kerala as well as in the petitioner State. Thus, this Court must intervene and put the matter on quietus by declaring that it is deemed that assent has been granted to the Bills and declare the action of reserving Bills for assent of the President as ultra vires.
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1035The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr. vi) He submitted that the 10 Bills which are the subject matter of present Writ Petition were dealt with by the Governor during the pendency of the Writ Petition in the manner referred to in paragraph 13 and 14 respectively of the third Amendment application in I.A. No. 216164 of 2024. Therefore, all unconstitutional acts of the Governor remain for consideration by this Court as they are actions pendente lite and this Court has the power to turn the clock back and restore status quo ante. ii. Submissions on behalf of the Respondents
34. Mr. R. Venkatramani, the learned Attorney General for India, appeared for the respondents and submitted as follows:
a. The Governor while acting under Article 200 is not acting in exercise of ordinary discretion but is acting under a constitutional responsibility. Thus, even if it is assumed that the Governor has no individual discretion, he may still withhold assent to a bill as per his constitutional obligation.
b. He submitted that having regard to the high level of responsibilities entrusted to the Governor in dealing with Bills presented for his consideration, the Governor may reach out to the Council of Ministers for advice, in order to know the legislative intent, and be benefited as well. However, when on the plain understanding of the bills, the Governor finds constitutional contraventions, or seriously debatable issues of the Constitution, he may apply his mind, with or without the aid of the Council of Ministers. This principle of an area of constitutional deliberation prior to the Governor taking any call under Article 200, cannot be subjected to or put into any strait-jacket formula.
c. He submitted that when new issues and concerns of legislation involving federal structure of the polity of the nation arise, it is important that the role of the Governor is neither stretched beyond a point, nor should be allowed to be diminished to a status of no consequence.
d. He submitted that in the instant case, the Governor was persuaded by the observations made in Valluri Basavaiah (supra), which suggest that when assent is withheld, the Bill will cease to exist. However, if the Governor chooses to follow the 1036 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports procedure under the first proviso, wherever it will be of relevance and of importance to follow, then the Governor would become bound by the mandatory stipulation enunciated in the first proviso. e. He submitted that the single-minded focus of the Governor was to ensure that a repugnant law, if allowed to be on the statute book, would open the scope for maladministration of universities and impede the avowed object and purpose of excellence in higher education, placing all power in the hands of the State Government as opposed to the Chancellor. It is only with a view to avoid such a situation that the Governor withheld assent to the Bills in question.
f. On the aspect of reservation of the bills for the consideration of the President, he submitted that there is nothing in Article 200 that suggests that the Governor ceases to have the authority to refer the matter to the President after he has withheld assent to the bill in the first instance. If this authority is available at the time of withholding of assent, the same cannot be taken away or not made available by the State Government acting on their own motion under the first proviso.
g. In furtherance of the aforesaid submission, he submitted that for all practical purposes, the Bills forwarded by the petitioner State on 18.11.2023 should not to be treated as sent by the Governor acting under the first proviso. Bills that are sent outside the procedure contemplated by the first proviso, would be open for consideration by the Governor for any further course of action including, reference to the President. The principle of power coupled with duty underlying Article 200 demands that recourse to reference to President even after initial withholding of assent by the Governor, be read into the Article, in order to make the power effective to achieve its purpose.
h. He submitted that on a proper reading of the substantive part and the first proviso to Article 200, it will be seen that four courses of actions are available to the Governor. The observations made in the State of Punjab (supra) decision may thus warrant a qualification, or an additional statement to fine-tune the scope of Article 200.
i. On the issue as regards whether the first proviso is attracted in all instances of withholding of assent, he submitted that the role [2025] 4 S.C.R. 1037The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr. for the first proviso is confined to cases where the bill may not be hit by any constitutional limitation, is within the competence of the legislature, but may admit of changes, amendments, etc. Such amendments or changes that the Governor may thus suggest within the scope of the first proviso, will not be relatable to matters such as repugnancy. With the perception of repugnancy, the focus of the Governor will be outside the first proviso. He argued that even though this Court in State of Punjab (supra) has opined that the exercise of power under the first proviso is relatable to the withholding of the assent by the Governor, yet this view may require a further qualification that in the context of repugnancy, unlike any other reason for withholding of assent, the Governor need not necessarily proceed to act under the first proviso. The first proviso perhaps cannot be read to be pressed into service when both the Governor and the State Government understand the repugnancy dimension. In the event the State Government desires to clear the repugnancy or any other hurdle, it may itself seek the assent of the President. In such an event the State Government may also ask the Governor to refer the matter to the President for consideration.
j. He submitted that that in the present case as the President has withheld assent to the Bills in question, therefore in terms of the statement of law in Hoechst Pharamaceuticals (supra), the action of the President in withholding assent is not justiciable. What cannot be directly done by seeking such justiciability cannot be indirectly achieved by the claim that the action of the Governor in forwarding the bills in question to the President was beyond his authority.
k. He submitted that the exposition of Article 200 as done in State of Punjab (supra) is sub-silentio as the Court while making the said decision did not take into account the observations made by the Constitution Bench in Valluri Basavaiah (supra). l. In the last, he submitted that the matter may be referred to a larger Bench of this Court so as to harmonise the observations made in B.K. Pavitra (supra), Valluri Basavaiah (supra) and State of Punjab (supra).
35. Mr. Vikramjit Banerjee, the learned Additional Solicitor General, appeared for the respondents and submitted as follows:
1038 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports a. A reading of Clause (1) of Article 163 categorically provides that the Governor ordinarily is aided and advised by the Council of Ministers headed by the Chief Minister, however, there is an express discretion vested with the Governor for exercising functions under the Constitution which permeates all of the provisions that require the Governor to exercise his/her power, including Articles 200 and 201.
b. Placing reliance on the decision of this Court in M.P. Special Police (supra), he submitted that that the normal rule is that the Governor acts on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers and not independently or contrary to it. But there are exceptions under which the Governor can act in his own discretion and the exceptions are not exhaustive or limited but differ as per the facts of each case. He further submitted that the aforesaid decision recognised that the concept of the Governor acting in his discretion or exercising independent judgment is not alien to the Constitution. There may be situations where, by reason of peril to democracy or democratic principles, an action may be compelled which by its very nature is not amenable to Ministerial advice. An instance of a situation curiously similar to the present case is discussed where bias was inherent and manifest in the advice of the Council of Ministers as the proposed bills sought to fundamentally encroach into the role of the Governor as the Chancellor by seeking to substitute “Chancellor” (who is the appointing authority of Vice Chancellors and also the disciplinary authority) with “Government”. The State Government has impugned the notifications issued by the Governor (in the capacity of the Chancellor) for constitution of Search Committees for appointment of Vice Chancellors for State Universities. Additionally, the Bills were effectively aimed at seeking to control the co-ordination and standards of higher and technical education/research which fall under Entry 66 of the Union List (under the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution).
c. Placing reliance on the decision of this Court in Purushothaman Nambudiri v. State of Kerala reported in 1961 SCC OnLine SC 361 he submitted that the idea of reading in a time limit in Articles 200 and 201 respectively had been deliberated upon and expressly rejected by this Court in the said decision. [2025] 4 S.C.R. 1039The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.
C. ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION
36. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having gone through the materials on record, the following questions of paramount constitutional importance fall for our determination: I) What courses of action are available to the Governor in exercise of his powers under Article 200 of the Constitution?
i. Whether the first proviso could be said to provide an independent course of action available to the Governor in addition to the three options provided under the substantive part of Article 200?
ii. In what manner the expression “the Bill falls through unless the procedure under the first proviso is followed”, as used in Valluri Basavaiah Chowdhary (supra), should be construed?
iii. Whether the decision of this Court in State of Punjab (supra) could be said to be per incuriam for not having taken into consideration the observations made in previous decisions rendered by larger benches of this Court?
iv. Whether the scheme of Article 200 of the Constitution envisages the exercise of ‘absolute veto’ or ‘pocket veto’ of a bill by the Governor?
II) Whether the Governor can reserve a bill for the consideration of the President at the time when it is presented to him for assent after being reconsidered in accordance with the first proviso to Article 200, more particularly, when he had not reserved it for the consideration of the President in the first instance and had declared withholding of assent thereto? i. Whether the reservation by the Governor, for the consideration of the President of the ten Bills which were repassed by the Tamil Nadu State Assembly and presented to the Governor on 18.11.2023, is erroneous in law and hence liable to be set aside?
III) Whether there is an express constitutionally prescribed time-limit within which the Governor is required to act 1040 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports in the exercise of his powers under Article 200 of the Constitution?
i. How is the absence of an express time-limit in Article 200 to be construed for ascertaining the manner in which the Governor is expected to exercise his powers under the said provision?
ii. What is the import of the expression “as soon as possible” appearing in the first proviso to Article 200?
iii. Whether a time-limit can be prescribed by this Court for ensuring that the exercise of power by the Governor under Article 200 is in conformity with the object of expediency underlying the scheme of the said provision?
IV) Whether the Governor in the exercise of his powers under Article 200 of the Constitution can only act in accordance with the aid and advice tendered to him by the State Council of Ministers? If not, whether the constitutional scheme has vested the Governor with some discretion in discharge of his functions under Article 200?
i. How has the role of the Governor been envisaged under the constitutional scheme?
ii. Whether the Governor enjoys a certain degree of discretion in discharge of his functions in contrast to the President? What is the source of such discretion, if any?
iii. Whether the deletion of the expression “in his discretion” from Article 175 of the Draft Constitution imply that the Governor has no discretion available in the exercise of his powers under Article 200?
iv. Whether the observations of this Court in B.K. Pavitra (supra) that “a discretion is conferred upon the Governor to follow one of the courses of action enunciated in the substantive part of Article 200” could be said to be per incuriam for having failed to notice the position of law as laid down by the larger Benches of this Court?
V) Whether the exercise of discretion by the Governor in discharge of his functions under Article 200 could be [2025] 4 S.C.R. 1041The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr. said to be subject to judicial review? If yes, what are the parameters for such judicial review?
i. Whether the discharge of functions by the Governor under Article 200 of the Constitution in his discretion could be said to be immune from judicial review?
ii. Whether the withholding of assent by the President under Article 201 of the Constitution could also be said to be beyond the scope of judicial scrutiny?
iii. If the aforesaid discharge of functions is subject to judicial review, whether such discharge of functions could be said to be non-justiciable in light of the decisions of this Court in Hoechst (supra), Kaiser-I-Hind (supra), and B.K.
Pavitra (supra)?
VI) What is the manner in which the President under Article 201 of the Constitution is required to act once a bill has been reserved for his consideration by the Governor under Article 200 of the Constitution?
i. Whether the decision of the President to withhold assent under Article 201 of the Constitution could be said to be justiciable? If yes, what is the extent of justiciability that the courts can embark upon while undertaking judicial review of the exercise of powers by the President under Article 201 of the Constitution?
D. ASSENT TO BILLS – HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
37. Article 200 appears in Chapter III of Part VI of the Constitution under the heading Legislative Procedure. Part VI deals with the States and Chapter III deals with the State Legislature. The marginal note attached to Article 200 reads “Assent to Bills” and the article reads as follows: “200. Assent to Bills. – When a Bill has been passed by the Legislative Assembly of a State or, in the case of a State having a Legislative Council, has been passed by both Houses of the Legislature of the State, it shall be presented to the Governor and the Governor shall declare either that he assents to the Bill 1042 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports or that he withholds assent therefrom or that he reserves the Bill for the consideration of the President:
Provided that the Governor may, as soon as possible after the presentation to him of the Bill for assent, return the Bill if it is not a Money Bill together with a message requesting that the House or Houses will reconsider the Bill or any specified provisions thereof and, in particular, will consider the desirability of introducing any such amendments as he may recommend in his message and, when a Bill is so returned, the House or Houses shall reconsider the Bill accordingly, and if the Bill is passed again by the House or Houses with or without amendment and presented to the Governor for assent, the Governor shall not withhold assent therefrom:
Provided further that the Governor shall not assent to, but shall reserve for the consideration of the President, any Bill which in the opinion of the Governor would, if it became law, so derogate from the powers of the High Court as to endanger the position which that Court is by this Constitution designed to fill.”
38. Section 75 of the Government of India Act, 1935 (for short, “the GoI Act, 1935”) upon which the Article 200 has been substantially modelled is reproduced hereinbelow:
“75. Assent to Bills. – A Bill which has been passed by the Provincial Legislative Assembly or, in the case of a Province having a Legislative Council, has been passed by both Chambers of the Provincial Legislature, shall be presented to the Governor, and the Governor in his discretion shall declare either that he assents in His Majesty’s name to the Bill, or that he withholds assent therefrom, or that he reserves the Bill for the consideration of the Governor General :
Provided that the Governor may in his discretion return the Bill together with a message requesting that the Chamber or Chambers will reconsider the Bill or any specified provisions thereof and, in particular, will consider the desirability of introducing any such amendments as [2025] 4 S.C.R. 1043The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr. he may recommend in his message and, when a Bill is so returned, the Chamber or Chambers shall reconsider it accordingly.”
39. A perusal of both the aforesaid provisions indicates that Article 200 of the Constitution corresponds to Section 75 of the GoI Act, 1935 except for the following differences:
a. The expression “in his discretion” has been omitted from both the substantive part of Article 200 as well as the first proviso thereto.
b. The Governor under Article 200 assents to the bill in his own name unlike Section 75 wherein the assent was to be granted in the name of the Crown.
c. The expression “if the Bill is passed again by the House or Houses with or without amendment and presented to the Governor for assent, the Governor shall not withhold assent therefrom” has been added to the first proviso to Article 200. d. The second proviso is a further addition to Article 200 and did not exist in Section 75 referred to above.
40. D.D. Basu in his Commentary on the Constitution of India (pp. 6311, 8th Ed., 2009) has observed that the omission of the expression “in his discretion” from Article 200 signifies that the Governor must exercise his power under the Article according to the advice of his ministers. Further, the addition of the expression “shall not withhold assent therefrom” indicates that the Governor has no power to veto a reconsidered bill and must assent to it whether it is passed in the original form or with amendments.
41. Article 200 is divided into three parts - the substantive part and two provisos. A perusal of the substantive part of Article 200 indicates that the presentation of a bill to the Governor is mandatory after it is passed by the State legislature. The same is made evident from the use of the expression “it shall be presented to the Governor”. In the same breath, Article 200 makes it mandatory for the Governor to make one of the following declarations:
a. That he assents to the bill; or b. That he withholds assent to the bill; or c. That he reserves the bill for the consideration of the President. 1044 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
42. It is important to note that the expression “shall” has been used to qualify the three types of declarations that the Governor can make upon presentation of the bill to him. Further, the three options provided in the substantive part of Article 200 are connected by the conjunction “or” which signifies that the three options are mutually exclusive of each other, and the Governor can only choose one of them at a time. In other words, the Governor cannot assent to a bill and also reserve it for the consideration of the President at the same time. Similarly, the Governor cannot declare that he withholds assent and also reserve the bill for the consideration of the President at the same time. Patanjali Sastri, Chief Justice (as he then was), observed to this effect in State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh reported in (1952) 1 SCC 528 as follows:
“20. […] It is significant that the article does not contemplate the Governor giving his assent and thereafter, when the Bill has become a full-fledged law, reserving it for the consideration of the President. Indeed, the Governor is prohibited from giving his assent where such reservation by him is made compulsory. The Constitution would thus seem to contemplate only “Bills” passed by the House or Houses of Legislature being reserved for the consideration of the President and not “laws” to which the Governor has already given his assent. […] Similarly, Article 31(3) must, in my judgment, be understood as having reference to what, in historical sequence, having been passed by the House or Houses of the State Legislature and reserved by the Governor for the consideration of the President and assented to by the latter, has thus become a law. If it was intended that such a law should have the assent of both the Governor and the President, one would expect to find not only a more clear or explicit provision to that effect, but also some reference in Article 200 to the Governor’s power to reserve a measure for the consideration of the President after himself assenting to it. On the other hand, as we have seen, where reservation by the Governor is made obligatory, he is prohibited from giving his assent.”
(Emphasis supplied)
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1045The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.
43. The first proviso to Article 200 has no application to Money Bills. For all other bills, it provides that the Governor may, as soon as possible after the presentation of the bill to him for assent, return the bill to the House or Houses along with a message requesting the House or the Houses to reconsider the bill in totality or certain provisions thereof. He may also recommend the introduction of certain amendments to the bill. The first proviso further states that when a bill is returned with such a message, then the House or the Houses must reconsider the bill accordingly and if the bill is passed with or without amendments and presented to the Governor for assent, he shall not withhold assent therefrom.
44. The second proviso to Article 200 provides that if the Governor is of the opinion that a bill which is presented to him for assent would, upon becoming law, so derogate from the powers of the High Court as to endanger the position which that Court is designed to fill by the Constitution, then he must reserve the bill for the consideration of the President and not grant assent to it.
45. The heart of the controversy before us lies in the interpretation of the substantive part of Article 200 and the first proviso to it. The arguments advanced before us coupled with the factual situation which we are confronted with, and the broader constitutional and political consequences that an interpretation of Article 200 entails, has opened up before us a treasure trove of questions hidden in the seemingly innocuous and plain language used in Article 200.
46. For a better understanding of Article 200, it is necessary that we should first understand the concept of assent to bills, how it has evolved over the centuries and its importance in parliamentary democracies across the globe. We are undertaking this exercise as Article 200 cannot be understood fully without having regard to the context in which it came to be included in the Constitution. While fidelity to the text of the provision holds paramount consideration in its interpretation, the context is equally, if not more, important, more so in light of the fact that Article 200, as its stands today, bears striking resemblance to Section 75 of the GoI Act, 1935 and other important historical documents which were being drafted by Indians during the course of the freedom struggle.
47. In Westminster styled polities, the Parliament consists of a lower House, an upper House and the head of state. The Indian Constitution 1046 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports has also broadly adopted a similar structure, which becomes evident from Articles 79 and 168 respectively. Article 79 provides that the Parliament shall consist of the President and two Houses - the Council of States and the House of the People. Article 168 provides that each State shall have a Legislature which shall comprise of the Governor and either one or two House(s), as the case may be. In the Westminster system, for a law to be passed by the Parliament, it must receive the approval of all the three elements - the Lower House, the Upper House and the Head of the State.
48. Jessica J. Richardson 2 in her paper titled “Modernisation of Royal Assent in Canada”, has traced the historical origins of the practice of granting assent to bills enacted by the Parliament in the United Kingdom. She has explained that the practice of signifying royal assent to bills passed by Parliament began during the reign of Henry VI (1422-71), when the practice of introducing bills in the form of petitions was replaced by bills in the form of complete statutes. This was a time when assent was granted in person. The Sovereign would attend the Parliament in the House of Lords and give his consent in person. This practice continued until 1541, when the task of signifying royal assent was assigned to a Royal Commission in order to spare King Henry VIII the indignity of having to give royal assent to the Bill of Attainder, which provided for the execution of his wife Catherine Howard. It was after this occurrence that the practice of appointing Lords Commissioners responsible for giving royal assent developed. In the United Kingdom, the last instance of a monarch giving royal assent in person was in 1854 when Queen Victoria personally assented to several bills prior to proroguing the Parliament. However, in Canada, King George VI gave royal assent in person to bills passed by the Canadian Parliament in 1939 during a visit to Canada. The use of a royal assent ceremony continued in the United Kingdom until 1967, when the British Parliament passed the Royal Assent Act, 1967. The said legislation repealed the Royal Assent by Commission Act, 1541 and allowed a simple report of royal assent by the Speakers of the two Houses to give a bill the force of law.
49. In the Canadian context, she explains that the royal assent ceremony was inherited from the United Kingdom tradition and was used prior 2 Jessica J. Richardson, Modernisation of Royal Assent in Canada, 27 CAn . PArliAm . rev.2, 32 (2004), <http://www.revparl.ca/27/2/27n2_04e_Richardson.pdf>.
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1047The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr. to Confederation in both Lower and Upper Canada and closely resembled the original ceremony used in the United Kingdom. Prior to adoption of the new procedure in 2002, Canada was the only remaining Commonwealth country to still use the traditional ceremony for royal assent. However, taking inspiration from the practice prevailing in other Commonwealth countries including Australia and New Zealand, as well as several Canadian provinces, the royal assent procedure was modernised by adopting a written declaration procedure.
