Rajeev Gupta & Ors. v. Prashant Garg & Ors.
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 552; [2025] 4 S.C.R. 2364
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Dipankar Datta, Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra
- Decided
- 23 Apr 2025
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 11061/2024
- Sections
- 3, 52, 41, 68, 96, 100, 440, 3317, 90A, 18, 22, 54
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:20 am. Original source ↗
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[2025] 4 S.C.R. 2364 : 2025 INSC 552 Rajeev Gupta & Ors.
v.
Prashant Garg & Ors.
(Civil Appeal No. 11061 of 2024)
23 April 2025 [Dipankar Dutta* and Prashant Kumar Mishra, JJ.] Issue for Consideration Issue arose whether the suit was barred by limitation; whether the sale deeds were void documents; whether the Will stood admitted in the previous suits and was no longer required to be proved; whether the First Appellate Court was right in decreeing the suit without the plaintiffs seeking relief of declaration/cancellation. Headnotes† Limitation Act, 1963 – Arts.58, 59 and 65 – Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – ss.54, 41 – Suit for cancellation of sale deed and recovery of possession – Limitation period – Will allegedly executed by the common ancestor of the parties, bequeathing suit property in favour of his two sons-I and Dr.K, and third son was bequeathed business of pharmacy – Thereafter, a family settlement in 1956, the names of wife of I and the third son mutated in respect of the suit property, with remaining properties being allotted to Dr.K – Rounds of litigation between the family members qua ownership of the suit property – Ultimately, Dr.K’s absolute right over the eastern portion of the suit property was accepted, third son was permitted to remain in possession thereof – Two sale deeds duly registered (qua the eastern and southern portions of the suit property) executed by the third son in favour of the appellants in 1992 – Thereafter, suit filed by Dr.K and his son (plaintiffs) against the appellants seeking cancellation of the sale deeds and possession of the suit property – Subsequently, the plaint amended whereby new relief added to the effect that the suit is based on title, and recovery of possession is sought on the basis of title and by way of abundant precaution plaintiff seeks relief of cancellation – Trial Court dismissed the suit – First Appellate court allowed the suit and granted the reliefs * Author [2025] 4 S.C.R. 2365Rajeev Gupta & Ors. v. Prashant Garg & Ors. sought for – High Court dismissed the second appeal filed by the appellants – Appeal before this Court, wherein issue arose whether the suit was barred by limitation; whether the sale deeds were void documents; whether the Will stood admitted in the previous suits and was no longer required to be proved; and whether the First Appellate Court right in decreeing the suit without the plaintiffs seeking relief of declaration/cancellation:
Held: Subject suit of the plaintiffs could not have succeeded – Trial court, was right in dismissing the suit – Impugned second appellate judgment and decree of the High Court and the first appellate judgment and decree of the first appellate court, both set aside and that of the trial court restored, dismissing the subject suit – As regards limitation, the limitation period would have to be adjudged from the primary relief of cancellation which is 3 (three) years, and not the ancillary relief of possession which is 12 (twelve) years – Limitation period prescribed for suits seeking cancellation of documents being 3 (three) years, despite the cause of action having arisen in 1992, the plaintiffs chose to institute the suit 11 (eleven) years later, the suit of the plaintiffs having been instituted in 2003, was hopelessly barred by limitation and s.3 of the Limitation Act essentially entails its dismissal – Appellants had been put in possession of the suit property in furtherance of the sale deeds executed by and between third son and the former after the same were registered – Hence, suit seeking declaration of status or right simplicitor would not have sufficed for the plaintiffs since admittedly, they were required to seek further relief – Composite suit seeking cancellation, recovery of possession and injunction is what was required to be instituted, as distinguished from a suit seeking only recovery of possession – Thus, cancellation was the primary relief in the circumstances with recovery of possession being the ancillary relief – Plaintiffs did have knowledge-constructive as well as actual during the pendency of the second suit or soon thereafter of transfer of the suit property in