Smt. Lavanya C & Anr. v. Vittal Gurudas Pai Since Deseased By LRs. & Ors.
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 325; [2025] 3 S.C.R. 450
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Pankaj Mithal, Justice Sanjay Karol
- Decided
- 4 Mar 2025
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 13999/2024
- Sections
- 151, 89
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:20 am. Original source ↗
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[2025] 3 S.C.R. 450 : 2025 INSC 325 Smt. Lavanya C & Anr.
v.
Vittal Gurudas Pai Since Deseased By LRs. & Ors.
(Civil Appeal No. 13999 of 2024)
05 March 2025 [Pankaj Mithal and Sanjay Karol,* JJ.] Issue for Consideration Whether the High Court was correct in setting aside the order of the Trial Court holding the appellants not guilty of wilful disobedience of their undertaking given to the Court.
Headnotes† Contempt of Court – When – Appellants gave undertaking before the Trial Court to not alienate the property which was the subject matter of the suit – Respondents filed application alleging violation thereof – Trial Court held that the Appellants were not guilty of wilful disobedience of the undertaking given by them – Order set aside by High Court – Correctness:
Held: Plea of the appellants that the undertaking to not alienate the subject matter property was given by the lawyer without requisite authority, not accepted – The undertaking in question was given in July 2007 and reiterated in August 2007 –Trial Court made such an undertaking into an order of the Court in November 2007, which was extended at regular intervals – The application for violation of the undertaking/order of the Court under Order XXXIX Rule 2A was made in 2011 i.e., after a period of four and a half years – Had the undertaking been without requisite authority, the appellants were well within their rights to seek discharge of that order, however, no such step was taken – Alienation of the subject matter property was despite express orders of the Court and thus, in violation thereof – High Court rightly punished the appellants for contempt of Court – However, order modified, as directed – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Or. XXXIX R. 2A. [Paras 6, 11, 12, 14] * Author [2025] 3 S.C.R. 451Smt. Lavanya C & Anr. v.
Vittal Gurudas Pai Since Deseased By LRs. & Ors.
Legal Profession – Relationship between Advocate and client – Nature:
Held: A lawyer-client relationship is fiduciary in nature and the former is cast in terms of agency of the latter – The lawyer must respect the decision-making right of the client – Any undertaking given to a Court cannot be without requisite authority from the client. [Para 9] Case Law Cited Samee Khan v. Bindu Khan [1998] Supp. 1 SCR 244 : (1998) 7 SCC 59; Wander Limited & Anr. v. Antox India Pvt. Ltd. (1990) Supp. 1 SCC 727; Ramakant Ambalal Choksi v. Harish Ambalal Choksi, 2024 SCC OnLine 3538; Dalpat Kumar v. Prahlad Singh [1991] Supp. 3 SCR 472 : (1992) 1 SCC 719; Kanwar Singh Saini v. High Court of Delhi [2011] 15 SCR 972 : (2012) 4 SCC 307; Kokkanda B. Poondacha v. K.D. Ganapathi [2011] 4 SCR 417 : (2011) 12 SCC 600; State of U.P. v. U.P. State Law Officers' Assn. [1994] 1 SCR 348 : (1994) 2 SCC 204; Himalayan Coop. Group Housing Society v. Balwan Singh [2015] 4 SCR 616 : (2015) 7 SCC 373; Bar of Indian Lawyers v. National Institute of Communicable Diseases (2024) 8 SCC 430; Supreme Court Bar Assn. v. Union of India [1998] 2 SCR 795 : (1998) 4 SCC 409 – referred to.
List of Acts Contempt of Courts Act, 1971; Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. List of Keywords Contempt of Court; Express violation of order of Court; Disobedience of Undertaking; Or. XXXIX R. 2A of Civil Procedure Code, 1908; Civil contempt; Fiduciary relationship between Advocate and client; Undertaking without requisite authority from client; Alienation of subject matter property; Disobedience of an order of temporary injunction.
Case Arising From CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 13999 of 2024 From the Judgment and Order dated 23.02.2021 of the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru in MFA No. 7055 of 2013 452 [2025] 3 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports Appearances for Parties Advs. for the Appellants:
Radhakrishna S Hegde, Rajeev Singh.