50. One of the first instances where the concept of assent to bills appears in a documented form in the Indian context is the Constitution of India Bill, 1895 which is also popularly referred to as the Swaraj Bill. The Bill, which is also termed by the academics as the first articulation of a constitutional imagination by Indians, besides incorporating ideas of free speech, equality before law, right to property, etc., also envisaged a machinery of governance and separation of powers, albeit within the British Empire. As regards the legislative structure, the Bill proposed that the Sovereign of Great Britain shall reign and rule over India and the Viceroy shall be the representative of the Sovereign in India. It further envisaged that the Viceroy would be the President of the Parliament and would have the power to veto any law enacted by the Indian Parliament and initiate legislation. Article 97 of the Bill provided that no bill would become law until it received the sanction of the Sovereign. The said provision is reproduced hereinbelow:
“97. No Bill shall become law unless it has passed by majority through the Lower House three times and the Upper House three times and unless it has obtained the sanction of the Sovereign.”
51. A few years after the ideation of the Swaraj Bill, the demand for self-government further found expression in the Congress- League Scheme of 1916 which was a result of deliberations of the committees constituted jointly by the Indian National Congress and the All India Muslim League. The document envisioned a federal polity - with Provincial Legislative Councils for the provinces and an Imperial Legislative Council at the national level. It is pertinent to note that as per the scheme, the Governor was envisaged as the head of the provincial government and any bill passed by the provincial legislature had to mandatorily receive his assent before 1048 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports it became law. Further, the document also conferred upon the Governor-General the power of vetoing any law passed by the provincial legislature. Any bill passed by the Imperial Legislative Council had to receive the assent of the Governor-General before it became law. The relevant provisions in the said document are reproduced hereinbelow:
“I. Provincial Legislative Councils xxx xxx xxx
9. A Bill, other than a Money Bill, may be introduced in Council in accordance with rules made in that behalf by the Council itself and the consent of the Government should not be required therefor.
II. Provincial Governments
1. The head of every Provincial Government shall be a Governor who shall not ordinarily belong to the Indian Civil Service or any of the permanent services.
xxx xxx xxx III. Imperial Legislative Council xxx xxx xxx
9. All Bills passed by the Council shall have to receive the assent of the Governor-General before they become law.”
52. In the backdrop of the growing demand for self-government by the Indian National Movement and the Montagu-Chelmsford Report, the Government of India Act, 1919 (for short, “the GoI Act, 1919”) was enacted and received assent of the British Crown in December, 1919. The legislation introduced dyarchy at the provincial level, by the introduction of the transferred list and the reserved list. The reserved list consisted of the subject matters on which the Governor enjoyed exclusive legislative powers. However, what we wish to draw attention to is the provision contained in the said legislation as regards assent to bills. Section 12 provided that the Governor had four options to choose from when a bill was presented to him for assent - to declare assent, to withhold assent, to return the bill to the council for reconsideration or to reserve the bill for the consideration of the Governor-General. Notably, there was no requirement for the [2025] 4 S.C.R. 1049The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr. Governor to mandatorily assent to a bill upon its presentation after reconsideration. Further, the Governor had the power to veto any bill passed by the legislative council by a declaration simplicter of withholding of assent. There was also a provision for the lapse of a bill reserved for the consideration of the Governor-General if assent was not granted within a period of six months. Thus, the concept of both absolute and pocket veto could be said to have been available to the Governor and the Governor-General under the provisions of the GoI Act, 1919. The relevant provision is reproduced hereinbelow: “12. Return and reservation of Bills. –
(1) Where a Bill has been passed by a local legislative council, the governor, lieutenant-governor or chief commissioner may, instead of declaring that he assents to or withholds his assent from the Bill, return the Bill to the council for reconsideration, either in whole or in part, together with any amendments which he may recommend, or, in cases prescribed by rules under the principal Act may, and if the rules so require shall, reserve the Bill for the consideration of the Governor-General.
(2) Where a Bill is reserved for the consideration of the Governor-General, the following provisions shall apply:-
(a) The governor, lieutenant-governor or chief commissioner may, at any time within six months from the date of the reservation of the Bill, with the consent of the Governor- General, return the Bill for further consideration by the council with a recommendation that the council shall consider amendments thereto:
(b) After any Bill so returned has been further considered by the council, together with any recommendations made by the governor, lieutenant-governor or chief commissioner relating thereto, the Bill, if re-affirmed with or without amendment, may be again presented to the governor, lieutenant-governor, or chief commissioner:
(c) Any Bill reserved for the consideration of the Governor-General shall, if assented to by the 1050 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Governor-General within a period of six months from the date of such reservation, become law on due publication of such assent, in the same way as a Bill assented to by the governor, lieutenant-governor or chief commissioner, but, if not assented to by the Governor-General within such period of six months, shall lapse and be of no effect unless before the expiration of that period either-
(i) the Bill has been returned by the governor, lieutenant-governor or chief commissioner, for further consideration by the council; or
(ii) in the case of the council not being in session, a notification has been published of an intention so to return the Bill at the commencement of the next session.
(3) The Governor-General may (except where the Bill has been reserved for his consideration), instead of assenting to or withholding his assent from any Act passed by a local legislature, declare that he reserves the Act for the signification of His Majesty’s pleasure thereon, and in such case the Act shall not have validity until His Majesty in Council has signified his assent and his assent has been notified by the Governor- General.”
53. A reading of the aforesaid provision also indicates that at the time of drafting Article 200, the framers of the Constitution not only had before them Section 75 of the GoI Act, 1935 but also Section 12 of the GoI Act, 1919 as well as other possible variations about which we shall discuss in the following paragraphs. However, certain features of Article 200, namely, the absence of automatic lapse upon not receiving approval, mandatory requirement for the Governor to not withhold assent to a bill which is presented to him after being reconsidered by the legislature and absence of the expression “in his discretion”, must be viewed in the context of gradual dilution of the role and powers of the Governor in provincial governance as the country neared independence.
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1051The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr. i. Concept of assent to bills as envisaged by certain historical documents drafted during the freedom struggle.
54. The concept of assent by the Sovereign found mention in Section 75 of the GoI Act, 1935 and Article 200 as it stands today is predominantly modelled according to the version which existed therein. However, before we proceed to discuss Section 75 of the GoI Act, 1935 and how it eventually evolved into Article 200 of the Constitution, we deem it appropriate to briefly shed light on how other aspirational constitutional documents, drafted during the course of the freedom struggle, imagined the practice of assent to bills and made certain modifications to the practice that prevailed in the United Kingdom.
55. The Commonwealth of India Bill, 1925 that was drafted by the National Convention had a lasting impact on the eventual framing of our Constitution as regards the idea of royal assent. Article 39 of the said Bill provided that a bill passed by the Parliament would be presented to the Viceroy for obtaining the King’s assent. Similarly, for the provinces, Article 83 provided that the bills passed by the provincial legislature would be presented to the Governor for obtaining the King’s assent. However, what is relevant to note is that the provisions were not elaborate as regards the procedure and scope of powers of the Sovereign while taking a decision on the aspect of assent.
56. However, the Nehru Report of 1928 shortly followed the Commonwealth of India Bill, 1925 and was drafted in response to the dissatisfaction with the Simon Commission. The Report sought to negative the challenge posed by the British that a constitutional document, which is agreeable to all, could not be drawn by Indians, and contained elaborate provisions providing the mechanism for the purpose of assent to bills.
57. As regards the bills passed by the Parliament, it was stipulated in the Nehru Report that a bill would not become an Act until assent was granted by the Governor-General. The Governor-General was provided with three options - to signify assent, to withhold assent or to reserve the bill for consideration by the British Crown. Notably, there was no obligation on the Governor-General to signify assent after a bill was repassed with or without the amendments suggested by him. The relevant provision is reproduced hereinbelow: “21. (i) So soon as any bill, shall have been passed, or deemed to have been passed by both Houses, it shall be presented to the Governor-General for the signification 1052 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports by him, in the King’s name, of the King’s assent, and the Governor-General may signify such assent or withhold the same or he may reserve the bill for the signification of the King’s pleasure.
(ii) A bill passed by both Houses of Parliament shall not become an Act until the Governor-General signifies his assent thereto in the King’s name or in the case of a bill reserved for the signification of the King’s pleasure until he signifies by speech or message to each House of Parliament, or by proclamation that it has received the assent of the King in Council. Provided that the Governor-General may, where a bill has been passed by both Houses of Parliament and presented to him for the signification by him of the King’s assent, or has been reserved by him for the signification of the King’s pleasure, return the bill for reconsideration by Parliament with a recommendation that Parliament shall consider amendments thereto.
(iii) Any bill so returned shall be further considered by Parliament together with the amendments, recommended by the Governor-General, and if re-affirmed with or without amendments, may be again presented to the Governor- General for the signification in the King’s name of the King’s assent.”
58. As regards the provincial legislature, a bill passed by the provincial legislature had to be assented to by the Governor before it would become an Act. The Governor had two options - to declare assent or to withhold assent. Notably, the Governor did not have the option to reserve the bill for the consideration of the Governor-General. However, every bill after receiving the assent of the Governor had to be mandatorily referred to and assented by the Governor-General failing which the Act would have no validity. Even after receiving the assent of the Governor-General, the Act could be disallowed by the King and would thereupon become void. The relevant provisions are reproduced hereinbelow:
“37. When a bill has been passed by a local Legislative Council, the Governor may declare that he assents to or withholds his assent from the bill.
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1053The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.
38. If the Governor withholds his assent from any such bill, the bill shall not become an Act.
39. If the Governor assents to any such bill, he shall forthwith send an authentic copy of the Act to the Governor- General, and the Act shall not have validity until the Governor-General has assented thereto and that assent has been signified by the Governor-General to, and published by the Governor.
40. Where the Governor-General withholds his assent from any such Act, he shall signify to the Governor in writing his reason for so withholding his assent.
41. When an Act has been assented to by the Governor- General it shall be lawful for His Majesty in Council to signify his disallowance of the Act.
42. Where the disallowance of an Act has been so signified, the Governor shall forthwith notify the disallowance, and thereupon the Act, as from the date of the notification shall become void accordingly.”
59. In 1944, the All India Hindu Mahasabha adopted the Constitution of Hindustan Free State Act as an aspirational constitutional document. As regards the procedure of assent by Governor in provinces, the document contained the following provision:
“93. (1) So soon as any bill shall have been passed by both Chambers it shall be presented to the Governor for the signification of his assent, and he may signify such assent or withhold the same.
(2) A bill passed by both Chambers shall become an Act if the Governor signifies his assent thereto, and that assent has been published by him.
(3) In case where the Governor withholds his assent to a bill passed by both Chambers, he shall return the bill for reconsideration with his own recommendations thereto.
(4) A bill so returned shall be further considered by both Chambers together with the recommendations made by the Governor, and if it is reaffirmed with or without amendments by both Chambers, it shall be deemed to have been 1054 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports assented to by the Governor, but it shall not become an Act unless and until the President of the Hindusthan Free State has assented thereto and that assent has been signified by the President to and published by the Governor.”
60. A perusal of the above indicates that the Governor had the option of either assenting to or withholding a bill presented before him. However, in the latter case, the Governor was under an obligation to return the bill for reconsideration with his own recommendations, whereupon the provincial legislature was required to reconsider the bill in light of the recommendations made. Upon being passed again, with or without amendments, the bill would be deemed to have been assented to by the Governor. However, it would become an Act only upon being assented to by the President, who would signify his assent to the Governor. Thus, the President was vested with the power to veto any bill which had not been assented to by the Governor and was passed again after reconsideration with or without the amendments recommended by the Governor. This was in contrast to the position with respect to the Federal Legislature, wherein no veto power was conferred on the President. The relevant provision read as follows: “30. (1) So soon as any bill shall have been passed by both Chambers, it shall be presented to the President for the signification of his assent, and he may signify such assent or withhold the same.
(2) A bill passed by both chambers shall not become an Act unless and until the President signifies his assent thereto.
(3) In case where the President withholds his assent to a bill passed by both Chambers, he shall return the bill for reconsideration to the originating Chamber with his own amendments thereto.
(4) A bill so returned shall be further considered by both Chambers together with the amendments recommended by the President, and if it is reaffirmed with or without amendments by both Chambers, it shall be deemed to have been assented to by the President and shall become an Act.”
61. One more document that we would like to refer to is the “Constitution of Free India: A Draft” authored by M.N. Roy in 1944. The document proposed a radically different version of assent to bills as [2025] 4 S.C.R. 1055The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr. distinguished from the scheme prevailing under the GoI Act, 1935 or other contemporaneous aspirational constitutional documents. The document vested no authority in the Governor to withhold assent to a bill passed by the provincial legislature or to veto the same. However, the document vested power in the Supreme People’s Legislature, which was a joint sitting of both the chambers of the Federal Legislature, to veto any provincial legislation. However, this veto power was subject to judicial review and the provincial government was given the right to challenge the veto before the Supreme Federal Court. The relevant provisions are reproduced hereinbelow: “Article 62.
The Supreme People’s Council will have the right to veto any provincial legislation in the Federal Union on the ground that it is repugnant to the Federal Constitution or contradicts any particular Federal law. Either on the advice of the Council of Ministers or on his own initiative, the Governor General will recommend the vetoing of a Provincial legislation. The Provincial Government concerned will have the right to appeal to the Supreme Federal Court against the veto.
xxx xxx xxx Article 91.
The Governor shall sign and promulgate all laws made by the Provincial People’s Council.”
62. What is interesting to note is that the imagination of a provision as regards assent to bills, when the country was on the brink of becoming independent from the British rule, was significantly different from the previous versions envisaged in times when the freedom struggle was focused more on obtaining greater degree of self-rule while being under the sovereignty of the British Crown, as can be seen in the versions used in the Nehru Report and the Constitution of India Bill, 1925. The two documents which were drafted in 1944, and are referred to above, indicate that the Governor was vested with lesser powers and discretion, and there was a clear inclination towards a more unitary arrangement insofar as assent to bills was concerned. The ideas of judicial review 1056 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports of exercise of veto by the President against a state legislation, mandatory return of the bills for reconsideration upon withholding of assent, and deemed assent upon reconsideration were being experimented with among others in the immediate lead up to the framing of our Constitution.
63. Besides the aspirational constitutional documents referred to above, it is also pertinent to discuss how assent was envisaged by one of the first indigenous constitutional documents that was implemented in practice as well. Section 15 of the Aundh State Constitution Act, 1939 that was purportedly enacted to grant self-rule to the people of the Aundh princely state, laid down the procedure for assent to bills. The relevant provision read as follows:
“15. (a) All bills shall be passed by a majority of members of the Legislative Assembly present and voting and shall become law only on receiving the assent of Shrimant Rajasaheb.
(b) If Shrimant Rajasahab, in his discretion, withholds his assent to a bill which has been duly passed by the Legislative Assembly, he shall return it to the Legislative Assembly together with a message requesting that the Legislative Assembly will reconsider the Bill in the light of his recommendations, and when a bill is so returned, the Legislative Assembly shall consider it accordingly.
(c) If the Legislative Assembly accepts the recommendations, the bill shall forthwith become law; but if it rejects the recommendations of Shrimant Rajasaheb, he shall have the right to postpone his assent to the bill till the next session of the Legislative Assembly. He can so postpone the said bill for not more than three times. If the said bill, in its original form, is passed by a simple majority of the members present on all the three times, it is sent for reconsideration, it shall forthwith become law.”
64. What is interesting to note in the aforesaid provision is that although it vested Shrimant Rajasaheb, the King, with the discretion to either assent to a bill passed by the legislature or to withhold assent thereto, yet it made it mandatory for him to return the bill to the legislature with a message requesting them to reconsider the bill in light of his recommendations if he opted for withholding assent. Further, after a [2025] 4 S.C.R. 1057The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr. maximum of three rounds of reconsideration, the bill would become law upon being passed with a majority, regardless of receiving assent of the King or not.
65. On the contrary, the Government of Mysore Act, 1940, gave the King unfettered powers to veto any bill passed by the Legislative Council. The relevant provision reads as follows:
“28. (1) When a Bill has been passed by the Legislative Council, it shall be submitted through the Dewan to His Highness the Maharaja for assent with a statement of the opinion expressed by the Representative Assembly on the principles of the Bill or its general provisions.
(2) No such Bill shall become law until it has received the assent of His Highness the Maharaja.”
66. Having discussed in detail the inception of the concept of assent to bills in the Indian context and its interaction with the indigenous thought prevailing at the time, we shall now proceed to discuss the provisions pertaining to assent as contained in the GoI Act, 1935 and how it was moulded by the Constituent Assembly into Article 200 of the Constitution.
67. Under the GoI Act, 1935, the Governor was required to act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers responsible to the Provincial legislature. However, the Governor continued to have some special responsibilities and he also possessed discretionary powers to act in situations such as prevention of grave menace to the peace or tranquility of the province, safeguarding the legitimate interests of minorities and so on. The Governor could also act in his discretion in specified matters. He functioned under the general superintendence and control of the Governor-General, whenever he acted in his individual judgement or discretion.
68. It is interesting to note that while the framing of the Constitution was being undertaken by the Constituent Assembly, the GoI Act, 1935 as adapted by the India (Provisional Constitution) Order, 1947 was made applicable for the administration of the country. By way of paragraph 3 of the said order, the expressions “in his discretion”, “acting in his discretion” and “exercising his individual judgement” were removed/deleted from wherever they occurred in the GoI Act, 1935. Paragraph 3 read thus:
1058 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports “3.(1) As from the appointed day, the Government of India Act, 1935, including the provisions of that Act which have not come into force before the appointed day, and the India (Central Government and Legislature) Act, 1946, shall, until other provision is made by or in accordance with a law made by the Constituent Assembly of India, apply to India with the omissions, additions, adaptations and modifications directed in the following provisions of this paragraph and in the Schedule to this Order.
(2) The following expressions shall be omitted wherever they occur, namely, “in his discretion”, “acting in his discretion” and “exercising his individual judgment”. [...]”
69. Article 147 of the Draft Constitution, prepared by the constitutional adviser, Shri B.N. Rau, dealt with assent to bills passed by the provincial legislature and read as follows:
“147. A Bill which has been passed by the Provincial Legislature or, in the case of a Province having a legislative Council, has been passed by both Houses of the Provincial Legislature shall be presented to the Governor and the Governor shall declare either that he assents to the Bill or that he withholds assent therefrom or that he reserves the Bill for the consideration of the President:
Provided that where there is only one House of the Legislature of a Province and the Bill has been passed by that House the Governor may, in his discretion, return the Bill together with a message requesting that the House will reconsider the Bill or any specified provisions thereof and, in particular, will reconsider the desirability of introducing any such amendments as he may recommend in his message and, when a Bill is so returned the House shall reconsider it accordingly and if the Bill is passed again by the House with or without amendments and presented to the Governor for assent, the Governor shall not withhold assent therefrom.”
70. Article 147 as reproduced aforesaid made significant departure from Section 75 of the GoI Act, 1935 as follows:
a. The expression “in his discretion” was removed from the substantive part of the provision. However, the said expression [2025] 4 S.C.R. 1059The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr. continued to be present in the proviso to the substantive part.
b. While Section 75 of the GoI Act, 1935 provided for the sending back of a bill for reconsideration by the legislature in the provinces having both unicameral and bicameral legislatures, Article 147 only provided for such reconsideration in the provinces with a unicameral legislature.
c. Under Section 75, there was no mandate upon the Governor to mandatorily assent to a bill when the bill was presented to him for reconsideration. However, in Article 147, the expression “shall not withhold assent therefrom” was added in the first proviso.
71. Four months after the Draft Constitution was submitted by Shri B.N. Rau, the Drafting Committee under the chairmanship of Dr. B.R. Ambedkar submitted the Draft Constitution to the President of the Constituent Assembly in February, 1948. Article 147 of the Draft Constitution submitted by the constitutional advisor was adapted with certain structural modifications as Article 175 of the Draft Constitution, however, in essence the provision remained the same.
ii. Debates of the Constituent Assembly on Article 200 of the Constitution
72. When Article 175 of the Draft Constitution, 1948 was taken up for consideration by the Constituent Assembly, certain amendments were moved by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar that came to be accepted, leading to the adoption of the draft Article 175 as Article 200 of our Constitution. The amendments were:
a. To remove the expression “in his discretion” appearing in the first proviso to Article 175;
b. To exclude Money Bills from the purview of the first proviso; c. To enable the Governor to return the bills in all the States irrespective of whether there was a unicameral or a bicameral legislature.
