K.P. Tamilmaran v. The State By Deputy Superintendent of Police
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 576; [2025] 4 S.C.R. 1865
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia, Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra
- Decided
- 28 Apr 2025
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 2253/2025
- Sections
- 3(2), 218, 4, 217, 154, 311, 165, 161, 162, 157, 3, 164
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:20 am. Original source ↗
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[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1865 : 2025 INSC 576 K.P. Tamilmaran v.
The State by Deputy Superintendent of Police (Criminal Appeal No. 2253 of 2025)
28 April 2025 [Sudhanshu Dhulia* and Prashant Kumar Mishra, JJ.] Issue for Consideration Whether the High Court was justified in upholding the conviction and sentence of A-15 under Sections 217, 218, Penal Code, 1860 and ss.3(2)(i), 4, SC/ST Act, 1989 and modifying the conviction and sentence of A-14, while upholding the conviction and sentence of the other co-accused.
Headnotes† Penal Code, 1860 – ss.302 r/w 149, 217, 218 – Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 – ss.3(2)(i), 4 – Murder of a young couple in the name of honour killing where the girl belonged to the Vanniyar community and the boy was a Dalit – Eventually, 11 accused were convicted and sentenced by the High Court wherein A-14 and A-15 were the police officers who were convicted by the Trial Court u/ss.217, 218, IPC and ss.3(2)(i), 4, SC/ST Act, 1989 and were sentenced to life imprisonment – However, High Court modified the conviction and sentence of A-14 by acquitting him for offences u/s.3(2)(i), SC/ST Act, 1989 and s.218, Penal Code, 1860 but, maintained his conviction u/s.4, SC/ST Act and s.217, IPC; the conviction and sentence of A-15 was upheld – Present appeal by eleven accused:
Held: A-14 (Sub-inspector) and A-15 (Inspector-IO) both committed the offences u/s.217, IPC and s.4, SC/ST Act as they did not register the FIR at the first instance with the intention to save the culprits – In addition, A-15 was the main architect behind the FIR which falsely implicated the four members of Schedule Caste community – Further, A-15 was in-charge of the investigation which led to the filing of the charge-sheet against the innocent persons belonging to Dalit community – A-15 did this entire exercise to absolve the culprits belonging to the Vanniyar community of their complicity * Author 1866 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports in the crime, and he knowingly and deliberately falsely implicated some of the Dalits in an offence punishable with death – A-15 also manufactured the extra-judicial confessions and evidence – High Court rightly upheld the conviction of A-15 u/ss.217, 218, IPC and ss.4, 3(2)(i), SC/ST Act and the sentence of life imprisonment – Impugned judgment not interfered with. [Paras 74, 75] Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.154 – Penal Code, 1860 – ss.302 r/w 149, 217, 218 – Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 – ss.3(2)(i), 4 – Murder of a young couple in the name of honour killing – A-14 and A-15 were the police officers who were convicted by the Trial Court u/ss.217, 218, IPC and ss.3(2)(i), 4, SC/ST Act, 1989 and were sentenced to life imprisonment – High Court upheld the conviction of A-14 but modified his sentence by acquitting him of charges u/s.3(2)(i), SC/ST Act, 1989 and s.218, Penal Code, 1860 however, the conviction and sentence of A15 was not modified – One of their defence was that nobody came forward to lodge a complaint for registration of FIR:
Held: Such defence is unacceptable in light of the law as well as the facts of the case and was rightly disbelieved by High Court – s.154, CrPC should not be misunderstood to mean that the police is empowered to register FIR only in cases where some informant comes forward and provides information regarding the commission of a cognizable offence to the police – Once the police gets information regarding the commission of a cognizable offence, whether it is through any informant/complainant or otherwise, police is empowered to register the case and proceed with the investigation – In the present case, A-14 (Sub-inspector) and A-15 (Inspector-IO) had the information regarding the incident on the day of the incident itself – However, they still did not register the FIR. [Para 69] Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – ss.156, 157(1) – Police Act, 1861 – ss.23, 24 – Penal Code, 1860 – ss.302 r/w 149, 217, 218 – Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 – ss.3(2)(i), 4:
Held: The purpose of an investigation is to reach to the truth – Duty of an Investigating Officer is to lawfully collect evidence – In the present case, the Investigating Officer (A-15) not only covered evidence but fabricated his own – Instead of collecting evidence, he created evidence and tried to implicate the innocent and set the [2025] 4 S.C.R. 1867K.P. Tamilmaran v. The State by Deputy Superintendent of Police guilty loose – In order to fulfil his wicked design, he deliberately and willfully violated the mandate of ss.154 and 157(1), CrPC as well as ss.23 and 24, Police Act, 1861. [Para 67] Criminal Jurisprudence – Hostile witness – Meaning – Evidence Act, 1872 – ss.154, 3, 155:
