Ramayana Ispat Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors.
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 424; [2025] 4 S.C.R. 436
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Vikram Nath, Justice Prasanna Bhalachandra Varale
- Decided
- 31 Mar 2025
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 7964/2019
- Sections
- 42, 79(1), 42(2), 42(3), 2(47), 181, 2(36), 86(1), 86, 9, 9(1), 2(15)
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[2025] 4 S.C.R. 436 : 2025 INSC 424 Ramayana Ispat Pvt. Ltd. and Anr.
v.
State of Rajasthan & Ors.
(Civil Appeal No. 7964 of 2019)
01 April 2025 [Vikram Nath* and Prasanna B. Varale, JJ.] Issue for Consideration i) Whether the Rajasthan Electricity Regulatory Commission (RERC) has the jurisdiction to regulate inter-state open access under the Electricity Act, 2003; ii) Whether the imposition of penalties for variations in drawal from contracted demand amounts to an unreasonable restriction on the right to open access under Section 42 of the Act of 2003; iii) Whether Regulation 26(7) of Rajasthan Electricity Regulatory Commission (Terms and Conditions for Open Access) Regulations, 2016 is ultra vires for requiring an advance notice of 24 hours a day prior, thereby preventing urgent procurement and creating an artificial barrier to open access as protected by the Act of 2003; iv) Whether Regulation 21 is arbitrary and discriminatory, thereby discouraging captive power generation by creating unreasonable distinction between captive power plants (CPPs) and state distribution companies; v) Whether the appellants’ right to open access is foreclosed by the Regulations of 2016.
Headnotes† Electricity Act, 2003 – Rajasthan Electricity Regulatory Commission (Terms and Conditions for Open Access)
Regulations, 2016 – Whether the Rajasthan Electricity Regulatory Commission (RERC) has the jurisdiction to regulate inter-state open access under the Electricity Act, 2003: Held: 1. s.79(1)(c) of the Act of 2003, defines the regulatory authority of the CERC over inter-state transmission of electricity – However, this provision does not strip State Commissions, including RERC, of their jurisdiction over intra-state aspects of open access – s.42(2) of the Act of 2003 expressly empowers State Commissions to regulate open access within their respective states, * Author [2025] 4 S.C.R. 437Ramayana Ispat Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. ensuring fair and non-discriminatory access to transmission and distribution networks within the state – Further, s.42(3) of the Act of 2003 provides that whenever a consumer, with premises within the area of supply of a distribution licensee, requires supply of electricity from a generating company other than such distribution licensee, such transmission and supply shall be in accordance with the regulations made by the State Commission. [Para 45]
2. The key determinant is not the source of power but its delivery, end-user, and consumption within Rajasthan's intra-state grid – The Act of 2003 provides a framework for demarcating responsibilities between CERC and State Commissions, ensuring that intra-state aspects of electricity regulation remain within the purview of State Commissions – The claim that only CERC has the authority to regulate inter-state open access cannot be accepted in light of the legislative intent behind the Act of 2003 – Therefore, RERC retains jurisdiction over intra-state transactions even if the power originates from another state. [Para 47]
3. Further, s.2(47) of the Act of 2003 defines open access as nondiscriminatory access to transmission and distribution systems, encompassing both interstate and intra-state transactions – The respondents argue that the statute does not differentiate between them for regulatory purposes, meaning that State Commissions naturally retain authority over open access within their jurisdictions – This interpretation aligns with s.42, which explicitly grants State Commissions the power to regulate open access for consumers in their states. [Para 48]
4. s.181 of the Act of 2003 empowers State Commissions to frame regulations necessary for implementing the provisions of the Act of 2003 – By granting State Commissions the authority to introduce and regulate open access, the legislature has clearly vested regulatory oversight with RERC in Rajasthan – The omission of any reference to CERC’s jurisdiction over open access consumers in s.42 of the Act is indicative of the legislature’s intent to keep such matters under State Commissions’ oversight, ensuring that electricity consumers and distribution networks within a state remain subject to state-level regulation. [Para 49]
5. Thus, the respondents’ argument is well-founded in statutory provisions, legislative intent, and the structural framework of the Act of 2003 – RERC’s authority to regulate intra-state aspects of open access transactions, even when electricity is sourced from 438 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports another state, aligns with the Act’s objectives and ensures effective regulatory oversight. [Para 50] Electricity Act, 2003 – Rajasthan Electricity Regulatory Commission (Terms and Conditions for Open Access)
Regulations, 2016 – Whether the imposition of penalties for variations in drawal from contracted demand amounts to an unreasonable restriction on the right to open access u/s.42 of the Act of 2003:
Held: The electricity grid operates on principles of frequency stability and demand-supply balance – Any deviation from scheduled drawal or injection can lead to grid instability, potentially affecting all consumers – The impugned regulations, therefore, serve a critical function in preventing such disruptions by enforcing discipline among generators and consumers alike – The penalties imposed are a deterrent mechanism to prevent strategic gaming of the system and to ensure that all stakeholders adhere to scheduling norms – The State Commission’s role is to balance the rights of individual market participants with the broader objective of ensuring an efficient, reliable, and stable power supply to all consumers in the State. [Para 54] Electricity Act, 2003 – Rajasthan Electricity Regulatory Commission (Terms and Conditions for Open Access)
Regulations, 2016 – Whether Regulation 26(7) of Rajasthan Electricity Regulatory Commission (Terms and Conditions for Open Access) Regulations, 2016 is ultra vires for requiring an advance notice of 24 hours a day prior, thereby preventing urgent procurement and creating an artificial barrier to open access as protected by the Act of 2003:
