Disortho S.A.S. v. Meril Life Sciences Private Limited
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 352; [2025] 3 S.C.R. 1555
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 3 Judges: Justice Sanjiv Khanna, Justice Sanjay Kumar, Justice K.V. Viswanathan
- Decided
- 18 Mar 2025
- Case number
- ARBITRATION PETITION No. 48/2023
- Sections
- 11(6), 2(2), 9
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:20 am. Original source ↗
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[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1555 : 2025 INSC 352 Disortho S.A.S.
v.
Meril Life Sciences Private Limited (Arbitration Petition No. 48 of 2023)
18 March 2025 [Sanjiv Khanna,* CJI, Sanjay Kumar and K.V. Viswanathan, JJ.] Issue for Consideration Law governing the arbitration agreement in the present case. Headnotes† Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – s.11(6) – International Commercial Arbitration – Petitioner is a company incorporated in Bogota, Colombia – Respondent is a company incorporated in Gujarat, India – International Exclusive Distributor Agreement executed between parties for distribution of medical products in Colombia – Disputes emerged – Petition u/s.11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, for appointment of an arbitral panel in terms of Clauses 16.5 and 18 of the Distributor Agreement, opposed by the Respondent on jurisdictional grounds, contending that these clauses do not grant Indian Courts jurisdiction to appoint arbitrators:
Held: Applying the three-step test developed by Sulamérica Cia, neither Clause 16.5 nor Clause 18 explicitly stipulates the governing law of the arbitration agreement – The next step of the test involves identifying the parties' implied choice of law for the arbitration agreement – There is a strong presumption that the lex contractus, i.e., Indian law, governs the arbitration agreement – This presumption may be displaced if the arbitration agreement is rendered non-arbitrable under Indian law – But that is not the case here – Furthermore, the mere choice of ‘place’ is not sufficient, in the absence of other relevant factors, to override the presumption in favor of the lex contractus – In this case, it is important to note that no seat of arbitration has been explicitly chosen – In conclusion, at this second stage of the inquiry, it is found the parties have impliedly agreed that Indian law governs the arbitration agreement, and the controversy can be resolved accordingly – Applicability of the A&C * Author 1556 [2025] 3 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Act u/s.11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, affirmed – In accordance with Clause 16.5 and 18, the procedural rules of the arbitration would be the rules of the Conciliation and Arbitration Centre of the Chamber of Commerce of Bogota DC, with Bogota DC as the venue of arbitration – However, the parties unanimously stated that, should the present application under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, be allowed, the parties are agreeable to the arbitration being held in India – Parties also consented to the appointment of a sole arbitrator to adjudicate and decide the disputes in question – Sole arbitrator appointed – Venue of the arbitration be decided mutually by the parties and the arbitrator – Arbitration shall be governed by the rules applicable to the Delhi International Arbitration Centre attached to the High Court of Delhi. [Paras 31-33, 35] Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Three-fold test to determine the law governing the arbitration agreement as laid down in Sulamérica Cia case:
Held: Sulamérica Cia observed that the law governing the arbitration agreement may differ from the law of the contract – However, it is reasonable to presume that the parties intended for their entire relationship to be governed by the same system of law throughout the contract – In this context, a distinction is made between a stand-alone arbitration agreement and one that is embedded within a contract – In the former, a choice of seat of arbitration becomes highly significant, and the law of the seat would likely govern the arbitration agreement – However, when the arbitration agreement forms part of a contract, the express choice of a lex contractus strongly indicates the parties' intention – It would generally be inferred that the arbitration is governed by the same law as the substantive contract – However, this presumption is rebuttable – Even when the arbitration agreement is part of the contract, the court must conduct a three-step inquiry: first, looking at the express choice of law; second, considering any implied choice; and third, determining the closest and most real connection – Second step is applied when the first step is negative, and the third step is applied when the first and second steps are negative. [Para 16] Trans-border arbitration – Appropriate test to determine jurisdiction – Divergence of opinion, internationally and domestically:
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1557Disortho S.A.S. v. Meril Life Sciences Private Limited Held: The divergence stems from the interaction between three distinct legal systems which come into play when a dispute occurs:
(i) lex-contractus, the law governing the substantive contractual issues; (ii) lex arbitri, the law governing the arbitration agreement and the performance of this agreement; and (iii) lex-fori, the law governing the procedural aspects of arbitration – These legal systems may either differ or align, depending on the parties’ choices – Furthermore, there may be internal splits within these legal systems, such as for lex arbitri. [Para 3] Case Law Cited M/s. Arif Azim Co. Ltd. v. M/s. Micromax Informatics Fze, 2024 INSC 850 : [2024] 11 SCR 1142; Group of Companies Doctrine, Cox and Kings Ltd. v. SAP India Pvt. Ltd. and Another, 2023 INSC 1051 : [2023] 15 SCR 621; BALCO v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc. [2016] 1 SCR 364 : (2016) 4 SCC 126; Bhatia International v. Bulk Trading S.A. and Another [2002] 2 SCR 411 : (2002) 4 SCC 105; Mankastu Impex Private Limited v. Airvisual Limited [2020] 4 SCR 565 : (2020) 5 SCC 399; Enercon (India) Ltd. v. Enercon GmbH [2014] 2 SCR 855 : (2014) 5 SCC 1 – referred to.