Held: The phrase ‘hostile witness’ is used for a witness who gives a statement contrary to the story of the side for which he/she is a witness – Only because a witness has supported some, though not all, aspects of a case, it would not automatically mean that this witness has to be declared ‘hostile’ – A party can cross-examine its own witness u/s.154 even without getting a declaration of ‘hostility’ – The only restriction to cross-examination u/s.154 is that the party, who seeks to cross-examine its own witness, must obtain the leave of the Court – If part of the evidence of a hostile witness corroborates with other reliable evidence, then that part of the evidence is admissible – Once a prosecution witness has been declared hostile and then cross-examined by the prosecution, then it is for the Court to evaluate the veracity of the testimony – There can be several reasons for a witness to turn hostile and the court must also look into these factors while evaluating the evidence given by a hostile witness – The purpose of a Trial Court is to go to the truth of the matter – Whatever evidence is there before the Court must be examined, tested, corroborated (whenever necessary), before a verdict can be finally given. [Paras 31, 36] Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.311 – Evidence Act, 1872 – s.165 – Power to summon material witness, or examine person present – Judge’s power to put questions or order production – Powers of Court u/s.311 and s.165, Evidence Act: Held: Power u/s.311, CrPC can be invoked at any stage of the trial, even after the closing of the evidence – Powers of the Court u/s.165, Evidence Act are complementary to s.311, CrPC – Powers u/s.311, CrPC can either be exercised on an application moved by either side to the case or suo moto by the Court – In case a person is not listed as a witness in the charge-sheet but later, the prosecution desires to bring that person as an additional prosecution witness, then the prosecution can move an application to bring this person as a prosecution witness – It is then for the Court to decide whether such a person is required as a witness or not – If the Court finds that such a person should have been examined as a prosecution witness then the Court may allow the application and such a 1868 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports person can be examined as a prosecution witness – Thereafter, the normal course of examination-in-chief, cross-examination, etc. would follow – On the other hand, when the Court calls a person as a Court witness, he can be cross-examined by either side but only with the leave of the Court – Further, the cross-examination is to be restricted only to what was stated by this witness in his/her reply to the questions of the Court, and a Court witness cannot be contradicted to his/her previous statements made before the police i.e. statements u/s.161 of CrPC – However, the special powers of the Court u/s.165, Evidence Act are not impaired or controlled by the provisions of s.162, CrPC – Courts are not barred from putting questions which may contradict the witness with the previous statements made before the police. [Paras 48, 51] Words and Phrases – ‘may’, ‘shall’ – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.311 – Discussed.
Evidence – Hostile witness – Position in India vis-à-vis under English law – Discussed. [Para 30] Case Law Cited Jagir Singh v. State (Delhi) (1975) 3 SCC 562; Sat Paul v. Delhi Administration [1976] 2 SCR 11 : (1976) 1 SCC 727; Neeraj Dutta v. State (NCT of Delhi) [2022] 5 SCR 104 : (2023) 4 SCC 731; Paulmeli v. State of T.N. [2014] 6 SCR 420 : (2014) 13 SCC 90; Ramesh Harijan v. State of U.P. [2012] 6 SCR 688 : (2012) 5 SCC 777; Bhajju v. State of Madhya Pradesh [2012] 5 SCR 37 : (2012) 4 SCC 327; Jaikam Khan v. State of U.P. [2021] 14 SCR 767 : (2021) 13 SCC 716; State of A.P. v. S. Rayappa [2006] 2 SCR 200 : (2006) 4 SCC 512; Jamatraj Kewalji Govani v. State of Maharashtra [1967] 3 SCR 415 : 1967 SCC OnLine SC 19; Rama Paswan v. State of Jharkhand [2007] 5 SCR 83 : (2007) 11 SCC 191; Zahira Habibullah Sheikh & Anr. v. State of Gujarat & Ors. [2006] 2 SCR 1081 : (2006) 3 SCC 374; Mahabir Mandal & Ors. v. State of Bihar [1972] 3 SCR 639 : (1972) 1 SCC 748; Dipakbhai Jagdishchandra Patel v. State of Gujarat & Anr. [2019] 6 SCR 701 : (2019) 16 SCC 547; Raghunandan v. State of U.P. [1974] 3 SCR 92 : (1974) 4 SCC 186; Ram Chander v. State of Haryana [1981] 3 SCR 12 : (1981) 3 SCC 191; Lalita Kumari v. Govt. of U.P. [2013] 14 SCR 713: (2014) 2 SCC 1 – referred to. Khijiruddin Sonar v. Emperor, 1925 SCC OnLine Cal 259;
Praphullakumar Sarkar v. Emperor, 1931 SCC OnLine Cal 7 – referred to.
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1869K.P. Tamilmaran v. The State by Deputy Superintendent of Police List of Acts Penal Code, 1860; Evidence Act, 1872; Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Police Act, 1861.
List of Keywords Sections 217, 218 of the Penal Code, 1860; Sections 3(2)(i), 4 of Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989; Honour killing; Double murder; Vanniyar Community; Dalit Community; Poisoned; Caste-based abuses; Delay in trial; Conviction and sentence modified; Hostile witness; Crossexamination; Cross-examine own witness; Declaration of hostility; Prosecution witness; Court witness; Testimony of prosecution witness; Impeach credibility of own witness; falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus; Related witnesses; Interested witnesses; Eyewitness; Duty on court to summon and examine or recall or re-examine any person as witness; Not listed as witness in charge-sheet; Additional prosecution witness; examination-in-chief; Court witness cannot be contradicted to his/her previous statements made before the police; Wrong and misleading investigation; Extra-judicial confession; Implicate the innocent; Not only covered evidence but fabricated; Commission of cognizable offence; Registration of FIR obligatory; Neglected duties and disobeyed law; Knowingly and deliberately falsely implicated Dalits; Victim compensation.