favour of the appellants effected by the third son by way of execution of the sale deeds – It is from such date of knowledge in June, 1992 that the said transfer effectively did invade or jeopardize the plaintiffs’ interest in respect of the suit property – As regards sale deeds being void documents, submission of the plaintiffs that the third son had no right in the property, and being devoid of any ownership rights, was in no position to transfer title of the same to the appellants, and the sale deeds having been 2366 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports executed when an ad-interim injunction order was in operation, the bar in s.52 of the ToP Act would render the sale deeds void ab initio, cannot be accepted – Appellants submission that third son having been portrayed to the world at large as owner, the plaintiffs could not emerge from out of the woodwork to claim a secret title accepted – High Court’s finding that the sale deeds would be rendered void solely on account of the operation of an injunction order has necessarily to be set aside – s.52 of the ToP Act does not ipso facto render a sale transaction as inoperative, it merely subjects it to the outcome of the pending proceedings – Transfer, subject to the result of the suit, could remain valid – There being no proof that the appellants had knowledge of this injunction order, the transaction could not have been declared void ab initio – Thus, the appellants would have be held to be bona fide purchaser for value and, thus, entitled to the benefit of s.41 of the ToP Act – As regards whether the Will stood admitted in the previous suits and was no longer required to be proved, the requirement of proof of a Will in accordance with s.68 is not done away with, even if the Will is not disputed by the opposite party – In light of the vague descriptions about the WILL, it is difficult to accept that there was deemed admission due to non-denial in the first place – Plaintiffs were specifically put on notice by the appellants that they were disputing the WILL – Burden was on the plaintiffs to prove the WILL – List of documents sought to be relied on by the plaintiffs included certified copy of the registered Will of the father but there was no pleading in the plaint as to whether the WILL was lost or misplaced – Certified copy was only sought to be produced – First appellate court proceeded on the basis that the WILL was accepted by the parties to the first and the second suit and, thus, res judicata applied without, however, realising that the appellants were not parties to any of those two suits and neither was there any occasion for them to be bound by any admission or acceptance of the WILL by their predecessor-in-interest nor did the appellants ever make any such admission – Thus, the plaintiffs’ title to the suit property could not have been traced to the WILL of the testator – As regards whether the First Appellate Court was right in decreeing the suit without the plaintiffs seeking relief of declaration/cancellation, the first appellate court acted illegally in the exercise of its jurisdiction in granting relief to the plaintiffs by passing a decree for recovery of possession without there being any decree for declaration of rights/cancellation of deeds – At the stage of exercise of jurisdiction by the appellate court u/s.96 CPC, [2025] 4 S.C.R. 2367Rajeev Gupta & Ors. v. Prashant Garg & Ors. the plaint in the form it was there before such court was incurably defective and no relief could have been granted to the plaintiffs. [Paras 32-69] Limitation Act, 1963 – Art.58 and 59 – Meaning of the word “first” under the column ‘Time from which period begins to run’ in Articles 58 and 59 – Interpretation – Explained. [Paras 30-31] Case Law Cited Khatri Hotels (P) Ltd. v. Union of India [2011] 15 SCR 299 : (2011) 9 SCC 126; G.T. Girish v. Y. Subba Raju [2022] 8 SCR 991 : (2022) 12 SCC 321; Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy [2008] 5 SCR 331 : (2008) 4 SCC 594; Rukhmabai v. Lala Laxminarayan [1960] 2 SCR 253 : AIR 1960 SC 335; Shakti Bhog Food Industries Ltd. v. Central Bank of India [2020] 6 SCR 538 : (2020) 17 SCC 260; Union of India v. West Coast Paper Mills Ltd. [2004] 2 SCR 145 : (2004) 2 SCC 247; Madhukar Vishwanath v. Madhao (1999) 9 SCC 446; L.C. Hanumanthappa v. H.B. Shivakumar [2015] 9 SCR 651 : (2016) 1 SCC 332; Rajpal Singh v. Saroj [2022] 19 SCR 202 : (2022) 15 SCC 260; Ramesh Verma v. Lajesh Saxena [2016] 11 SCR 210 : (2017) 1 SCC 257; Benga Behera v. Braja Kishore Nanda [2007] 6 SCR 853 : (2007) 9 SCC 728; Jagmail Singh v. Karamjit Singh [2020] 4 SCR 1163 : (2020) 5 SCC 178; Sopanrao v. Syed Mehmood [2019] 9 SCR 37 : (2019) 7 SCC 76 – referred to.
