Cryogas Equipment Private Limited v. Inox India Limited and Others
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 483; [2025] 4 S.C.R. 765
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Surya Kant, Justice N Kotiswar Singh
- Decided
- 15 Apr 2025
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 5174/2025
- Sections
- 15(2), 2, 201, 62(2), 14, 479, 15(1), 15, 19, 299
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:20 am. Original source ↗
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[2025] 4 S.C.R. 765 : 2025 INSC 483 Cryogas Equipment Private Limited v.
Inox India Limited and Others (Civil Appeal No. 5174 of 2025)
15 April 2025 [Surya Kant* and Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, JJ.] Issue for Consideration i) What are the parameters for determining whether a work or an article falls within the limitation set out in s.15(2) of the Copyright Act, thereby classifying it as a ‘design’ u/s.2(d) of the Designs Act; ii) Whether the High Court erred in setting aside the order of the Commercial Court and thus rejecting the application u/Or.VII, R.11 of the CPC.
Headnotes† Copyright Act, 1957 – s.15(2) – Designs Act, 2000 – s.2(d) – What are the parameters for determining whether a work or an article falls within the limitation set out in s.15(2) of the Copyright Act, thereby classifying it as a ‘design’ u/s.2(d) of the Designs Act:
Held: The original artistic work, which initially enjoys copyright protection, does not lose the same merely because a ‘design’ derived from it has been industrially applied to create a product – While the expression ‘artistic work’ has a broad spectrum, ‘design’ is restricted to specific features such as shape, configuration, pattern, ornamentation, or composition of lines or colours, applied to an article through an industrial process, resulting in a finished product that appeals to the eye – These visually appealing features, when applied industrially, define a ‘design’ under the Designs Act – The inquiry cannot be concluded merely by assuming that what does not qualify as an ‘artistic work’, within the meaning of the Copyright Act, would automatically receive protection under the Designs Act – While protection under the Designs Act is not as enduring as that under the Copyright Act, it is not granted by default and requires specific criteria to be met – In this regard, courts in India and globally consistently apply the test of ‘functional utility’ to * Author 766 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports determine whether a work qualifies for protection under the Designs Act – This Court has formulated a two-pronged approach in order to crack open the conundrum caused by s.15(2) of the Copyright Act so as to ascertain whether a work is qualified to be protected by the Designs Act – This test shall consider: (i) whether the work in question is purely an ‘artistic work’ entitled to protection under the Copyright Act or whether it is a ‘design’ derived from such original artistic work and subjected to an industrial process based upon the language in s.15(2) of the Copyright Act; (ii) if such a work does not qualify for copyright protection, then the test of ‘functional utility’ will have to be applied so as to determine its dominant purpose, and then ascertain whether it would qualify for design protection under the Design Act – The courts, while applying this test, ought to undertake a case specific inquiry guided by statutory provisions, judicial precedents, and comparative jurisprudence. [Paras 58, 59, 60, 61] Copyright Act, 1957 – Designs Act, 2000 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Respondent no.1 filed a trademark suit before the Commercial Court against the appellants – Appellant moved its application u/Or. VII, R.11 of CPC, seeking rejection of the suit on the ground that it was not maintainable u/s.15(2) of the Copyright Act – It was contended that the Proprietary Engineering Drawings, for which respondent no.1 claimed copyright protection, fell within the definition of ‘design’ u/s.2(d) of the Designs Act, 2000 – Commercial Court allowed the said application and rejected respondent no.1’s plaint – High Court remanded the matter to Commercial Court for fresh consideration – The Commercial Court reconsidered the application and allowed the application u/Or.VII, R.11 of the CPC and rejected the plaint – Respondent no.1 again approached the High Court challenging the order of the Commercial Court – The High Court by the impugned judgment set aside the Commercial Court’s orders – Whether the High Court erred in setting aside the order of the Commercial Court and thus rejecting the application u/Or.VII, R.11 of the CPC:
Held: The core dispute revolves around whether the ‘Proprietary Engineering Drawings’ qualify as drawings u/s.2(c) of the Copyright Act or whether they fall within the definition of a ‘design’ u/s.2(d) of the Designs Act, necessitating a detailed examination – This Court is in complete agreement with the reasoning of the High Court that the question as to whether the original artistic work [2025] 4 S.C.R. 767Cryogas Equipment Private Limited v. Inox India Limited and Others would fall within the meaning of ‘design’ under the Designs Act cannot be answered while deciding an application u/Or.VII, R.11 of the CPC – This stage would involve only a prima facie inquiry as to the disclosure of cause of action in the plaint – The question pertaining to ascertaining the true nature of the ‘Proprietary Engineering Drawings’ involves a mixed question of law and fact and could not have been decided by the Commercial Court at a preliminary stage based upon such a casual appraisal of the plaint averments – This Court, therefore concur with the High Court that this case warrants a trial given the triable issues involved – The plaintiff before the Commercial Court, i.e., respondent no.1, was erroneously non-suited due to incorrect assumptions made by the Commercial Court which misread the plaint, misapplied legal principles and overlooked the distinction between ‘artistic work’ and ‘design’ – In light of the discussion on relevant precedents and legal positions, and the clear test outlined, the Commercial Court is directed to consider the issue afresh and conduct trial by adopting an Occam’s Razor approach to ascertain the true nature of the ‘Proprietary Engineering Drawings’. [Paras 66(b), 67, 68, 69] Case Law Cited Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust and Others v. Shrimant Chhatrapati Udayan Raje Pratapsinh Bhonsle, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3844; Bharat Glass Tube Ltd. v. Gopal Glass Works Ltd. [2008] 7 SCR 397 : (2008) 10 SCC 657 – referred to.