Held: 1. The requirement of prior notice is a reasonable procedural safeguard that aligns with the objectives of the Act of 2003, particularly those laid out in Section 42, which envisages a structured approach to open access – The 24-hour notice period ensures that both transmission and distribution licensees, as well as load despatch centres, have adequate time to adjust their schedules and prevent system disturbances – Moreover, it prevents misuse by entities that may attempt to take advantage of realtime price fluctuations, thereby engaging in speculative trading rather than genuine demand based procurement – Further, the option of purchasing power from the real-time market and day-ahead [2025] 4 S.C.R. 439Ramayana Ispat Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. market in need of urgent procurement is always available, and is not prevented by the impugned regulations. [Para 57]
2. Furthermore, the regulation does not create an insurmountable barrier to open access but rather seeks to bring order and predictability to its implementation – The requirement is uniformly applicable to all consumers, ensuring that no undue advantage is given to any particular category – Considering the technical and regulatory imperatives involved, the 24-hour advance notice condition under Regulation 26(7) cannot be considered ultra vires, as it falls within the regulatory domain of the State Commission to establish fair, transparent, and non-disruptive mechanisms for open access. [Para 58] Electricity Act, 2003 – Rajasthan Electricity Regulatory Commission (Terms and Conditions for Open Access)
Regulations, 2016 – Whether Regulation 21 is arbitrary and discriminatory, thereby discouraging captive power generation by creating unreasonable distinction between captive power plants (CPPs) and state distribution companies:
Held: 1. The distinction between captive power generators and state DISCOMs is not arbitrary but arises from the structural differences in their roles and obligations – While captive generators primarily generate electricity for self-consumption, distribution companies serve a wider consumer base, requiring them to adhere to broader regulatory commitments, including universal supply obligations – As such, differential treatment based on the nature of their functions is legally justified and does not amount to unfair discrimination – Moreover, Regulation 21 does not impose undue restrictions on captive generators but ensures that their operations align with grid discipline, preventing any adverse impact on the larger power ecosystem. [Para 61]
2. Additionally, the principle of non-discrimination under the Act of 2003 does not mandate identical treatment for all entities but rather requires a rational basis for any differentiation – In this case, the regulatory conditions imposed on captive generators are aimed at ensuring a level playing field and preventing misuse of open access provisions – The regulatory framework ensures that captive generators contribute fairly to system stability without imposing additional burdens on distribution licensees and other grid participants – Thus, Regulation 21 is neither arbitrary nor 440 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports discriminatory but rather a necessary and proportionate measure to balance the interests of various stakeholders in the electricity sector. [Para 62] Electricity Act, 2003 – Rajasthan Electricity Regulatory Commission (Terms and Conditions for Open Access)
Regulations, 2016 – Whether the appellants’ right to open access is foreclosed by the Regulations of 2016:
Held: 1. A careful analysis of the Regulations of 2016 indicates that they primarily aim at maintaining the reliability of the electricity grid, ensuring fair pricing, and preventing speculative misuse of open access provisions – The requirement of advance notice for short-term open access, penalties for deviations from contracted demand, and specific conditions for captive power generators are all designed to create a structured and predictable electricity market – These provisions do not prevent eligible consumers from availing open access but instead ensure that they do so within a framework that safeguards the interests of all stakeholders, including distribution licensees and other consumers – Moreover, Section 181 of the Act of 2003 empowers State Commissions to frame regulations necessary for implementing statutory provisions, thereby validating the regulatory measures introduced by RERC. [Para 64]
2. Furthermore, the Act of 2003, envisages a balance between the rights of open access consumers and the operational concerns of the power sector – The Regulations of 2016, while imposing certain conditions, do not outright deny open access but ensure that its implementation is equitable and does not jeopardize grid discipline – Open access remains available to consumers who comply with regulatory prerequisites, including scheduling obligations and financial commitments – Thus, the appellants’ assertion that their right to open access is foreclosed is misplaced – The Regulations of 2016 are consistent with the legislative intent of the Act of 2003, ensuring that open access is exercised in a manner that does not compromise system stability, fairness, or economic viability – Therefore, the regulatory framework does not foreclose open access but rather operationalizes it within reasonable constraints essential for sustaining the electricity sector. [Para 65] Case Law Cited Energy Watchdog v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission [2017] 3 SCR 153 : (2017) 14 SCC 80; Reliance Infrastructure v. [2025] 4 S.C.R. 441Ramayana Ispat Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. State of Maharashtra [2019] 1 SCR 886 : (2019) 3 SCC 352; Hindustan Zinc v. RERC [2015] 7 SCR 1104 : (2015) 12 SCC 611 – referred to.
List of Acts Electricity Act, 2003; Rajasthan Electricity Regulatory Commission (Terms and Conditions for Open Access) Regulations, 2016. List of Keywords Rajasthan Electricity Regulatory Commission (RERC); Inter-state open access; Imposition of penalties; Variations in drawal from contracted demand amounts; Section 42 of Electricity Act, 2003; Regulation 26(7) of Rajasthan Electricity Regulatory Commission (Terms and Conditions for Open Access) Regulations, 2016; Advance notice of 24 hours; Regulation 21 of Rajasthan Electricity Regulatory Commission (Terms and Conditions for Open Access) Regulations, 2016; Jurisdiction to regulate interstate open access; Intra-state aspects of electricity regulation; Right to open access; Consumer; Distribution licensee; Inter- State transmission system; Captive generation; State Load Despatch Centre; Duties of distribution licensee and open access; Functions of Central Commission; Functions of State Commission; Powers of Central Commission to make regulations; Powers of State Commissions to make regulations; Unscheduled Interchange Pricing.