List of Acts Evidence Act, 1882; Limitation Act, 1963; Transfer of Property Act, 1882; Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
List of Keywords Will; Sale deeds duly registered; Cancellation of the sale deeds; Limitation; Composite suit; Barred by limitation; Right to sue first accrues; Bona fide purchaser for value; Requirement of proof of a Will; Declaration of title and consequential relief of injunction; Relief of declaration/cancellation; Suit for cancellation of sale deed and recovery of possession; Limitation period; Sale deeds, void document; Meaning of the word “first” under the column ‘Time from which period begins to run’ in Arts.58 and 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
2368 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Case Arising From CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 11061 of 2024 From the Judgment and Order dated 21.09.2021 of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in SA No. 426 of 2017 Appearances for Parties Advs. for the Appellants:
Kavin Gulati, Sr. Adv., Rohit Amit Sthalekar, Pramod Dayal, Nikunj Dayal, Rakesh Kumar.
Advs. for the Respondents:
Santosh Kumar, Ms. Dharitry Phookan, Ms. Sangeeta Vazirani, Ms. Lanutula K.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment Dipankar Dutta, J.
The A ppeAl
1. This appeal, by special leave, is at the instance of the second to fifth defendants1 in a suit for cancellation of sale deeds, recovery of possession and injunction. The appellants mount a challenge to the judgment and decree dated 21st September, 2021 of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad2, dismissing their second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 19083. In such appeal, the first appellate judgment and decree was under challenge which reversed the decree of the trial court of dismissal of the civil suit instituted by the respondent 1.
R esume of fAcTs
2. The factual conspectus of the case, to the extent relevant for adjudication of the present lis, is set out below:
1 appellants, hereafter 2 High Court, hereafter 3 CPC, hereafter [2025] 4 S.C.R. 2369Rajeev Gupta & Ors. v. Prashant Garg & Ors. i) The common ancestor of the parties, Dr. Babu Ram Garg, allegedly executed a will dated 17th October, 19514, bequeathing House No. 49/1, Nai Mandi, Muzaffarnagar5 in favour of his two sons - Ishwar Chand and Dr. Karam Chand. The third son, i.e., Ramesh Chand was not given a share in the suit property; instead, he was bequeathed the business of a pharmacy and a sum of Rs 5,000/- (Rupees five thousand only). The suit property was a two storeyed building, with shops being run in part / portion of the ground floor.
ii) The genealogical chart of the family is reproduced below for the sake of convenience:
iii) In the year 1956, a family settlement was entered into by the parties concerned in terms whereof the names of Leelawati and Ramesh Chand were mutated in respect of the suit property, with the remaining properties being allotted to Dr. Karam Chand. iv) After the death of Ishwar Chand in 1984, a civil suit6 was filed by his wife Leelawati against Ramesh Chand, praying that she be declared the owner of the western portion of the suit property admeasuring 48 ft x 83 ft 6 inches, leaving the eastern portion of the house, admeasuring 96 ft 6 inches x 48 ft for Ramesh Chand. The said suit stood decreed on 30th May, 1987 by compromise. v) Litigation inter se the family members did not end with the first suit being decreed on compromise. The same continued with Dr. Karam Chand instituting a suit7 against his brother Ramesh Chand as well as the heirs of late Ishwar Chand, 4 WILL, hereafter 5 suit property, hereafter 6 Original Suit No. 307/1987, referred to as the “first suit” hereafter 7 Original Suit No. 458/1992, referred to as the “second suit” hereafter 2370 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports whereby permanent injunction was sought restraining them from alienating the suit property. An ex-parte ad-interim injunction was granted vide order dated 15th June, 1992 as regards the suit property. Such order does not seem to have been served upon Ramesh Chand or Ishwar Chand’s heirs.