Microfibres Inc. v. Girdhar, 2006 SCC OnLine Del 60; Dart Industries Inc. and Another v. Techno Plast and Others, 2007 SCC OnLine Del 892; Mattel, Inc. v. Jayant Agarwalla, 2008 SCC Online Del 1059; Microfibres Inc. v. Girdhar and Co., 2009 SCC OnLine Del 1647; Pranda Jewelry Pvt. Ltd. v. Aarya 24 KT, 2015 SCC OnLine Bom 958; Fun World and Resorts (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Nimil KK, 2020 SCC OnLine Ker 219; Smithkline Beecham Plc. v. Hindustan Lever Ltd., 1999 SCC OnLine Del 965; Tractors and Farm Equipment Ltd. v. Standard Combines Pvt. Ltd, 2012 SCC OnLine Mad 5470; Mohan Lal v. Sona Paint and Hardwares, 2013 SCC OnLine Del 1980; Whirlpool of India Ltd. v. Videocon Industries Ltd., 2014 SCC OnLine Bom 565; Standard Corporation India Ltd. v. Tractors and Farm Equipment Ltd., 2014 SCC OnLine Mad 850; Photoquip India Ltd. v. Delhi Photo Store, 2014 SCC OnLine Bom 1088; TTK Prestige Ltd. v. KCM Appliances Pvt. Ltd., 2023 SCC OnLine Del 2129 – referred to.
768 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Amp v. Utilux [1972] RPC 103; Interlego A.G v. Tyco Industries Inc and Others [1988] UKPC 3; Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 74 S. Ct. 460, 98 L. Ed. 630 (1954); Esquire Inc v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1980); Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411 (2d Cir.1985); Brandir International, Inc. v. Cascade Pacific Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir.1987); Pivot Point Int’l, Inc. v. Charlene Prods., Inc., 372 F.3d 913 (7th Cir. 2004); Galiano v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 416 F.3d 411, 419 (5th Cir. 2005); Star Athletica, L. L. C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 197 L. Ed. 2d 354 (2017) – referred to.
Books and Periodicals Cited Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, 1883 (Paris Convention); Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 1886 (Berne Convention); Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 1995 (TRIPS). List of Acts Copyright Act, 1957; Designs Act, 2000; Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958; English Registered Designs Act, 1949; Penal Code, 1860.
List of Keywords Section 15(2) of Copyright Act, 1957; Section 2(d) of Design Act, 2000; Design; Rejection of plaint; Order VII, Rule 11; Copyright protection; Artistic work; Shape; Configuration; Pattern; Ornamentation; Composition of lines or colours; Test of ‘functional utility’; Industrial process; Case specific inquiry guided by statutory provisions, judicial precedents, and comparative jurisprudence; Proprietary Engineering Drawings; Detailed examination; Mixed question of law and fact; Triable issues.
Case Arising From CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 5174 of 2025 From the Judgment and Order dated 22.10.2024 of the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in AFO No. 119 of 2024 With Civil Appeal No. 5175 of 2025 [2025] 4 S.C.R. 769Cryogas Equipment Private Limited v. Inox India Limited and Others Appearances for Parties Advs. for the Appellant:
Shyam Divan, Sr. Adv., Rahul Chitnis, Sudipto Sircar, Hersh Desai, Ms. Shwetal Shepal, Aditya Khanna, Samrat Mehta, Chander Shekhar Ashri.
Advs. for the Respondents:
Chander M Lall, J Sai Deepak, Sr. Advs., Smriti Yadav, Nirupam Lodha, Dhiren Karania, Kshitij Parashar, Gautam Wadhwa, Ms. Annanya Mehan, R Abhishek, For M/S. Khaitan & Co..
