M/S S.R.S. Travels By Its Proprietor K.T. Rajashekar v. The Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation Workers & Ors.
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 152; [2025] 3 S.C.R. 262
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Vikram Nath, Justice Prasanna Bhalachandra Varale
- Decided
- 5 Feb 2025
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 2181/2025
- Sections
- 68(5), 3, 96, 2(7), 2(40), 68, 68(2), 68(3), 66, 143(2), 69, 81
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:20 am. Original source ↗
Preview: first 50% of the document.
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 262 : 2025 INSC 152 M/s S.R.S. Travels by its Proprietor K.T. Rajashekar v.
The Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation Workers & Ors.
(Civil Appeal No(s). 2181-2182 of 2025)
06 February 2025 [Vikram Nath* and Prasanna B. Varale, JJ.] Issue for Consideration Issue arose as regards the constitutional validity of the Karnataka Motor Vehicles Taxation and Certain Other Law (Amendment) Act, 2003 repealing the Karnataka Contract Carriages (Acquisition) Act, 1976 particularly given that the 1976 Act had earlier been upheld by this Court; and whether u/s.68(5) of the Motor Vehicles Act read with r. 56 of the Karnataka Motor Vehicle Rules, 1989, the state and regional transport authorities can lawfully delegate the power to grant contract carriage permits to the Secretary or whether such power must remain with the multi-member authorities due to its quasi-judicial character.
Headnotes† Karnataka Motor Vehicles Taxation and Certain Other Law (Amendment) Act, 2003 – s.3 – Karnataka Contract Carriages (Acquisition) Act, 1976 – Validity of repealing Act – Power of the legislature to repeal an Act – Presidential assent for repeal statute, if required – KCCA Act designed to bring privately operated contract carriages under State control in order to serve the public interest and to implement the Directive Principles of State Policy – However, over the ensuing decades, urbanization intensified, public transport demand grew, and it became increasingly evident that the restrictive regime established by the KCCA Act was contributing to an artificial scarcity of public transport services, particularly in rural and semi-urban areas – In response, the Legislature exercised its plenary power by enacting the 2003 Act which repealed the KCCA Act – Constitutional validity of repealing Act:
* Author [2025] 3 S.C.R. 263M/s S.R.S. Travels by its Proprietor K.T. Rajashekar v. The Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation Workers & Ors. Held: s.3 of the 2003 Act which repeals the KCCA Act, is constitutional, and State Legislature rightly exercised its power to repeal the Act – Power to repeal a law is coextensive with the power to enact it – Repeal was not an arbitrary act of legislative whim but was backed by a clear statement of objects and reasons that identified the deficiencies in the existing regulatory framework and the necessity to liberalize the transport sector – This Court’s decisions affirming the constitutional validity of an Act, do not bind the Legislature from modifying or repealing a statute when subsequent developments warrant a change in policy – It cannot be said that repeal should have required fresh presidential assent – Repeal statute does not recreate the legal framework anew but rather extinguishes the earlier Act’s operative provisions – Repeal statute is not subject to the same procedural requirements as an original enactment when it comes to the need for fresh assent, provided that the repeal falls within the legislative competence of the State – 2003 Repeal Act is rooted in the practical realities of modern transport policy – Repeal of the KCCA Act was thus a deliberate policy decision aimed at fostering a more dynamic and responsive transport framework – Legislature may, subject to constitutional limitations, repeal any law it has enacted – Repeal does not alter or contradict the judicial interpretation of the 1976 Act; rather, it reflects a conscious legislative choice to adapt to new economic and social conditions – Rationale underlying the 2003 Repeal Act is sound and consistent with the principles of legislative power. [Paras 10, 11, 13-18] Motor Vehicles Act 1988 – ss.68(3)(b), 96 – Karnataka Motor Vehicle Rules, 1989 – rr.55, 56 – Delegation of power to grant permit – Under s.68(5) of the MV Act, rw r.56 of the 1989 Rules, State Transport Authority-STA and Regional Transport Authorities-RTA, if can lawfully delegate the power to grant contract carriage permits to the Secretary or such power to remain with the multi-member authorities due to its quasijudicial character:
Held: State Transport Authority possesses the power to delegate its functions u/s.68(5) of the MV Act read with r.56(1)(d) of the KMV Rules – Secretary of the STA is empowered to grant non- 264 [2025] 3 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports stage carriage permits (including contract carriage, special, tourist, and temporary permits) in accordance with s.68(5) and r. 56(1) (d), subject to the limitations and conditions prescribed therein – 1988 Act unambiguously confers upon the transport authorities, the power to delegate its functions provided that rules are framed u/s.96 – Even if it is accepted that the grant of permits has a quasijudicial element, it is an established principle of administrative law that quasi-judicial functions may be delegated if the enabling statute expressly provides for such delegation – s.68(5) read with r. 56(1)
(d) makes it clear that the Legislature intended for the transport authority to delegate certain routine permit functions – Exclusion of stage carriage permits from this delegation does not imply that all permit functions are inherently non-delegable – STA is entrusted with a wide range of responsibilities under the Motor Vehicles Act, and its workload necessitates delegation to ensure timely service delivery – Secretary, being a high-ranking officer with substantial expertise in transport administration, is well equipped to handle routine permit applications – Practical impact of not allowing delegation would be to overload the transport authority with routine functions, potentially causing undue delays and inefficiencies – Power of the State Transport Authority to delegate the issuance of contract carriage, special, tourist, and temporary permits to its Secretary is fully supported by the statutory provisions of s.68(5) and r.56(1)(d) – Delegation is a rational and necessary administrative measure that facilitates prompt and efficient processing of permit applications without undermining the oversight function of the STA – Power to delegate, as provided by law, remains intact, and any decision to the contrary is unsustainable in light of both legislative intent and practical necessity – High Court’s reasoning on the non-delegability of permit-granting power is flawed – Impugned orders of the High Court that denied the delegation power set aside. [Paras 20-30] Case Law Cited State of Karnataka v. Ranganatha Reddy [1978] 1 SCR 641 : AIR 1978 SC 215; Vijayakumar Sharma v. State of Karnataka AIR 1990 SC 2072; Vijay Kumar Sharma v. State of Karnataka [1990] 1 SCR 614 : (1990) 2 SCC 562; Newtech Promoters & Developers Private Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others [2021] 9 SCR [2025] 3 S.C.R. 265M/s S.R.S. Travels by its Proprietor K.T. Rajashekar v. The Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation Workers & Ors. 909 : (2021) 18 SCC 1; Ramakrishna v. Janpad Sabha [1962] Supp. 3 SCR 70 : AIR 1962 SC 1073 – referred to.
List of Acts Karnataka Motor Vehicles Taxation and Certain Other Law (Amendment) Act, 2003; Karnataka Contract Carriages (Acquisition) Act, 1976; Motor Vehicles Act, 1988; Karnataka Motor Vehicle Rules, 1989; Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950; Constitution of India; General Clauses Act, 1897.
List of Keywords Contract carriages; Contract carriage permits; Stage Carriage; Stage carriage permits; State Transport Authority; Regional Transport Authority; State Transport Corporation; Artificial scarcity of public transport; Liberalize public transport; Private bus operators; Presidential assent; Permit-granting power; Repeal statute; Entry 42 of List III; “Secretary alone” approach; Private operators in the contract carriage; Fresh Presidential assent; Quasi-judicial functions; Secretary; State Transport Officer; Delegated power; Repealing the Karnataka Contract Carriages (Acquisition) Act, 1976; Delegate power to grant contract carriage permits to Secretary; Validity of repealing Act; Power of the legislature to repeal an Act; Presidential assent for repeal statute, if required; Privately operated contract carriages under State control; Public interest; Directive Principles of State Policy; Public transport; Rural and semi-urban areas; Plenary power; Subsequent developments; Repeal statute; Legislative competence of State; Practical realities of modern transport policy; Policy decision; Grant of non-stage carriage permits; Contract carriage, special, tourist, and temporary permits; Principle of administrative law.
Case Arising From CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 2181-2182 of 2025 From the Judgment and Order dated 28.03.2011 of the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru in WA No. 5466 of 2004 and WA No. 60 of 2005 With Civil Appeal Nos. 1985-2153 and 2154-2180 of 2025 266 [2025] 3 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports Appearances for Parties Ms. Kiran Suri, Col Balasubramaniyam, Devadatt Kamat, Sr. Advs., Amith S.J., Ms. Vidushi Garg, Dr. (Mrs. ) Vipin Gupta, Mrs. T S Shanthi, Ms. Sneha Irine Kachhap, Sanjeev Kumar, Narendra Kumar, D. L. Chidananda, Hruday Pavan, Revanta Solanki, Advs. for the Appellant.