73. With a view to better understand the intention of the framers of the Constitution, it is of utmost importance that we turn the pages of the debates that took place in the Constituent Assembly.
1060 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
74. On the 30 th of July, 1949, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar moved an amendment, as discussed aforesaid, for the substitution of the first proviso under draft Article 175, which later came to be successfully adopted by the Constituent Assembly. While moving for the substitution and highlighting that predominantly three key changes were sought to be made to the first proviso, he remarked that the words “in his discretion” under the draft Article 175 were sought to be deleted because it was felt that “in a responsible government, there can be no room for the Governor acting on discretion”3 . Shri. Brajeshwar Prasad was not whole-heartedly in favor of the changes suggested to the first proviso and contended that they would strip the Governor of the power to veto a bill or reserve it for the consideration of the President, in his own discretion or initiative and he would be able to do so only when so advised by his Cabinet of Ministers. In his opinion, the change also meant that the Governor would not be able to veto a bill that has been passed twice by the Legislative Assembly, which he felt was not acceptable.
75. Shri. Brajeshwar Prasad acknowledged that there are two classes of cases in which a bill can be reserved for the consideration of the President – One, where a certain Article of the Constitution requires the same and two, when the Governor is advised by his Ministry to do so. However, he advocated for a third category i.e., where the Governor would possess the power, in his discretion, to veto a bill passed by the Legislature, irrespective of whether it was passed once or twice by it. He supported the vesting of discretion in the hands of the Governor so that he could veto unjust and unsound legislation while also ensuring that there is a check on potentially disruptive legislative tendencies. From his standpoint, the fear of disruptive legislation was not imaginary but real in our country and he advocated that his proposal was in consonance with the traditions of the centralized system of Government that existed in our country until independence. He was of the view that the parliamentary form of polity was a new experiment to the facts of life in our country and it was required to be moderated and regulated. Expressing his lack of confidence in the provincial Ministers, he contended that empowering the Governor to act in his discretion would not be so objectionable since the Governor is also the representative of the Government of 3 9, Constituent A ssemb. Deb., (July 30, 1949) 41.
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1061The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr. India and it is by virtue of this position that his views must prevail over those of the State legislature.
76. On the other hand, during the course of the debate, Shri. Shibban Lal Saxena, addressed the practical realities of assigning such a discretion to the Governor who is a nominee of the President, especially when the party in power in the province may not be the same as the party in power at the Centre. In such a scenario, it was his opinion that, “it will introduce a very wrong principle to give the Governor this power to go against the express wish of the Assembly and even of the council” 4.
77. Shri. T.T. Krishnamachari also emphasized that under the newly proposed draft Article 175, more specifically the first proviso, the Governor will not be exercising his discretion in the matter of referring a bill back to the House with a message. The Governor would exercise his power under the first proviso only upon the advice of his Council of Ministers. According to him, the first proviso was to be exercised in situations wherein the House has already accepted and endorsed a provision, but the Ministry was of the opinion that certain modifications are required to be made in the said provision. It is only when such an occasion arises that the procedure envisaged under the first proviso would be resorted to. The Council of Ministers would use the Governor to hold up further proceedings of the bill and remit it to the Lower House with the message informing the legislature about the modifications sought to be made to the bill by the Ministry. He drew attention to the words of Dr. Ambedkar on this aspect and stated as follows:
“[...] If he construes that this Amendment is worse than the proviso in the draft Article and that it makes for further dilatoriness in the proceedings of the legislatures in the provinces or the States as the case may be, I would ask him to remember one particular point to which Dr.
Ambedkar drew pointed attention, viz., that the Governor will not be exercising his discretion in the matter of referring a Bill back to the House with a message. That provision has gone out of the picture. The governor is no longer vested with any discretion. If it happens that as 4 9, Constituent A ssemb. Deb., (Aug. 1, 1949) 61.
1062 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports per Amendment No.17 the Governor sends a Bill back for further consideration, he does so expressly on the advice of his Council of Ministers. The provision has merely been made to be used if an occasion arises when the formalities envisaged in Article 172 which has already been passed, do not perhaps go through, but there is some point of the Bill which has been accepted by the Upper House which the Ministry thereafter finds has to be modified. Then they will use this procedure; they will use the governor to hold up the further proceedings of the Bill and remit it back to the Lower House with his message.”5
78. The first proviso, according to him, was therefore a saving clause which vested power in the hands of the Ministry to remedy a hasty action that they might have undertaken with respect to the bill in question, or, it could also be seen as providing some scope to the Ministry to take certain additional actions that the Ministry feels should be taken in order to meet the popular opinion reflected outside the House in some form or another. Therefore, the operation of the first proviso does not abridge the power of the Legislature or the Ministry responsible to it, rather, it further curtails the Governor’s power from the position that was envisaged in the original first proviso, which is now sought to be supplanted.
79. In light of the debate which took place as regards the substitution of the first proviso to draft Article 175, the amendment was put to vote and the same was successfully adopted by the Constituent Assembly.
80. On 17 th of October, 1949, T.T. Krishnamachari moved an amendment that a second proviso to Article 175 also be added, which later came to be adopted by the Constituent Assembly. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar elucidated that the second proviso that was proposed to be moved, was a part of the Instrument of Instructions issued to the Governor of the provinces under the GoI, 1935. Paragraph 17 of the Instrument of Instructions read as follows:
“Without prejudice to the generality of his powers as to reservation of Bills our Governor shall not assent in our name to, but shall reserve for the consideration of our Governor-General any Bill or any of the clauses herein 5 9, Constituent A ssemb. Deb ., (Aug. 1, 1949) 61.
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1063The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr. specified, i.e. (b) any Bill which in his opinion would, if it became law so derogate from the powers of the High Court as to endanger the position that that Court is, by the Act, designed to fulfil.”
81. Such a clause was initially supposed to be included in the Fourth Schedule that separately contained instructions to the Governors of the States. However, since it was considered unnecessary to have such a separate Schedule, this particular aspect was sought to be brought in as second proviso to the draft Article 175. A need to incorporate the second proviso was felt because the High Courts were placed under the legislative competence of the Centre as well as the States. In so far as the organization and territorial jurisdiction of the High Court was concerned, the power remained with the Centre. However, with regard to the pecuniary jurisdiction and the jurisdiction in relation to any of the matters which are mentioned under List II, the power rests with different States. Therefore, there could arise a scenario wherein the State legislature would enact a bill which would derogate from the powers of the High Court. For example, passing a bill that reduces the pecuniary jurisdiction of the High Court by raising the value of the suit that may be entertained by the High Court. This would be one method whereby the State legislature would diminish the authority of the High Court. Furthermore, a bill could also affect the subject-matter jurisdiction of a High Court. For example, in enacting any measure under any of the entries contained in List II, say, debt cancellation, it would be open for the provinces or States to say that the decree made by any such Court or Board shall be final and conclusive, and that the High Court should not have any jurisdiction in the matter at all. In light of such possibilities, it was felt that the second proviso to draft Article 175 must be added.
82. It was the opinion of Dr. B.R. Ambedkar that any such bill or Act as illustrated above would amount to a derogation from the authority that the Constitution confers or intends to confer upon the High Court. This is why it was felt necessary that before such a law becomes final, the President must be given an opportunity to examine whether such a law should be permitted to take effect or not. Such a shield was considered imperative keeping in mind the important constitutional position that the High Courts hold in adjudicating disputes. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar had emphasized on the importance of the second proviso as follows:
1064 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports “I, therefore, submit that in view of the fact that the High Court is such an important institution intended by the Constitution to adjudicate between the Legislature and the Executive and between citizen and citizen such a power given to the President is a very necessary power to maintain an important institution which has been created by the Constitution. That is the purpose for which this amendment is being introduced.” 6
E. ARTICLE 200 OF THE CONSTITUTION - DEVELOPMENTS
POST THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION.
If we could roll back History A century, let’s say, And start from there, I’m sure that we Would find things as to-day:
In all creation’s cosmic range No vestige of a change”
~ Robert William Service
83. We are tempted to preface this part of our judgment with the enlightening words of Robert William Service, keeping in mind the history of our country which has been fraught with instances of friction in the federal polity from its inception, with the Governor occupying the center stage in this ongoing saga.
84. As the democratic polity of the country unfolded post-independence, the predominance of a single party at the union and provincial level gave way to emergence of new political factions and regional parties. As a consequence, the position of the Governor, which had mostly been latent during the era of single-party dominance, started to assume importance. Allegations also came to be levelled by a number of State Governments that the Governor in a number 6 10, C onstituent A ssemb. Deb., (Oct. 17, 1949) 394.
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1065The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr. of States was acting as an agent of the Central Government and the objectivity that was expected of the Governor was not being displayed, more particularly when it came to reservation of bills for the consideration of the President or recommendation for the imposition of emergency under Article 356. In light of the aforesaid, certain commissions came to be constituted which submitted their reports after undertaking exhaustive analysis of the working of the constitutional machinery prescribed for Centre-State relations. One of the key foci of these reports was the working of Articles 200 and 201 of the Constitution respectively and the scope of exercise of discretion by the Governors, which we deem appropriate to discuss hereinafter.
i. First Administrative Reforms Commission, 1966.
85. The First Administrative Reforms Commission (the “ARC”) was established in January 1966 by a resolution of the Ministry of Home Affairs to examine the public administration of the country and make recommendations for reform and reorganization where necessary. An aspect of this exercise was the examination of Centre-State relations particularly with respect to the need for national integration, and for maintaining efficient standards of administration throughout the country.
86. While examining the various facets of Centre-State relations, the Commission found it apposite to discuss the role of the Governor in the political context which existed back then. Taking note of the skirmishes between the State governments and Governors, the Commission was of the view that the Governor’s office ceased to be merely ornamental and ceremonial. This changed role demanded a scrutiny of the discretionary powers of the Governor.
87. As the discretionary powers of the Governor affect some of the vital issues in the functioning of democratic governments in the States, the ARC underscored the importance of evolving guidelines to enable the exercise of such discretionary powers for the purpose of preserving and protecting democratic values. It was noted that such guidelines would serve the purpose of securing uniformity in action and eliminate all suspicions of partisanship and arbitrariness.
88. The ARC, therefore, recommended the following:
1066 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports “Recommendation 9:
We recommend:
Guidelines on the manner in which discretionary powers should be exercised by the Governors should be formulated by the Inter-State Council and on acceptance by the Union issued in the name of the President. They should be placed before both Houses of Parliament.”
89. However, no such guidelines have been formulated by the Inter- State Council till date and none of the Commissions on Centre-State relations constituted thereafter made any recommendations on the issuance of guidelines for exercise of discretion by the Governor. ii. Rajamannar Commission, 1971
90. The Rajamannar Commission was set up by the Government of Tamil Nadu in 1969 under the chairmanship of Dr. P.V. Rajamannar to look into the question regarding the relationship that should subsist between the Centre and States in a federal set-up. The Commission noted that in the changed political circumstances, there can be no dispute regarding the fact that the Governors have a positive role to play in the stability and progress of States. This requires that the authority of the Governor should be clearly spelt out and the Governors should no longer consider themselves to be instruments of the Centre under compulsion to act on its directions and in its political interests.
91. One of the questions on which the Commission addressed itself was whether the Constitution provides for the exercise of any power by the Governor in his discretion that is, whether the Governor could exercise any of his functions without consulting the Ministry or contrary to the aid and advice tendered by the Council of Ministers.
92. To answer this question, the Commission adverted to the history of the making of the Constitution and concluded that the Constitution does not provide for the issue of any instructions to the Governor, nor does it vest any discretionary powers in express terms in the Governor, except in relation to certain specified matters. While referring to certain judicial pronouncements of this Court as well as Granville Austin’s seminal work on the Indian Constitution, the Commission opined that the discretion of the Governor must be limited to those matters [2025] 4 S.C.R. 1067The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr. in respect of which there are express provisions in the Constitution. The relevant portion of the report is reproduced below: “6. The question as to the discretionary functions of the Governor was considered by the Supreme Court in Ram Jawaya v. State of Punjab (A.I.R. 1955 8.C. 549 at page 556). The Supreme Court held that the Governors were constitutional heads of the executive, and that real executive power was vested in the Council of Ministers. A similar view has been expressed by the Supreme Court in T. M. Kanniyan v. 1.T.O., Pondicherry (A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 687). Again, Granville Austin in his book The Indian Constitution— Cornerstone of a Nation has categorically stated that the Governor occupies the same position as the English Monarch and that the Governor has to act in accordance with the advice of his Cabinet in all matters. To place the matter beyond doubt, Article 163 (1) may be modified making it clear that the reference to discretion is only in relation to the matters in respect of which there are express provisions, e.g., Assam.”
(Emphasis supplied)
93. The Commission observed that while exercising his functions, the Governor should not be under any pressure from an external authority. To explain the position of discretionary powers of the Governor, the Commission referred to the speech of the former Vice President of India, Shri G.S. Pathak, which reads thus:
“He is the constitutional head of the State to which he is appointed, and, in that capacity, he is bound by the advice of the Council of Ministers of the State except in the sphere where he is required by the Constitution, expressly or impliedly, to exercise his discretion. In the sphere in which he is bound by the advice of the Council of Ministers, for obvious reasons, he must be independent of the Centre.
‘There may be cases where the advice of the Centre may clash with the advice of the State Council of Ministers. In the sphere in which he is required by the Constitution to exercise his discretion, it is obvious again that it is His discretion and not that of any other authority and therefore 1068 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports his discretion cannot be controlled or interfered with by the Centre.”
(Emphasis supplied)
94. However, in the same vein, it was also noted that the Governor has to function in a dual capacity as (1) the appointee of the central government; and (2) the constitutional head of the State. This is because the Central Government retains the power to appoint and remove the Governor, therefore, the Governor cannot but look to the Central Government for guidance in the discharge of his duties.
95. The Commission was of the opinion that it is necessary to indicate at least a broad outline of the principles that should guide the Governor in the exercise of discretion, if any, vested in him. It was observed that the evolution of rules and guidelines in this respect is especially important in order to reconcile the actions of the Governor in his capacity as an agent of the Centre and the head of the State Executive.
96. Having discussed the discretion of the Governor in matters of constitutional decision-making at length, the Commission recommended that a specific provision should be inserted in the Constitution to enable the President to issue Instruments of Instructions to the Governors laying down guidelines or principles with reference to which the Governor should act including the occasions for the exercise of discretionary powers.
iii. Sarkaria Commission
97. In June 1983, the Central government headed by the former Prime Minister of India, Ms. Indira Gandhi, formally constituted a commission to examine and review the working of the arrangements between the Union and States in regard to powers, functions and responsibilities in all spheres and to recommend such changes or other measures as may be deemed appropriate. The said commission was formed under the chairmanship of a former judge of this Court, Justice R.S. Sarkaria and hence, came to be known as the Sarkaria Commission.
98. The Sarkaria Commission was enjoined with the task of reviewing the Centre-State relationship and consider the importance of unity and integrity of the country for promoting the welfare of the people. One of the facets of such review was to discuss the scope of the role of the Governor and its impact on the federal polity of India. [2025] 4 S.C.R. 1069The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.
99. For a number of years after the independence of India, the political scene was dominated by a single party and there was little occasion for strife between the central and state governments. The role of the Governor, therefore, remained latent. However, post-1967, the emergence of new regional political parties led to a discord between the central government and those state governments that came to be led by such new regional parties. These developments engendered political instability in several states, as a result of which, the Governors were called upon to exercise their discretionary powers more frequently, particularly in recommending President’s rule and in reserving State bills for the consideration of the President.
100. The role of the Governor in giving assent to State bills, withholding assent therefrom or reserving such bills for the consideration of the President, thus, assumed importance. By virtue of Articles 200 and 201 of the Constitution respectively, the office of Governor became a major stakeholder for the maintenance of a cordial relationship between the central and state governments. The Sarkaria Commission was, therefore, tasked with providing recommendations regarding the interpretation of the said Articles and amendments therein to strengthen the federal polity of India.
101. To the limited extent of studying the issues arising from the exercise of powers under Articles 200 and 201 respectively, the Commission addressed itself on the following broad points:
(i) Scope of Governor’s discretion under Article 200;
(ii) Interplay of Articles 200 and 254 respectively of the Constitution;
(iii) Scope of Union Executive’s discretion under Article 201;
(iv) Impropriety of conditional assent by the President;
(v) Essentials for a “reference” of State bills to the President for his consideration;
(vi) Delays in disposal of State bills;
(vii) Withholding of assent by the President.
102. A discussion of the recommendations of the Commission in this regard would be beneficial to our examination of Articles 200 and 201 respectively and the role of the Governor in the contemporary federal polity.
1070 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports a. Scope of Governor’s Discretion Under Article 200
103. The Commission observed that the rule is that the Governor shall perform his functions on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers of the State and the exercise of discretionary powers by him is the exception. The Commission envisaged that discretionary powers of reservation of a bill under Article 200 should be exercised by the Governor only in rare cases where a bill is patently unconstitutional in his opinion. However, the Governor should not act contrary to the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers merely because he, in his personal capacity, does not favour the policy embodied in the bill. The relevant observations of the Commission are reproduced below: “5.6.13 We are, therefore, of the view that:
(i) Normally, in the discharge of the functions under Article 200, the Governor must abide by the advice of his Council of Ministers. However, in rare and exceptional case, he may act in the exercise of his discretion, where he is of opinion that the provisions of the Bill are patently unconstitutional, such as, where the subject-matter of the Bill is ex-facie beyond the legislative competence of the State Legislature, or where its provisions manifestly derogate from the scheme and framework of the Constitution so as to endanger the sovereignty, unity and integrity of the nation; or clearly violate Fundamental Rights or transgress other constitutional limitations and provisions.
(ii) In dealing with a State Bill presented to him under Article 200, the Governor should not act contrary to the advice of his Council of Ministers merely because, personally, he does not like the policy embodied in the Bill.”
104. According to the Commission, the scheme of the Constitution indicates that the Governor’s opinion at best, is persuasive. The Governor cannot, in any circumstance, exercise dictatorial powers to override or veto the decisions or proposals of his Council of Ministers. The scope of discretionary powers should be construed in the context of a parliamentary democracy with a responsible government. In such a form of government, the role of a formal head of the State cannot be enlarged at the cost of the real executive, which enjoys the confidence of the people as it is responsible to the State legislature.
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1071The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.
105. Discretion, in exercise of powers under Article 200, therefore, should be dictated by reason, actuated by good faith and tempered by caution. Discretionary functions should be performed in public interest and cannot be discharged at the dictation of any outside authority unless so authorized by and under the Constitution.
106. While addressing suggestions of some State governments that the discretionary powers of the Governor must be curtailed or removed as it presents a potential threat to the autonomy of the States, the Commission observed that the makers of the Constitution advisedly refrained from putting such discretionary powers in a straitjacket rigid definition. It noted that the Constitution is ever evolving and the ways in which its provisions and principles may be tampered with or circumvented, cannot be foreseen. Therefore, the office of the Governor should be afforded enough flexibility to react in any situation and his discretion to approach a matter cannot be pre-determined. b. Interplay of Articles 200 And 254 respectively of the Constitution.
107. Article 246(2) endows the Parliament as well as the State legislatures with the competence to legislate on entries under List III i.e., the concurrent list. The provision under Article 254 is appurtenant to the concurrent exercise of legislative competence by the Parliament and State legislature insofar as there is any inconsistency or repugnancy between the laws of the respective legislatures.
108. Article 254(1) saves the power of the State legislatures to make laws with respect to matters in the concurrent list from being automatically superseded by the operation of the doctrine of repugnancy. Article 254(2) allows a law enacted by the State legislature and repugnant to the central law on the same subject-matter, to operate and prevail in that State provided that such State law receives the assent of the President.
109. The Commission highlighted that clause (2) of Article 254 is applicable only when the following two conditions are cumulatively met:
(a) There is a valid Union law on the same subject-matter occupying the same field in the Concurrent List to which the State legislation relates.
(b) The State legislation is repugnant to the Union law. That is to say, there is a direct conflict between the provisions of the two 1072 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports laws, or the Union law is intended to be an exhaustive code on the subject-matter in question.
It is upon satisfaction of both these conditions that the Governor can reserve a bill for Presidential consideration under Article 254(2).