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment Surya Kant, J.
Leave granted.
2. The captioned appeals arise from a common judgement dated 22.10.2024 delivered by the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad (High Court) in a dispute between the parties primarily concerning an alleged copyright infringement, whereby the 4th Additional District Judge at Vadodara’s (Commercial Court) order dated 03.05.2024 allowing an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) was set aside, and the Suit filed by Respondent No. 2 was restored to its original number (Impugned Judgement).
3. The parties to the appeal are, inter alia embroiled in a dispute concerning the purported infringement of intellectual property (IP) rights in relation to the designing and manufacturing of the internal parts of Cryogenic Storage Tanks and Distribution Systems which are mounted on Trailers and Semi-Trailers, to effectively transport industrial gases, liquified natural gas (LNG) and such like substances.
A. FActs
4. That being so, given the shared sequence of events underlying these two appeals, this presents an appropriate juncture for a detailed examination of the factual matrix.
770 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
4.1. The dispute between the parties arose when Respondent No. 1 in these appeals, Inox India Limited (Inox), filed Trademark Suit No. 3/2019 (Suit) before the Commercial Court against the Appellants, i.e. Cryogas Equipment Private Limited (Cryogas) and LNG Express India Private Limited (LNG Express), on 24.09.2018. Inox primarily alleged that Cryogas, LNG Express, and others had infringed two distinct types of copyright: (i) the drawings of LNG Semi-trailers developed by Inox (Proprietary Engineering Drawings); and (ii) the details, processes, descriptions and narrations written by Inox employees in creating the Proprietary Engineering Drawings (Literary Works). These IPs were supposedly developed by Inox to meet the specific requirements for storing and transporting sophisticated LNG Semi-trailers suitable for Indian roads.
4.2. In this Suit, Inox sought relief in terms of: (i) a declaration that Cryogas, LNG Express and others have infringed Inox’s Proprietary Engineering Drawings, IP and Literary Works; (ii) a permanent injunction restraining Cryogas, LNG Express and the other associated parties from using or reproducing any drawings or works similar to that of Inox’s Proprietary Engineering Drawings or Literary Works; (iii) a permanent injunction against the use of any IP or know-how associated with manufacturing the impugned products; (iv) an order directing Cryogas, LNG Express and others to surrender all infringing materials for destruction, including drawings, trailers, labels and other items using the Proprietary Engineering Drawings; and (v) an award of damages amounting to Rs. 2 Crores for copyright infringement.
4.3. In addition, Inox filed an application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the CPC, seeking an ad interim injunction to restrain Cryogas, LNG Express, and others from infringing its IP rights and confidential information during the pendency of the Suit.
4.4. In response thereto, LNG Express moved its application under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC, seeking rejection of the Suit on the ground that it was not maintainable under Section 15(2) of the Copyright Act, 1957 (Copyright Act). It primarily contended that the Proprietary Engineering Drawings, for which Inox claimed copyright protection, fell within the definition of a ‘design’ [2025] 4 S.C.R. 771Cryogas Equipment Private Limited v. Inox India Limited and Others under Section 2(d) of the Designs Act, 2000 (Designs Act). It argued that Inox had lost copyrights for the said drawings by failing to register them under the Designs Act. Furthermore, LNG Express asserted that copyright does not subsist in any design that is registered or capable of being registered under the Designs Act once it has been reproduced more than fifty times by an industrial process, either by the copyright owner or any authorised licensee. Specifically, it contested Inox’s claim of generating revenue amounting to Rupees 122 crores, arguing that such proceeds could only have been realised through the sale of Cryogenic Semi-trailers manufactured by an industrial process and using the Proprietary Engineering Drawings in excess of the stipulated threshold of fifty reproductions. In this context, LNG Express assailed that protection could not be sought under the Copyright Act by virtue of Section 15(2), and the Suit thus falls at the threshold.
4.5. The Commercial Court, on 01.04.2022, allowed the application filed by LNG Express under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC, consequently rejecting Inox’s plaint and its application for interim injunction. Inox filed two appeals before the High Court challenging the orders of the Commercial Court. On 13.03.2024, the High Court, through a common order set aside the Commercial Court’s order, holding that it erred in allowing the application under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC, which had led to the rejection of both the plaint and the prayer for interim injunction. The High Court remanded the matter to the Commercial Court for fresh consideration, restoring the Suit to its original number and directing it to adjudicate the pending applications concurrently while issuing separate orders for each.
4.6. Subsequently, on 03.05.2024, in compliance with the High Court’s directions, the Commercial Court reconsidered the aforementioned applications. By way of separate orders, it allowed LNG Express’ application under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC, resulting in the rejection of the plaint, and consequently dismissed Inox’s application for ad interim injunction.