Melford Capital Partners (Holdings) LLP and Others v. Frederick John Wingfield Digby [2021] EWHC 872 (Ch); Paul Smith Ltd. v. H&S International Holdings Inc. [1991] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 127; Ace Capital Limited v. CMS Energy Corporation, 2008 EW SC 1843 Comm; Enka Insaat Ve Sanayi AS v. OOO Insurance Company Chubb, 2020 UK SC 38; Sulamérica Cia Nacional De Seguros S.A. and Others v. Enesa Engenharia S.A. and Others [2012] EWCA Civ 638; Anupam Mittal v. Westbridge Ventures II Investment Holdings [2023] SGCA 1; BYC v. BCZ [2016] SGHC 249; BNA v. BNP and Another [2019] SGCA 84; Braes of Doune Wind Farm (Scotland) Ltd. v. Alfred McAlpine Business Services Ltd. [2008] EWHC 426; C v. D [2007] EWCA Civ 1282; Roger Shashoua
(1) v. Sharma [2009] EWHC 957 (Comm); Arnold v. Britton, 2015 AC 1619 – referred to.
Books and Periodicals Cited Hugh Beale, Chitty on Contracts, Sweet and Maxwell, Vol. 1, 33rd Ed. (2019).
1558 [2025] 3 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports List of Acts Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
List of Keywords International Commercial Arbitration; Trans-border arbitration; Three-fold test; Law governing the arbitration agreement; Express choice of law; Implied choice; Closest and most real connection; Bogota, Colombia; Company incorporated in Gujarat, India; International Exclusive Distributor Agreement; Delhi International Arbitration Centre attached to the High Court of Delhi; Lex contractus; Lex arbitri; Lex fori.
Case Arising From CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Arbitration Petition No. 48 of 2023 Under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 Appearances for Parties Advs. for the Petitioner:
Preetesh Kapur, Sr. Adv., Shaunak Kashyap, Ms. Nistha Gupta, M/S. Mitter & Mitter Co.
Advs. for the Respondent:
Nakul Dewan, Sr. Adv., Ms. Marylou Bilawala, Abinash Pradhan, Chiranjivi Sharma, Ms. Garima Agarwal, Ms. Rubeka Himayat, Ms. Nehal Gupta, Rohan Naik, Pranaya Goyal.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment Sanjiv Khanna, CJI Disortho S.A.S,1 the petitioner before us, is a company incorporated in Bogota, Colombia. The respondent, Meril Life Science Private Limited, 2 is a company incorporated in Gujarat, India. Disortho and Meril executed an International Exclusive Distributor Agreement, 3 1 Hereinafter referred to as, “Disortho”.
2 Hereinafter referred to as, “Meril”.
3 Hereinafter referred to as, “Distributor Agreement”.
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1559Disortho S.A.S. v. Meril Life Sciences Private Limited dated 16th May 2016, for distribution of medical products in Colombia. Later, disputes emerged between the parties.
2. Disortho has filed this petition under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 4 , for appointment of an arbitral panel in terms of Clauses 16.5 and 18 of the Distributor Agreement. Meril has opposed the petition on jurisdictional grounds, contending that these clauses do not grant Indian Courts jurisdiction to appoint arbitrators. The clauses 16.5 and 18 read:
“16. Miscellaneous
16.5. This Agreement shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of lndia and all matter pertaining to this agreement or the matters arising as a consequence of this agreement with be subject to the jurisdiction of courts in Gujarat, India.