Case Arising From CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 7964 of 2019 From the Judgment and Order dated 06.09.2016 of the High Court of Rajasthan at Jaipur in DBCWP No. 4402 of 2016 With C.A Nos. 7966 and 7965 of 2019 Appearances for Parties Advs. for the Appellants:
Manu Seshadri, Sahil Manganani, Ms. Aakriti Gupta, Siddhant Singh, Nikunj Dayal, Kumar Mihir, Athul Joseph, Gunjan Sharma. 442 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports Advs. for the Respondents:
Shiv Mangal Sharma, A.A.G., Milind Kumar, Zoheb Hossain, Dr. Rupesh Singh, Guru Prasad Singh, Anshul Suri, Satya Veer Singh, Ms. Pratibha Jain, Ms. Christi Jain, Pallav Mongia, Anubhav Mishra, Amritesh Krishna.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment Vikram Nath, J.
1. The present appeals challenge two separate orders passed by the High Court of Rajasthan—one by the Jodhpur Bench dated 29.08.2016 and the other by the Jaipur Bench dated 06.09.2016. The appeals arise from challenges to the validity of the Rajasthan Electricity Regulatory Commission (Terms and Conditions for Open Access) Regulations, 2016 1 framed by the Rajasthan Electricity Regulatory Commission 2 in the exercise of its powers under Section 42 read with Section 181 of the Electricity Act, 2003. 3 The primary grievance of the writ petitioners, appellants herein, before the High Court, and now the appellants before this Court, relates to the restrictions and conditions imposed by the Regulations of 2016 on the exercise of open access for captive power plants4 and other large consumers of electricity.
2. The brief background of the facts giving rise to the challenge before us are that the writ petitioners before the High Court are engaged in industrial production and have substantial power consumption requirements. The facts, as taken by the High Court from one of the writ petitions filed by Hindustan Zinc Limited, respondent No.6 in Civil Appeal No. 7966 of 2019, for convenience, are that Hindustan Zinc Limited is a public limited company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956, and is engaged in the business of mining, smelting, and production of non-ferrous metals, including lead and zinc. The company operates multiple units at Chanderia, Dariba, 1 Regulations of 2016.
2 RERC.
3 Act of 2003.
4 CPPs.
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 443Ramayana Ispat Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. and Zawar, which are supported by CPPs. In addition to captive power generation, the company also has agreements with Ajmer Vidhyut Vitran Nigam Limited (respondent No.3 in Civil Appeal No. 7964 of 2019, respondent No.2 in Civil Appeal No. 7965 of 2019, and respondent No.3 in Civil Appeal no. 7966 of 2019) for the supply of power to meet its contractual demand. Under these agreements, Hindustan Zinc Limited is entitled to draw electricity up to 70 MW from the distribution licensee at its Dariba Zinc Smelter Unit at any time, as per its operational requirements.
3. Prior to the introduction of the Regulations of 2016, the appellants were availing open access under the Rajasthan Electricity Regulatory Commission (Terms and Conditions for Open Access) Regulations, 2004, 5 which permitted them to draw power from both, their captive generation and open access sources, without any reduction in the contracted demand from the distribution licensee. The open access facility under the Regulations of 2004 allowed the appellants to schedule their power requirements on a day-ahead basis for each 15-minute block, with the flexibility to meet shortfalls through their contracted demand from the distribution licensee.
4. RERC issued a draft of the proposed Regulations of 2016 through a public notice dated 06.07.2015 and invited comments and suggestions. Hindustan Zinc Limited, along with other stakeholders, submitted detailed objections, highlighting that certain provisions of the draft regulations were inconsistent with the objectives of the Act of 2003 and the principle of promoting open access. The Commission notified the Regulations of 2016 on 27.01.2016.
5. The key change introduced by the Regulations of 2016 was the imposition of limitations on the simultaneous drawal of power through open access and contracted demand from the distribution licensee. Under the new regime, if a consumer opted to procure power through open access, the contracted demand from the distribution licensee would be reduced by the quantum of power scheduled through open access. Additionally, the Regulations of 2016 imposed penalties for over-drawal and under-drawal from the contracted demand.
5 Regulations of 2004.
444 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports
6. The appellants before the Jodhpur Bench of the High Court challenged several specific provisions of the Regulations of 2016 on the ground that they were arbitrary, unreasonable, and contrary to the statutory scheme of the Act of 2003. The primary contention was that the Regulations of 2016 sought to undermine the statutory right of open access guaranteed under Section 42 of the Act of 2003 by imposing unreasonable restrictions on the simultaneous use of open access and contracted demand. The appellants further contended that the imposition of penalties for variations in drawal, even when caused by unforeseen breakdowns or operational exigencies, was unjust and discriminatory. The appellants argued that the Regulations of 2016, by reducing the contracted demand by the quantum of power scheduled through open access, effectively penalized consumers for exercising their statutory right to open access. It was submitted that the statutory framework under the Act of 2003 envisaged open access as a means to promote competition and efficiency in the electricity market, and the Regulations of 2016 were contrary to this objective.