4.7. Inox once again approached the High Court, challenging the Commercial Court’s orders dated 03.05.2024 through separate appeals. The High Court, in turn, vide the Impugned Judgment, 772 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports set aside the Commercial Court’s orders based on the following rationale and has issued: (i) The Commercial Court erred in law by presuming that the Proprietary Engineering Drawings qualified as a ‘design’ under Section 2(d) of the Designs Act and stood utilised to manufacture a product more than fifty times through an industrial process, thereby excluding it from protection under the Copyright Act; (ii) LNG Express’ application under Order VII, Rule 11 of the CPC was rejected, and the Suit was restored to its original number; (iii) Inox’s interim injunction application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the CPC was reinstated; and (iv) The restored interim injunction application was directed to be decided by the Commercial Court on its merits independently and as expeditiously as possible, preferably within eight weeks.
4.8. Hence, the instant appeals. We may clarify at this stage that after reserving our judgment on 29.01.2025 and pending the present proceedings, the Commercial Court was permitted to proceed with hearing the parties on the interim application in accordance with the High Court’s directions. However, the passing of the final order was directed to remain in abeyance. B. contentions on BehAlF oF the A ppellAnts
5. Mr. Shyam Divan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for Cryogas and LNG Express, vehemently argued that the High Court erred in setting aside the Commercial Court’s order dated 03.05.2024, which had allowed their application under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC. In support of his contentions, he advanced the following submissions:
(a) Inox filed the Suit seeking protection of the Proprietary Engineering Drawings under the Copyright Act, alleging that Cryogas and LNG Express had infringed its IP rights in both the artistic elements of the drawings and the literary components detailing the processes and descriptions therein. Inox further sought to restrain Cryogas and LNG Express from converting the two-dimensional industrial drawings of cryogenic Semitrailers into three-dimensional representations. However, these pleas ought to be outrightly rejected as they have been raised as an afterthought to circumvent the applicability of Section [2025] 4 S.C.R. 773Cryogas Equipment Private Limited v. Inox India Limited and Others 15(2) of the Copyright Act. Admittedly, Semi-trailers can only be manufactured through an industrial and mechanical process.
(b) LNG and Cryogenic Semi-trailers worldwide are designed in accordance with international standard-setting bodies such as the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) and the Pressure Equipment Directive (PED). Given that these trailers are used for transporting cryogenic liquids, their design must comply with country-specific regulations, while international standards prescribe detailed guidelines on design parameters, material selection, and internal components. Accordingly, all relevant stakeholders, including the parties herein, adhere to PED stipulations and the guidelines issued by the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways of India.
(c) The Suit is barred under Section 15(2) of the Copyright Act, as the Proprietary Engineering Drawings, for which Inox claims copyright infringement, are capable of being registered under the Designs Act. The copyright protection for such drawings would cease to subsist in view of Section 15(2) of the Copyright Act once Semi-trailers are reproduced or manufactured more than fifty times through an industrial process.
(d) The right to protect IP in terms of the Proprietary Engineering Drawings would, however, be available to Inox under the Designs Act, provided the said drawings were registered under it. Furthermore, ‘Semi-trailers’ or ‘Road Vehicle Trailers’ manufactured by Inox fall within the classification under Schedule III of the Designs Act, specifically Class 12-10. Consequently, to claim an IP infringement, Inox should have registered the Proprietary Engineering Drawings under the Designs Act.
(e) The objective of the Copyright Act is to protect artistic works such as paintings, sculptures, and other forms of creative expression for extended periods. In contrast, the Designs Act is intended to safeguard industrial designs for a limited duration to facilitate commercial exploitation. The Legislature’s intent was thus to provide protection for industrial designs, such as the Proprietary Engineering Drawings, under the Designs Act rather than the Copyright Act, so as to ensure that such works are regulated within the appropriate legal framework.
774 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
(f) Inox has failed to disclose in its plaint before the Commercial Court the number of Semi-trailers it has produced through an industrial process. Instead, it has engaged in strategic drafting by selectively revealing that it has generated revenue of Rupees 122 crores, seemingly to circumvent the legal effect of Section 15(2) of the Copyright Act. However, such revenue can be reasonably inferred to result from the production of more than fifty Semi-trailers, thereby triggering the bar under Section 15(2) of the Copyright Act. Inox cannot rely on evasive drafting to create a misleading impression of a valid cause of action. These contentions were buttressed by relying on the ratio laid down in decisions such as Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust and others v. Shrimant Chhatrapati Udayan Raje Pratapsinh Bhonsle.1
(g) Inox has erroneously asserted that the Proprietary Engineering Drawings are not capable of registration as ‘designs’ under Section 2(d) of the Designs Act on the ground that the products manufactured using these drawings lack visual appeal, as they pertain to the inner vessel of the Semi-trailer, which remains concealed. This claim ought to be rejected, as the drawings fall within the category of designs capable of registration under the Designs Act but have not been registered. Moreover, it is incorrect to suggest that the Semi-trailers lack visual appeal, given that the drawings also encompass the external shape and components of a Semi-trailer. In any case, the question of visual appeal is inherently subjective and cannot be a determinative factor for considering an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC.