vi) During the pendency of the second suit, on 16th June, 1992 and 29th June, 1992 to be precise, two sale deeds were executed qua the southern and eastern portion of the suit property by Ramesh Chand, in favour of the appellants for a total consideration of Rs 80,000/- (Rupees Eighty thousand only). The deeds were duly registered, and entered in the relevant book (Book No.1) on 17th June, 1992 and 30th June, 1992, respectively. It is material to note that the appellants were not wholly unknown to the family; they resided in the building immediately to the south of the suit property.
vii) During the pendency of the second suit instituted by Dr. Karam Chand, again a compromise was arrived at between Dr. Karam Chand and Ishwar Chand’s heirs on 28th September, 1992. In terms thereof, Dr. Karam Chand relinquished his rights in respect of the western portion of the house which had continuously been in the possession of Ishwar Chand’s family.
viii) In yet another seemingly filial turn of events, the second suit was finally compromised between Dr. Karam Chand and Ramesh Chand. Dr. Karam Chand’s absolute rights over the eastern portion of the suit property having been accepted, Ramesh Chand was permitted to remain in possession thereof. In view of the latter’s unemployment, he was allowed to use part of the rental receipts from the shops to support his family, with the remainder being given to Dr. Karam Chand. Lastly, the revenue records were to be mutated to insert Dr. Karam Chand’s name. ix) It is the appellants’ claim that this compromise was never acted upon, which is evinced by the fact that as agreed upon in the compromise, mutation in the revenue entries was never carried out.
x) In 1997, however, a mutation did occur in the revenue records. This was carried out in favour of the appellants.
xi) Ramesh Chand left for his heavenly abode in 2002.
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 2371Rajeev Gupta & Ors. v. Prashant Garg & Ors.
3. This factual background set the stage for the commencement of the third round of legal proceedings, out of which this civil appeal has arisen.
4. As late as on 25th February, 2003, Dr. Karam Chand (since deceased) along with his son8 instituted a suit9 against the appellants, their mother (the first defendant) (since deceased), the other heirs of Dr. Karam Chand, and the heirs of Ramesh Chand seeking, inter alia, the following relief:
“A. That the sale deed dated 16.06.1992 executed by Shri Ramesh Chand favoring Smt. Meena Kumari etc.
at Rs.80,000/- whose registry has been done on date 17.06.1992 in Book No.1 Section 440 at Page No.347/360 at Serial No.4215 and dated 29.06.1992 executed by Shri Ramesh Chand favoring Smt. Meena Kumari etc.
at Rs.80,000/- the registry of which has been done in Book No.1 at Section 3317/3485 at Page No.350/408 at Serial No.5179 on date 30.06.1992 and whose details have been given at the end of the plaint and which are in respect of House No.49B, Nai Mandi, Muzaffarnagar, should be cancelled and possession be given to Plaintiff No.2 from the Defendant No.1 to 5 and the intimation of cancellation of the sale deeds be sent to the office of Sub- Registrar, Registry, Muzaffarnagar. In case the Hon’ble Court considers that the relief cannot be granted only in favour of the Plaintiff No.2 then the relief may be granted in favour of the Plaintiff No.2 and Defendant No.8 and 9. B. That the Defendants should be restrained by way of injunction order that the property built in A B C D as shown in map plaint in which on the ground floor Defendant No. 6 and 7 are in possession over some portion should not execute the sale deed in favour of Defendant No.1 to 5 or in favour of any other person or in any other manner should not put the Defendant No.1 to 5 or any other person into the possession over the property of occupancy by oneself or on any other portion.
8 plaintiffs, hereafter 9 Original Suit No. 117/2003, referred to as the “subject suit” hereafter 2372 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports C. That the total cost of the suit be directed to be paid by the defendants to the Plaintiff No. 2.