Case Arising From CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
2253 of 2025 From the Judgment and Order dated 08.06.2022 of the High Court of Judicature at Madras in CRLA No. 626 of 2021 With Criminal Appeal No(s). 2254, 2255, 2256, 2257, 2258, 2259-2260 and 2261 of 2025 Appearances for Parties Advs. for the Appellant:
Ratnakar Dash, M. Sathyanarayanan, Gopal Sankaranarayanan, Siddharth Aggarwal, S. Nagamuthu, Mrs. Anjana Prakash, Sr. Advs., K. Balu, Avinish K Saurab, S. Thananjayan, Poornachandiran R, 1870 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Ajith Williyam S, Ms. Puspita Basak, Ankur S. Kulkarni, Karuppaiah Meyyappan, Ms. Kanika Kalaiyarasan, Tushar Srivastava, Shourya Dashupta, Nirnimesh Dube, S. Prabu Ramasubramanian, Raghunatha Sethupathy B, Ms. Arshiya Ghose, S. Sabari Bala Pandian, Pariksheet Bishnoi, Yusuf, Muthalagu, Naveen, G Anandan, G Jai Singh, Muthu Ganesa Pandian, M. A. Gouthaman, Dr. Ram Sankar, Mrs. Harini Ramsankar, Mrs. Usha Prabakaran, Maheswaran Prabakaran, M/s. Ram Sankar & Co, C. Paramsivam, Nishant Sharma, Rakesh K. Sharma, Ms. Promila, Deepak Reddy, Pradum Kumar, Neeraj Dubey.
Advs. for the Respondent:
Vikramjeet Banerjee, A.S.G., Mukesh Kumar Maroria, Arkaj Kumar, B K Satija, Ms. Rukhmini Bobde, Anukalp Jain, Madhav Sinhal, Rohit Khare, Ms. Sunanda Shukla, Ishaan Sharma, Arvind Kumar Sharma, Rahul Shyam Bhandari, Ms. G Priyadharshni, Satyam Pathak, Prabhakar Pahepuri, Harsh Vardhan, K Kesavan.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment Sudhanshu Dhulia, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The challenge before this Court in all these Appeals is to the decision of the Madras High Court dated 08.06.2022. Before proceeding to the impugned judgment, it is necessary to trace the trajectory of this case from the Trial Court onwards, since it has passed through a maze of facts.
3. A total of fifteen accused had faced trial, and the Trial Court ultimately convicted thirteen of them. Amongst them, A-1 to A-3, A-5 to A-8, A-10 to A-13 were convicted primarily under Sections 302 read with 149 of the Indian Penal Code (for short ‘IPC’). They were all sentenced to life imprisonment, except A-2 (Maruthupandiyan), who was given death sentence by the Trial Court. A-14 and A-15 were the police officers, who were convicted by the Trial Court under Sections 217, 218 of IPC and Sections 3(2)(i), 4 of the Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (for short, ‘SC/ST Act’), and both of them were sentenced to life imprisonment. A-4 (Ayyasamy) [2025] 4 S.C.R. 1871K.P. Tamilmaran v. The State by Deputy Superintendent of Police and A-9 (Gunasekaran) were acquitted by the Trial Court, and no appeal against their acquittal was filed before the High Court.
4. By the impugned judgment, the High Court has modified the conviction and sentence of A-14 (Sub-inspector K.P. Tamilmaran), acquitting him for offences under Section 3(2)(i) of the SC/ST Act and Section 218 of IPC, but maintaining his conviction for offences under Section 4 of the SC/ST Act and Section 217 of IPC, and thus reducing the sentence imposed from life imprisonment to two years rigorous imprisonment. The conviction and sentence of another police officer (A-15, Inspector M. Sellamuthu) has been upheld. In the case of A-2, the conviction by the Trial Court has been maintained but the sentence was changed from death penalty to life imprisonment. The High Court has also acquitted two other accused, i.e. A-3 (Rangasamy) and A-13 (Chinnadurai). The remaining appeals of all other co-accused were dismissed, and their conviction and sentence was upheld.
5. No appeal has been filed against the acquittal of the above-mentioned accused by the High Court. Before us, now the remaining eleven accused i.e. A-1, A-2, A-5 to A-8, A-10 to A-12, A-14, A-15, have challenged their conviction and sentence.
6. At this stage, it is necessary to bring a few crucial aspects of this case, in order to have a better perspective.
7. This is a case of a dastardly murder of a young couple, Murugesan and Kannagi, who were only in their early twenties, when they were killed. Both of them were administered poison in full view of a large number of villagers. The masterminds and the main perpetrators of this macabre act were none other than the father and the brother of the girl Kannagi. The reason behind the murder of this young couple was that Kannagi, belonging to the ‘Vanniyar’ community, had dared to marry Murugesan, who was a ‘Dalit’ from the same village. So, at the root of this crime is the deeply entrenched hierarchical caste system in India, and ironically, this most dishonorable act goes by the name of honour-killing!
8. The brief facts of the case are as follows:
i. Kannagi and Murugesan, both residents of village ‘Pudukoorapettai’ in District Cuddalore, Tamil Nadu, were in love. Murugesan had just completed his B.E. (Chemical Engineering) from a college in Chidambaram, Tamil Nadu, and was employed in Bangalore, 1872 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports whereas Kannagi was completing her B.Com. studies from the same college. Knowing well that the Vanniyar community, to which Kannagi’s family belonged, would never allow their union, the two got secretly married before the Registrar of Marriage at Cuddalore on 05.05 .
2003, and got their marriage registered.