Devadatt Kamat, Col Balasubramaniam, Ms. Kiran Suri, Shanthakumar V. Mahale, Sr. Advs., Ms. Abha R. Sharma, V. N. Raghupathy, Harsh Pandey, Hruday Bajentri, Ms. Anuradha Mutatkar, Mrs. T S Shanthi, Narendra Kumar, Ms. Sneha Irine Kachhap, Sanjeev Kumar, Anil Kumar, Amith S.J., Ms. Vidushi Garg, Dr. (Mrs.) Vipin Gupta, Ms. Mrinal Pande, Ms. S. Anuradha Bhat, Harisha S.R., Ranvir Singh, Rishi Kumar Singh Gautam, Advs. for the Respondent.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment Vikram Nath, J.
1. Delay, if any, is condoned.
2. Leave granted.
3. These appeals arise out of the common judgment and order dated 28.03.2011 of the High Court of Karnataka in W.A. No. 5466 of 2004 and connected matters. In view of the multiple appeals that have been filed, there is a need to clarify the array of parties in the respective SLPs:
I. SLP (C) Nos. 27833-27834 of 2011: Filed by private bus operators.
II. SLP (C) Nos. 32499-525 of 2011: Filed by the Karnataka State Road Transport Authority (STA).
III. SLP (C) Nos. 25787-956 of 2012: Filed by the Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation (KSRTC), a corporation constituted under the Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950.1 1 The 1950 Act [2025] 3 S.C.R. 267M/s S.R.S. Travels by its Proprietor K.T. Rajashekar v. The Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation Workers & Ors. For clarity of reference in this judgment:
• The Private Bus Operators and the Karnataka State Road Transport Authority will be referred to collectively as “the Appellants.”
• The Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation will be referred to as “the Respondent Corporation” or “KSRTC.”
4. The facts leading to the present appeals are as follows:
4.1. Enactment of the 1976 Act (Karnataka Contract Carriages (Acquisition) Act, 1976 2 ) – The 1976 Act was enacted with the objective of acquiring privately operated contract carriages to curb their alleged detrimental operation in the State and to bring them under public control. Under the 1976 Act, once these contract carriages were acquired, all corresponding permits as well as certificates of registration stood vested in the State Government. Subsequently, the State Government transferred these vehicles and permits to State-owned Road Transport Corporations, notably including the KSRTC.
4.2. The Act was challenged but upheld by this Court in State of Karnataka v. Ranganatha Reddy 3 and later reaffirmed in Vijayakumar Sharma v. State of Karnataka. 4 In these decisions, the Supreme Court recognized that the 1976 Act’s purpose was to further the Directive Principles of State Policy under Article 39(b) and (c) of the Constitution and did not infringe any fundamental rights or constitutional principles.
4.3. MV Act Enactment: In 1988, the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 5 was enacted by the Parliament. This Act contains several provisions relevant to the present matter: Section 2(7) defines “Contract carriage” and Section 2(40) defines “Stage Carriage.” Moreover, Section 68 deals with transport authorities; in particular, Section 68(2) provides for the composition of the State Transport Authority 6 and the Regional Transport Authority, 7 mandating 2 The KCCA Act
3 AIR 1978 SC 215
4 AIR 1990 SC 2072
5 MV Act
6 STA
7 RTA
268 [2025] 3 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports that each include a Chairman with judicial experience along with other members—up to four for the STA and up to two for the RTA. Section 68(3)(b) empowers the STA to perform the duties of the RTA, and Section 68(5) enables both authorities, under rules made pursuant to Section 96, to delegate their powers and functions to any other authority or person subject to prescribed restrictions.
4.4. On 1 July 1989, the Karnataka Motor Vehicle Rules, 1989 8 were enacted. Under Rules 55 and 56 of these Rules, the RTA and STA were empowered to delegate their powers to their secretaries, including the authority to grant contract carriage permits. Furthermore, on 27 February 1990, the constitutionality of the KCCA Act was challenged on the ground of repugnancy. In Vijay Kumar Sharma v. State of Karnataka, 9 this Hon’ble Court upheld the constitutionality of the KCCA Act, holding that there is no inconsistency or repugnancy between the KCCA Act and the MV Act.