18. Direct Settlement of Disputes The Parties mutually agree and pact that any dispute, controversy or claim arising during this Agreement related to subscription, execution, termination, breach, as well as non-contractual relationships, related to the clauses mentioned above; They may be submitted to conciliation in accordance with the Rules of Arbitration and Conciliation of the Chamber of Commerce of Bogota DC., or instead.
of this city, where the Director of the Centre so determine. Similarly, the Parties mutually agree and pact that if the dispute or difference has not been settled in conciliation, or to the extent that has not been resolved; it will be committed to Arbitration by either party for final settlement in accordance with the Arbitration and Conciliation Center of the Chamber of Bogota DC. The Arbitral Tribunal shall consist of one (1) arbitrator in cases of minor or no value E according to the Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration Center of the Chamber of Commerce of Bogota DC. Also, in the event of greater amount, the Court of conformity shall comply with the Regulations of the Center for Conciliation and Arbitration of the Chamber of Commerce of Bogota 4 Hereinafter referred to as, “A&C Act”.
1560 [2025] 3 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports DC., With three (3) arbitrators appointed by the Centre and by drawing lots. The arbitration will take place in Bogota DC. On the premises of Center for Conciliation and Arbitration of the Chamber of Commerce of Bogota DC., or at the place where the Director of the Centre as determined in this city. The award shall be in law and standard will be applicable Colombian law governing the mailer, Expenditure in the conciliation and arbitration proceedings shall be borne equally.”
3. What initially appeared to be a straightforward question has, in fact, become a vexed one, primarily for two salient reasons. First, there exists a divergence of opinion, both internationally and domestically, on the appropriate test to determine jurisdiction in a case of transborder arbitration. This divergence stems from the interaction between three distinct legal systems which come into play when a dispute occurs: (i) lex-contractus, the law governing the substantive contractual issues; (ii) lex arbitri, the law governing the arbitration agreement and the performance of this agreement; and (iii) lex-fori, the law governing the procedural aspects of arbitration. These legal systems may either differ or align, depending on the parties’ choices. Furthermore, there may be internal splits within these legal systems, such as for lex arbitri.5 Secondly, when contractual clauses conflict, as is the case here, the resolution becomes legalistic and complicated.
4. In the interest of avoiding prolixity, we deem it unnecessary to separately address each argument raised or delve into the extensive body of jurisprudence surrounding the issue. It suffices to note that a similar, though not in pari materia, question was examined by this Court in M/s. Arif Azim Co. Ltd. v. M/s. Micromax Informatics Fze.6 This judgment references earlier precedents of this Court on the subject, and we will discuss these judgments subsequently.
5. We begin by referring to Redfern and Hunter’s Commentary on International Arbitration. 7 Chapter 7, titled “Agreement to Arbitrate”, 5 Lex arbitri might be split into two components if the parties so desire – (i) law governing the agreement to arbitrate or the proper law of arbitration and (ii) the law governing the arbitration. While the former relates to validity, scope and interpretation of the arbitration agreement, the later refers to the supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the courts. We will refer to this split later in this judgment.
6 2024 INSC 850.
7 Blackaby KC, Nigel, Constantine Partasides, and Alan Redfern, Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration, 7th Edition (2022), Oxford University Press. [2025] 3 S.C.R. 1561Disortho S.A.S. v. Meril Life Sciences Private Limited emphasizes the cardinal importance of parties’ chosen law. It is stated that the law governing the arbitration agreement sets the rules and norms that determine the validity, scope, and interpretation of the agreement. This chosen law assumes paramount significance when disputes arise concerning the tribunal’s jurisdiction. For instance, disputes related to actions in rem may not be arbitrable in India but arbitrable in another jurisdiction. Additionally, it determines whether the arbitration agreement extends to third parties, such as parent or sister concerns. 8 Equally, it plays a key role in determining the validity of the arbitration agreement itself—some national laws may render the agreement void or unenforceable, thereby affecting the arbitrability of the dispute, while others may uphold its enforceability. Finally, this law serves as a guiding principle when the dispute resolution mechanism is unclear, inconsistent or when conflicting dispute resolution clauses are bundled together in the same agreement.
6. In our opinion, the law governing the arbitration may differ from both the lex contractus and the lex fori.9 This distinction was succinctly brought out in the recent English High Court decision of Melford Capital Partners (Holdings) LLP and Others v. Frederick John Wingfield Digby. 10 This decision refers to the earlier decision of Paul Smith Ltd. v. H&S International Holdings Inc.,11 which dealt with two conflicting clauses. One clause provided for resolution of disputes through ICC arbitration, while the other designated the courts of England as having exclusive jurisdiction. The conflict between these provisions was resolved by the Steyn J. by adopted the following analysis:
“Fortunately, there is a simple and straight forward answer to the suggestion that cll. 13 and 14 are inconsistent.