The marriage certificate was marked as Exhibit P-1 before the Trial Court.
ii. After performing their marriage, the two returned to their village and were leading a normal life with their respective families, but then in the first week of July, 2003, both left their village quietly without attracting any attention.
iii. On 03.07.2003, A-2 (Maruthupandiyan), brother of Kannagi, reached the house of PW-1 Samikannu (father of Murugesan), with a big sickle in his hand, and ordered PW-1 to bring his son back to the village. The reason why he was looking for Murugesan, A-2 said, was that Murugesan had borrowed money from him which he was now refusing to return. Samikannu (PW-1) leaves his house the same day to look for Murugesan. He goes to his sister-in-law’s house in the village Rasapalayam where he met Murugesan and asked Murugesan to send Kannagi to her parents. Thereafter, PW-1 returned to his house that day. After a gap of four days, on 07.07.2003, A-2 again comes to the house of PW-1 and threatens him for the second time to bring Murugesan back to the village. On 07.07.2003, PW-1 again goes in search of Murugesan but he returns only on 08.07.2003, and by that time, his son and Kannagi had already been murdered. It is further on record that, on 07.07.2003, A-2 also threatened A-4 (Ayyasamy), who was made an accused by the prosecution, though he was the uncle of Murugesan. A-2 repeats the same false story of Murugesan borrowing money from him, which he had refused to return and therefore he was on a lookout for him.
iv. The prosecution story then proceeds to state that on 07.07.2003, A-4 leaves his village Pudukoorapettai for the house of PW- 15 (Tamilarasi), sister of Murugesan, in Vannangudikadu village, where Murugesan was hiding. A-4 brings Murugesan back to Pudukoorapettai village and presents him before A-1 (Duraisamy) and A-2 (Maruthupandiyan), father and brother of Kannagi, respectively.
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1873K.P. Tamilmaran v. The State by Deputy Superintendent of Police v. By the time Murugesan was brought to the village, it was evening (on 07.07.2003). Thereafter, as per the prosecution story, A-1 to A-13 undressed Murugesan, tied him to a post and then he was mercilessly beaten by the mob including A-1 to A-13. This was done in full view of many villagers who were present there, yet there was no attempt to stop this savage brutality. A-1 to A-13 continued to torture Murugesan compelling him to reveal the whereabouts of Kannagi. After much physical torture and beating, when Murugesan was unable to bear it any longer, he finally revealed that Kannagi was in PW-23 Saroja’s house (who was the mother-in-law of A-4). Immediately a Tata Sumo car was arranged by A-1, which was driven by PW-22 (Jayatharasan), in which A-4 to A-11 climbed and proceeded to Moongilthuraipattu village where PW-23’s house was located, with the intention of getting Kannagi back to Pudukoorapettai village.
vi. Kannagi was finally brought to her village, and by this time it was about 5:30 AM in the morning (of 08.07.2003). Both Kannagi and Murugesan were then taken to a cashew grove near the village. Once there, A-1 gets Nuvacron1 (insecticide/poison) in a steel tumbler and gives it to his son A-2, and orders him to administer that to his daughter Kannagi.
vii. A-2 then forced Nuvacron down Kannagi’s throat which caused her death in minutes. The prosecution story here though also suggests that A-2 tried to administer the remaining Nuvacron to Murugesan but when Murugesan resisted, this task was assigned to A-4. All the same, we must note that this version of prosecution, that A-4 administered or tried to administer poison to Murugesan, was not accepted in view of the evidence of PW-49 (Chinnapillai, step-mother of Murugesan) who had said that she saw A-2 administering poison to her son Murugesan. Like Kannagi, Murugesan too died minutes after being forced to drink the poison. PW-49 is an eye-witness who has stuck to her deposition that it was A-2 who had administered poison to her son Murugesan, and not A-4. A-4 has ultimately been acquitted by the Trial Court and as stated above, no appeal against his acquittal was filed before the High Court. We will deal with this 1 Insecticide with common name “Monocrotophos”. Considered highly toxic by all routes of exposure. The ingestion of even 120 mg of Monocrotophos can be fatal. 1874 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports aspect in greater detail at a later point in this judgment. We must also point out here that PW-49 was not mentioned in the charge-sheet as one of the prosecution witnesses. It was only in the middle of the trial that an application was moved under Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short ‘CrPC’) by the prosecution to bring PW-49 as a witness. viii. Returning to the facts of the case. The two bodies were then burnt in different places-Kannagi in the village cremation ground and Murugesan at a place nearby.
ix. Meanwhile, as per the prosecution case, A-14 and 15 (police officers) not only knew about these events but they had also visited the crime scene, according to some of the witnesses on 08.07.2003 itself, and yet they did not lodge an FIR, which was their statutory duty under Section 154 and Section 157 CrPC. Not only this, but when PW-49 goes to the police station to lodge an FIR on 08.07.2003, she was rebuffed and abused at the police station, and practically thrown out of the station. x. It was only after a gap of nine days, when some leaders belonging to the Dalit community raised this issue through Press and Media and a support was gathered from the public, that a case was finally registered on 17.07.2003 as Crime No.356 of 2003 under Sections 147, 302, 201 of IPC at police station Virudhachalam. The FIR, however, was registered on the basis of the extra-judicial confession of A-1 before PW-32 (Ashokan), who was the Village Administrative Officer. In this FIR, eight accused were named, four belonging to the Dalit community and the other four belonging to the Vanniyar community. The Dalits included PW-1 (Samikannu), who was none other than the father of the deceased Murugesan; A-4 (Ayyasamy), who was the uncle of Murugesan and who allegedly brought Murugesan back to Pudukoorapettai village from his sister’s house; Ilayaperumal, another uncle of Murugesan, and Kannadasan, who ultimately became a prosecution witness as PW-33. The four Vanniyars who were made accused were A-1, A-2 (who were the father and brother of Kannagi, respectively), A-3 and Anbalagan, who later became a prosecution witness as PW-29.