7. The appellants before the Jaipur Bench of the High Court were interstate consumers, unlike the appellants before the Jodhpur Bench, who were intra-state consumers drawing power from their captive plants within the State of Rajasthan. The challenge before the Jaipur Bench specifically related to Regulations 26(6) and 26(7) of the Regulations of 2016, which the appellants contended imposed restrictions on inter-state open access, thereby exceeding the Commission’s jurisdiction under the Act of 2003. The appellants argued that the Regulations of 2016 amounted to an extra-territorial application of the RERC’s regulatory power, which was beyond the statutory mandate conferred under the Act of 2003. It was contended that the Act of 2003 empowered the State Commissions to regulate intrastate open access but not inter-state open access, which falls within the jurisdiction of the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission. 6 Therefore, the appellants contended that the impugned regulations were ultra vires the Act of 2003 and liable to be struck down.
8. The Jodhpur Bench in the judgment dated 29.08.2016 upheld the validity of the Regulations of 2016, holding that the Commission was empowered to regulate open access to ensure grid stability and
6 CERC
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 445Ramayana Ispat Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. efficient load distribution. The High Court observed that the impugned regulations have been notified with the objective to ensure that the consumers do not indulge in any gaming activities on the grid, and thus the rationale behind the Regulations of 2016 is to further the objectives of the Act of 2003 while ensuring that the interests of consumers as well as distribution licensees are balanced. Further, rejecting the appellants’ claim that the regulations are violative of their rights protected under Part III of the Constitution of India, the High Court observed that they had failed to establish that the Regulations of 2016 violate their Fundamental Rights, or the RERC lacked competence to frame these regulations or that they are manifestly arbitrary or unreasonable; and thus merely because the Regulations of 2016 are claimed to cause certain inconvenience or hardship to the appellants, they cannot be held to be illegal or ultra vires the Act of 2003.
9. The Jaipur Bench also upheld the validity of the Regulations of 2016 and dismissed the writ petition of the appellants herein in C.A. 7964 of 2019 herein, holding that their challenge and the issues in their petition before the High Court were squarely covered by the judgment of the Jodhpur Bench.
10. The appellants in all the three appeals before us are challenging the findings of the High Court on the grounds that the Jodhpur Bench failed to appreciate that the Regulations of 2016 are discriminatory against the CPPs as they impose unreasonable and excessive restrictions upon them for availing open access, contrary to the objectives of the Act of 2003. Further, the appellants challenging the order of the Jaipur Bench further contend that the Bench failed to consider that RERC lacked jurisdiction to regulate inter-state open access, which falls within the exclusive domain of the CERC under the Act of 2003.
11. The issues for consideration before this Court are as follows: i. Whether the RERC has the jurisdiction to regulate inter-state open access under the Act of 2003?
ii. Whether the imposition of penalties for variations in drawal from contracted demand amounts to an unreasonable restriction on the right to open access under Section 42 of the Act of 2003? iii. Whether Regulation 26(7) is ultra vires for requiring an advance notice of 24 hours a day prior, thereby preventing urgent 446 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports procurement and creating an artificial barrier to open access as protected by the Act of 2003?
iv. Whether Regulation 21 is arbitrary and discriminatory, thereby discouraging captive power generation by creating unreasonable distinction between CPPs and state distribution companies? v. Whether the appellants’ right to open access is foreclosed by the Regulations of 2016?
12. We have heard the learned counsels for the parties at great length.
ARGUMENTS OF THE APPELLANTS
13. The appellants have raised a comprehensive challenge to the validity of the Regulations of 2016. The challenge is primarily directed against regulations concerning the levy of additional surcharge, scheduling requirement, and penalties for deviations. In Civil Appeal No. 7964 of 2019, appellants have also contested the jurisdiction of the RERC to regulate inter-state open access, arguing that such jurisdiction falls exclusively within the domain of the CERC under the Act of 2003.
14. The appellants in Civil Appeal No. 7964 of 2019 have contended that the RERC lacked jurisdiction to regulate inter-state open access through Regulations of 2016. The appellants submitted that under the scheme of the Act of 2003, the authority to regulate inter-state open access lies exclusively with the CERC. It is the case of the appellants challenging the jurisdiction of the RERC with respect to regulating inter-state open access that the Regulation 26(7) essentially forecloses the appellants from purchasing powers as it imposes conditions on inter-state open access. The appellant argued that these conditions, such as requiring a 24-hour scheduling period, advance intimation of power usage, and a minimum consumption threshold of 75% of the scheduled quantum, exceed the jurisdiction of the State Commission and infringe upon the powers vested in the CERC.
15. The appellants referred to Section 2(36) of the Act of 2003, which defines “inter-state transmission” as:
“(36) “ inter-State transmission system” includes –
(i) any system for the conveyance of electricity by means of main transmission line from the territory of one State to another State;
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 447Ramayana Ispat Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors.
(ii) the conveyance of electricity across the territory of an intervening State as well as conveyance within the State which is incidental to such inter-State transmission of electricity;
(iii) the transmission of electricity within the territory of a State on a system built, owned, operated, maintained or controlled by a Central Transmission Utility.”
In light of the above definition, the appellants argued that merely because the transmission lines in the state of Rajasthan are used to convey electricity it does not cease to be an inter-state transaction as the usage of the said lines is only incidental to the conveyance of electricity using inter-state open access.