(h) The scope of inquiry before the Commercial Court in the Suit is limited to determining whether the Proprietary Engineering Drawings are capable of registration under the Designs Act and, if they have not been so registered, whether they lose the protection of the Copyright Act once applied to articles through an industrial process. The question of such drawings being subject to the limitations imposed by Section 15(2) of the Copyright Act is a pure question of law, which should be decided based on a prima facie appraisal of the averments in the plaint, without the necessity of adducing further evidence. 1 (2024) SCC OnLine SC 3844.
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 775Cryogas Equipment Private Limited v. Inox India Limited and Others
(i) Lastly, Inox’s assertion that the plaint also pertains to the alleged theft of confidential information and trade secrets by Respondent Nos. 3 and 4, ought to be rejected at the threshold. The plaint contains no specific prayers regarding such claims, and any alleged breach of this nature arising from a common law right would be actionable before a civil court rather than a Commercial Court, which inter alia may only adjudicate matters related to IP rights. Moreover, a perusal of the plaint reveals that the Suit has been filed for copyright infringement under Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act, which falls within the jurisdiction of the Commercial Court.
c. contentions on BehAlF oF R espondent no. 1
6. Mr. Chander M. Lall and Mr. J. Sai Deepak, Learned Senior Counsels representing Inox, refuted the claims put forth by Cryogas and LNG Express and instead adduced the following submissions:
(a) The Suit pertains to two distinct categories of copyright: the Proprietary Engineering Drawings and the Literary Work. Consequently, the reliefs sought in the Suit are also distinct in nature. As a result, each IP claim should be assessed independently, with due consideration given to its unique characteristics and legal implications.
(b) Industrial drawings, such as the Proprietary Engineering Drawings, fall within the definition of ‘artistic works’ under Section 2(c) of the Copyright Act. An artistic work can be denied copyright protection by invoking Section 15(2) of the Copyright Act only if such work is either registered or capable of being registered under the Designs Act. Moreover, the Proprietary Engineering Drawings pertain to the internal components of a cryogenic container and are excluded by the exception under Section 2 of the Designs Act, which states that a registrable design ‘does not include any mode or principle of construction or anything which is in substance a mere mechanical device’. Furthermore, these drawings lack visual appeal, a necessary criterion for a ‘design’ under the Designs Act. Accordingly, Section 15(2) of the Copyright Act is inapplicable, and the Proprietary Engineering Drawings cannot be deemed capable of registration under the Designs Act.
776 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
(c) The Literary Work in question is not subject to the bar under Section 15(2) of the Copyright Act. The Commercial Court erred in concluding that the Literary Work, including details, processes, and descriptions, is merely a reference to the Proprietary Engineering Drawings and the information contained therein. Such an interpretation incorrectly assumes that all the rights asserted in the plaint are intrinsically linked to the Proprietary Engineering Drawings. This approach is inconsistent with fundamental principles of copyright law, which recognise that each category of copyright protection is distinct and must be assessed independently.
(d) The infringement arising from the theft of confidential information constitutes a distinct legal issue and is not subject to the limitations imposed by Section 15(2) of the Copyright Act. Courts have consistently recognised that confidential information is a separate legal concept possessing independent value, warranting protection under common law principles. Accordingly, the misappropriation of confidential information should be assessed on its own merits.
(e) The issues concerning the three IPs in question are distinct and separate, a fact that the Commercial Court failed to appreciate while allowing LNG Express’ application under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC. The Commercial Court proceeded under the erroneous assumption that an ‘original artistic work’ automatically loses protection under the Copyright Act once it is applied to an article through an industrial process. The Commercial Court further failed to consider the true meaning and scope of ‘design’ under the Designs Act. That apart, the claims concerning the infringement of the Literary Work and the theft of confidential information fall outside the purview of Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC and could not have been summarily rejected.
(f) The determination of whether the original artistic work qualifies as a ‘design capable of being registered’ under the Designs Act cannot be made while deciding an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC. At this stage, the jurisdiction of the court is limited to conducting a prima facie inquiry to ascertain whether or not the plaint discloses a cause of action. The issue at hand involves a mixed question of law and fact and thus requires [2025] 4 S.C.R. 777Cryogas Equipment Private Limited v. Inox India Limited and Others a full trial wherein both parties can present evidence before a conclusive finding can be drawn.