xi. Based on this FIR, an investigation was done by the local police and a charge-sheet was filed on 16.09.2003 against all [2025] 4 S.C.R. 1875K.P. Tamilmaran v. The State by Deputy Superintendent of Police the eight above-mentioned accused under Sections 147, 302, 201 of IPC.
xii. Meanwhile, the questionable manner in which the entire investigation was carried out by the local police, compelled the family of the deceased Murugesan to seek interference from the Madras High Court where a petition was filed with a prayer that the investigation in this case must be handed over to the Central Bureau of Investigation (for short ‘CBI’). The High Court, by its order dated 22.04.2004, allowed this application and directed that the investigation be handed over to CBI.
xiii. On 21.05.2004, the CBI again registered its FIR under Sections 147, 302, 201 of IPC and started the investigation. A chargesheet was filed on 14.10.2005 against fifteen accused, which included two Dalits i.e. A-4 (Ayyasamy) and A-9 (Gunasekaran), two police officers i.e. A-14 (K.P Tamilmaran) and A-15 (M. Sellamuthu). The remaining accused belong to the Vanniyar community. As we have already stated in the beginning, A-4 and A-9 were acquitted by the Trial Court, while accused A-3 and A-13 were later acquitted by the High Court in Appeal. xiv. There has been an inordinate delay caused in this case. The incident is of 7 th and 8 th July, 2003, and the Trial was concluded only on 24.09.2021. The delay on account of the belated filing of the FIR, etc. we have already discussed above, but the case was only committed to Sessions on 15.03.2010 i.e. after more than seven years. The proceedings again remained stalled till charges were ultimately framed on 14.07.2017. An additional charge under Section 3 of the SC/ST Act was framed by the Trial Court against A-14 and A-15 in 2020.
As noticed by the High Court, the reason for this long and inordinate delay was because of the multiple petitions filed by the accused for one reason or the other primarily as a challenge to the proceedings itself.
9. As mentioned in the beginning, the High Court in appeal, by the impugned judgment, modified the sentence of A-2 from death penalty to life imprisonment, while upholding his conviction. A-3 and A-13 were acquitted by the High Court. A-14 was acquitted for offences under Section 3 of SC/ST Act and Section 218 of IPC.
1876 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
10. The eleven accused who stood convicted and sentenced by the High Court are now before us. Their defence is based primarily on the alleged weaknesses of the prosecution theory, the inconsistencies and frequent contradictions in the statements of key prosecution witnesses, including its star witness PW-49 (Chinnapillai), etc. The learned senior counsels for the appellants, Mrs. Anjana Prakash, Mr. Ratnakar Dash, Mr. M. Sathyanarayanan, Mr. Siddharth Aggarwal and Mr. S. Nagamuthu have tried to convince this Court that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are unreliable and there has been a total failure on the part of the prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt.
11. The contention on behalf of A-14 and A-15 (the two police officers- K.P Tamilmaran and M. Sellamuthu, respectively), raised by learned senior counsel Mr. Siddharth Aggarwal and Mr. Gopal Sankaranarayanan, respectively, is that none of the witnesses have specifically identified them as the officers at the police station who refused to lodge the FIR when apprised of the incident. It is the contention of A-15, additionally, that merely because he had filed the charge-sheet against persons belonging to both the Dalit and Vanniyar community, the investigation conducted by him cannot be said to be motivated by a desire to falsely implicate members of the Dalit community.
12. We have heard learned senior counsels for the accused as well as the learned counsel, Mr. Rahul Shyam Bhandari, for the family of Murugesan and Mr. Vikramjit Banerjee, the learned Additional Solicitor General representing CBI.
13. In order to appreciate the sequence of events and the role of the accused, it is important to look at the testimonies of PW-1 (Samikannu-father of Murugesan), PW-2 (Velmurugan-younger brother of Murugesan), PW-3 (Palanivel-second younger brother of Murugesan), PW-15 (Tamilarasi-sister of Murugesan), and PW- 49 (Chinnapillai-step-mother of Murugesan), who are the main prosecution witnesses.
14. But before we do that, it may be necessary to say a few words about some essential aspects of this case, in order to set the context for the examination of testimonies of these key prosecution witnesses. [2025] 4 S.C.R. 1877K.P. Tamilmaran v. The State by Deputy Superintendent of Police Delay in Trial and evidentiary value of so-called “hostile witness”
15. The long and inordinate delay which has been caused in this case, right from the lodging of the FIR, speaks volumes about the gross inefficiency at the hands of the prosecution on the one hand and dilatory tactics employed by the defence on the other hand, which together led to a slow trial.
16. The second and more crucial aspect is that many of the prosecution witnesses in this case have turned, what has come to be known as ‘hostile’; a fact which has been strongly pressed by the defence in their favour. The defence would also argue that the Trial Court and High Court have mainly relied on the testimonies of the family members of Murugesan, who are interested witnesses.
17. In our opinion, there is no force in these arguments and as will be seen, there was enough material placed by the prosecution before the Trial Court, which was sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused, beyond a reasonable doubt.