16. Appellants contended that inter-state open access is a matter falling within the exclusive domain of the CERC under Section 79(1)(c) of the Act of 2003. The Act of 2003 clearly demarcates the jurisdiction between CERC and State Commissions. It was argued that the power of the State Commission, RERC in this case, under Section 86(1)(c) is confined to regulating intra-state open access, and therefore, any attempt to regulate inter-state open access by the RERC is ultra vires the Act of 2003. The appellants highlighted that the petitioners in Civil Appeal No. 7965 of 2019 and Civil Appeal No. 7966 of 2019 are intra-state consumers of captive power from their captive generating plants located within Rajasthan. However, the appellants in Civil Appeal No. 7964 of 2019 are inter-state consumers, purchasing power from sources located outside Rajasthan. Therefore, the challenge to Regulation 26(7) by the appellants in Civil Appeal No. 7964 of 2019 is on a different footing, as it concerns the extra-territorial application of the Regulations of 2016 to inter-state transactions, which is beyond the legislative competence of the RERC.
17. The appellants while referring to Section 79(1)(c) of the Act of 2003, submitted that it explicitly provides that the CERC shall regulate the transmission of electricity and determine tariffs for inter-state transmission of electricity. Section 2(36) of the Act of 2003 defines “inter-state transmission” to mean the conveyance of electricity from one state to another. Therefore, any open access transaction involving the transmission of electricity across state boundaries would qualify as an inter-state transaction, which falls exclusively within the regulatory domain of the CERC. The appellants submitted that 448 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports Section 86(1)(c) of the Act of 2003 empowers the State Commissions to facilitate intra-state open access only. The power to regulate intrastate open access does not include the authority to regulate interstate open access transactions. The regulatory scheme under the Act of 2003 establishes a clear division of jurisdiction between the CERC and the State Commissions, with the CERC having exclusive authority over inter-state transactions and the State Commissions having authority over intra-state transactions.
18. It was the argument of the appellants that any surcharge or regulatory requirement imposed by the RERC on such inter-state transactions is ultra vires the Act of 2003 and amounts to an extra-territorial application of state law. The appellants further submitted that the findings of the Jodhpur Bench of the High Court, which upheld the validity of Regulations of 2016 with respect to intra-state consumers, cannot be applied to inter-state consumers. The challenge before the Jaipur Bench of the High Court concerned inter-state consumers, whose transactions are governed by the regulatory framework established by the CERC, not the RERC, and thus would not be covered by the judgment of the Jodhpur Bench.
19. Further, the appellants submitted that the jurisdiction of the RERC is circumscribed by Section 86(1)(a) of the Act of 2003, in terms of which the State Commission shall determine the tariff for generation, supply, transmission and wheeling of electricity, wholesale, bulk or retail “within the state”. Thus, the RERC’s powers with respect to open access are only within the state and not beyond it. Whereas, the CERC has been empowered under Section 79(1)(c) to regulate inter-state transmission of electricity.
20. Appellants also made a reference to Section 42 of the Act of 2003 which provides that the RERC in exercise of its powers under this provision may impose cross subsidy surcharge; wheeling charges; additional surcharge on wheeling, if any, to meet fixed cost of the distribution licensee arising out of its obligation to supply. Thus, the RERC is within its power to factor operational costs only. Reference was also made to the definition of “open access” provided under Section 2(47), which reads as follows:
“(47) “open access” means the non-discriminatory provision for the use of transmission lines or distribution system or associated facilities with such lines or system [2025] 4 S.C.R. 449Ramayana Ispat Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. by any licensee or consumer or a person engaged in generation in accordance with the regulations specified by the Appropriate Commission.”
21. Appellants thus submitted that Section 42 of the Act of 2003 only refers to the State Commissions whereas the definition of open access contained in Section 2(47) refers to the Appropriate Commission which includes the CERC. Therefore, the power of the State Commissions does not extend to regulating inter-state open access transactions which power has been conferred upon the Central Commission. A conjoint reading of Sections 42 and 86(1)(a) of the Act of 2003 makes it clear that the regulations of the State Commissions only apply within the state. In the case of inter-state transmission of electricity, the governing regulation is the CERC (Connectivity and General Network Access to the ‘inter-state’ Transmission System) Regulations, 2022.7 All inter-state transactions (including collective transactions) on the power exchange are necessarily inter-state transactions and governed by the CERC GNA Regulations. In the event of transmission of inter-state power from outside the state into Rajasthan, it is not the RERC Regulations of 2016 which apply within the state but the CERC GNA Regulations.
22. The appellants relied upon the decision of this Court in Energy Watchdog v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission,8 wherein it was held that the authority to regulate inter-state transmission and inter-state open access vests exclusively with the CERC. The appellants argued that the ratio of this judgment squarely applies to the present case, rendering the impugned regulation beyond the competence of the RERC. The appellants relied upon the following findings of this Court in Energy Watchdog (Supra):
“...24. The scheme that emerges from these sections is that whenever there is inter State generation or supply of electricity, it is the Central involved, and whenever there is intra-State generation or supply of electricity, the State Government or the State Commission is involved. This is the precise scheme of the entire Act, including Sections 79 and 86. It will be seen that Section 79(1) itself in 7 CERC GNA Regulations.
8 (2017) 14 SCC 80.