(g) Inox, in its Suit, has also sought an injunction restraining Cryogas, LNG Express, and others from converting the two-dimensional Proprietary Engineering Drawings into three-dimensional objects. The Local Commissioner’s Report dated 26.09.2018 provides substantive evidence in this regard, revealing that several files containing Inox’s proprietary materials—including inspection reports, general test plans, shop weld plans, quality control programs, and drawing design calculations—were found at the premises of LNG Express and Cryogas. These documents pertain to the quality control processes of Inox’s proprietary materials and products, further substantiating the claim of unauthorised use. d. issues
7. Having perused the factual matrix and on consideration of the rival contentions advanced by the parties, it is patently clear that the singular issue which invites our analysis, revolves around the maintainability of the application under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC. However, given the abstruse nature of the underlying dispute, stemming from a fundamental dissonance in the parties’ interpretations of the applicability of the Designs Act, we deem it appropriate to adjudicate and analyse the following issues: i. What are the parameters for determining whether a work or an article falls within the limitation set out in Section 15(2) of the Copyright Act, thereby classifying it as a ‘design’ under Section 2(d) of the Designs Act?
ii. Whether the High Court erred in setting aside the order of the Commercial Court and thus rejecting the application under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC?
e. A nAlysis E.1 Issue No. 1: The parameters for determining whether a work or an article falls within the limitation set out in Section 15(2) of the Copyright Act
8. We may clarify at the very outset that the discussion herein would be limited to determining the distinction between a ‘design’ under 778 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports the Designs Act and an ‘artistic work’ that might warrant copyright protection. To be precise, we are not, either expressly or implicitly, addressing the merits of the case. This examination has been prompted by the intrinsic disagreement posited by the parties in terms of the applicability of the Designs Act. Such a divergence in interpretation brings to light an interesting juxtaposition and perhaps a grey area which has not been seemingly addressed by this Court in the past. In this context, we find it appropriate to bridge this gap by conducting a conclusive analysis through a two-pronged approach:
(i) examining the current IP statutory framework in India; and (ii) evaluating the criteria considered and tests adopted across various jurisdictions. Finally, based on these two aspects, we seek to set out
(iii) the definitive factors to be considered to ascertain whether an article ought to be conferred protection under the Copyright Act or the Designs Act within the confines of Section 15(2) of the Copyright Act. E.1.1. The current IP statutory framework
9. IP rights are fundamentally aimed at excluding or preventing others from possessing, using, or alienating the protected IP, thereby enabling the owner to benefit from the product of their intellect. In India, IP rights encompass a broad spectrum of intangible properties, including Patents, Trademarks, Copyrights, Designs, and Geographical Indications, each governed and protected by distinct Statutes. These legislations enable creators or inventors to earn recognition and receive financial benefits from their innovations in a manner which balances them with public interest. However, for the purposes of the present analysis, our examination will be confined to the intersection between the Copyright Act and the Designs Act.
10. In India, copyright is governed by the Copyright Act, 1957, which was enacted to safeguard the rights of copyright owners, including for commercial exploitation and to encourage the creation of innovative works. Copyright is a statutory and negative right, preventing unauthorised copying of copyrighted material. Under Section 14 of the Act, copyright owners are granted a bundle of exclusive rights, including the right to reproduce, issue copies, perform in public, and create translations and adaptations.
11. The term ‘copyright’ has been defined under Section 14 of the Copyright Act to mean “the exclusive right subject to the provisions of the Act, to do or authorise the doing of any of the following acts [2025] 4 S.C.R. 779Cryogas Equipment Private Limited v. Inox India Limited and Others in respect of a work or any substantial part thereof, namely…” It espouses the protection of works in terms of: (i) literary, dramatic or musical work, not being a computer programme; (ii) a computer programme; (iii) an artistic work; (iv) a cinematograph film; and
(v) a sound recording. To put it in more clear terms, the language employed in the provision reads as follows:
“14. Meaning of Copyright—For the purposes of this Act, “copyright” means the exclusive right subject to the provisions of this Act, to do or authorise the doing of any of the following acts in respect of a work or any substantial part thereof, namely:—
(a) in the case of a literary, dramatic or musical work, not being a computer programme,—
(i) to reproduce the work in any material form including the storing of it in any medium by electronic means;
(ii) to issue copies of the work to the public not being copies already in circulation;
(iii) to perform the work in public, or communicate it to the public;
(iv) to make any cinematograph film or sound recording in respect of the work;
(v) to make any translation of the work;
(vi) to make any adaptation of the work;
(vii) to do, in relation to a translation or an adaptation of the work, any of the acts specified in relation to the work in sub-clauses (i) to (vi);
(b) in the case of a computer programme,—
(i) to do any of the acts specified in Clause (a);
(ii) to sell or give on commercial rental or offer for sale or for commercial rental any copy of the computer programme: Provided that such commercial rental does not apply in respect of computer programmes where the programme itself is not the essential object of the rental.