4.5. In the subsequent decades, transport policy in Karnataka underwent shifts due to rising demand for public transport services, rapid urbanization, and the perceived inability of government-run corporations alone to meet commuter needs. Over time, committees such as the Tax Reforms Commission observed that strict limitations on private contract carriages had contributed to an artificial scarcity of public transport options. It was noted that in many rural and semi-urban areas, a shortage of KSRTC-run buses compelled travellers to rely on private goods vehicles, tractors, or other sub-optimal modes of travel, raising concerns of safety and inconvenience.
4.6. Enactment of the 2003 Repeal Act (Karnataka Act No. 9 of 2003) – Responding to these developments, the State Legislature passed the Karnataka Motor Vehicles Taxation and Certain Other Law (Amendment) Act, 2003. 10 Among other amendments (notably to taxation laws), Section 3 of the 2003 Repeal Act repealed the 1976 KCCA Act. According to 8 KMV Rules
9 (1990) 2 SCC 562
10 The 2003 Repeal Act or Karnataka Act No.9 of 2003 [2025] 3 S.C.R. 269M/s S.R.S. Travels by its Proprietor K.T. Rajashekar v. The Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation Workers & Ors. the Statement of Objects and Reasons appended to the 2003 Act, the legislative intent was to liberalize public transport, encourage private operators, and address “woeful shortages” in passenger services. The Legislature believed that removing the KCCA Act’s prohibitions would enable better competition, expanded services, and ultimately greater passenger comfort.
4.7. Challenge Before the High Court of Karnataka – After 2003, private bus operators began applying for contract carriage permits under the more liberal regime. In some instances, Secretaries of the STA or RTAs granted these permits, relying on purported delegations under Rule 56. Meanwhile, KSRTC and its employees’ federation filed various writ petitions challenging (a) the validity of the 2003 Repeal Act and
(b) the power of the Secretaries to grant permits. They argued that the 1976 Act, having been upheld by the Supreme Court, could not be repealed without fresh Presidential assent, and contended that awarding permit-granting power which was quasi judicial to a single officer ought to remain vested only in multi-member bodies.
4.8. In a judgment and order dated 17 November 2004 in W.P. No. 40339/2004 and related matters, the Single Judge of the High Court held that Rules 55 and 56 of the KMV Rules are null and void as ultra vires the MV Act, and that the delegation of the power to issue contract carriage and stage carriage permits, as well as to perform the functions of the STA/RTA, to the Secretary is not permissible. On 16 December 2004, the Learned Single Judge of the High Court ruled that the repeal of the KCCA Act by Act No. 9/2003 is unconstitutional. Citing the decisions in Ranganatha Reddy (Supra) and Vijayakumar Sharma (Supra), the Judge observed that the State Government lacks the authority to repeal an Act that has received the President’s assent. Since the KCCA Act falls under Entry 42 of the Concurrent List in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, Act No. 9/2003 was required to be sent for the President’s assent. It further noted that, by repealing the KCCA, the objective of the State Transport Undertaking could not be achieved, and that the issue could have been resolved by granting additional permits to the State Transport Corporation.
270 [2025] 3 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports
4.9. Reference to Division Bench – Ultimately, appeals (W.A. Nos. 5466/2004, 60/2005, and connected matters) were placed before a Division Bench. The Division Bench consolidated multiple challenges to the 2003 Repeal Act, as well as the dispute about whether the Secretary, STA could lawfully grant permits.
4.10. Vide order dated 28.03.2011, the Division Bench of the High Court gave the following findings with respect to the main issues in these matters:
• Constitutional Validity of the 2003 Repeal Act – The Division Bench upheld the constitutionality of repealing the 1976 Act. It reasoned that the Legislature had plenary power to repeal a statute if it fell within its legislative domain. The bench also noted that since the 1976 Act had been validly enacted under Entry 42 of List III (Concurrent List), the State Government was equally competent to repeal it, without requiring a fresh reference to the President for assent. The Court disagreed with the contention that repealing an Act previously upheld by the Supreme Court amounted to “overruling” the Supreme Court. Once the 1976 Act had been constitutionally affirmed, the Legislature’s power to modify or repeal it remained unimpaired, subject only to not violating fundamental or constitutional rights.