450 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports clauses (c), (d) and (e) speaks of inter-State transmission and inter-State operations. This is to be contrasted with Section 86 which deals with functions of the State Commission which uses the expression “within the State” in clauses (a), (b) and (d), and “intra-State” in clause (c). This being the case, it is clear that the PPA, which deals with generation and supply of electricity, will either have to be governed by the State Commission or the Central Commission. The State Commission’s jurisdiction is only where generation and supply takes place within the State. On the other hand, the moment generation and sale takes place in more than one State, the Central Commission becomes the appropriate Commission under the Act. What is important to remember is that if we were to accept the argument on behalf of the appellant, and we were to hold in the Adani case that there is no composite scheme for generation and sale, as argued by the appellant, it would be clear that neither Commission would have jurisdiction, something which would lead to absurdity. Since generation and sale of electricity is in more than one State obviously Section 86 does not get attracted. This being the case, we are constrained to observe that the expression “composite scheme” does not mean anything more than a scheme for generation and sale of electricity in more than one State.”
23. Thus, the appellants submitted that by curtailing the purchase power on the exchange by imposing conditions on inter-state open access transactions taking place outside the state of Rajasthan, Regulation 26(7) is ex-facie contrary to the objectives of Act of 2003 and the National Tariff Policy, and thus RERC has encroached upon the jurisdiction of the CERC in framing these arbitrary regulations. By imposing these conditions in excess of its territorial jurisdiction, the RERC has essentially banned the purchase of power under real time contracts, intraday contracts, and contingency contracts and thereby ensured that industrial consumers such as the appellants have no option but to purchase power from the Distribution Licensee (Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam), contrary to the objectives of promoting competition such that consumers can avail quality and cheaper power from different sources on the power exchange via the interstate open access mechanism. It was submitted that the impugned [2025] 4 S.C.R. 451Ramayana Ispat Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. regulation, by interfering with inter-state scheduling, exceeds the regulatory authority of the RERC and violates the statutory framework established under the Act of 2003.
24. In Civil Appeal Nos. 7965 and 7966 of 2019, the challenge is to the vires of the regulation by the captive generators supplying power within the state of Rajasthan. Appellants have challenged the Regulations of 2016 on the grounds that the Regulations of 2016 are discriminatory against the CPPs as they put illegal fetters upon them for availing open access which is a statutory right of the such power generators under Section 9 of the Act of 2003.
25. The appellant submitted that Regulation 21 of the Regulations of 2016 is arbitrary and discriminatory against CPPs. Section 9 of the Act of 2003 recognizes the right of industries to set up captive generation plants and ensures non-discriminatory access to transmission and distribution networks. However, Regulation 21 creates an unreasonable distinction between captive generators and state distribution companies,9 discouraging captive power generation. The appellants contend that the pricing mechanism imposed under Regulation 21 unfairly penalizes captive generators while providing undue advantages to state DISCOMs. Under the regulation, any under-injection by an open access consumer is settled at higher rates, whereas over-injection is compensated at lower rates. Further, Regulation 21 also provides that any energy injected by the power plant but not utilised by its captive units is not paid for at all to the captive unit/drawer/buyer. Such a pricing mechanism creates a disincentive for captive generators to sell their surplus power through open access and effectively forces them to rely on state utilities. The appellants further argued that the discriminatory treatment of captive generators under Regulation 21 is inconsistent with the intent of the Act of 2003, which promotes competition and self-sufficiency in power generation. By creating an uneven playing field, the regulation hampers industrial consumers’ ability to optimize their power procurement strategies and forces them into an unfair dependence on state utilities.
26. The appellants have challenged Regulation 21 on the ground that by imposition of heavy penalty in case of under-injection by CPPs as provided in Regulation 21 and at the same time exemption of the 9 DISCOMs.
452 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports State Generators and other generators supplying power to DISCOMS on long term basis (by virtue of Regulation 5 and Regulation 6), the Regulations of 2016 have created a discriminatory regime detrimental to the interest of CPPs which is totally against the spirit of the proviso to Section 9(1) of the Act of 2003.
27. It is the argument of the appellants that these regulations discourage open access by providing extremely stringent provisions for normal and practically uncontrollable deviations from schedule and are thereby creating artificial barriers on CPPs and consumers availing open access by making the supply from open access non feasible and economically unviable by forcing the captive generators and consumers to incur very steep payments as well as enriching the DISCOMs at the expense of the open access consumers.
28. Appellants further highlighted that the National Electricity Policy 2005 10 realises the enormous potential of CPPs and envisages encouraging generation from such plants for the overall development of the power market in the country. A conjoint reading of the provisions of the Act of 2003 and NEP of 2005 establishes that it is the explicit intention of the legislature that the CPPs should be encouraged and developed as a source of decentralised power generators. Therefore, any regulation putting CPPs at a position disadvantageous vis-a-vis other generator in the matter of providing open access or regulating supply of power from them is in violation of and ultra vires to the provisions of Act of 2003 and the NEP of 2005.
ARGUMENTS OF THE RESPONDENTS
29. The respondents, including the RERC and the distribution licensees have strongly defended the validity of the Regulations of 2016, contending that the same have been framed well within the jurisdiction of the RERC as conferred under the Act of 2003 and are essential for maintaining grid discipline, ensuring fair competition, and safeguarding the financial viability of the electricity DISCOMs. Further, it has also been vehemently submitted that open access cannot be absolutely free, untrammelled, un-controlled or unrestricted. The submissions of all the respondents defending the validity of the Regulations of 2016 have been reproduced below.
10 NEP of 2005.
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 453Ramayana Ispat Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors.