18. When a witness, produced on behalf of prosecution, deposes against the prosecution version and goes against his/her own previously recorded statements, the prosecution can request the Court to declare such a witness as hostile and seek permission from the Court to cross-examine its own witness. This is the procedure followed in a Trial, as we all know. In the present case, there are as many as fifty-one prosecution witnesses and it is also a fact that many of them have turned hostile by turning against their earlier statements made before the police under section 161 CrPC, and even before the Magistrate under section 164 CrPC, in some cases. This phenomenon is not new, in fact it is sadly a common occurrence in our criminal Courts today, much to the despair and frustration of the prosecution. This case, therefore, is no exception. Despite this, however, there are witnesses in the present case, especially PW-1, PW-2, PW-3, PW-15 and PW-49, whose evidence, in the form of their testimonies before the Court, is more than sufficient to convict the present appellants. A word here about the evidentiary value of a so-called hostile witness.
19. The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (hereinafter ‘Evidence Act’) allows a party, with the leave of the Court, to cross-examine its own witness. Section 154 of the Evidence Act originally read as follows: 1878 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports “154.Question by party to his own witness The Court may, in its discretion, permit the person who calls a witness to put any questions to him which might be put in crossexamination by the adverse party.”
20. The Calcutta High Court, in Khijiruddin Sonar v. Emperor 1925 SCC OnLine Cal 259, while interpreting Section 154 of the Evidence Act, held that “When a witness who has been called by the prosecution is permitted to be cross-examined on behalf of the prosecution under the provisions of Section 154 of the Evidence Act, the result of that course being permitted is to discredit that witness altogether and not merely to get rid of a part of his testimony”.
21. But this judgment in Khijiruddin was overruled by a five-Judge bench of the Calcutta High Court in Praphullakumar Sarkar v. Emperor 1931 SCC OnLine Cal 7. The High Court was answering a reference from a Division Bench regarding the specific question of whether the testimony of a witness, who was cross-examined by the party which produced him/her, should be discarded totally, partially, or not discarded at all. Chief Justice Rankin, speaking for three other Judges and himself, answered the reference in the following terms: “24. In my opinion, the fact that a witness is dealt with under Section 154 of the Evidence Act, even when under that Section he is “cross-examined” to credit, in no way warrants a direction to the jury that they are bound in law to place no reliance on his evidence, or that the party who called and cross-examined him can take no advantage from any part of his evidence. There is, moreover, no rule of law that if a jury thinks that a witness has been discredited on one point they may not give credit to him on another. The rule of law is that it is for the jury to say. Of the seven questions stated by the Division Bench I propose that we should answer four, viz.—
(3) whether the evidence of a witness treated as “hostile” must be rejected in whole or in part;
(4) whether it must be rejected so far as it is in favour of the party calling the witness;
(5) whether it must be rejected so far as it is in favour of the opposite party.
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1879K.P. Tamilmaran v. The State by Deputy Superintendent of Police These three questions I would answer in the negative.
(6) Whether the whole of the evidence so far as it affects both parties favourably or unfavourably, must go to the jury for what it is worth.
25. To this question, I would be content to answer “yes,” …”
22. Justice Buckland, in the above case, in his concurring opinion holds that there is no law which states that the evidence of a witness, who has been cross-examined by its party, should be entirely rejected. In his opinion, it is for the jury (or the Judge) to form an opinion regarding the value of the testimony of such a witness.
23. All the same, later this Court in Jagir Singh v. State (Delhi) (1975) 3 SCC 562 held to the contrary and approved the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Khijiruddin. This is what was said in Jagir Singh by Justice Bhagwati:
“7. Now, it is apparent from the judgment of the High Court that the conviction of the appellant rested entirely on the evidence of Pritam Singh (P.W. 10) and Sajjan Singh (P.W. 13). Swaran Singh (P.W. 11) was also examined on behalf of the prosecution but his evidence is of no help to the prosecution because he went back on the story of the prosecution and was permitted to be cross-examined on behalf of the prosecution. It is now well settled that when a witness, who has been called by the prosecution, is permitted to be cross-examined on behalf of the prosecution, the result of that course being adopted is to discredit that witness altogether and not merely to get rid of a part of his testimony. See Khijiruddin v. Emperor….”
24. However, it is to be noted that Jagir Singh does not refer to the five- Judge Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court in Praphullakumar Sarkar.
25. But then in a subsequent decision (of which Justice Bhagwati was also a part) i.e., Sat Paul v. Delhi Administration (1976) 1 SCC 727, it was held differently. Justice Sarkaria, speaking for the Bench, clarified the earlier judgment in Jagir Singh, and held that what has been held in Jagir Singh would only be applicable where a witness through cross-examination by the party which calls it, is totally 1880 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports discredited. It is only in such a situation that the Court, as matter of prudence, discards his/her evidence in its entirety.
26. As a general rule, the testimony of a witness who has been crossexamined by the party which produced him/her will not stand totally discredited, and it is for the Court to consider what value should be attached to this testimony. After referring to a series of judgments on this point, the Court in Sat Paul held as follows:
“52. From the above conspectus, it emerges clear that even in a criminal prosecution when a witness is crossexamined and contradicted with the leave of the court, by the party calling him, his evidence cannot, as a matter of law, be treated as washed off the record altogether. It is for the Judge of fact to consider in each case whether as a result of such cross-examination and contradiction, the witness stands thoroughly discredited or can still be believed in regard to a part of his testimony. If the Judge finds that in the process, the credit of the witness has not been completely shaken, he may, after reading and considering the evidence of the witness, as a whole, with due caution and care, accept, in the light of the other evidence on the record, that part of his testimony which he finds to be creditworthy and act upon it. If in a given case, the whole of the testimony of the witness is impugned, and in the process, the witness stands squarely and totally discredited, the Judge should, as matter of prudence, discard his evidence in toto.