• Delegation of Permit-Granting Power to the Secretary – The Division Bench, however, rejected the argument that the STA (or RTA) could delegate contract carriage permit issuance to the Secretary. It held that permit-granting under Chapter V is a quasi-judicial function requiring collective adjudication or at least decision-making by the statutory authority itself. The High Court thus invalidated the relevant portion of the KMV Rules (Rule 56) or, more precisely, the manner in which the STA had invoked it. The Division Bench concluded that the “Secretary alone” approach improperly bypassed the multi-member scheme envisaged by the MV Act.
4.11. Aggrieved by the Division Bench’s order dated 28.03.2011, the private bus operators and the Karnataka STA; and the KSRTC, filed Special Leave Petitions before this Court, leading to the present appeals with the following main contentions:
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 271M/s S.R.S. Travels by its Proprietor K.T. Rajashekar v. The Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation Workers & Ors. • SLP (C) Nos. 27833-27834 of 2011: Filed by private bus operators, challenging the High Court’s ruling that prohibits delegation of permit-granting powers to the Secretary, STA/ RTA. These appellants accept the High Court’s decision upholding the validity of the 2003 Repeal Act.
• SLP (C) Nos. 32499-525 of 2011: Filed by the Karnataka State Road Transport Authority (STA), similarly challenging the portion of the judgment that disallows delegation to the Secretary. STA supports the validity of the 2003 Repeal Act.
• SLP (C) Nos. 25787-956 of 2012: Filed by the Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation (KSRTC), primarily disputing the High Court’s conclusion that repealing the 1976 Act is constitutional. It wants the 2003 Repeal Act declared invalid but concurs with the High Court that the Secretary, STA/RTA, cannot grant or renew permits under delegated power.
5. Before we delve into the specific controversies arising in these appeals, it would be instructive to first set out the relevant legal provisions that govern the issues at hand. A clear understanding of these enactments is vital to appreciate the two principal questions that fall for our consideration.
I. Karnataka Contract Carriages (Acquisition) Act, 1976 Purpose and Scope- Enacted with the objective of acquiring privately operated contract carriages that were perceived to be functioning contrary to public interest. Once acquired, the vehicles, permits, and certificates of registration vested in the State Government, which, in turn, transferred them to stateowned road transport corporations such as KSRTC.
Judicial Endorsement – The 1976 Act was upheld by this Court in State of Karnataka v. Ranganatha Reddy11 and later reaffirmed in Vijayakumar Sharma v. State of Karnataka. 12 These decisions recognized that the statutory objective,
11 AIR 1978 SC 215
12 (AIR) 1990 SC 2072
272 [2025] 3 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports furthering the Directive Principles under Article 39(b) and (c) of the Constitution, did not violate any fundamental or constitutional rights.
Subsequent Development- By virtue of Section 3 of the Karnataka Motor Vehicles Taxation and Certain Other Law (Amendment) Act, 2003 (Karnataka Act No. 9 of 2003), the 1976 Act stood repealed, which is one of the core issues challenged in these proceedings.
II. Karnataka Motor Vehicles Taxation and (Amendment) Act, Statement of Objects and Reasons – The Legislature observed a shortage of passenger transport services, especially in rural and semi-urban areas, and took the view that permitting private operators in the contract carriage sector would help meet rising demand. Section 3 of this enactment repealed the 1976 Act, thereby removing existing curbs on private contract carriage operation and paving the way for a more liberalized regulatory regime.
Legislative Competence – Enacted under the same legislative field (Entry 42, List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution) that empowered the original 1976 Act. The Division Bench of the High Court held that there was no requirement of fresh Presidential assent for the repeal, and it affirmed that the State Legislature was competent to affect such a repeal.
III. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 Chapter V: Control of Transport Vehicles Section 66: No owner can use or permit the use of a transport vehicle without a valid permit.
Section 68(3): Enumerates the powers and functions of the STA and RTA, including the grant of various permits.
Section 68(5): Permits the STA or RTA, “if authorised by the Rules made under Section 96,” to delegate any of its powers or functions to any other authority or person, subject to prescribed conditions.
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 273M/s S.R.S. Travels by its Proprietor K.T. Rajashekar v. The Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation Workers & Ors. Chapter VI: Special Provisions Relating to State Transport Undertakings (for completeness) – While primarily not at issue in these appeals, Chapter VI establishes procedures for formulating schemes granting exclusive rights to State Transport Undertakings. This chapter was relevant in the earlier era when nationalization of routes was prevalent; however, the main focus here is on whether the 1976 Act’s approach (acquiring contract carriages) could be rescinded by the 2003 repeal.