30. At the outset, it is submitted that the regulation of electricity is an intricate and highly specialized domain requiring expertise in technical, economic, and legal considerations. The Act of 2003, entrusts regulatory commissions with the responsibility of ensuring an efficient, reliable, and economically viable electricity sector while balancing the interests of generators, consumers, and DISCOMs. Electricity, being a form of energy that cannot be stored in its raw form, necessitates continuous real-time management to maintain grid stability. Any mismatch between demand and supply can lead to severe disruptions, including grid failure, thereby causing widespread economic and social ramifications. To prevent such contingencies, electricity regulatory commissions, including RERC, are mandated to frame and enforce operating norms that promote efficiency and discipline among participants in the electricity sector. The primary objective of these norms is to ensure that the benefits derived from improved operational efficiency are passed on to consumers while simultaneously maintaining grid stability.
31. The respondents submitted that RERC possesses regulatory authority over certain aspects of open access transactions, even where electricity is procured from outside the state of Rajasthan but delivered within Rajasthan. The jurisdiction of CERC is defined under Section 79(1) of the Act of 2003 Act, granting it regulatory powers over inter-state transmission of electricity. However, this does not preclude State Commissions, including RERC, from exercising jurisdiction over intra-state aspects of open access. Section 42(2) of the Act of 2003 specifically empowers State Commissions to regulate intra-state open access, ensuring fair access to transmission and distribution networks within the state. While the appellant argues that only CERC has the power to regulate inter-state open access, this contention is misplaced. RERC retains regulatory oversight over intra-state transactions, even if the power originates from another state but is ultimately transmitted within Rajasthan’s intra-state grid. Thus, while CERC has jurisdiction over inter-state transmission, RERC retains regulatory authority over the intra-state aspects of open access transactions, even if the power source is located outside the state but the power is delivered within the State through the intra-state grid. This is in consonance with the framework of the Act of 2003, which provides for a clear demarcation of responsibilities between central and state regulators without unduly restricting state regulatory 454 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports authority. Further, Section 42 of the Act of 2003 expressly empowers the State Commissions to introduce and regulate open access within the state. Nowhere in the parent Act has the legislature conferred the power to regulate open access to the Central Government or CERC for consumers falling under the purview of Section 42.
32. It is thus the submission of the respondents that the appellant’s assertion that only CERC has the power to regulate inter-state open access is misleading. While CERC indeed has jurisdiction over inter-state transmission under Section 79(1) of the Act of 2003, RERC retains regulatory authority over the intra-state aspects of open access transactions, even if the power is sourced from outside the state. Further, it has been contended that as rightly pointed out by the appellants, Section 2(47) of the Act of 2003 defines open-access as non-discriminatory access to transmission or distribution system; but this encompasses in its ambit both, inter-state as well as intra-state transactions, without creating any distinction between them for regulatory purposes. Therefore, it is a natural consequence that State Commissions will retain the power to regulate open access within their jurisdictions, even if it involves powers sourced from another state. Hence, from the plain reading of Section 2(47) with Section 42 of the Act of 2003, it is clear that the statute treats open access uniformly, regardless of the source and the legislature did not intend to create any unnecessary distinction. Hence, the power to regulate open access, as per Section 42, rests with the RERC, especially since the consumer, as defined under Section 2(15) of the Act of 2003, is the one who consumes electricity via the distribution licensee, which operates within the state. Section 2(15) defines a “consumer” as any person who is supplied electricity by a licensee or whose premises are connected to a distribution system. Since distribution licensees operate within specific states, the regulation of open access for consumers naturally falls within the jurisdiction of the respective State Commission. Since open access transactions ultimately facilitate the supply of electricity to consumers through the distribution network of a state licensee, their regulation necessarily falls within the purview of the concerned State Commission. This reinforces the position that State Commissions, rather than CERC, have jurisdiction over open access transactions where power is consumed within the state, irrespective of its source.
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 455Ramayana Ispat Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors.
33. Section 181 of the Act of 2003 grants State Commissions the power to frame regulations to implement the provisions of the Act of 2003. This includes the power to introduce and regulate open access, determine applicable charges, and establish conditions for access to intra-state transmission and distribution networks. The ability of State Commissions to make rules regarding open access further affirms that RERC, in the exercise of its statutory functions, can formulate regulations governing open access transactions within Rajasthan. Moreover, Section 181 of the Act of 2003 reinforces the independent authority of State Commissions by specifying their role in electricity regulation at the state level. This provision upholds the principle of decentralization in electricity governance and affirms the legislative intent to vest regulatory control over intra-state electricity transactions with State Commissions, including RERC. While, Section 181 of the Act of 2003 specifically grants the State Commissions the authority to make regulations concerning the classes of consumers falling under Section 42 of the Act of 2003, Section 178 of the Act of 2003 grants the CERC broad powers to make regulations on a wide range of subjects while intentionally withholding powers related to Section 42 of the Act. In furtherance of this, Section 79 of the Act of 2003, which outlines the functions of the CERC, does not confer any responsibility upon the Central Commission regarding he regulation of consumer classes. The absence of any such provision is evident of the legislature’s intent to not extend the CERC’s role in regulating the supply of power to end consumers from distribution licensee, either through intra-state transmission or inter-state transmission. Therefore, inter-state open access falls within the purview of the State Commissions, RERC herein, for regulatory purposes.
34. The respondents further submitted that Regulation 26(7) of the Regulations of 2016, which mandates a one-day advance scheduling requirement for 24-hour power procurement, serves a legitimate regulatory purpose. This is a reasonable and necessary provision and is only applicable in the case of ‘short-term inter-state open access’. This requirement ensures grid stability, facilitates proper load forecasting, and prevents last-minute fluctuations that could destabilize the electricity network. The advance scheduling requirement is neither arbitrary nor unreasonable but is in line with best practices for efficient power system management.