53. It was in the context of such a case, where, as a result of the cross-examination by the Public, Prosecutor, the prosecution witness concerned stood discredited altogether, that this Court in Jagir Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.) with the aforesaid rule of caution — which is not to be treated as a rule of law — in mind, said that the evidence of such a witness is to be rejected en bloc.”
(Emphasis Provided)
27. An examination of the cases referred above shows that there can be no doubt about the fact that the evidence of a witness, who has been cross-examined by the side which produced him/her, cannot [2025] 4 S.C.R. 1881K.P. Tamilmaran v. The State by Deputy Superintendent of Police be totally discarded [Also see:Neeraj Dutta v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2023) 4 SCC 731].
28. It may also be worthwhile to mention here that by the Criminal Law Amendment Act of 2005, sub-section 2 was added to section 154 of the Evidence Act. The amended section 154 of the Evidence Act now reads as under:
154. Question by party to his own witness.— (1) The Court may, in its discretion, permit the person who calls a witness to put any questions to him which might be put in cross-examination by the adverse party.
(2) Nothing in this section shall disentitle the person so permitted under sub-section (1), to rely on any part of the evidence of such witness.
(Emphasis Provided)
29. By way of the above amendment, the position which had been reiterated by this Court has now come in the statute itself.
30. The word ‘hostile’ or ‘hostile witness’ has not been used anywhere in the Evidence Act. The logic behind this exclusion seems to be that the declaration of witness as ‘hostile witness’ carries a specific significance under the English law, from where this term has been derived, where liberty is only granted to a side to cross-examine its own witness when such declaration of ‘hostility’ is made. The position in India is different and here it is left to the discretion of the Court to allow a party to cross-examine its own witness, regardless of a declaration of ‘hostility’. This has been explained by this Court in Sat Paul:
“38. To steer clear of the controversy over the meaning of the terms “hostile” witness, “adverse” witness, “unfavourable” witness which had given rise to considerable difficulty and conflict of opinion in England, the authors of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 seem to have advisedly avoided the use of any of those terms so that, in India, the grant of permission to cross-examine his own witness by a party is not conditional on the witness being declared “adverse” or “hostile”. Whether it be the grant of permission under Section 142 to put leading questions, or the leave under 1882 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Section 154 to ask questions which might be put in crossexamination by the adverse party, the Indian Evidence Act leaves the matter entirely to the discretion of the court (see the observations of Sir Lawrence Jenkins in Baikuntha Nath v. Prasannamoyi [AIR 1922 PC 409: 72IC 286]). The discretion conferred by Section 154 on the court is unqualified and untrammelled and is apart from any question of “hostility”. It is to be liberally exercised whenever the court from the witnesses demeanour, temper, attitude, bearing, or the tenor and tendency of his answers, or from a perusal of his previous inconsistent statement, or otherwise, thinks that the grant of such permission is expedient to extract the truth and to do justice. The grant of such permission does not amount to an adjudication by the court as to the veracity of the witness. Therefore, in the order granting such permission, it is preferable to avoid the use of such expressions, such as “declared hostile”, “declared unfavourable”, the significance of which is still not free from the historical cobwebs which, in their wake bring a misleading legacy of confusion, and conflict that had so long vexed the English Courts.”
(Emphasis Provided)
31. The phrase ‘hostile witness’ is commonly used in criminal jurisprudence and court proceedings. We too cannot escape the blame of using the term ‘hostile witness’ in our judgment. We do it for pragmatic reasons. Some words like ‘hostile witness’ in this case are now a part of our legal vocabulary. There is no point in inventing or substituting new words or phrases, at least in the present case, and we leave that for the future. But what is necessary, however, is to explain the meaning of the term as it is now to be understood. The phrase ‘hostile witness’ has come to be used for a witness who gives a statement contrary to the story of the side for which he/she is a witness. All the same, because a witness has supported some, though not all, aspects of a case, it would not automatically mean that this witness has to be declared ‘hostile’. A party can cross-examine its own witness under Section 154 Evidence Act, even without getting a declaration of ‘hostility’. The only restriction to cross-examination under Section 154 Evidence Act is that the party, who seeks to cross-examine its [2025] 4 S.C.R. 1883K.P. Tamilmaran v. The State by Deputy Superintendent of Police own witness, must obtain the leave of the Court. Whether there is a declaration of ‘hostility’ or not, one thing is clear that evidence of witness, who has been cross-examined under Section 154 Evidence Act by the party who called such witness, cannot be washed off entirely and it is for the Court to see what can be retrieved from such evidence.
32. This can be understood from another aspect. We shall now refer to the definition of the term ‘evidence’ given under Section 3 of the Evidence Act. It reads as follows:
“Evidence” - “Evidence” means and includes –
(1) all statements which the Court permits or requires to be made before it by witnesses, in relation to matters of fact under inquiry; such statements are called oral evidence;
(2) all documents including electronic records produced for the inspection of the Court; such document are called documentary evidence.”
(Emphasis Provided)
33. The statements made by a witness in Court, including in crossexamination, either conducted by the opposite party or by the party who produced the witness, would come under the definition of ‘evidence’ under Section 3 of the Evidence Act, since this evidence has come before the Court with its permission. Moreover, there is no specific bar under the Evidence Act which mandates that such evidence has to be discarded. Thus, it would form part of the entire evidence which the Court can examine while arriving at its decision, and it is for the Court to determine what value has to be given to that piece of evidence or how such evidence has to be used in a given case.