110. It was noted by the Commission that the assent by the President to the State bills had been withheld on certain occasions on the ground that the Union was contemplating a more comprehensive legislation on the same subject matter. However, withholding of assent on such a premise at the level of the Union may unnecessarily delay or defeat the measures sought to be taken by the State legislature. Since the Parliament retains the power to amend, vary or repeal such a State legislation, even after its enactment, by passing a subsequent law inconsistent therewith, the Commission recommended that Presidential assent should not ordinarily be withheld on the ground that the Union is contemplating a comprehensive law in future on the same subject-matter.
c. Scope of Union Executive’s Discretion under Article 201
111. As per the report of the Commission, a State bill, once reserved for the consideration of the President (upon the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers), is made subject to the procedure prescribed under Article 201 and the Union Executive is entitled to examine it from all angles such as, inter alia, conformity to legislative or executive policy of the Union, harmony with the scheme and provisions of the Constitution, vires of the bill, etc.
112. On the question of the Union Executive’s discretion to withhold assent to a State bill on the ground of non-conformity with its policy, the Commission sounded a note of caution saying that policy considerations should not ordinarily be treated as a valid ground for withholding Presidential assent. Article 201 confers supervisory powers on the Union Executive to enable it to secure a broad uniformity across central and state legislations in the interests of the social and economic unity of the country. However, the said provision cannot act as a measure for the Union Executive to bring to a grinding halt a State bill by withholding assent thereto if such a bill does not conform to its policy in general.
113. Further, the Union Executive is required to exercise utmost caution, circumspection and restraint in the exercise of supervisory powers [2025] 4 S.C.R. 1073The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr. under Article 201, especially in respect of the bills on subject matters that fall within the State List. In this regard, the Commission recommended that as a matter of convention, the President should not withhold assent only on consideration of policy differences on matters relating, in pith and substance, to the State List, except on the grounds of patent unconstitutionality.
114. The Commission did not make any specific prescription in respect of Article 143 of the Constitution, which enables the President and by extension, the Union Council of Ministers to seek the opinion of the Supreme Court in respect of bills which may be deemed to be unconstitutional and left the decision up to the President to make such a reference in appropriate cases.
d. Impropriety of Conditional Assent by the President
115. The Commission noted that the scheme of the Constitution providing for reservation of State legislations for the consideration and assent of the President, is intended to subserve the broad purpose of cooperative federalism in the realm of Union-State legislative relations. Therefore, the practice of according assent to a State bill by the President on the reciprocal assurance that the changes suggested by him (or the Union Executive) will be carried out by way of an ordinance, was not considered to be ideal especially when there exists a constitutional remedy under the proviso to Article 201 itself.
116. Since, conditional assent may become a tool for the Centre to dictate its policies to the States by attaching conditions to Presidential assent, the Commission, in cognizance of the impropriety of such a practice, recommended that in cases where the Union Government is of the opinion that some amendments to a State bill are essential before it becomes a law, such bill should be returned through the Governor to the State legislature for reconsideration in terms of the proviso to Article 201.
e. Essentials for a “Reference” of State Bills to the President for his Consideration
117. The Commission, cognizant of the misgivings and irritations in Union- State relations due to delays in the process of securing Presidential assent, recommended that the procedure of making a reference to the President by the State Government through the Governor and the consideration thereof by the Union Government must be 1074 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports streamlined. It was also endorsed that the Governments at both the Centre and State level may benefit from a prior consultation at the stage of drafting of the bill itself and prescribing time-limits for disposal, which ought to be made convention and practice.
118. As regards the suggestion of streamlining the procedures involved in reserving a State bill for consideration of the President, the Commission recommended that every reference from the State should be complete and clearly established. Such reference should set out precise material facts, points for consideration and the reason for making a reference to the President. Accordingly, the Commission recommended the following information to be necessarily provided for ensuring that the reference to the President is self-contained: “5.15.01— To facilitate its speedy examination by the Union Executive, every reference of a State Bill from the State should be self-contained, setting out precisely the material facts, points for consideration and the ground on which reference has been made. It should contain information on the following points:
a. The relevant provisions of the Constitution attracted or applicable, with reasons.
b. If the reference is made under Article 254(2), clear identification of the provisions of the Bill which are considered repugnant to, or inconsistent with, the specific provisions of a Union law or an existing law.
c. Urgency, if any, of passing the law within a certain time-limit.
d. A clear statement that the Bill is being reserved as per the advice of the Council of Ministers, or in the exercise of his discretion by the Governor, with reasons for the same.
e. A lucid explanatory note on the intended policy behind the legislation instead of merely referring to the objects and reasons of the Bill.
f. An indication whether the Bill was sent for prior scrutiny of the Union Government, and if so, deviations, if any, from the prior reference.”
(Emphasis supplied)
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1075The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr. f. Delays in Disposal of State Bills
119. The question whether there was a requirement of introducing timelimits in Article 201 was necessary or not was also looked into by the Commission. It was reiterated that streamlining the procedure of reserving a State bill for Presidential consideration and enabling a mechanism for high-level discussions between the Union and State at the stage of drafting such bill may effectively reduce procedural delays at the level of the Union Government. Nevertheless, it was recommended that the Union and State Governments should adopt definite timelines for processing State bills and disposing of their references to the President.
120. With regard to prescription of such timelines, the Commission proposed the following timelines to be treated as salutary conventions:
STAGE OF THE BILL PROPOSED TIMELINE
i. Reserving the bill for consideration of the President, by the Governor under Article 200 (on the aid and advice of the State Council of Ministers).
I m m e d i a t e l y u p o n presentation of the bill to the Governor.
ii. Reserving the bill for consideration of the President, by the Governor under Article 200 (in exercise of his discretion in exceptional circumstances).
Within one month from the date on which the bill is presented to the Governor.
iii. Decision on the bill by the President under Article 201 (in case the proviso to Article 201 is not being exercised).
Within four months from the date on which the reference is received by the Union Government.
iv. Returning the bill for consideration of the State legislature in case the proviso to Article 201 is exercised by the President.
Within two months from the date on which the original reference is received by the Union Government.
v. Decision on the bill by the President, once received with clarifications from the State legislature under proviso to Article 201.
W i t h i n f o u r m o n t h s o f the date on which the reconsidered bill is received by the Union Government.
121. With a view to ensure that the timelines so suggested are not frustrated by lack of clarity and comprehensiveness in a reference, the Commission underscored the importance of a self-contained communication by the President to the State legislature for clarification 1076 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports or reconsideration of the bill. It was emphasized that clarifications to be sought by way of the proviso to Article 201 should not be piecemeal.
122. While the Commission noted the significance of clear timelines for the exercise of powers under Articles 200 and 201 respectively, it did not recommend any amendments to the said Articles for introducing concrete time periods within the constitutional scheme and left its recommendations in this regard at the stage of conventions only. g. Withholding of Assent by the President
123. As regards the withholding of Presidential assent, the Commission laid great emphasis that the Union Government ought to communicate to the State government, the reasons therefor. It was noted that the Union Government should enter into the practice of discussing the issues present in the bill with the State Government and making an effort to present its point of view to the State Government with reasons.
h. Recommendations given by the Commission
124. Before concluding the discussion on the aspect of reservation of bills by the Governor for consideration of the President, the Commission noted that needless reservation of bills should be avoided. The constitutional scheme does not envisage indiscriminate reservation of bills, especially when it is being done in his discretion, as the same would be subversive of the federal principle and the supremacy of the State legislature.
125. The Commission classified State bills to be reserved for the consideration of the President as follows:
“5.1.05 State Bills reserved for President’s consideration under the Constitution, may be classified as follows: — i. Bills which must be reserved for President’s consideration In this category come Bills —
(i) which so derogate from the powers of the High Court, as to endanger the position which that Court is by this Constitution designed to fill (Second Proviso to Article 200);
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1077The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.
(ii) which relate to imposition of taxes on water or electricity in certain cases, and attract the provisions of Clause (2) of Article 288; and
(iii) which fall within clause (4) (a) (ii) of Article 360, during a Financial Emergency.
ii. Bills which may be reserved for President’s consideration and assent for specific purposes
(i) To secure immunity from operation of Articles 14 and
19. These are Bills for—
(a) acquisition of estates, etc. [First Proviso to Article 31A(I)];
(b) giving effect to Directive Principles of State Policy (Proviso to Article 31C).
(ii) A Bill relating to a subject enumerated in the Concurrent List, to ensure operation of its provisions despite their repugnancy to a Union law or an existing law, by securing President’s assent in terms of Article 254(2).
(iii) Legislation imposing restrictions on trade and commerce requiring Presidential sanction under the Proviso to Article 304(b) read with Article 255.
iii. Bills which may not specifically fall under any of the above categories, yet may be reserved by the Governor for President’s consideration under Article 200.”
(Emphasis supplied)
126. The Commission recommended that bills should be reserved only if required for specific purposes falling in the first two classes as extracted hereinabove.
iv. Punchhi Commission
127. Another Commission on Centre-State relations was constituted by the Government of India in 2007 under the chairmanship of Justice Madan Mohan Punchhi, the former Chief Justice of India. The Commission was tasked with the mandate of reviewing the existing arrangements between the Union and States as per the Constitution 1078 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports of India in regard to powers, functions and responsibilities in all spheres including legislative relations, administrative relations, role of Governors, emergency provisions, etc. and recommending such changes as may be appropriate keeping in view practical difficulties, growing challenges of ensuring good governance and the need for strengthening the unity and integrity of the country.
128. The Commission, inter alia, looked at the original scheme of the Centre-State relations as laid down by the Constitution, examined the friction points in the working thereof and reviewed the adequacy of the constitutional arrangements for promoting social welfare and good governance. One aspect of this study involved looking minutely into the role of the Governor in the federal polity of India. The Commission noted that the role of the Governor became important as he had to balance the political considerations between the Centre and State and be as impartial as possible.
129. However, as regional political powers grew at the State level, the role of the Governor came to be a point of contention between the Centre and States with the latter leveling allegations of partiality and lack of objectivity in exercise of the Governor’s discretionary powers. As a result, the Commission was enjoined with the task of providing recommendations for better working of the office of the Governor. a. Role of the Governor
130. The Commission observed that the nature and scope of rights and powers of the Governor should be understood in the context of a Cabinet system of government. Under such system, the Governor performs a multi-faceted role. First, as constitutional head of the State, he has a right to be consulted, to warn and encourage. In performance of this role, the Constitution makers ideated the office of Governor to perform the role of a “a friend, philosopher and guide” to his Council of Ministers. Secondly, the Governor functions as a sentinel of the Constitution and acts as the Union’s representative in the State. As observed by this Court in Rameshwar Prasad & Ors. v. Union of India reported in (2006) 2 SCC 1, the Governor discharges “dual responsibility” to the Union and State.
131. Further, the Constitution affords the Governor only a persuasive role and not dictatorial powers to override or veto the decisions or proposals of his Council of Ministers. The Commission observed that [2025] 4 S.C.R. 1079The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr. the Governor, at best, has powers of giving advice or counselling for further reflection of the decision taken by the Council of Ministers. The Governor only flags a need for caution for the purpose of bridging the understanding between the Government and opposition (if there are different governments at the central and state level).
132. The Governor is not amenable to the directions of the Union government, nor does the Constitution make him accountable to the Centre for the manner in which he carries out his functions and duties. The office of Governor is an independent constitutional office. The Governor, by virtue of Article 163, however, is bound by the aid and advice of the State Council of Ministers. Therefore, in the event of a conflict between the aid and advice of the State Council of Ministers and the dictates of the Central Government, the scheme of the Constitution indicates that the Governor must adhere to the former.
133. With the broad tenets of the role of the Governor under the constitutional scheme, the Commission, while appraising the existing framework of Centre-State relations, observed that a major point of friction between the Centre and States is the power of the Governor to reserve any State bill for the consideration of the President, sometimes even for an indefinite period.
b. Discretionary Powers of the Governor
134. Upon a perusal of Article 163(2), the Commission was of the view that the said provision gives the impression that the Governor has a wide and undefined area of discretionary powers. However, the scope of the discretionary powers of the Governor has to be narrowly construed. The language of Article 163(2) cannot be taken to mean that the Governor has a general discretionary power to act against the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers.
135. In continuation to the Sarkaria Commission’s views on the question of discretionary powers of the Governor, the Punchhi Commission report also asserts that the area for the exercise of discretion is limited and even in this limited area, the Governor’s choice of action should neither be nor appear to be arbitrary or fanciful. It must be a choice dictated by reason, actuated by good faith and tempered with caution.
136. The Commission further emphasized the necessity of prescribing time limits for the exercise of powers under Articles 200 and 201 1080 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports respectively in order to ensure that discretionary powers are not exercised by the Governor or the President in a manner that undermines the State legislature and the will of the people. c. Expediency in Disposal of Bills – Timelines Suggested by the Report of the Commission
137. The Commission suggested that definite timelines ought to be adopted as salutary conventions for the Governor to either provide assent or reserve the bill for the consideration of the President. Similarly, there should be a time limit for the President to take a decision on the State bill under Article 201 of the Constitution. The Commission was of the view that concrete timelines are sine qua non for the exercise of powers under Articles 200 and 201 respectively so as to avoid dissensions between the Central and State governments.
138. The Commission noted that the substantive part of Article 200 does not stipulate time period within which the Governor has to either assent, withhold assent or reserve the bill for Presidential consideration. The requirement of expediency is incumbent upon the Governor only when he decides to return the bill to the State legislature for reconsideration. The same was considered to be evident from the expression “as soon as possible”.
139. The Commission noted that while the expression “as soon as possible” is mentioned in Article 200 albeit only in the first proviso thereof, there is no such compulsion on the President under Article 201. As a result, the President or the Union Government may kill the bill by not taking a decision on the same, sometimes for the entire duration of the State legislature. This increases the scope for abuse of discretion by the Union government based on political considerations particularly when the ruling party in the State concerned is different from the one enjoying power at the Union level. The lack of a reasonable timeline allows the executive fiat to make inroads into the legislative power of the State thereby thwarting the democratic will of the State legislature. Such invasion of the powers of the State legislature by the Union Executive is questionable in the context of ‘basic features’ of the Constitution.
140. Therefore, the Commission suggested that a period of six months should be prescribed in Article 201 for the President to decide on [2025] 4 S.C.R. 1081The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr. assenting or withholding assent to a bill reserved for consideration of the President. In case the President on the aid and advice of the Union Council of Ministers, is unable to give assent to a State bill under Article 201, it is desirable for him to make a reference to the Supreme Court under Article 143 for an opinion. Such reference should be done as a matter of practice in order to avoid allegations of political bias, while securing the dignity and authority of the State legislature.
d. Recommendations
141. Having considered the challenges in the exercise of powers under Articles 200 and 201 respectively, the Commission reiterated the recommendations of the National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution (“NCRWC”), which are reproduced hereinbelow: “After considering the suggestions given by the Sarkaria Commission, the National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution gave the following recommendations:
(a) Prescribe a time-limit - say a period of four months within which the Governor should take a decision whether to grant assent or to reserve it for the consideration of the President;
(b) Delete the words “or that he withholds assent therefrom”. In other words, the power to withhold assent, conferred upon the Governor, by Article 200 should be done away with;
(c) If the Bill is reserved for the consideration of the President, there should be a time-limit, say of three months, within which the President should take a decision whether to accord his assent or to direct the Governor to return it to the State Legislature or to seek the opinion of the Supreme Court regarding the constitutionality of the Act under Article 143 (as it happened in the case of Kerala Education Bill in 1958);
(d) When the State Legislature reconsiders and passes the Bill (with or without amendments) after it is returned by the Governor pursuant to the direction of the President, the President should be bound to grant his assent;
1082 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
(e) To provide that a “Money Bill” cannot be reserved by the Governor for the consideration of the President;
(f) In the alternative it may be more advisable to delete altogether the words in Article 200 empowering the Governor to reserve a Bill for the consideration of the President except in the case contemplated by the second proviso to Article 200 and in cases where the Constitution requires him to do so. Such a course would not only strengthen the federal principle but would also do away with the anomalous situation, whereunder a Bill passed by the State Legislature can be ‘killed’ by the Union Council of Ministers by advising the President to withhold his assent thereto or just by cold-storaging it.”
(Emphasis supplied)
142. The report of the Punchhi Commission advocated for the immediate implementation of the above-mentioned recommendations by way of a Constitutional Amendment.
F. INTERNATIONAL JURISPRUDENCE ON ASSENT TO BILLS
143. The tenets of parliamentary democracy demand that while the head of state must act on the advice of ministers, the ministers, in turn, must uphold their responsibility to the people when providing that advice. Indeed, the very raison d’être of a democratic government is to uphold the primacy of the Parliament by ensuring executive accountability. This has been aptly put forth by Nicholas Barber, Professor of Constitutional Law and Theory at the Oxford University, in his work ‘Can Royal Assent Be Refused on the Advice of the Prime Minister?’7 wherein he argues:
“The point of the convention on royal assent is to uphold the primacy of the democratic element of the constitution in the making of law. But just as it would be undemocratic to allow one person – the Monarch – to veto legislation, so too it would be undemocratic to give this power to the Prime Minister. In short, when presented with a bill that has 7 Nicholas Barber, Can Royal Assent Be Refused on the Advice of the Prime Minister?, uK C onstitutionAl lAw A ssoCiAtion (Apr. 7, 2025, 9:45 PM), https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2013/09/25/nick-barber-canroyal-assent-be-refused-on-the-advice-of-the-prime-minster/. [2025] 4 S.C.R. 1083The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr. passed through Parliament in a proper manner, the duty of the Monarch is to give assent – irrespective of the advice of her Ministers. There is no room for discretion. On its best interpretation, this is what the convention requires: if the Monarch were to accept the advice of her Prime Minister on this issue, she would be acting unconstitutionally.” a. United Kingdom
144. The position in the United Kingdom is that once a bill has passed through all parliamentary stages in both Houses, it is poised for the conferment of ‘royal assent’. Historically, the Sovereign granted assent to bills in person in the House of Lords, attended by the Lords Commissioners. This formal ceremony was known as the ‘Royal Assent ceremony’. The Royal Assent ceremony continued until 1967, when the British Parliament passed the Royal Assent Act wherein the requirement of grant of assent in person by the monarch was made voluntary. Although granting assent is a personal prerogative of the monarch, yet it has long been an established convention that the monarch does not withhold it for a bill that has received approval from both Houses. The process of Royal Assent comprises two stages: first, the signification of the royal assent to a bill via the Royal Sign Manual on Letters Patent issued under the Great Seal of the Realm; and secondly, the communication of the King’s Assent to both Houses of Parliament. In the United Kingdom (UK), royal assent is regarded as a formality and has not been refused to a bill since Queen Anne’s reign in 1707.
145. In Parliament of the UK, the procedure for obtaining Royal Assent begins with officials in the Public Bill Office of the House of Lords that manages and assists the processes relating to the House’s consideration of public legislation. First, a list of bills is prepared by the Clerk of the Parliaments. Thereafter, once a date for Royal Assent has been set, all the bills approved by both Houses are presented before the monarch for assent. In this regard, the monarch has no power to withhold assent to a bill, regardless of any instructions from the Government or anyone else. 8 In Scotland, a period of four weeks is allowed before a bill is presented to the Queen for assent, during which any legal objections may be raised.
8 David Torrance, Royal Assent, House of Commons Library (Feb. 26, 2024), HTTPS:// RESEARCHBRIEFINGS.FILES.PARLIAMENT.UK/DOCUMENTS/CBP-9466/CBP-9466.PDF. 1084 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
146. The only ground on which assent may be withheld, that too solely on ministerial advice, is if the bill has failed to comply with mandatory procedural requirements or if there has been a change in government between the bill’s approval and its presentation for assent. Section 4 of the Judicial Committee Act, 1833 provides that the Sovereign may refer a bill to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council for an advisory opinion on whether such bill contravenes a fundamental constitutional principle. However, the position in the UK does not clarify whether the Sovereign can initiate such a referral independently. b. Canada
147. Canada’s Royal Assent ceremony traces its origins to the United Kingdom. Traditionally, once a bill was passed in identical form by both the Senate and the House of Commons, the Governor General, as the Crown’s representative, attended the Parliament to provide Royal Assent to such bill. In absence of the Governor General, a Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada acting as Deputy to the Governor General is presented the bills for Royal Assent. The Governor General signs a Declaration of Royal Assent, witnessed by the Clerk of the Parliaments.