Advs. for the Respondents:
Vikram Hegde, Abhinav Hansaraman.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment Sanjay Karol J.
1. This appeal arises out of judgment and order dated 23rd February 2021/16 th March, 2021 passed in Miscellaneous First Appeal No.7055/2013(CPC) by the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru, whereby the respondents before the High Court, appellants herein (defendants in Trial Court), were held guilty of disobedience of their undertaking before the Trial Court of not alienating the property, subject matter of the suit.
The original defendants in the Trial Court through their counsel gave an undertaking which was allegedly disobeyed. The plaintiffs aggrieved thereby filed the case, which was dismissed, and they appealed to the High Court, ultimately resulting in a favourable order. The original defendants now aggrieved by being held in contempt, are appellants herein.
2. A brief resume of facts leading to the appeal are : 2.1 The respondents herein were the original plaintiffs in Original Suit No.4191 of 2007 seeking a declaration to the effect that agreement between the parties dated 30 th April 2004, i.e., ‘Joint Development Agreement’ 1 to be “revoked rescinded and terminated.” The JDA was entered into regarding the construction of residential apartments within a period of 24 months, on a turnkey basis.
2.2 Said construction was to be completed by 31 st October 2006. However, the same could not be done. Legal notice intimating 1 ‘JDA’, for short [2025] 3 S.C.R. 453Smt. Lavanya C & Anr. v.
Vittal Gurudas Pai Since Deseased By LRs. & Ors.
the cancellation of the JDA was issued on 23 rd March 2007, and eventually, the subject Original Suit came to be filed. 2.3 The learned Trial Court eventually concluded vide judgment and order dated 2 nd January 2017 that the plaintiffs could not prove that the construction made was in violation of the JDA and instead, the defendants proved that the construction made by them was in accordance thereof. It was held that the plaintiffs were not entitled to the declaration and permanent injunction, as prayed for.
2.4 In the pendency of the above proceedings, record reveals that the counsel for the defendants undertook, on two occasions, i.e., 11 th July 2007 and 13th August 2007 that they will not alienate the subject property to any third person. Allegedly, however, such undertaking was not abided by, which led to the filing of Interlocutory Application No.3 that came to be registered as Civil Misc. Application No.38 of 2011 under Order XXXIX Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code, 19082 .
2.5 The concerned Court framed the following issues : "1) Whether the petitioners have made out a case of breach or willful disobedience by the respondents of order passed by this court in pursuance of undertaking given by the defendant and order of injunction dated 17.11.2007 beyond all reasonable doubts?
2) What order?”
2.6 The Court considered the jurisdiction which has been agitated, observing that the said power is punitive in nature and akin to imposing punishment for civil contempt under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. It was concluded as under :
“38. It is significant to note that advocate for petitioners have produced 10 photos of suit property, which depict that suit property is still vacant and foundation is lying. But, here in this case, the petitioners have contended that the flats were sold by the respondents 2 Hereafter ‘CPC’ 454 [2025] 3 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports inspite of Court Order. Moreover,, the description of the suit property is incomplete and ambiguous.
Therefore, the averment/contention of the petitioners is not believable.
39. In view of aforesaid reasons and observations made, I can safely conclude that the petitioners are failed to prove their case beyond all reasonable doubt that the respondents are knowingly and willfully disobeyed the injunction order of this Court. : There is no sufficient and satisfactory materials on record to come to conclusion that the respondents have knowingly and willfully disobeyed and committed the breach of order of this Court. Hence, respondents are entitled for benefit of doubt. Therefore, I answer aforesaid point No.1 in Negative.
40. Point No.2 : For the foregoing reasons and in view of my findings and discussions, I proceed to pas the following :
ORDER
In the result, therefore this Civil Misc. petition (I.A. No.3) filed by the petitioners U/o XXXIX Rule 2A and U/s.151 of CPC against the respondents is liable to be rejected. Accordingly, it is dismissed.
Parties shall bear their own costs.”