D. That any other or further order which this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case may be passed in favour of the Plaintiff No.2 and against the Defendants.”
5. The plaintiffs had applied for amendment of the plaint by filing an application under Order 6 Rule 17, CPC. They intended to insert paragraph 13A, after paragraph 13, reading as follows:
“13A: - That the suit is based on title and the suit has been filed for recovery of possession based on title and the ground in the plaint is that through the two sale deeds dated 16.06.1992 and 29.06.1992 which are executed by Ramesh Chand Garg in favour of Defendant No. 1 to 5 no title has been transferred to Defendant No. 1 to 5 or any one of them. Ramesh Chand Garg had no title in the said property to which those two sale deeds relate. Plaintiff by way of abundant precaution also seeks the relief of cancellation of sale deeds in the suit but which is not required under the law. Dr. Karam Chand Garg is not a party in both the sale deeds and Ramesh Chand Garg had no title in the property.”
6. The order passed on such prayer for amendment by the trial court is reproduced hereunder:
“From the proposed amendment in the Plaint the nature of the suit is not changed and nor any irreparable loss is to be caused to the Defendants at all. The condonation of delay may be compensated through the costs. Hence the amendment application is liable to be accepted with costs.”
7. The amendment, though innocuous, was applied with a definite purpose in mind, which will unfold as the discussion goes ahead.
8. In the subject suit, a compromise was eventually arrived at between the plaintiffs and Ramesh Chand’s legal heirs on 28th January, 2008. The latter accepted execution of the WILL by the common ancestor, thus, consequently accepting that they had no right or title in the suit property. It was accepted that Ramesh Chand was merely in [2025] 4 S.C.R. 2373Rajeev Gupta & Ors. v. Prashant Garg & Ors. permissive possession and, thus, did not have the right to execute sale deeds qua the suit property in favour of the appellants. VeRdicTs of The TRiAl couRT, The fiRsT A ppellATe couRT And The high couRT
9. On 25th January, 2015, the subject suit was dismissed by the trial court on the following grounds:
i) That the plaintiffs failed to prove execution of the WILL in view of Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, 187210 and Section 90A thereof as amended by the State of Uttar Pradesh. It was held that the presumption of valid execution of documents older than 30 (thirty) years would not be attracted to those documents which formed the basis of the subject suit. The plaintiffs’ claim having arisen from the WILL, they failed to prove its execution inasmuch as only a certified copy of the WILL was produced before the trial court. Further, the plaint was found to be bereft of the date of the execution of the WILL, nor was there any description of the witnesses to the WILL or whether they were alive at the time.
ii) Reliance was placed on Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act, 188211 to observe that ever since the death of the common ancestor, the plaintiffs had allowed Ramesh Chand to reside in the suit property, allowed his name to be mutated in the revenue records and collected rent from the shopkeepers, thus, effectively portraying Ramesh Chand as the owner. In such circumstances, the plaintiffs could not appear out of the blue as the actual owners so as to challenge the sale deeds by which the appellants derived title to the suit property.
iii) With respect to the contention that the sale deeds were barred by the doctrine of lis pendens, the trial court held that the doctrine excepted from its ambit suits that are collusive in nature, which the second suit was found to be. Furthermore, no objection had been taken by the plaintiffs during the pendency of the second suit with respect to the strangers taking possession.
10 Evidence Act, hereafter 11 ToP Act, hereafter 2374 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports iv) The amendment applied for by the plaintiffs, referred to above, was ostensibly made with the purpose of getting over the bar of limitation. If it were a suit seeking only recovery of possession, the prescribed period of limitation would be 12 (twelve) years, whereas for cancellation, it would be 3 (three) years. However, the trial court did not confine itself to what the plaintiffs averred in paragraph 13A (inserted by way of amendment) and looking at the nature of relief claimed, placed reliance on Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 196312 providing only a three-year limitation period for cancellation of documents. The subject suit was instituted only in 2003 qua sale deeds which had been executed 11 (eleven) years prior in 1992. Thus, the suit was held to be barred by limitation.
v) Additionally, it was held that the plaintiffs had been unable to prove their ownership of the suit property and, thus, were not entitled to the consequential reliefs sought for.