456 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports
35. The contention that this requirement forecloses urgent procurement is misplaced. The regulations provide alternative mechanisms, including short-term market purchases, that allow participants to address urgent electricity shortages. Respondents submitted that the real-time market and day-ahead market operated under the guidelines of the CERC still allow purchase of power for urgent needs. However, the scheduling requirement is only applicable to procurement through open access within the state of Rajasthan in order to integrate the demanded power securely. Thus, such a requirement is a rational measure to ensure that the grid operates in a stable and reliable manner without the risk of sudden fluctuations, and thus is in no way ultra vires the provisions of the Act of 2003 or against the objectives of open access. The argument that the scheduling requirement creates an artificial barrier to open access is completely misplaced, as the intention is to ensure a stable and moderated open access, thereby protecting the reliability of the grid. This in no way forecloses the access to urgent procurement, which is available through other sources, but only ensures that open access consumers follow grid discipline, which is imperative to prevent any imbalances. Therefore, the imposition of a structured scheduling mechanism is necessary for maintaining an efficient and stable grid.
36. It has been further submitted by the respondents that the consistent under-utilization of contract demand by such consumers can lead to financial losses for the distribution licensees. This is because the fixed costs associated with maintaining the infrastructure necessary to support higher demand must still be covered, irrespective of the actual consumption levels. By allowing only consumers who demonstrate genuine demand to access open access, the regulatory framework seeks to create a more equitable and efficient system. This furthers the aim of the Act of 2003 while ensuring transparency and accountability among consumers of open access.
37. The respondents contend that the Regulations of 2016 do not arbitrarily foreclose the petitioner’s right to open access, which was previously available under the Regulations of 2004. The Regulations of 2016 are an evolved framework aimed at aligning open access policies with the current realities of electricity distribution and transmission. The modifications introduced in the new regulations, including changes in scheduling requirement, charges, and penalties, are intended to address inefficiencies and ensure a level playing field [2025] 4 S.C.R. 457Ramayana Ispat Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. for all stakeholders. These changes are well within the regulatory domain of RERC and do not constitute an unlawful revocation of rights granted under the previous framework.
38. The appellants argued that its transactions qualify as ‘collective transactions’ under the CERC GNA Regulations, thereby falling outside RERC’s regulatory jurisdiction. The respondents counter this argument by asserting that collective transactions, as defined under the applicable regulations, pertain to centralized power exchanges and structured market transactions. The appellants’ transactions, however, involve bilateral arrangements and open access usage within Rajasthan’s network. Therefore, they do not automatically fall under the exclusive purview of CERC. The respondents submit that RERC’s jurisdiction remains intact concerning aspects of the transactions that involve intra-state transmission and distribution.
39. The respondents next submitted that Regulation 21 of the Regulations of 2016, which imposes penalties for under-injection of power by captive power plants, is a necessary regulatory measure designed to ensure grid discipline. The contention that Regulation 21 is discriminatory against CPPs is unfounded, as the provision applies equally to all entities responsible for power injection into the grid. The rationale behind this regulation is to prevent deviation from scheduled generation, which can disrupt grid stability. Captive generators, unlike state generators under long-term power purchase agreements 11 , have greater flexibility in their operations, necessitating stricter scheduling norms to maintain system integrity. The imposition of penalties is intended to discourage any kind of gaming or foul play and ensure that all participants bear the cost of grid imbalances, as deviation charges are necessary to discourage under-injection and over-drawal, to ensure grid stability. The imposition of penalties for under-injection by CPPs is an essential regulatory measure aimed at ensuring predictability in electricity scheduling and preventing deviations that could jeopardize grid stability. The respondents further emphasize that Regulation 21 does not violate the rights of captive consumers under Section 9(1) of the Act of 2003. The proviso to Section 9(1) merely recognizes the right of captive consumers to establish and operate generation plants for self-use. However, this 11 PPAs.
458 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports right is not absolute and is subject to regulatory oversight to ensure that the operation of CPPs does not disrupt grid stability or create imbalances in electricity supply. The regulatory measures imposed under the Regulations of 2016 are well within the powers conferred upon RERC under the Act of 2003, and are consistent with the broader objectives of the statute.
40. It is a settled principle of law that courts should exercise judicial restraint when reviewing the validity of regulations framed by expert regulatory bodies. The respondents argued that this Court has consistently recognized that regulatory commissions are vested with specialized knowledge and expertise, and their decisions should not be lightly interfered with unless they are manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or in direct contravention of statutory provisions. In Reliance Infrastructure v. State of Maharashtra,12 this Court held that regulatory decisions should be accorded deference unless it is demonstrated that they are wholly irrational, ultra vires the parent statute, or violate Fundamental Rights. Similarly, in Hindustan Zinc v. RERC,13 this Court reaffirmed the well-established presumption of constitutionality that extends to subordinate legislation, including regulations framed under statutory authority. The respondents submitted that unless a regulation is shown to lack legislative competence, be inconsistent with the provisions of the parent statute, exceed the authority conferred upon the regulatory body, or be manifestly arbitrary and unreasonable, it must be presumed to be valid. The burden lies on the party challenging the regulation to establish its invalidity, and in the present case, the appellant has failed to discharge this burden.
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