2.7 Aggrieved by this order, the High Court was approached by way of Misc. First Appeal No.7055 of 2013 (CPC) under Order XLIII Rule 1(r) read with 104(i) of CPC. The question to be considered was whether the lower Court’s order is sustainable in law. Impugned Judgment
3. A question of maintainability of the application under Order XXXIX Rule 2A was raised. With reference to Samee Khan v. Bindu Khan,3 it was held that even if the injunction order was subsequently set aside, the disobedience thereof is not erased. The subsequent dismissal of a suit does not absolve the party of liability of breach of injunction
3 (1998) 7 SCC 59
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 455Smt. Lavanya C & Anr. v.
Vittal Gurudas Pai Since Deseased By LRs. & Ors.
order. That apart, it was observed that an appeal against the Trial Court’s dismissal of the Original Suit was also pending before the High Court bearing R.F.A.No.592/2017.
3.1 The substance of the dispute is that on 11 th July 2007, the counsel for the appellants herein filed memo as follows : “The undersigned counsel undertake that the defendants have not alienate the suit schedule property to any third person”
3.2 Subsequently, on two dates 13th August and 17th November, 2007 the proceedings of the Trial Court have been taken note of by the Trial Court in paras 26 to 28, which read as follows : “26. Then the matter was adjourned to 13.08.2007. On 13.08.2007, the advocate for the defendants filed another memo which reads as follows :
“The undersigned counsel undertake that they have not alienate the suit schedule property in the above case.”
27. Then the trial Court ordered to list the matter on 17.11.2007. On 17.11.2007, the defendants’ Counsel failed to appear before the Court. The plaintiffs’ Counsel submitted to the Court about the undertaking given by the defendants’ Counsel. Under such circumstances, the trial Court passed the following order:
“Parties to the suit called out. Absent. Learned Counsel for the plaintiff is present. Learned Counsel for the defendant is absent. On the last date the learned Counsel for the defendants had undertaken that the defendants will not alienate suit property.
Today neither defendants nor learned Counsel for the defendants are present. I.A. I & II cannot be heard as the defendants and learned Counsel for defendant Nos.1 to 3 are absent.
Hence, it is hereby ordered that defendants 1 to 3 shall not alienate the suit property till next date. For hearing of IA I & II and to 456 [2025] 3 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports call the parties under Section 89 of CPC. Call on 08.12.2007.”
28. That order was extended from time to time. Subsequent to 17.11.2007, the defendants executed the sale deeds under Exs.P3 to P5, Ex.P7 to P13, the dates of which are as follows :
Ex.P3–19.11.2007 Ex.P4-03.12.2008 Ex.P5–01.07.2008 Ex.P7-15.06.2009 Ex.P8–06.08.2008 Ex.P9-13.12.2011 Ex.P10–19.11.2007Ex.P11-01.07.2008 Ex.P12-03.12.2008 Ex.P13-15.06.2009 ”
3.3 The Court citing various judicial pronouncements observed that there was no merit in the contention that injunction order is invalid. The order of the lower Court was set aside, and the appellants herein were held guilty of disobedience of their undertaking made before the Trial Court.
3.4 Vide order dated 16th March 2021 the appellants were held guilty of contempt of Court. Contemnor No.3, namely, Chalsani R.B. who is the second appellant herein, was directed to be detained in a civil prison for a period of three months and his property, subject matter of suit, to be attached for a period of one year. Contemnor No.2, namely, Smt. Lavanya C., the first appellant herein, qua her it was directed that the subject matter property be attached for a period of one year. It was further directed that both the contemnors shall pay a sum of Rs.10 lakhs within four weeks, as compensation for the hardship caused to the respondents herein. The part of the order directing attachment was stayed for a period of 60 days.
Our Consideration
4. It is this order of the High Court which is sought to be challenged in this appeal. By way of the special leave petition, it has been urged, inter alia :
a) In the prayers made in the application under Order XXXIX Rule 1 and 2, no specific prayer, restraining the parties from creating third party rights, has been made. The Trial Court has observed that the description of property is ambiguous, incomplete and that no satisfactory material has been brought on record to [2025] 3 S.C.R. 457Smt. Lavanya C & Anr. v.