10. Aggrieved, the plaintiffs filed a first appeal before the District Judge13. During the pendency of this appeal, the second plaintiff had also filed an interlocutory application, again seeking an amendment. On this occasion, he sought to introduce in the plaint the relief of declaration with respect to the disputed sale deeds. Given the stand taken in paragraph 13A of the plaint that cancellation of the sale deeds had been prayed for only as and by way of abundant caution, a completely new relief of declaration that the sale deeds dated 16th June, 1992 and 29th June, 1992 do not affect the title of the plaintiffs to the suit property and are not binding on them was sought by the second plaintiff which effectively turned his said stand on its face. Surprisingly, this application was allowed by the first appellate court vide order dated 18th October, 2016. However, on an application made by the appellants under Article 227 of the Constitution, the High Court set aside the same vide its order dated 06th December, 2016.
11. The first appellate court thereafter, vide judgment dated 04th March, 2017, allowed the appeal and decreed the suit of the plaintiffs on the following grounds:
12 Limitation Act, hereafter 13 first appellate court, hereafter [2025] 4 S.C.R. 2375Rajeev Gupta & Ors. v. Prashant Garg & Ors. i) In the first suit, Ms. Leelawati relied upon the WILL which was not contested by Ramesh Chand, thus, proving the veracity of the WILL. Furthermore, the appellants being strangers to the family could not question the validity of the WILL, more so when none of the family members themselves had laid such a challenge.
ii) The appellants traced their interest in the suit property from Ramesh Chand, who himself had never claimed ownership of the suit property either on the basis of the WILL or a family settlement. Their case being that Ramesh Chand acquired ownership through the latter, the burden to prove the same rested on the appellants.
iii) Since Ramesh Chand was never the owner, the sale deeds executed by him in favour of the appellants were void and, thus, it could not affect the plaintiffs’ right to the suit property, hence obviating the necessity to seek a declaration qua such sale deeds. Consequently, Article 59 of the 1963 Act would not apply, the deeds having been executed by a person who had no right to execute them, with the plaintiffs not being a party thereto.
iv) The sale deeds were held to be hit by the doctrine of lis pendens, having been executed during the pendency of the second suit. The trial court’s finding of the second suit being collusive was set aside on the ground that the compromise arrived at in the said suit benefitted only Ramesh Chand, and not the plaintiffs.
12. The second appeal carried by the appellants before the High Court resulted in the judgment and decree impugned in this civil appeal. It was held by the High Court as follows:
i) The sale deeds being void, having been hit by lis pendens, the plaintiffs were not obliged to seek the relief of cancellation. Further, it was Article 65 of the 1963 Act which would govern the suit proceedings and the relief of possession having been sought, the period of limitation prescribed therefor being 12 (twelve) years.
ii) The plaints of both the first and the second suits were examined. In the first suit, Ms. Leelawati claimed title to the suit property through the WILL, which suit was eventually compromised. 2376 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports In the second suit too, it was categorically averred that the WILL executed did not give any share in the suit property to Ramesh Chand. This suit too was decreed on compromise, with both parties admitting execution of the WILL. The execution of the WILL having, thus, been proved by admission of both the plaintiffs and the predecessor-in-interest of the appellants, there thus arose no need to prove the WILL in the present proceedings, the issue being barred by res-judicata.
iii) The subject suit was held to be instituted within limitation, Article 65 of the 1963 Act being applicable since the plaintiffs sought possession not on the basis of the cancellation of void documents, but on the basis of title. Though there was a prayer seeking cancellation of the documents, the benefit of the outer limitation period of 12 (twelve) years for recovery of possession would still accrue in favour of the plaintiffs.
iv) The compromise decree in the first suit would not bind the plaintiffs since they were not parties to the suit. Hence, the subject suit being decreed by the first appellate court was confirmed.