34. Viewed from a different perspective, the rejection of the entire testimony of a prosecution witness, who has been cross-examined by the prosecution, would not only harm the case of the prosecution but perhaps also of the defence in a given case. This is because as the law stands today, the benefit of the testimony of such witness can be taken by both the prosecution and the defence, allowing them to use it to build their case [See: Paulmeli v. State of T.N. (2014) 1884 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports 13 SCC 90, Ramesh Harijan v. State of U.P. (2012) 5 SCC 777]. In any case, ultimately, it will be the cause of justice that will suffer if the testimony of such witness is totally discarded. It is, therefore, rightly left to the discretion of the Court to test the evidentiary value of such a testimony.
35. Here, we may also take note of Section 155 of the Evidence Act2 which allows a party, with permission of the Court, to impeach the credibility of its own witness as per the procedure laid down therein.
36. It is though trite and much overstated but the maxim “falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus”3, is not applicable to our criminal justice system. It is for the Court to distinguish the wheat from the chaff while dealing with the depositions of a hostile witness. Courts can rely upon that part of the deposition of a hostile witness which is corroborated by other evidence on record. This Court in Bhajju v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2012) 4 SCC 327 discussed the worth of the evidence of a hostile witness in the following words:
“36. It is settled law that the evidence of hostile witnesses can also be relied upon by the prosecution to the extent to which it supports the prosecution version of the incident. The evidence of such witnesses cannot be treated as washed off the records, it remains admissible in trial and there is no legal bar to base the conviction of the accused upon such testimony, if corroborated by other reliable evidence…”
If part of the evidence of a hostile witness corroborates with other reliable evidence, then that part of the evidence is admissible. Once a prosecution witness has been declared hostile and then crossexamined by the prosecution, then it is for the Court to evaluate the veracity of the testimony. There can be several reasons for 2 155. Impeaching credit of witness: The credit of a witness may be impeached in the following ways by the adverse party, or, with the consent of the Court, by the party who calls him:
(1) By the evidence of persons who testify that they, from their knowledge of the witness, believe him to be unworthy of credit;
(2) By proof that the witness has been bribed, or has accepted the offer of a bribe, or has received any other corrupt inducement to give his evidence;
(3) By proof of former statements inconsistent with any part of his evidence which is liable to be contradicted… 3 false in one thing, false in everything.
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1885K.P. Tamilmaran v. The State by Deputy Superintendent of Police a witness to turn hostile and the court must also look into these factors while evaluating the evidence given by a hostile witness. It is an uncomfortable reality in our criminal Courts for a prosecution witness to turn hostile. But then the purpose of a Trial Court is to go to the truth of the matter. Whatever evidence is there before the Court must be examined, tested, corroborated (whenever necessary), before a verdict can be finally given.
37. One of the many reasons for witnesses turning hostile is the long delay usually caused in a trial. This is again unfortunate but true in our country. The present case is no exception. Here, the incident occurred in the year 2003, the case was committed to Sessions in the year 2010 and charges were framed as late as in the year 2017, and the judgment was finally pronounced by the Trial Court on 24.09.2021. It took eighteen years!
38. The role played here by the accused in delaying the trial cannot be discounted, as already stated. The records also reveal that the depositions of most of the prosecution witnesses were recorded only towards the end of the year 2017. Moreover, CBI in this case had filed its charge-sheet, inter alia, against two persons belonging to Dalit community. Although, these two (A-4 and A-9) were finally acquitted by Trial Court as there was absolutely nothing against them, but in the process, prosecution had to declare many of its witnesses belonging to the Dalit community as hostile simply because these witnesses did not depose against A-4 and A-9. It is also clear now, in any case, that these two were wrongly made accused by the prosecution. All the same, the benefit of such witnesses turning hostile cannot be given to other accused who were found involved in the offence, on the overwhelming weight of other evidence. Related witnesses are not necessarily interested witnesses
39. Another plea taken by the defence is that many witnesses who have deposed against them, such as PW-49, PW-1, PW-15, are interested witnesses. PW-49 for example being the step-mother of Murugesan, the boy who was killed. Now, so far as witnesses being interested witnesses is concerned, it is a settled position of law that the Court cannot ignore the testimonies of witnesses only because they are close relatives of the victim. A Three-Judge Bench of this Court in Jaikam Khan v. State of U.P. (2021) 13 SCC 716 notes:
1886 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports “28…No doubt that, merely because the witnesses are interested and related witnesses, it cannot be a ground to disbelieve their testimony. However, the testimony of such witnesses has to be scrutinised with due care and caution. Upon scrutiny of the evidence of such witnesses, if the court is satisfied that the evidence is creditworthy, then there is no bar on the court in relying on such evidence.” In cases where the crime is committed at the residence or a place near the residence of the deceased, it is the close relatives who are likely to be a witness to the crime. They are natural witnesses. This Court in State of A.P. v. S. Rayappa, (2006) 4 SCC 512, while noting the difference between interested witness and related witness, observed as follows:
“6…By now it is a well-established principle of law that testimony of a witness otherwise inspiring confidence cannot be discarded on the ground that he being a relation of the deceased is an interested witness. A close relative who is a very natural witness cannot be termed as an interested witness. The term interested postulates that the person concerned must have some direct interest in seeing the accused person being convicted somehow or the other either because of animosity or some other reasons.
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