(c) in the case of an artistic work,—
(i) to reproduce the work in any material form including— (A) the storing of it in any medium by electronic or other means; or 780 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports (B) depiction in three-dimensions of a two-dimensional work; or (C) depiction in two-dimensions of a three-dimensional work;
(ii) to communicate the work to the public;
(iii) to issue copies of the work to the public not being copies already in circulation;
(iv) to include the work in any cinematograph film;
(v) to make any adaptation of the work;
(vi) to do in relation to adaptation of the work any of the acts specified in relation to the work in sub-clauses (i) to (iv);
(d) in the case of a cinematograph film,—
(i) to make a copy of the film, including— (A) a photograph of any image forming part thereof; or (B) storing of it in any medium by electronic or other means;
(ii) to sell or give on commercial rental or offer for sale or for such rental, any copy of the film;
(iii) to communicate the film to the public;
(e) in the case of a sound recording,—
(i) to make any other sound recording embodying it including storing of it in any medium by electronic or other means;
(ii) to sell or give on commercial rental or offer for sale or for such rental, any copy of the sound recording;
(iii) to communicate the sound recording to the public.”
12. The enactment of the Designs Act in 2000, established a distinct protection regime for designs in India. The Designs Act seeks to minimise overlap with the Copyright Act by defining the term ‘design’ under Section 2(d) as “only the features of shape, configuration, pattern, ornament or composition of lines or colours applied to any article whether in two dimensional or three dimensional or in both forms, by any industrial process or means, whether manual, mechanical or chemical, separate or combined, which in the finished article appeal to and are judged solely by the eye but does not include any mode or principle of construction or anything which is in substance a mere mechanical device, and does not include any trade mark as defined in clause (v) of sub-section (1) of section 2 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 (43 of 1958) or property mark as defined in section 479 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) or any artistic work [2025] 4 S.C.R. 781Cryogas Equipment Private Limited v. Inox India Limited and Others as defined in clause (c) of section 2 of the Copyright Act, 1957 (14 of 1957).” This aspect of IP thus focuses on the utility of work, as well as its visual appeal and aesthetic, making it an important factor in determining consumer preference or commercial viability.
13. It must be borne in mind that Section 2(d) of the Design Act, reproduced above, expressly bars the inclusion of ‘artistic works’ encapsulated under Section 2(c) of the Copyright Act. To further illuminate, the expression ‘artistic work’ has been defined in the Copyright Act which reads as follows:
“2. Interpretation.— In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires— ….
(c) “artistic work” means,—
(i) a painting, a sculpture, a drawing (including a diagram, map, chart or plan), an engraving or a photograph, whether or not any such work possesses artistic quality;
(ii) a work of architecture; and
(iii) any other work of artistic craftsmanship;”
14. Despite the clear language employed in these provisions, a small vantage point of intersection exists wherein a ‘design’ shares commonalities with ‘artistic works’ such as paintings or drawings, that may be accorded copyright protection. This similitude is aptly illustrated in the Venn Diagram below. We may, however, hasten to caveat that this is only an illustrative image and is not exhaustive in nature. 782 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
15. This penumbra seems to have been synopsized and, to some extent, amplified in Section 15(2) of the Copyright Act. We say so, for the reason that the provision itself enumerates that “copyright in any design, which is capable of being registered under the Designs Act, 2000 but which has not been so registered, shall cease as soon as any article to which the design has been applied has been reproduced more than fifty times by an industrial process by the owner of the copyright or, with his licence, by any other person.”
16. We must also bear in mind that Section 15(1) of the Copyright Act explicitly states that a ‘copyright’ shall not subsist in a ‘design’ protected under the Designs Act. This provision thus establishes that once a ‘design’ is registered, any copyright protection ceases to exist. Whereas, as already recapitulated, Section 15(2) of the Copyright Act clarifies that any design which is capable of being registered under the Designs Act, if not registered, then the copyright protection in such design would terminate once that design is applied to any article and reproduced in excess of 50 times by an industrial process, either by the owner or a licensee.