ARgumenTs
13. Mr. Gulati, learned senior counsel on behalf of the appellants, assailed the impugned judgment on the following grounds:
(i) First, though the plaintiffs’ claim to title rested entirely on the WILL, the plaint was woefully bereft of pertinent particulars with respect to execution of the document, such as the date of its execution, who were the attesting witnesses and whether the WILL was registered or not. Furthermore, the original of the WILL had not been produced before any forum in the present proceedings, and only a certified copy of the WILL was produced, that too 5 (five) years after the subject suit was instituted. There was no pleading in the plaint that the original WILL had been misplaced or lost. Thus, the courts below could not have accepted the WILL without the plaintiffs first having proved the loss of the original.
(ii) Secondly, though the plaint originally contained a prayer for cancellation of the sale deeds, the same was later given up on the premise that it was wholly unnecessary and had only [2025] 4 S.C.R. 2377Rajeev Gupta & Ors. v. Prashant Garg & Ors. been made by way of abundant caution. Once such prayer stood removed, the only prayer remaining in the suit was that of seeking possession. However, where there lay a cloud over the title, such a suit for bare relief of possession could not lie and succeed.
(iii) Thirdly, the first and the second suits, which were decreed by way of compromise, were evidently collusive suits and, thus, constituted an exception to the doctrine of lis pendens. Further, the validity of the execution of the WILL was not an issue that was determined in either of the two suits, so as to constitute res judicata in the present proceedings. Even in the subject suit, Ramesh Chand’s daughter, i.e., the seventh defendant had admitted in her evidence that she was paid money by the plaintiffs to settle the subject suit, though she was also a witness to both the sale deeds executed by her father.
(iv) Fourthly, the compromise in the second suit was recorded only on 13th October, 1992, by which time Ramesh Chand had already executed the two sale deeds. Having sold his share in the subject property anterior to the compromise, Ramesh Chand no longer had any locus to enter into the said compromise, having transferred the entirety of his rights, title and interest in the suit property to the appellants. Reliance was placed on Section 18 of the Evidence Act to urge that an admission by a person would be binding only if the person still had an interest in the matter at the time the admission was made.
(v) Fifthly, the interim order of injunction dated 05th June, 1992 in the second suit was never communicated to the appellants. Though the plaint contains a bare averment with respect to such order being within the knowledge of the appellants, no details of the same were ever given. Furthermore, this interim order was not produced before the trial court and was only produced for the first time at the first appellate stage.
(vi) Sixthly, Section 41 of the ToP Act would apply to the present proceedings, as rightly held by the trial court, since the plaintiffs had allowed Ramesh Chand to act as the owner for all intents and purposes to the world at large. This is evinced by the factum of Ramesh Chand’s name being mutated in the municipal records in respect of the eastern portion of the suit property all the way 2378 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports back in 1956, and that he was allowed to collect rent from the tenants in possession of part of the suit property.
(vii) Seventhly, the second plaintiff in his cross-examination admitted that within 10 (ten) days of purchase of the suit property, in 1992 itself, the appellants had taken possession of the suit property. Despite the cause of action having arisen in 1992, the plaintiffs chose to institute the suit 11 (eleven) years later in 2003. The limitation period prescribed for suits seeking cancellation of documents being 3 (three) years, as laid down in Article 59 of the 1963 Act, the plaintiffs’ suit was evidently barred by limitation.
14. Mr. Gulati, resting on the aforesaid contentions, appealed that it was a fit and proper case where the impugned second appellate judgment and decree ought to be reversed and that of the trial court restored.