148. Section 3 of the Royal Assent Act, 2002 (Can) provides that assent may be given ‘in Parliament assembled’ or through a written declaration, provided it is witnessed by more than one member from each House. The Act stipulates that the Royal Assent must be given in the Senate Chamber at least twice a year and for the first appropriation bill of each session of the Parliament. In all other cases, such assent may be granted by the Governor General or her Deputy by written consent. At the provincial level, assent is given by the Lieutenant Governor, who is appointed by the Governor General. As per Section 57 of the Constitution Act, 1867, when bills are reserved for Queen’s pleasure, she acts upon ministerial advice rather than the advice of the Houses.
149. The Supreme Court of Canada in Reference Re Amendment of the Constitution of Canada, reported in 1981 SCC OnLine Can SC 77, recognized that, by convention, neither the Queen nor the vice-regal representative (equivalent of a Governor in India) may, on their own, refuse assent to a bill passed by both Houses of the Parliament on the grounds of opposition to or disapproval of its policy. The relevant portion of the judgment in reference reads thus: [2025] 4 S.C.R. 1085The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr. “As a matter of law, the Queen, or the Governor General or the Lieutenant Governor could refuse assent to every bill passed by both Houses of Parliament or by a Legislative Assembly as the case may be. But by convention they cannot of their own motion refuse to assent to any such bill on any ground, for instance because they disapprove of the policy of the bill. We have here a conflict between a legal rule which creates a complete discretion and a conventional rule which completely neutralizes it. But conventions, like laws, are sometimes violated. And if this particular convention were violated and assent were improperly withheld, the courts would be bound to enforce the law, not the convention. They would refuse to recognize the validity of a vetoed bill. This is what happened in Gallant v. The King, a case in keeping with the classic case of Stockdale v. Hansard where the English Court of Queen’s Bench held that only the Queen and both Houses of Parliament could make or unmake laws. The Lieutenant Governor who had withheld assent in Gallant apparently did so towards the end of his term of office. Had it been otherwise, it is not inconceivable that his withholding of assent might have produced a political crisis leading to his removal from office which shows that if the remedy for a breach of a convention does not lie with the courts, still the breach is not necessarily without a remedy. The remedy lies with some other institutions of government; furthermore it is not a formal remedy and it may be administered with less certainty or regularity than it would be by a court.”
150. In Galati v. Governor-General of Canada, reported in [2015] FC 91, the Federal Court of Canada was faced with the question of whether the grant of royal assent by the Governor General to the Strengthening Canadian Citizenship Act, 2014 could be set aside by the court on the ground that enactment of the same was outside the legislative competence of the Parliament. It was contended by the applicants that the Governor General exceeded the scope of his discretion as well as his authority under the Royal Assent Act of Canada by assenting to the said bill. The Federal Court, however, dismissed the application and held that the Governor General’s act of affixing royal assent to the bill was a legislative act. Therefore, the issue of whether the Governor General exceeded his constitutional 1086 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports authority in granting royal assent to the said bill was not justiciable. The relevant portion of the judgment is reproduced below for ready reference:
“The courts exercise a supervisory jurisdiction once a law has been enacted. Until that time, a court cannot review, enjoin or otherwise engage in the legislative process unless asked by way of a reference framed under the relevant legislation. To conclude otherwise would blur the boundaries that necessarily separate the functions and roles of the legislature and the courts. To review the Governor General’s act of granting royal assent, as the applicants request, would conflate the constitutionally discreet roles of the judiciary and the legislature, affecting a radical amendment of the Constitution Act, 1867 and the conventions which underlie our system of government, notably the right of Parliament to consider and pass legislation. The applicants’ arguments turn this principle on its head. On the theory advanced, the judiciary would adjudicate on the constitutionality of proposed legislation before it became law. That line, once crossed, would have no limit.”
151. The views of the Federal Court in Galati (supra) that the grant of royal assent by the Governor-General was a legislative act and hence, non-justiciable was in line with the view of the Court in Gallant v. The King, [1949] 2 DLR 425 wherein it was noted that the Lieutenant-Governor is a part of the legislature and the act of providing royal assent is also a legislative action.
c. United States of America
152. The Constitution of the United States, more particularly, Article I, Section 7, Clause 2 thereof states that once a bill has been passed by the House of Representatives and the Senate, it must be presented to the President. If the President approves, he may sign the bill; otherwise, he may return it with his objections for reconsideration. If, after reconsideration, two-thirds of both the Houses passes the bill, it becomes law. Further, if the President does not sign a bill within ten days of presenting the same, while Congress is in session, the bill automatically becomes law. Therefore, in this limited circumstance, the concept of pocket veto is not available to the President. However, if Congress adjourns while the bill is awaiting [2025] 4 S.C.R. 1087The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr. assent and the President does not sign the bill within ten days, the bill does not become law.
d. New Zealand
153. The colonial legislative framework of New Zealand under the Constitution Act, 1852, vested structured discretion in provincial authorities while maintaining the supremacy of the Crown. Section 27 of the Constitution Act, 1852 stipulated that every bill passed by the Provincial Council must be presented to the Superintendent who was an elected head of each Provincial Council, for the assent of the Governor who was the representative of the monarch. The Superintendent, in his discretion, could have either granted assent on behalf of the Governor or withheld assent or reserved the bill for the Governor’s pleasure. For a bill to become law, Superintendent had to signify Governor’s assent. Further, her Majesty, with the advice of her Privy Council could issue instructions to the Governor to guide him in exercise of his powers to assent to, dissent from, or reserve bills for her Majesty’s pleasure. The Governor was required to act in obedience to these instructions.
154. By the introduction of the Constitution Act, 1986, the Sovereign began to act on the advice of the Executive Council which is the part of the executive branch of government. It states that a bill passed by the House of Representatives becomes law when the Sovereign or the Governor-General grants assent. Section 3 of the Act states that the power conferred on the Governor-General are royal powers exercised on behalf of the Sovereign. These powers may be exercised either by the Sovereign in person or by the Governor-General. Additionally, any reference in an Act to the Governor-General in Council also includes the Sovereign acting with the advice and consent of the Executive Council. The Prime Minister-designate is appointed as the Executive Councillor and he advises the Governor-General to appoint other Councillors. Section 3A removes any discretion of the Sovereign or the Governor-General, stating that they may exercise a power on the advice and with the consent of the Executive Council.
e. Australia
155. The structure of governance in Australia reflects a nuanced distribution of the Queen’s powers through her representatives at both national 1088 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports and state levels. The Queen of Australia is the formal Head of State. At the national level, the Queen’s powers and functions qua the Government of Australia are exercised by the Governor-General of Australia. At the State level, her powers are exercised by the Governor of the State. As per Section 2(1) of the Constitution Act, 1889, the legislative powers were vested in the Sovereign and exercised by her colonial Governors, subject to the advice of legislators. At the national level, Governor-General is not given ministerial advice on assent, the Presiding Officer of the House requests for assent and the Attorney General provides a certificate to the Governor-General regarding whether the bill needs to be reserved for the Queen’s assent or regarding any corrections. 9
156. It is said that the role of the Governor-General is to ensure due process – that the bill was passed in Houses following the procedure. He is not concerned with the contents of the legislation as the act of the Governor-General is executive. However, in the context of Governor (state level), the Court of Appeal in Eastgate v. Rozzoli, reported in (1990) 20 NSWLR 188, noted that while giving assent the Australian State Governor acts as a constituent part of the Parliament. If a bill is reserved for Queen’s pleasure, she acts upon the advice of Australian Commonwealth Ministers. The power to refer bills back to Parliament can be exercised only upon ministerial advice. At the states, the parliamentary officers seek State Governor’s assent. Ordinarily, the State Governors assent to bills without any ministerial advice, only South Australia endeavors to provide executive advice to the Governor. f. Ireland
157. Ireland’s constitutional order provides a unique provision enabling the President to refer bills to the Supreme Court for its view on the constitutionality of the bills. Article 26 of the Constitution of the Ireland confers a power on the President, who, after consultation with the Council of State, may refer any bill to the Supreme Court for a decision on whether any provisions of the bill are repugnant to the Constitution. Such reference must be within seven days from the presentation of the bill to the President. If the Supreme Court holds that any provision of the bill is repugnant to the Constitution, the President declines to sign such bill.
9 D ePt. of Prime minister & CAbinet, Austl . Govt., leGislAtion HAnDbooK (2017). [2025] 4 S.C.R. 1089The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr. g. Republic of Singapore
158. The Constitution of Singapore establishes a structured framework for the exercise of presidential discretion, setting clear time limits for decision-making while also ensuring safeguards against legislative overreach. Article 21A of the Constitution stipulates the general time limit for the President to exercise his discretionary powers. It provides that when the Constitution grants the President discretion in granting or refusing assent, concurrence, approval, or confirmation, he must signify his decision within the specified period after it is sought. The time period specified for granting assent ranges from thirty days to six weeks. However, it may be extended contingent upon any agreement between the President and the Cabinet.
159. Article 22H applies in cases where the bill or any provision seeks to curtail discretionary powers of the President. If, within thirty days, the President neither withholds assent nor refers the bill to the tribunal for its opinion on whether the bill curtails the President’s discretionary powers, then the President is deemed to have assented. Even when the tribunal is of the opinion that the bill does not curtail the discretionary powers conferred on the President, the President is still deemed to have assented.
h. Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka
160. The Constitution of Sri Lanka, more particularly, Article 154H, stipulates that upon the presentation of a statute enacted by the Provincial Council, the Governor shall either assent to it or return it for reconsideration as soon as possible. The Provincial Council may then pass the statute with or without amendments. If the statute is presented to the Governor again, he may reserve it for reference by the President to the Supreme Court within one month of its second time, seeking a determination as to whether is inconsistent with the Constitution. If the Supreme Court holds the statute to be consistent, the Governor must grant assent. If it is held inconsistent, the Governor may withhold assent. It can be concluded that, upon the first presentation of a bill, the Governor has only two options: granting assent or returning it for reconsideration. On the second presentation, the Governor may only reserve the bill, referring it to the President for submission to the Supreme Court. He does not have the discretion to withhold assent independently.
1090 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports i. Republic of Kiribati
161. The constitutional framework of Kiribati is similar to the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka. It provides powers to withhold assent only in exceptional situations. Section 66 of the Constitution of Kiribati allows the Beretitenti, that is the head of the state and head of the government, to withhold assent to a bill only if he believes the bill to be inconsistent with the Constitution. In such a case, the bill is returned to the Parliament for amendment, and if it is presented again and the Beretitenti still believes that the bill is inconsistent with the Constitution, he is required to refer it to the High Court for a declaration. If the Court declares that the bill is not consistent with the Constitution, the Beretitenti must grant assent forthwith. If the Court declares the bill to be inconsistent, it is sent back to Parliament. The Constitution of Zimbabwe under Section 131 provides a time period of twenty-one days to either assent to the bill or refer it for reconsideration.
j. Republic of Fiji
162. The Constitution of Fiji, 2013 also does not vest discretionary power in the President. While Section 53 of the Fiji Independence Order, 1970 and Constitution of Fiji granted the Governor-General the power to grant assent or withhold assent, the Constitution of Fiji, 2013, removed any discretion on the part of the President. Section 48 of the Constitution stipulates that once a bill is passed, the Speaker must present it to the President for assent, which must be granted within seven days; otherwise, the bill is deemed to have received assent.
k. Solomon Islands & Antigua and Barbuda
163. Both the Solomon Islands and Antigua and Barbuda have constitutional provisions that mandate the Governor-General to grant assent to bills passed by Parliament. In the Solomon Islands, Section 59(2) of the Constitution of the Soloman Islands provides that when a bill has been passed by the Parliament it shall be presented to the Governor-General who shall assent to it forthwith on behalf of the Head of the State. Whereas Section 52(2) of the Constitution of Antigua and Barbuda states that when a bill is presented to the Governor-General for assent in accordance with this Constitution, he shall signify that he assents thereto.
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1091The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr. l. Islamic Republic of Pakistan
164. In our neighboring country, Article 75 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan provides that when a bill is presented to the President, he must either assent within ten days or return it to Parliament with a request for reconsideration. If the bill is passed again by a majority, whether amended or not, the President must grant assent within ten days, failing which it will be deemed to have received assent. Whereas Article 105 stipulates that the Governor shall act in accordance with the advice of the Cabinet or the Chief Minister. The Governor may, however, require the Cabinet or the Chief Minister to reconsider the advice. Following such reconsideration, the Governor must act in accordance with the advice tendered within ten days. m. Federal Republic of Germany
165. The legislative process in Germany is governed by both federal and state constitutional provisions. Article 76 of the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany states that bills are to be introduced in Bundestag (house elected by the people) by the Federal Government or by the Bundesrat (federal council). The provision grants the Bundesrat a period of six weeks to comment on bills for Federal Government bills. The Federal Government submits the bills, alongwith its views, to the Bundestag within six weeks alongwith its views. Article 78 provides that a bill adopted by the Bundestag become the law if the Bundesrat consents to it. Laws enacted in accordance with the provisions of the Basic Law, after being countersigned, are certified by the Federal President. Furthermore, Section 60, Section V, the Constitution of Berlin stipulates that the bills shall be signed by the President of the House of Representatives without delay and then promulgated by the Governing Mayor within two weeks. n. Italian Republic
166. The legislative process in Italy is shaped by constitutional provisions that define the President’s role in the promulgation of laws and the scope of legislative urgency. Article 73 of the Constitution of the Italian Republic mandates that laws be promulgated by the President within one month of their approval. However, if the Chambers (the Parliament consists of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate of the Republic), by a majority vote, declare a bill to be urgent, it shall be promulgated within the time specified by the bill itself. Article 74 1092 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports empowers the President to request a new deliberation by means of a message stating the reasons for such a request. It is important to take note that if the Chambers pass the bill once again, then the law must to be promulgated.
o. French Republic
167. In France, the promulgation of legislation is subject to defined constitutional timelines. Article 10 of the Constitution of October 4, 1958, stipulates that the President of the Republic must promulgate Acts of Parliament within fifteen days after the final passage of an Act. It also empowers the President to request Parliament to reopen the debate on the Act, or any specific sections thereof, and such a request for reopening of debate shall not be refused.
p. Japan
168. As per the Japanese constitutional framework, the Diet (Parliament of Japan) is the sole law-making organ of the State. Article 59 envisages that if a bill passed by the House of Representatives is rejected by the House of Councillors, it becomes a law when passed a second time by the House of Representatives by a two-thirds majority of the members present. Article 74 states that all laws and cabinet orders must be signed by the competent Minister of State and countersigned by the Prime Minister.
G. ANALYSIS
i. What courses of action are available to the Governor in exercise of his powers under Article 200 of the Constitution?
169. A plain reading of Article 200 of the Constitution indicates that when a bill is passed by the legislature of a State, it is mandatorily required to be placed before the Governor for his assent. This is because without receiving the assent of the President, a bill cannot become an Act. However, when a bill is presented to the Governor for his assent, the Governor is required to make a declaration from the three options available to him under the substantive part of Article 200, that is, to assent, to withhold assent, or to reserve the bill for the consideration of the President.
170. The first proviso prescribes a mechanism whereby the Governor may return a bill, which is not a Money Bill, back to the State legislature [2025] 4 S.C.R. 1093The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr. requesting them to reconsider the bill or certain provisions thereof or consider the possibility of making certain amendments to it. Once a bill is so returned by the Governor, the State legislature is required to take note of the suggestions made by the Governor and reconsider the bill accordingly. If the bill, after such reconsideration by the State Legislature is again passed and presented to the Governor, then in such circumstances as per the first proviso, the Governor would then be prohibited from withholding his assent to the bill.
171. The second proviso provides for a specific situation wherein the Governor is mandated to reserve a bill for the consideration of the President if, in his opinion, the bill upon becoming law, would so derogate from the powers of the High Court as to endanger the position which the High Court has been designed to fill by the Constitution.
172. One of the principal contentions advanced by the learned Attorney General before us was that the first proviso to Article 200 provides an independent fourth course of action to the Governor besides the three other options available to him under the substantive part of the Article. To put it differently, his argument was that the Governor may either withhold assent to a bill simpliciter, as provided under the substantive part of Article 200, or he may invoke the procedure prescribed under the first proviso and return the bill back to the State legislature along with such a message as is mentioned in the first proviso. In other words, he contended that where the Governor declares a simpliciter withholding of assent, the same would be an absolute veto of the bill, and the State legislature would have no occasion to reconsider the bill in such a scenario. As a corollary the first proviso would have no applicability and the State legislature would not be entitled to reconsider the bill on its own motion.
173. He argued that in cases where the bill suffers from some gross and manifest unconstitutionality, the Governor need not invoke the procedure mentioned in the first proviso and it would be sufficient if he declares a simpliciter withholding of the bill. As a corollary, he submitted that the procedure prescribed under the first proviso may be followed by the Governor when he is of the belief that the bill, which is otherwise constitutional, may benefit from certain amendments and in such a case he may send a message to the State legislature suggesting certain amendments to the bill.
1094 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
174. In other words, his contention was that simpliciter withholding is to be opted for by the Governor in his position as a custodian of the Constitution in the State, while the procedure prescribed in the first proviso is to be followed by him in his role as a friend, philosopher and guide of the State Government, with a view to improve an otherwise constitutionally innocuous piece of legislation.
175. The aforesaid contention of the Attorney General was met by the petitioner by placing reliance on the recent decision of this Court in State of Punjab (supra) wherein it was held that the option of withholding of assent under the substantive part of Article 200 is attached with the first proviso. The petitioner contended that in light of the said observation, it is not open for the Governor to undertake any simpliciter withholding of a bill presented to him and he must mandatorily resort to the procedure indicated in the first proviso if he decides to withhold assent to a bill.
176. The Attorney General, on the other hand, raised doubts as regards the correctness of the decision in State of Punjab (supra) and argued that the said decision was rendered without having regard to the earlier decisions given by larger Benches of this Court. In particular, he placed reliance on certain observations made by the Constitution Bench in Valluri Basavaiah Chowdhary (supra) to support his contention.
177. In response, the petitioner argued in favour of the decision in State of Punjab (supra) and submitted that the observations made in Valluri Basavaiah Chowdhary (supra) were made in a case where this Court was not dealing with the interpretation of Article 200 of the Constitution. Thus, the observations made therein as regards Article 200 could be said to be obiter dicta at best. Mr. Dwivedi went to the extent of submitting that the observations of this Court being relied upon by the Attorney General cannot be construed as obiter dicta as they were mere passing remarks irrelevant to the lis before the Court in that case.
178. It is in this backdrop that we are called upon to ascertain whether the observations made in Valluri Basavaiah Chowdhary (supra) can be reconciled with the decision of this Court in State of Punjab (supra). The consequence of this inquiry would be that it would determine whether the constitutional scheme of Article 200 envisages a simpliciter [2025] 4 S.C.R. 1095The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr. withholding of assent by the Governor. In other words, if the decision in State of Punjab (supra) is found to be per incuriam, it would mean that the Governor under Article 200 has the power of exercising an absolute veto upon any bill which is presented to him for assent.
179. Before going into the question of whether the observations made in Valluri Basavaiah Chowdhary (supra) could be said to be the ratio, obiter or irrelevant to the lis, we deem it necessary to reproduce the observations relied upon by the Attorney General in support of his submission:
“19. The Governor is, however, made a component part of the legislature of a State under Article 168, because every Bill passed by the State legislature has to be reserved for the assent under Article 200. Under that article, the Governor can adopt one of the three courses, namely
(i) he may give his assent to it, in which case the Bill becomes a law; or (ii) he may, except in the case of a “Money Bill”, withhold his assent therefrom, in which case the Bill falls through unless the procedure indicated in the first proviso is followed i.e. return the Bill to the Assembly for reconsideration with a message, or (iii) he may (subject to Ministerial advice) reserve the Bill for the consideration of the President, in which case the President will adopt the procedure laid down in Article 201. The first proviso to Article 200 deals with a situation where the Governor is bound to give his assent when the Bill is reconsidered and passed by the Assembly. The second proviso to that article makes the reservation for consideration of the President obligatory where the Bill would, “if it becomes law”, derogate from the powers of the High Court. Thus, it is clear that a Bill passed by a State Assembly may become law if the Governor gives his assent to it, or if, having been reserved by the Governor for the consideration of the President, it is assented to by the President. The Governor is, therefore, one of the three components of a State legislature. The only other legislative function of the Governor is that of promulgating Ordinances under Article 213(1) when both the Houses of the State legislature or the Legislative Assembly, where the legislature is unicameral, are not in session. The Ordinance-making power of the Governor is 1096 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports similar to that of the President, and it is co-extensive with the legislative powers of the State legislature.”