IV. Karnataka Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 Rule 54: Governs the manner in which the STA and the RTA conduct their business, including guidelines for meetings, quorums, and decision-making.
Rule 56: Delegation of Powers by the STA- Rule 56(1)(d): Allows the STA to delegate its power to grant “a permit other than a stage carriage permit” to the Chairman, the Secretary, or an officer not below the rank of Regional Transport Officer. The High Court construed this provision to mean that, while the Rules contemplated delegation, the question remained whether such delegation extended to quasi-judicial functions (like granting contract carriage permits) or was confined to purely administrative powers.
6. In light of the foregoing factual matrix and the contentions urged before us, the following principal issues arise for determination: I. Validity of the 2003 Repeal Act: Whether the 2003 Repeal Act repealing the KCCA Act is constitutionally valid, particularly given that the 1976 Act had earlier been upheld by this Court. II. Delegation of Power to Grant Permits: Whether, under Section 68(5) of the MV Act, read with Rule 56 of the KMV Rules, the STA and RTAs can lawfully delegate the power to grant contract carriage permits (and related permits) to the Secretary, or whether such power must remain with the multimember authorities due to its quasi-judicial character.
7. The learned Senior Counsel for the Appellants, Mr. Devadatt Kamat and Ms.Kiran Suri advanced the following main submissions:
7.1. Express Provision in the MV Act and KMV Rules: The Appellants rely on Section 68(5) of the MV Act, which provides 274 [2025] 3 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports that the STA and any RTA, if authorised under rules made pursuant to Section 96 of the MV Act, may delegate their powers and functions subject to prescribed restrictions. They further highlight Rule 56(1)(d) of the KMV Rules, which expressly permits the STA to delegate its power to grant a permit other than a stage carriage permit to the Chairman, Secretary, or any officer not below the rank of a Regional Transport Officer. This statutory scheme clearly distinguishes between stage carriage permits (non-delegable) and other permits (delegable).
7.2. Consistency with Legislative Intent: The Appellants contend that the MV Act was designed to confer broad administrative discretion on the STA and RTAs. They argued that the power to delegate, as provided in Section 68(5) of the MV Act, was meant to ensure administrative efficiency in routine matters like the issuance of contract carriage permits. They maintained that the legislative intent was not to require that every decision be taken by a full, multi-member board but rather to facilitate expeditious processing of permit applications in cases that do not involve the complex considerations inherent in stage carriage permits.
7.3. Practical Necessity and Administrative Efficiency: The Appellants argued that in practice, the STA is inundated with diverse functions and that delegating routine permit issuance to the Secretary, a high-ranking officer with substantial expertise in transport matters, ensures timely and efficient service. They further contended that such delegation is a common administrative practice not only in Karnataka but also in several other States, where similar delegation mechanisms have been effectively implemented.
7.4. Reconciliation of Divergent Judicial Approaches: The Appellants noted that the High Court, in its earlier judgments, appeared to split the issue. In one instance, the learned Single Judge held that the grant of permits is quasi-judicial and cannot be delegated, while in another, it recognized that delegation is permissible if rules are framed under Section 96 of the MV Act. The Appellants argued that the latter view reflects the true statutory scheme. They submitted that by incorporating amendments to the KMV Rules (notably, the inclusion of [2025] 3 S.C.R. 275M/s S.R.S. Travels by its Proprietor K.T. Rajashekar v. The Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation Workers & Ors. Section 96), the State has unambiguously affirmed its intention to delegate routine functions, such as the issuance of contract carriage permits, to the Secretary.
7.5. Delegation Does Not Subvert Judicial Oversight: It is submitted that even if the power to grant permits were quasi-judicial, such functions can be delegated provided the enabling statute expressly permits it. The Appellants have relied on the recent decision in Newtech Promoters & Developers Private Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others, 13 to support the view that quasi-judicial functions may be delegated when done so in accordance with statutory provisions. The Appellants stress that the delegation in this instance is limited to contract carriage, special, tourist, and temporary permits, matters that are routine and do not necessitate the full weight of collective adjudication. This is entirely consistent with the legislative scheme of the MV Act and the KMV Rules.
Continue reading
Sign in and become a member to continue reading this judgment and every other document in the library.
Members read the full text, download where permitted, and keep notes and bookmarks.