Clause 13 is a self-contained agreement providing for the resolution of disputes by arbitration. Clause 14 specifies the lex arbitri the curial law or the law governing the arbitration, which will apply to this particular arbitration. 8 See the Group of Companies Doctrine, Cox and Kings Ltd. v. SAP India Pvt. Ltd. and Another, 2023
INSC 1051.
9 This is assuming that the law governing the (i) agreement to arbitrate, and (ii) arbitration itself, are the same, which is most often the case. As explained earlier, the former relates to validity, scope, and interpretation of the arbitration agreement, while the later relates to inter alia the supervisory jurisdiction by national courts.
10 [2021] EWHC 872 (Ch).
11 [1991] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 127.
1562 [2025] 3 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports The law governing the arbitration is not to be confused with (1) the proper law of the contract, (2) the proper law of the arbitration agreement, or (3) the procedural rules which will apply in the arbitration. These three regimes depend on the choice, express or presumed, of the parties. In this case it is common ground that both the contract and the arbitration agreement are governed by English law. The procedural rules applicable to the arbitration are not rules derived from English law. On the contrary, the procedural regime is the comprehensive and sophisticated ICC rules which apply by virtue of the parties’ agreement.
What then is the law governing the arbitration? It is, as Martin Hunter and Alan Redfern, International Commercial Arbitration, p. 53, trenchantly explain, a body of rules which sets a standard external to the arbitration agreement, and the wishes of the parties, for the conduct of the arbitration. The law governing the arbitration comprises the rules governing interim measures (e.g. Court orders for the preservation or storage of goods), the rules empowering the exercise by the Court of supportive measures to assist an arbitration which has run into difficulties (e.g. filling a vacancy in the composition of the arbitral tribunal if there is no other mechanism) and the rules providing for the exercise by the Court of its supervisory jurisdiction over arbitrations (e.g. removing an , arbitrator for misconduct).
(emphasis supplied)”
7. This ratio distinguishes between four choices of law – (i) the law governing the arbitration, (ii) the proper law of arbitration agreement,
(iii) the proper law of contract, and (iv) the procedural rules which apply in the arbitration. These choices are either expressly provided or implied by the parties involved. The passage also highlights the subtle distinction between the proper law of arbitration agreement (i.e., law governing the agreement to arbitrate) and the law governing the arbitration as a whole. The law governing the agreement to arbitrate determines the validity, scope, and interpretation of the agreement. [2025] 3 S.C.R. 1563Disortho S.A.S. v. Meril Life Sciences Private Limited In contrast, the law governing the arbitration itself is concerned with determining which court has supervisory jurisdiction over the arbitration. This jurisdictional framework pertains to the conduct of the arbitration, the rules governing interim measures, and the provisions under which the court may exercise its supervisory authority, such as in the removal of arbitrators.
8. While parties may elect to differentiate between the lex arbitri — the law governing the agreement to arbitrate and the law governing the arbitration itself — such a distinction warrants caution. A distinction should not be readily drawn unless the parties intended to preserve such a distinction. Invariably, these concepts are subsumed in each other. They are inherently intertwined as a part and parcel of the lex arbitri. This is particularly apparent in matters such as the filling of vacancies within the arbitral tribunal or the removal of an arbitrator for misconduct. In these situations, the law governing the arbitration agreement and the law governing the arbitration overlap, as both are essential to the functioning and integrity of the arbitral process. Consequently, unless the parties have provided otherwise, it is prudent not to divide lex arbitri.
9. A more common distinction exists between the lex arbitri and the lex fori, that is the governing law of arbitration and the procedure of arbitration. The lex arbitri determines which court exercises supervisory jurisdiction. In Melford Capital (supra), it was held that both the contract and the arbitration agreement would be governed by English Law but the procedural rules shall be the rules of ICC.
10. This position is also clear from the judgment of Christopher Clark, J. in Ace Capital Limited v. CMS Energy Corporation,12 which had examined Paul Smith (supra) to observe that the law governing the arbitration decides the extent of the court’s supervisory jurisdiction. Agreeing on the approach adopted in Ace Capital (supra), the judgment in Milford Capital (supra) states that it is the appropriate lodestar.
11. We are of the view that matters such as filling vacancies on arbitral tribunals and the removal of an arbitrator through the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, in the absence of a clear mechanism within 12 2008 EW SC 1843 Comm.
1564 [2025] 3 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports the arbitration agreement, should be normally governed by the law applicable to the arbitration agreement itself, rather than by the procedural rules that govern the arbitration process. It is, after all, the lex arbitri that governs the arbitration and its associated processes. However, as noticed above, this may not be the position in all cases as the mutually agreed terms may stipulate otherwise.
12. At this juncture, the pertinent question that arises is: how do we determine the law that governs the arbitration agreement?