(Emphasis supplied)
180. The crux of the controversy as regards whether the first proviso provides an independent course of action to the Governor lies in the use of the expression “in which case the Bill falls through unless the procedure indicated in the first proviso is followed”. However, what is interesting to note is that this expression did not come to be used for the first time in Valluri Basavaiah Chowdhary (supra). Much prior to the said decision, Justice S.R. Das (as his lordship then was), in a concurring opinion in State of Bihar v. Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga reported in (1952) 1 SCC 528 observed as follows: “235. [...] The procedure to be followed after a Bill is passed by the State Assembly is laid down in Article 200. Under that article the Governor can do one of three things, namely, he may declare that he assents to it, in which case the Bill becomes a law, or he may declare that he withholds assent therefrom, in which case the Bill falls through unless the procedure indicated in the proviso is followed, or he may declare that he reserves the Bill for the consideration of the President, in which case the President will adopt the procedure laid down in Article 201. Under that article the President shall declare either that he assents to the Bill in which case the Bill will become law or that he withholds assent therefrom, in which case the Bill falls through unless the procedure indicated in the proviso is followed. Thus it is clear that a Bill passed by a State Assembly may become a law if the Governor gives his assent to it or if, having been reserved by the Governor for the consideration of the President, it is assented to by the President. In the latter event happening, the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners will require that what has become a law by the assent of the President will, in order to be effective, have to be again reserved for the consideration of the President a curious conclusion I should be loath to reach unless I am compelled to do so. Article 200 does not contemplate a second reservation by the Governor. [...]”
(Emphasis supplied)
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1097The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.
181. The same expression also came to be used by a three-Judge Bench in Hoechst (supra) wherein it was observed thus:
“85. The constitutional position of a Governor is clearly defined. The Governor is made a component part of the legislature of a State under Article 168 because every Bill passed by the State legislature has to be reserved for the assent of the Governor under Article 200. Under that Article, the Governor can adopt one of the three courses, namely: (1) He may give his assent to it, in which case the Bill becomes a law; or (2) He may except in the case of a ‘Money Bill’ withhold his assent therefrom, in which case the Bill falls through unless the procedure indicated in the first proviso is followed i.e. return the Bill to the Assembly for consideration with a message; or (3) He may “on the advice of the Council of Ministers” reserve the Bill for the consideration of the President, in which case the President will adopt the procedure laid down in Article
201. The first proviso to Article 200 deals with a situation where the Governor is bound to give his assent and the Bill is reconsidered and passed by the Assembly. [...]” (Emphasis supplied)
182. This Court in State of Punjab (supra) wherein one of us (J.B. Pardiwala J.) was part of the Bench, observed that the second proviso to Article 200 is in the form of an exception as it restricts the choice that the Governor otherwise has under the substantive part of Article
200. It observed that the use of the expression “shall not assent to, but shall reserve for the consideration of the President” makes it abundantly clear that the Governor has no choice but to reserve a bill for the consideration of the President if the bill is of the description given in the second proviso. This Court further held that unlike the second proviso, which is in the form of an exception, the first proviso is in the form of an explanation and the same is made clear from the use of the expression “may” in the first proviso. The Court observed that the expression “may” has been used because the first proviso attaches with the option of withholding of assent and it is a matter of choice for the Governor if he wants to withhold assent to a bill or if he wishes to exercise the other two options available to him, namely, declaring assent or reserving the bill for the consideration 1098 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports of the President. Taking note of the expression “shall not withhold assent therefrom” used in the first proviso, the Court observed that the expression signified that the first proviso was attached to the option of withholding of assent alone. In lieu of this, the Court held that upon withholding of assent to a bill, the Governor is mandatorily required to follow the procedure prescribed in the first proviso. The relevant observations are reproduced hereinbelow:
“20. The present case turns upon how the first proviso is to be construed. In construing the first proviso, it needs to be noted that the substantive part of Article 200 provides the Governor with three options : an option to assent; an option to withhold assent; and an option to reserve the Bill for the consideration of the President. The first proviso opens with the expression “the Governor may” in contrast to the second proviso which begins with the expression “the Governor shall not assent”. The “may” in the first proviso is because the first proviso follows the substantive part which contains three options for the Governor. The first proviso does not qualify the first option (where the Governor assents to the Bill) nor the third option reserving the Bill for consideration of the President. The first proviso attaches to the second option (withholding of assent) and hence begins with an enabling expression, “may”. By the mandate of the second proviso, there is an embargo on the Governor assenting to a Bill which derogates from the powers of the High Court under the Constitution. The Governor is by the mandate of the Constitution required to reserve such a Bill for consideration of the President.
21. The second proviso impacts upon the option which is provided by the substantive part of Article 200 to the Governor to reserve a Bill for the consideration of the President by making it mandatory in the situation envisaged there. The option of reserving a Bill for the consideration of the President is turned into a mandate where the Governor has no option but to reserve it for the consideration of the President. The second proviso is, therefore, in the nature of an exception to the option which is granted to the Governor by the substantive part of Article 200 to reserve any Bill for the consideration of the President.
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1099The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.
22. A proviso, as is well settled, may fulfil the purpose of being an exception. Sometimes, however, a proviso may be in the form of an explanation or in addition to the substantive provision of a statute. The first proviso allows the Governor, where the Bill is not a Money Bill to send it back to the legislature together with a message. In terms of the message, the legislature may be requested by the Governor to reconsider the entirety of the Bill. This may happen for instance where the Governor believes that the entirety of the Bill suffers from an infirmity. Alternatively, the Governor may request the legislature to reconsider any specific provision of the Bill. While returning the Bill, the Governor may express the desirability of introducing an amendment in the Bill. The desirability of an amendment may arise with a view to cure an infirmity or deficiency in the Bill. The concluding part of the first proviso however stipulates that if the Bill is passed again by the legislature either with or without amendments, the Governor shall not withhold assent therefrom upon presentation. The concluding phrase “shall not withhold assent therefrom” is a clear indicator that the exercise of the power under the first proviso is relatable to the withholding of the assent by the Governor to the Bill in the first instance. That is why in the concluding part, the first proviso indicates that upon the passing of the Bill by the legislature either with or without amendments, the Governor shall not withhold assent. The role which is ascribed by the first proviso to the Governor is recommendatory in nature and it does not bind the State Legislature.
23. This is compatible with the fundamental tenet of a parliamentary form of Government where the power to enact legislation is entrusted to the elected representatives of the people. The Governor, as a guiding statesman, may recommend reconsideration of the entirety of the Bill or any part thereof and even indicate the desirability of introducing amendments. However, the ultimate decision on whether or not to accept the advice of the Governor as contained in the message belongs to the legislature alone. That the message of the Governor does not bind 1100 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports the legislature is evident from the use of the expression “if the Bill is passed again …with or without amendments”.
24. The substantive part of Article 200 empowers the Governor to withhold assent to the Bill. In such an event, the Governor must mandatorily follow the course of action which is indicated in the first proviso of communicating to the State Legislature “as soon as possible” a message warranting the reconsideration of the Bill. The expression “as soon as possible” is significant. It conveys a constitutional imperative of expedition. Failure to take a call and keeping a Bill duly passed for indeterminate periods is a course of action inconsistent with that expression. Constitutional language is not surplusage. In State of Telangana v. Governor of Telangana [State of Telangana v. Governor of Telangana, (2024) 1 SCC 405] this Court observed that “The expression ‘as soon as possible’ has significant constitutional content and must be borne in mind by constitutional authorities.” The Constitution evidently contains this provision bearing in mind the importance which has been attached to the power of legislation which squarely lies in the domain of the State Legislature. The Governor cannot be at liberty to keep the Bill pending indefinitely without any action whatsoever.
25. The Governor, as an unelected Head of the State, is entrusted with certain constitutional powers. However, this power cannot be used to thwart the normal course of law-making by the State Legislatures. Consequently, if the Governor decides to withhold assent under the substantive part of Article 200, the logical course of action is to pursue the course indicated in the first proviso of remitting the Bill to the State Legislature for reconsideration. In other words, the power to withhold assent under the substantive part of Article 200 must be read together with the consequential course of action to be adopted by the Governor under the first proviso. If the first proviso is not read in juxtaposition to the power to withhold assent conferred by the substantive part of Article 200, the Governor as the unelected Head of State would be in a position to virtually veto the functioning of the legislative domain by [2025] 4 S.C.R. 1101The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr. a duly elected legislature by simply declaring that assent is withheld without any further recourse. Such a course of action would be contrary to fundamental principles of a constitutional democracy based on a Parliamentary pattern of governance. Therefore, when the Governor decides to withhold assent under the substantive part of Article 200, the course of action which is to be followed is that which is indicated in the first proviso. The Governor is under Article 168 a part of the legislature and is bound by the constitutional regime.
26. Insofar as Money Bills are concerned, the power of the Governor to return a Bill in terms of the first proviso is excluded from the purview of the constitutional power of the Governor. Money Bills are governed by Article 207 in terms of which the recommendation of the Governor is required for the introduction of the Bill on a matter specified in sub-clauses (a) to (f) of clause (1) of Article 199.” (Emphasis supplied)
183. Placing reliance on the expression “unless the procedure indicated in the first proviso is followed” the learned Attorney General submitted that the decision as regards whether the procedure prescribed under the first proviso is to be invoked or not, is the discretion of the Governor. It is only when the Governor decides to return the withheld bill along with a message that the first proviso would come into play. In other words, if the Governor believes that the bill is constitutionally infirm and beyond any remedial changes, then he may choose not to return the bill along with a message and may simply declare that he is withholding assent to the bill, in which case the bill would “fall through” or lapse.
184. Although the argument is seemingly lucrative and appealing, and the petitioner also could not provide a concrete reply to the same during the course of the arguments and instead took shelter under the semantics of obiter-dicta and ratio-decidendi, yet we deem it necessary to explain how the argument is short-sighted, half-baked and suffers from an inherent fallacy.
185. As the observation made by this Court in the three decisions referred to above holds that the Bill would fall through unless the procedure prescribed in the first proviso is followed, we first need to understand 1102 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports the procedure that is prescribed in the first proviso. The proviso stipulates that when any bill, other than a Money Bill, is presented to the Governor for assent, he may, as soon as possible, return it to the State legislature, together with a message. As regards the contents of the message, the proviso stipulates that the Governor may request the House(s) of the State legislature to reconsider the bill or certain parts of it, and also explore the desirability of introducing certain amendments as may be suggested by the Governor in the message. Once the bill is so returned together with the message, the House(s) are required to reconsider the bill in accordance with the recommendations contained in the message of the Governor. If the bill is then passed again by the House(s), with or without amendments, and presented to the Governor, then the Governor cannot withhold assent from such a bill.
186. A close reading of the first proviso reveals that the action of returning the bill to the State legislature by the Governor is qualified by the expression “as soon as possible”. However, once the bill has been returned to the State legislature by the Governor, there is no such expediency required on part of the State legislature in reconsidering the bill. Further, once the bill is reconsidered and passed again by the State legislature, there is again a mandate on the Governor not to withhold assent to such a bill. The only obligation upon the State legislature is to mandatorily take into consideration the suggestions contained in the message sent by the Governor along with the bill. However, the State Legislature is not under an obligation to mandatorily introduce any amendments suggested by the Governor and it may proceed to repass the bill without any amendments.
187. Since there is no obligation on the State legislature to repass the bill returned by the Governor under the first proviso, the expression “falls-through” can only refer to those situations where the State legislature elects not to pass the bill for reconsideration again, and in such circumstances causing the bill to lapse. There is nothing in the first proviso which gives the Governor the discretion to initiate the procedural machinery described therein. Therefore, the first proviso, cannot be treated as an independent course of action severable from the option of withholding of assent. The use of the expression “as soon as possible” in the first proviso makes it clear that the Constitution has imposed a sense of urgency upon the [2025] 4 S.C.R. 1103The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr. Governor and expects him to act with expediency if he decides to declare the withholding of assent. At the same time, that the use of the expression “may” in the first proviso, as explained in State of Punjab (supra) does not confer a discretion upon the Governor to decide whether to act in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the first proviso. On the contrary, it only denotes that the first proviso would be applicable only when the option of withholding of assent is exercised. In other words, the expression “may” is used keeping in mind that there are three options that the Governor may choose from when a bill is presented to him for assent. Therefore, there is no requirement for construing the expression “may” as “shall” as was vehemently urged on behalf of the petitioner, and the interpretation provided in State of Punjab (supra) and further explained by us does not merit construing the use of “may” as “shall”, as it would result in a logical absurdity insofar as it would make the compliance with the procedure laid down in the first proviso mandatory in the exercise of all three options available to the Governor under the substantive part of Article 200 of the Constitution.
188. It is also remarkable to take note of the expression “if the bill is passed again” which signifies that the ultimate discretion to decide whether the State legislature wants to repass the bill or not continues to remain the prerogative of the State legislature alone. Similarly, the use of the expression “with or without amendment” denotes that even if the State legislature decides to reconsider the bill, the discretion to repass it with or without the amendments suggested by the Governor again continues to be their sole prerogative. In order to obviate any further confusion, we deem it appropriate to clarify that the use of the expression “shall reconsider the bill accordingly” does not indicate that it is obligatory for the State legislature to take up the bill for reconsideration. The word “shall” used in this expression must be read in conjunction with the word “accordingly”. The use of “shall” in this context is only for the limited purpose that if the State legislature in its discretion does decide to not allow the bill to “fall through” by taking it up for reconsideration, then the scope of such reconsideration must at the very least encompass the suggestions communicated by the Governor in his message. The word “shall” used herein cannot be singled out and construed devoid of its context.
189. The structure of Article 200 is also helpful in discerning the meaning of the content that it holds. There is a substantive part of the 1104 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports provision and there are two provisos to the substantive part. In the substantive part, there are three options for the Governor to choose from, each separated by the conjunction “or” thereby indicating the mutual exclusivity of the three options. If the Governor opts for the first option and grants assent to the bill presented to him, the first proviso doesn’t come into consideration. Similarly, if the Governor chooses the third option and reserves the bill for the consideration of the President, there is no occasion for the operation of first proviso. The second proviso is overarching in nature and provides that in the situation as described therein, the Governor can only exercise one option, that is, reserve the bill for the consideration of the President.
190. The use of the expression “shall declare” in the substantive part of Article 200 indicates that the Governor is required to make a declaration from the three choices provided to him under the substantive part and there cannot be any fourth course of action. As soon as assent is granted, the bill becomes an Act and there is no scope thereafter for reservation for the consideration of the President or returning back to the State legislature. If reservation for the consideration of the President is declared then thereafter no returning of the bill to the State legislature can take place, unless the President so directs under the proviso to Article 201. Thus, it is only upon the declaration of withholding of assent that the first proviso is animates into action.
191. Another important aspect that may be pointed out is that the observations made in Valluri Basavaiah Chowdhary (supra) and Hoechst (supra), respectively state that except in the case of a Money Bill, the Governor may withhold assent. A bare reading of Article 200 indicates that there is no restriction in the substantive part that prohibits the Governor from declaring that he withholds assent to a Money Bill, and it is only under the first proviso that such a restriction can be found. Therefore, it is only when the option of the withholding of assent in the substantive part of Article 200 is read along with the first proviso that Money Bills could be said to be excluded from the purview of withholding of assent under the substantive part of Article
200. Thus, rather than fortifying the argument of the learned Attorney General, the observations made in Valluri Basavaiah Chowdhary (supra) and reiterated in Hoechst (supra) only reinforce the intricate and inseparable connection between the exercise of the option of withholding of assent by the Governor and coming into operation [2025] 4 S.C.R. 1105The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr. of the procedure prescribed in the first proviso. The dictum of the above mentioned two decisions in no way renders the decision in State of Punjab (supra) per-incuriam, and rather bolsters the line of reasoning adopted by this Court therein.
192. Therefore, the use of the expression “the Bill falls through unless the procedure indicated in the first proviso is followed” should be construed in the context of the entire procedure described in the first proviso. Seen thus, it would mean that the bill would fall-through if the bill, having been returned by the Governor, is not passed again by the State legislature and presented again to the Governor for his assent. The fallacy of the argument canvassed by the learned Attorney General lies in the very fact that he has construed the observations of this Court, pertaining to compliance with the procedural requirement under the first proviso, to mean that the mechanism under the first proviso can only be initiated upon the desire and discretion of the Governor.
193. This Court in Nambudiri (supra) explained as to how the State legislature may cause a bill to fall through with which they no longer intend to proceed by not reconsidering and repassing it, once it has been returned by the Governor with the deceleration of withholding of assent. This Court held that the stage of assent could only be arrived at after the stage of reconsideration and repassing by the State legislature has been successfully crossed. The relevant observations read as under: - “16. […] Similarly, when it is said that if the Bill is passed again the Governor shall not withhold assent therefrom it does not postulate the existence of the same House because even if it is the successor House which passes it it is true to say that the Bill has been passed again because in fact it had been passed on an early occasion. Besides, if the effect of Article 196 is that the Bills pending assent do not lapse on the dissolution of the House then the relevant provisions of Article 200 must be read in the light of that conclusion. In our opinion, there is nothing in the proviso to Article 201 which is inconsistent with the basic concept of democratic Government in asking a successor House to reconsider the Bill with the amendments suggested by the President because the proviso makes it perfectly clear that it is open to the successor House to throw out the Bill altogether. It is only if the Bill is passed by the successor 1106 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports House that the stage is reached to present it to the Governor or the President for his assent, not otherwise.”
194. There is one another way of looking at Article 200. The procedure, as prescribed under the scheme of the provision, involves and envisages the actual motion of a bill from one constitutional authority to another. The Article starts with the requirement of the bill having to be mandatorily presented to the Governor after it has been passed by the State legislature. Thereafter, there is an obligation on the Governor to make a choice from one of the three options provided in the substantive part of the Article and also declare such a decision. Here, if assent is declared, then the bill becomes an Act and the Government may thereafter take steps to notify the same in the official Gazette. If the Governor declares that bill is being reserved for consideration of the President as per the second proviso or otherwise, then the bill travels from the Governor to the President, whereupon Article 201 comes into play. The mechanism provided in the first proviso also envisages the movement of the bill from the Governor to the State legislature and then back to the Governor upon being passed again. The expression “as soon as possible” appearing in the first proviso infuses a sense of urgency and expediency in the mechanism of returning of bills by the Governor. It goes without saying that the scheme of Article 200 is characterized by the movement of the bill from one constitutional authority to another and that too with a sense of expediency. It is trite to say that Article 200 occupies an important role of giving the bills passed by the State legislature the authority of an Act. Without the procedure envisaged under Article 200, the bills remain mere pieces of paper, skeletons without any flesh or lifeblood flowing through their veins, mere documentation of the aspirations of the people without any possibility of bringing them to fruition. The only way by which the option of withholding of assent provided in the substantive part of Article 200 can be reconciled with the scheme permeating the remainder of the provision is by reading it in conjunction with the first proviso. It is only when the withholding of assent is tempered with the requirement of following the procedure prescribed in the first proviso that the constitutional object of ensuring that the law-making machinery at the State level keeps on running unhindered can be fulfilled.
195. Any other reading of the provision that construes the option of withholding of assent without attaching it to the mechanism prescribed [2025] 4 S.C.R. 1107The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr. in the first proviso would render the very idea of smooth functioning of the law-making process nugatory and would vest with the Governor untrammeled powers of thwarting the legislative machinery and in effect the will and aspirations of the people whose voices the legislature represents.
196. Thus, in light of the aforesaid discussion, it becomes clear that there are only three courses of action available to the Governor to choose from when a bill is presented to him for assent under Article
200. The first proviso is not an independent fourth course of action but intrinsically attached to the option of withholding of assent. In other words, the first proviso is clarificatory and only elaborates the procedure to be followed in case the option of withholding of assent is invoked by the Governor.
197. The use of the expression “shall” in the substantive part of Article 200 read with the expression “as soon as possible” used in the first proviso indicates that there is no pocket veto available to the Governor while he is exercising the powers under Article 200. As we have also discussed in the subsequent parts of this judgment, inaction on part of the Governor to take a decision when a bill is presented to him under Article 200 is grossly violative of the constitutional scheme of expediency which permeates the provision.