15. Mr. Kumar, learned counsel for the plaintiffs, assiduously argued in favour of upholding of the impugned second appellate judgment and decree, asserting that it was in accordance with law and did not deserve interference, on the following grounds:
(a) First, the WILL of Dr. Babu Ram Garg gave all the three sons shares of the testator’s properties, leaving none behind. As per the document, Ramesh Chand only inherited the pharmacy business and Rs 5000. Thus, Ramesh Chand (the vendor of the appellants) not having been bequeathed any interest in the suit property by his father, he could not have transferred any portion thereof to the appellants. The plaintiffs had duly produced a certified copy of the registered WILL on 26th February, 2003 and a certified copy was also exhibited on 06th February, 2008. At no point in the proceedings did the appellants raise any additional issue with respect to the WILL or non-production of the original thereof. Thus, the issue could not be agitated for the first time before this Court.
(b) Secondly, the WILL stood admitted by all heirs of Dr. Babu Ram Garg with none of the legal heirs contesting the same. In view thereof, the appellants could not have raised a challenge to the WILL when the party through whom they traced their title, i.e., Ramesh Chand, never contested the WILL. It was argued that any defence that could not have been taken by the person from whom a transferee derives his title could not be taken by such transferee.
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 2379Rajeev Gupta & Ors. v. Prashant Garg & Ors.
(c) Thirdly, the sale deeds executed by Ramesh Chand in favour of the appellants were executed in violation of the ad-interim stay order dated 05th June, 1992 passed in the second suit and hence, were void.
(d) Fourthly, the plaint duly prayed for cancellation of sale deeds, by way of abundant caution. The issue was duly contested by the appellants and, thus, they cannot today claim that such prayer was never made.
(e) Fifthly, the appellants would not get the benefit of Section 41 of the ToP Act in the absence of any pleadings to such effect. It was argued that there is no whisper of the alleged ostensible ownership of Ramesh Chand in either the written statement, the grounds of the second appeal or the present special leave petition. The appellants could not be held entitled to the benefit of such provision since no case was specifically made out for the same.
(f) Sixthly, without prejudice to the submission that no challenge could have been laid to such compromise without filing an application under Order XXIII Rule 3, CPC, it was contended that no issue was framed in the subject suit/proceedings with respect to the compromise decrees passed in the earlier suits being collusive. Further, no questions or suggestions in this regard were put to the plaintiffs’ witnesses. The compromise decree in the second suit was, thus, valid and binding on the appellants.
(g) Lastly, it was submitted that the main relief sought in the subject suit was recovery of possession, the limitation period for which is 12 (twelve) years, as prescribed in Article 65 of the Limitation Act. The dispossession of the plaintiffs having occurred in 1992, institution of the subject suit in 2003 was well within the period of limitation. The relief of cancellation of void sale deeds was merely an ancillary relief, and would not disentitle the plaintiffs to the primary relief for which the limitation period is 12 (twelve) years.
A nAlysis And R eAsons
16. The present proceedings involve determination of multiple legal issues of some complexity. We would endeavour to deal with them sequentially.
2380 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports I. Whether the suIt Was barred by lImItatIon
17. A coordinate Bench of this Court, in its decision of Khatri Hotels (P) Ltd. v. Union of India14, examined the position under Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908 vis-à-vis Article 58 of the Limitation Act to observe that the right to sue would accrue when there was a clear and unequivocal threat of infringement of the plaintiff’s right. However, while the former provision simply stated that the period of limitation commenced when the right to sue accrues, in a marked linguistic departure, the latter provision stated that the limitation would commence when the right to sue “first” accrued. Having observed so, this Court held that:
“30. While enacting Article 58 of the 1963 Act, the legislature has designedly made a departure from the language of Article 120 of the 1908 Act. The word ‘first’ has been used between the words ‘sue’ and ‘accrued’. This would mean that if a suit is based on multiple causes of action, the period of limitation will begin to run from the date when the right to sue first accrues. To put it differently, successive violation of the right will not give rise to fresh cause and the suit will be liable to be dismissed if it is beyond the period of limitation counted from the day when the right to sue first accrued.”
(emphasis supplied)
18. Khatri Hotels (P) Ltd. (supra) noticed the decision of a three-Judge Bench in Rukhmabai v. Lala Laxminarayan15 wherein the legal position was stated thus:
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