13. In Enka Insaat Ve Sanayi AS v. OOO Insurance Company Chubb,13 the UK Supreme Court examined this legal issue and divergent opinions surrounding it. One line of precedents suggest that the lex contractus should govern the arbitration agreement. Although the arbitration agreement is separable from the main contract, it is not completely detached from it. Conversely, there is case law indicating that the law of the seat of arbitration should typically govern the arbitration agreement. Enka Insaat (supra) follows the principles stipulated in Sulamérica Cia Nacional De Seguros S.A. and Others v. Enesa Engenharia S.A. and Others,14 which it observes straddles both views. The Court ultimately establishes the following principles:
“X Conclusions on applicable law
170. It may be useful to summarise the principles which in our judgment govern the determination of the law applicable to the arbitration agreement in cases of this kind:
i) Where a contract contains an agreement to resolve disputes arising from it by arbitration, the law applicable to the arbitration agreement may not be the same as the law applicable to the other parts of the contract and is to be determined by applying English common law rules for resolving conflicts of laws rather than the provisions of the Rome I Regulation.
ii) According to these rules, the law applicable to the arbitration agreement will be (a) the law chosen by the 13 2020 UK SC 38.
14 [2012] EWCA Civ 638.
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1565Disortho S.A.S. v. Meril Life Sciences Private Limited parties to govern it or (b) in the absence of such a choice, the system of law with which the arbitration agreement is most closely connected.
iii) Whether the parties have agreed on a choice of law to govern the arbitration agreement is ascertained by construing the arbitration agreement and the contract containing it, as a whole, applying the rules of contractual interpretation of English law as the law of the forum.
iv) Where the law applicable to the arbitration agreement is not specified, a choice of governing law for the contract will generally apply to an arbitration agreement which forms part of the contract.
v) The choice of a different country as the seat of the arbitration is not, without more, sufficient to negate an inference that a choice of law to govern the contract was intended to apply to the arbitration agreement.
vi) Additional factors which may, however, negate such an inference and may in some cases imply that the arbitration agreement was intended to be governed by the law of the seat are: (a) any provision of the law of the seat which indicates that, where an arbitration is subject to that law, the arbitration agreement will also be treated as governed by that country’s law; or
(b) the existence of a serious risk that, if governed by the same law as the main contract, the arbitration agreement would be ineffective. Either factor may be reinforced by circumstances indicating that the seat was deliberately chosen as a neutral forum for the arbitration.
vii) Where there is no express choice of law to govern the contract, a clause providing for arbitration in a particular place will not by itself justify an inference that the contract (or the arbitration agreement) is intended to be governed by the law of that place.
viii) In the absence of any choice of law to govern the arbitration agreement, the arbitration agreement is governed by the law with which it is most closely connected. 1566 [2025] 3 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Where the parties have chosen a seat of arbitration, this will generally be the law of the seat, even if this differs from the law applicable to the parties’ substantive contractual obligations.
ix) The fact that the contract requires the parties to attempt to resolve a dispute through good faith negotiation, mediation or any other procedure before referring it to arbitration will not generally provide a reason to displace the law of the seat of arbitration as the law applicable to the arbitration agreement by default in the absence of a choice of law to govern it.
(emphasis supplied)”
14. The conclusions in Enka Insaat (supra) summarizes the tie breaker rules. Sub-paragraph (i) explains that the law governing the arbitration agreement may differ from the law governing the contract. The former should be determined through conflict of law rules. Sub-paragraph
(ii) states that the law governing the arbitration agreement is the law chosen by the parties. If no such choice is made, the law most closely connected to the agreement applies. However, sub-paragraph
(ii) must be read alongside sub-paragraph (iii), which clarifies that the law chosen for the arbitration agreement is determined by interpreting the agreement, and if necessary, the entire contract using rules of contractual interpretation. Sub-paragraph (iv) states that when the law governing the arbitration agreement is not specified, the law of the contract (lex contractus) usually applies. Sub-paragraph (v) highlights that selecting a country for the seat of arbitration does not automatically alter the presumption that lex contractus governs the arbitration agreement. Sub-paragraph (vi) outlines factors that may override this presumption. This can happen when the law of the seat mandates that the arbitration agreement must be governed by the law of that country. For instance, this becomes relevant in the context of the A&C Act. Section 2(2) of the A&C Act stipulates that Part I of the A&C Act applies to arbitrations seated in India.15 The second exception is when there is a serious risk that the agreement will become ineffective, or the dispute will become inarbitrable, if 15 See Arif Azmi (supra) quoted in paragraph 25 post.
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