17. The lines perhaps seem blurred owing to the inherent overlap between copyrightable artistic works and designs. To put it more simply, there may be some designs that could be entitled to copyright protection, and conversely, there can be certain artistic works which lose their copyright protection when industrially applied. This perplexity is further augmented on account of there being an express interdiction on designs from seeking any long-term copyright protection. E.1.2. Parameters adopted across various jurisdictions
18. To resolve this legal conundrum, it is essential to establish clear parameters distinguishing works eligible for protection under the Designs Act versus the Copyright Act. In this vein, we turn to established jurisprudence and comparative legal frameworks, and have thus examined: (i) the approach adopted by Courts in India;
(ii) the factors employed by courts in the United States of America (US); and (iii) broader international principles that provide guidance on the interplay between copyright and design protection.
19. By synthesising these perspectives, we aim to formulate a definitive test that will provide clarity on the scope of protection afforded under the respective Statutes.
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 783Cryogas Equipment Private Limited v. Inox India Limited and Others E.1.2.1 Approach adopted by Courts in India
20. The test applied by various High Courts in India to resolve the intersection between the Copyright Act and the Designs Act can be categorised into two distinct approaches:
i. Interpretation of Section 15(2) of the Copyright Act: This involves pulling back the curtains on the overlaps or intersections between the two Statutes and ascertaining whether an article would qualify protection under the Copyright Act for being an ‘original artistic work’ or whether it would earn protection under the Designs Act.
ii. Examination of the ‘Functional Utility’ of the Article: This requires an assessment as to whether the article serves a functional purpose beyond mere artistic expression. If the primary characteristic of the work is its functional utility rather than aesthetic appeal, it would not qualify to seek protection under the Designs Act.
E.1.2.1.1 Interpreting Section 15(2) of the Copyright Act
21. It has already been explained in paragraphs 16 and 17 of this judgement, that a ‘design’ defined under Section 2(d) of the Designs Act cannot be afforded protection by the Copyright Act under the guise of it being an ‘artistic work’. While there obviously seems to be a narrow intersection between ‘artistic works’ and ‘designs’, particularly in the case of paintings, sculptures or drawings, Section 15(2) attempts to obfuscate these overlaps and create a marked distinction so as to prevent any unintended disconcertment. The crux of the issue thus lies in correctly classifying an article as either a ‘design’ under the Designs Act or an ‘artistic work’ under the Copyright Act.
22. This interface between the two legislations was addressed extensively by the Delhi High Court in Microfibres Inc v. Girdhar,2 where the dispute concerned the copyright infringement in the manufacture and sale of certain patterns of upholstery fabric by the defendant therein. The plaintiff, an American company, claimed exclusive rights to the drawings applied on the fabric, stating that they had sought copyright registration for the same and sought damages from the defendant. 2 2006 SCC OnLine Del 60.
784 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
23. The Delhi High Court denied the plaintiff any protection under the Copyright Act. It based its decision on the following definitive factors:
(i) the plaintiff’s work is not a piece of art in itself in the form of a painting, despite there being labour and innovativeness applied to put a particular ‘configuration’ in place. This configuration comprises of motifs and designs, which by themselves are not original; (ii) The object of such an arrangement was to put them to industrial use and does not have any utility or independent existence of itself; (iii) Fabric designs on textile goods have been classified as proper subject matter of design protection by inclusion under Class 5 of the Design Rules, 2001; (iv) Legislative intent is also to be kept in mind, which is to protect the creator of the work for a certain period for commercial exploitation. Protection under the Copyright Act is for the lifetime of the author and an additional period of sixty years, which is not so in the case of the Designs Act, where the period is much lesser; (v) ‘Artistic work’ defined under Section 2(c) of the Copyright Act has been excluded from the definition of ‘design’ under Section 2(d) of the Designs Act to exclude for instance, works such as the painting of M.F. Hussain; (vi) It is apparent that it is the Designs Act which would give protection to the plaintiff in this case and not the Copyright Act, as the work in question cannot be labelled as an ‘artistic work’.
24. The Delhi High Court followed and affirmed the ratio in Microfibres I (supra) in subsequent judgements, such as in Dart Industries Inc and another v. Techno Plast and others,3 where the controversy concerned the plaintiffs, who were manufactures of ‘Tupperware’ products, alleging that the defendants had infringed their copyright and design rights by producing strikingly similar products. The High Court held that no copyright protection would subsist once a design had been registered under the Design Act. That was a case concerning product drawings meant to create the ultimate product design, for which the copyright claim in the said drawings was rejected.
25. The High Court in this context further enunciated as follows: “44. No doubt, the plaintiff has tried to argue that for creating the same designs, the defendant would have applied the technique of ‘reverse engineering’ inasmuch as striking resemblance to the Tupperware Products could 3 2007 SCC OnLine Del 892.
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