198. The Governor, in exercise of his powers under Article 200, also does not possess any absolute veto. He is mandated to take a decision from among the three options that are provided in the substantive part of the Article 200. In case of withholding of assent, the Governor is bound to follow the procedure prescribed under the first proviso and assent to the bill if it is ultimately presented to him for assent after being repassed by the State legislature. The Governor may also reserve certain bills for the consideration of the President. However, in no case has the Governor been conferred with the power to veto a bill which is presented to him. He is envisaged as an intermediary stop in the journey of the bill towards becoming an Act. When a bill comes to the Governor, he may forthwith assent to it, or postpone the grant of assent by exercising the option of withholding of assent but only for so long till the bill comes back to him after reconsideration, or he may forward the bill to the President whereupon the procedure prescribed under Article 201 is to be followed. Thus, in none of these cases can the Governor permanently keep a bill with him without according 1108 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports assent to it, nor can he declare a simpliciter withholding of assent thereby killing the bill.
ii. Whether the Governor can reserve a Bill for the consideration of the President when it is presented to him for assent after being reconsidered in accordance with the first proviso to Article 200, more particularly, when he had not reserved it for the consideration of the President in the first instance?
199. As discussed in the preceding issue, the Governor, in exercise of his powers under Article 200, has three options to choose from. The use of the conjunction “or” between the three options signifies that the options are mutually exclusive and once one of the options is exercised by the Governor, the other options become unavailable to choose from. Kameshwar Singh (supra) held that there can be no reservation for the consideration of the President once assent is declared and similarly, there is no requirement for the Governor to assent to the bill, once the bill, having been reserved for the consideration of the President, has received his assent.
200. We have also discussed in line with the decision in State of Punjab (supra) that the option of withholding of assent is attached with the first proviso and once the Governor declares the withholding of assent, the entire mechanism which is laid down in the first proviso itself has to follow suit. Thus, the first proviso to Article 200 is a complete code in itself as regards the procedure which is to be followed once the Governor withholds assent and the rest of the article has no applicability thereafter.
201. It is also interesting to note that the expression “withhold assent” has been employed in the substantive part of Article 200. The literal meaning of the expression ‘withhold’ as defined in a number of dictionaries is to keep back; to keep in one’s possession what belongs to or is due to others; to hinder; to prevent; to defer; to postpone; to detain; to keep under control; to retain; to keep from doing something; to refrain from doing something. Thus, it would not be incorrect to construe that the option of withholding of assent has been provided to the Governor under the substantive part only with a view to defer or to postpone the grant of assent to a bill. Withholding of assent cannot be construed to be the same as denying of assent or as conferring a power in the Governor to veto a legislation passed by [2025] 4 S.C.R. 1109The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr. the State legislature, which would be against the very fundamentals of a representative democracy.
202. Further, the scope of this deferment of assent by the Governor has been made subject to the procedure laid down in the first proviso. The procedure laid down in the first proviso ensures that the withholding of assent does not become analogous to a pocket veto. The use of the expression “if the Bill is passed again by the House or Houses with or without amendment” in the first proviso clearly indicates that the role of the Governor under the first proviso has been characterized as recommendatory in nature and that his suggestions do not bind the legislature. Further, the expression “the Governor shall not withhold assent therefrom” in the first proviso leaves no scope for the Governor to take any course of action other than discontinuing the withholding of assent, which by necessary implication means to accord assent to the bill. The expression also indicates that there is strict constitutional prohibition against the Governor to not withhold assent to the bill.
203. What follows from the aforesaid discussion is that once the option of withholding of assent is exercised by the Governor, the mechanism under the first proviso is set into motion to the exclusion of everything else envisaged under the article. This is in view of the maxim Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius i.e., the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another. Once the mechanism under the first proviso is set into motion and the various stages are complied with, the only possible manner in which the mechanism prescribed under the first proviso can conclude is by the Governor granting assent to the bill. Thus, there is no scope for the Governor to reserve a bill for the consideration of the President once it is presented to him for reconsideration after compliance with the procedure laid down in the first proviso.
204. However, for the sake of completeness, we deem it necessary to discuss a possible scenario wherein the Governor may have the power to reserve the bill for the consideration of the President even after it is repassed by the State legislature and presented to him for assent. Say, for instance, in a particular case, the Governor withholds assent to a bill which is presented to him and returns it to the House or the Houses together with a message requesting them to reconsider certain aspects of the bill or introduce certain amendments desirable thereto. However, the House or the Houses, 1110 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports in the process of reconsideration, introduce certain changes which were not suggested by the Governor in the message which he sent together with the bill. In such a scenario, the House or Houses cannot be said to have “reconsidered the Bill accordingly” which is a mandatory condition prescribed under the first proviso. If the bill which is presented to the Governor for assent in the second round could be said to have been reconsidered by the House or Houses on wholly different and new grounds, and if those changes are of such a nature where a reservation for the consideration of the President may be desirable, then the Governor would not be precluded from reserving the bill for the consideration of the President.
205. However, if the bill is repassed by the House or Houses without amendments, or only with such amendments as were suggested by the Governor in his message, then the procedure prescribed under the first proviso could be said to be fully complied with and the Governor would be bound to signify his assent thereto and would be precluded from reserving the bill for the consideration of the President.
206. We say so because the procedure laid down in the first proviso cannot be construed as giving the State legislature the unfettered power to introduce changes to the bill which alter its very nature, or which, for instance, fall foul of the second proviso to Article 200. In such a scenario, the Governor would have all the three options which are available to him when a bill is presented to him in the first instance. However, whenever the House or Houses reconsider the bill “accordingly”, that is, in accordance with the suggestions of the Governor and pass it with or without amendments, the Governor is bound to act as per the clear constitutional directive laid down in the first proviso.
207. As we shall also discuss later, any reservation of a bill by the Governor for the consideration of the President on the ground that the bill was not reconsidered as per the procedure prescribed in the first proviso would be subject to judicial scrutiny.
208. Coming to the facts of the present case, out of twelve bills which are the subject matter of the present petition, two were reserved by the Governor for the consideration of the President in the first instance of their presentation. As regards the remaining ten bills, the Governor declared a withholding of assent, however, the bills were returned without any message as is envisaged under the first proviso. What stands out as a glaring omission on the part of the Governor is that the day on which the withholding of assent was declared, the [2025] 4 S.C.R. 1111The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr. decision in State of Punjab (supra) had already been passed and even the notice in the present petition had been issued. Thus, it was expected of the Governor that he would not declare a simpliciter withholding of assent of the bills without specifying the reasons for such withholding and also without making recommendations as regards the desirability of introducing any amendments by the State legislature while reconsidering the bills.
209. In light of the language of Article 200, and also keeping in mind its interpretation by this Court in State of Punjab (supra), there was no room for the Governor to declare a simpliciter withholding of assent without taking recourse to the first proviso as that virtually amounts to the exercise of absolute veto by the Governor, a power which is conspicuously absent from our constitutional scheme.
210. In the absence of any message under the first proviso by the Governor, the State legislature was left with no other option but to proceed on the assumption that the bills were required to be reconsidered in its entirety. The State legislature proceeded on this assumption and the said 10 Bills were reconsidered in a special sitting and were passed without any material changes and presented to the Governor on the same day. Thereafter, the Governor, rather than giving his assent to the Bills, went on to reserve the Bills for the consideration of the President on the ground that the Bills were repugnant to Entry 66 of the List I of the Schedule VII to the Constitution.
211. For the reasons that we have assigned in our foregoing discussion, we are of the view that the Governor could not have reserved the Bills for the consideration of the President once they were reconsidered by the State legislature and presented to him without any amendments, particularly when the Governor sent back the Bills to the State legislature without any message on an earlier occasion. As a natural consequence of the reservation of the bills for the consideration of the President having been found to be in contravention of the procedure prescribed under Article 200 of the Constitution and thus, illegal and void, any subsequent decision taken by the President on those Bills would also be non-est and is thus declared to be void ab-initio.
iii. Whether there is an express constitutionally prescribed time-limit within which the Governor is required to act in the exercise of his powers under Article 200 of the Constitution? 1112 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
212. It was argued by the petitioner that the Governor in exercise of his powers under Article 200 is required to act promptly and the absence of any prescribed time period should not be construed as allowing the Governor the liberty to act on his own free will and volition. It was also submitted that the expression “as soon as possible” appearing in the first proviso places an obligation on the Governor to act promptly and with expedience.
213. The petitioner also placed reliance on the recommendations made by the Sarkaria Commission and the Punchhi Commission to argue that the Court should read in some time-limit into the scheme of Article(s) 200 and 201 respectively to prevent inaction on the part of the Governor and the President.
214. Refuting the contention of the petitioner, the learned Attorney General argued that in the absence of any prescribed time-limit in the text of the provision, it would not be open to the Court to read in a timelimit and the only way to do so would be by way of a constitutional amendment. He placed reliance on the decision of this Court in Nambudiri (supra) to argue that this Court had expressly rejected the idea that there is a time limit which circumscribes the exercise of functions of the Governor under Article 200.
215. The arguments advanced before us present an interesting question whether it would be open to the courts to read in a time limit for the exercise of a power by a constitutional authority where no such limit is prescribed by the Constitution. We have expressly held during the course of answering the previous issue that the scheme of Article 200 does not envisage either the exercise of a pocket or an absolute veto by the Governor. The use of the expression “shall” in the substantive part indicates that the Governor is under an obligation to choose from one of the three options that are made available to him. By virtue of the first proviso attaching itself to the option of withholding of assent, as discussed earlier, the possibility of an absolute veto is also ruled out as the Governor must assent to the bill once it is presented to him after the procedure prescribed in the first proviso is complied with.
216. However, unlike many countries across the globe wherein a provision for deemed assent upon the expiry of the specified time period has been made, there is no such provision in our Constitution. The only manner in which a temporal imperative has been weaved into the scheme of Article 200 is by the use of the expression “as soon as possible” in the first proviso. The said expression, which also appears [2025] 4 S.C.R. 1113The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr. in Article 111 of the Constitution, was the subject of some debate in the Constituent Assembly.
217. Article 111, which provides for the President’s assent to bills passed by Parliament was originally numbered as Article 91 under the Draft Constitution and it provided a time-limit of six-weeks to the President to send back the bill to the House(s) for reconsideration. The Draft article read as follows:
“When a Bill has been passed by the Houses of Parliament, it shall be presented to the President, and the President shall declare either that he assents to the Bill, or that he withholds assent therefrom:
Provided that the President may, not later than six weeks after the presentation to him of a Bill for assent, return the Bill if it is not a Money Bill to the Houses with a message requesting that they will reconsider the Bill or any specified provision thereof, and, in particular, will consider the desirability of introducing any such amendments as he may recommend in his message, and the Houses shall reconsider the Bill accordingly.”
218. During the Constituent Assembly debates, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar moved an amendment to substitute the expression “not later than six weeks” with “as soon as possible”. Further in the debate, Shri Naziruddin Ahmad advocated for a change in the aforesaid amendment and sought to substitute the term “as soon as possible” with “as soon as may be”. His contention rested on the reasoning that the phrase, “as soon as possible” which was introduced by Dr. Ambedkar in his amendment in place of the original wording used in Article 91, that is, “not later than six weeks”, imposed an unduly stringent obligation upon the President. He was of the opinion that “as soon as possible” mandates immediate action, thereby curtailing the President’s scope to engage in a careful and deliberate review of the bill presented for assent. He expressed concern that such a rigid constraint could give rise to hasty decisions, devoid of any careful examination of the presented bill. In his view, the formulation ran the risk of undermining the quality of the President’s judgment under Article 111. He expressed his opinion as follows:
“[...] The Proviso is to the effect that “the President may, as soon as possible, after the presentation of the Bill, 1114 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports return the Bill,” and so on. I want to make it “as soon as may be”. If we leave it exactly as Dr. Ambedkar would have it, it leaves no margin. ‘As soon as possible’ means immediately. Possibility which means physical possibility is the only test. It may leave no breathing time to the President. The words ‘may be’ give him a reasonable latitude. It would mean, “reasonably practicable”. This is the obvious implication. That is the only reason why I have suggested amendment.”10
219. To avoid the aforesaid possibilities, Shri Naziruddin Ahmad proposed the adoption of “as soon as may be”, which he interpreted to mean “as soon as is reasonably practicable”. In his opinion, this change would allow the President greater flexibility and sufficient time to thoroughly examine the provisions of the bill presented to him. Such freedom would prove particularly valuable when the President contemplates returning the bill to the House(s) for reconsideration, especially in circumstances where amendments might be recommended. The essence of Shri Ahmad’s amendment was to safeguard the President’s ability to render well-reasoned and thoughtful decisions without any rigid time constraints.
220. Shri P.S. Deshmukh expressed his opposition to the amendment proposed by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, deeming the suggested substitution of the words as unnecessary. He, on the other hand, argued that the original phrasing, particularly the expression “not later than six weeks”, ought to remain unaltered, as it established a precise time frame for the President to act accordingly. He further argued that this specific time frame mandated that the President must convey his decision to return the bill for reconsideration as expeditiously as possible, and in no event beyond six-weeks. He opined that preserving the words “not later than six weeks” was quintessential to ensure timely action, thereby preventing undue delays in the legislative process to send the bills back to the House(s) for reconsideration.
221. Shri H.V. Kamath vehemently opposed the amendment put forward by Dr. Ambedkar. Advocating for expeditious and timely action, he argued that, “in human nature, if you will permit me to say so, unless there is a compelling sense of duty or service, there is always a 10 8, Constituent A ssemb. Deb., (May 20, 1949) 192.
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1115The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr. tendency to procrastinate”.11 It was his opinion that such tendencies to procrastinate must be rooted out by infusing a standard of duty or service to ensure timely action on part of the President. He further opined that there exists no assurance that every President of India will consistently adhere to the principle of timely action in legislative processes. Therefore, according to him, it was very necessary that the “Constitution should provide specifically a time limit for a contingency of this nature” 12 . He believed the phrase “as soon as possible” to be vague, purposeless and meaningless, and argued that such vague phrases have no place in a provision of such an important nature.
222. In light of the debate which took place on 20 th May 1949, the proposed amendment to Article 91 was adopted by the Assembly, thereby substituting the expression “not later than six weeks” with “as soon as possible” and the same came to be added to the Constitution.
223. What can be postulated from this discussion of the relevant Constituent Assembly debates is that although our constitutional makers expressed their concerns for the possibility of an undue delay in the legislative process on account of the human nature to procrastinate, yet they nevertheless proceeded to adopt the phrase “as soon as possible” in the original Article 91. This adoption and amendment of draft Article 91 reflects a sense of inherent trust reposed by the Constituent Assembly that the President would execute his functions as enshrined under Article 111 of the Constitution in a timely and efficient manner.
224. The expression also came to be adopted mutatis mutandis in Article 200. The experience of the working of the Constitution, more particularly, Article 200, has shown that the apprehensions expressed by some of the members of the Constituent Assembly have unfortunately proven to be prophecy. As we have discussed in the preceding paragraphs, one of the prominent grievances of the State governments as recorded by the Sarkaria Commission and Punchhi Commission reports was that the exercise of the power under Article 200 by the Governor, not being a time-bound process, leads to significant legislative delay and that certain bills are withheld in the Governor’s secretariat for years.
11 8, Constituent A ssemb. Deb , (May 20, 1949) 194.
12 8, Constituent A ssemb. Deb . (May 20, 1949) 195.
1116 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
225. Not taking any action on the bills for an unreasonable and prolonged period of time virtually vests the Governor with the power of pocket veto and the same cannot be held to be permissible within our constitutional scheme. Dr. Singhvi had submitted during the course of his arguments that there is no scope for the Governor to decide not to decide. Article 200, being the final step in the process of the birth of a legislative enactment, the stage wherein life is breathed into an otherwise lifeless document, cannot be interpreted in a manner which allows the Governor to remain silent and exhibit inaction upon the bills which are submitted to him after having received the approval of the majority of the State legislature.
226. This Court in Durga Pada Ghosh v. State of West Bengal reported in (1972) 2 SCC 656 whilst dealing with a writ in the nature of habeas corpus was called upon to examine the meaning and import of the expression “as soon as may be” appearing in Article 22(5) of the Constitution and its significance in communication of the grounds of detention and disposal of the representation of the detenu. In the said case, the detenu came to be arrested and put in preventive detention in December, 1971. The detenu moved a representation which was received in early January, 1972. However, his representation came to be considered by the State government therein only in February, 1972 and his detention was confirmed and communicated in March, 1972. The detenu challenged the order of preventive detention passed against him on the ground that there was an inordinate delay of almost two months on part of the State government in considering his representation even though the same had been received in January itself. This Court held that the aforesaid expression must be seen in the context of the scheme underlying Article 22, more particularly, the importance that it occupies in the constitutional set-up as regards the personal freedom of an individual and in a manner whereby the provision does not lose both its purpose and meaning. The words “as soon as may be” in such context implies anxious care on the part of the authority concerned to perform its duty in this respect, as early as practicable, without avoidable delay. The course of action which is expected from the concerned authority; being communication of the grounds of arrest and disposal of the representation, was required to be considered with a sense of urgency and must be done with due promptitude or expedition and with reasonable dispatch. It was further held that although there is no definite time-limit which can be [2025] 4 S.C.R. 1117The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr. laid down within which such actions must be done, yet at the same time, whether the appropriate authority had disposed of its obligation as expeditiously as possible ought to be looked into keeping in mind the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case. It further held that such constitutional obligations cannot be ignored or justified on reasons of administrative delay except where it is shown that ample arrangements were made to cope with the situation that led to a delay and a certain degree of priority was accorded. The relevant observations read as under:
“7. Now it is not disputed before us that on the question of delay in considering the representation by the State Government no hard and fast rule can be laid down and it is a matter which falls for decision on the facts and circumstances of each case. It may in this connection be pointed out that in Jayanarayan case the writ petition was referred to a Bench of five Judges to consider as to what would be the question of period within which the State Government could dispose of the representation of the detenu because it was felt that there was an apparent conflict between Shyamal Chakraborty v. Commissioner of Police, Calcutta and Khairul Haque v. State of West Bengal. After considering the various decisions on the point this Court expressly concluded thus:
“No definite time can be laid down within which a representation of a detenu should be dealt with save and except that it is a constitutional right of a detenu to have his representation considered as expeditiously as possible. It will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case whether the appropriate Government has disposed of the case as expeditiously as possible for otherwise in words of Shelat, J., who spoke for this Court in the case of Khairul Haque : ‘it is obvious that the obligation to furnish the earliest opportunity to make a representation loses both its purpose and meaning’.”
8. The scheme underlying Article 22 of the Constitution highlights the importance attached in our constitutional setup to the personal freedom of an individual. Sub-articles (1) 1118 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports and (2) refer to the protection against arrest and detention of a person under the ordinary law. Persons arrested or detained under a law providing for preventive detention are dealt with in sub-articles (4) to (7). Sub-article (5) says that when a person is detained in pursuance of an order under a law providing for preventive detention the grounds on which the order is made have to be communicated to the person concerned as soon as may be and he has to be afforded earliest opportunity to represent against the order. The object of communicating the grounds is to enable the detenu to make his representation against the order. The words “as soon as may be” in the context must imply anxious care on the part of the authority concerned to perform its duty in this respect as early as practicable without avoidable delay. Similarly, when the representation is made it is in the fitness of things that the said representation should be considered with the same sense of urgency with which the grounds are intended to be communicated to the detenu. That is the only way in which the purpose, for which the earliest communication of the grounds to the person concerned is provided, can be achieved. The representation must, therefore, be considered with due promptitude or expedition and without avoidable delay, in other words with reasonable dispatch. As held by this Court in Jayanarayan case, the representation should be considered as expeditiously as possible. As the question of delay in considering the representation falls for determination on the facts and circumstances of each case the binding force of a past precedent for a later case would largely depend on the degree of close similarity of the circumstances dealt with therein. [...]”
(Emphasis supplied)
227. In Keisham (supra) the question that arose before this Court was whether courts can direct the Speaker to decide disqualification petitions pending before it within a reasonable period of time, and this Court speaking eruditely through R.F. Nariman, J., answering the aforesaid question in an affirmative held as under: [2025] 4 S.C.R. 1119The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.