Vittal Gurudas Pai Since Deseased By LRs. & Ors.
show wilful disobedience on the part of the appellants, hence, they are entitled to the benefit of doubt.
b) There has been deliberate suppression of facts on the part of the respondents herein regarding construction of apartments and selling off a part thereof, even prior to filing of the original Suit. c) An unconditional apology has been tendered before the Court and the appellants herein have no intent or desire to disrespect any order passed by a competent Court.
d) The sentence imposed, in the attending facts and circumstances, is unjustified given that the second appellant is a person of advanced years and suffers from various ailments.
5. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. The question to be considered is whether the High Court was correct in setting aside the order of the Court below, holding the appellants herein not guilty of wilful disobedience of their undertaking given to the Court.
6. A few dates require immediate recall. The undertaking subject matter of controversy was given by the counsel on 11 th July 2007 and reiterated on 13 th August 2007. The Trial Court made such an undertaking into an order of the Court on 17 th November 2007. The same was extended at regular intervals. The application for violation of the undertaking/order of the Court under Order XXXIX Rule 2A was made in 2011. An order was made dismissing the application on 2 nd August 2013. Immediately thereafter, an appeal was filed before the High Court. In the pendency of this appeal, the Original Suit came to be decided on 2 nd January 2017. An appeal against such dismissal of the Original Suit was pending before the High Court on the date that the impugned judgment came to be passed.
7. Although of primary concern, in this appeal is the sentence of imprisonment and compensation to be paid by the appellants herein, it would be apposite to take note of the contours of Order XXXIX Rule 1, Rule 2 and Rule 2A.
7.1 A Three-Judge Bench in Wander Limited & Anr. v. Antox India Pvt. Ltd.4 observed as follows :
4 (1990) Supp. 1 SCC 727 458 [2025] 3 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports “9. .....
“...is to protect the plaintiff against injury by violation of his rights for which he could not adequately be compensated in damages recoverable in the action if the uncertainty were resolved in his favour at the trial. The need for such protection must be weighed against the corresponding need of the defendant to be protected against injury resulting from his having been prevented from exercising his own legal rights for which he could not be adequately compensated. The court must weigh one need against another and determine where the ‘balance of convenience’ lies.”
x x x x
14. The appeals before the Division Bench were against the exercise of discretion by the Single Judge. In such appeals, the appellate court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion of the court of first instance and substitute its own discretion except where the discretion has been shown to have been exercised arbitrarily, or capriciously or perversely or where the court had ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions. An appeal against exercise of discretion is said to be an appeal on principle. Appellate court will not reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the court below if the one reached by that court was reasonably possible on the material. The appellate court would normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise of discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it would have come to a contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised by the trial court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the appellate court would have taken a different view may not justify interference with the trial court’s exercise of discretion. After referring to these principles Gajendragadkar, J. in Printers (Mysore) Private [2025] 3 S.C.R. 459Smt. Lavanya C & Anr. v.
Vittal Gurudas Pai Since Deseased By LRs. & Ors.
Ltd. v. Pothan Joseph [(1960) 3 SCR 713 : AIR 1960 SC 1156] : (SCR 721)
“... These principles are well established, but as has been observed by Viscount Simon in Charles Osenton & Co. v. Jhanaton [1942 AC 130] ‘...the law as to the reversal by a court of appeal of an order made by a judge below in the exercise of his discretion is well established, and any difficulty that arises is due only to the application of well settled principles in an individual case’.”
The appellate judgment does not seem to defer to this principle.”
(Emphasis supplied)
7.2 A recent judgment of this Court in Ramakant Ambalal Choksi v. Harish Ambalal Choksi, 5 referring to Dalpat Kumar v. Prahlad Singh 6 has reiterated the principles governing the grant of temporary injunction.
7.3 The aspect of disobedience of an order of temporary injunction has been discussed in detail in Kanwar Singh Saini v. High Court of Delhi,7 in the following terms :
“17. Application under Order 39 Rule 2-A CPC lies only where disobedience/breach of an injunction granted or order complained of was one that is granted by the court under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC, which is naturally to enure during the pendency of the suit. However, once a suit is decreed, the interim order, if any, merges into the final order. No litigant can derive any benefit from mere pendency of case in a court of law, as the interim order always merges in the final order to be passed in the case and if the case is ultimately dismissed, the interim order stands nullified automatically. (Vide A.R. Sircar v. State 5 2024 SCC OnLine 3538
6 (1992) 1 SCC 719
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