(i) First, that the Speaker, being the quasi-judicial authority for the purposes of the Tenth Schedule, is duty bound to take a decision on disqualification petitions within a reasonable time. Any failure of the Speaker in exercising his jurisdiction or refraining from deciding such petition within a reasonable time would be an error that would attract the scrutiny of the courts in judicial review, notwithstanding the exclusive jurisdiction to the exclusion of the courts that has been conferred upon the Speaker in terms of Paragraph 6 of the Tenth Schedule. The relevant observations read as under: -
24. It is clear from a reading of the judgment in Rajendra Singh Rana and, in particular, the underlined portions [italicised herein] of paras 40 and 41 that the very question referred by the two-Judge Bench in S.A. Sampath Kumar has clearly been answered stating that a failure to exercise jurisdiction vested in a Speaker cannot be covered by the shield contained in Para 6 of the Tenth Schedule, and that when a Speaker refrains from deciding a petition within a reasonable time, there was clearly an error which attracted jurisdiction of the High Court in exercise of the power of judicial review.
(Emphasis supplied)
(ii) Secondly, it observed that although Paragraph 6 of the Tenth Schedule vests the Speaker with an exclusive jurisdiction to decide disqualification petitions and ousts the reach of courts in such matters, yet it does not mean that there is no scope of judicial review by the courts or that the power to pass any direction(s) to the Speaker acting under the Tenth Schedule does not exist. It was observed that the true purport of such exclusive jurisdiction was only to ensure that no obstacle comes in the way of the Speaker in deciding such petitions by way of injunctions from the courts. However, it by no means interdicts the exercise of judicial review in aiding a prompt decision on such disqualification petitions to ensure that the Speaker decides these issues within a reasonable period. The relevant observations read as under:
1120 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports “30. A reading of the aforesaid decisions, therefore, shows that what was meant to be outside the pale of judicial review in para 110 of Kihoto Hollohan are quia timet actions in the sense of injunctions to prevent the Speaker from making a decision on the ground of imminent apprehended danger which will be irreparable in the sense that if the Speaker proceeds to decide that the person be disqualified, he would incur the penalty of forfeiting his membership of the House for a long period. Paras 110 and 111 of Kihoto Hollohan do not, therefore, in any manner, interdict judicial review in aid of the Speaker arriving at a prompt decision as to disqualification under the provisions of the Tenth Schedule. Indeed, the Speaker, in acting as a tribunal under the Tenth Schedule is bound to decide disqualification petitions within a reasonable period. [...]”
(iii) Lastly, it held that although what would be a ‘reasonable period’ for deciding such petitions by the Speaker largely depends on the facts of each case yet, where there are no exceptional circumstances, the Speaker should arrive at a decision within an outer time-limit of three-months so that the avowed constitutional objective of anti-defection under the Tenth Schedule is not defeated. The relevant observations read as under:
“30. [...] What is reasonable will depend on the facts of each case, but absent exceptional circumstances for which there is good reason, a period of three months from the date on which the petition is filed is the outer limit within which disqualification petitions filed before the Speaker must be decided if the constitutional objective of disqualifying persons who have infracted the Tenth Schedule is to be adhered to. This period has been fixed keeping in mind the fact that ordinarily the life of the Lok Sabha and the Legislative Assembly of the States is 5 years and the fact that persons who have incurred such disqualification do not deserve to be MPs/MLAs even for a single day, as found in Rajendra Singh Rana, if they have infracted the provisions of the Tenth Schedule.”
(Emphasis supplied)
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1121The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.
228. The aforesaid view was reiterated in State of Telangana v. Governor of Telangana reported in (2024) 1 SCC 405 wherein this Court whilst dealing with a similar issue pertaining to the pendency of a few bills before the Governor of Telangana, held that the expression “as soon as possible” in Article 200 has significant constitutional content and must be borne in mind by the constitutional authorities. The relevant observations read as under:
“2. The first proviso to Article 200 states that the Governor may “as soon as possible after the presentation” of the Bill for assent, return the Bill if it is not a Money Bill together with a message for reconsideration to the House or Houses of the State Legislature. The expression “as soon as possible” has significant constitutional content and must be borne in mind by constitutional authorities.”
(Emphasis supplied)
229. In Ram Chand (supra) certain parcels of land had been demarcated and declared for compulsory acquisition vide a notification, sometime between the years 1959-1965. However, the awards for compensation came to be passed almost fourteen-years later in the year 1980. These awards came to be challenged before this Court on the ground that since the statute in question provides for payment of compensation in respect of the acquisition made at the market value of the land, as it stood, at the time of publication of the notification for declaration, the same necessarily meant that compensation ought to be paid expeditiously and without delay. This Court held that although the legislature by way of an amendment has now prescribed a time-limit for making an award, yet it does not mean that prior to such amendment there was no time-limit for payment of compensation or that an award could be passed by the authorities at their own pace and leisure. It held that where for exercise of any power no time-limit has been prescribed, such power has to be exercised within a reasonable period of time. It further held that sans any fixed time-limit, such powers cannot be exercised or subjected to delay in a manner that violates or circumvents the object of the statute and the constitutional mandate under Article 31A of timely acquisition and adequate compensation, respectively. The relevant observations read as under:
1122 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports “14. The Parliament has recognized and taken note of the inaction and non-exercise of the statutory power on the part of the authorities, enjoined by the provisions of the Act to complete the acquisition proceedings within a reasonable time and because of that now a time-limit has been fixed for making of the award, failing which the entire proceeding for acquisition shall lapse. But, can it be said that before the introduction of the aforesaid amendment in the Act, the authorities were at liberty to proceed with the acquisition proceedings, irrespective of any schedule or time-frame and to complete the same as and when they desired? It is settled that in a statute where for exercise of power no time-limit is fixed, it has to be exercised within a time which can be held to be reasonable. This aspect of the matter can be examined in the light of second proviso to Article 31-A of the Constitution, which in clear and unambiguous terms prohibits making of any law which does not contain a provision for payment of compensation at a rate, which shall not be less than the market value thereof. The Act is consistent with the second proviso to Article 31-A, because it provides for payment of compensation at the market value of the land acquired. But, whether the constitutional and statutory requirement of the payment of the market value to the persons, whose lands have been compulsorily acquired, is not being circumvented and violated by keeping the land acquisition proceedings pending for more than a decade and half, without making the awards and paying the compensation, which has been pegged to the dates of notifications under sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Act, which in the present cases had been issued 14 to 21 years before the making of the awards. [...]”
(Emphasis supplied)
230. In A.G. Perarivalan (supra) the facts germane for our discussion are that the appellant convict therein had filed a mercy petition under Article 161 to the Governor in December, 2015. The State Cabinet recommended the grant of remission to the Governor in 2018. However, the Governor did not take any decision on the mercy petition for two years despite receiving the recommendation of the State Cabinet. Thereafter, upon a direction of this Court, the [2025] 4 S.C.R. 1123The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr. Governor in 2021, by an order, forwarded the mercy petition of the appellant to the President citing that the Union is the appropriate authority to decide the same. This reference came to be challenged before this Court wherein it was held as under:
(i) First, it was held that the “limits within which the executive Government can function under the Indian Constitution can be ascertained without much difficulty by reference to the form of the executive which our Constitution has set up”. The Court observed that although the Governor is the head of the executive in the State, yet in actuality, it is the Council of Ministers that carries on the executive Government. It held that as per Article 163, the Governor shall exercise his functions provided under different provisions of the Constitution only under the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers except where he under the Constitution has been expressly authorised to exercise such functions in his discretion. This Court, speaking through L. Nageswar Rao, J., described this relation of the Governor and the Council of Ministers as “a hyphen which joins, a buckle which fastens the legislative part of the State to the executive part”. The relevant observations read as under:
“18. The power to grant pardons, reprieves, respites or remissions of punishment or to suspend, remit or commute the sentence of any person convicted of an offence against any law related to which the executive power of the State extends is vested in the Governor under Article 161 of the Constitution.
Article 162 makes it clear that the executive power of the State shall extend to matters with respect to which the legislature of the State has power to make laws. Article 163 of the Constitution provides that there shall be a Council of Ministers with the Chief Minister at the head to aid and advise the Governor in the exercise of his functions, except insofar as he is by or under this Constitution required to exercise his functions or any of them in his discretion.
19. The limits within which the executive Government can function under the Indian Constitution can be ascertained without much difficulty by reference to the form of the executive which our Constitution 1124 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports has set up. Our Constitution, though federal in its structure, is modelled on the British parliamentary system where the executive is deemed to have the primary responsibility for the formulation of governmental policy and its transmission into law though the condition precedent to the exercise of this responsibility is its retaining the confidence of the legislative branch of the State. The Governor occupies the position of the head of the executive in the State but it is virtually the Council of Ministers in each State that carries on the executive Government. In the Indian Constitution, therefore, we have the same system of parliamentary executive as in England and the Council of Ministers consisting, as it does, of the members of the legislature is, like the British Cabinet, “a hyphen which joins, a buckle which fastens the legislative part of the State to the executive part
20. Under the Cabinet system of Government as embodied in our Constitution the Governor is the constitutional or formal head of the State and he exercises all his powers and functions conferred on him by or under the Constitution on the aid and advice of his Council of Ministers, save in spheres where the Governor is required by or under the Constitution to exercise his functions in his discretion. Wherever the Constitution requires the satisfaction of the President or the Governor for the exercise of any power or function by the President or the Governor, as the case may be, as for example in Articles 123, 213, 311(2) proviso (c), 317, 352(1), 356 and 360, the satisfaction required by the Constitution is not the personal satisfaction of the President or of the Governor but is the satisfaction of the President or of the Governor in the constitutional sense under the Cabinet system of Government. It is the satisfaction of the Council of Ministers on whose aid and advice the President or the Governor generally exercises all his powers and functions.
21. Even though the Governor may be authorised to exercise some functions, under different provisions [2025] 4 S.C.R. 1125The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr. of the Constitution, the same are required to be exercised only on the basis of the aid and advice tendered to him under Article 163, unless the Governor has been expressly authorised, by or under a constitutional provision, to discharge the function concerned, in his own discretion.”
(ii) Secondly, it observed that the law is clear and explicit – the advice of the State Cabinet is binding on the Governor when it comes to the exercise of powers under Article 161. In the absence of any other provision under the Constitution or any statute in this regard, the Governor could not have deviated from the binding recommendations of the State Cabinet and referred the mercy petition to the President. It was held that such an action is contrary to the constitutional scheme. The relevant observations read as under:
“24. The law laid down by this Court, as detailed above, is clear and explicit. The advice of the State Cabinet is binding on the Governor in matters relating to commutation/remission of sentences under Article
161. No provision under the Constitution has been pointed out to us nor any satisfactory response tendered as to the source of the Governor’s power to refer a recommendation made by the State Cabinet to the President of India. In the instant case, the Governor ought not to have sent the recommendation made by the State Cabinet to the President of India. Such action is contrary to the constitutional scheme elaborated above. [...] It is relevant to point out that the recommendation made by the State Cabinet was on 9-9-2018, which remained pending before the Governor for almost two-and-a-half years without a decision being taken. It was only when this Court started enquiring about the reason for the decision being delayed, the Governor forwarded the recommendation made by the State Government for remission of the appellant’s sentence to the President of India.”
(Emphasis supplied)
1126 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
(iii) Thirdly, as regards the inaction of the Governor in deciding the mercy petition for more than two-years, this Court held that although there is a certain degree of immunity with respect to the exercise of powers by the Governor under the Constitution, yet it is an equally settled position that the courts have the power to judicially review the functioning of the Governor on certain grounds. It held that a non-exercise of these powers, such as, under Article 161 is one such ground for the exercise of judicial review as the said provision pertains to the liberty of individuals and any inexplicable delay not on account of the prisoners, is inexcusable. The relevant observations read as under:
“24. [...] It is relevant to point out that the recommendation made by the State Cabinet was on 9-9-2018, which remained pending before the Governor for almost two-and-a-half years without a decision being taken. It was only when this Court started enquiring about the reason for the decision being delayed, the Governor forwarded the recommendation made by the State Government for remission of the appellant’s sentence to the President of India.
25. We are fully conscious of the immunity of the Governor under the Constitution with respect to the exercise and performance of the powers and duties of his office or for any act done or purported to be done by him in the exercise and performance of such powers and duties. However, as held by this Court in numerous decisions, this Court has the power of judicial review of orders of the Governor under Article 161, which can be impugned on certain grounds. Non-exercise of the power under Article 161 is not immune from judicial review, as held by this Court in Epuru Sudhakar v. State of A.P. Given petitions under Article 161 pertain to the liberty of individuals, inexplicable delay not on account of the prisoners is inexcusable as it contributes to adverse physical conditions and mental distress faced by a prisoner, especially when the State Cabinet has taken a decision to release the prisoner by granting [2025] 4 S.C.R. 1127The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr. him the benefit of remission/commutation of his sentence.”
(Emphasis supplied)
(iv) Lastly, as regards the contention of the respondents that the decision of the Governor to forward the mercy petition to the President was done in exercise of his discretion owing to the irrational recommendation of the Cabinet in line with the ratio of M.P. Special Police (supra), this Court held that the aforesaid decision would not be applicable, since there is nothing to make out a case of irrational or non-consideration of relevant factors by the State government to warrant the Governor exercising his discretion and deviating from their recommendations as laid down in M.P. Special Police (supra). The relevant observations read as under:
“29. We are afraid that the judgment of this Court in M.P. Special Police Establishment is not applicable to the facts of the present case. No arguments have been put forth to make out a case of non-consideration of relevant factors by the State Cabinet or of the State Cabinet having based its recommendation on extraneous considerations. Moreover, in the said case, the Governor had taken a decision which was subsequently challenged, unlike the present case, where the Governor has merely forwarded the recommendation made by the State Cabinet to the President of India.”
Accordingly, this Court held as under:
“38. In conclusion, we have summarised our findings below:
38.1. The law laid down by a catena of judgments of this Court is well settled that the advice of the State Cabinet is binding on the Governor in the exercise of his powers under Article 161 of the Constitution.
38.2. Non-exercise of the power under Article 161 or inexplicable delay in exercise of such power not attributable to the prisoner is subject to judicial review 1128 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports by this Court, especially when the State Cabinet has taken a decision to release the prisoner and made recommendations to the Governor to this effect.
38.3. The reference of the recommendation of the Tamil Nadu Cabinet by the Governor to the President of India two-and-a-half years after such recommendation had been made is without any constitutional backing and is inimical to the scheme of our Constitution, whereby “the Governor is but a shorthand expression for the State Government” as observed by this Court.
38.4. The judgment of this Court in M.P. Special Police Establishment has no applicability to the facts of this case and neither has any attempt been made to make out a case of apparent bias of the State Cabinet or the State Cabinet having based its decision on irrelevant considerations, which formed the fulcrum of the said judgment. [...]”
(Emphasis supplied)
231. What is discernible from a reading of the decisions discussed above is that despite there being no prescribed time-limit for the Governor to take a decision under Article 200, the provision cannot be read in a manner which allows the Governor to not take action upon bills which are presented to him for assent and thereby delay and essentially roadblock the law-making machinery in the State. As held in A.G. Perarivalan (supra), the inaction of the Governor would be subject to judicial review and in the absence of any cogent reasons for the delay, it would be open to the courts to issue directions for a time-bound decision on a case-to-case basis.
232. In Purushothaman Nambudiri (supra), two questions fell for the consideration of this Court; first, whether a bill which has been pending for assent before the President or the Governor could be said to have lapsed with the dissolving or dissolution of the State legislative assembly and secondly, whether Article 200 mandates that a bill sent back by the President or the Governor for reconsideration must be looked into by the very same House that originally passed it. Before looking into the effect of the dissolution of the House on bills [2025] 4 S.C.R. 1129The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr. pending before the Governor for assent, the Court, while examining the effect of prorogation of the House on the bills pending before the State legislature, observed that Article 196 of the Constitution that deals with the introduction and passing of bills in the State legislature reinforces that the parliamentary form of government established under the Constitution is markedly different from the Parliament in England inasmuch as clause (3) of Article 196 explicitly stipulates that a bill pending in the legislature of a State will not lapse by reason of the prorogation of the House or Houses thereof.
233. Thereafter, the Court observed that Article 196(5) provides for three categories of cases where a bill pending before a Legislative Assembly would lapse upon its dissolution. Those are as follows: a. A bill pending before the Legislative Assembly of a unicameral State legislature;
b. A bill pending before the Legislative Assembly of a bicameral State legislature; or c. A bill which originated in the Legislative Assembly and is yet to reach the Legislative Council.
234. In light of the aforesaid, the Court reached the conclusion that since Article 196 only stipulates as to when a bill pending in the State legislature could be said to have lapsed, be it the Legislative Assembly or the Legislative Council, any bill which has been passed by the State legislature and is pending assent of the Governor or President, would be outside the ambit of the doctrine of lapse of pending business as contained in Article 196(5) of the Constitution. Had the intent of the framers of the Constitution been otherwise, a specific provision to that effect providing for lapse of a bill awaiting assent would have been inserted. The natural corollary of the omission of the aforesaid is that Article 196(5) is exhaustive in nature, and only the circumstances enumerated therein would result in any lapse of a pending bill, as otherwise there was no need for inserting clause (5) in Article 196 after having already provided the situations where a bill would not lapse in clause(s) (3) and (4) of the Constitution respectively.
235. Thereafter, the Court adverted to Articles 200 and 201 of the Constitution respectively in order to determine the effect of dissolution on bills pending the assent of the Governor or the President. Adverting 1130 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports to the procedure prescribed under Articles 200 and 201 respectively, the Court noted that both the Articles do not prescribe a time-limit within which the Governor or President are required to come to a decision on the bill presented to him unlike other provisions in the Constitution where it was felt necessary and expedient to prescribe a time-limit such as Articles 197(1)(b) and (2)(b) respectively. This, in the opinion of the Court, necessarily meant that the omission in prescribing a time-limit within which the Governor or the President should reach a decision under Articles 200 and 201 respectively suggests that the framers of the Constitution knew that a bill pending the assent of the Governor or the President does not stand the risk of getting lapsed on the dissolution of the Assembly. Any other contrary view would lead to a chilling effect whereby a fair number of bills which may have been passed by the Assembly during the last months of its existence, may be exposed to the risk of lapse, consequent to the dissolution of the Assembly, unless assent is either withheld or granted before the date of the dissolution, which could not have been the intention in the absence of a time-limit under Articles 200 and 201 respectively. The relevant observations read as under: “15. It is clear that if a Bill pending the assent of the Governor or the President is held to lapse on the dissolution of the Assembly it is not unlikely that a fair number of Bills which may have been passed by the Assembly, say during the last six months of its existence, may be exposed to the risk of lapse consequent on the dissolution of the Assembly, unless assent is either withheld or granted before the date of the dissolution. If we look at the relevant provisions of Articles 200 and 201 from this point of view it would be significant that neither Article provides for a time limit within which the Governor or the President, should come to a decision on the Bill referred to him for his assent. Where it appeared necessary and expedient to prescribe a time limit the Constitution has made appropriate provisions in that behalf (vide : Article 197(1)(b) and (2)(b)). In fact the proviso to Article 201 requires that the House to which the Bill is remitted with a message from the President shall reconsider it accordingly within a period of six months from the date of the receipt of such message. Therefore, the failure to make any provision as to the time within which the Governor or [2025] 4 S.C.R. 1131The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr. the President should reach a decision may suggest that the Constitution-makers knew that a Bill which was pending the assent of the Governor or the President did not stand the risk of lapse on the dissolution of the Assembly. That is why no time limit was prescribed by Articles 200 and 201. Therefore, in our opinion, the scheme of Articles 200 and 201 supports the conclusion that a Bill pending the assent of the Governor or the President does not lapse as a result of the dissolution of the Assembly, and that incidentally shows that the provisions of Article 196(5) are exhaustive.” (Emphasis supplied)
236. What is clearly discernible from a plain reading of the aforesaid decision is that the observations as regards the absence of a time-limit under Articles 200 and 201 respectively were made in the context of the impact of dissolution of the State legislature on the bills which were pending assent from the Governor. Applying the doctrine of constitutional continuity of the State legislature as an institution and the absence of any specific time-limit prescribed under Article 200, the Court arrived at a finding that such bills would not lapse by virtue of dissolution of the State legislature. It is important to note that the observations in Nambudiri (supra) were not made in the context of the expediency with which the Governor is expected to act in discharge of his duties under Article 200. Further, while this Court said that there was no prescribed time-limit in Article 200, it held that the reason for this was that the framers of the Constitution knew that such a bill would not lapse automatically with the dissolution of the House. It was never observed or even remotely indicated by this Court that the exercise of power by the Governor under Article 200 was not of an urgent or expedient character and thus, could be exercised even beyond reasonable time.
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